*1 juvenile to allow the court to intended in whether to transfer a deciding exercise discretion felony. I C, a class D or unclassified involving case required would, therefore, hearing conclude that juvenile juvenile court, evidence, without but of, alia, on the inter may object grounds to the transfer prior record, crime and alleged his involvement has discretion whether to transfer the judge and the I affirm the would, accordingly, case to the adult court. Court. Appellate judgment A. MCCOY v. COMMISSIONER RICKY PUBLIC SAFETY
OF (SC 18545) Palmer, Rogers, J., Norcott, Katz, McLachlan, Eveleigh C. Vertefeuille, Js. *2 January 5, officially September 8, 2011* Argued released 2010— attorney general, Rosenberg, assistant R. Jane attorney Blumenthal, brief, was Richard whom, on the appellant (defendant). for the general, appellee (plaintiff). for the Sherman, D. Ralph Opinion the commissioner defendant, J. The EVELEIGH, ren- summary judgment appeals from safety,1 public * slip opinion, as a January 5,2011, was released that this decision the date purposes. procedural operative for all substantive date is the specifically complaint Leonard C. although named We note that defendant, safety, public as the Boyle, capacity as the commissioner in his safety public as the defendant. commissioner herein to the we refer
dered the trial partially court favor of plaintiff, Ricky A. McCoy, declaring illegal the defendant’s desig- nation of plaintiff as a perma- “convicted felon” and nently enjoining the defendant any designating from person a convicted felon because of a second conviction years within ten under General Statutes 14-227a,2 provides part: “(a) person General Statutes 14-227a in relevant No shall operate a intoxicating liquor motor vehicle while under the influence of or any drug person operating or both. A commits the offense of a motor vehicle liquor intoxicating while ünder drug the influence of or or if both such person operates (1) a motor intoxicating vehicle while under the influence of liquor any drug both, (2) or while such has an elevated blood purposes section, alcohol content. For the of this ‘elevated blood alcohol *3 person content’ means a ratio of eight- alcohol in the blood of such that is per alcohol, by weight hundredths of one cent or more of . . . and ‘motor vehicle, vehicle’ includes a snowmobile and all-terrain as those terms are defined in section 14-379. “(g) Any person any provision (a) who violates of subsection of this (1) violation, section shall: (A) For conviction aof first be fined not less dollars, than five (B) hundred dollars or more than one thousand and be (i) imprisoned months, forty-eight not more than six consecutive hours of may suspended any manner, imprisoned which (ii) not be or in reduced or not months, more than six with the execution of such sentence of suspended entirely period probation imposed requiring and a of as a condi- probation person perform tion of such that such one hundred hours of community service, 14-227e, (C) person’s as defined in section and have such operator’s motor vehicle operating privilege license or nonresident sus- pended year; (2) for one for conviction of a second violation within ten years prior offense, (A) after a conviction for the same be fined not less dollars, than one (B) impris- thousand dollars or more than four thousand be years, twenty days oned not more than two one hundred consecutive of may suspended any manner, which not be or in reduced and sentenced to period probation requiring probation of as a condition of such that such person perform community service, one hundred hours of as defined in 14-227e, (C) person (i) twenty-one years section and if age such is under of offense, person’s at the operator’s time of the have such motor vehicle operating privilege suspended license or years nonresident for three or until person’s twenty-first birthday, the date longer, of such whichever is and be prohibited two-year period following completion period for the of such of suspension operating from a motor vehicle unless such motor vehicle is equipped functioning, approved ignition device, with a interlock as defined 14-227j; person (ii) twenty-one years in section age or if such of or older offense, person’s operator’s at the time of the have such operating privilege suspended year license or nonresident for one and be the influence of drugs vehicle while under operating a while The sole issue intoxicated). or alcohol (driving second for a in this is whether a conviction appeal period year of within a ten is classified breach3 specifically, a crime, felony, under the Penal Code as a concluded, trial it is classified whether, as the court ” “ We that a as a ‘motor vehicle violation.’ conclude motor of 14-227a does not fall within the vehi- breach of a criminal exception cle violation to the definition (a), and, “offense” to General Statutes pursuant therefore, 14-227a within a second conviction completion period two-year period following prohibited of such for the suspension operating a motor vehicle unless such motor vehicle is from approved device, equipped functioning, ignition as defined with a interlock subsequent 14-227j; (3) for of a third and violation in section conviction years offense, prior (A) be within ten after a conviction for same fined eight dollars, (B) more than thousand not less than two thousand dollars or year imprisoned years, more than three one of which not be period probation suspended manner, reduced and sentenced to perform probation requiring as of such that such one a condition community 14-227e, service, (C) hundred as defined section hours of person’s operator’s operating license or nonresident have such permanently purposes privilege upon third For revoked such offense. pursuant imposition subsequent penalties for a second or third and offense provisions subsection, conviction under the of subsection to this *4 thereafter, 1,1981, on October or as amended convic- this section in effect (1) (2) (a) provisions of subdivision or of subsection tion under the either provisions section, of section 53a-56b or 53a- of this a conviction under the any any or a other state of offense the essential elements 60d conviction by substantially the to be the same subdivi- of which are determined court (1) (2) of this section section 53a-56b or 53a- sion of subsection 60d, prior .” the . . shall conviction for same offense. constitute changes made to various subsections of 14- Several technical have been present See, proceedings case. 227a since time of the in the the relevant 04-257, 101; 2004, 04-199, 31; 2004, e.g., Acts No. Public No. Public Acts 2010, 6, 06-147, 10-110, 1; §§ Acts No. 46. Public Acts No. Public appeal. purposes changes, however, to this For are not relevant Those clarity, we current of the statute. refer to the revision 3Throughout opinion, to indicate we use the term “breach” conduct this statutory provision. clarity, prohibited by given interest of In the “infraction,” “offense,” “violation,” or their various use of the terms our provided meanings §§ in General Statutes forms is restricted to the through 53a-27. year a ten period is a felony because it carries with it a term of up years. to two Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The record reveals the undisputed following facts procedural and history. May On 7, 2004, plaintiff the was convicted of while driving intoxicated for the sec- ond time in a year period. ten Subsequently, at the plaintiffs request, the provided defendant him with a copy of history his criminal record, which included the designation “CONVICTED FELON.” Following the receipt of that record, plaintiff, pursuant the to General 4-174,4petitioned Statutes § the repeal defendant to regulations under plaintiff which the had been desig- nated a convicted felon, requested and a new criminal history record without that designation. After the defen- dant denied this request, plaintiff commenced the present action, seeking, inter alia: (1) a declaration that the defendant had enacted an unlawful regulation per- it mitting classify plaintiff as a convicted felon because he had failed to follow the rule-making proce- required dures under the Uniform Administrative Proce- dure Act, General Statutes 4-166 seq.; et (2) permanent injunction prohibiting the defendant from classifying individual as a convicted felon on the basis of a qualifying second conviction under 14-227a.5 Thereafter, parties agreed summary judgment was an appropriate manner which to resolve the case, and filed cross summary motions for judgment. provides: “Any General may petition Statutes 4-174 interested agency requesting promulgation, amendment, an orrepealof aregulation. agency prescribe by regulation Each petitions shall the form for and the procedure submission, consideration, disposition. thirty their Within days petition, agency deny petition after submission of a either shall *5 writing stating in regulation- its reasons for the denials or shall initiate making proceedings in accordance with section 4-168.” plaintiff sought compelling The provide also an order the defendant to printed history, him with a new criminal without a convicted felon notation. in the part part in and denied court granted The trial the trial court rendered Specifically, parties’ motions. plaintiffs in the on the favor of defendant judgment the declaratory concluding that judgment, a claim for plaintiff as a convicted of the designation defendant’s The trial court rule making. felon did constitute plaintiff in favor the on the second judgment rendered a conviction that, although second issue. It concluded consis- of incarceration under 14-227a carries term felony, a second conviction tent with the definition felony it falls under as a because could not classified exception the to definition the motor vehicle violation in Accord- (a). set 53a-24 of a offense forth criminal declaratory judgment that trial issued a the court ingly, felon was ille- plaintiffs as a convicted designation label- enjoined the defendant from permanently gal felon the basis of person as a convicted on ing any year within a ten under second conviction partial judg- from the appeal The defendant’s period. plaintiff favor followed.6 ment in history of contends that text The defendant driving clear intent legislative 14-227a evidence a which offense, a criminal intoxicated constitutes while felony upon a subject as a to classification turn by virtue of year period ten within a second conviction that, claims punishment prescribed. defendant falls within of 14-227a concluding that breach exception the definition violation Code, the trial of the Penal offense definition of apply improperly declined court which violation, phrase to the violation punish- exception to breaches have limited that would the defendant contends only. Finally, able fine its con- support dicta to on mere the trial court relied judgment appealed trial to the court from the The defendant appeal Appellate Court, this court and we thereafter transferred (c) pursuant Book 65-1. and Practice to General Statutes 51-199 *6 In the response, plaintiff
struction. the claims that trial properly court determined that second conviction 14-227a falls within motor under the vehicle violation exception to the definition of offense and therefore felony. plaintiff cannot be The contends that this con- struction is case supported other statutes and law that the definition of evidencing violation the apply Code not Penal does to the vehicle violation exception agree to the definition of offense. We defendant. the outset,
At the we set forth the of review. standard appeal requires interpret The resolution of this us to statutory principles interpre- 14-227a. “Well settled govern statutory tation our review. . . . Because inter- pretation question is a our de law, review is novo. . . . When construing statute, fundamental [o]ur objective is apparent to ascertain and effect to give the words, intent ... In other we legislature. seek determine, manner, to in a reasoned meaning statutory applied language case, to facts of [the] including question of whether the language actually apply. does ... In seeking to determine that meaning, l-2z General Statutes us first directs to consider the text of the statute itself its relationship and to other If, examining statutes. after such text and considering relationship, plain such of such text meaning is and does unambiguous yield and absurd or unworkable results, extratextual of the meaning evidence statute shall . . . not be considered. to deter- test mine is whether ambiguity statute, when read in context, susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. . . plain . When a statute is not also unambiguous, interpretive guidance we look for legislative history to the and circumstances surrounding its enactment, legislative policy to the it designed was implement, relationship its legislation existing and common law principles general the same governing quota- internal omitted; . . . subject (Citation matter Middletown, Wilson Woodrow omitted.) marks tion Authority, Finance Housing v. Connecticut LLC 271 (2010). 986 A.2d 639, 644-45, Conn. *7 14- statutory text. Section with the relevant begin
We shall person No part: “(a) in relevant provides 227a of the influence while under motor vehicle operate a com- person A any or both. liquor drug or intoxicating while vehicle a motor operating of mits the offense any drug or liquor intoxicating of the influence (1) a motor vehicle person operates if such or both liquor or intoxicating of under the influence while has an elevated person while such both, (2) drug section, of this purposes For the alcohol content. blood a ratio of alcohol means blood alcohol content’ ‘elevated of that is person eight-hundredths of such in the blood . . . and alcohol, by weight more of per cent or one all-terrain includes a snowmobile vehicle’ ‘motor 14-379. in section are defined as those terms vehicle, * * * of subsec- any provision violates Any person who “(g) for conviction ... (2) this section shall tion of prior after a years ten violation within a second of fined not less offense, (A) be for the same conviction than four thousand or more thousand dollars than one years, more than two imprisoned not be dollars, (B) which days of twenty consecutive hundred one any manner, and sen- or reduced suspended as a condition requiring probation of period tenced to hun- perform one person that such probation of such in section as defined community service, dred hours twenty- is under person if such (i) 14-227e, (C) offense, have such of the at the time years age one or nonresi- operator’s license person’s years or three suspended for operating privilege dent birthday, twenty-first person’s of such until the date prohibited two-year whichever is and be longer, for the period following completion period of such suspen- sion from a motor vehicle operating unless such motor vehicle is equipped with a functioning, approved inter- device, lock as defined in section if 14-227j; or such (ii) twenty-one years age or older at the time offense, person’s have such opera- tor’s license or nonresident operating privilege sus- pended year for one prohibited two-year and be for the period completion following period suspen- of such sion from operating motor vehicle unless such motor equipped vehicle is with a functioning, approved igni- device, tion interlock 14-227j as defined section . . . (Emphasis added.) plain clearly of 14-227a language indicates that *8 the legislature intended a violation of that provision to be a criminal offense. First, clearly the statute defines a motor vehicle operating while under the influence of liquor any intoxicating drug as an offense. Section provides 14-227a in part: “Aperson relevant commits a motor operating vehicle while under offense the influence of intoxicating liquor any . . . .” drug (Emphasis added.) Indeed, repeatedly the statute uses the term offense to describe a breach of 14-227a. See § General Statutes 14-227a (b) (“at § the time of the alleged General offense”); Statutes 14-227a (c) (“at § the time of the alleged General offense”); Statutes 14- prior 227a (g) (2) (“a conviction for the same offense”); General Statutes 14-227a (g) second or (3) (“a third and subsequent offense . . . any conviction in [and] any other state of offense . . . shall prior constitute a conviction for the same offense”).
