State v. CollinsState v. Collins
Opinion
FOTI, J. The defendant, Rogeau R. Collins, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of felony murder in violation of General Statutes
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. In March, 2009, Robert Dixon, the victim, resided in Hartford with his girlfriend. Dixon always carried two cell phones. He used one cell phone to sell drugs and the other for personal matters. In addition, he always wore an expensive pair of Cartier glasses. He did not store the drugs he sold at his home, but kept them at a remote location secured in a safe. The key to the safe was on the same key ring as Dixon’s car keys.
On March 9, 2009, Dixon exchanged several phone calls with an individual named Adrian Dean, a friend of the defendant. At approximately 9:25 p.m. that night, Dixon left his residence in his vehicle carrying both of his cell phones and wearing his Cartier glasses. Sometime thereafter, Dean joined Dixon in the vehicle. Dean then contacted the defendant, who was driving around the Hartford area in his girlfriend’s vehicle. Dean arranged to meet the defendant at a location in Bloomfield and gave the defendant directions to that location.
The state, in a long form information filed on January 11, 2011, charged the defendant with murder in violation of General Statutes
I
The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly excluded testimony of an alleged statement made by Dean to Carlton Martin, Dean’s former cellmate in prison, as inadmissible hearsay. Specifically, the defendant contends that Martin’s testimony as to Dean’s alleged statement was admissible as a statement against penal interest pursuant to § 8-6 (4) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. We disagree.
The following additional facts and procedural history are necessary to resolve this claim. During trial, defense counsel notified the court that he intended to call Martin to testify about a statement made by Dean while the two shared a prison cell. The prosecutor objected to Martin’s proffered testimony as inadmissible hearsay. Defense counsel, however, argued that Martin’s testimony was admissible as a statement against Dean’s penal interest. As part of defense counsel’s offer of proof, Martin testified outside the presence of the jury. Martin’s testimony revealed that he was serving a ninety-six year term of imprisonment and had shared a prison cell with Dean between May and December, 2010. During this period, Dean and Martin watched an episode of the television show “Cold Case,” which involved betrayal between two codefendants to a crime. The show prompted a discussion about codefendants between Dean and Martin. During their discussion, Dean mentioned that he still had a codefendant on trial. He explained that he originally intended to take his case to trial, but decided to take a twenty-five year sentence plea deal after learning that the defendant had implicated him in the shooting. Dean was apparently
We begin by setting forth our standard of review. It is well established that “[w]e review a trial court’s decision to admit [or exclude] evidence, if premised on a correct view of the law ... for an abuse of discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Davis, 298 Conn. 1, 10–11, 1 A.3d 76 (2010). “[A]fter a trial court has made the legal determination that a particular statement is or is not hearsay, or is subject to a hearsay exception, [it is] vested with the discretion to admit or to bar the evidence based upon relevancy, prejudice, or other legally appropriate grounds related to the rule of evidence under which admission is being sought.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Smith, 289 Conn. 598, 617–18, 960 A.2d 993 (2008). Accordingly, “[w]e will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial’s court ruling and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Snelgrove, 288 Conn. 742, 758, 954 A.2d 165 (2008). “In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court . . . reasonably [could have] conclude[d] as it did.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Davis, supra, 11.
In the present case, the trial court excluded testimony with respect to Dean’s statement because it determined that it did not fall within the statement against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule. It is hornbook law that “hearsay statements may not be admitted into evidence unless they fall within a recognized exception
“As to what is against penal interest, quite obviously the essential characteristic is the exposure to risk of punishment for a crime .... Moreover, it is not the fact that the declaration is against interest but the awareness of that fact by the declarant which gives the statement significance.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bryant, 202 Conn. 676, 695–96, 523 A.2d 451 (1987). Our review of the evidence before the court reveals that Dean’s statement was not against his penal interest because it did not subject him to criminal punishment. Prior to making the alleged statement to Martin, Dean already had pleaded
II
The defendant next claims that the court improperly precluded evidence of the circumstances in which he made certain statements to the police and, in doing so, deprived him of his right to a present a complete defense as required by the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution. See
The following additional facts and procedural history are necessary to resolve this claim. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress written statements he made in the presence of Bloomfield police Sergeant Shawn Bolden. Following a hearing, the court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress.6 During trial, the state called Bolden as part of its case-in-chief. On direct examination, Bolden testified about his interview with the defendant on March 19, 2009. He specifically testified that, at the beginning of the interview, he informed the defendant that “he wasn’t under arrest ... he was free to leave and ... he didn’t have to submit to an interview.” Bolden also testified that the defendant did not seem to have any trouble understanding him and did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Thereafter, the state introduced the defendant’s written statements through Bolden.
On cross-examination, defense counsel probed the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s questioning. Through the cross-examination of Bolden,
Defense counsel then inquired about the defendant’s waiver of his Miranda rights.7 Bolden testified that he had the defendant fill out a Miranda waiver form. Defense counsel asked Bolden, with respect to the Miranda waiver, “you put on there that [the defendant] understood English to a limited degree, could write to a limited degree, correct?” Bolden answered in the affirmative, prompting defense counsel to inquire: “Were you able to test ... to what dimension that was, how limited he was in his understanding?” The prosecutor objected on relevance grounds and requested to be heard outside the presence of the jury.
