*1 No. 30904. Aug. [L.A. 1979.]
FAIR COMMISSION, Petitioner, POLITICAL PRACTICES THE COUNTY, SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES Respondent; OF al.,
INSTITUTE GOVERNMENTAL ADVOCATES et Real Parties Interest.
Counsel Stern, J. Lowenstein, Michael Baker and Lee C. H. Robert M. Daniel for Petitioner. Rosenthal Guido, Diamond, Hecht, & Jr., Diamond Jon J.
Kenneth Roger of Petitioner. John W. Black as Amici Curiae behalf Greenfield and for No Respondent. appearance General, J. Iver E. Assistant
Evelle Attorney Attorney Skjeie, Younger, Hunt, General, Ball, General, Shimomura, D. Attorney Deputy Floyd F. Hart, Baerwitz, Laurence Brown John R. Jay & McDonough, E. for in Interest. Allan Tebbetts Real Parties and Amitai L. Schlosser Simon, Alan C. M. Ruth Crosby, Margaret Real Parties Interest. Amici Curiae on behalf Schwartz Opinion
CLARK, J. The FairPolitical Commission for writ Practices petitions mandate to court vacate a compel respondent judgment enjoining Code, enforcement of the Political Act of 1974 81000 et Reform (Gov. § an initiative measure. seq.),
We have enforcement of the stayed judgment except paragraph Fair . . “That intervenor Political Practices Commission . permanent [is] as civil ly enjoined commencing proceedings prosecutor against any based on the act of a recommendation lobbyist single advising making to the of the with of a employer regard making political contribution where advice or recommendation results in a contribu tion from the This made employer.” provision permanent preliminary issued court, injunction by Judge Hupp superior affirmed in Institute Governmental Advocates v. Younger Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. 233]. invalid, court declared the entire initiative it
Respondent holding violates the one II, rule initiatives (Cal.Const., art. subject applicable IV, subd. (d), 22); § art. section 86202 of § formerly chapter *5 contributions to violates First (prohibiting political campaigns) and, Amendment and with minor equal protection guarantees; excep- tions, the 6 remainder of violates chapter equal protection guarantees. 6 Sections of declared invalid include limitations on chapter lobbyist gifts officials, certain and disclosure for certain public requirements persons and involved with organizations lobbying. Single Subject
The Rule The initiative concerns elections and different methods for preventing and undue influence in and corruption political campaigns governmental activities. 1 2 definitions, contain Chapters general provisions 3 establishes the commission. including severability provision. Chapter 4 establishes disclosure for candidates’ Chapter requirements significant financial 5 limitations on supporters. Chapter places campaign spending. 6 activities. 7 establishes rules Chapter regulates lobbyist Chapter relating 8 conflict of interest. establishes rules to voter Chapter relating on summaries of ballot measures. pamphlet arguments proposed Chapter 9 ballot of candidates. 10 establishes regulates position Chapter auditing law, to aid enforcement 11 procedures chapter imposes for violations of the act. penalties
38 been held invalid in
Several sections of
initiative have
prior
v.
