THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAVID J. VALENCIA, Defendant and Appellant; THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CLIFFORD PAUL CHANEY, Defendant and Appellant
S223825 | S223676
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
July 3, 2017
Ct.App. 5 F067946; Tuolumne County Super. Ct. No. CRF30714; Ct.App. 3 C073949; Amador County Super. Ct. No. 05CR08104
In
SEE CONCURRING & DISSENTING OPINIONS
contrast to Proposition 36, however, Proposition 47 restricted that discretion by defining the phrase “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (
We granted review in these two cases to resolve two related issues concerning Proposition 47‘s effect on resentencing proceedings under Proposition 36. In People v. Valencia (S223825), we address whether Proposition 47‘s definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” (
I. FACTS
Defendant David J. Valencia has a lengthy criminal record. In 1995, he was convicted of kidnapping. (
In 2013, following the enactment of the Three Strikes Reform Act, Valencia petitioned for resentencing. He was eligible for resentencing because (1) his third strike was neither serious nor violent, as defined by statute, (2) his third strike was not among the other crimes excluded from the sentencing reforms,4 and (3) he had not suffered a prior conviction for a super strike. (See People v. Johnson (2015) 61 Cal.4th 674, 681-682 (Johnson).)
The People opposed resentencing, arguing that releasing Valencia would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety based on his criminal history of alcohol abuse and domestic violence. In August 2013, after considering evidence from both parties and hearing testimony from Valencia and his mother, the sentencing court denied Valencia‘s petition: “I cannot grant this. I just feel that he is a danger. He is an unreasonable risk to public safety. And, in particular, to the women he‘s around. I just can‘t do this.”
On appeal, Valencia argued that Proposition 47 had amended the Three Strikes Law by narrowing the sentencing court‘s discretion to deny resentencing on the ground that the petitioner posed an unreasonable risk to public
In 2005, Clifford Paul Chaney was arrested for felony drunk driving after having been convicted of three separate incidents of driving under the influence in the prior 10 years. (
and was sentenced as a third strike offender for the 2005 felony drunk-driving conviction, receiving an indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life.
In 2013, Chaney unsuccessfully sought resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act. The resentencing court stated that it was unconvinced “that [Chaney] would not re-engage in alcohol use and place the public at risk.” Accordingly, the court concluded that Chaney posed an “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” (
On appeal, Chaney argued that Proposition 47‘s narrower definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” (
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Three Strikes Reform Act (Proposition 36) and the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47)
1. Proposition 36: The Three Strikes Reform Act
We recently summarized the Three Strikes Reform Act in Johnson, supra, 61 Cal.4th 674. As we noted, “[p]rior to its amendment by the [Three Strikes
circumstance, unless an exception applies, the defendant is to receive a second strike sentence of twice the term otherwise provided for the current felony, pursuant to the provisions that apply when a defendant has one prior conviction for a serious or violent felony.” (Id. at p. 681.) As noted above, Proposition 36 excluded from its reforms third strikes involving large quantities of controlled substances, specified sex offenses, and offenses committed when the defendant was armed or intended to cause great bodily harm. It also excluded defendants with prior convictions for super strikes. (See ante, fns. 3 & 4.)
Most pertinent here is Proposition 36‘s resentencing provision, which “provides a procedure by which some prisoners already serving third strike sentences may seek resentencing in accordance with the new sentencing rules. (
In exercising its discretion to deny resentencing, the court has broad discretion to consider: (1) the inmate‘s “criminal conviction history, including the type of crimes committed, the extent of injury to victims, the length of prior prison commitments, and the remoteness of the crimes“; (2) his or her “disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation while incarcerated“; and (3) “[a]ny other evidence the court, within its discretion, determines to be relevant in deciding whether a new sentence would result in an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (
evidence it determines is relevant, such as the offender‘s criminal history, behavior in prison, and participation in rehabilitation programs.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012) analysis of Prop. 36, p. 50, italics added.)
Following the enactment of Proposition 36, Courts of Appeal have rejected arguments that the phrase “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety,” as
2. Proposition 47: The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act
Proposition 47 reclassified as misdemeanors certain drug- and theft-related offenses that previously were felonies or wobblers. (
The resentencing procedure provides that if an inmate “would have been guilty of a misdemeanor” had Proposition 47 been in effect at the time of the offense, and he or she has no prior convictions for super strikes or any offense that requires registration as a sex offender, the inmate may petition for a recall of his or
her sentence and resentencing in accordance with Proposition 47‘s reclassification of certain offenses as misdemeanors. (
In exercising this discretion, the resentencing court may consider: (1) the petitioner‘s “criminal conviction history, including the type of crimes committed, the extent of injury to victims, the length of prior prison commitments, and the remoteness of the crimes“; (2) his or her “disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation while incarcerated“; and (3) “[a]ny other evidence” the court deems relevant. (
Significantly, however, in contrast to Proposition 36, Proposition 47 limits the trial court‘s discretion to deny resentencing by defining the phrase “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” narrowly. In connection with resentencing under Proposition 47, “‘unreasonable risk of danger to public
Of most significance to the present matter, Proposition 47 also provides that its definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” is effective “[a]s used throughout this Code.” (
requires the court to assess whether the petitioner‘s resentencing would pose “an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety,” this raises the question of whether Proposition 47 amended the resentencing criteria for eligible third strike offenders under the previously enacted measure, Proposition 36. The parties do not contest that such an amendment would be more favorable to three strike inmates and result in the release of more recidivist serious and/or violent offenders than had been originally contemplated under Proposition 36.
B. Proposition 47‘s Definition of “Unreasonable Risk of Danger to Public Safety” Does Not Apply to the Three Strikes Reform Act
Viewed in isolation, Proposition 47‘s statement that its definition of “‘unreasonable risk of danger to public safety‘” is to be “used throughout this Code” (
First, the phrase “[a]s used throughout this Code” in
low-level felons to misdemeanants,
Finally, under the circumstances of this matter, it is unreasonable to assign dispositive significance to the legal presumptions we normally apply to voters who approve an initiative in order to interpret the phrase “[a]s used throughout this Code.” Those presumptions, even if applicable, would not alter our conclusion that the statutory language is ambiguous and that this ambiguity should be resolved by construing
1. The Rules of Statutory Interpretation
We have long recognized that the language used in a statute or constitutional provision should be given its ordinary meaning, and “[i]f the
language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature (in the case of a statute) or of the voters (in the case of a provision adopted by the voters).” (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735.) To that end, we generally must “accord[] significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and sentence in pursuance of the legislative purpose,” and have warned that “[a] construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided.” (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387.)
But “[t]he words of the statute must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible.” (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1387.) “Where uncertainty exists consideration should be given to the consequences that will flow from a particular interpretation.” (Ibid.)
2. Prior Cases Involving Ambiguous Statutory Language
A reason to further explore the meaning of statutory language and to consider extrinsic evidence of legislative intent is where statutory language is ambiguous when considered “in the context of the statute and initiative as a whole.” (People v. Superior Court (Pearson) (2010) 48 Cal.4th 564, 571.) This is because an initiative‘s “‘language must also be construed in the context of the statute as a whole’ and its ‘overall scheme.‘” (Professional Engineers in California Government v. Kempton (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1016, 1037, quoting People v. Rizo (2000) 22 Cal.4th 681, 685.)
In Building Industry Assn. v. City of Camarillo (1986) 41 Cal.3d 810, this court interpreted the meaning of the phrase “governing body,” as used in Evidence Code former section 669.5, subdivision (a), a statute that sought to limit growth
control legislation “enacted by the governing body of a city, county, or city and county.” Opponents of a local growth control ordinance, adopted by city voters as a local initiative, claimed the ordinance was invalid because it did not comply with the requirements of
In Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1991) 53 Cal.3d 245, this court interpreted a provision of article XIII A, section 3 of the California Constitution (hereafter, article XIII A, section 3) that stated that any changes in state taxes collected for increasing revenue “‘must be imposed by an Act passed by no less than two-thirds of all members elected to each of the two houses of the Legislature . . . .‘” (Id. at p. 248, quoting
through which “the people expressly ‘reserve to themselves the powers of initiative and referendum.’ ” (Kennedy Wholesale, at p. 249, quoting
In People v. Hazelton (1996) 14 Cal.4th 101, we interpreted a provision enacted in 1994 by Proposition 184, the initiative version of the Three Strikes law that mandated life sentences as the third strike penalty for those who have “‘two or more prior felony convictions, as defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (b)’ of former section 1170.12. (Hazelton, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 105, quoting former
convictions described in paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) in former section 1170.12.
We rejected this argument by concluding that “[r]ead in the context of section 1170.12 as a whole, the language of subdivision (c)(2)(A) is ambiguous regarding the inclusion of out-of-state convictions . . . .” (Hazelton, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 105.) This court observed that introductory language in
Consequently, Building Industry Assn., Kennedy Wholesale, and Hazelton all established that statutory language, even if it appears to have a clear and plain meaning when considered in isolation, may nonetheless be rendered ambiguous when the language is read in light of the statute as a whole or in light of the overall legislative scheme.
3. Ambiguity of Section 1170.18‘s Application to the Three Strikes Reform Act
petitioner will commit a new violent felony within the meaning of”
First, although the words “as used throughout this code” in
If Proposition 47‘s definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” was intended to apply to petitioners both under Proposition 36 and Proposition 47, then
Additionally, the location of the provision in question within
It is true that the use of the phrase “[a]s used throughout this Code” in
Second, another indication that
The initiative‘s Findings and Declarations state that the “act ensures that sentences for people convicted of dangerous crimes like rape, murder, and child molestation are not changed.” (Voter Information Guide, supra, text of Prop. 47, § 2, p. 70.) Similarly, Proposition 47 reiterates its Purpose and Intent as being to “[e]nsure that people convicted of murder, rape, and child
Thus, the expressly stated central objectives of Proposition 47 were to redesignate specified minor felony offenses as misdemeanors and to permit those persons previously convicted of these same low-level felonies to seek resentencing
as misdemeanors. Proposition 47 further assured voters that persons convicted of murder, rape, and child molestation would not benefit from Proposition 47 and specifically declared that the “act ensures that sentences for people convicted of dangerous crimes . . . are not changed.” (Voter Information Guide, supra, text of Prop. 47, § 2, p. 70, italics added.)
It is not unreasonable to view the term “dangerous crimes” as encompassing the serious and violent felonies addressed by both the Three Strikes law and the Three Strikes Reform Act. The uncodified introductory provisions of Proposition 47 further assured voters that the measure would reduce low-level felony convictions to misdemeanors, “unless the defendant has prior convictions for specified violent or serious crimes.” (Voter Information Guide, supra, text of Prop. 47, § 3, p. 70.) By design, those convicted under either the former Three Strikes law or the amended version enacted by Proposition 36 are persons convicted of dangerous crimes and have prior convictions for various violent or serious crimes. These uncodified introductory provisions, therefore, are inconsistent with any intention to make the resentencing provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act more favorable to the resentencing and release of three strike inmates, who are felons with recidivist convictions for serious or violent felonies.
Also, an extension of Proposition 47‘s definition of “an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” to the previously enacted Three Strikes Reform Act would conflict with the measure‘s stated purpose to “[e]nsure that people convicted of murder, rape, and child molestation will not benefit from this act.” (Voter Information Guide, supra, text of Prop. 47, § 3, p. 70.)