Second, repeatedly the statute prosecution refers to a for a breach of 14-227a. In two instances, such statute uses prosecution.” the term “criminal General Statutes 14-227a (b) (“in any criminal prosecution”); General any Statutes 14-227a (e) (“[i]n prose- criminal instances, the statute uses In other cution”). it. See General Stat defining without prosecution term sec prosecution under this 14-227a (b) (“any utes § (c) (“[i]n General Statutes 14-227a tion”); prosecution”); (k) (“subse General Statutes § use of the term legislature’s quent prosecution”). supports in instances the con prosecution all of these 14- intended violation of legislature clusion of the understanding legisla 227a to be crime. This by the prosecution is bolstered ture’s use the term Dictionary, Law prosecution Black’s definition prosecution proceeding as criminal which defines “[a] . . . .” Black’s which an accused is tried Dictionary Ed. see Law (9th 2009); Hartford/Windsor Hartford, LLC v. Properties, Healthcare A.3d construction of the 200-201, (“ ‘In the (2010) phrases shall be construed statutes, words and lan commonly usage according approved phrases, words and and such technical guage; in the acquired appropriate meaning peculiar have accordingly.’ and understood law, shall construed 1-1 ‘If a statute or regulation General Statutes § [a]. term, appropriate it is sufficiently define a does term as understanding to the common to look plain dictionary.’ ”). in a It would torture the expressed of 14-227a to conclude that meaning viola for motor vehicle guidelines established criminal *9 by definition, are crimes. See General that, tions Statutes 53a-24. § plain of the statute demonstrates
Third, language 14-227a understood a breach of legislature § (g) offense. Section 14-227a be a serious criminal 53a- provides that a under General Statutes § conviction manslaughter in the which defines the offense of 56b, C and is a class with a motor vehicle degree second 53a-60d, which defines or General Statutes felony, § a motor vehicle degree in the second assault prior D conviction felony, class shall constitute is a for the same offense as 14-227a.7 § Accordingly, plain language of the statute reveals that legislature understood violation of 14-227a to be comparable § felony to a involving a motor vehicle.8 The legislature made clear its intent that a second conviction under 14-227a within year period § a ten be felony when it amended that statute in 1999. Public Acts 99-255, No. 1 (P.A. § General 99-255). Statutes provides 53a-259 in part: relevant An “(a) offense for person may which a be sentenced imprison- to a term of ment in year excess of one felony. is a . . .
“(c) Any . . . any offense defined other section general which, by statutes expressly virtue of an specified sentence, is within the definition set forth in subsection (a) shall be deemed an felony.” unclassified Section 14-227a (g) (2) provides, inter alia, person that a who is convicted of a second violation of 14-227a years within ten prior after a conviction for the same offense shall imprisoned “be not more years than two . . . .” legislature The chose to penalty increase the a second conviction under 14-227a years within ten possible to a imprisonment term of up years to two 1999. See P.A. 99-255, 1. Prior to that time, a second conviction under year within a ten period was opinion. See footnote 2 of this important It is provide to note that the amended 14-227a to prior convictions under §§ 53a-56b and 53a-60d constitute convictions for the same imprisonment offense at the same time it increased the term of years. for a second conviction 99-255, to two See Public Acts No. 1. provides: “(a) General Statutes An offense for which a year felony. sentenced to a term of in excess of one ais “(b) purposes Felonies are classified for the (1) of sentence as follows: A, B, (2) (3) C, (4) D, Class class (5) capi- class (6) class unclassified and tal felonies. “(c) particular felony chapter classification of each defined in this expressly designated defining Any in the section it. offense defined in general which, by other expressly section of the statutes virtue of an specified sentence, is within the definition set forth in subsection shall felony.” be deemed an unclassified
155 of not more than by imprisonment a term of punishable to make a legislature At the time the chose year.10 one by a term punishable 14-227a conviction under second had years, of two 53a-25 been imprisonment up to of thirty years. “Our case law approximately effect for act, . chooses to it legislature . . that when the is clear consistent legislation to know how to draft presumed is of statutes existing its and know all other intent will have that its action or nonaction effect any AvalonBay Communities, . . one of them. . upon Commission, 405, 417, Conn. 908 Zoning v. 280 Inc. Zoning v. & Planning see also Fedus (2006); A.2d 1033 1 751, 779, (2006) 278 900 A.2d Commission, Conn. if intends limit presumption that, legislature (noting express it how to expand jurisdiction, knows or v. Palmer quotation omitted.) marks intent).” (Internal n.12, 285 475 940 Friendly Corp., Ice Cream Conn. Hillebrand, A.2d 742 see also Stein (2008); presumed A.2d (1997) (legislature 35, 42-43, presumed laws and knowledge existing to have of body law). Accordingly, of intend to create harmonious to make a second conviction legislature’s decision year by period punishable a ten under 14-227a within year a strong of one imprisonment of in excess a term felony. it to be a intended legislature indication supports of the statute Thus, plain language of intended a breach conclusion plaintiff asserts, however, The be a crime. 14-227a to violation of is a motor vehicle that a breach of offense from the definition and therefore excluded by we to related l-2z, As look by§ 53a-24 directed (a).11 through 1999, 14-227a within a third conviction From 1983 years. up year period punishable to two a term was ten any provides: “(a) term means The ‘offense’ General Statutes any of this state or which law constitutes breach crime violation apolitical state, subdivision law law or federal or local ordinance other fine, imprisonment or to a state, to a which a term of this sentence imposed, except both, may a motor vehicle violation one that defines comprises ‘crime’ felonies be an infraction. term or is deemed to
statutes for whether ascertaining a of be a intended breach 14-227ato motor vehicle vio- lation. in (a) provides
Section 53a-24 relevant part: “The any term ‘offense’ or means crime violation which con- any any a of stitutes breach law of this state or other state, political federal law or local law a or ordinance of state, subdivision of this a to a which sentence term imprisonment or to a fine, both, may imposed, or be except one a that defines motor vehicle violation or is deemed to be an infraction. ...” Section 53a-24 does define not the term motor vehicle violation. The term defined, violation is however, in General Statutes 53a- provides: 27. Section An offense, for which “(a) fine, sentence authorized is a is a violation unless expressly designated an infraction. Every
“(b) chapter violation defined this is expressly Any designated such. offense defined in any other which expressly designated section is not violation infraction shall be deemed a violation if, notwithstanding express other it designation, within the set (a).” definition forth in subsection
Because the
not
legislature has
defined motor vehicle
violation,
violation,
but has defined
we conclude that
apply
it is reasonable to
the definition of violation to
phrase
Cafe,
violation. See Rainforest
v. Dept.
Inc.
Services,
Revenue
293 Conn.
vehicle person person a and a convicted a a convicted of crime distinction between carry potential 14-227a, a § or vehicle laws that of a violation of other motor imprisonment. First, § to General Statutes 14-44 of the dissent cites term requirements operator’s obtaining a (b), for commercial which delineates the applicant provides part: (b) for “Each an 14-44 in relevant license. Section bearing operator’s or of a license an endorsement the renewal such license vehicles], or the commissioner’s furnish the commissioner motor [of shall prove satisfactory evidence, oath, representative, to under authorized of a and has not been convicted such has no criminal record that years (a) the date section 14-227awithin five of violation of subsection of grant application a to or renew such and that no reason exists for refusal of operator’s bearing ...” license an endorsement. an quoted that, contrary language important in the dis- note to the It is to senting opinion, (b) not word “or” between “criminal § 14-44 does contain the (a) a subsection of “has been convicted of violation of record” and years contrary, . we that five . . .” To the conclude 14-227awithin section applicant language for to have a criminal record of the statute allows an long containing as as it not within for a violation of 14-227a a conviction prohibits Nothing years application. in that this of statute five of the date construing 14-227aas a offense. from criminal court (b) 53a-24, Second, disagree with the that subsection of we dissent exception violation to forth limitation on the motor vehicle which sets supports (a), a in the conclusion that of offense subsection the definition exception to falls within the motor vehicle violation violation of 14-227a part: provides in “Notwith- That subsection relevant the definition of offense. provisions section, standing provisions (a) of of subsection this inclusive, apply 53a-44, vehicle violations. shall to motor 53a-28 sections (b). § 53a-24 asserts that because . 53a-24 The dissent . .” General Statutes apply (b) with terms that convictions references sections violations, procedures applicable describing vehicle to motor when it was
Indeed, 53a-24, the motor vehicle violation exception the definition of offense is limited to those offenses that are as motor vehicle violations. defined Specifically, provides part relevant any term ‘offense’ means crime or violation which “[t]he any law constitutes breach of this state or state, other law federal or local law or ordinance political state, of this which subdivision a sentence to a of imprisonment fine, both, term or to a be imposed, except one defines violation is deemed to be an . . .” infraction. (Emphasis The legislature, added.) therefore, created the term motor vehicle violation to have a discrete within meaning statutory scheme, legisla- ture can define particular breaches of statutes violation, much like it defines a breach See, some statutes as an infraction. General e.g., (“[failure headlamps Statutes 14-96b (d) to have *13 requirements accordance with the of this section shall be an General infraction”); Statutes 14-96c (d) (“[f]ail- lamps ure to tail have or failure to illuminate the rear plate registration required in this section shall be an infraction”); General Statutes 14-96d (c) (“[f]ailure to carry required and mount reflectors as in this section shall be an A infraction”). review of 14-227a reveals legislature has chosen not to define a breach of that statute as a motor vehicle violation.13 Accord- ingly, the failure the legislature to define a breach legislature could not have the term intended violation apply only punishable by to those breaches §§ fine. A review of 53a-28to provisions specified range reveals that some in never could applied See, e.g., ato breach of the motor vehicle laws. General Statutes (addressing §§ imprisonment). Therefore, 53a-35b and 53a-35c life we con- legislature only apply parts clude provisions, that the intended those thereof, range within the stated that are relevant to motor vehicle laws punishable by only fine ato motor vehicle violation. 13 Indeed, chapter a review of the other in statutes the motor vehicle legislature reveals that the has not chosen to define a breach of statute as a motor vehicle violation. violation is evidence vehicle as a motor within for it to fall did not intend the legislature definition exception to the vehicle violation of offense. “define phrase that the persuasive find it
We also [d] in the same violation” is contained a motor vehicle [as] provi- “Where a (a). infraction within 53a-24 clause as we together, more words grouped two or sion contains to the relationship word’s particular often examine its meaning to determine phrases words and associated ” noscitur a sociis. of construction to the canon pursuant Inc. v. Assn., Heights Condominium Cantonbury 724, 740, 873 Development, LLC, 273 Conn. Land Local principle of noscitur (2005). Applying A.2d 898 further bol- motor vehicle violation phrase to the sociis intended legislature sters our conclusion relatively penalties minor breaches exclude of offense. from the definition 14- of § that a breach seems to assert plaintiff simply because violation a motor vehicle
227a is We chapter. within the motor placement its enacted originally 14-227a was At the time § disagree. See Public Acts not exist. the Penal Code did 1963, adopted was not Penal Code No. 1. The legislature after the years six 1969, approximately until under the influence driving to criminalize decided not exist at the Code did the Penal 14-227a. Because placement its 14-227a, adopted time impact on has no vehicle statutes the motor within *14 intent. determining legislative other chapter reveals vehicle of the motor
A review
impris-
a term of
for
14-227a,provide
like
that,
§
statutes
a misde-
breach as
classifying
without
onment
14-
Statutes
instance,
§
General
felony.