The California “An than not be initiative measure more one subject may embracing or have effect.” submitted electors was initiative measures requirement single subject adopted IV, article section lc. The next this court in v. Jordan as year Perry 92-93 P.2d Cal.2d construed 47], provision “The whether more than one is embraced
follows: problem subject lc act is not new in state. section has within one this Although constitutional initiative been added newly requirement extending amendments, the Constitution for has ‘Every required many years its act one shall shall embrace but expressed subject subject, IV, of that Const., title.’ art. § (Cal. proper scope application *6 elucidated, word on as the latest as to was provision subject singleness 58, Court, 62 215 Cal. v. the court in Evans this [8 Superior subject, a Probate Code in P.2d the single 467], upholding adoption is not to receive a view the enactment: ‘... we are the that provision cases, to construed in but is be narrow or technical construction all are of which to all reasonably liberally uphold proper legislation, parts 507, The v. Cal. 510 P. 160].) 209 (Heron provision Riley, [289 germane. the overthrow of was not enacted to means for legitimate provide 23, 26 P. ... 429].) v. 198 Cal. (McClure Riley, [243 [If] legislation. in indicated the one if Numerous object, fairly provisions, general having title, so related in one Provisions be united act. projects governing may scheme be as constitute a and may properly single interdependent 1, 3 195 Cal. P. within act. v. included (Barber Galloway, [231 single
39 insert in a act all 34].) legislation legislature single germane the as in its title within the field general subject expressed 82 v. Los Gas (Treat legislation suggested thereby. Corp., Angeles 610 Provisions are the P. which 447].) Cal.App. [256 logically germane act, title of the are included within its be united. The scope, may declared, aof statute the details for its general purpose being provided will be incidents. (Estate accomplishment regarded necessary Levenstadt, 506, 192 Cal. P. Buelke v. Cal. 628]; Wellings, [221 684, 687 P. and cases 42]; cited.) The of this court language [214 40, 51 Robinson v. 151 Cal. 12 Ann.Cas. Kerrigan, Am.St.Rep. [121 829, 90 P. A 129], is to this case at this especially applicable point. act, which is conduces the or which to and provision auxiliary of its main has and natural connection promotive purpose, necessary with conclusion, such is within . . the rule. . Our purpose germane therefore, is the enacted Probate Code not does embrace more newly than one Its numerous have one subject. provisions general object. commission, classification of these made the code provisions, carried act, into the title is a reference to “reasonably intelligent to which addressed,” of the act is is all subject legislation also, 646-650; cases collected in Cal.Jur. (See, requisite.’ Am.Jur., Statutes, When the 196-199.) of words or §§ scope meaning in a statute have courts, been there phrases repeatedly interpreted by is some indication that the use of them in a in a statute similar subsequent carries with it a like construction. v. setting Beach (City Long Payne, Cal.2d 184 P.2d There is in the 305].) the voters nothing argument when section lc of article IV was such construction adopted contrary the ‘one limitation.” purposes subject’ underlying Jordan, this court
Relying upon Perry applied reasonably test and the California Water Resources germane upheld Development Bond Act Water Dist. v. 59 Cal.2d Metropolitan Marquardt 172-173 379 P.2d The act for issuance of Cal.Rptr. provided 28]. $2 bonds, dams, levees, billion in to be used nearly proceeds facilities, channel a water distribution improvements, system, drainage electrical and transmission and local water energy generation systems, facilities. development *7 we a claim the was one
Recently, rejected subject requirement rates, violated an initiative real tax real by limiting property limiting assessments, taxes, and local taxes. property restricting restricting Const., A; art. XIII the Jarvis-Gann held (Cal. Initiative.) We that all were related and provisions functionally reasonably germane 40 tax relief. Joint Union Schl. of (Amador
subject
property
Valley
High
208,
22
231
v.
Cal.3d
(1978)
Dist.
State Bd.
Cal.Rptr.
Equalization
[149
of
239,
decision,
Court held that a similar initiative involved only
Washington Supreme
(Fritz
920-921].)
41 Consistent with our to initiative duty uphold people’s right and, so, we adhere test find process, reasonably germane doing that the measure before us with the one complies subject requirement.
“The amendment of the California Constitution in 1911 provide the initiative and referendum one of the achieve signifies outstanding ments of the movement of the 1900’s. Drafted in of progressive early light that all of resides in the theory power government ultimately people, referendum, amendment of the initiative and not as a speaks right but as a reserved them. it ‘the granted people, power by Declaring of the courts to this duty v. jealously guard (Martin right people’ 115, Smith 176 (1959) 117 the courts have 307]), Cal.App.2d Cal.Rptr. [1 described the initiative and referendum as ‘one of the most articulating of our Acker, democratic v. ... 189 precious rights process’ (Mervynne 558, 563 has our 340]). been Cal.App.2d Cal.Rptr. [11 long judicial ‘[I]t a liberal construction to this wherever it is policy apply power in order that the be not annulled. If challenged doubts right improperly can be resolved in favor of the use of this reserve reasonably power, Acker, courts will 558, it.’ v. 189 preserve (Mervynne supra, Cal.App.2d 563-564; Hamm, 250, v. 25 ... 258 Gayle Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. [101 etc., Home 628].)” (Associated Builders v. Inc. Livermore City of 582, 41, Cal.3d 473, 557 P.2d 92 A.L.R.3d (fns. Cal.Rptr. 1038] omitted); Cal.2d Farley Healey Cal.Rptr.
