Lead Opinion
(temporarily assigned) delivered the opinion of the Court.
On Oсtober 20, 2008, police responded to a 9-1-1 call requesting assistance for an injured child. The child was defendant Terrell Hubbard’s five-month-old daughter, Lanaya. When police arrived, the infant was in an ambulance about to be transported to the hospital. Medical technicians informed the responding police officers that the child was in critical condition.
Defendant told a detective that he found his daughter lying on the bed and noticed that she was not breathing. He placed a 9-1-1 call and performed CPR while waiting for assistance. Defendant acceded to the detective’s request to come to the police
A grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant with second-degree manslaughter, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-4(b)(l), and second-degree endangering the welfare of a child, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a). The trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress his October 20, 2008 statement. The court concluded that defendant was in custody at the time of the interview and that police had failed to advise defendant of his Miranda rights. The Appellate Division granted the State’s motion for leave to appeal and reversed. The panel determined that this Court’s recent ruling in State v. Diaz-Bridges, 208 N.J. 544,
In Diaz-Bridges, the Court emphasized that de novo review of a video record is confined to the rare case in which the videotaped statement is the only evidence before the trial court or the trial court clearly and unequivocally relies on no evidence other than the videotaped statement to resolve the motion to suppress. Id. at 565-66,
We further determine that the interview conducted by the detective at the police station was a custodial interrogation and the failure to administer Miranda warnings prior to the interview requires suppression of that recorded statement.
I.
On October 20, 2008, defendant Terrell Hubbard was alone with Lanaya, his five-month-old daughter, at the home he shared in Vineland with the child’s mother and her father. The child’s mother left Lanaya in defendant’s care to go to the dentist before reporting to work. At approximately 3:30 p.m., defendant placed a 9-1-1 call to report that his daughter was not breathing. The operator instructed defendant how to administer CPR as he awaited the arrival of emergency medical assistance. Emergency medical personnel arrived at defendant’s home before the police. After restoring the child’s heartbeat, medical personnel placed her in an ambulance for transport to a hospital. Police arrived just before the ambulance departed. A medic informed Detective Jeff Travaline that the child was in critical condition.
After speaking to the medic, the detective went to the porch of the house, where defendant stood with another police officer. The detective asked defendant what had happened to the baby. Defendant stated that the child was lying on the bed and had been crying. He picked her up, rеalized she was not breathing, and placed the call for assistance. When a police sergeant informed Travaline that he wanted to secure the house as a crime scene, Travaline and the sergeant conducted a “walk-through” to confirm that no one else was in the house. Defendant remained on the porch with a police officer.
After locking the front door, Travaline asked defendant to accompany him to the police station. Defendant assented and Travaline drove him to the police station.
The parties disputed the circumstances surrounding defendant’s trip to the police station. Travaline maintains that he offered to
Defendant was not handcuffed or patted down at any time that day. According to Travaline, defendant was not a suspect at that time; he was simply being interviewed to provide a fuller understanding of what transpired so that additional information could be relayed to the medical professionals treating defendant’s daughter.
At approximately 4:17 p.m., defendant entered an interview room at the station. He sat alone for almost three minutes before being joined by Travaline. After providing defendant with water, Travaline asked him to move to a different seat in the corner of the room. The move permitted defendant to face the video camera. Travaline sat across from defendant, between him and the door. Defendant was in the interview room for almost three hours. During that period, Travaline asked defendant questions for about forty minutes. Defendant was never advised of his Miranda rights that day.
Defendant told Travaline that, earlier in the day, his girlfriend informed him that the baby was cranky. Defendant tried to calm the baby over several hours. Eventually, he placed her on the bed and went to the kitchen to prepare something to eat. On his return to the bedroom, he noticed that the baby “was flimsy and ... wasn’t breathing,” so he called 9-1-1. Travaline then asked defendant to “back up a little bit” and clarify a few things. The detective’s questions focused on defendant’s movements and his interaction with his daughter. Defendant provided additional detail, explaining that Lanaya had been uncharacteristically fussy the night before and that her mother had given the child Tylenol earlier that day.
Returning to the interview, Travaline asked defendant if Lanaya had fallen or been accidentally dropped, or if defendant may have been distracted at any point while watching her. Defendant answered each of these questions in the negative. Travaline asked defendant about his relationship with his girlfriend, whether her pregnancy was a surprise, and how the birth of the baby had altered his life. Travaline also asked if he was ever advised or counselled to treat the infant gently, whether he ever got frustrated with the baby, if he loved her, and if he ever resented her.