a
For
meanor or
refused,
is
or license
registration
while
215 (operating
(reck-
14-222
Statutes §
General
suspended
revoked),
officer
(striking
Statutes §
General
driving),
less
with motor
General Statutes
14-224
vehicle),
(evading
responsibility with motor
and General Statutes
vehicle),
responsibility
operation
14-225
of other
(evading
provide
all
for a term of
with-
vehicles),
felony.
out
the breach as a
a
classifying
misdemeanor or
An
examination
the statutes
the motor vehicle
chapter that the legislature has classified as misdemean-
simply
ors or felonies
reinforces our conclusion that
legislature intended
violation of 14-227a to be
a crime. All or some of the breaches of motor
code
legislature
specifically
has
classified as
misdemeanors
and felonies are much less serious
breaches than driving under the influence of alcohol or
instance,
For
has
drugs.
legislature
classified selling
repairing motor vehicle without a license as a class
B misdemeanor under General
14-52,
Statutes
selling
parts
recy-
used motor vehicle
without a motor vehicle
permit
cler’s
as a class C misdemeanor under General
14-62b,
operating
Statutes
without insurance
felony
D
class
under General Statutes
14-223 (b). It
is axiomatic that
presumed
is
to have
body
acted so as to create a consistent
law.
See
Brown &
Brown,
Blumenthal,
Inc.
v.
297 Conn. 725,
Indeed, supports also conclusion that a second conviction breach of 14-227a within a year ten period felony. is a Section 14-224 addresses *15 motor vehi- operation in the of evading responsibility provides “[a]ny of that 14-224 (f) cles. Subsection in an accident which knowingly who involved person [is injury ... or results in the physical serious causes stop once person and does not at any other death and as be needed give and render such assistance number and name, operator’s license his address injured any or to person number the registration physical injury or witness to death or serious officer be not more than ten thousand any person] shall fined year nor imprisoned not less than one dollars be imprisoned.” years more than ten be both fined and any statute within Applying plaintiff’s reasoning, chapter specified that is not as a the motor vehicle felony and, therefore, not a crime or misdemeanor to ten imprisoned up years be for an individual could it would be 14-224, but still not violation yields a interpretation a crime.14 Such an considered and unreasonable. result that is both absurd supports the further (a) General Statutes 53a-40f legislature intended that second conclusion that felony. as a 14-227a would treated conviction under 14- provision in multiple with the offender Consistent persistent “A provides: operating (g), 227a 53a-40f is a felony offender while under the influence section 53a- of a violation of who stands convicted (1) has, prior the commission (2) or 53a-60d and 56b years, ten preceding present crime within or 53a- of a violation of section 53a-56b been convicted excep “construing the ‘motor vehicle violation’ dissent asserts a breach of of offense in 53a-24 mean tion to the definition attached, law, penalty irrespective construction is the vehicle [treating cases breaches of motor statutes with both these consistent being as potential classified criminal terms body . . . ." of our General Statutes Penal and the Code] offenses entirely disagree to conclude that it is unreasonable We and conclude up imprisoned for to ten an to be intended for individual years is not a crime. for a breach that considered
60d or subsection of section (a) 14-227a or been con any victed in other state of an offense the essential elements of substantially which are the same as section 53a-56b or 53a-60d or subsection (a) section 14- 227a.”15The enumerated offenses, manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle and assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle, axe class C and class D felonies, respectively. person To deem a per sistent felony offender presumably requires that all of the qualifying offenses, in and of themselves, could constitute important felonies. It is also to note that General Statutes 53a-56b and §§ 53a-60d were first ref erenced in 14-227a at the same time that the legislature imprisonment term of increased for a second con up viction years. to two See P.A. 99-255, 1. Accord we ingly, conclude that the legislature’s inclusion of 53a-56b and §§ 53a-60d in § 14-227a (g) evidences its intent that a conviction of a second breach of 14-227a year within a ten period be a felony.16 provides: (b) any General Statutes 53a-40f “When has been persistent operating found to felony offender, while under the influence court, imposing by in lieu of the sentence authorized section 53a-35a person presently may for the crime of which convicted, impose such stands imprisonment by the sentence of authorized said section for the next more degree felony.” serious ‘persistent’ designation dissent concludes that “[t]he is attached to operating influence, by under the an element shared all the conduct— felony designation.” (Emphasis offenses—not the original.) support in In conclusion, of its the dissent relies on the fact that “because a first offense imprisonment under 14-227acarries a maximum term of that would render misdemeanor, subject it a if offense, to classification as a criminal it could felony.” under such circumstances constitute a The dissent also relies driving on the fact that under the influence be considered a lesser included offense position §§of 53a-56b and 53a-60d.The dissent’s distorts plain meaning of the statute. What the dissent fails to note is that the above-referenced criminal statutes were first in § referenced 14-227aat the same time that the increased the term of for a up years. 99-255, second conviction Therefore, to two See P.A. 1. “a provisions conviction under the of section 53a-56bor 53a-60dor a conviction any other state of offense the essential elements of which are deter substantially mined the court to be (1) (2) the same as subdivision of subsection 53a-60d, of this section or section 53a-56bor shall constitute prior conviction for the same (g). offense.” General Statutes 14-227a as a crime is consistent of 14-227a Interpretation An Dukes, reasoning State with this court’s was Dukes, In this court A.2d 10 98, 124, (1988). federal whether a defendant’s to determine required by the were violated rights constitutional and state a motor vehicle during obtained admission of evidence felony operating under the influence “Persistent Section 53a-40fis entitled: being explains That section the elements Authorized sentences.” offender. felony . . .” persistent operating offender . while under the influence “[a] (a). Although word *17 § 53a-40fdoes not define the § Statutes 53a-40f General “insistently persistent means, usage, persistent, in the word its common Dictionary Heritage English repetitive Lan- American or continuous.” Co., Equipment guage (3d 1992); Service & see also Potvin Lincoln Ed. provide 633, (“When (2010) does not a a statute 6 A.3d particular definition, phrases in statute are to be construed words and a usage. usage, according that we look ... To ascertain to their common quotation omitted.]). dictionary marks definition ofthe term.” [Internal to the Thus, (1) § § a violation of 53a-56bor 53a- been convicted of if someone has present 60d, (2) “prior crime and within the commission of the has to years, 53a-56b preceding of a violation of section ten been convicted in (a) 14-227a or been convicted of section or 53a-60d or subsection substantially elements of which are of an offense the essential other state 14- or subsection of section 53a-56b or 53a-60d the same as section persistent operating person 227a”; (a); that is a § Statutes 53a-40f General felony There is no need to torture the influence offender. while under previously was con- wording It clear that if an individual of this statute. is statutes, designated individ- criminal that § 14-227aand violated the victed of fortiori, felony persistent driving offender. A under the influence ual is a felony subsequent for the convictions §of 14-227ais the first offense Clearly, felony qualify persistent driving offenses. under the influence as felony § offenses in 14-227a legislature’s include these other decision to imprisonment possible for a term of time that it increased at the same that the intended §of 14-227a demonstrates second breach felony. up years penalty We need to be a with a to two second offense dissent, offense, since it is the second as does the not refer to the first note, parenthetically, present question in case. We is in offense that that, respect recognition to a however, the fact that the dissent’s 14-227a, . . . would the “term of § first conviction posi- only misdemeanor,” dissent’s serves to weaken the further render it a Contrary to the dissent’s deal with a crime. § 14-227a does not tion language statute, coupled with the inserted position, it our view that this is strong legislative to make a second intent in evinces §in 14-227a explanation felony. ratio- There can be no other § 14-227aa breach of finding nally explains prior as the basis for under the statute violation felony operating person persistent the influence while under is that a “[a] (a). § Statutes 53a-40f . . . .” General offender stop in violation of General 14- speeding Statutes § 219 and a motor operating vehicle while license under suspension in violation of General Statutes 14-215. § In Id., discussion, 100-101. its the court concluded that a violation of 14-215is a misdemeanor, notwithstanding that, 14-227a, the fact like 14-215is contained within chapter the motor vehicle and was explicitly classi- Id., fied as a misdemeanor. 124. Accordingly, the court’s interpretation of 14-215 as a misdemeanor consis- tent with interpretation felony. our of 14-227a as a acknowledge
We
on
legislature,
occasion, has
used the term
phrase
violation and the
violation
a manner that is inconsistent with the defini-
tion of violation
an
punishable by
offense
fine
as set forth in 53a-27. See General Statutes
(e) (2) (referring
probation
conditions relevant
for “a motor vehicle violation for which a sentence to
a term
imprisonment may
General
imposed”);
Statutes
53a-173 (a) (1) (addressing
appear
failure to
in second
degree
context of
“charged with
*18
the commission of a misdemeanor or a motor vehicle
violation for which a sentence to a term of imprison-
may
ment
be
General
imposed”);
Statutes
53a-222a
violation of
(addressing
conditions of release in
second
degree
context of
“charged with the
commission of a misdemeanor or motor vehicle viola-
tion for which a sentence
imprisonment
to
term of
maybe
inconsistency
This
imposed”).
rise to
gives
some
ambiguity
53a-24 as to
phrase
whether the
vehicle violation
only
apply
is intended
to
to breaches
of a statute for
may
which
fines
be imposed, or
also to breaches of a statute for which a term of impris-
may
imposed.
onment
“A statute is ambiguous if,
when
in context,
read
it is susceptible to more than
In re Jan
interpretation.”
one reasonable
D.,
Carlos
297
16, 21,
Conn.
Therefore,
whether a second conviction for
as to
ambiguous
year
felony.
is a
period
of
within a ten
breach
14-227a
principles
statutory
construc-
well established
Under
when
we
look to “the
tion,
ambiguous,
a statute
its
history
surrounding
circumstances
legislative
to
enactment,
policy
designed
it was
legislative
relationship to
implement,
existing legislation
and to its
principles
general
the same
governing
and common law
quotation
. . .”
marks
subject
(Internal
matter .
omit-
Orr,
State 642, 651,
clusion that the year period felony. to be a of 14~227awithin a ten tion 1963, Acts was in 1963. Public adopted Section 14-227a terms 616, time, 1. At that the statute authorized No. Specifically, provided the statute for imprisonment. for first of not than six months more sixty days than more than one offense; not less nor not six months year offense; for a second less than year offense. See subsequent more than one for a nor In 616, 1983, legislature No. 1. Public Acts terms possible the statute and increased the amended more than six imprisonment under the statute not year, one offense; for a first more than months cannot be sus- horns which forty-eight consecutive for not more than reduced, offense; a second pended suspended thirty days which cannot be years, two Acts a third offense.17 See Public reduced, explicitly did not state The dissent relies on fact that penalty for a 14-227a that increased amendments year period a ten to not more 14-227a within second conviction *19 years felony. Specifically, it a dissent asserts that than two made it “simply accept legislature would intended to establish cannot that the have felony acknowledgment without the barest new under our General Statutes a herein, consequences.” explained how As we have that decision and its repeat driving ever, under the was the first time that a offense of felony. Indeed, a third has treated influence was deemed a No. 83-534. In statute was amended again to possible include the current imprisonment— terms of namely, months, not more than six forty-eight consecu- tive hours of which suspended reduced, cannot be offense; first not more than years, two 120 consecutive days of which suspended cannot be or reduced, for a second conviction within ten years; and not more than year three years, one of which suspended not be in any reduced for a manner, third offense.18P.A. 99- 255, 1 (h).