P.2d 650].) initiative, with the the voters not be keeping policy favoring may limited to brief statements but deal and in general comprehensively detail with an area of law. (§§ state ballot adoption measures 85300-85305 repealed]). Requirements [later [¶] 88001-88002,
to form and content of (§§ State ballot 88004-88005). pamphlet Duties [¶] State, Secretary Legislative Analyst Counsel State ballot Legislative regarding 88000, 88003, (§§ 88005.5). pamphlet to examine Right State ballot public [¶] pamphlet review of prior printing; (§ 88006). ballot judicial pamphlet prior printing 3. Regulation public interest. of the Act provisions [¶] dealing of include official conflicts of with this subject regulations Prohibition of actions pertaining by public [¶] official to influence decisions governmental which he has a financial interest (§§ 87100-87103). disclosure Required officials of investments and by public interests [¶] (§§ 87200-87207). in real property of conflict of interest codes Mandatory adoption [¶] and local agencies (§§ 87300-87312). governmental 4. agencies Regulation [¶] lobbyists. the Act provisions with this include dealing subject regulations (§§ 86100-86104). pertaining Registration lobbyists Accounts to be required [¶] [¶] 86105-86106). established and (§§ maintained by lobbyists receipts Reporting [¶] (§ 86107). expenditures Prohibition of contributions campaign [f] (§§ 86203). limitations of Other gifts by lobbyists prohibitions imposed upon [¶] (§ 86205).” of their lobbyists regarding practice profession *9 us is there the initiative measure before wordy complex,
Although claimed voter confusion could be eliminated is little reason to expect into four or ten or reduced the measure separate substantially by dividing the rules it whether Our propositions. society being complex, governing Unless we or initiative will necessarily complex. adopted by legislation initiative, use of the risk of confusion must be are repudiate cripple borne.
Nor does the that some measure voters vote for the possibility might —while to some the objecting parts—warrant reasonably rejection in more than test. Such risk is inherent initiative germane containing one sentence or even an “and” in a sentence unless the provisions single Const., For the initiative art. are redundant. Jarvis-Gann (Cal. example, limitations on on state XIII taxes and restrictions A) provided property and other local taxes. Amador Joint Union Schl. Dist. (See Valley High 22 Cal.3d owners Bd. Some State supra, property Equalization, tax for the measure because of the have voted primarily property relief, about the state and other local tax while having questions have voted for the restrictions. some owners may Similarly, nonproperty on other state and local initiative because restrictions primarily taxes, tax while reservations as to the limitations. having property
The enactment of laws whether the the voters Legislature by the last the issue whether balance analysis always presents so, act’s for benefits exceed its If proposed remedy shortcomings. is which will be difficult whether the law is shortcomings repeal, adopted or the one Legislature people. difficulty repeal merely factor to be considered their votes. and voters when by legislators casting initiatives,
Given the debate of widespread explanations public media, the ballot volume of and in the huge pamphlets 1,000 is unreasonable to business—over bills enacted each year—it than assume that initiative measures receive less scrutiny proposed legislation. reserved the themselves people having legislative power there is no reason to hold
well as it to the Legislature, having granted and the is more limited than that Legislature, power people’s II, Const., art. (Cal. both applicable powers single subject requirements IV, art. should not be used to establish 9) (Cf. subd. (d); § inequality. § Livermore, 18 Cal.3d Home etc. Inc. v. Associated Builders supra, City of test we adhere 591-592.) reasonably germane Accordingly, both. *10 to the' of the initiative are reasonably germane provisions of the one of and there is no violation subject
subject political practices, requirement. Regulation
Lobbyist Contributions