As previously discussed, the list of super strike offenses is limited to a set of eight categories of serious or violent felonies. (See, ante, p. 2, fn. 3.) The only sexual offenses included in that set are specific sexually violent offenses involving threats, force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily
injury and specific sexual offenses involving minors under the age of 14. (See
Construing the phrase “[a]s used throughout this Code” as a more expansive standard to permit the resentencing of three strikes offenders would thus be inconsistent with Proposition 47‘s uncodified findings, declarations, purpose, and intent. This stark inconsistency reinforces the conclusion that the meaning of section 1170.18, subdivision (c) is ambiguous.
4. The Voter Information Materials Concerning Proposition 47
Accordingly, we turn to evidence, outside the measure‘s express provisions, to ascertain the voter‘s intent in approving the initiative. Specifically, we examine the materials that were before the voters.5 (Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 905 (Robert L.) [in order resolve questions of purpose and ambiguity, “we look to the materials that were before the voters“].)
Nothing in the materials accompanying the text of Proposition 47 suggested that the initiative would alter the resentencing criteria under the previously enacted Three Strikes Reform Act, resulting in the potential release of additional recidivist serious or violent felony offenders. “We cannot presume that . . . the voters intended the initiative to effect a change in law that was not expressed or strongly implied in either the text of the initiative or the analyses and arguments in the official ballot pamphlet.” (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at pp. 857-858.)6
Nor does the Legislative Analyst‘s Analysis of Proposition 47 included in the Voter Information Guide make any reference to the Three Strikes Law, the Three Strikes Reform Act, three strike inmates, or life sentences for recidivist serious or violent felons. Under the Elections Code, the Legislative Analyst must “prepare an impartial analysis of the measure describing the measure and including a fiscal analysis of the measure showing the amount of any increase or decrease in revenue or cost to state or local government.” (
In addition, the Legislative Analyst must provide an analysis that is “easily understood by the average voter” and it “may contain background information, including the effect of the measure on existing law and the effect of enacted legislation which will become effective if the measure is adopted, and
However, the analysis mentions no “effect” on the “existing” Three Strikes Reform Act. Instead, it focuses on Proposition 47‘s proposal to reduce punishment for nonserious and nonviolent felony crimes. In explaining what Proposition 47 proposed, the Legislative Analyst declared: “This measure reduces penalties for certain offenders convicted of nonserious and nonviolent property and drug crimes,” and would allow “certain offenders who have been previously convicted of such crimes to apply for reduced sentences.” (Voter Information Guide, supra, analysis of Prop. 47, p. 35, italics added.) The analysis then lists the offenses for which the measure would reduce punishment - grand theft, shoplifting, receiving stolen property, writing bad checks, check forgery, and drug possession. (Id. at pp. 35-36.) Thus, the Legislative Analyst discerned that Proposition 47 would provide reduced punishment for only nonserious and nonviolent property and drug offenses.7
Turning to the assessments of Proposition 47‘s impacts, the Legislative Analyst again focused solely on the effect of the reduction of certain crimes from felonies to misdemeanors: “We estimate that about 40,000 offenders annually are convicted of the above crimes [grand theft, shoplifting, receiving stolen property, writing bad checks, check forgery, and drug possession] and would be affected by the measure.” (Voter Information Guide, supra, analysis of Prop. 47, at p. 36.) Furthermore, the Legislative Analyst
Finally, the arguments in favor of and opposed to Proposition 47 discussed only the reductions of certain felonies to misdemeanors and did not mention the previously enacted Three Strikes Reform Act.8 (Voter Information Guide, supra, arguments regarding Prop. 47, at pp. 38-39.)
Accordingly, nothing in the voter information pamphlet for Proposition 47 informed the electorate that the definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety,” contained in section 14 of the measure, proposed section 1170.18, subdivision (c), was intended to amend and narrow the resentencing criteria under Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act. The materials for Proposition 47 signaled no relationship at all with that prior initiative. In fact, based on the analysis and summary they prepared, there is no indication that the Legislative Analyst or the Attorney General were even aware that the measure might amend the resentencing criteria governing the Three Strikes Reform Act.
5. The Absence of Procedures for Resentencing Third Strike Offenders under the New Definition
Further weighing against the defendants’ proposed interpretation of the phrase “[a]s used throughout this Code” is the fact that Proposition 47 provides no guidance whatsoever concerning how to implement the resentencing of three strike inmates under the new definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (
As previously described, Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act, took effect on November 7, 2012, and it gave inmates “two years after the
An application only to inmates who had not yet sought resentencing would mean that such inmates would have only two days to seek resentencing under the new definition, unless the passage of Proposition 47 could constitute “good cause” for an untimely resentencing petition under section 1170.126, subdivision (b). In any event, it is reasonable to infer that, by November 5, 2014, most of the three strike inmates eligible for resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act would have already petitioned for resentencing.
Even if we were to assume without deciding that the new definition may apply to any inmate who had filed a resentencing petition, but the proceedings on that petition were not yet final (see In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744 [without legislative guidance to the contrary, courts ordinarily presume that newly enacted legislation ameliorating criminal punishment is intended to apply to all cases not yet reduced to final judgment on the statute‘s effective date]), such an application would serve, only a subset of third strike inmates - those who had unsuccessfully petitioned for resentencing and whose judgments on those petitions were not final as of November 5, 2014. Although Proposition 47 created new procedures for the resentencing of felons as misdemeanants, it created no similar procedural mechanism enabling previously unsuccessful third strike petitioners to seek a second opportunity for resentencing using the new definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (
If one of the purposes of Proposition 47 was to narrow the criteria applicable to resentencing third strike offenders, one would expect the drafters to have addressed at least some of the above described problems. Instead, the measure was silent on these matters.9 This further exacerbated
6. The Presumptions Concerning an Initiative Adopted by Voters
In favor of applying the defendants’ proposed interpretation, defendants and the dissents rely heavily on two presumptions we generally apply to measures approved by the initiative process. The first is the assumption that voters who approve an initiative are presumed to ” ‘have voted intelligently upon an amendment to their organic law, the whole text of which was supplied [to] each of them prior to the election and which they must be assumed to have duly considered . . . .’ ” (Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 243-244, quoting Wright v. Jordan (1923) 192 Cal. 704, 713.) The second is a presumption, which we also apply to the Legislature, that the voters, in adopting an initiative, did so being “aware of existing laws at the time the initiative was enacted.” (Professional Engineers in California Government v. Kempton, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1048; see also In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 890, fn. 11.)
Even if we assume for the sake of argument that these presumptions apply here, they do not alter our conclusion that the electorate did not intend to apply Proposition 47‘s definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” to inmates seeking resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act, because the presumptions have no bearing on our determination that the statutory language is ambiguous and that this ambiguity should be resolved by construing the definition as inapplicable to those inmates. In any event, we
a) The Presumption that Voters Have Considered the Text of the Laws Proposed by an Initiative
In Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Pol. Practices Comm. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 744 (Taxpayers), we declined to credit the presumption that voters had thoroughly studied the probable impact of proposed initiatives. (Id. at pp. 769-770.) There, we considered the voters’ simultaneous approval of two overlapping ballot measures regulating campaign contributions and spending. We examined the reach of
In rejecting the contention that the voters intended a hybrid version of the measures if they were both approved, this court acknowledged the “presumption that the voters thoroughly study and understand the content of complex initiative measures.” (Taxpayers, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 768.) But we refused to assume further “that voters not only recognized that they were approving initiatives with fundamentally conflicting provisions intended to regulate the same subject, but also analyzed the remaining provisions in order to predict which would be implemented if either measure received a lesser affirmative vote.” (Ibid.) This court remarked “that even the most conscientious voters may lack the time to study ballot measures with that degree of thoroughness.” (Id. at p. 770.) ” ” ‘We think the assertion may safely be ventured that it is only the few persons who earnestly favor or zealously oppose the passage of a proposed law initiated by petition who have attentively studied its contents and know how it will probably affect their private interests.’ ” ’ (Ibid., quoting Wallace v. Zinman (1927) 200 Cal. 585, 592-593, quoting in turn State v. Richardson (1906) 48 Or. 309, 319.)
The
Consequently, without an express reference to section 1170.126, part of the Three Strikes Reform Act, the average voter would not have known the impact or import of the phrase “[a]s used throughout this Code” in section 1170.18, subdivision (c), unless they had exhaustively sifted through the voluminous Penal Code in order to find the single other reference to the phrase “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” We similarly recognized in Taxpayers that it is unreasonable to presume that the voters had such a “degree of thoroughness” that they ” ‘attentively studied’ ” the measure and analyzed various provisions using the acumen of a legal professional. (Taxpayers, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 770.)
Indeed, in the present matter, even professional bodies charged with the duty of enforcing the law and assessing the effects of proposed legislation did not identify the need to refer to the Three Strikes Reform Act‘s section 1170.126. First, the Attorney General‘s Official Title and Summary fails to note or describe any effect Proposition 47 might have in facilitating the release of serious or violent recidivist felons. In general, the Official Title and Summary prepared by the Attorney General plays an important role in preempting voter confusion and manipulation in the initiative process. If the Attorney General had omitted a key provision from Proposition 47‘s title and summary, the initiative‘s drafters should have brought this to her attention during the measure‘s public review period. (See
Defendants and our dissenting colleagues find these circumstances unremarkable and engage in the fiction that we should still apply the presumption that the voters thoroughly study and understand the content of complex initiative measures, even though the implications for three strikes resentencing were apparently opaque to the Attorney General and the Legislative Analyst. They were almost certainly opaque to the average voter as well. It is not reasonable to apply a presumption of voter awareness when the text of the initiative and the voter information guide supporting it make no reference whatsoever to any effect on a different law.12
b) The Presumption that Voters Are Aware of Existing Laws
In Robert L., supra, 30 Cal.4th 894, we refused to presume that voters were aware of the legal meaning of the term “wobbler.” (See ante, p. 2, fn. 2.) There, we interpreted the meaning of a gang enhancement adopted by the 2000 electorate in Proposition 21, finding no evidence presented to the voters of the interpretation put forth by the defendant. The enhancement provides that “[a]ny person who is convicted of a public offense punishable as a felony
In reaching this conclusion, we first analyzed the statute‘s plain meaning. We acknowledged that wobblers are the only “offenses punishable as a misdemeanor or felony,” but we refused to apply the standard presumption that voters are aware of existing law when approving an initiative. (Robert L., supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 901, italics omitted.) Although the term “wobbler” is commonly used by “attorneys, judges, and law enforcement personnel who are familiar with criminal law,” we observed that the word “does not have a meaning defined by statute or commonly understood by the electorate.” (Id. at p. 902.) We refused to attribute this level of knowledge to the electorate such that voters would have recognized the phrase “punishable as a felony or a misdemeanor” as restricting the enhancement to “wobbler” offenses. “We are confident that the average voter, unschooled in the patois of criminal law, would have [instead] understood the plain language of section 186.22(d) to encompass all misdemeanors and all felonies.”13 (Robert L., at p. 902.)
Similarly, in this matter, without further guidance from Proposition 47‘s drafters or its Voter Information Guide materials, it is unreasonable to conclude that the measure‘s reference to an “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” would have triggered awareness on the part of voters that this was precisely the same language applied to govern the resentencing of three strike inmates.