After the jury left the courtroom, the prosecutor argued that “[defense counsel] is getting into the custody and voluntariness of the waiver . . . [t]here’s already been a prior ruling on this issue . . . .” The court sustained the objection and informed defense counsel: “[Y]ou can ask whatever you want [if] you’re trying to show coercion or that it’s a false statement or inaccurate. . . . But when [your questions] mix in legal issues like the question of voluntariness and custody . . . [you’re arguing] legal conclusions that have already been visited and ruled on ... . [Y]ou’re just trying to circumvent the ruling of the court. ... [Y]ou can ask as many questions as you want about the
It is well established that “[a] defendant’s fundamental right to present a defense, guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution, includes the right to present evidence of the circumstances under which a custodial statement was made.” State v. Fernandez, 27 Conn. App. 73, 78, 604 A.2d 1308, cert. denied, 222 Conn. 904, 606 A.2d 1330 (1992); see also Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690–91, 106 S. Ct. 2142, 90 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1986). The reason for this rule is that certain of those circumstances, such as a police interrogator’s use of coercive tactics to force or induce the defendant to make a statement or the defendant’s special susceptibility to being influenced by such tactics to make a false statement, may reasonably be claimed to cast doubt on the reliability of the statement.
Our review of the record indicates that the court’s ruling did not violate this rule, or thereby undermine the defendant’s constitutional right to present a complete defense. Rather, the ruling was limited to precluding evidence concerning the voluntariness of the defendant’s Miranda waiver, except to the extent that such evidence was offered to test the reliability of the defendant’s statements in light of the circumstances in which they were made. Indeed, the court expressly permitted defense counsel to thoroughly probe the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s statements, which is exactly what the constitution requires. See Crane v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. 689–90 (defendant must be afforded opportunity to challenge credibility of custodial statement). Accordingly, the defendant’s constitutional claim is without merit.8
III
The defendant next claims that the court improperly excluded as irrelevant evidence that Cartier glasses were found at Dean’s home. We disagree.
The following additional facts and procedural history are necessary to resolve this claim. Prior to the defendant’s case-in-chief during trial, defense counsel announced his intention to call Hartford police Detective Brian Plourde. Plourde was involved in the execution of a search warrant at Dean’s residence where the police discovered, inter alia, a safe containing four cell phones, a pair of Cartier glasses, and ammunition. The state objected to Plourde’s testimony on the ground that it was irrelevant. Specifically, the state argued that the Cartier glasses never were linked to the victim—a fact previously conceded by defense counsel. Defense counsel argued, however, that the Cartier glasses were relevant because they were found in Dean’s residence and “Cartier glasses were reported missing from [Dixon]. So circumstantially it ties . . . Dean to the incident as having taken those glasses from [Dixon].” When the court asked defense counsel why he did not ask Dixon’s girlfriend to identify the Cartier glasses as Dixon’s during cross-examination, defense counsel stated: “Honestly, it didn’t occur to me at that point to go ahead and show her a picture of the glasses.” The state subsequently stated that the police did not link the Cartier glasses to Dixon. The court sustained the
The principles governing our review of evidentiary claims are set forth in part I of this opinion. We supplement, however, the specific legal principles that govern our analysis of this particular claim. “Relevant evidence is evidence that has a logical tendency to aid the trier in the determination of an issue. . . . One fact is relevant to another if in the common course of events the existence of one, alone or with other facts, renders the existence of the other either more certain or more probable. . . . Evidence is irrelevant or too remote if there is such a want of open and visible connection between the evidentiary and principal facts that, all things considered, the former is not worthy or safe to be admitted in the proof of the latter. . . . Evidence is not rendered inadmissible because it is not conclusive. All that is required is that the evidence tend to support a relevant fact even to a slight degree, so long as it is not prejudicial or merely cumulative. . . . The trial court has wide discretion to determine the relevancy of evidence and [e]very reasonable presumption
The defendant contends that the Cartier glasses are relevant because “glasses costing $3000 are not a common item, and evidence that Dean had them in his safe could be used to support an inference that it was Dean who robbed Dixon of the glasses.” Our review of the record indicates that the value of the Cartier glasses seized from Dean’s residence never was established. Moreover, the seized Cartier glasses never were identified or connected as being the Cartier glasses owned and worn by Dixon. For all purposes, it appears that the defendant’s sole foundation for admitting the seized Cartier glasses was that they were the same brand as the glasses worn by Dixon. “[T]he proffering party bears the burden of establishing the relevance of the offered testimony. Unless a proper foundation is established, the evidence is irrelevant.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Deegan v. Simmons, 100 Conn. App. 524, 540, 918 A.2d 998, cert. denied, 282 Conn. 923, 925 A.2d 1103 (2007). Making every reasonable presumption in favor of the trial court’s ruling, we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion by excluding the seized Cartier glasses as evidence that it was Dean, not the defendant, who robbed Dixon of his Cartier glasses.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.