A. to make a for a “It be unlawful 86202 shall Section provides: of or in the contribution, an any or to act as making intermediary agent himself of contribution contribution, or to for the by making any arrange made to a a “contribution “Contribution” means other or any person.” by candidate, or an elected candidate, a state a committee supporting “ who is means state officer.” 8620Ó.) (§ any person employed ‘Lobbyist’ consideration, than other reimbursement or contracts for economic to communicate his travel reasonable directly agents expenses, through for the official, official or official elective state with agency any action, or administrative if substantial of influencing legislative purpose for which he receives consideration is of the activities regular portion action. No or administrative for the of influencing legislative purpose 86300.”3 reason of activities described in Section is a lobbyist person of There is no contributions (§ against by employers prohibition lobbyists. 70 In v. Institute Governmental Advocates Younger, supra, of 878, earlier, out the Court of First
Cal.App.3d pointed Appeal Amendment based on section invalidated commission grounds ruling 86202, to make their employers precluding advising contributions. political 659, Valeo, 424 23-38 690-699], v. U.S. L.Ed.2d Buckley supra,
the United States Court' considered the validity provisions Supreme Act the Federal Election of 1971 as amended Campaign limiting $1,000 for contribution individuals amount political limitations $25,000 The court that contribution candidate and total. held association, freedom of “a ‘basic constitutional restrict contributor’s Pontikes, freedom,’ v. 414 U.S. at that is allied ‘closely Kusper which, at the and a like free lies freedom speech right speech, 3 Section certain activities officials exempts governmental employees, media, and church representatives. Tucker, 479, 364 U.S. (1960). of a free Shelton
foundation society.’ Rock, 522-523 NAACP v. (1960); 361 U.S. See, v. Little Bates e.g., Button, 460-461; at Alabama, NAACP v. at supra, [371 U.S.] supra, at L.Ed.2d J., 691].) U.S. at (424 p. (Harlan, dissenting).” our out that under The court financing system private pointed for the sums of elections, money effective large candidacy requires effective discussion to allow media and mass communication mailing *11 at 26-29 L.Ed.2d at issues. U.S. (424 candidacies and pp. [46 campaign is unless an individual It is 691-694].) permitted apparent pp. candidates, his in the election political by contributing participate be voice may quieted. in fundamental, action associate any governmental being right ” “ closest
curtailment of it ‘is scrutiny.’ Recognizing subject absolute, interference not the court said that may significant right interest be sustained if the “State demonstrates sufficiently important drawn to avoid means unnecessary abridgment employs closely 25 L.Ed.2d at 691].) U.S. at associational freedoms.” (424 p. [46 actual or interest in that the The court concluded limiting government’s contributions individual political large corruption resulting apparent freedoms and associational for is sufficient restricting justification contribu- on the “focuses limitation large campaign problem precisely where the association tions—the narrow actuality political aspect at 24-29 identified.” U.S. (424 for have been pp. [46 potential corruption concluded the However, the court also at L.Ed.2d 690-694].) govern- pp. is insufficient and its mental interest corruption appearance preventing 45- at U.S. (424 pp. for limitations expenditures. political justification 377; Eu, 18 Cal.3d Hardie v. 702-704]; 47 L.Ed.2d at supra, pp. [46 Com., Political Practices v. Fair supra, & Jobs Citizens Energy 671, 674-675.) Cal.3d substantial interest A justifying compelling governmental sufficiently Carriers in CSC v. Letter was also found with interference rights political the Hatch 796, 93 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 413 U.S. Upholding (1973) 2880]. [37 the court employees, Act governmental activity limiting political harmed if that could be interests three govern- identified governmental activities: (1) could mental political publicly employees participate the extent upon might depend promotion employment governmental number than rather large efficiency, governmental participation become a machine employees might huge political governmental our democratic and processes, defeating partisan political activity . act without bias or impair employee’s ability might fairly U.S. 564-567 favoritism. L.Ed.2d (413 808-810].) at pp. at pp. contributions in section Obviously, prohibition against 86200 is a substantial association, restriction on the freedom of lobbyists’ and the restriction if the “State demonstrates a upheld only interest and means drawn avoid sufficiently important employs closely Valeo, of associational freedoms.” unnecessary abridgment (Buckley U.S. L.Ed.2d The statute 691].) fails meet the supra, test.