A examination thorough of the legislative history sur- rounding these amendments reveals that the legislature considered driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs a serious criminal Indeed, offense. each of these amendments was to designed discourage driving under the influence making penalties more severe. In the 1983 discussing amendments to 14-227a, Repre- sentative Martha D. explained Rothman the purpose as follows: we’re about talking to starting “[W]hat public attitude change about drunken drivers. Can this attitude be changed? Yes, it can be ... . We, said, as I are on a course now that is beginning change. Change our whole attitude and exactly that is what we’re talking today. about I’m not sure that this is going be the end-all. Truly, probably just it’s step the first in that certainly direction. But it step is a right direction I and urge passage of this amendment.” 26 H.R. Proc.,
Pt. 19, Sess., p. 6916. on Remarking the same felony Therefore, conviction under 14-227a as a since 1983. we are not persuaded legislature’s felony failure to mention the term in dis- cussing legislative 1999amendments to 14-227ais indicative of intent. important 54-56g provides It is also note that General Statutes pretrial program alcohol facing education for individuals who are their first charge eligible completes of violation of 14-227a. If an individual program, Therefore, he or she is not convicted of a violation of 14-227a. cases, in most who is convicted for a second violation of § 14- year period actually charged 227a within a ten has been with a violation of during period. § 14-227athree times
167 said, Alan R. amendment, Representative Schlesinger just today, we’re to make statement here going “[i]f you’re you if and one, [repeat get is that offender] [it] you you and come pretrial again and come back you’re thing do some time. That’s one again, gonna back today.” Id., p. 6764; I here think we want to establish id., p. 6685, Representative Eugene see also remarks of stopped. A. has to be We Migliaro (“[Drunk driving] And be damned. plea bargaining have to get tough. pay Let these individuals the fine. Let these individuals jail people these off the road so that the go get Sunday holiday families can out on a drive go safety id., and not have to fear for their lives.”); Representative Edith p. 6687, Prague (drunk remarks only a slap drivers can no be let “off with on longer the wrist”).
In amended 14- 1985, legislature again when adopted “per violation, legislators 227a and se” under the again recognized driving the seriousness nature influence and commented on the criminal Thomas Dudchik instance, Representative offense. For . . will punish- said that . make the legislation “[t]his Proc., 19, ment fit the crime . . . .” 28 H.R. Pt. 1985 James Giulietti also remarked Sess., p. 7031. Senator “I ... it is legislation as follows: am favor this only that I’ve seen piece driving legislation of drunk Assembly, General and that we’ve voted fron[t] An individual who on, that deals with the individual. drunk . . . This driving. has committed the crime of pinpoints individual, punishes an is the bill that 28 S. severely driving.” an more for drunk individual, H.R. Sess., p. 3951; Proc., Pt. see also 28 Proc., 12,1985 Representative remarks of Sess., p. 7035, Pt. driving “crime David Wenc whether (asking [of under the state law as-defined meet[s] influence] Proc., H.R. crime”); as the federal the same definition remarks of Sess., pp. 10,879-80, 10,912, Pt. and Richard Cun- Wenc, Farr, Robert Representatives amendment question of whether *21 ningham (addressing intoxication is proof limit as blood alcohol setting alcohol driving for with blood forth “new crime” setting “new definition for the specified level, content above Proc., 28 S. crimes’’); or “two different present crime” 5364-66, remarks of Senators Sess., pp. 1986 16, Pt. O’Leary (characteriz- Richard Johnston and Cornelius prose- therein as “criminal punishment statute and ing penalty,” offense”). and “criminal cutions,” “criminal 14-227a to amended 1999, legislature again In of not more than provide for a term of years. within ten In years for a second offense two amendment, legislature again of this the discussion penalties under 14-227a as “criminal referred to the as “criminalizing” and discussed the statute penalties” Sess., pp. 2903-2904, Proc., 9,1999 conduct. See 42 S. Pt. 42 H.R. Looney; Martin see also remarks of Senator Representa- remarks of 19,1999 Sess., p. 6732, Pt. Proc., Doyle person glass drank a of wine (“[i]f tive Paul .02 the normal criminal penalties and it was above basically first, and for the apply would pro- . . . alcohol education would able to get [emphasis added]). gram” history it is abun- reveals, foregoing legislative As the considered dantly driving clear that In fact, report influence a serious crime. under the incorporated which was 1116, on Senate Bill Substitute by the office of 99-255, prepared legislative into P.A. P.A. passing research, legislature, indicates for a second convic- increasing penalty 99-255 and year was period, 14-227a within a ten well tion under § considered a crimi- aware that a breach of 14-227awas Research, Legislative nal offense. See Office of Analysis Substitute Senate Bill Amended Bill at http://cga.ct.gov/ps99/ba/1999SB-01115- available 30, 2010). visited December (last R00-BA.htm
169
“
legislative
office of
the comments
‘Although
themselves, evidence
in and of
not,
are
research
on the
they
legisla
bear
intent,
properly
legislative
could
interpretive problems knowledge
ture’s
Transit, Inc.,
286
Harpaz v. Laidlaw
arise from a bill.’
cf. State
v.
n.15,
(2008);
172 felony.22 In the influence as a driving tion for under was 14-227a, legislature our amendments adopting § under the influence laws other driving mindful of to have Connecticut law be consistent sought states and Proc., 28 H.R. jurisdictions. See, e.g., with that of other Representative Sess., p. 7035, remarks of 19, Pt. 1985 driving whether “crime under (asking Wenc [of under the state law meets the as defined influence] crime”). Accordingly, same definition as the federal majority of states that treat overwhelming based on the under the influence subsequent driving convictions for persuaded that our did felonies, we are influence to fall within driving not intend for under the exception vehicle violation to the definition the motor of offense.23 [McKinney [2009]); 1996]); (N.C. § North Carolina Gen. Stat 20-138.5 § 1193 [1997]; (N.D. § N.D. 39- § North Dakota Cent. Code 12.1-32-01 Cent. Code 2929.14, 2929.16, [2008]); (Ohio §§ Rev. Code Ann. 2929.18 08-01 Ohio [B] [3], [2006]; [2008]); §Ann. 4511.99 2929.19 and 2929.21 Ohio. Rev. Code [C] 47, [2007]); Oregon (Or. (Okla. § Oklahoma Stat. tit. 11-902 Rev. Stat. 813.010, [2007]); Pennsylvania (75 §§ 161.605 and 161.615 Pa. Const. Stat. 3802, 3735.1, 2006]); (R.I. and Rhode Island Gen. §§
Ann.
3804 [West
16-1-10, 16-1-20,
[2010]);
(S.C.
§§
Ann.
§
Laws 31-27-2
South Carolina
Code
[2003];
[2006]);
16-1-90
and 16-1-100
S.C. Code Ann. 56-5-2940
South
[F]
[2006];
(S.D.
Laws
§§
Dakota
Codified Laws
22-6-1 and 22-6-2
S.D. Codified
seq.
[2010];
[2004]);
(Term.
Code Ann.
40-35-111
§ 32-23-2 et
Tennessee
[Sup.
(Tex.
2010]);
Term.
Ann.
55-10-403
Texas
Penal Code Ann.
Code
12.21, 12.22, 12.34,
2003]);
(Utah
§§
49.04 and 49.09
Utah
Code Ann.
[West
[2009];
[2005]);
(Vt.
Ann. tit.
Vt. Stat. Ann.
§ 41-6a-505
Vermont
Stat.
[2009]); Virginia
[f|,
(Va.
§§
tit.
Code Ann.
18.2-10
18.2-11
[a]
[2009]);
Virginia (W.
Ann.
18.2-270
West
Va. Code
17C-5-2 [LexisNexis
346.63,346.65,939.50
2009]);
(Wis.
§§
Stat. Ann.
and 940.25
Wisconsin
[West
2005]); Wyoming (Wyo.
[2009]).
§§
Stat. Ann.
6-10-101 and 31-5-233
22Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, New York and Oklahoma treat a second con
felony.
previously explained
driving
As
viction for
influence as
herein;
opinion;
presence
pretrial
see footnote 18 of this
due to the
Connecticut,
program, in
a second convic
alcohol education
most cases
usually
actually
tion under
indicates that the
has
been
year period
times in a ten
for a violation of 14-227a.
arrested three
“unpersuaded
that the choices
other
The dissent asserts
it is
majority
present question;
states in this area are relevant to the
has not
pointed
comparable
exception
state with a
in their
question
laws, meaning
classifying operating a motor vehicle
*25
commentary
the definition of offense
The official
intent to treat
legislature’s
evidences the
in 53a-24 also
offense and not
14-227a as a criminal
a breach of §
exception
violation
within the motor vehicle
include it
commentary explains:
of offense. The
to the definition
‘crime’,
‘offense’,
the terms
This section defines
“(a).
which means
is a
term
general
and ‘violation’. ‘Offense’
i.e., one that
local ‘criminal’
a breach of state or
law —
breach thereof.
or fine for
calls for
felony or misdemeanor.
‘Viola-
means either a
‘Crime’
in connection with section
tion’, which must be read
calling only
53a-27, means an
fine for
offense
for
‘violation’, which is
concept
The
of a
breach thereof
new. Section 53a-
Code,
Model Penal
taken from the
a violation does not
clear that conviction of
makes
disability
disadvantage
based
legal
rise to
‘give
a new category
criminal offense.’ It is
on conviction of a
pro-
which should be
offense; conduct
of non-criminal
way
in no
brand
for which should
scribed but conviction
example,
Thus,
the offender
‘criminal.’
only
a violation can truth-
been convicted
who has
been
question:
you
Have
ever
fully answer ‘no’ to the
.
.
The definition of
(b).
a crime? .
convicted of
clear that it does not
makes
‘offense’
subsection
purpose
The
this
infractions.
include motor vehicle
operation
Code,
except
provision is to
from
(b), motor vehicle
except
provided in subsection
statute,
be,
would
as a matter of
influence in other states
while under the
dissenting opinion.
simpler
As we
See footnote 31 of the
a far
exercise.”
history
herein,
legislative
explained
§of 14-227a demonstrates
have
years
many
have been intended
§to
14-227a over
of the amendments
driving
with the law of other
influence law consistent
make
under the
our
Accordingly,
federally
guidelines.
whether other
recommended
states and
exception
factor that is
is irrelevant.
have a motor vehicle
states
intended a second conviction
our
indicative of whether
felony
year period
that the vast
be a
is the fact
a ten
§ 14-227a within
repeat
driving
majority
under the influence as
offenses of
of other states treat
exception.
felony, regardless
have a motor vehicle
whether those states
provides
Subsection
(b), however,
infractions.
sentencing principles enumerated
sections 53a-28 to
53a-44, inclusive,
apply
should
to motor vehicle viola-
Thus,
tions.
a motor vehicle violator would have the
limits of his sentence determined
the motor vehicle
*26
section, since his ‘offense’ would be an ‘unclassified
within the
meaning
(c);
misdemeanor’
section 53a-26
principles
but he would be sentenced under the
procedures of sections 53a-28 to 53a-44.” (Emphasis
Statutes,
Commission to Revise the Criminal
added.)
Comments,
Penal Code
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. (West
“
53a-24, comment, pp. 454-55.
