State v. Christopher S.State v. Christopher S.
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins, Kahn, Ecker, Vertefeuille
Pursuant to statute (
Pursuant further to statute (
Convicted of the crimes of strangulation in the second degree and assault in the third degree, the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court. The defendant and the victim had a physical altercation in the early morning, and the police arrested the defendant. The arresting officer, C, read the defendant his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436), both at the time he was arrested and later that morning at the police station. Thereafter, less than six hours after the defendant‘s second Miranda warning, the defendant was questioned by a detective, M, but the interrogation was not video recorded. M did not readvise the defendant of his Miranda rights but did confirm with the defendant that he had been previously advised of his rights and that he was willing to speak with M. M then wrote out a narrative of the incident, and the defendant, after making several changes, signed and initialed the statement. Before trial, the state filed a motion seeking permission to introduce the defendant‘s signed statement into evidence. Although the state acknowledged that, because the interrogation was not recorded, the defendant‘s statement was presumptively inadmissible pursuant to
1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the Appellate Court improperly upheld the trial court‘s decision to admit his unrecorded, written statement into evidence on the ground that the state had failed to meet its burden of proving, in accordance with
a. This court concluded that the defendant‘s claim regarding
b. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the state had failed to meet its burden of proving that his unrecorded statement was voluntarily given, as the record supported the trial court‘s determination that there was no Miranda violation and that that defendant‘s statement was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances: the defendant received a valid Miranda warning at the police station, and there was no merit to the defendant‘s claim that M should have readvised him of his rights
c. The defendant failed to establish that the trial court had incorrectly determined that his unrecorded statement was reliable because, even if this court were to require independent, corroborating evidence to prove the reliability of his statement, the totality of the circumstances in this case, including instances of corroboration, demonstrated that the trial court correctly concluded that the state had met its burden.
2. This court declined to exercise its supervisory authority over the administration of justice to require trial courts to give a special instruction in all cases in which the police fail to record a custodial interrogation, but it emphasized that it was well within the trial court‘s discretion to give a specific, cautionary instruction when the police fail to record a custodial interrogation in violation of
Procedural History
Substitute information charging the defendant with the crimes of burglary in the first degree, kidnapping in the second degree, strangulation in the second degree, and assault in the third degree, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford and tried to the jury before Bentivegna, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty of strangulation in the second degree and assault in the third degree, from which the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, Prescott, Bright and Flynn, Js., which affirmed the trial court‘s judgment, and the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.
McDONALD, J. General Statutes
The Appellate Court‘s opinion sets forth the facts that the jury reasonably could have found; see State v. Spring, supra, 186 Conn. App. 201–207; which we summarize in relevant part. The Enfield police arrested the defendant at approximately 5:30 a.m., after the defendant and the victim had a physical altercation. The arresting officer, Mark Critz, read the defendant his Miranda2 rights both at the time he was arrested and, again, at approximately 7:23 a.m., at the Enfield police station. The defendant was placed in lockup until approximately 1:10 p.m. the same day, when he was brought to the desk of Detective Martin Merritt for questioning. Merritt‘s desk was situated in a large room containing a number of cubicles with walls about five feet high. The interrogation was not video recorded. Merritt did not readvise the defendant of his Miranda rights because Critz had informed Merritt that the defendant had previously been provided such warnings twice. Merritt did confirm with the defendant that he had been advised of his rights and was willing to speak
Merritt asked the defendant to explain what had happened the night before, asking clarifying questions when necessary and taking notes. From the defendant‘s statements, Merritt wrote out a narrative of the incident on an Enfield Police Department form titled ‘‘Supplement/Statement.‘’ Merritt explained to the defendant that this was the defendant‘s statement and that it should reflect his perspective of what happened. The defendant made several changes to the statement, which he signed in three places and initialed in fourteen places. The preprinted form on which the statement was written also contains the following acknowledgment: ‘‘I HAVE READ THE ABOVE STATEMENT AND IT IS TRUE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THAT IF I MAKE A FALSE STATEMENT THAT IS UNTRUE AND WHICH IS INTENDED TO MISLEAD A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS I WILL BE IN VIOLATION OF [
The defendant‘s statement provided the following summary of the incident. The defendant and the victim were married but had been on a break, living in separate residences, for about two weeks. The night before the incident, the defendant was watching a boxing match at a party. After leaving, the defendant drove to the victim‘s house in Enfield and knocked on a porch window. The victim let the defendant in the house, and they talked for a few minutes, eventually deciding to take a drive together. Once in the car, the defendant and the victim argued about having cheated on each other. The defendant ‘‘became very angry,‘’ pulled the car over, and began choking the victim with his hands. He also ‘‘punched her once in the side of the head . . . and slap[ped] her several times.‘’ At some point, the victim punched the defendant in the face and cut his gum, causing him to bleed from the mouth. The defendant then drove the pair to the home of the defendant‘s ex-wife. Both the defendant and the victim had a lot of blood on them from the fighting. Shortly thereafter, the police were called. The defendant ‘‘hung out on the back patio for a while [and] then went for a walk,‘’ and the police detained him while he was walking. The defendant talked to an officer about what had happened before being arrested and taken to the Enfield police station.