The claimed state interest is to rid the of both political system apparent and actual influence. Under such a corruption improper Buckley drawn However, restrictions. it does not purpose justifies closely appear *12 that total of all contributions is a prohibition by any lobbyist closely drawn restriction.
First, the to contributions to and all prohibition candidates applies any even never have occasion to the candidate. though lobbyist may lobby broad, definition of Secondly, include lobbyist extremely persons who before administrative appear influence regularly agencies seeking administrative determinations in favor of their clients. the statute Thirdly, does not discriminate between small and but all contribu- large prohibits Thus, tions. it is not directed to the narrowly aspects" political association where be identified. potential corruption might
While either or actual warrant apparent political corruption might some restriction of freedom, associational it does not warrant lobbyist total of all contributions all to all prohibition candidates. lobbyists interests held to warrant governmental substantial restrictions Carriers, in CSC v. Letter 548, political U.S. have no rights supra, than to other greater contribu- application private campaign tors.
Section 86202 is invalid because it is not drawn to avoid “closely Valeo, associational freedoms.” unnecessary abridgment (Buckley 1, 659, U.S. L.Ed.2d makes it supra, This 691].) unnecessary discuss whether the section results in a denial of protection. equal
B. and Other Lobbyist Employer Regulations Gifts $10 are than more
Lobbyists prohibited making gifts any candidate, month to state a or elective state official any legislative agency or from other (§§ participating gifts any person. are also and to all
Lobbyists required report register payments activities, the names of those the funds and lobbying supplying furnished, received, amounts disbursements from the funds they any transactions or with candidates or state elective legislative agency, or officials their families. must (§§ 86100-86107.) Lobbyists’ reports $500 include transaction or more in with a any totalling single year business entities in which the or has to know that knows reason lobbyist candidate, or or a elective official is any legislative, agency, director, officer or or more than a has partner, proprietor, manager also interest. subd. must (See, (e).) § percent Lobbyists report or administrative action which description legislative “specific influence, has influenced or and the lobbyist agencies attempted involved, if subd. (§ (f).) any.” $250 in month influence
Persons who any pay employ other file action must also or administrative Among reports. legislative in, the total amount matters, the must disclose businesses engaged reports action, contri- or administrative to influence payments more, $25 and a made, the names of who received butions persons *13 be to or administrative action sought specific description differs 86109.) influenced. The transaction (§ requirement reporting transactions more to to only totalling applicable lobbyists, applying $1,000 subds. (Id., (e).) than (d), per year. First the Amend the fundamental guaranteed
Among rights the the to to United States Constitution is ment right “petition function a redress Government lobbyist’s grievances.” on behalf his is to exercise such employer. obviously right to do not limit or restrict statutes right petition. directly challenged on burdens Rather, the and impose reporting requirements registration the form limitation affects to and the gift right petition, bear the burden All registration they may petition provided petition. and do not offer excessive gifts. reporting affected, are claims that because Advocates rights speech petition rule the strict is scrutiny applicable.
