Lead Opinion
Opinion
After a trial before a three judge court,
The following facts, which the trial court reasonably could have found, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the defendant’s claims. In late 2002, the defendant began dating D.
At approximately 7 a.m. on May 15, the defendant woke D and informed her that the victim needed his diaper changed. D proceeded to clean the victim in the bathroom and then laid him on the bed. The defendant brought a bottle full of apple juice to the victim and told D that she needed to clean the hall closet where she kept the victim’s clothes, toys, and other items. D had been at the hall closet less than five minutes when the defendant called out to her that the victim was spitting up. D ran into the bedroom and found the defendant sitting on the bed with the victim, who was face-down over the defendant’s knees. D observed the defendant patting the victim on the back as fluid came out of his mouth. D also observed a pair of red and white boxing gloves on the bed. The victim continued to vomit fluid for several minutes, after which D propped him up on the bed. According to D, the victim did not look good; he had become very calm and his eyes were glossy. Although D stated that she wanted to take the victim to a physician or a hospital, the defendant told her that he thought the victim was fine. The defendant persuaded D not to take the victim to the hospital and, instead, asked D to clean up the victim’s vomit on the floor.
After D finished cleaning the floor, she returned to the victim and tried speaking with him. The victim did not respond and D observed that the victim was working very hard to breathe. At this point D decided to take the victim to the hospital, and as she dressed herself she also began breathing into the victim’s mouth because the victim had ceased breathing on his own.
At the hospital, the defendant and D were approached by Laura Buyak and Karla Rodriguez, detectives of the Hartford police department, which had been notified of the victim’s death by hospital personnel. The defendant voluntarily agreed to accompany Buyak and Rodriguez to the police station in their police cruiser in order to provide information concerning the victim’s death.
At the police station, the defendant explained to Buyak the circumstances leading to the victim’s death, at one point stating that he had “played rough” with the victim, including on the morning of his death.
The defendant subsequently was arrested and charged in connection with the victim’s death. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress his oral and written statements, claiming that he made those statements while in police custody and before he had been given Miranda warnings. On the first day of trial, both parties agreed that, in lieu of a suppression hearing, the state would present evidence and testimony concerning the statements that the defendant sought to
I
The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress statements made after his admission that he had “played rough” with the victim, contending that those statements were obtained in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, supra,
We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review and governing legal principles. “It is well established that the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self incrimination. Miranda v. Arizona, [supra,
“As a general matter, the standard of review for a motion to suppress is well settled. A finding of fact will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record .... [W]hen [however] a question of fact is essential to the outcome of a particular legal determination that implicates a defendant’s constitutional rights, and the credibility of witnesses is not the primary issue, our customary deference to the trial court’s factual findings is tempered by a scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain that the trial court’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. . . . [When] the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, [our review is plenary, and] we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set [forth] in the memorandum of decision .... [T]he ultimate determination . . . of whether a defendant already in custody has been subjected to interrogation . . . presents a mixed question of law and fact over which our review is plenary, tempered by our scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Canady, supra,
In the present case, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly concluded that the defendant was not in custody when he made the additional statements to police, following his initial statement that he had “played rough” with the victim the morning of his death. The defendant does not challenge the trial court’s factual findings regarding the circumstances surrounding his questioning. Rather, the defendant claims that, on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial, the trial court improperly concluded that a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation would have felt free to leave. “Mindful of the constitutional nature of the claim, we have conducted a scrupulous examination of the transcripts . . . and the trial court’s ruling thereon.” State v. Britton, supra,
The following additional facts are relevant to this claim. At approximately 9 a.m. on May 15, 2003, the Hartford police department dispatched Buyak and Rodriguez to the hospital following a report that a deceased infant had been brought to the hospital. After speaking with fellow officers and physicians, and observing the victim’s body, Buyak and Rodriguez spoke with D and the defendant in one of the hospital’s family rooms. Buyak and Rodriguez asked D and the defendant if they would accompany them to the police station for interviews in order to assist the detectives in ascertaining the circumstances leading up to the victim’s death. Buyak and Rodriguez testified that the police station was a quieter environment within which to conduct the interviews, in comparison to the hectic hospital. At this time, D and the defendant were informed that they were under no obligation to go to the police department and that, once there,
Upon reaching the police station, the defendant and D again were informed that they were free to leave, and Buyak testified that if the defendant had asked to leave the station she would have given him a ride to his destination. At no time while at the police station did the defendant ask to leave. Rodriguez and D proceeded to the only available interview room in the major crimes section of the station, and Buyak and the defendant went to an available interview room in the youth and family services division, which was separated from the major crimes section by a doorway. Buyak described the defendant’s interview room as a “pretty nice size[d] room” with its own attached bathroom.