The court held a pretrial hearing on the state‘s motion, at which Critz, Merritt, and Detective Sergeant Daniel Casale testified. Critz testified that, at approximately 5:30 a.m., he read the defendant his Miranda rights from a Miranda warning card that he carries during his shifts, and the defendant acknowledged that he understood his rights. The defendant talked to Critz, saying that he had been at a party watching the ‘‘[Manny] Pacquiao‘’ fight. Critz noted that the defendant was bleeding from the mouth, and he did not appear to be intoxicated. Critz also testified that he advised the defendant of his Miranda rights a second time at 7:23 a.m. at the Enfield police station, using a Connecticut Judicial Branch form titled ‘‘Notice of Rights—Bail,‘’ which the defendant signed. Critz had no further involvement in the case. The state entered into evidence both the Miranda warning card and Notice of Rights—Bail form.
Merritt testified that, at approximately 1:10 p.m., he spoke with the defendant at the police station in an interview that lasted approximately one hour. Merritt did not readvise the defendant of his Miranda rights because Critz told him that he had already given the defendant two advisements earlier that morning. Merritt did testify, however, that he confirmed with the defendant that he had been advised of his rights and that the defendant spoke voluntarily. Merritt followed his usual technique in questioning the defendant—he obtained the defendant‘s version of the incident and then wrote out a statement that the defendant could freely edit and adopt. The defendant made and initialed changes, ultimately signing the statement. Merritt also testified that the defendant did not appear intoxicated.
Casale testified that he ‘‘overs[aw] the process‘’ of the defendant‘s interrogation. His office was approximately twenty feet from Merritt‘s desk, and, during the course of the interview, he was ‘‘bouncing back and forth‘’ between his office and Merritt‘s desk. Casale also acknowledged that he had no explanation for why the interrogation was not recorded.
After testimony and brief argument by the parties, the trial court issued an oral ruling, concluding that the state could introduce the defendant‘s statement in its case-in-chief. The court initially noted: ‘‘[T]he defendant . . . was under formal arrest. There was a postbooking statement. The defendant was subjected to police interrogation. This was a custodial interrogation at a police station. No electronic recording was made. The written statement [was taken from a] person under investigation or accused of a . . . class A or B felony . . . . [T]he court finds by the preponderance of the evidence that there was [no] compliance with the electronic recording requirement, and . . . based on that, the statement is presumed to be inadmissible as evidence . . . .‘’
The court considered the claimed exceptions to
As to the voluntariness inquiry, the trial court determined that the defendant‘s statement was given ‘‘pursuant to a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the defendant‘s Miranda rights.‘’ Specifically, the court reasoned that the defendant had received and understood two Miranda warnings in a matter of hours before his interrogation, Merritt was not required to provide a third warning before the interrogation began, there was no evidence of improper or coercive interrogation methods by the police, there was no issue with respect
As to reliability, the court concluded that the defendant‘s statement was reliable based on the totality of the circumstances. The court credited Merritt‘s testimony, noting that Merritt explained to the defendant that the written statement was intended to be ‘‘his statement . . . his words . . . what he believes happened . . . and, if there‘s anything that he wants . . . to add or take out of the statement, then we can do so.‘’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The defendant made multiple corrections, crossed things out, changed words, initialed his changes, and signed each page. The court further reasoned that the statement was taken ‘‘pursuant to standard police practices,‘’ and there was ‘‘no evidence of threats, promises, or coercive or deceptive measures by the police.‘’
The case went to trial, and the state, during its case-in-chief, offered the defendant‘s statement into evidence. The jury ultimately found the defendant guilty of assault in the third degree and strangulation in the second degree. It found him not guilty of kidnapping in the second degree and burglary in the first degree. The defendant was sentenced to a total effective term of three years incarceration and two years of special parole.
The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, raising three claims: (1) the trial court erred in granting the state‘s motion to admit his unrecorded statement because the state failed to prove that the statement was voluntarily given and reliable; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by overruling the defense counsel‘s objection to an inaccurate argument made by the state; and (3) the Appellate Court should exercise its supervisory authority over the administration of justice and order a new trial for the defendant and require trial judges to give a particular jury instruction in cases in which the police violate
We thereafter granted the defendant‘s petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issues: (1) ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly uphold the trial court‘s determination that the state met its burden of proving that the defendant‘s statement obtained during a custodial interrogation, which was not recorded in accordance with . . .