47
involved, both the
a fundamental
interest
be
Although
States
Court and this court have
that not
United
Supreme
recognized
limitation or incidental burden on a fundamental
every
right
subject
the strict
standard. When the
has an incidental
scrutiny
merely
regulation
effect
exercise of
strict
is not
protected rights,
scrutiny
applied. (E.g.,
618,
673,
Zablocki v. Redhail
As out the pointed and registration, reporting, gift are not direct limitations on provisions to for of redress petition right of the burdens of grievances. and disclosure of Application registration and to does not receipts expenditures interfere lobbyists substantially with the of the to raise his voice. While the burden ability lobbyist disclosure be substantial for those in extensive might engaging lobbying activities, the burden not when in the viewed context of the total great activities in. a a in to business engaged Requiring person engaged describe it and to its and not be viewed in report may receipts expenses
our commercial a substantial society impediment engaging business. to disclose their the burden on employers lobbyists
Similarly, placed and the action be sought lobbying purposes, thereby expenditures influenced, with the exercise does not constitute a substantial interference and petition speech rights. Brown,
On the basis Harriss and we sustain the validity and their and provisions requiring registration employers and activities and reporting lobbying receipts, expenditures, businesses. employers’
The limitation on the form of the lobbyist only gifts, affecting petition, also does not have a real and on the appreciable impact legitimate exercise of the and and the strict test is rights petition speech, scrutiny inapplicable. hand,
On the other the transaction will reporting requirements often be so onerous as constitute a interference with the significant fundamental The extent of is not. right petition. reporting required related the extent of activities but is determined directly lobbying others, with be transactions mainly by lobbyist employer unrelated to activities. For entirely lobbyist example, reporting a as to business transactions to transactions with applies requirement candidate, or or business where entity legislative, agency, if elective state official is a director. subd. a (§ (e).) Accordingly, a director of the Bank of America is also an agency official—perhaps of California—a who Regent lobbyist University any person $250 more than month employs spends single action must disclose transactions influence administrative amount with the Bank of America. The above the statutory requirement even have to do with the activities lobbying nothing applies though serve or banks. Because directors of many corporations university major on boards and other administrative the transaction agencies, reporting burdensome, business, requirement may extremely persons union or other who seek influence only organizations governmental will be deterred from so action on an isolated basis doing burdensome reporting requirements. *15 will often constitute a
Because the transaction reporting requirements the strict with the fundamental interference right petition, significant
49
doctrine
be
if
is
may
upheld
scrutiny
applicable.
requirements
only
interests and
statute “is
demonstrates sufficiently important
Redhail,
tailored to
interests.”
v.
effectuate
those
(Zablocki
closely
only
618, 631,
374,
673,
434
388
98
U.S.
L.Ed.2d
S.Ct.
682]; Buckley
supra,
[54
Valeo,
1,
424 U.S.
Even if the
state interest is
25.)
v.
supra,
compelling
on
be drawn
First Amendment activities must
with
restriction
present,
narrow
avoid
of the
and
curtailment
specificity
arbitrary
unnecessary
v.
freedom.
Inc.
Los
(Kash
Angeles,
protected
Enterprises,
City
supra,
294, 303;
331,
Cal.3d
Fort v.
Civil
Com.
61 Cal.2d
Service
625,
337-338
We have considered the of disclosure financial validity requirements activities officials and and held invalid a statute public employees which “would intrude alike into the relevant and the irrelevant private financial affairs . . . and is not limited to such only holdings might affected duties functions of a office.” particular public (City of 259, 1, Cal.3d Carmel-By-The-Sea Young Cal.Rptr. 225, 37
P.2d MacMillen, A.L.R.3d Nevada v. 1313]; County supra, 662, Cal.3d We are satisfied that the for redress of right petition not be conditioned disclosure irrelevant grievances similarly may upon financial matters unrelated to the Because the private petition activity. transaction to transactions no reporting requirements apply having activities, relation are not tailored” lobbying they “closely state interest in the constitute an but legitimate regulation lobbying curtailment unnecessary right petition.