At the commencement of the interview, Buyak told the defendant that she wanted to know what had happened to the victim. Buyak testified that at this time the defendant was not under arrest and that she did not have any information that would have prompted her to arrest him. Prior to interviewing the defendant, Buyak also: offered him food or a beverage, which he declined; asked if she could take notes, which he agreed to; informed him that he did not have to answer a question if he did not want to; and informed him that he could take a break whenever he wanted. Buyak stated that the defendant had indicated that he wanted to talk to her and that he had no hesitancy in doing so. During the interview, the door to the room remained closed but unlocked, and Buyak was not in possession of her weapon, handcuffs, or other police equipment. At various times, Buyak again offered the defendant food or a beverage, and she reiterated that he did not have to answer her questions if he did not want to.
When questioned about the events that morning leading up to the death of the victim, the defendant stated that the victim had “appeared woozy” when the defendant had entered the bedroom. The defendant explained that he gave water to the victim and, thinking that he needed to be burped, placed the victim on his knees, burped him, and then fluid started coming from the victim’s mouth, at which point D reentered the bedroom. The defendant admitted to Buyak that “[h]e probably burped [the victim] too hard,” and at another point in the interview, the defendant also stated that he had “played rough” with the victim, including on the mom-ing of his death. It was at this moment, roughly two hours into the interview, that Buyak decided to take an approximately twenty minute break. Although Buyak stated that she took this break to use the restroom, she also apprised Rodriguez of the status of her interview with the defendant, and on cross-examination she admitted that her decision to take the break had been prompted by the defendant’s statement that he had “played rough” with the victim. Buyak testified, however, that the defendant was still free to leave, and that
Following the break, Rodriguez interviewed the defendant outside Buyak’s presence. Rodriguez testified that she had reiterated to the defendant that he was free to leave, that he did not have to answer any of her questions, and that, similar to Buyak, she would ask him questions about what had happened to the victim. Rodriguez testified that at this point the defendant did not wish to leave and that he agreed to speak with her. At some point in the interview, Rodriguez asked whether the defendant would provide in writing that he understood his rights and that he would submit a voluntary statement repeating the details that he had told the detectives. Rodriguez then explained the significance of an untruthful statement, how it would become part of the case file, and she testified that she never told the defendant that he had to provide either of these items.
As Rodriguez was about to leave the interview room to retrieve a waiver of rights form and a laptop computer with which to take the defendant’s voluntary statement, the defendant exclaimed that he had forgotten to tell her something and that he needed to speak with Buyak because “he didn’t want to seem like a liar . . . .” The defendant explained that he had forgotten to mention that he had “put on some boxing gloves and he tapped [the victim] on his stomach a lot. He played rough with him.” Simultaneously, the defendant illustrated his statement by scrunching up his face and making five or six punching motions.
“He [was] repeatedly told that he [was] free to leave, and under the circumstances, we believe that a reasonable person in his position ... up to and including the second [written] statement . . . would determine that ... a reasonable person would feel free to leave.”