I
We begin with the defendant‘s contention that the Appellate Court erred by upholding the trial court‘s decision to admit his unrecorded statement into evidence because the state failed to meet its burden of proving that the statement was voluntarily given and reliable under the totality of the circumstances, as required by the exception found in
A
As an initial matter, the parties disagree as to whether the defendant‘s claim regarding subsection (h) of
The Appellate Court concluded that the defendant‘s claim was not constitutional because this court has made clear that the recording of custodial interrogations is not a constitutional concern. State v. Spring, supra, 186 Conn. App. 208; see, e.g., State v. Edwards, 299 Conn. 419, 443–44, 11 A.3d 116 (2011); State v. Lockhart, 298 Conn. 537, 542–44, 550 and n.6, 4 A.3d 1176 (2010); State v. James, 237 Conn. 390, 428–29, 678 A.2d 1338 (1996). Although we have stated that the constitution does not require the recording of custodial interrogations, we also stated in Lockhart that we were leaving to the legislature whether to require recording and how to balance competing interests to implement such a requirement. State v. Lockhart, supra, 574–75, 577. Our statement that a recording is not constitution
The question of whether the legislature used the word ‘‘voluntar[y]‘’ in
It is significant that the legislature chose to use the word ‘‘voluntar[y]‘’ in a statute dealing with the admission of statements made by criminal defendants subject to custodial interrogation in places of detention because ‘‘voluntary‘’ is a constitutional term of art in this context. In State v. Piorkowski, 236 Conn. 388, 672 A.2d 921 (1996), we explained that, ‘‘[i]n the jurisprudence of statements made to the police by persons accused of crime, traditionally there are two types of ‘voluntariness’ inquiries. One, dating from before Miranda and emanating from principles of due process, involves essentially whether the defendant‘s will was overborne by the police in eliciting the statement. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1991); Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 107 S. Ct. 851, 93 L. Ed. 2d 954 (1987); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 83 S. Ct. 917, 9 L. Ed. 2d 922 (1963). The other, deriving from Miranda, involves essentially whether, when the police interrogate a suspect who is in their custody, they properly administer the Miranda warnings to him and he waives the rights about which he was warned. See, e.g., Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79, 114 S. Ct. 1280, 128 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1994); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S. Ct. 515, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1986); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1986); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 99 S. Ct. 2560, 61 L. Ed. 2d 197 . . . (1979). Although Miranda is not itself a constitutional command; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966); it is nonetheless a judicially created prophylactic rule designed to safeguard the defendant‘s fifth amendment right to remain silent because of the inherently coercive quality of custodial interrogation. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 691–92, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 123 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1993) . . . .‘’ (Citations omitted.) State v. Piorkowski, supra, 404–405. The fact that the legislature chose to use this word to the exclusion of any other it could have chosen, and the fact that the legislature chose not to define it, despite having defined other words in the statute; see
Relatedly, the statute‘s intended audience is significant. For example, in State v. Piorkowski, supra, 236 Conn. 388, we construed the word ‘‘involuntariness‘’ as used in a prior version of
In view of the foregoing, we agree with the defendant that, in passing
As to reliability, however, the defendant‘s claim is evidentiary.4 By requiring the state to prove that an unrecorded statement is reliable, the legislature sought to address the risk of false confessions. See State v. Lockhart, supra, 298 Conn. 589–95 (Palmer, J., concurring) (explaining utility of recording in ensuring both that confessions are voluntarily given and that defendants do not confess falsely). In State v. James, supra, 237 Conn. 390, this court explained that, under a Connecticut common-law, evidentiary rule dating back to the mid-eighteenth century, the admissibility of a confession turned not on whether the statement was coerced but whether it was true. See id., 414–15. We further explained that, in Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 81 S. Ct. 735, 5 L. Ed. 2d 760 (1961), the United States Supreme Court ‘‘rejected the [common-law] focus on reliability in determining whether a confession is admissible.‘’ State v. James, supra, 415. For purposes of the federal constitution, ‘‘in determining whether a confession should be excluded as involuntary, the test is whether the defendant‘s will was overborne, which is to be determined with complete disregard of whether . . . the [accused] in fact spoke the truth.‘’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.; see also Rogers v. Richmond, supra, 544. Thus, the reliability of a confession is not a constitutional matter under the federal constitution, and principles that govern evidentiary rulings apply to our review of this claim.5 Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant‘s claim with respect to reliabil
B
We turn now to the defendant‘s claim that the state failed to meet its burden of proving that his statement was voluntarily given. The defendant argues that
The standard of review of a trial court‘s ruling on voluntariness in the context of the state‘s motion to admit a defendant‘s confession under