The exchange proceeded as follows:
[Q]: [T]here’s a reason that she, uh, there is a reason that we’re here. There is a reason that she stopped breathing. You know and ...
[A]: I know.
[Q]: ... and I don’t understand ... the time period that you[’re] giving!. It] doesn’t account or explain why she would stop breathing, I mean?
[A]: [I] never heard of anything ... like this, especially happening to my daughter.
[Q]: You ever get mad because the baby’s, you know, not mad, mad! is] the wrong word, maybe frustrated?
[A]: Yeah.
[Q]: Did you get a little frustrated at all this afternoon?
[A]: Um, no I ... I wasn’t with her long. I mean after a couple hours in the same ... same crying and whining ...
[Q]: You love this baby?
[A]: Like so much. I never had nothing like this. I got her name tattooed on my arm.
[Q]: Just seem indifferent, you know.
[A]: Just everything changed when the baby was bom. Stuff I could do before!.] I loved playing basketball. I don’t do it much. I think this summer I played about five times through the whole summer.
*259 [Q]: This wasn’t a planned event, having a baby?
[A]: No. No.
[Q]: [Y]ou ever resent the baby or ... or her, you know for [...]
[A]: [W]hat happened ...
[Q]: Uh-huh.
[A]: No. I mean, if it happened, it was meant to happen. Just how it goes. I’m not regretting anything____
At 5:12 p.m., after abоut an hour in the interview room, Travaline told defendant that he was going to check the baby’s status and that he would return in a few minutes. After an absence of approximately two hours, Travaline returned to the room, apologized for the wait, and told defendant he would drive him home.
Defendant’s daughter died three days later. The medical examiner’s report noted a number of healing bruises and fractures, including a broken clavicle and three broken ribs. An examination of the child’s large intestine indicated some form of impact to that organ. The medical examiner also noted abnormal swelling of the brain and fluid in the spinal cord. A neurologist opined that a bleeding malformation in the child’s brain likely caused her to become increasingly fussy and to cry. The neurologist also opined that the child sustained a traumatic injury to the brainstem and spinal cord.
The pоlice arrested defendant on May 7, 2009, approximately seven months after the October 2008 interview. Sergeant Alexis Sheftall read defendant his Miranda rights, and Sheftall and Travaline questioned defendant. Eventually, defendant admitted that he tossed Lanaya toward the bed, causing her to hit the wall. When defendant noticed that she had stopped breathing, he called 9-1-1.
II.
The grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant with second-degree reckless manslaughter, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(1), and second-degree endangering the welfare of a child, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a). In a motion to suppress the
The Law Division judge conducted a suppression hearing on February 9 and 16, 2012, at which Travaline and defendant testified аnd the court viewed the October 20, 2008 videotaped statement. The trial court confirmed the undisputed fact that the detective did not administer Miranda warnings to defendant before or at any time during his interview. The court also found that defendant was in custody during the October 20 interview. The court stated that several factors influenced this finding, including Travaline’s instruction that defendant sit in a certain chair to permit the camera to obtain a full-face view of defendant, Travaline’s physical proximity to defendant, and the probing nature of the questions posed to defendant. In addition, the court cited several other facts presented by witnesses at the evidentiary hearing in support of its finding that defendant had been the subject of a custodial interrogation, including Travaline’s request for defendant to accompany him to the police station, placing defendant in thе back seat of the unmarked police car, securing the house to prevent entry by anyone, and preparing a crime log. The court also found that no reasonable person in defendant’s position would have felt free to leave the room or the police station. An order dated March 22, 2012, suppressed the October 20 statement in its entirety.
The Appellate Division granted the State’s motion for leave to appeal and reversed the March 22, 2012 order. Quoting Dim-Bridges, supra, 208 N.J. at 566,
This Court granted defendant’s motion for leave to appeal. 217 N.J. 281,
III.