7. Conclusion
The parties agree that the application of Proposition 47‘s definition of an “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” to the resentencing proceedings of three strike inmates would ease the burden for recidivist serious or violent
Moreover, such an amendment necessarily would suggest disfavor with the broad discretion that Proposition 36, two years earlier, had given resentencing courts to determine which offenders are too dangerous to the public to be eligible for resentencing. If Proposition 47 actually intended to curtail this discretion, just two years after Proposition 36 went into effect, and confine trial courts to consider only whether the resentencing of a recidivist serious or violent offender posed a danger of committing one of eight categories of super strike offenses, one would expect to see some mention of the Three Strikes Law, the Three Strikes Reform Act, three strike inmates, life sentences, or why the resentencing discretion required reform in the text of the initiative. But there is none.
Instead, Proposition 47 explicitly assured voters that the sentences of persons convicted of dangerous crimes and various sex crimes would not change. In describing to voters Proposition 47‘s title and summary, the Attorney General failed to note or identify any effect the measure might have in facilitating the release of serious or violent recidivist felons. In describing to voters Proposition 47‘s effect on public safety, the criminal justice system, and fiscal policy, the Legislative Analyst also failed to note or identify any effect the measure might have in facilitating the release of serious or violent recidivist felons.
Our dissenting colleagues argue that our decision here subverts the will of the voters and impermissibly interferes with the sanctity of our state‘s initiative process. On the contrary, adopting the construction advocated by defendants and the dissents as to the scope of a phrase in a measure without notice to the voters, not mentioned by the Attorney General or Legislative Analyst, and contrary to the stated purposes and assurances described in the measure‘s own preamble, would not protect the voters’ right to directly enact laws but could very likely encourage the subversion and manipulation of that democratic right.
“While we are of the opinion that statutes dealing with the initiative should be liberally construed to permit the exercise by the electors of this most important privilege, we are also of the opinion that statutes passed for
We cannot infer the realization of a voter intent where there was nothing to enlighten it in the first instance. As we have aptly recognized, and reiterated in Robert L., ” ‘[i]n the case of a voters’ initiative statute . . . we may not properly interpret the measure in a way that the electorate did not contemplate: the voters should get what they enacted, not more and not less.’ ”14 (Robert L., supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 909, quoting Hodges v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 109, 114.)
For the reasons described above, we decline to credit defendants’ proposed interpretation of section 1170.18, subdivision (c) as enacted by Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act. Given the circumstances, it is reasonable to interpret section 1170.18, subdivision (c)‘s definition of an “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” as applicable only to the resentencing proceedings that are authorized under Proposition 47.
C. Equal Protection Does Not Compel the Application of Proposition 47‘s Definition of “Unreasonable Risk of Danger to Public Safety” to the Three Strikes Reform Act
We further conclude that refusing to construe Proposition 47‘s definition as applicable to the previously enacted Three Strikes Reform Act does not
“The concept of equal protection recognizes that persons who are similarly situated with respect to a law‘s legitimate purposes must be treated equally. [Citation.] Accordingly, ” ‘[t]he first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.” ’ [Citation.] ‘This initial inquiry is not whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but “whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 328, italics omitted.)
It is not difficult to conclude that those resentenced under Proposition 36 are not similarly situated to those resentenced under Proposition 47. These are two very different populations of offenders. As the text of Proposition 47 indicates, that measure focused on offenders convicted of a set of low-level, nonserious, nonviolent felonies and reduced them to misdemeanors. In contrast, Proposition 36 concerned the resentencing of recidivist offenders who had two prior violent or serious felony convictions and a third nonserious, nonviolent felony conviction, and who are serving terms of 25 years to life. Obviously, those recidivists with criminal records involving serious or violent felonies, who may have already been incarcerated for a lengthy period, raise concerns for public safety different from those who committed what were previously low-level felonies. Thus, the two groups are not similarly situated for purposes of resentencing because one group consists of recidivist serious or violent offenders, who may have the propensity to commit serious or violent felony crimes and the other generally consists of low-level offenders.15
For these same reasons, the defendants’ Eighth Amendment challenge fails as well because there is a valid reason to apply less lenient resentencing
Because we hold that Proposition 47‘s definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” does not apply to resentencing proceedings under the Three Strikes Reform Act, we need not address whether, in People v. Chaney (S223676), that definition applies retroactively to petitions that a court has already denied but are not yet final on appeal.
III. DISPOSITION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgments of the Courts of Appeal in both People v. Valencia (S223825) and People v. Chaney (S223676).
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
WE CONCUR:
CHIN, J.
CORRIGAN, J.
KRUGER, J.
CONCURRING OPINION BY KRUGER, J.
A provision of the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act of 2014 (better known as Proposition 47) permits inmates serving felony sentences for certain drug- and theft-related offenses to petition to have their sentences recalled and to be resentenced as misdemeanants. (
The question before us is whether this definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” applies only to petitioners who seek resentencing under Proposition 47, or whether it also applies to individuals who have petitioned for relief under a different provision of the Penal Code — specifically, life prisoners seeking resentencing under the earlier enacted Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (better known as Proposition 36), which contains a parallel recall procedure. I agree with the majority that the text of this definitional provision contains conflicting indications about its intended scope. I also agree that standard interpretive aids resolve the ambiguity in favor of the narrower interpretation. Every other provision of Proposition 47 reflects a clear and exclusive focus on affording relief to individuals who have committed specified drug- and theft-related offenses, and neither the stated purposes of the proposition nor the ballot materials alerted voters to any possibility that a favorable vote might also result in a significant change to the separate statutory scheme governing the resentencing of life prisoners
I.
At issue in this case are two related statutory schemes: Proposition 36, which amended the Three Strikes law, and Proposition 47. As first enacted in 1994, the Three Strikes law provided that the prison sentence of a defendant convicted of a felony who had a single prior conviction for a violent or serious felony (a strike) was doubled (
Proposition 36 also permits inmates who, before its enactment, had received a life sentence under the Three Strikes law as the result of a conviction of a nonserious and nonviolent felony with two or more prior strikes to file a petition asking the trial court to instead impose a second-strike sentence. (
In November 2014, two years after the enactment of Proposition 36, the voters approved Proposition 47. Proposition 47 reclassifies certain drug offenses and theft-related crimes, which previously were either felonies or wobblers, as misdemeanors. Much like Proposition 36, Proposition 47 creates a recall procedure that permits previously sentenced individuals to seek the benefit of its ameliorative changes to the law. Such a petition may be brought by a person whose felony conviction was based on conduct that the initiative reclassified as a misdemeanor (
II.
The question before us is one of statutory interpretation: whether Proposition 47‘s definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety,” set forth in section 1170.18(c), applies to petitioners who have received life sentences under the Three Strikes law and are seeking resentencing under Proposition 36.
California cases have established a set of standard rules for the construction of voter initiatives. “We interpret voter initiatives using the same principles that govern construction of legislative enactments. [Citation.] Thus, we begin with the text as the first and best indicator of intent. [Citations.] If the text is ambiguous and supports multiple interpretations, we may then turn to extrinsic sources such as ballot summaries and arguments for insight into the voters’ intent.” (People v. Mentch (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 282.) On the other hand, “““[i]f there is no ambiguity, then we presume the lawmakers meant what they said,” and the plain meaning of the language ordinarily will govern. ( Mays v. City of Los Angeles (2008) 43 Cal.4th 313, 321.) In interpreting a voter initiative, we “give effect to the voters’ formally expressed intent, without speculating about how they might have felt concerning subjects on which they were not asked to vote.” (Ross v. RagingWire Telecom., Inc. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 920, 930 (Ross).)
Proposition 47‘s resentencing provision states, as relevant here: “As used throughout this Code, ‘unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ means an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent felony within the meaning of clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of section 667.” (
The text of section 1170.18(c) alone does not provide a clear answer. On the one hand, the breadth of the introductory clause of section 1170.18(c) (“As used throughout this Code“) suggests that the “unreasonable risk” definition is designed to apply broadly, for purposes of evaluating the dangerousness of any “petitioner” in any petition proceeding under any provision of the Penal Code. And not coincidentally, the phrase “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” appears only in one other place in the Penal Code: the earlier-enacted, parallel resentencing provision of Proposition 36 (
But on the other hand, reading section 1170.18(c) in the context of surrounding provisions, the focus of the provision appears much narrower. Subdivision (a) of Penal Code section 1170.18 explains that “[a] person serving a sentence for a conviction . . . of a felony or felonies who would have been guilty of a misdemeanor under the act that added this section . . . may petition for a recall of sentence . . . .” The next subdivision explains that “[u]pon receiving a petition under subdivision (a), the court shall determine whether the petitioner satisfies the criteria in subdivision (a). If the petitioner satisfies the criteria in subdivision (a), the petitioner‘s felony sentence shall be recalled and the petitioner resentenced to a misdemeanor . . . unless the court, in its discretion, determines that resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. In exercising its discretion, the court may consider all of the following: [¶] (1) The petitioner‘s criminal conviction history . . . . [¶] (2) The petitioner‘s disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation . . . . [¶] (3) Any other evidence the court . . . determines to be relevant . . . .” (
The remainder of the statute reinforces the inference. The phrase “the petitioner” appears in just two other places in the statute, and each time, it again clearly refers to persons who have filed a petition authorized by subdivision (a). (See
Defendants argue that if the “unreasonable risk” definition in section 1170.18(c) does not apply to Proposition 36 petitioners, then the introductory language providing that the definition is to apply “throughout this Code” is superfluous. Because no other provision of the Penal Code applies to Proposition 47 petitioners, section 1170.18(c) would operate no differently had the drafters of Proposition 47 omitted the introductory clause entirely. But while we do generally strive to construe enactments to avoid rendering any word or provision surplusage (City of Alhambra v. County of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 707, 724), we have also made clear that, like all such interpretive canons, the canon against surplusage is a guide to statutory interpretation and is not invariably controlling. (People v. Cruz (1996) 13 Cal.4th 764, 782;
In truth, either interpretation of section 1170.18(c) raises oddities. If we accept the proposition that the phrase “throughout this Code” must be given independent significance, then we also must accept that Proposition 47 contains a definitional provision that uses the phrase “the petitioner” differently from every other provision of the Act in which that phrase appears — including its immediately preceding subdivision, in which the same phrase appears no fewer than seven times, and which contains the operative “unreasonable risk” language to which the definition attaches. This, too, would be a departure from ordinary interpretive rules.
All this leads to the unavoidable conclusion that the text of section 1170.18(c)‘s “unreasonable risk” definition is indeed ambiguous. It is possible that it was meant to apply to any petitioner in any proceeding governed by any provision of the Penal Code, including Proposition 36. It is also possible that it applies only to the lower-level offenders who have petitioned
This wider look ultimately settles the matter, because, with the arguable exception of section 1170.18(c)‘s introductory phrase, every other provision of the initiative focuses exclusively on the category of offenders covered by Proposition 47‘s operative provisions — that is, the lower-level offenders who have committed certain drug- and theft-related crimes the law now treats as misdemeanors. No provision of Proposition 47 manifests an intent to change the law applicable to other categories of offenders, nor were the voters otherwise informed that their vote on the initiative might result in any such change.