‘While the com-
2007) §
hardly
law,
mission comment
has the force of enacted
Valeriano v.
it, nevertheless, may furnish
guidance.’
Bronson,
State
75, 94,
209 Conn.
177 intent, nothing to do to do with nothing gence, Sess., p. 884, Proc., 3, 24 H.R. Pt. 1981 . . . drinking State Richard D. Tulisano.” Representative remarks of legislative on this primarily 697. Based Kluttz, supra, v. 14-222a concluded that Appellate Court history, exception violation motor vehicle fell within the explained have Id., 698. As we definition of offense. history of contrary to the herein, legislative previously 14-227a history surrounding § 14-222a, legislative impose criminal intent to clearly legislative evidences influence. under the driving on convictions penalties in KLuttz Court’s Appellate reasoning Accordingly, a conviction for whether inapplicable determining is year period 14-227a within a ten breach of § a second felony. is a subse cases, on a number of plaintiff also relies Appellate decision, in which the
quent to the KLuttz
under
that a conviction
Corut concluded
it falls within the motor
not a crime because
offense. These
to the definition of
exception
violation
they simply
force because
persuasive
lack
decisions
undertaking
without
adopted the KLuttz conclusion
Brown,
App.
v.
22 Conn.
analysis. See State
independent
216
denied,
cert.
Kluttz),
A.2d 699
108, 111,
(citing
Conn.
Trahan,
A.2d 61
State
(1990);
Conn.
Brown
portion of
(citing
simply
whether the conviction constituted a
particular purpose
crime for the
at issue. See State v.
Harrison,
758, 761,
228 Conn.
On
foregoing,
the basis of the
we conclude that the
14-227a,
relationship
its
language
statutes,
to other
legislative history
commentary
its
and the
to the Penal
Code reveal that the legislature
driving
intended
under
the influence to
abe
criminal offense and not to fall
within
exception
the motor vehicle violation
to the defi-
nition of an offense, and, therefore, a second conviction
year period
14-227a within a ten
constitutes
Harrison, supra,
763,
In
v.
State
228 Conn.
court
this
noted: “We have
previously
may may
purposes
held that
not be a criminal offense for
[w]hat
particular statutory categorization
necessarily
of a
is not
determinative of
purposes
Guckian,
whether it is a criminal offense for
.... State v.
[other]
191, 198,
(1993), quoting
Kluttz, supra,
Conn.
KATZ, J., ROGERS, J., with whom a join, majority The concludes that LAN, J., dissenting. while for a motor vehicle operating second conviction in liquor or intoxicating drugs the influence of under 14-227a1must constitute violation of General Statutes part: person provides “(a) in No shall Statutes 14-227a relevant General intoxicating liquor operate of or the influence a motor vehicle while under any person operating drug of a or both. A commits the offense any intoxicating liquor drug or if such while the influence of or both intoxicating person operates (1) a while under the influence of motor vehicle any both, person liquor (2) drug or has an elevated blood or while such or section, purposes alcohol of this ‘elevated blood alcohol content. Por eight- person a of alcohol in the blood of such that is content’ means ratio alcohol, weight per . . . ‘motor cent or more of and hundredths of one vehicle, are all-terrain as those terms includes a snowmobile and vehicle’ . . . defined in section 14-379. any provision Any person this “(g) of subsection of who violates violation, (1) (A) less a be fined not For conviction of first section shall: dollars, (B) be or than thousand and hundred dollars more one than five forty-eight months, of (i) imprisoned consecutive hours not more than six manner, imprisoned (ii) may suspended not not be or reduced which months, sentence of with the execution of such more than six imposed requiring suspended entirely period probation as a condi- and a of probation person perform of hundred hours one tion such such 14-227e, person’s (C) community service, and have such as defined in section operator’s operating privilege sus- license or nonresident motor vehicle year; pended (2) violation within ten of a second for one conviction offense, years prior (A) less be fined not a conviction for the same after dollars, (B) impris- than four thousand be than thousand dollars more one twenty days years, consecutive more than two one hundred oned not any manner, suspended to and sentenced or reduced in which probation period probation requiring such of such as condition community service, person perform defined one hundred hours twenty-one years age 14-227e, (C) (i) if is under such section
a felony inteiprets because it terms of that statute dictate such conclusion because it tex deems tual and legis extratextual evidence to indicate that the lature intended such breach2 be treated as a serious offense. If consider, these were the sources to I might be Penal agree. Code, however, inclined offense, person’s operator’s at the time of the have such *31 suspended operating privilege years license or nonresident for three or until twenty-first birthday, person’s longer, the date of such whichever is and be prohibited two-year period completion following period for the of of such suspension operating from a motor unless such vehicle motor vehicle is equipped functioning, approved ignition device, with a interlock as defined 14-227j, (ii) twenty-one years age in section if such or of or older offense, person’s operator’s at the time of the have such motor vehicle operating suspended year privilege license or nonresident for one and be prohibited two-year period completion following period for the of such of suspension operating from a motor vehicle unless such motor vehicle is equipped approved functioning, ignition device, with a interlock as defined 14-227j; (3) subsequent in section for third and conviction of a violation years prior offense, (A) within ten a after conviction for the same fined be eight dollars, not (B) less than two dollars thousand or more than thousand imprisoned years, year than not more three of one which not be suspended any manner, aperiod probation or in reduced and sentenced to of requiring probation person perform of as a condition such such that one community service, 14-227e, (C) hundred hours of as defined section person’s operator’s operating have such or license nonresident privilege permanently upon purposes revoked such third offense. For imposition penalties subsequent pursuant of for a second or third and offense subsection, provisions (a) to this a conviction under of subsection 1,1981, thereafter, this section in on October effect or as amended a convic- provisions (1) (2) tion (a) under the of either subdivision of subsection section, provisions of this a conviction under the of section 53a-56b or 53a- any any 60d or a conviction in other state of offense the essential elements substantially of which are determined court to be the same as subdivi- (1) (2) sion of subsection of this section or section 53a- 53a-56b or 60d, prior shall a constitute conviction for the same offense . . . .” Although changes been there have several made to 14-227a since proceedings present case, changes time of the relevant in the those are appeal and, majority, relevant to this consistent I refer herein to majority opinion. the current revision the statutes. See footnote of the 2Throughout dissenting opinion, generic this I the term “breach” use as a prohibited by given statutory provision. term to indicate that is conduct clarity, my “violation,” “infraction,” In the interests of use of the terms “offense,” meanings provided or their various forms is to the restricted through General §§ Statutes 53a-27. of a criminal exception an definition provides violations,” and the offense “motor vehicle exception that renders the entire of that interpretation falls is one under which scheme harmonious apply this exception. under Rather than fundamen that principle statutory construction, however, tal essentially ren majority embraces construction with prior Consistent exception meaningless. ders the statutory I appellate law, case would conclude compel history, and related statutes text, legislative excep that the “motor vehicle violation” the conclusion law.3 of a There tion refers breach fore, proper what I view to be the construction 14-227a falls within exception, of that breach an exception and thus cannot not be considered I would that a second Accordingly, offense. conclude 14-227a cannot constitute qualifying violation felony. *32 on of the “motor vehi- appeal meaning This turns the “ ” exception to the definition of ‘offense’
cle violation”
question
a
of
statu-
(a),4
under General Statutes §
opinion,
recognize
dissenting
I
As
later in this
noted
expressly
designated
misde
breaches of certain motor vehicle statutes as
has
given
designations
the
are
their effect under
meanors or felonies. These
re
specific provisions
ones. In
general
over more
rule that more
control
D.,
(“[i]tis
16,25,997A.2d471 (2010)
Jan
a well
Carlos
297 Conn.
established
specific
covering
principle
statutory
terms in a
construction that
statute
of
subject
prevail
general language
given
will
over the more
a
matter
quota
might
controlling”
that otherwise
be
[internal
same or another statute
omitted]).
tion marks
any
provides: “(a) The term
means
§ 53a-24
‘offense’
General Statutes
any
of
law of this state or
crime
violation which constitutes
breach
or
political
any
state,
of
or
law or ordinance
subdivision
federal law local
other
fine,
state,
or to a
a sentence to
term
of this
which
both, may
imposed, except
that defines motor vehicle violation
or
be
one
comprises felonies and
to
an infraction. The term ‘crime’
deemed
be
Every
‘violation’. Convic
which is not a ‘crime’ is a
misdemeanors.
offense
disability
disadvantage
give
legal
to
tion of a violation shall not
rise
a criminal offense.
based on conviction of
section,
provisions
the
“(b) Notwithstanding
of this
the
subsection
inclusive,
apply
53a-44,
provisions
shall
to motor vehicle
of sections 53a-28
tory interpretation over
we
plenary
which
exercise
review. Ziotas v. Reardon
Firm, P.C.,
Law
Conn.
579, 587,
“. are guided principle that the legis- [W]e [also] always presumed lature is to have created a harmonious body and consistent of law .... tenet of statu- [T]his tory . . . requires construction us to read statutes they together when relate subject to the same matter .... Accordingly, determining meaning of a [i]n ... statute we look not the provision at at issue, also to statutory but the broader scheme ensure coherency our quotation (Internal construction.” Proper- marks omitted.) Healthcare Hartford/Windsor ties, LLC v. Hartford, 191, 197-98, 3 A.3d 56 (2010).