Defendant argues that the Appellate Division erred by limiting its review of the record to just the videotape of the October 20 interview and then conducting a de novo review of that statement. In doing so, defеndant asserts that the appellate panel misapplied Diaz-Bridges, because this is not a case in which the trial court relied solely on the videotaped statement. Rather, defendant contends that the trial court plainly stated that it relied on more evidence than simply the videotaped statement. Defendant argues that the panel was required to defer to the factual findings of the trial court, which were well-supported by the entire record. Finally, defendant insists that the facts, as found by the trial court, lead to the inexorable conclusion that defendant was subject to a custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings on October 20,2008, and that his statement must therefore be suppressed.
The State responds that “to the extent that the motion judge made any factual findings beyond the videotape, they are not proper considerations.” Therefore, the State contends that the Appellate Division was not required to defer to any findings of fact made by the trial judge and was free to limit its review to the videotape and make its own findings of fact and draw its own
The Attorney General, appearing as amicus curiae, submits that the Appellate Division properly adopted a de novo standard of review. The Attornеy General concedes that an appellate tribunal should defer to the findings of fact of a trial court based on witness testimony, but contends that the findings of fact made by the trial court were founded solely on the videotape of the October 20 statement. Therefore, the appellate panel was not required to defer to the trial court’s findings of fact. Finally, the Attorney General submits that defendant was never in custody. Rather, the October 20 interview was nothing more than “part of an investigatory procedure” that did not require administration of Miranda warnings to defendant.
IV.
A.
Appellate courts reviewing a grant or denial of a motion to suppress must defer to the factual findings of the trial court so long as those findings are supported by sufficient evidence in the record. State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424,
The rule of deference announced in Johnson, and endorsed repeatedly through the years, see, e.g., Elders, supra, 192 N.J. at 243,
Although the means of recording statements or proceedings have changed, the deference accorded to the findings of fact of the trial judge has not. See Elders, supra, 192 N.J. at 243-44,
Nevertheless, the introduction of electronic recordation of court proceedings and certain investigative proceedings, such as custodial interrogations, has triggered questions about whether the traditional standard of appellate review should be maintained. In Diaz-Bridges, supra, the Court indicated that when assessing the totality of the circumstances in certain fact-sensitive contexts, such as an assessment of whether a defendant invoked his right to remain silent or to terminate an interrogation or to request counsel, appellate review may require consultation of the videotaped statement. 208 N.J. at 565,
As it relates to the invocation of the right to remain silent, both the words used and the suspect’s actions or behaviоrs foi’m part of the inquiry into whether the investigating officer should have reasonably believed that the right was being asserted. As a result, the court’s inquiry necessarily demands a fact-sensitive analysis to discern from the totality of the circumstances whether the officer could have reasonably concluded that the right had been invoked. For this reason, it may be inadequate to confine appellate review to the transcript of the interrogation. Instead, as this appeal demonstrates, if the trial court has based its findings on conduct or behaviors that defendant exhibited during a videotaped interrogation that may be observed and analyzed with equal precision by an appellate court, a review of the videotape of the interrogation is appropriate.
[Ibid.]
Notably, the Court emphasized that it did not intend to elevate the appellate panel’s evaluation of the videotape over the factual findings of the trial court. Id. at 565-66,
B.
A confession or incriminating statement obtained during a custodial interrogation may not be admitted in evidence unless a defendant has been advised of his or her constitutional rights. Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 492, 86 S.Ct. at 1637,
In Miranda, supra, the United States Supreme Court held that in order to safeguard a suspect’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, confessions obtained during custodial interrogations are inadmissible as evidence unless the defendant has been advised of his or her constitutional rights. 384 U.S. at 492, 86 S.Ct. at 1637,
The failure to administer Miranda warnings prior to custodial interrogation “creates a presumption of compulsion.” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307,
“Custodial interrogation” was defined by the United States Supreme Court as “questioning initiated by law enforce
“[C]ustody in the Miranda sense does not necеssitate a formal arrest, nor does it require physical restraint in a police station, nor the application of handcuffs, and may occur in a suspect’s home or a public place other than a police station.” Id. at 103,
Indeed, “[w]hether a suspect has been placed in custody is fact-sensitive and sometimes not easily discernible.” State v. Stott, 171 N.J. 343, 364,
The relevant inquiry is determined objectively, based on “how a reasonable [person] in the suspect’s position would have understood his situation,” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3151, 82 L.Ed.2d 317, 336 (1984); see P.Z., supra, 152 N.J. at 103,
“Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689,
Furthermore, the State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant’s confession is voluntary and not resultant from actions by law enforcement officers that overbore the will of a defendant. Hreha, supra, 217 N.J. at 383,
We apply these principles to the facts of this case, focusing first on the deference owed by an appellate panel to a videotaped statement.