Uncodified section 3 of Proposition 47, entitled “Purpose and Intent,” identifies six statutory purposes: (1) to “[e]nsure that people convicted of murder, rape, and child molestation will not benefit from this act,” (2) to create a “Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Fund,” (3) to “[r]equire misdemeanors instead of felonies for nonserious, nonviolent crimes like petty theft and drug possession, unless the defendant has prior convictions for specified violent or serious crimes,” (4) to “[a]uthorize consideration of resentencing for anyone who is currently serving a sentence for any of the offenses listed herein that are now misdemeanors,” (5) to “[r]equire a thorough review of criminal history and risk assessment of any individuals before resentencing to ensure that they do not pose a risk to public safety,” and (6) to “save significant state corrections dollars” and to “increase investments in programs that reduce crime and improve public safety.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, at p. 70.)
The fourth and fifth items on this list describe the purposes of Proposition 47‘s resentencing provision: namely, to permit persons who have been convicted of specified minor offenses that the initiative designates as misdemeanors to obtain reduction of their sentences, while ensuring that none of those individuals “pose[s] a risk to public safety.” (Voter Information Guide, supra, at p. 70.) Neither provision contains any indication that the voters also intended the resentencing provision to make a significant alteration to the existing law governing resentencing for life prisoners under Proposition 36. On the contrary, uncodified section 3 suggests that, as far as resentencing is concerned, the only persons to whom section 1170.18(c) applies are those “currently serving a sentence for any of the offenses listed herein that are now misdemeanors.” (Voter Information Guide, supra, at p. 70.)
The remaining text of Proposition 47 is to similar effect. (See Horwich v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 272, 276 [” ‘we do
As the majority opinion explains (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 21-26), the ballot materials accompanying Proposition 47 also focus exclusively on the lower-level offenders who are the subject of Proposition 47‘s operative provisions. (See Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 905 [to determine the voters’ intent in adopting ambiguous language, “we look to the materials that were before the voters“].) On the subject of resentencing, the analysis of the initiative prepared by the Legislative Analyst states that Proposition 47 “reduces penalties for certain offenders convicted of nonserious and nonviolent property and drug crimes,” and “allows certain offenders who have been previously convicted of such crimes to apply for reduced sentences” (Voter Information Guide, supra, at p. 35). After describing the crimes that are reduced to misdemeanors by the initiative, the analysis states that an offender who is serving a felony sentence for one of those crimes may “apply to the court to have their felony conviction changed to a misdemeanor.” (
This omission is not, of course, dispositive. But neither is it irrelevant. Our cases recognize that, as a practical matter, voters often rely on the experts employed by the Attorney General and the Legislative Analyst to summarize proposed initiatives and to discuss their significant effects. Here, the use of the phrase “[a]s used throughout this Code” in section 1170.18(c) was, it appears, sufficiently oblique that neither the Attorney General nor the Legislative Analyst appeared to recognize the possibility that its purpose might be to make a significant amendment to the resentencing provisions of Proposition 36. When these trained experts were apparently unaware of the initiative‘s possible effect on Proposition 36, and thus did not alert the voters to the possibility of such an effect, it becomes more difficult to conclude that the voters understood that a “yes” vote would have that consequence.
The ballot arguments both for and against Proposition 47 likewise made no mention of petitioners seeking relief under Proposition 36. As pertinent to the
Finally, the circumstances surrounding the enactment of Proposition 47 reinforce this conclusion. Proposition 36 prescribed a two-year window, beginning on November 7, 2012, during which life prisoners could file a petition for resentencing. Proposition 47 took effect on November 5, 2014, two days before that window closed. Had the voters intended to make significant changes to the procedures governing Proposition 36 resentencing so shortly before the window closed, one might have expected to see some acknowledgment of this state of affairs, if not some effort to address how the changes might apply to petitions that had already been filed or adjudicated. Proposition 47 contains no such acknowledgment.
In sum, aside from the unelaborated reference to “this Code” in section 1170.18(c)‘s definitional provision, every provision of the statute, as well as the ballot materials accompanying the initiative, focuses exclusively on the mechanisms for providing relief for the lower-level offenders covered by Proposition 47 itself. All available interpretive aids thus point in the same direction: The phrase “the petitioner” in section 1170.18(c) refers to an offender seeking to reduce convictions for specified minor felonies to misdemeanors under Proposition 47.3
It is entirely possible that, if the choice had been put to them, the voters might have decided that Proposition 47‘s definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” should apply equally to inmates serving life sentences under the Three Strikes law who are seeking resentencing under Proposition 36. Proposition 36 itself supplied no definition of the term, instead conferring more open-ended discretion on judges to evaluate a life prisoner‘s dangerousness. (Cf. People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 659 [advising that the public safety requirement “must be applied realistically, with careful consideration of the [Three Strikes] Reform Act‘s purposes of mitigating excessive punishment and reducing prison overcrowding“].) There is nothing inherently improbable or absurd about a conclusion that life prisoners should be entitled to resentencing under Proposition 36 unless a court determines that there is an unreasonable risk that they will commit future super strikes. That is not the only possible policy choice the voters could make, but it is a plausible one.
But voters can make that choice only if the question is presented in the initiative on which they have been asked to vote. The question was not presented in Proposition 47, and so it is not a choice we can say the voters have already made.
Voter initiatives play a unique role in California‘s system of government. They are designed to “enable the people to amend the state Constitution or to enact statutes when current government officials have declined to adopt (and often have publicly opposed) the measure in question.” (Perry v. Brown (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1116, 1125.) In interpreting a voter initiative, we are bound to respect both the choices the voters have made and the limits of those choices. “For a court to construe an initiative statute to have substantial unintended consequences strengthens neither the initiative power nor the democratic process . . . .” (Ross, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 930.) For these reasons, I concur.
KRUGER, J.
WE CONCUR:
CHIN, J.
CORRIGAN, J.
DISSENTING OPINION BY LIU, J.
In 1994, California voters enacted the “Three Strikes” law, one of the toughest sentencing laws in the country. This measure required any person convicted of two prior serious or violent felonies to receive a sentence of 25 years to life imprisonment for a third felony conviction, even if the third felony was not serious or violent. (
In 2012, the California electorate passed Proposition 36. This initiative reduced the punishment for nonviolent, nonserious third-strike felonies and allows eligible persons who had received third-strike sentences for such felonies to petition for resentencing. (
In 2014, California voters passed Proposition 47. This measure reduced certain low-level crimes from felonies to misdemeanors and allows eligible persons previously convicted of such crimes to seek recall of the felony sentence and resentencing to a misdemeanor. (
The question here is whether Proposition 47‘s definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” applies to that term as used in Proposition 36. The plain meaning of section 1170.18(c) supplies the answer: Proposition 47‘s definition applies to that term “[a]s used throughout this Code” (
Instead of following this straightforward analysis, the court today nullifies the phrase “As used throughout this Code” in section 1170.18(c). This
A statute‘s plain meaning need not be given effect if the text clearly reveals a drafting error, but the court does not say there was a drafting error here. A statute‘s plain meaning need not be given effect if doing so would produce absurd results, but the court does not claim any absurdity here. The plain meaning rule does not apply if the text is in fact ambiguous, but the court identifies no ambiguity in the phrase “As used throughout this Code.” Indeed, what two ways are there to read those words? Finally, we have said the plain meaning rule does not apply if it would contravene the manifest purpose of the statute, but the evidence of a purpose to restrict the applicability of Proposition 47‘s definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” is underwhelming. The court says nothing indicates the voters intended or knew that Proposition 47‘s definition of that term would apply to Proposition 36. Nothing, that is, except the unambiguous words they enacted, which we must presume the voters duly considered against the backdrop of existing laws.
Today‘s decision crosses the line from statutory interpretation to judicial legislation. When the voters enacted Proposition 47, they spoke clearly on how widely its resentencing criteria would apply. We cannot now tell inmates like David Valencia and Clifford Chaney, whose third strike was neither serious nor violent, that what Proposition 47 plainly says is not what the voters really meant. I respectfully dissent.
I.
At the outset, it is essential to note that the phrase “As used throughout this Code” in section 1170.18(c) has a plain meaning, and no one suggests
The court relies on cases “where statutory language is ambiguous when considered ‘in the context of the statute and initiative as a whole.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 12.) But in those cases, the consideration of context did not create ambiguity in statutory text that was otherwise unambiguous. Instead, the consideration of context showed that the text itself was susceptible to multiple meanings and therefore ambiguous. (See Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1991) 53 Cal.3d 245, 249 [statutory text is ”susceptible of the interpretation that plaintiff has proposed” (italics added)]; People v. Hazelton (1996) 14 Cal.4th 101, 105–106 [the statutory term ” ‘prior felony convictions . . .’ could be interpreted . . . to refer to the forum in which the prior conviction was obtained” or “the nature of the prior conviction“]; Building Industry Assn. v. City of Camarillo (1986) 41 Cal.3d 810, 819–820 [“the Legislature must have assumed that measures enacted by a ‘governing body’ included initiatives adopted by the electorate“].) No one could disagree with the principle that statutory language must be construed in the context of the statute as a whole, and there are many cases where context sheds light on alternative ways of interpreting language. But those cases provide no support for what the court has done here.
The court contends that section 1170.18(c) is ambiguous because its use of the term “the petitioner” may be understood to mean only a Proposition 47 petitioner, which is what the term means in subdivisions (b), (l), and (m) of section 1170.18. This interpretation of “the petitioner” is not unreasonable. But it does not establish that there are two ways of reading the entirety of section 1170.18(c). Instead, reading “the petitioner” to mean what the court says it means requires us to wholly disregard the introductory phrase “As used throughout this Code.”
Although the concurring opinion suggests that the phrase may be read as tolerable “surplusage” (conc. opn., ante, at pp. 7–8), all the instances of tolerable surplusage cited in the main text of the concurring opinion involve language that was construed as redundant. (See People v. Cruz (1996) 13 Cal.4th 764, 782–783; In re J.W. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 200, 209–210; Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 299, fn. 1; Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 536.) It is one thing to tolerate redundancy in interpreting statutory text; it is quite another to give no
In a footnote, the concurring opinion says Chickasaw Nation v. United States (2001) 534 U.S. 84, 94, held that “a statutory cross-reference should be treated as surplusage, even though doing so gave no effect to the language at issue.” (Conc. opn., ante, at p. 8, fn. 2.) But Chickasaw Nation said the statutory cross-reference was language that “Congress included inadvertently” — in other words, “a drafting mistake.” (Chickasaw Nation, at pp. 90, 91.) No member of the court contends that the phrase “As used throughout this Code” in section 1170.18(c) was a drafting error. The concurring opinion‘s reliance on King v. Burwell (2015) 576 U.S. 473, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2489–2492, is also
unavailing. The high court there said it was deciding between two plausible interpretations of a statutory provision, not between one interpretation that gives effect to all the words of the provision and another that does not. (Id. at p. ___ [135 S.Ct. at p. 2491].) And in People v. Watts (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 223, the court declined to apply the rule against surplusage because doing so would not “result[] in a reasonable reading of the legislation.” (Id. at p. 237.) No member of the court contends that giving effect to the plain meaning of “As used throughout this Code” inThere is indeed nothing unreasonable about reading “the petitioner” in
Thus, the issue before us presents a choice between (1) giving “the petitioner” a reasonable construction that effectuates the plain meaning of “As used throughout this Code” and (2) giving “the petitioner” a different, reasonable construction that ignores the plain meaning of “As used throughout this Code.” These two options do not show that
Nor is it correct to say that
A finding of ambiguity opens the door to consideration of extrinsic sources that may tip the balance between two reasonable readings of the text. But in order to apply a statute in a manner that disregards its plain meaning, the burden of justification is much steeper. Plain meaning may be disregarded if the text contains a clear drafting error or if the consequences would be unreasonable or absurd. (See, e.g., People v. Broussard (2003) 5 Cal.4th 1067, 1071; People v. Skinner (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765, 775.) As noted, the court does not allege any drafting error or absurd consequences here. We have also said courts may disregard plain meaning when it “contravenes clear evidence of a contrary legislative intent.” (Ornelas v. Randolph (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1095, 1105 (Ornelas).) In truth, this is the standard of justification that the court‘s decision to disregardthe plain meaning of the phrase “As used throughout this Code” must meet. The court is not unaware of this, for why else does today‘s opinion argue at such length that giving effect to the phrase‘s plain meaning would violate the voters’ intent? This labored effort to prove that the voters who enacted the phrase did not really mean it is the real ground of today‘s decision, notwithstanding the court‘s attempt to conjure ambiguity out of unambiguous text.