Interpreting statutory scheme at pres- issue ent case involves consideration of distinct, several related, statutory but provisions. To determine whether a conviction under 14-227a can felony, constitute a I *33 begin the Penal Code’s definition of that term. A felony is defined as a person for which “[a]n offense may be imprisonment sentenced to a term of in excess year of one . . . .” (Emphasis added.) General Statutes (a). 53a-25 The Penal “[a]ny Code instructs provisions apply violations. Said shall to convictions under section la-278 except any mandatory imposed of execution minimum sentence provisions may suspended.” of said section not be any general section of the stat- defined other offense sentence, expressly specified virtue of an which, utes . . . deemed an unclassi- within definition is [is] th[is] 14- felony.” 53a-25 Because (c). fied General Statutes that a second conviction under (g) provides 227a (2) a years punished by be term within ten can that statute it imprisonment years,” of “not more than two of a requirement the incarceration undoubtedly meets felony. resolved, however, must be Thus, the issue that as of 14-227a is an “offense” is whether a breach term is defined under the Penal Code. “any part is
The term offense defined relevant any a breach of or violation which constitutes crime state, law or local or other federal law of this state political state, of this of a subdivision law or ordinance imprisonment which a term of or a sentence to except one that may imposed, fine, both, a or defines an or is deemed to be a motor vehicle violation infrac- tion. comprises felonies misde- The term ‘crime’ added.) General Statutes (Emphasis meanors. ...” (felony an offense is either a crime Thus, 53a-24 (a). violation, a unless the breach con- misdemeanor) is an infrac- a vehicle violation or deemed stitutes motor felony, providing In definition tion. addition misdemeanor, the terms Penal also defines Code and infraction. violation are provided, crimes distin to the definitions
Turning See imprisonment. Gen by potential term guished General Statutes (felony); 53a-25 (a) eral Statutes § By offense, contrast, 53a-26 (a) (misdemeanor).5 “[a]n is a is a fine, authorized for which the sentence expressly an infraction.” designated violation unless is A breach of 14-227a (a). Statutes General provides: “An for which § 53a-26 offense General Statutes year than one not more be sentenced to term a misdemeanor.” *34 an it designated infraction, is not a violation potential 53a-27 because it carries varying
terms of imprisonment depending on whether it is a fust repeat offense. See General Statutes (g); opinion. see also 1 of dissenting footnote this There fore, a breach 14-227a is either a crime that falls within the definition of offense under (a), a motor vehicle violation that falls within the exception to that definition. phrase
The “motor vehicle violation” is not defined in the Penal Code or in the elsewhere General Statutes. In a statutory definition, the absence of it appear, would at blush, first that the legislature incorpo- intended to rate the phrase definition “violation” into the “motor vehicle violation.” Applying definition would limit the exception to those motor vehicle laws pun- that are only. by ishable fine See General Statutes 53a-27 (a). majority an Although adopt would additional limita- tion to that exception, such that it would encom- pass those breaches that have been designated expressly as “motor violations,” vehicle its own an admission, interpretation such would create a null set of and, “motor vehicle violations”6 accordingly, ren- superfluous. der the exception Undoubtedly, such rejected, result must princi- as it contravenes settled ples of construction. See Foley State Elections v. Commission, 764, 792, 297 Conn. 2 A.3d Enforcement 823 (2010) statutory (“[i]n construing language, ‘[n]o part of a legislative enactment is to be treated as insig- unnecessary, nificant or is a presumption there purpose every sentence, phrase behind clause or . . . and no in a word statute is to be treated as superflu- Vibert ous’ ”); see Education, Board also msoority acknowledges opinion of its footnote 13 that “a review chapter of the other in the motor statutes reveals that the has not chosen to define breach of as a motor statute vehicle violation.” *35 word in statute (2002) (every A.2d 1076 167, 176, 793 meaning). have presumed to recognize I majority’s aside, the construction
Putting of “viola- incorporate if were to the definition that we vehicle into the term “motor tion” under 53a-27 § would not render the such construction violation,” it limit to exception superfluous, application as would punishable by are motor vehicle laws that numerous Under that only. (a). fine See General Statutes § excep- not fall into the view, a breach of 14-227a would Indeed, 14- to a criminal offense. tion the definition of prosecution . . . .”7 Gen- 227a term “criminal uses the (b) (e). eral 14-227a Statutes majority argues 14-227a the “motor The the exclusion of from that exception supported the that also is fact vehicle violation” usage, however, operating influence. That refers to the “offense” the compel legislative When defin intent. is insufficient to conclusion about prohibited punishment prescribed, ing conduct commonly understood, chapter as that term is often uses the word “offense” means, “[Ojffense” gener than it is defined under the Penal Code. rather as Dictionary 2009); law”; (9th ally, of the Black’s Law Ed. violation “[a] Dictionary Collegiate (10th . . . “an of law .” Merriam-Webster’s infraction 1995). Ed. addressing stop provision example, to a failure For the motor vehicle designates signaled by police as an “offense” and when officer is referred to (Rev. . .” General to its terms as an “infraction . . Statutes a breach of (i) (1) (referring 2009) (a); § 14-36 to see General Statutes 14-223 also committing who “be to have commit shall deemed individual first “offense” infraction, infraction”). expressly designated as an how- an An offense ted expressly offense, ever, as is a “motor from the definition is excluded vehicle violation.” prosecution” majority upon use term “criminal also relies reaching While this § 14-227a a crime. §in 14-227ain its conclusion that majority’s conclusion, support superficially appears reference “prosecuted” persons may legislature for breaches who be has referred to carry imprisonment. no See General laws that term of “may jointly persons prosecuted (a) (referring be who Statutes 14-107 expressly provisions, including individually [specified ones for violation of (i) (addressing designated ‘infractions’]”); § 14-286 how as General Statutes opera- provision dealing “prosecuted” for breach of individual designated infraction). cycles, provision expressly tion of motorized prosecution” Indeed, §in looking 14- at the of the term “criminal context incorporate simply may this suggests use term 227a
“It is of course
that,
true
when a statutory definition
applies to a statutory term, the
apply
courts must
question
definition. The
present
case, however,
is whether the statutory
applies
definition
in the first
instance.” Commissioner
Environmental Protection
v. Mellon,
I begin with the definition of ‘offense’ in subsec- tion of (b) 53a-24, which sets forth a limitation on the motor exception in subsection of (a) 53a-24.8 provides Section 53a-24 (b) part: relevant “Notwith- standing provisions of subsection of this section, provisions of sections 53a-28 to 53a-44, inclusive, apply shall to motor vehicle . . .” violations. A review of the enumerated provisions, which concern sentenc- procedures process certain standards and seeking into the of a conviction 14-227a, implying for breach of process rather than that the will be a prosecution Specifically, prosecution for a “crime.” the reference to such a establishing evidentiary used in the course of proceedings rules for seeking conviction for a breach of 14-227a. opinion dissenting See footnote 4 of this for the text of 53a-24. majority provisions that the vast these ing, reveals imprisonment.9 with terms apply convictions phrase “motor vehicle If the had intended legislature only, fine punishable violation” to refer to breaches unlikely it would have referred to such a it seems If the term inapplicable provisions. broad range is construed to include “motor vehicle violation” imprisonment, I avoid punishable by a term of breaches superfluous. provisions See most of these rendering AvalonBay Communities, Orange, Inc. is basic tenet
557, 588-89, (2001) (“It A.2d not intend did statutory construction . . . meaningless provisions. Accordingly, to enact provisions all care must be taken to effectuate quotation omitted; internal marks statute.” [Citation omitted.]). enumerated
Significantly, one of sections to “a vehicle violation refers range specifically imprisonment may a sentence to term of for which . . imposed (e) (2) . .” General Statutes of probation).10 of sentence conditions (addressing *37 9 Appellate previously §§ noted: “General Statutes 53a- As the Court has which, alia, inter through are of the [C]ode 28 53a-44 the sections [P]enal for the classified and unclassified offenses set out the authorized sentences provide sentencing felonies, violations) (i.e., and for such misdemeanors and discharge probation, and unconditional dis as conditional mechanisms by meaningless charge. (b)] the be state’s 53a-24 would rendered [Section violations,’ analysis, meaning the of ... 53a- ‘motor vehicle within since purpose only Yet, (a), transgressions carrying fine. be a the of 24 could sentencing principles (b)] enumerated is to make that ‘the 53a-24 clear [§ ’ inclusive, apply 53a-44, to motor vehicle violations. in 53a-28 to shall sections Comments, Statutes, Code Revise Penal [Conn. Commission to the Criminal by 53a-24], purpose legisla p. no served 8. There would be Gen. Stat. Ann. tively sentencing provisions authorizing application of of [P]enal suspension [C]ode, i.e., of of condi execution sentences of probation discharge, ‘motor vehicle to a tioned on terms of conditional only authorizing of statutes if a ‘motor vehicle violation’ consisted violation’ Kluttz, App. 686, 693-94, by punishment 9 521 A.2d State a fine.” Conn. (1987). 178 person sentencing (e) provides: “When a to General Statutes 53a-28 (1) period probation of a misdemeanor has been convicted a of who appears provisions
Identical in the other language in the Penal Code in which the has used the legislature term “motor vehicle violation . . . General Statutes (a)11 (addressing appear 53a-173 failure to in second General Statutes 53a-222a12 viola- degree); (addressing tion of conditions of release in second degree). More- a over, has used similar “for which imprisonment may to a term imposed” sentence of be procedure in chapter the criminal language Gen- eral referring Statutes when to motor vehicle violations. See General Statutes 54-56Z shall a (a) (“[t]here be supervised diversionary program persons for with psy- of or chiatric disabilities accused a crime crimes or or motor vehicle violation violations for which a sen- imprisonment may tence to a term of imposed, be which use, attempted physical did not involve use or use of threatened force person against (2) another a motor vehicle violation which a sentence for imprisonment may imposed, consider, to a term be shall the court of person probation, ordering perform condition such sentence to community community service in which offense or violation community appropriate, occurred. If the court determines service is community implemented by community such service be court estab- lished accordance with section 51-181cif the offense or violation occurred jurisdiction community within the of a court established said section.” (Emphasis added.) provides: (a) person guilty General Statutes is “A of failure appear degree (1) charged to in the second when while the commission of a or a misdemeanor motor vehicle violation which a sentence to for imposed imprisonment may term on bail while out or released procedure law, person wilfully appear under other fails such when legally according person’s promise called of such bail the terms bond or appear, (2) probation while on of a conviction misdemeanor or violation, person wilfully appear legally such fails to when relating hearing probation.” called for court to a violation such (Emphasis added.) provides: guilty General Statutes 53a-222a “A of violation *38 degree when, charged of of release in conditions the second while the of a commission misdemeanor motor vehicle violation which a for imprisonment may imposed, term sentence to a be such is released of pursuant (b) 54-63c, (c) to subsection of section subsection of section 54- intentionally (c) 63d or subsection of section 54-64a and violates one or imposed (Emphasis added.) of more of the conditions release.” a serious see nature”); violations are not of crimes or any “the case of (f) (in also General Statutes for which a of a violation sentence person convicted imprisonment may imposed, be the board to a term of pardons authority grant have to paroles] shall [of in the conditioned, provisional absolute, pardon, a any person as in the of convicted of same manner case similarly phrase the That against state”).13 an offense which autho- (a), treated in General Statutes 51-193u motor “[cjases involving rizes a to handle magistrate sec- violations, alleged violations of excluding 14-215, 14-222, 14-222a, 14-224 and 14-227a and tions involving possible motor a other vehicle violation my . In has imprisonment sum, term of ...” review consistently refer yielded numerous statutes that to punishable by impris- a term of motor vehicle violations a not exist under Notably, onment. such violation could adopted by majority. my the In interpretation view, the intent that the legislative this evidences clear usage be a broader given term “motor vehicle violation” must defini- simply incorporates than one that the meaning punishable fine. tion violation —an offense history provision legislature legislative that of this evidences Number intended the term “violation” to include vehicle violations. for authority 1, expanded 07-57, Acts of the board of Public against (board) parole pardons over “offense state” include [s] imposed which a “a violation for sentence a term Act, legislature During one member of the . . . debate on the Public expansion authority encompass would “viola board’s clarified violations, carry possible example, tions, which do added.) Proc., (Emphasis 50 H.R. Pt. sentence of incarceration.” Sess., p. Representative Lawlor. These comments remarks of Michael P. legislature “motor vehicle viola believed both certain evidence that necessary carry imprisonment, it and that was tions” could term authority petitions explicitly grant from convictions for such the board over unnecessary expansion authority if would have been That offenses. particular within convictions fell had believed those authority petitions relating against . . . the state .” over to “offenses extant *39 with legislature’s express acknowledg- Consistent a can punished ment that motor vehicle violation be by imprisonment, phrase a of term “motor vehicle the common appear incorporate violation” would statutory of than meaning “violation,” rather defini- is, tion in A in general parlance, 53a-24. violation “[a]n or a law; infraction breach of the Black’s transgression”; Dictionary Law (9th 2009); Ed. act of violating”; “the Collegiate Dictionary Merriam-Webster’s (10th Ed. 1995); “violate,” turn, “break[ing], is defined as disregard[ing] (the Merriam-Webster’s law).” Collegiate Dictionary (9th Ed. Under 1987). meaning, breach of 14-227a would constitute “motor vehicle viola- tion,” undoubtedly as it is a violation a motor of vehicle Thus, law. applying rubric, breach of 14-227a within exception would fall the motor vehicle violation ” “to thus, ‘offense’ under 53a-24 (a) and, could not crime, felony be a either a or a misdemeanor. I such note that a conclusion would bolstered two apparent other distinctions in the General Statutes. First, are provisions there several in which the legisla- ture drawn a a person has distinction between con- victed of a crime and a convicted of a violation of 14-227a or law another that carries potential term imprisonment. of General See Statutes 14-44 commercial (b) (limiting operator’s license to person who no criminal record has not been “[h]as [or] of a convicted violation of of subsection section [a] years 14-227a within five the date of application”); General Statutes (b) (2) (conferring § 54-56e discretion on invoke court to accelerated rehabilitation program respect who, alia, to defendant inter previ- “has no ous of a record conviction crime or of a violation 14-196, section subsection 14-215, section section [c] 14-222a, subsection section 14-224 or section 14- [a] General 227a”); Statutes 54-143 fees (a) (imposing on persons of a felony,” “convicted “convicted of a 14- 14-219, sections convicted under misdemeanor *40 Second, a review 14-227a”). 14-225 and 222, 14-224, vehicles motor governing the General Statutes title 14-227a, which, in unlike § eleven statutes reveals breaches as misde- has expressly designated legislature possible it is that the Although meanors or felonies.14 14-227a to constitute intended a breach of § misdemeanor; see General felony or an unclassified such a conclusion (c); and 53a-26 (c) Statutes §§ frequent practice unlikely legislature’s in of the light vehicle code as of the motor breaches designating an when it intended such or felonies misdemeanors result. statutory scheme aspect is one
There that a support the conclusion superficially appears with the but I crime, disagree 14-227a is a breach § Specifically, Gen- provision. of that majority’s treatment be desig- allows an individual to 53a-40f15 eral Statutes personal (k) (disclosure of information § 14-10 See General Statutes misdemeanor); department A General vehicles is class from of motor Stat repairing B (selling vehicle without license is class motor utes 14-52 or (selling (e) motor vehicle misdemeanor); 14-62b used General Statutes recycler’s misdemeanor); parts General Statutes is class C without license is class B misde (f) (selling at auction without license § 14-65 motor vehicle (d) (5) (transporting in motor meanor); child Statutes General required misdemeanor); General Statutes restraint is class A vehicle without using pres regulations regarding vehicle’s (b) (violation motor § 14-103d (d) misdemeanor); gas Statutes 14-106b General surized is class C functioning A misde odometer is class (operating vehicle without motor offering (c) (selling to sell fake air meanor); or Statutes 14-106d General (b) (operating misdemeanor); § 14-213b bag General Statutes is class A felony); coverage is class D General insurance vehicle with insufficient signaled stop (b) (failure when to do so motor vehicle § 14-223 Statutes felony); police and class C is class A misdemeanor officer in tampering (c) (avoiding with motor vehicle or § 14-227k General Statutes misdemeanor). ignition is class C interlock device operating persistent provides: “(a) while A § 53a-40f General Statutes person (1) felony stands convicted a who offender is under the influence has, prior (2) commis to the or 53a-60d of a violation of section 53a-56b years, preceding convicted present ten been and within the sion of the crime 14- or subsection of section or 53a-60d of a violation of section 53a-56b the essential elements in state of an offense 227a been convicted other “persistent under operating
nated as a
while
felony
specified
circum-
influence
offender”
stances,
impose
which in turn allows the court to
apply.