We begin with the defendant‘s claimed Miranda violations. The defendant contends that the police failed to comply with Miranda in three ways. First, the defendant argues that he did not receive a valid Miranda warning at the police station because the rights listed on the Notice of Rights—Bail form that Critz read to
After first being advised of his Miranda rights at the time of his arrest,6 the defendant was again advised of his rights at the police station. At the station, Critz read the defendant his Miranda rights from a form titled Notice of Rights—Bail, which provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a]nything you say or any statements you make may be used against you.‘’ (Emphasis added.) The language the United States Supreme Court used in Miranda was that ‘‘anything said can and will be used against the individual in court.‘’ (Emphasis added.) Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 469. The Notice of Rights—Bail form also provides in relevant part: ‘‘You have the right to not say anything about this offense you are charged with; you may remain silent. . . .‘’ The defendant argues that, by contrast, ‘‘[s]tandard Miranda warnings are direct: ‘You have the right to remain silent.’ ‘’ The United States Supreme Court has made clear that Miranda warnings need not ‘‘be given in the exact form described in that decision. . . . [T]he rigidity of Miranda [does not] exten[d] to the precise formulation of the warnings given a criminal defendant . . . and . . . no talismanic incantation [is] required to satisfy its strictures. . . . The inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda.‘’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 202–203, 109 S. Ct. 2875, 106 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1989). We conclude that the slight differences noted by the defendant are immaterial for the purpose of communicating the relevant rights to criminal suspects. The language used in the Notice of Rights—Bail form reasonably conveys a suspect‘s rights under Miranda.
The second Miranda issue that the defendant raises is that Merritt should have readvised the defendant of his rights before beginning his interrogation at 1:10 p.m. We disagree.
In determining whether a defendant, who received a Miranda warning at an earlier time, is entitled to a new Miranda warning before a subsequent custodial interrogation, courts consider a nonexclusive list of eight factors: ‘‘(1) the length of time that has passed between the initial warnings and the subsequent interrogation, (2) whether the warnings and interrogation occurred in the same location, (3) whether the officers who gave the warnings were the same as those who conducted the subsequent interview, (4) whether the subsequent interview concerned the same or new offenses and facts, (5) the physical settings of the advisement and interviews, (6) whether the officer reminded the suspect of his rights before resuming questioning, (7) whether the suspect confirmed that he
We conclude that the relevant facts and circumstances support the trial court‘s conclusion that Merritt was not required to readvise the defendant before beginning his interrogation. Less than six hours had passed between the defendant‘s second Miranda warning and the interrogation. Although some courts have determined that readvisement was necessary after a shorter gap; see, e.g., People v. Sanchez, 88 Misc. 2d 929, 936, 391 N.Y.S.2d 513 (N.Y. Sup. 1977); others have determined that readvisement was unnecessary after a longer gap. See, e.g., In re Interest of Miah S., 290 Neb. 607, 614, 861 N.W.2d 406 (2015) (citing cases); see also, e.g., In re Kevin K., supra, 299 Conn. 125–26 (two day gap between warning and interrogation favored readvisement, but, in light of totality of circumstances, readvisement was unnecessary). We acknowledge that the officer who gave the warning was not the one who performed the interrogation, but we are unpersuaded by the defendant‘s argument that Merritt needed to readvise the defendant to show the defendant ‘‘that he was prepared to honor [the defendant‘s rights].‘’ It is sufficient that Merritt reminded the defendant of his rights by expressly confirming with him that he had been advised of his rights earlier that day, and the interview concerned the same incident for which the defendant had been arrested and advised of his rights. Moreover, the trial court found that the defendant understood the warnings he received, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that his understanding would have disappeared or dissipated between the warnings and the interrogation. The trial court also found that there were ‘‘no issues in terms of the defendant being intoxicated or otherwise [mentally] incapacitated . . . .‘’ In light of the foregoing factors, we conclude that Merritt‘s decision not to readvise the defendant of his rights did not violate Miranda.
The defendant‘s final Miranda claim is that he never gave a ‘‘knowing‘’ and ‘‘voluntary‘’ waiver of his Miranda rights, without which his statement is inadmissible. We disagree.
‘‘Even [in the absence of] the accused‘s invocation of the right to remain silent, the accused‘s statement during a custodial interrogation is inadmissible at trial unless the prosecution can establish that the accused in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived [Miranda] rights when making the statement. . . . The waiver . . . must be voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception, and made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being
As we have explained, the defendant received two valid Miranda warnings from Critz, one at 5:30 a.m. and one at 7:23 a.m. Critz testified that, after he administered the first warning, the defendant ‘‘said . . . that he understood his rights.‘’ The defendant also adopted the statement that Merritt wrote during the interrogation, which included the following: ‘‘When I was arrested earlier this date, I was advised of my rights. I understand those rights and give this statement voluntarily.‘’7 The defendant understood his rights when Merritt sought to interrogate him around 1:10 p.m.