II.
To show that the voters did not mean what the statute says, the court points to (1) uncodified language in Proposition 47 illuminating the initiative‘s purpose, (2) the absence of procedural mechanisms for applying Proposition
A.
According to the court, uncodified provisions of Proposition 47 make clear that the initiative was not intended to affect the resentencing criteria for Proposition 36 petitioners. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 19–21.) The court quotes the initiative‘s “Findings and Declarations” section, which says “[t]his act ensures that sentences for people convicted of dangerous crimes like rape, murder, and child molestation are not changed.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, § 2, p. 70 (Voter Information Guide).) The court also quotes the “Purpose and Intent” section, which says “it is the purpose and intent of the people of California to: [¶] (1) Ensure that people convicted of murder, rape, and child molestation will not benefit from this act. [¶] . . . . [¶] (3) Require misdemeanors instead of felonies for nonserious, nonviolent crimes like petty theft and drug possession, unless the defendant has prior convictions for specifiedviolent or serious crimes. [¶] (4) Authorize consideration of resentencing for anyone who is currently serving a sentence for any of the offenses listed herein that are now misdemeanors.” (Id., § 3, at p. 70.)
The court reasons that because three-strikes offenders who are eligible for resentencing under Proposition 36 necessarily have been convicted of violent or serious crimes, the application of Proposition 47‘s definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” to resentencing under Proposition 36 would contravene Proposition 47‘s purpose to “ensure[] that sentences for people convicted of dangerous crimes . . . are not changed.” (Voter Information Guide, supra, text of Prop. 47, § 2, at p. 70.) It would also conflict with Proposition 47‘s purpose to “[e]nsure that people convicted of murder, rape, and child molestation will not benefit from this act” (id., § 3, subd. (1), at p. 70), the court says, because three-strikes offenders convicted of nonforcible rape or child molestation involving minor victims over the age of 14 are eligible for resentencing under Proposition 36.
This line of argument is problematic for several reasons. First, although we have looked to statements of purpose contained in a preamble to inform our interpretation of an operative statutory provision that is ambiguous (see Carter v. California Dept. of Veteran Affairs (2006) 38 Cal.4th 914, 922–927; People v. Canty (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266, 1280–1281), I am not aware of any case — the court cites none — in which we have relied on statements of
Second, one reason courts do not assign much weight to preamble language relative to operative provisions is that such language is often phrased at a high level of generality and typically includes multiple purposes that point in different directions. (Cf. Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1167 [” ‘[N]o statute . . . pursues its “broad purpose” at all costs.’ “]; ibid. [” ’ ” ‘[I]t frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute‘s primary objective must be the law.’ ” ’ “].) That is certainly true here. The court, while citing the purposes above, neglects to mention other purposes stated in Proposition 47: to “save significant state corrections dollars on an annual basis” and to “increase investments in programs that reduce crime and improve public safety, such as prevention programs in K-12 schools, victim services, and mental health and drug treatment, which will reduce future expenditures for corrections.” (Voter Information Guide, supra, text of Prop. 47, § 3, subd. (6), at p. 70; see id., § 2, at p. 70 [“The people enact [Proposition 47] to ensure that prison spending is focused on violent and serious offenses, to maximize alternatives for nonserious, nonviolent crime, and to invest the savings generated from this act into prevention and support programs in K–12 schools, victim services, and mental health and drug treatment.“].) Applying Proposition 47‘s definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” to Proposition 36 petitioners whose third strike is not serious or violent is fully consistent with Proposition 47‘s purpose of maximizing alternatives for nonserious, nonviolent crime, saving significant state correction dollars each year, and increasing investment in crime prevention, victim services, and mental health and drug treatment to reduce recidivism.
Third, apart from the court‘s one-sided presentation of Proposition 47‘s purposes, there is no inconsistency between the purposes the court focuses on and the application of Proposition 47‘s definition of “unreasonable risk of danger topublic safety” to Proposition 36. It is true that inmates eligible for resentencing under Proposition 36 have been convicted of violent or serious felonies. But that is also true of many inmates eligible for resentencing under Proposition 47, which excludes only persons who have been convicted of a “super strike” or a registrable sex offense. (
Further, the fact that a smaller share of eligible Proposition 47 petitioners, compared to eligible Proposition 36 petitioners, have prior serious or violent felony convictions does not compel the inference that Proposition 47‘s definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” must apply only to the former and not the latter. The definition establishes the level of risk that the electorate found acceptable to authorize a reduced sentence in each individual case. (See Voter Information Guide, supra, text of Prop. 47, § 3, subd. (5), at p. 70 [Prop. 47 “[r]equire[s] a thorough review of criminal history and risk assessment of any individuals before resentencing to ensure that they do not pose a risk to public safety“].) It is perfectly rational for the voters to have established the same risk threshold for evaluating individuals from both populations, even if the populations differ on average in terms of criminal history. The Court of Appeal in Valencia‘s case said it would be “logical” and not “absurd” to treat differently “someone withmultiple prior serious and/or violent felony convictions whose current offense is (or would be, if committed today) a misdemeanor” versus “someone whose current offense is a felony.” But even so, there is also nothing illogical or absurd about using the same risk criteria in evaluating both types of recidivist offenders. That is simply a policy judgment — and one that the voters made clearly in the text of Proposition 47.
Nor does it help the court‘s analysis that Proposition 47, but not Proposition 36, excludes from resentencing eligibility persons who have committed certain sex offenses involving minor victims over the age of 14. It is true that Proposition 47 declares a general purpose of “ensur[ing] that people convicted of murder, rape, and child molestation will not benefit from this act.” (Voter Information Guide, supra, text of Prop. 47, § 3, subd. (1), at p. 70.) But Proposition 36 likewise states in its uncodified preamble that its purpose is “to restore the original intent of California‘s Three Strikes Law—imposing life sentences for dangerous criminals like rapists, murderers, and child molesters” and to “[r]equire that murderers, rapists, and child molesters serve their full sentences—they will receive life sentences, even if they are convicted of a new minor third strike crime.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012), text of Prop. 36, § 1, subd. (1), p. 105.) It is entirely
It is important to keep in mind the burden that the court‘s analysis must satisfy here. In order to disregard plain meaning, there must be ”clear evidence of a contrary legislative intent” (Ornelas, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1105, italics added); the plain meaning must be inconsistent with the “manifest purpose” of the statute(Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 979, italics added). It is hardly enough to cite generally worded preamble language that declares several competing purposes. Such language falls well short of the clarity and precision required to nullify the plain meaning of an operative provision.
B.
As a further reason to reject
Conspicuously absent from the court‘s discussion of this point is any citation to precedent suggesting that the absence of details addressing the procedure for implementing a statutory provision is a reason to disregard the provision‘s plain meaning. As to whether Proposition 47‘s narrowing of the definition of unreasonable risk constitutes “good cause” for filing a new or renewed Proposition 36 resentencing petition beyond the two-year window, isn‘t this the kind of question that lawmakers regularly leave for the courts to answer? Similarly, when we encounter a statute that does not say whether it applies retroactively or prospectively, we do not simply throw up our hands in confusion and infer that the lawmakers, having not addressed this issue, did not mean to enact what they enacted. Instead, we regularly give effect to such statutes in amanner guided by interpretive presumptions in our case law. (See, e.g., People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 656–657 (Conley); In re Pedro T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1041, 1049; People v. Hajek (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1195–1196; People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 312.)
Here, I would apply the presumption that new statutes reducing criminal punishment apply to cases that have not yet proceeded to final judgment, absent evidence of contrary legislative intent. (See In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745 [“[w]hen the Legislature amends a statute so as to lessen the punishment” for a crime, “[i]t is an inevitable inference that the Legislature must have intended that the new statute imposing the new lighter penalty now deemed to be sufficient should apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply“].) The Attorney General says the Estrada presumption does not apply because
The main point is that courts do not infer that a statute does not mean what it says simply because the statute does not say more about how it is to be implemented. Lawmakers know that courts have plenty of tools to answer questions that statutes leave unanswered. The court‘s approach, which effectively ” ‘dictate[s] to legislative drafters the forms in which laws must be written’ ” (Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 656), is unprecedented, as the court‘s failure to cite any precedent confirms.
In addition to citing the lack of procedures to guide Proposition 47‘s applicability to resentencing under Proposition 36, the court says the ballot materials for Proposition 47 “signaled no relationship at all” with Proposition 36. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 26.) The court treats this silence as a reason to jettison the usual presumptions that the voters have duly considered the initiative‘s text and are aware of existing laws. (Id. at pp. 29–36.) According to the court, we should not give effect to the plain meaning of the phrase “As used throughout this Code” in
This line of argument is as startling as it is threatening to the orderly development of the law. (See Eskridge et al., Legislation and Statutory Interpretation (2d ed. 2006) p. 231 [“plain meaning is the most obvious and perhaps the most objective focal point for all of us to know what the rule of law requires of us and our neighbors“].) Is the judiciary free to nullify an unambiguous statutory provision whenever it can be shown that the ballotmaterials did not inform the electorate of its consequences? Our precedent, including two recent decisions construing Proposition 47, makes clear this is not the law. We do not impute such ignorance to the voters out of respect for the democratic process and out of concern for overstepping the judicial function. If we can rewrite statutes on the ground that the voters were not aware of what they were enacting, there will be no end to the mischief that courts and litigants can inflict on the initiative process.
We have long followed the rule that voters “must be assumed to have voted intelligently upon an [initiative measure], the whole text of which was supplied each of them prior to the election, and which they must be assumed to have duly considered, regardless of any insufficient recitals in the instructions to voters or the arguments pro and con of its advocates or opponents accompanying the text of the proposed measure.” (Wright v. Jordan (1923) 192 Cal. 704, 713, italics omitted (Wright).) This rule has led us, repeatedly, to enforce the plain meaning of an initiative‘s text even when its consequences were not apparent from the ballot materials.