The defendant’s contention that he was in custody and entitled to Miranda warnings is foreclosed by State v. Britton, supra,
The defendant contends that his noncustodial status became custodial when he stated that he had “played rough” with the victim and, as a consequence, the detectives viewed him not merely as a witness but as a possible suspect. We previously have concluded that “[a] person, even if a suspect in a crime, is not in custody every time he is asked questions at a police station.” State v. Northrop,
In the present case, the record demonstrates that the circumstances of the defendant’s interview were not altered such that his noncustodial status became custodial when Rodriguez commenced her interview of the defendant after he had admitted to Buyak that he had “played rough” with the victim. First, after the defendant had made this statement, Buyak left him alone in the interview room with the door open for a period of approximately twenty minutes, and Buyak testified that she still
The dispositive question therefore remains “whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would believe that he or she was in police custody of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Britton, supra,
The defendant contends, however, that in light of evidence introduced at trial regarding his mental limitations, this court should incorporate into the existing objective standard a consideration of the defendant’s mental impairments, thereby making the question whether a reasonable person similar to the defendant would have believed that he was in custody. We decline to do so.
The following additional facts are relevant to this discussion. At some point during Buyak’s interview of the defendant, the defendant stated that he received social security checks, although Buyak testified that she did not recall the defendant explaining why he received such checks. During the interview, the defendant also asked Buyak “if murder was [only] with a gun or with a knife,” to which she responded “not necessarily.” In describing the
On several occasions prior to trial, the defendant had been found not competent to stand trial.
In reaching its verdict, the trial court did not specifically reference Baranoski’s testimony, although the court stated that intent had been the disputed issue at trial, specifically concerning whether the defendant was guilty of capital felony murder or murder because he had had a conscious objective to cause the victim’s death. Finding the defendant not guilty of these two charges, the court concluded that the “[t]he defendant is a man of limited intelligence,” and that there was a reasonable doubt whether the defendant, with a conscious objective to cause the victim’s death, would have punched the victim on May 15, 2003, when the evidence showed that the violent punching of the victim seven to ten days prior to his death had not resulted in any apparent consequences other than flu-like symptoms.
In State v. Turner, supra,
In other instances this court has applied the objective person standard in concluding that a defendant was not in custody, despite evidence of a mental limitation. Thus, for instance, in State v. Pinder, supra,
In light of our reaffirmation of the objective reasonable person standard set forth in State v. Turner, supra,
The defendant’s final claim is that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress based on the court’s conclusion that videotaping of the defendant’s statements was not required. Specifically, the defendant claims that State v. James,
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion ROGERS, C. J., and McLACHLAN and VERTEFEUILLE, Js., concurred.
Notes
All references in this opinion to the trial court are to the three judge court, Blue, Mulcahy and Koletsky, Js., unless otherwise indicated.
The trial court found the defendant guilty of manslaughter in the first degree as a lesser included offense of the charged crime of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a.
The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 65-1 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c).
In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of sexual abuse and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to identify the victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54^86e.
Although D’s daughter also initially moved into the defendant’s apartment, she later returned to Middletown to live with her grandmother in order to continue attending her prior school.
Neither D nor the defendant contacted 911. D explained at trial that there was no telephone landline in the apartment and that the defendant, while dressing in the bedroom, had told her that he could not place the call on his cellular telephone because he had no reception, although D testified that the defendant previously had made cellular telephone calls from other areas of the apartment.
Because neither D nor the defendant owned a car, they intended to walk to the hospital. In the lobby of the defendant’s apartment building they came across a neighbor, who telephoned 911 after D informed her that the victim had stopped breathing. When it appeared that the ambulance would take too long to arrive, D and the defendant continued on foot to the hospital, ultimately stopping a passing van whose driver drove them the remaining distance to the emergency room entrance at the hospital.