than otherwise would
To be
harsher sentence
so
must be convicted of either
designated,
with a
manslaughter
degree
the second
53a-56b,16
felony,
under General Statutes
class C
assault
the second
with a motor vehicle under
degree
felony,
a class D
53a-60d,17
General Statutes
and have
prior
conviction under either of those offenses or
majority
Although
argues
that the combi-
§ 14-227a.
“persistent”
“felony”
nation of the terms
indicates
legislature necessarily
prior
viewed a
convic-
*41
felony,
tion under
14-227a as a
this
construction fails
substantively and
An
linguistically.
essential element
of both
53a-56b and
is
a person
53a-60d
must
§§
“operatfe] a motor vehicle
under the influence
[while]
of intoxicating liquor
any
both,” thereby
or
or
drug
incorporating
prohibited by
the conduct
14-227a. A
14-227a, therefore, properly
breach of
is viewed as a
lesser included offense of
53a-56b and 53a-60d.18See
§§
substantially
of which are
the same as section 53a-56bor 53a-60dor subsec-
(a)
tion
of section 14-227a.
any person
persistent
“(b)
operating
When
has been found to
abe
while
felony offender,
court,
imposing
under the influence
the
in lieu of
the sen-
by
person
tence authorized
section 53a-35a for the
which such
crime of
presently
convicted, may impose
imprisonment
stands
the sentence of
by
felony.”
degree
authorized
said section for the next more serious
16
provides: “Aperson
(a)
guilty manslaugh
General Statutes 53a-56b
is
degree
when,
operating
ter in
with a
the second
while
a motor
liquor
any
both,
intoxicating
drug
vehicle under the influence of
or
or
he
person
consequence
causes the death of another
as a
of the effect of such
liquor
drug.”
or
17
provides:
(a)
person
guilty
General Statutes 53a-60d
“A
of assault
degree
when,
operating
in the second
with a motor vehicle
while
a motor
liquor
both,
intoxicating
drug
vehicle under the influence of
or
or
he
physical injury
consequence
causes serious
to another
as a
liquor
drug.”
effect of such
or
crime,
It is well settled that a law
not be
classified as
but nonethe
purposes
less can be treated as such for
of the lesser included offense
Kluttz,
App. 686, 690,
(1987).
doctrine. See State v.
In Code and within the Penal and inconsistencies dictions my interpretation General Statutes throughout *42 mechanistically apply do not wholly avoids. “We [P]enai interpret language to a statute but definitions [C]ode purpose.” the statute’s implements manner that in a 601 638 A.2d 758, 763, Harrison, 228 Conn. State by (g) shared element. undermined this § 14-227a is 56b and 53a-60d prior § 53a- § 53a-56bor (g) provides conviction under that a Section determining whether qualify §as 14-227afor “same offense” as the 60d can sentencing. subject See repeat to harsher offender and is a the defendant majority Although that the dissenting opinion. claims 1 of this footnote “comparable §of 14-227a be a breach legislature must have considered incorporating vehicle,” by two offenses involving these felony a motor to a merely provisions, legislature ensured sentencing has into the 14-227a part for conduct statute under a different convicted that an individual having violated prohibited § 14-227a be treated to that identical § 14-227a.
194 see In re D., William (1994); 305, 312, 284 Conn. A.2d 1147 we (2007) (“[although agree that the defini- tion of ‘child’ under [General Statutes] 46b-120 [1] applied literally could be 46b- [General Statutes] support the respondent’s construction, we [b] application eschew such a mechanistic of the definition given the internal inconsistencies consequences would ensue clear contravention of the broader purposes delinquency scheme”).
I also note that this court is not on a blank writing slate in determining whether breaches of motor vehicle carry laws that term of constitute crimi- nal offenses under the Penal Code.19 neither Although this court Appellate nor Court squarely has present addressed the question dispositive in a manner, both courts have dealt closely with related issues in past cases. In State v. Kluttz, App. 686, 521 A.2d (1987), Appellate Court considered whether a breach of General Statutes 14-222a, negli- gent homicide with vehicle, a motor was a lesser included offense of General Statutes 53a-57, miscon- duct with a motor vehicle. The court concluded that, “[although we agree the defendant that negligent homicide with a motor vehicle is a ‘motor vehicle viola- tion’ within the of ... meaning 53a-24 and therefore an is not ‘offense’ or ‘crime’ within the meaning ... statute we hold that it an purposes offense for of the lesser included offense doctrine.” (Citation omit- Id., 690. ted.) my prior Consistent with observation in this opinion; see footnote 9 of this opinion dissenting text; Appellate and related Court noted that an inter- pretation of 14-222a that did not deem a conviction of previously noted, nothing legislative As this court has there is in the history suggest §to l-2z to intended to overrule cases *43 prior decided l-2z. See Commission on Human to the enactment of Bights Opportunities Sullivan, & 208, n.10, v. 285 Conn. 218-19 939 A.2d (2008). 541
195 within the “motor vehicle violation” that statute to fall would exception to the definition of offense render exception limitation that 53a-24 superfluous Brown, in State v. App. 108, Conn. Thereafter, (b). denied, 811, cert. 580 A.2d 109, 699, 575 A.2d Conn. held Appellate Court that violation (1990), of that condition of 14-227a “constituted violation probation forbidding order defen [the defendant’s] [the ‘any from law’ of this state.” violating criminal dant] conclusion, however, Appel Prior to that reaching Kluttz, analysis in Court, the basis of the con late on purposes that of ... 14- (a), cluded “for ” not a ‘crime.’ 227a is a motor vehicle violation and squarely 111. this conclusion addresses Id., Although present case, in the this statement could question predicate an be viewed either as dictum or essential holding.20 the ultimate has decisions, however,
In
this court
subsequent
predicate
conclusions
assumed the correctness of
Brown
in Kluttz and, thus,
has treated breaches
potential
impris-
with
terms
of motor vehicle statutes
as
classified
criminal offenses
being
onment
my
have, therefore,
the Penal Code. I
focused
on
convictions under such motor vehi-
inquiry whether
as crimes for
cle statutes nonetheless could
treated
Guckian,
State
In
purposes.
other
this court considered whether
(1993),
stance abuse treatment under General Statutes 17a- § 666, now General Statutes 17a-699. In § answering question in the affirmative, this court nonetheless relied favorably Appellate on the Court’s decision in Brown and assumed that 14-227a “is a § motor vehicle viola Id., tion.” 201. Similarly, in State Harrison, supra, v. 760,
228 Conn.
this court considered whether a breach
of 14-227a
§
constituted an “offense” within the mean
ing of General Statutes
54-lf (a),
§
which authorizes
police officers
pursuit
to continue
of an offender out
jurisdiction
side of their
in order to effectuate an arrest.
In concluding that it did, the court
“applica
noted that
tion of 54-lf (a)
§
has not been restricted to felonies or
misdemeanors as defined in the
[C]ode, and
[P]enal
may
thus
applied
to motor vehicle
Id.,
violations.”
764. Accordingly,
court,
this
sub silentio, assumed that
a breach of 14-227a is a
§
violation,
a criminal offense. In
State
v.
Trahan, 45 Conn. App.
722, 733-34, 697
A.2d
denied,
cert.