In People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903, we held that theft of access card (e.g., credit or debit card) information is a crime eligible for reduced punishment under Proposition 47. We explained that Proposition 47 reduced various theft crimes from felonies to misdemeanors where the value of the property taken does not exceed $950. (Romanowski, at p. 908.) Although neither the initiative‘s text nor the ballot
In People v. Gonzales (2017) 2 Cal.5th 858, we held that the new crime of shoplifting created by Proposition 47 includes any entry into a commercial establishment during regular business hours with intent to take property worth no more than $950, including entering a bank to cash a forged check. We acknowledged that this holding diverged from the “colloquial understanding” of shoplifting (Gonzales, at p. 871), and our examination of the ballot materials revealed nothing that mentioned its application to nonlarcenous thefts (id. at pp. 869–870). But we observed that Proposition 47‘s definition of shoplifting “expressly mentions the burglary statute” (Gonzales, at p. 869), and we said the burglary statute had long been construed to cover theft by false pretenses (id. at pp. 867–868). Reasoning that “[t]he electorate ‘is presumed to be aware of existing laws and judicial construction thereof,’ ” we concluded that the voters intended the definition of shoplifting to have the same scope as the burglary statute. (Id. at p. 869.)
In Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268, we held that a provision of Proposition 213 “precludes uninsured drivers from recovering noneconomic damages in actions against local public entities for nuisance and dangerous condition of property.” (Day, at p. 282id. at p. 282; see id. at pp. 273, 277), we said “it is of no consequence here that the ballot materials did not specifically refer to the act‘s application in actions against local public entities for nuisance and dangerous condition of property” (id. at p. 282). Ballot arguments,we explained, ” ‘are not legal briefs and are not expected to cite every case the proposition may affect.’ [Citations.] Here we may reasonably infer from the ballot arguments that a primary aim of Proposition 213 was to protect insured motorists and to reduce automobile insurance rates. [Citation.] Such arguments, however, did not imply that protection of insured motorists was the initiative‘s sole aim; nor did they suggest that reductions in automobile insurance premiums would be the initiative‘s only effect.” (Id. at pp. 278–279.)
In Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. Wilson (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1243, we concluded that Proposition 103 applied to surety insurance, finding the statutory text “clear” and not “ambiguous.” (Amwest, at p. 1260Ibid.) But we declined the plaintiff‘s suggestion ” ‘to make [the proposition] say what the voters thought it meant.’ ” (Amwest, at pp. 1260–1261.)
In Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, we considered whether an initiative amending the newsperson‘s shield law in our state Constitution applied only to confidential as opposed to all unpublished information collected by reporters. We found it “clear and unambiguous” that the enacted text — which protected any newsperson for ” ‘refusing to disclose any unpublished information’ ” — applied to all such information. (Id. at p. 798, italics added by Delaney.) The defendant, who sought to compel testimony from two journalists, suggested we rely on the Legislative Analyst‘s statement and ballot arguments to find that the voters intended the shield law to apply only to confidential information. (Id. at pp. 801–802.) We declined to do so: “We cannot conclude that, by emphasizing one purpose, perhaps the primary purpose of the measure, the argument misled voters into thinking confidentiality was the only purpose, especially when the measure itself made clear that all unpublished information would be protected. Moreover, a possible inference based on the ballot argument is an insufficient basis on which to ignore the unrestricted and unambiguous language of the measure itself.” (Id. at pp. 802–803.)
And in Cervera, supra, 24 Cal.4th 1073, we held that the Three Strikes law does not authorize prison conduct credits for use against indeterminate terms despite legislative history and ballot materials suggesting otherwise. We observed that the text of the Three Strikes laws authorize the award of prison
The lessons of this body of precedent are clear. The unambiguous language of an initiative is the best evidence of the voters’ intent. Ballot materials may help illuminate the purpose of an initiative statute. But the fact that ballot materials do not speak to the application of the statute in a particular case is not a reason to disregard the plain meaning of the enacted text. Ballot materials are necessarily incomplete and serve as summaries. “The summary must yield to the statute, not the statute to the summary.” (Cervera, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1080.)
Against the backdrop of this case law, it is mystifying how the court can place such heavy reliance on the fact that the ballot materials prepared by the Attorney General and Legislative Analyst did not mention Proposition 47‘s effects on resentencing three-strikes inmates. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 22–26, 32–34, 36–37.) The court makes reference to “[t]he statutory provisions imposed on the Attorney General and Legislative Analyst in order to educate voters about the effect of proposed initiatives and to protect them from being misled or confused.” (Id. at p. 37.) But as the Court of Appeal explained in People v. Cordova (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 543, 558–559 (Cordova), the contents of the ballot pamphlet “are constrained by considerations of space, time, and subjective determinations of materiality. The official summary of any ballot measure is authored by the office of the Legislative Analyst. (
“When the Legislative Analyst fails to mention some effect of a ballot measure, it remains open to the measure‘s official proponents and opponents to use their space in the ballot pamphlet to supply any perceived lack. But they too must practice triage; their arguments are restricted to 500 words to open and 250 words in rebuttal. (See
Instead of grappling with the precedent above, the court relies on Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894 and Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices Comm. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 744 (Taxpayers). But in Robert L., we rejected a technical reading of the phrase “punishable as a felony or a misdemeanor” in
The court‘s theory that the electorate was likely ignorant of the plain meaning of
In this case, the court claims neither a drafting error nor absurd consequences. The court instead contends that the voters, having duly enacted
III.
I conclude with a bit of context that may further illuminate why many will look askance at today‘s decision. In the early 1980s, as the “law and order” movement accelerated in this state and throughout the nation, California votersenacted a major criminal justice reform initiative known as “The Victims’ Bill of Rights” (Proposition 8). (See Brosnahan v. Brown (1982) 32 Cal.3d 236, 242–245 (Brosnahan).) This initiative affected numerous areas of our criminal law: restitution awards, evidentiary standards, bail, sentencing practices, diminished capacity defenses, plea bargaining, and more. The petitioners in Brosnahan, claiming that the initiative violated the single-subject rule, argued that “the complexity of Proposition 8 may have led to confusion or deception among voters, who were assertedly uninformed regarding the contents of the measure.” (Id. at p. 251.) We rejected this argument as follows:
“. . . Proposition 8 received widespread publicity. Newspaper, radio and television editorials focused on its provisions, and extensive public debate involving candidates, letters to the editor, etc., described the pros and cons of the measure. In addition, before the election each voter received a pamphlet containing (1) the title and summary prepared by the Attorney General, (2) a detailed analysis of the measure by the Legislative Analyst, and (3) a complete ‘Text of the Proposed Law.’ This text contained the entirety of the 10 sections of the Victims’ Bill of Rights and included in ‘strikeout type’ the text of former article I, section 12, of the Constitution. Each voter also was given written arguments in favor of Proposition 8 and rebuttal thereto, and written arguments against Proposition 8 and rebuttal thereto. [Citations.]
“Moreover, as we stated in [Fair Political Practices Com. v. Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 33, 42] in disposing of an identical contention that the measure was too complicated, ‘Our society being complex, the rules governing it whether adopted by legislation or initiative will necessarily be complex. Unless we are to repudiate or cripple use of the initiative, risk of confusion must be borne.’ [Citation.]
“Petitioners’ entire argument that, in approving Proposition 8, the voters must have been misled or confused is based upon the improbable assumption that the people did not know what they were doing. It is equally arguable that, faced with startling crime statistics and frustrated by the perceived inability of the criminal justice system to protect them, the people knew exactly what they were doing. In any event, we should not lightly presume that the voters did not know what they were about in approving Proposition 8. Rather, in accordance with our tradition, ‘we ordinarily should assume that the voters who approved a constitutional amendment “. . . have voted intelligently upon an amendment to their organic law, the whole text of which was supplied each of them prior to the election and which they must be assumed to have duly considered.” ’ [Citations.]” (Brosnahan, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 252, italics added by Brosnahan.)
This court has applied Proposition 8 in accordance with the full sweep of its plain language, even if the text or ballot materials did not alert the
Today California voters, like many citizens throughout America, have had second thoughts about our past criminal justice policies. Fiscal, moral, religious, and public safety considerations have motivated an unusually wide spectrum of leaders to reexamine penal laws and sentencing practices. (See, e.g., Chettiar & Waldman, Solutions: American Leaders Speak Out on Criminal Justice (2015); Ball, Do the Koch Brothers Really Care About Criminal-Justice Reform? (Mar. 3, 2015) The Atlantic.) It is in this context that the electorate, by large majorities, passed Proposition 36 and Proposition 47. Like the “tough on crime” initiatives from previous decades, Proposition 47 was vigorously debated, and statewide advocacy groups highlighted its various implications, including its effect on
resentencing petitions under Proposition 36. The court notes that one of the authors of Proposition 47, as reported the day after the 2014 general election, said three-strikes inmates previously denied resentencing ” ‘could return to court and cite Proposition 47‘s new definition of an “unreasonable risk of danger.” ’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 28, fn. 9, quoting St. John & Gerber, Prop. 47 Jolts Landscape of California Justice System, L.A. Times (Nov. 5, 2014).)
The court today concludes that the drafters of Proposition 47 pulled a fast one on an uninformed public. But it is at least “equally arguable that, faced with startling [prison spending] statistics and frustrated by the perceived inability of the criminal justice system to [reduce costs], the people knew exactly what they were doing” when they passed Proposition 47. (Brosnahan, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 252.) Many voters may have reasonably believed that inmates whose third strike was neither serious nor violent should not have received 25-years-to-life sentences or that some three-strikes inmates serving lengthy sentences have rehabilitated themselves or have aged out of crime. “In any event, we should not lightly presume that the voters did not know what they were about in approving” the initiative (ibid.) when the application of its definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” to inmates serving a third-strike sentence for a nonviolent, nonserious offense is fully consistent with Proposition 47‘s stated purpose “to ensure that prison spending is focused on violent and serious offenses,” “to maximize alternatives for nonserious, nonviolent crime,” and to “save significant state corrections dollars.” (Voter Information Guide, supra, text of Prop. 47, §§ 2, 3, at p. 70.)
I would reverse the judgments of the Courts of Appeal in these cases and remand each case to the resentencing court to consider whether the petitioner poses an “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” as defined in
LIU, J.
WE CONCUR:
WERDEGAR, J.
CUÉLLAR, J.
DISSENTING OPINION BY CUÉLLAR, J.
In 2014, Californians enacted Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act. This initiative allowed certain offenders convicted of less serious nonviolent felonies and wobblers to petition to have their felony convictions reclassified as misdemeanors and their felony sentences recalled for resentencing. (
The parties accept that Proposition 47 leaves intact the eligibility criteria to petition for resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act. Under Proposition 47‘s more specific definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety,” courts retain discretion to determine whether sentence recall is warranted, though subject to more precise constraints than would apply under the previously undefined Proposition 36 standard. Permitting Proposition 47‘s definition to apply wherever the phrase “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” appears throughout the Penal Code tends to advance the goal of concentrating state corrections spending on the most dangerous offenders. And giving effect to the terms of
So why does the court conclude that “throughout this Code” (
The most striking problem with the court‘s conclusion, for me, is that it‘s not clear what justifies it. Even if one were to accept the implicit idea that we are simply weighing competing “reasonable” definitions of an opaque statute in this case, there is nothing “reasonable” about failing to apply a statutory definition throughout the code when it is supposed to apply “throughout this Code.” For the majority, sentencing judges should retain somewhat greater discretion under the Three Strikes Reform Act to deny relief to individuals who‘d have a marginally stronger basis to obtain such relief if the phrase “[a]s used throughout this Code” were given proper effect. To reach this conclusion, the majority appears to rely on an implausibly cramped reading of Proposition 47‘s purposes. Nothing in the court‘s analysis persuasively supports a reading of the statute that essentially ignores the words “throughout this Code” and their place in the statutory scheme. Nor do the majority opinion and concurrence persuade in insisting that “the petitioner” in
I.