The evidence presented at the hearing also established that the defendant‘s statements to Merritt during his interrogation were not coerced. Merritt testified that, before he began the questioning, he confirmed with the defendant that the defendant had ‘‘previously been advised of his rights‘’ and was ‘‘willing to speak with‘’ Merritt. The defendant then gave an account of the incident and read, made changes to, and signed Merritt‘s written summation of what the defendant had said. The statement itself expressly indicates that the defendant was giving the statement ‘‘voluntarily.‘’ There is nothing in the record to suggest that Merritt obtained the defendant‘s cooperation through physical or psychological coercion, trickery, threats, promises of leniency, or other questionable tactics. Accordingly, because the defendant received and understood valid Miranda warnings and voluntarily participated in Merritt‘s interrogation, he implicitly gave a knowing, voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights.
In sum, even if, as the defendant contends, the state had to prove that the police complied with the requirements of Miranda, the record supports the trial court‘s determination that there was no Miranda violation in this case.
Finally, with respect to the second traditional volun
‘‘Irrespective of Miranda, and the fifth amendment itself . . . any use in a criminal trial of an involuntary confession is a denial of due process of law.‘’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hafford, 252 Conn. 274, 298, 746 A.2d 150, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 855, 121 S. Ct. 136, 148 L. Ed. 2d 89 (2000). ‘‘The state has the burden of proving the voluntariness of the confession by a fair preponderance of the evidence. . . . [T]he test of voluntariness is whether an examination of all the circumstances discloses that the conduct of law enforcement officials was such as to overbear [the defendant‘s] will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined . . . . The ultimate test remains . . . [i]s the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process. . . . The determination, by the trial court, whether a confession is voluntary must be grounded upon a consideration of the circumstances surrounding it. . . . Factors that may be taken into account, upon a proper factual showing, include: the youth of the accused; his lack of education; his intelligence; the lack of any advice as to his constitutional rights; the length of detention; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; and the use of physical punishment, such as the deprivation of food and sleep.‘’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lawrence, supra, 282 Conn. 153. Under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, however, in order for a confession to be deemed involuntary and thus inadmissible at trial, there must be ‘‘police conduct, or official coercion, causally related to the confession
Here, the record supports the trial court‘s determination that the defendant voluntarily gave his statement to Merritt. The defendant was thirty-eight years old at the time of the interrogation. There was no indication that he was intoxicated or impaired. He was formally advised of his Miranda rights twice and reminded of them a third time just before the interrogation began, at which point he had been in police custody for less than six hours. The interrogation itself took place in a large room with multiple cubicles. Questioning was conducted by only one official, with his supervisor checking in periodically. The interrogation took place in a single session, which lasted only one hour. The defendant took the opportunity to read and make multiple changes to the statement as written by Merritt, including that the defendant was giving his statement ‘‘voluntarily‘’ and of his ‘‘own free will with no threats or promises made to‘’ him. There is no evidence of physical or psychological punishment. There is no evidence that Merritt used any potentially coercive methods, such as threats, promises of leniency, or deception. Indeed, the defendant has not even argued that Merritt used any such tactics or that the defendant‘s will was actually overborne.
Even if we assume that the trial court failed to consider Merritt‘s conduct as part of the totality of the circumstances, the defendant has not attempted to explain how the specific circumstances that he lists, either in isolation or in the aggregate, could overbear a suspect‘s will and elicit an involuntary confession.8 Although it is troubling that Merritt offered no satisfactory explanation as to why the interrogation was not recorded,9 a failure to record does not itself bear on a suspect‘s will. Similarly, it is not clear how Merritt‘s failure to readvise the defendant of his Miranda rights, which we have concluded was not required, or his choice not to have the defendant sign the waiver portion of the form on which the statement was written, which is irrelevant because we have concluded that the defendant implicitly waived his Miranda rights, affected the defendant‘s will. Nothing in the record suggests that the defendant was seriously injured or needed medical attention, and there is no connection between Merritt‘s ‘‘ignor[ing]‘’ the defendant‘s bloodied gum and the defendant‘s will being overborne. Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant‘s statement was freely given and not the result of overbearing police conduct, and its admission into evidence did not violate the defendant‘s
In sum, the Appellate Court properly upheld the trial court‘s determination that the state met its burden under
C
The defendant next claims that the Appellate Court improperly upheld the trial court‘s determination that the state met its burden of proving that the statement was reliable under the totality of the circumstances. Specifically, the defendant argues that, to prove reliability, the state must introduce independent, corroborating evidence that the statement itself is true, and, here, the state relied only on evidence regarding the circumstances under which the statement was given. The state contends that all of the circumstances surrounding the giving of a statement are relevant to a reliability determination, but there is no requirement under our law that there be independent, corroborating evidence of the contents of the statement. Furthermore, the state argues that it did introduce substantial, independent evidence corroborating the truth of the defendant‘s statement.