A.
This Court has subscribed unequivocally and continuously to the traditional rule that an appellate tribunal should adhere to the findings of fact of the trial court and must avoid disturbing those findings unless the evidential record provides insufficient support for those findings. Gamble, swpra, 218 N.J. at 424,
Recently, in Diaz-Bridges, supra, the Court referenced the videotape of the custodial intеrrogation of the defendant on several occasions. 208 N.J. at 551, 556, 562, 570,
We do not suggest that we have altered our admonition to appellate courts that they give due deferenсe to the fact-finding role of the trial courts. See State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 [724 A.2d 234 ] (1999) (concluding that reviewing court should defer to factual findings of trial judge as long as they can reasonably be reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record). Indeed, as we have recently reiterated, if the trial court has had the benefit of and has relied upon testimony of witnesses, appellate courts must give due deference to those findings because it is the trial court that had the opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses who appeared and testified. Elders, supra, 192 N.J. at 245 [927 A.2d 1250 ] (observing that trial court based its evaluation on police testimony because patrol ear’s videotape showed only part of interaction with individuals involved in traffic stop).
[Id. at 565,34 A.3d 748 .]
Thus, an appellate tribunal must defer to the factual findings of the trial court when that court has made its findings based оn the testimonial and documentary evidence presented at an evidentiary hearing or trial. Deference is also not confined simply to credibility findings. To be sure, when the evidence consists of testimony of one or more witnesses and a videotaped recording of a statement by a witness or a suspect, an appellate court is obliged to review the entire record compiled in the trial court to determine if the factual findings are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. Locurto, supra, 157 N.J. at 470-71,
This appeal is not one of those cases in which the trial reсord was confined to a video record of the interrogation. We acknowledge that the trial court referred to the videotape of the October 20 interrogation and that certain findings of fact are premised on that review. Witness testimony, however, played a key role in the trial court’s analysis of the record and its findings
The trial court was uniquely situated to integrate the testimony and the video record to formulate its findings of fact. The appellate panel was not free to conduct a de novo review of the videotape, reject the findings of fact of the trial court, and substitute its own findings. The Appellate Division therefore erred when it dismissed the findings of fact of the trial court and conducted a de novo review of the record of the motion to dismiss.
Our review of the entire record, including the detective’s testimony and giving the required deference to the trial court’s findings, including those pertaining to the credibility of the detective, leads us to conclude that those findings are supported by the entirety of the testimonial and videotaped record. The final inquiry is whether the trial court properly applied the governing law to those factual findings to conclude that defendant was the subject of a custodial interrogation.
B.
The protections provided by Miranda apply only when a person is both in custody and subjected to police interrogation. P.Z., supra, 152 N.J. at 102,
In the present case, the officers secured defendant’s house as a crime scene. The trial court found that Travaline directed defendant to ride in the police cruiser to the station. Meanwhile, his daughter was in critical condition and removed from her home by emergency medical personnel to a hospital for treatment. Although not handcuffed, defendant rode in the backseat of the vehicle. Defendant and Travaline did not converse at all during the drive.
Upon arrival at the station, defendant was directed into an interrogation room, where he sat alone for several minutes. When Travaline entered, he instructed defendant to move into the chair in the corner of the room, farthest from the door. The officer positioned himself between defendant and the door.
The detective questioned defendant for approximately an hour before exiting the room, leaving defendant to wait approximately two hours. The detective never advised defendant that he was free to leave, even after relaying the news that the hospital was able to restore and maintain his daughter’s heartbeat.
During the interview, the detective’s questions roamed far from merely obtaining information that might assist the child’s treatment. Specifically, the detective asked defendant to account for аll of his movements on his return from work. He inquired whether defendant may have been distracted at any point while watching
In light of the conditions, substance, and duration of the interview, combined with the events at defendant’s home, the trial court’s conclusion that the October 20 interview was custodial in nature is sufficiently supported by credible, factual evidence in the record and the proper application of governing law. The October 20 interview, conducted without administration of defendant’s Miranda rights, must be suppressed.
YI.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the Law Division for further proceedings.