At trial, Harold Wayne Carver II, the state’s chief medical examiner, testified regarding the autopsy that he had performed on the victim. Carver testified that he had found bruises on the victim’s stomach, eight fractured ribs, a tear in the victim’s liver, lacerations in the victim’s left and right adrenal glands, and “a fair amount” of internal bleeding. In his opinion, these injuries were consistent with blunt force trauma, such as being repeatedly hit with “[a] great deal of force” in the stomach. According to Carver, the victim’s injuries occurred on two separate occasions. The tears in the liver and right adrenal gland occurred approximately one week prior to the victim’s death and could have caused the victim to exhibit a “sort of crummy feeling and lack of appetite” with the possibility of a low level fever. The remaining injuries occurred at or around the time of death, the ultimate cause of the victim’s death being multiple blunt force traumatic injuries. On the basis of these findings, Carver classified the victim’s death as a homicide.
Before leaving the hospital, D and the defendant signed a consent to search form in order for Hartford police officers to search their apartment. Neither D nor the defendant requested to be present during this search.
It is the defendant’s claim that at this point he should have been advised of his Miranda rights and, as a consequence of the failure to so advise the defendant, his subsequent statements should have been suppressed.
Rodriguez, who was standing near the doorway, testified that during this break she believed that she had overheard the defendant talking on his cellular telephone, which was in his possession during the course of the interview. Similarly, Buyak testified that she had heard from a fellow officer that the defendant had made a cellular telephone call while he was alone in the interview room.
Rodriguez testified that she was “in shock” at how the defendant’s use of the word “tapped” was contradicted by the force he used to illustrate his punches.
At this time the defendant also stated that “he felt that he, he could have caused [the victim’s] death in away,” but that “he never killed anybody before,” and that “he didn’t mean it.”
At the conclusion of his voluntary statement, the defendant stated that he did not wish to be left alone in the interview room and Rodriguez requested that Robert Davis, another detective of the Hartford police department, remain with the defendant. Davis testified, however, that he first sat with the defendant at 1:30 p.m., and that he did not see the defendant again until after he had been arrested and Davis escorted him to the booking room. We agree with the state that, regardless of this inconsistency, it is clear from the testimony that the conversation between the defendant and Davis occurred after the defendant had told Buyak that he had “played rough” with the victim. Davis testified that he and the defendant had walked to Davis’ desk, located in the major crimes portion of the police station, because the defendant was concerned that D’s family members were nearby, including her father. At Davis’ desk, they discussed sports and the fact that the defendant had been a boxer for several years. When questioned by Davis as to what had happened to the victim, the defendant stated that he had been boxing with the victim using thinly padded gloves. When asked to describe the boxing, the defendant first described it as play-fighting, but then as punching. After a brief pause, Davis testified that the defendant then stated that “I punched [the victim] too hard ... I killed [the victim], but I didn’t mean to.” After informing his colleagues of the defendant’s statements, Davis returned him to the interview room located in the youth and family services division.
On May 11, 2004, the defendant was found not competent to stand trial but restorable. On November 4, 2004, the defendant was again found not competent and unlikely to be restored under his current treatment regimen and the court, Mullarkey, J., ordered in-patient psychiatric treatment. On December 16, 2004, the defendant was again found not competent and the court, Mullarkey, J., found that involuntary medication of the defendant would restore him to competency, and that no less intrusive means existed to do so. On March 3,2005, the defendant was found competent to stand trial. On July 19, 2005, however, the defendant was again found not competent to stand trial and the defendant was remanded to the Whiting Forensic Division of Connecticut Valley Hospital (Whiting). On October 17,2005, the defendant was found not competent to stand trial but restorable and the court, Mullarkey, J., ordered treatment and medication at Whiting. On February 13, 2007, the defendant was found competent to stand trial, although the court, Mullarkey, J., ordered that the defendant remain at Whiting and be transported to and from the courthouse for trial.