The Legislature enacted the “Three Strikes” law in 1994 ” ‘to ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felony offenses.’ ” (
Over the next 20 years, California‘s prison population surged. By 2008, the state‘s correctional facilities housed roughly 156,000 persons, almost double the number of inmates the state‘s prisons were designed to hold. (Brown v. Plata (2011) 563 U.S. 493, 501 (Brown v. Plata).) In 2009, a three-judge federal court concluded that overcrowding was the “primary cause of the state‘s unconstitutional failure to provide adequate medical and mental care” to its prisoners and ordered the state to reduce its prison population to 137.5 percent of design capacity within two years. (Coleman v. Schwarzenegger (E.D. Cal. 2009) 922 F.Supp.2d 882, 949; see also id. at pp. 969-970.) In May 2011, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the three-judge court‘s remedial order, holding that “the court-mandated population limit [was] necessary to remedy the violation of prisoners’ constitutional rights.” (Brown v. Plata, at p. 502.)
The Legislature and the Governor responded by enacting the Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011. (Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 1; Stats. 2011, 1st Ex. Sess. 2011-2012, ch. 12, § 1 (Realignment Act); see also People v. Scott (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1415, 1418.) The Realignment Act revised sentencing for nonserious, nonviolent, and non-sex registrant offenders, directing them from the state to local jurisdictions, and shifting fiscal responsibility for those offenders from the state to local governments. (See Scott, at pp. 1418-1419;
California voters then began using the initiative process to reform some of the most punitive features of the criminal justice system. In 2012, voters approved Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act. (As approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012).) In the wake of Brown v. Plata and the
A third strike inmate who satisfies certain specified criteria “shall be resentenced” as a second strike offender to “twice the term otherwise provided for the current felony conviction,” “unless the court, in its discretion, determines that resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (
Two years after the passage of Proposition 36, in November 2014, California voters approved additional changes in sentencing law by enacting Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act. (As approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014).) Proposition 47 reclassified certain drug- and theft-related felony and wobbler offenses as misdemeanors. (See
Through a procedure modeled on Proposition 36‘s, Proposition 47 permits the sentencing court to deny a resentencing petition from an inmate otherwise
II.
So what does Proposition 47‘s phrase “[a]s used throughout this Code” mean here? When we interpret statutes, giving effect to legislative purpose is the touchstone of our mission. (See Goodman v. Lozano (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1327, 1332 [“In interpreting a statute, our primary goal is to determine and give effect to the underlying purpose of the law“].) “[A]long with the text of the statutory provision directly at issue, structure and context can be critical in determining whether ambiguity exists and in discerning the Legislature‘s intended purpose.” (Poole v. Orange County Fire Authority (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1378, 1393 (conc. opn. of Cuéllar, J.).)
The text of the statute is integral to our understanding of the statute‘s purpose. (See Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 901 (Robert L.), quoting People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226, 231 [in interpreting a voter initiative, as with ordinary statutory construction, ” ‘we turn first to the language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning’ “].) We treat the text as an especially important indication of legislative purpose, typically even as the most reliable indicator of purpose. (Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1103; Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 871.) We must take “the language . . . as it was passed into law, and [we] must, if possible without doing violence to the language and spirit of the
As the court suggests, we are indeed bound to give effect to the statute‘s underlying purposes. In doing so, we must consider the function of the specific statutory provisions as written. But giving effect to a provision‘s intended purpose requires us to consider not only the statutory design in its wider legal context, but also the purpose of a specific provision within the framework of that design. Everything about that inquiry in this case points in the same direction: “throughout this Code” means throughout this code.
Consider first the particular terms of the provision most directly at issue. By defining a phrase as it is “used throughout this Code” (
In addition, we strive to give effect to all the words in a statute, avoiding surplusage whenever possible. (See City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell (1982) 32 Cal.3d 47, 54 [“In construing the words of a statute or constitutional provision to discern its purpose, the provisions should be read together; an interpretation which would render terms surplusage should be avoided, and every word should be given some significance, leaving no part useless or devoid of meaning“].) The term “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” appears in only one other provision in the entire Penal Code —
We may decline to give full effect to the ordinary meaning of a statute‘s language in certain circumstances. None of those circumstances is present in this case. For example, we have found judicial correction of language appropriate in instances of drafting error, where it has “appear[ed] clear that a word has been erroneously used.” (People v. Skinner (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765, 775; see id. at pp. 775-779 [construing statutory provision‘s use of the word “and” instead of “or” to be inadvertent].) But the court carefully refrains from asserting that a drafting error occurred in Proposition 47. Indeed, it acknowledges that at least one of
Nor is there any good reason to believe the consequences of construing the phrase “throughout this Code” to mean throughout the Penal Code will prove absurd. On occasion, we have disregarded the literal meaning of a statutory provision when an “obvious absurdity” would otherwise result. (In re Thierry S. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 727, 741, fn. 13.) And it is certainly true that anticipating the consequences of a particular interpretation can help inform our understanding of whether an interpretation is consistent with the purpose of the statutory design. (See Horwich v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 272, 280; id. at pp. 287-288.) But the absurdity doctrine is to be invoked sparingly — only when we determine that “as a matter of law, the [enacting body] did not intend the statute to have its literal effect.” (Gorham Co., Inc. v. First Financial Ins. Co. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1544; see also California School Employees Assn. v. Governing Bd. of South Orange County Community College Dist. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 574, 588 [“We must exercise caution using the ‘absurd result’ rule; otherwise, the judiciary risks acting as a ‘super-Legislature’ by rewriting statutes to find an unexpressed legislative intent“].) In light of the striking similarities between the resentencing procedures of the two initiatives, the results of applying the definition consistently between Proposition 36 and Proposition 47 prove entirely reasonable. Once a petitioner‘s eligibility is established under either Proposition 36 or Proposition 47, the petitioner must be resentenced ”unless the court, in its discretion, determines that resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (
What the court posits is that an amendment circumscribing the basis for denying relief under the Three Strikes Reform Act “necessarily would suggest disfavor” of the broader discretion afforded courts under Proposition 36‘s originally undefined phrase “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.”
Finally, we have held that a literal construction of an enactment‘s language does not control “when such a construction would frustrate the manifest purpose of the enactment as a whole.” (Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 979; accord, California School Employees Assn. v. Governing Board (1994) 8 Cal.4th 333, 340.) This last exception to general statutory interpretation principles appears to animate the court‘s view, insofar as the court concludes that certain aspects of the initiative appear “inconsistent with” giving effect to the statutory text. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 19-21.) But, according to some of its stated purposes, Proposition 47 sought to assess the public safety risk of inmates and reduce corrections spending. Proposition 36‘s petition mechanism is also markedly similar to Proposition 47‘s in terms of its procedures and its identification of factors bearing on an inmate‘s risk of danger to public safety. The court has not gone so far as to find that Proposition 47‘s manifest purposes would be frustrated by applying “unreasonable risk” definition to the Three Strikes Reform Act, as our precedent has up until now required. Today‘s departure from our ordinary mode of statutory interpretation unjustifiably augments the judicial power to rewrite duly enacted statutes in accordance with courts’ own preferences.3
The court appears to concede that the phrase “[a]s used throughout this Code” — on its own — has a clear ordinary meaning. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 16; see also Marshall v. Pasadena Unified School Dist. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1255 [“There is nothing ambiguous about the phrase ‘as used in this code.’ In enacting [Public Contract Code] section 1102, the Legislature did not merely define the term ‘emergency’ for a particular chapter, article or division . . . .“].) But the court would find the statutory language ambiguous when considered in the context of the entire statute and initiative.
The provisions of the initiative contain no reference to the Three Strikes law or the Three Strikes Reform Act, or to persons sentenced to life imprisonment. Such silence cannot be taken to resolve the issue, or else we would effectively impose a requirement that initiative provisions specify every possible consequence that would result from voter approval. (See People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903, 908-909 [“We deny a phrase like ‘any other provision of law’ its proper impact if we expect a penal statute — whether enacted by the Legislature or the electorate — to further enumerate every provision of the Penal Code to which it is relevant“].) In harmonizing provisions of a ballot measure consistent with the spirit of the law, “it matters not whether the drafters, voters or legislators consciously considered all the effects and interrelationships of the provisions they wrote and enacted.” (Garcia, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 14.)
The court does not show that applying Proposition 47‘s definition to the resentencing standard under the Three Strikes Reform Act would frustrate — or even, under its diluted standard, prove inconsistent with — the manifest purposes of Proposition 47. Portions of Proposition 47‘s uncodified sections demonstrate the initiative‘s focus on reducing certain nonserious and nonviolent felonies to misdemeanors, while “ensur[ing] that sentences for people convicted of dangerous crimes like rape, murder, and child molestation are not changed.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) (Voter Information Guide), text of Prop. 47, § 2, p. 70.) But application of the definition in accordance with the statute‘s literal text appears consistent with other stated purposes of the initiative. One of Proposition 47‘s uncodified purposes is to “[r]equire a thorough review of criminal history and risk
The majority and concurrence also find ambiguity in the language of the initiative because
Even if we assumed that the term “the petitioner” in the preceding provision of
The court appears to have found ambiguity not because it has found statements in the rest of Proposition 47 directly undermining the statute‘s clear language, but instead because it has not found redundant statements bolstering this language. The court posits that “one would expect [the Proposition 47] drafters to have mentioned or referred to a purpose and intention” to amend the Three Strikes Reform Act in the initiative‘s preamble. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 36.) But why would this be so? The amendment was sufficiently conveyed through the text of the law distributed to and approved by voters.
Nor should a lack of procedural detail in the statute bear on how we construe an unambiguous term. A prospective-only application of Proposition 47‘s definition to the Three Strikes Reform Act would mean the new definition would pertain to any petitioner who has not yet had a court decide whether he or she presents “an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” as of Proposition 47‘s effective date. The court believes that Proposition 47‘s failure to include procedures for resentencing Three Strikes Reform Act petitioners under the new definition “widens the gap concerning the voters’ understanding” of Proposition 47‘s effects. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 25.) But Proposition 36‘s two-year deadline for filing a petition may be extended “upon a showing of good cause.” (
Under today‘s holding, the clarity and meaning of text would be called into question whenever any statute refers to an application of a provision “throughout this Code.” The phrase itself is straightforward, and remains so even when considering the definite article preceding the word “petitioner.” (
IV.
Having detected what it perceives to be ambiguity in the language of the statute, the court proceeds to examine evidence of voter “intent” outside the measure‘s provisions. Ballot materials extrinsic to the initiative may be relevant in the interpretation of statutes forged through the initiative process. But this does not mean that the ballot materials’ failure to expressly mention one particular consequence can contravene relatively simple language. Official ballot materials are not detailed legal memoranda, nor can we command they discuss every nuance or legal issue an initiative may touch. (Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 237 [“Ballot arguments are not legal briefs and are not expected to cite every case the proposition may affect“]; see also Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268, 282 [“it is of no consequence here that the ballot materials did not specifically refer to the act‘s application in actions against local public entities for nuisance and dangerous condition of property” because “[s]uch actions fall squarely within the terms of [Civil Code]
Here, a total of seven brief bullet points constitute Proposition 47‘s Official Title and Summary. This abbreviated statement prepared by the Attorney General may serve as a useful guide to voters, but it by no means replaces the statute itself. In Cervera, we considered whether the original Three Strikes law authorized a defendant with three strikes to receive prison conduct credits under article 2.5 of the Penal Code — which by its terms only applied to determinate sentences — for use against his mandatory indeterminate term of life imprisonment. (Cervera, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1076.) Although some of the “documents within the history of the bill and the initiative measure that would each become the Three Strikes law” assumed that prison conduct credits could apply to third-strikers (id. at p. 1079), we concluded that the statute‘s language did not authorize such reductions of indeterminate life sentences. “A statute, of course, must prevail over any summary. Were it not so, no statute could ever be enacted whole and entire. For every summary, by definition, is incomplete. . . . The summary must yield to the statute, not the statute to the summary.” (Id. at pp. 1079-1080.)