As we explained in part I A of this opinion, the reliability inquiry is evidentiary in nature. ‘‘The standard that we apply in reviewing a trial court‘s evidentiary ruling depends on the context in which the ruling was made. . . . When a trial court‘s determination of admissibility is founded on an accurate understanding of the law, it must stand unless there is a showing of an abuse of discretion. . . . When the admissibility of the challenged testimony turns on the interpretation of an evidentiary rule, however, we are presented with a legal question and our review is plenary.‘’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted.) State v. Burney, 288 Conn. 548, 555, 954 A.2d 793 (2008).
We begin by emphasizing the distinction between the voluntariness and reliability inquiries under
Although voluntariness and reliability are distinct inquiries, evidence that is probative of voluntariness may also be probative of reliability. Specifically, evidence regarding the circumstances under which a statement was given can inform both determinations. See, e.g., State v. Pierre, 277 Conn. 42, 61–62, 890 A.2d 474 (fact that witness indicated he was giving statement freely, reviewed it with attorney, and signed it in eight places demonstrated lack of coercion, providing sufficient indicia of reliability for admission of statement under State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 753, 513 A.2d 86, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S. Ct. 597, 93 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1986)), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1197, 126 S. Ct. 2873, 165 L. Ed. 2d 904 (2006); State v. Collins, 147 Conn. App. 584, 594–95, 82 A.3d 1208 (involuntariness of defendant‘s statements to police may undermine reliability of those statements), cert. denied, 311 Conn. 929, 86 A.3d 1057 (2014). Because the same evidence can be used as evidence of both requirements, courts must be careful not to conflate the two analyses. It is entirely possible for a confession to be voluntary, yet false, or involuntary, yet true, and courts must not collapse voluntariness and reliability into a single inquiry. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 617 F.3d 857, 860 (6th Cir. 2010) (“even voluntary ‘inculpatory confessions . . . are frequently unreliable’ “).
With these principles in mind, we turn to the dispute between the parties regarding the type of evidence that the state was either required or permitted to use to prove that the defendant‘s statement was reliable. Both
This court has regularly relied on the circumstances under which a statement was given to determine whether it is reliable. See, e.g., State v. Carrion, 313 Conn. 823, 839–40, 100 A.3d 361 (2014) (listing among factors “particularly salient” to determination of reliability of child witness’ prior out-of-court statement whether questions eliciting statement were leading or open and presence of authority figure during questioning); State v. Pierre, supra, 277 Conn. 61 (“[w]e emphasize . . . that the linchpin of admissibility is reliability: the statement may be excluded as substantive evidence only if the trial court is persuaded, in light of the circumstances under which the statement was made, that the statement is so untrustworthy that its admission into evidence would subvert the fairness of the fact-finding process” (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Mukhtaar, 253 Conn. 280, 306, 750 A.2d 1059 (2000) (witness’ prior inconsistent statement to police that otherwise meets requirements for admissibility for substantive purposes “may have been made under circumstances so unduly coercive or extreme as to grievously undermine the reliability generally inherent in such a statement, so as to render it, in effect, not that of the witness“); State v. James, supra, 237 Conn. 414–15 (general approach under Connecticut common-law, evidentiary rule intended to protect defendants from convictions based on false confessions was to “identify certain inducements [that] made a confession unreliable,” such as whether it was “obtained as a result of a promise of a benefit or leniency or a threat of harm” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Evidence that independently corroborates the substantive truth of a statement is also highly probative of a statement‘s reliability. As the amici point out, in questioning suspects, the police often hold back known details of the crime to see if the suspects independently mention details that could not be fabricated. In a related context, this court has also approved of the use of independent, corroborating evidence to establish the trustworthiness of a defendant‘s statement. See, e.g., State v. Leniart, 333 Conn. 88, 114, 215 A.3d 1104 (2019) (under “trustworthiness” doctrine, which grew out of and modified corpus delicti rule, state may generally rely on defendant‘s statements to establish all elements of crime “as long as there is sufficient, independent evidence to establish the trustworthiness of those statements“); State v. Hafford, supra, 252 Conn. 315 (under old version of corpus delicti rule, confessions were admissible only if state “demonstrate[d] through extrinsic evidence that the crime charged had been committed“).