The state objects to the defendant’s assertion that this court rely on Baranoski’s testimony on the grounds that her testimony, part of the defendant’s case-in-chief, was not before the trial court when it ruled on the defendant’s motion to suppress, and that the defendant had elicited her testimony in order to negate the intent element of capital felony murder and murder, rather than to demonstrate the defendant’s ability to comprehend whether he was in custody when he made the contested statements. We do not consider it improper to review Baranoski’s testimony because on appeal, in order to determine whether the defendant’s constitutional rights have been infringed, “[w]e review the record in its entirety and are not limited to the evidence before the trial court at the time the ruling was made on the motion to suppress.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wallace,
Baranoski testified that, according to the third edition of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, the defendant scored seventy-four in the verbal component and seventy-two in the performance component, which combine for a full-scale IQ of seventy. Baranoski explained that scores in the eighty-five to ninety range are “low average,” scores below eighty-five are in the borderline and impaired range, and scores below seventy signal some form of mental retardation.
By way of example, Baranoski explained how the fact that the gloves allegedly used to punch the victim were toy gloves held special significance to the defendant. According to Baranoski, the defendant would state: “Well, I put on the gloves because the hand is too hard. So . . . I’m going to wear the toy gloves, as though the toy gloves made the strength of the hand [of] less . . . importance. He identified . . . the aspect of the gloves being bought at Toys ‘R’ Us and being a toy as more important than the fact that an adult was using them.”
Our rejection of the defendant’s claim is consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence similarly rejecting efforts to incorporate into the objective test for determining whether a defendant had been in custody the subjective aspects of an inquiry into the voluntariness of a defendant’s confession. In Yarborough v. Alvarado,
“At the same time, the objective Miranda custody inquiry could reasonably be viewed as different from doctrinal tests that depend on the actual mindset [or characteristics] of a particular suspect, where we do consider [characteristics such as] a suspect’s age and experience. For example, the voluntariness of a statement is often said to depend on whether the defendant’s will was overborne ... a question that logically can depend on the characteristics of the accused .... The characteristics of the accused can include the suspect’s age, education, and intelligence ... as well as a suspect’s prior experience with law enforcement .... [T]he custody inquiry [however] states an objective rule designed to give clear guidance to the police, while consideration of a suspect’s individual characteristics — including his age— could be viewed as creating a subjective inquiry.” (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 667-68.
Concurrence Opinion
joins, concurring. As I stated in my concurring opinion in State v. Lockhart,
The contention of the defendant, Lee Edwards, in the present case that the police should have recorded the statements that they obtained from him at the police station is particularly compelling in view of the fact that the defendant suffers from both a significant mental impairment, bordering on retardation, and from several, serious psychiatric disorders. With respect to the defendant’s mental abilities, trial testimony revealed that the defendant has a full-scale intelligence quotient (IQ) of seventy, that IQ scores below eighty-five are in the borderline and impaired range, and that scores below seventy indicate some form of mental retardation. With respect to the defendant’s psychiatric problems, the evidence disclosed that the defendant previously has been diagnosed with schizophrenia, post-traumatic stress disorder, Tourette’s syndrome and dysthymia. In fact, the defendant’s psychiatric condition was so severe following his arrest in this case that he was found not competent to stand trial on five separate occasions, despite repeated and extensive periods of inpatient psychiatric treatment and involuntary medication.
It is well established that people with mental illness and mental deficiencies are more prone than others to confess falsely, either because of an inordinate desire to accommodate and agree with authority figures or because they are unable to cope with the psychological intensity of the police interrogation, which frequently includes the use of sophisticated ploys and techniques designed to weaken the suspect’s resolve. See, e.g., State v. Lockhart, supra,
Particularly because experience has demonstrated that a recording requirement would not adversely affect the way in which the police question suspects or otherwise impair the ability of the police to obtain confessions; see State v. Lockhart, supra,
Because, however, the recording requirement for which I have advocated was rejected by the majority of this court in Lockhart, I am constrained to abide by our holding in that case. Accordingly, I concur in the result.