Moreover, just as with the language of the uncodified initiative, there are several statements in the ballot materials consistent with an application of Proposition 47‘s definition to the Three Strikes Reform Act. The “Argument in Favor of Proposition 47” disclosed that the initiative would “[i]mprove public safety,” “[r]educe prison spending and government waste,” and “focus[] law enforcement dollars on violent and serious crime.” (Voter Information Guide, supra, argument in favor of Prop. 47, p. 38.) These declared purposes of reallocating prison spending to the most dangerous criminals and allowing others to pursue resentencing would be advanced by permitting Three Strikes Reform Act petitioners to demonstrate that — under the same forward-looking risk assessment employed under Proposition 47 — they do not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.
Opponents of the initiative also argued that “[t]he proponents of this dangerous measure have already admitted that Proposition 47 will make 10,000 felons eligible for early release. According to independent analysis, many of those 10,000 felons have violent criminal histories” and “Felons with prior convictions ”
for armed robbery, kidnapping, carjacking, child abuse, residential burglary, arson, assault with a deadly weapon, and many other serious crimes will be eligible for early release under Prop. 47.” (Voter Information Guide, supra, argument against Prop. 47, p. 39.) The rebuttal to the opponents’ argument clarified that Proposition 47 would not require automatic release of anyone. (Voter Information Guide, at p. 39.) Yet the voters enacted Proposition 47 despite cautionary statements that persons with violent criminal histories could benefit from the passage of the initiative. (Cf. Robert L., supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 906-907 [voters’ approval of initiative despite warnings contained in opponents’ argument was indicative of voter intent].)
Both the majority opinion and the concurrence appear to use the ballot statements made by the Attorney General and the Legislative Analyst as a reference point for voter awareness and understanding. (See, e.g., maj. opn., ante, at p. 11 [expressing skepticism at notion that voters may have “greater acumen than the legal professionals“]; conc. opn., ante, at pp. 11-12 [“When these trained experts were apparently unaware of the initiative‘s possible effect . . . it becomes more difficult to conclude that voters understood” the consequences of their affirmative vote].) Such an approach downplays the fact that the ballot materials authored by the Attorney General and Legislative Analyst are indisputably incomplete summaries of the ballot measure, constrained by word limits. An even more troubling feature of the court‘s argument is that it suggests that a few “legal professionals” or “trained experts” hold ultimate authority to decide (advertently or not) which portions of the people‘s enactments are ratified. Under today‘s holding, pronouncements of individual officers can defeat the actual language of laws approved by the electorate.
To the extent that the court‘s decision is calibrated to apply only in the initiative context, it departs from our longstanding commitment to analyze voter-approved statutes using the same approach we employ for Legislature-enacted statutes. Lawmaking by ballot initiative is so fundamental to California‘s democracy that our state Constitution speaks of the power of initiative “not as a right granted the people, but as a power reserved by them.” (Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582, 591;
We generally presume voters “‘have voted intelligently upon an amendment to their organic law, the whole text of which was supplied [to] each of them prior to the election and which they must be assumed to have duly considered.‘” (Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 243-244, quoting Wright v. Jordan (1923) 192 Cal. 704, 713.) This presumption, we have acknowledged, serves “to further the fundamental right of the electorate to enact legislation through the initiative process.” (Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Pol. Practices Com. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 744, 768.) Although the court identifies Taxpayers as one case in which we recognized some limit to the degree of thoroughness with which we presume voters review ballot measures, Taxpayers is a far cry from the case before us. There, the voters simultaneously approved two initiatives with “fundamentally conflicting provisions intended to regulate the same subject.” (Id.) Provision-by-provision reconciliation of nonconflicting aspects of those initiatives was riddled with uncertainty, as “illustrated by the divergent conclusions” reached by lower courts and administrative agencies. (Id. at p. 760.) In contrast, in the instant case, we are tasked with assessing whether reasonable voters plausibly meant to give effect to a ballot measure‘s clear language, thus affecting a law previously enacted by ballot measure. These unremarkable circumstances do not warrant a departure from our standard presumption that the electorate votes intelligently after considering the provided text of the law.
Contrary to the court‘s assertion, we did not “refuse[] to apply” this presumption in Robert L. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 35.) What we did was interpret the term at issue in the context of the entire statute. We observed that the ordinary meaning of the phrase “a public offense punishable as a felony or a misdemeanor” would not have been restricted to wobbler offenses, and identified discrepancies between that phrase and the statutory description of so-called wobbler offenses. (Robert L., supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 901.) Our conclusion was also supported by the fact that the term wobbler was, at that time, “a legal term of art of recent vintage” with no “meaning defined by statute or commonly understood by the electorate.” (Id. at p. 902.) Our opinion in Robert L. does not signify that we disregard the presumption that voters are aware of existing law; it means that we cannot assume that every term is unambiguous in its meaning. We must acknowledge when statutory language is reasonably susceptible to multiple interpretations. Yet, in attempting to justify their interpretation in this case, the court does not contend that the word “code” is commonly understood by the electorate to refer to only the initiative containing the provision at issue. Its decision to strike the phrase “throughout this Code” from
Although we analyze text, structure, and context to give effect to a statutory provision‘s intended purpose or purposes as reasonable voters or legislators might have understood them, we are hardly in a position to ascertain the subjective intentions of each member of an enacting majority. When we analyze a statute, a particularly compelling mix of humility and analytical clarity should prevent us from implying that we are articulating legislators’ or voters’ subjective states of mind. (Garcia, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 14, fn. 8. [“We do not say anything regarding the ‘probability’ any or all legislators or voters subjectively contemplated a given meaning; we simply do not know.“]) To some extent, we must attribute constructive notice on the part of the enacting body in order to properly give effect to the purposes of any enacted law. We do so because, in construing statutes, our task is not to ask whether the enacting body “consciously considered all the effects and interrelationships of the provisions” but is instead to take the language of the
It is one of democracy‘s recurring challenges that the rules and standards governing society — whether enacted by legislation or initiative — are often enormously complicated in both their content and effect. (Fair Political Practices Com. v. Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 33, 42 [“Our society being complex, the rules governing it whether adopted by legislation or initiative will necessarily be complex“].) Whether or not the complexity of any individual provision is fully understood by a voter casting a ballot on an initiative, we “should not lightly presume” that voters are unaware of what they are doing in approving an initiative — even when the contents of a ballot measure are intricate and potentially confusing. (Brosnahan v. Brown (1982) 32 Cal.3d 236, 252.) The tenets we typically apply to voter-enacted statutes are rooted in our respect for the initiative process and, more generally, the legislative function. Thus, they start from the premise that the electorate must take a considerable measure of responsibility in enacting complicated laws. The court has not offered a convincing reason for us to here dispense with these fundamental interpretive canons.
It is a well-settled principle of statutory interpretation that, where both text and purpose are clear, courts shall not endeavor to rewrite language of a ballot measure. (See People v. Skinner (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765, 775; see also Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications, Inc. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 920, 930 [“the initiative power is strongest when courts give effect to the voters’ formally expressed intent“].) Here, the court contravenes this principle by attempting to discern the purpose of the voters’ enactment without consideration of a relevant provision‘s clear text as a crucial indicator of purpose.
The court sees in
CUÉLLAR, J.
WE CONCUR:
WERDEGAR, J.
LIU, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Chaney & People v. Valencia
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 12/16/14 - 5th Dist.
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 231 Cal.App.4th 1391
Rehearing Granted
Opinion No. S223676 & S223825
Date Filed: July 3, 2017
Court: Superior
County: Amador & Tuolumne
Judge: Steve Hermanson & Eleanor Provost
Counsel:
Michael Satris, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Clifford Paul Chaney.
Stephanie L. Gunther, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant David John Valencia.
Three Strikes Project and Michael S. Romano for George Gascon, Bill Landsdowne and David Mills as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Richard Such and John T. Philipsborn for California Attorneys for Criminal Justice as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette and Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen G. Herndon, Rachelle A. Newcomb, Peter W. Thompson and Darren K. Indermill, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Michael Satris
Law Office of Michael Satris
Post Office Box 337
Bolinas, CA 94924-0337
(415) 868-9209
Stephanie L. Gunther
P.O. Box 20910
Bakersfield, CA 93309
(661) 428-3720
Peter W. Thompson
Deputy Attorney General
1300 I Street, Suite 125
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
(916) 324-5244
Darren K. Indermill
Deputy Attorney General
1300 I Street, Suite 125
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
(916) 324-5244
Notes
In Chickasaw Nation, for example, the United States Supreme Court held that a statutory cross-reference should be treated as surplusage, even though doing so gave no effect to the language at issue. (Chickasaw Nation, supra, 534 U.S. at p. 94; see also pp. 97-98 (dis. opn. of O‘Connor, J.).) The court explained that it was impossible to give effect to the cross-reference without either “seriously rewriting the language of the rest of the statute” (
The alternative is to recognize the practical reality that voters are sometimes asked to vote on statutory language that is not drawn with the precision one might hope for. In the initiative process, there are no hearings, no committee reports, no opportunities to propose amendments from the floor. Our job, ultimately, is to give effect to the voters’ intent, “without speculating about how they might have felt concerning subjects on which they were not asked to vote.” (Ross, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 930.) The court questions why I emphasize the absence of a drafting error, the inapplicability of the absurdity doctrine, and the lack of any finding that the manifest purposes of the law are frustrated by a particular interpretation of the law. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 38, fn. 14). Yet the fact that these matters are not addressed in the court‘s opinion is precisely why I mention them. Although California law underscores the importance of effectuating a statute‘s purpose, it also limits the circumstances under which courts may simply refuse to give effect to a statute as it was enacted. It is quite surprising that today‘s decision avoids any meaningful discussion of cases where our court has declined to apply the literal meaning of a provision because it conflicts with statutory purposes.
“Criminal Sentences. Misdemeanor Penalties. Initiative Statute.
- Requires misdemeanor sentence instead of felony for certain drug possession offenses.
- Requires misdemeanor sentence instead of felony for the following crimes when amount involved is $950 or less: petty theft, receiving stolen property, and forging/writing bad checks.
- Allows felony sentence for these offenses if person has previous conviction for crimes such as rape, murder, or child molestation or is registered sex offender.
- Requires resentencing for persons serving felony sentences for these offenses unless court finds unreasonable public safety risk.
- Applies savings to mental health and drug treatment programs, K-12 schools, and crime victims.
Summary of Legislative Analyst‘s Estimate of Net State and Local Government Fiscal Impact:
- Net state criminal justice system savings that could reach the low hundreds of millions of dollars annually. These savings would be spent on school truancy and dropout prevention, mental health and substance abuse treatment, and victim services.
- Net county criminal justice system savings that could reach several hundred million dollars annually.”