Notes
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
I fully concur with the Court’s opinion that a deferential standard of review applies in assessing the trial court’s finding in this case. The trial court’s finding that defendant was in custody when questioned without Miranda
Significantly, this ease does not involve a trial court’s fact-finding based solely on the review of a videotape statement. In State v. Diaz-Bridges, 208 N.J. 544, 566,
A number of jurisdictions have addressed the appellate-review standard when a trial court’s findings are based on videotape of some event, such as an interrogation or a search. Federal appellate courts take a deferential approach in such cases for reasons found in the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574-75, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511-12,
Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.
This is so even when the district court’s findings do not rest on credibility determinations, but are based instead on physical or documentary evidence or inferences from other facts.
The rationale for deference to the original finder of fact is not limited to the superiority of the trial judge’s position to make determinations of credibility. The trial judge’s major role is the determination of fact, and with experience in fulfilling that role comes expertise. Duplication of the trial judge’s efforts in the court of appeals would very likely contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination at a huge cost in diversion of judicial resources.
[Ibid, (internal citations omitted).]
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6) was amended the same year that the United States Supreme Court released its decision in Anderson. That Rule provides: “Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a)(6) (emphasis added).
The principal argument advanced in favor of a more searching appellate review of findings by the district court based solely on documentary evidence is that the rationale of Rule 52(a) does not apply when the findings do not rest on the trial court’s assessment of credibility of the witnesses but on an evaluation of documentary proof and the drawing of inferences from it, thus eliminating the need for any special deference to the trial court's findings. These considerations are outweighed by the public interest in the stability and judicial economy that would be promoted by recognizing that the trial court, not the appellate tribunal, should be the finder of the facts. To permit courts of appeals to share more actively in the fact-finding function would tend to undermine the legitimacy of the district courts in the eyes of litigants, multiply appeals by encouraging appellate retrial of some factual issues, and needlessly reallocate judicial authority.
[Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) advisory committee’s note to 1985 amendment.]
Thus, Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a)(6) calls for the application of the clearly erroneous standard to physical or documentary evidence, including videotapes. Although the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not contain a similar rule, “the considerations underlying Rule 52(a) — the demands of judicial efficiency, the expertise developed by trial judges, and the importance of first-hand observation — all apply with full force in the criminal context, at least with respect to factual questions having nothing to do with guilt.” Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 145, 106 S.Ct. 2440, 2451,
State courts have split on the appropriate standard of appellate review when the evidence at a hearing is a videotape of either an interrogation or some other police interaction. Some state courts favor a deferential standard. See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3A 362, 365 (Ind.2014) (stating that even when “faced with video evidence,” “appellate standard of review remains constant” and that court “do[es] not reweigh the evidence”); State v. Williams,
Other state courts favor a de novo review. See, e.g., People v. Hughes, 378 Ill.Dec. 17, 3 N.E.3d 297, 313 (Ill.App.Ct.2013) (stating that appellate court’s “eyes are just as functional a[s] the trial court’s” in reviewing video evidence evaluated in making suppression ruling), appeal denied, 379 Ill.Dec. 17, 5 N.E.3d 1126 (2014); Commonwealth v. Novo, 442 Mass. 262, 812 N.E.2d 1169, 1173 (2004) (reviewing video evidence de novo and stating that “lower court findings based on documentary evidence available to an appellate court are not entitled to deference”); State v. Binette,
The law must adapt to technological advances. The videotaping of interrogations has become a current law enforcement practice and is mandated by court rule in defined circumstances. See R. 3:17. Today, video cameras are mounted in many police vehicles recording motor vehicle stops and searches. Body cameras worn by police officers may soon be an integral part of an officer’s uniform. In the near future, it may be that an officer’s interaction with a suspect will be video-recorded from beginning to end, from a street arrest to an interrogation at pоlice headquarters.
Whether a videotape of events is the sole evidence or one piece of evidence should not be determinative of the standard of review. It does not follow logically that a videotape of an interrogation when mixed with live testimony should be viewed deferentially, but when standing alone should be viewed without deference. The standard of review for fact-findings of videotape evidence should not vary from one hearing to another.
How appellate courts review a trial court’s fact-findings based on a videotape is an important judicial-policy issue. On the proper occasion, when the issue is squarely before us, we should give full consideration to all the competing rationales favoring either deference or de novo review.
For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice RABNER and Justices LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZYINA, SOLOMON and Judge CUFF (temporarily assigned) — 7.
Opposed — -None.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602,