in 53a-24 through §§ 53a-27 was, “[according to the drafters of the Code ... ‘to eliminate the kind [Penal] irrationally disparate sentences which often existed prior law between essentially similar serious crimes, and irrationally similar sentences between crimes of greatly varying seriousness, and to substitute therefore system a which will, nearly as as possible, is treat essen- ” tially the same similarly serious kinds of conduct.’ 23Indeed, passage 80-438, at the legislatively time of of Public Act the required established blood alcohol level for breach §of 14-227awas more than twice its (Rev. 1979) current level. See General Statutes (blood alcohol percent). level ten-hundredths of one 24The fact that attitudes had been more lax about the treatment of drunk similarly drivers is reflected in Stonington, our decisions in Shore v. 187 (1982), Craig Conn. Driscoll, 444 A.2d v. (2003). A.2d 1003 The former negligence concluded that an action in could against police not be maintained a town officer for the death of a by whose vehicle was hit previously an intoxicated driver whom the officer stopped go had specific duty and let because the officer owed no to the decedent to enforce the state’s motor Stonington, vehicle laws. v. Shore supra, 151,157. Craig Driscoll, supra, 327-30, The court in 339-40, recog negligence against purveyor nized a common-law action a of alcohol for serving patron who, alcohol to an intoxication, injures adult as a result of his statutory recovery another and held that the limitation on under the Dram Shop Act, 30-102, remedy. General Statutes was not the exclusive Penal Code Reference Manual Gittler, J. Connnecticut There is connection between p. apparent 2-1. no (1971) and the of breaches under purpose classification misdemeanors or felonies. motor vehicle laws as commentary particularly illumi- to 53a-24 is not The commentary Although (a) subsection nating.25 commentary entirety: provides (a). in its “Subsec. This section The ‘offense’, ‘crime’, general and ‘violation’. ‘Offense’ is a defines the terms i.e., ‘criminal’ one that term which means a breach of state or local law— for breach thereof. ‘Crime’ means either calls for fine felony ‘Violation’,which must be or a misdemeanor. read connection only 53a-27, calling an for a fine thereof. means offense for breach section Code, ‘violation’, concept The is taken from the Model Penal which ‘give makes of a does not new. Section 53a-24 clear that conviction violation any disability legal disadvantage rise based on conviction of a criminal offense; category which should offense.’ It is a new of non-criminal conduct way proscribed conviction which should in no the offender but for brand Thus, example, person been of a a ‘criminal.’ who has convicted truthfully question: you Have ever been violation can answer ‘no’ to of a crime? convicted (b). The definition in subsection makes clear that “Subsec. of ‘offense’ purpose provision it not include motor vehicle infractions. of this does provided except operation Code, except is to in subsection from provides (b), (b), however, motor vehicle infractions. Subsection inclusive, principles 53a-44, sentencing in sections 53a-28 to enumerated Thus, apply vehicle violator should to motor vehicle violations. have the limits of his sentence determined would section, within since his ‘offense’ would be an ‘unclassified misdemeanor’ meaning (c); he would be sentenced under the of section 53a-26 but principles procedures to 53a-44.” Commission to of sections 53a-28 Comments, Statutes, Ann. Code Conn. Gen. Stat. Revise the Criminal Penal (West 53a-24, comment, pp. 2007) § 454^55. *47 commentary written, that, not § at the time was 53a-24 did We note this expressly vehicle from the exclude “infractions” or “motor infractions” offense; simply That it “motor vehicle violations.” definition of excluded commentary’s to “motor vehicle lead us fact and the references to violations” commentary synonymously vehicle uses “motor infractions” assume commentary’s of the word vehicle violations.” Because the use with “motor 53a-27, predated statutory § that we definition of term “infraction” commentary “infraction” intended further assume that authors of violation; ordinary meaning; time, breaching “the act of to at that have its Heritage Dictionary English infringement; a violation.” The American Accordingly, interpret Language (1969). “motor infractions” as we vehicle laws; appar- phrase encompassing that breaches all of motor synonymously ently in the the term “motor vehicle violations” used commentary supports conclusion. further our ultimate 53a-24 instructs that “violation” should be read “in
conjunction” with the 53a-27 definition of that word, “violation,” the term descriptive terms, without further is used three times in the definition of “offense,” and the commentary expressly does not state that this definition similarly applies to the term “motor vehicle violation.” Indeed, commentary to subsection (a) does not even refer to the motor vehicle violation exception. That exception commentary is discussed in the to subsection of 53a-24. In (b) of that considering meaning com- mentary precise question on the us, before David Judge Borden, previously who had been the executive director of the commission to revise the criminal statutes and one of the Code, drafters of the Penal stated, when writing Appellate for the Court: commentary to “[T]he ... is less (b) clarity than a model of contributes to the confusion of whether a motor vehicle violation is an ‘offense.’ See Commission to Revise the Criminal Statutes, Comments, Penal Code Gen. [Conn. Stat. Ann. 53a-24, The (West) § first three comment]. commentary point sentences of the toward the conclu- sion that a motor vehicle violation is an ‘offense.’ The support fourth sentence lends some contrary to the conclusion, namely, it is an ‘offense.’ In this instance, we hesitate to draw firm inferences as to commentary.” State legislative Delphic intent from this Kluttz, supra, App. 694 n.8. I agree with Judge Borden’s characterization similarly decline rely commentary on this ambiguous to reach a con- clusion that would conflict with numerous related stat- utes, persuasive interpretive which are far more tools. majority suggests legislative debates over various amendments to 14-227aand provisions related support the conclusion that a breach of 14-227a consti- majority tutes a crime.26 While the relies on the fact argues The defendant also that a 1985 amendment 14-227a first “offense”; 85-596, 1; inserted the word see Public Acts No. and did essentially codify Appellate Superior so Session of the Court’s decision
201 while legislators have referred to driving that several act, I “crime” or “criminal” note intoxicated can be during linguisti- comments debate legislators’ rely on common mean- cally imprecise, or can a term’s statutory Indeed, rather than a definition. ing legal in legislative has been referred as a “crime” speeding by is a fine and debates, punishable even it though offense, of a first suspension, is, the case license an See designated as “infraction.”27 General expressly previously 14-219. 14-lllb and As this court Statutes §§ ordinarily so term ‘crime’ is recognized, has “[t]he however, that is broadly defined, meaning its common statutory determining not instructive in whether State term ‘crime’ includes vehicle violations.” Conn. The Guckian, supra, meaning v. 226 198. common “an act or commission of an act simply of “crime” .” Collegiate is forbidden . . . Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary 1995). Ed. (10th use of
Although majority generic focuses on give any it fails to consideration “crime,” the term referred to a breach legislators the fact that the never felony. 99-255, over No. During 14-227a as a debate of § Acts, 14- of the 1999 Public the amendment 1, Anonymous (1980-5), 527, 531, Sup. A.2d 168 in State (1980), that a 14-227a is an “offense” which had concluded breach of already meaning was Because term “offense” within the of 53a-24. prior decision, court’s and because the amendment used in to that Anony years five eleven amendments after the decision in was made (1980-5), legisla disagree mous we amendment constituted a endorsement that decision. tive 14-227a, instance, over amendments to for In the course a debate confusing president pro tempore clarified a and chair the Senate speeding between made Senator on the distinction statement another influence, operating saying and a under the “whether violation conviction driving violation, [speeding] it a drunken it be a motor violation Proc., category broad of criminal 28 S. Pt. falls under the offense.” Philip imprecision Sess., p. Senator Robertson. remarks of S. majority’s that, terminology is in the fact even under the this reflected construction, a violation not be a criminal offense would the Penal Code. *49 202 potential
227a that increased the
sentence for
second
offense into a
qualifying
range where for the first time
satisfy
requirements
it would
the incarceration
of a
felony,
sponsor
the amendment’s
pro-
stated that his
posal “substantially
penalties
increases
both in
penalties,
incarceration,
terms of financial
and [coun-
seling]
repeat
for
offenders.” 42 S.
programs
Proc., Pt.
Sess., p. 2926,
remarks of Senator Robert Gen-
In
uario.
the course of his detailed discussion of the
penalties
repeat
increased
for
offenders under
14-
227a,
emphasized
Senator Genuario
explicitly
listed
statutory consequences,
point
any
but at no
mentioned
any
altered criminal status or
additional collateral con-
sequence. While debate over the amendment was lim-
at
ited,
point
each
at which the amendment was debated
in either legislative chamber, at least one legislator
spoke about the
penalties
repeat
increased
offend-
ers, but no
ever
legislator
discussed a
in criminal
change
status,
any
mentioned
collateral consequences, or even
felony.
uttered the
Especially
word
in
light
the over-
whelming textual evidence to the
I
contrary,
simply
accept
cannot
that the legislature would have intended
felony
establish a new
under our General Statutes
without
the barest
of that
acknowledgment
decision
consequences.281
and its
note, additionally, that at the
amendment,
time of this
in Kluttz, Brown,
decisions
and their
all
progeny had
been issued. If the legislature
had disagreed with those
apparent
decisions’
conclu-
sions that
14-227a did not
crime,
define a
consistent
presumption
with our
that “the
legislature mindful
judicial
construction relevant
legislation it
enacts”;
v. Planning
Murach
& Zoning Commission,
It is to note that present case is whether flowing from the decision a second conviction under 14-227a would qualifying impose plaintiff on the both the stigma being desig- *50 and, significantly, nated a convicted felon more a num- that attach consequences ber of other collateral to such appropriateness a Unlike the designation. attaching consequences turpi- such to crimes of violence or moral tude, consequences having a review of the collateral felony convicted of a leads us to conclude that been consequences all but two of those would seem to be inappropriately applied solely to an individual on the 14-227a.29 qualifying basis of conviction under Such § preclude plaintiff employ- would from designation specified his fields,30 impact ment certain as well as 29Although plaintiff argument, recognize has not made this we that a would, (c) (2), § “convicted felon” status under General Statutes 7-294d preclude serving police officer, and, him from as a under General Statutes preclude (b), possessing would him from a firearm. While we can § 29-28 consequences logic attaching understand the these collateral for a second intoxicated, consequences qualifying driving conviction of while these two by overwhelmingly consequences appear are outnumbered that to lack logical § 14-227a. connection to the nature of a conviction yield majority argues, however, that it would an absurd result to treat qualifying § a second breach of 14-227aas a motor vehicle violation while major- expressly designated crimes, treating certain which the blameworthy 14-227a, ity apparently suggests are less than a breach of my judgment appropriately I hesitate to substitute own for what is crimes. legislature; I note that the has considered “criminal” for that ofthe penalties 14-227a,and, accordingly, I severe to a second breach of attached by majority’s unpersuaded suggestion that such breaches are not am felony Additionally, punished appropriately without the attachment of status. express suggest designation of some sections of the motor I would opinion; supports crimes; dissenting vehicle code as see footnote of this designation is both deliberate and mean- the view that the absence of such ingful. by felony consequences Among convic numerous other virtue of precluded acting sports agent; tion, plaintiff from as a General could be 20-559e; General Statutes 30-17b. Statutes or as a wholesaler’s salesman. professions in unenumerated
ability employed to be convicted felons from their ranks. Notwith- that exclude of a breach of 14- the extreme seriousness standing many 227a, consequences, these like of the other collat- felony, to conviction for a consequences eral attached multiple for even inappropriate would seem to be breaches 14-227a.31 my that a note, finally, that, reaching I conclusion violation,” breach of 14-227a is a “motor vehicle accordingly generally cannot be classified as crime I felony specifically, legislature’s or a am mindful of the intent to treat while intoxicated as a serious driving problem penalties that calls for commensurate with the potential by harm caused such actions. As one legislator aptly remarked, intent of 14-227a is to legislative “[impose] appropriate penalties severe and on those people individuals who insist on innocent endangering Proc., supra, p. 2929, 42 S. drinking driving”; *51 Cook; give remarks of Senator Catherine and to “those penalties driving individuals who do not fear the today’s law . . . something while intoxicated to fear. they to make them think twice about what Something they driving stand to lose if embrace drunk as a life- style.” Thus, Id., pp. 2928-29, remarks of Senator Cook. majority’s the focus on the view that members of the precluded plaintiff serving juror; The also would be from: as a General raffle; 7-174; (a); conducting Statutes 51-217 a bazaar or General Statutes “major working contractor”; 20-341gg(b); working as a General Statutes as pawnbroker; 21-40;working General Statutes as a telecommuni- licensed cator; (e); working private see General Statutes 28-30 as a detective. General Statutes 29-154a. 31 majority jurisdictions suggests treat The that the choice of sister to operating weigh a motor vehicle while under the influence as a crime should Ultimately, unpersuaded into our consideration. I am that the choices of present question; majority other states in this area are relevant to the the exception pointed comparable has not to state with a laws, meaning question classifying operating their a motor vehicle be, statute, while under the influence in other states would as a matter of simpler a far exercise. the eventually to hold about Assembly came General misunderstands a breach seriousness us. effect question Giving before narrow focus of text clearly expressed intent in the legislature’s to fall of 14-227a to a violation of the scheme to deem exception would vehicle violation” within the “motor penalties upset appropriate strong nothing do legisla- while intoxicated. The by those who drive faced merely impose stigma collateral declined ture upon individ- felony conviction those consequences exclusively in its policy determination is uals. Such clearly expressed legislative intent is province. law as a crime classify a of a motor vehicle breach expressly designated the Penal Code unless judgment I would affirm Accordingly, such. defendant, the commis- concluding trial court placed has the nota- public safety, improperly sioner of records of the felon” on the criminal tion “convicted Ricky similarly situated McCoy, A. and other plaintiff, conviction who have received a second individuals 14-227a. violating § respectfully dissent.
I F. SOSIN
HOWARD B. SOSIN SUSAN (SC 18238) Vertefeuille, Flynn, Norcott, Palmer, Zarella and Js.* *52 * seniority justices on as of listing their status this court reflects argument. of oral the date