Although independent, corroborating evidence is highly probative of reliability, we are not persuaded that independent, corroborating evidence is required to prove reliability under
In a related statute; see Connecticut Podiatric Medical Assn. v. Health Net of Connecticut, Inc., 302 Conn. 464, 475–76, 28 A.3d 958 (2011) (looking to related statutes to construe meaning of statutory term); requiring the trial court to make a prima facie determination of the “reliability” of a jailhouse informant‘s testimony, the legislature set forth a number of “factors” that the court “may consider” in undertaking that inquiry.
We are also unpersuaded by the line of cases that the defendant cites for the proposition that independent, corroborating evidence is required to prove reliability. See State v. Hafford, supra, 252 Conn. 317; State v. Harris, 215 Conn. 189, 194–95, 575 A.2d 223 (1990); State v. Doucette, 147 Conn. 95, 98–106, 157 A.2d 487 (1959), overruled in part by State v. Tillman, 152 Conn. 15, 202 A.2d 494 (1964); State v. LaLouche, 116 Conn. 691, 694–95, 166 A. 252 (1933), overruled in part by
Although we do not agree with the defendant that the statute requires the state to introduce independent, corroborating evidence to prove reliability, we do agree with the defendant and the amici that such evidence is preferable in view of the purpose of the statute. The presumption of inadmissibility under
Moreover, courts evaluating unrecorded statements under
Having rejected the defendant‘s claim that independent, corroborating evidence is required to prove that a statement is reliable, we must now determine whether the trial court correctly concluded that the state met
First, contrary to the defendant‘s assertion, the state did introduce independent evidence that corroborated certain important parts of the defendant‘s statement. In particular, the defendant‘s statement is consistent with Critz’ testimony with respect to the circumstances of the arrest. The defendant‘s statement explains that, when the police arrived at the home of the defendant‘s ex-wife, the defendant “went for a walk. When [he] went for a walk, the police detained [him].” This is consistent with Critz’ testimony that, while he was processing the scene, officers “noticed a man walking back toward [the police]. . . . [T]here was an exchange of words, [Critz was] not quite sure what it was, and [he] was notified by another officer . . . that it was [the defendant] . . . .” The defendant‘s statement also explains that, before the incident with the victim, the defendant was “watching the fight on TV” and that, after he was detained, he “talked to an officer about what had happened.” This is consistent with Critz’ testimony confirming, on cross-examination, that the defendant had told him that “he was at some kind of party, watching the Pacquiao fight.” The defendant‘s statement also explains that the victim “punched [him] once in the face, causing [his] gum to be cut . . . .” This is consistent with Critz’ testimony confirming, on cross-examination, that Critz “noticed [that the defendant] apparently was bleeding from his mouth.” Similarly, the defendant‘s statement notes that, after his altercation with the victim, “[w]e both had a lot of blood on us from the fighting.” This is consistent with Critz’ testimony that the defendant had “blood on his shirt and . . . blood on his phone.” The blood on his shirt is also physical evidence, consistent with the defendant‘s statement, that an altercation had taken place. Critz’ testimony also notes that the victim was questioned at the scene by other officers, which further suggests the occurrence of a violent, domestic dispute between the defendant and the victim, which is what the defendant‘s statement describes.11
In addition to this corroborating evidence, we also acknowledge all of the evidence set forth in part I B of this opinion that was credited by the trial court regarding the circumstances under which the statement was given, none of which suggests that Merritt coerced the defendant into giving a false confession. The defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, the interrogation lasted only one hour, the defendant made several corrections to his written statement, and Merritt did not use any potentially coercive interrogation methods. See, e.g., State v. Carrion, supra, 313 Conn. 841 (fact that child corrected interviewer on several points indicated reliability because child was not just giving interviewer
In sum, we conclude that the defendant has failed to establish that the trial court incorrectly determined that the defendant‘s statement was reliable. Even if we were to require independent, corroborating evidence to prove the reliability of a statement, the totality of the circumstances in this case, including instances of corroboration, demonstrates that the trial court correctly concluded that the state met its burden. Accordingly, because the state successfully proved that the defendant‘s statement was both voluntarily given and reliable under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court properly ruled that the statement was admissible as evidence at the defendant‘s criminal trial.
II
The defendant also claims that this court should exercise its supervisory authority over the administration of justice to require our trial courts to instruct juries to evaluate with “particular caution” statements obtained by custodial interrogation that are out of compliance with the recording mandate in
At the outset, we note that the defendant did not request a jury instruction related to Merritt‘s failure to record the interrogation; nor did he object to the instructions that were given by the court, a copy of which he had been given in advance of the final charge to the jury. As the Appellate Court noted, if this claim were of constitutional magnitude, it likely would have been deemed waived under State v. Kitchens, 299 Conn. 447, 482–83, 10 A.3d 942 (2011), but we have previously
Turning to the merits of the defendant‘s contention, we are mindful that, “[a]lthough [a]ppellate courts possess an inherent supervisory authority over the administration of justice . . . [that] authority . . . is not a form of free-floating justice, untethered to legal principle. . . . Our supervisory powers are not a last bastion of hope for every untenable appeal. They are an extraordinary remedy to be invoked only when circumstances are such that the issue at hand, [although] not rising to the level of a constitutional violation, is nonetheless of utmost seriousness, not only for the integrity of a particular trial but also for the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole. . . . Constitutional, statutory and procedural limitations are generally adequate to protect the rights of the defendant and the integrity of the judicial system. Our supervisory powers are invoked only in the rare circumstance [when] these traditional protections are inadequate to ensure the fair and just administration of the courts.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wade, 297 Conn. 262, 296, 998 A.2d 1114 (2010).
In support of his argument, the defendant contends that we have previously adopted jury instructions that require the fact finder to scrutinize certain testimony, such as that of complaining witnesses, accomplices, and informants. See, e.g., State v. Arroyo, 292 Conn. 558, 561, 973 A.2d 1254 (2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 911, 130 S. Ct. 1296, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1086 (2010); State v. Patterson, 276 Conn. 452, 469–70, 886 A.2d 777 (2005); State v. Ortiz, 252 Conn. 533, 561–63, 747 A.2d 487 (2000). The defendant contends that, as in those cases, when the police fail to record an interrogation in violation of
We are not persuaded that, in all cases in which the police fail to record a custodial interrogation, we should mandate such an instruction. As we have explained, “[g]enerally, a [criminal] defendant is not entitled to an instruction singling out any of the state‘s witnesses and highlighting his or her possible motive for testifying falsely.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Baltas, 311 Conn. 786, 820, 91 A.3d 384 (2014). Unlike
The defendant also points to other jurisdictions that require special instructions when the police fail to follow laws requiring that custodial interrogations be recorded. For example, state recording statutes in Michigan, New York, North Carolina, and Wisconsin provide for a jury instruction requirement when the police fail to record certain custodial interrogations. See
Unlike the statutory provisions the defendant relies on that specifically provide for certain jury instructions, under
We take this opportunity to emphasize, however, that it is well within the trial court‘s discretion to give a specific, cautionary instruction when the police fail to record a custodial interrogation in violation of
When the police fail to record a custodial interrogation in violation of
Because trial courts already have the discretion to give a cautionary instruction under existing case law, we decline to create a new supervisory rule requiring a special instruction in all cases in which the police fail to comply with the recording mandate in
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
In this opinion D‘AURIA, ECKER and VERTEFEUILLE, Js., concurred.
Notes
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‘‘(d) If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the person was subjected to a custodial interrogation in violation of this section, then any statements made by the person during or following that nonrecorded custodial interrogation, even if otherwise in compliance with this section, are presumed to be inadmissible in any criminal proceeding against the person except for the purposes of impeachment.
‘‘(e) Nothing in this section precludes the admission of:
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‘‘(2) A statement made during a custodial interrogation that was not recorded as required by this section because electronic recording was not feasible;
‘‘(3) A voluntary statement, whether or not the result of a custodial interrogation, that has a bearing on the credibility of the person as a witness;
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‘‘(6) A statement made during a custodial interrogation by a person who requests, prior to making the statement, to respond to the interrogator’s questions only if an electronic recording is not made of the statement, provided an electronic recording is made of the statement by the person agreeing to respond to the interrogator’s question only if a recording is not made of the statement;
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‘‘(8) Any other statement that may be admissible under law.
‘‘(f) The state shall have the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that one of the exceptions specified in subsection (e) of this section is applicable.
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‘‘(h) The presumption of inadmissibility of a statement made by a person at a custodial interrogation at a place of detention may be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement was voluntarily given and is reliable, based on the totality of the circumstances. . . .’’
Under the concurrence’s interpretation of the statute, the state would have a lower, evidentiary burden with respect to proving voluntariness when the police fail to record a custodial interrogation in violation of the statute. We decline to construe the statute to create such an anomalous result. See, e.g., Kelly v. New Haven, 275 Conn. 580, 616, 881 A.2d 978 (2005). Just as the legislature cannot create a constitutional right, neither can it lower the state’s burden of proof. Moreover, the consequence of concluding that the voluntariness inquiry is merely evidentiary is that a trial court’s determination of voluntariness is entitled to substantial deference on appeal. We decline to create two different standards for reviewing the voluntariness of a statement given during a custodial interrogation.
Although the corpus delicti rule, like
We note that, in both New Jersey and Massachusetts, the defendant must request the jury instruction. In the present case, the defendant made no such request. Additionally, the instruction adopted in DiGiambattista was an effort by the Massachusetts high court to find a middle ground between excluding unrecorded confessions and doing nothing to ameliorate the harm to defendants. See id., 445–46.