Conclusion sum, we conclude: The contribu prohibition against lobbyist set tions forth in 86202 is section a substantial limitation on associational freedoms Amendment, the First is invalid. guaranteed the First right petition guaranteed by grievances Amendment not be conditioned on disclosure of financial private matters irrelevant to the and section subdivisions petition activity and section (d) (e) subdivisions are therefore (d) (e) However, invalid. the other reporting requirements,-the registra tion and the limitation do not constitute substantial requirements, gifts limitations on and the to those petition speech rights, challenge the Political Reform Act of 1974 provisions rejected, Finally, not does involve Constitution, in violation of California multiple subjects II, article section subdivision (d).
Let a writ of mandate issue court to vacate its directing respondent and enter in accordance with the views judgment judgment expressed herein. J., Richardson, J.,
Mosk, and concurred. TOBRINER, J., In Schmitzv. Cal.3d (1978) Concurring. Younger I Manuel’s 577 P.2d Justice 652], dissenting Cal.Rptr. joined nature of the initiative which concluded that “the special opinion, of the one a narrower construction” subject requirement process requires bills, “to than the limitation on that satisfy an initiative’s must be functionally one-subject requirement, provisions related in furtherance of a common Cal.3d at (21 underlying purpose.” I continue to adhere that Unlike 99-100.) pp. today. position Manuel, however, I believe that the 1974 Political Reform Act Justice I satisfies the standard enunciated in the Schmitz dissent. Accordingly, with that lower court erred majority invalidating agree issues, I entire act. With in the respect remaining join majority’s and conclusions. analysis and Dissenting.
NEWMAN, J., I with the Concurring agree that the I conclusion rule has not been violated. single subject majority’s however, 86202, 86107, enforcement of do not sections agree, of the (e) subdivisions subdivisions (d) (e), (d) Political Reform Act of 19741should be enjoined.
In view the does not advise California my majority opinion adequately and citizens as to their legislators generally powers regulate lobbying. follows has been reading substantially Language part California Constitution for 100 “A who seeks to influence years: person the vote of action of a member of the in the member’s Legislature intimidation, reward, or other legislative capacity by bribery, promise means, influenced, dishonest or a member of the so Legislature guilty IV, of a 15.) 1972 the commanded (Art. electors § felony.” additionally shall. . . for . . . free elections” and “shall Legislature provide “[t]he II, that affect elections . . . .” 3 and (Art. prohibit improper § practices later, Two because believed that § years apparently they regulations 81000 et seq. 1Government Code section *17 essential, constitutional were the electors
complementing language via the initiative the Political Reform Act of 1974. approved states, “The claimed state interest to rid the majority opinion of both and actual and political system corruption improper apparent influence.” is an 45.) That {Ante, bowdlerized unconscionably para- aims that in the initiative measure were declared to be as phrase complex follows note the declaration laws (and especially “[previous regulat- have suffered from enforcement ing political practices inadequate by state and local authorities”2);
“The find and declare as follows: people State and “(a) local should serve the needs and government respond the wishes of all citizens without wealth; their equally, regard officials, Public whether elected or
“(b) should appointed, perform manner, their duties in an free from bias caused their own impartial financial interests or the financial interests of who have persons supported them; Costs of election
“(c) have increased conducting campaigns greatly recent and candidates have been forced to finance their years, campaigns contributions and who by seeking large lobbyists organizations decisions; influence over thereby gain disproportionate governmental The influence of “(d) contributors is increased because large campaign for laws disclosure of have existing campaign receipts expenditures to be proved inadequate; often
“(e) make their contributions who incumbents Lobbyists cannot be because of abusive election laws and effectively challenged an incumbent unfair practices give advantage; individuals which make “(f) wealthy large organizations contributions extend influence their campaign by employing frequently amounts influence spending large actions; administrative Newman, Laws on 2Compare California Legal Representation, Lobbying, Aspects Orientation
Legislators’ Conference 125-130. pages measure The influence of contributors ballot “(g) large campaign because the ballot mailed to the voters elections is increased pamphlet the state is difficult to read and almost impossible layman understand; and *18 Previous laws have suffered from
“(h) political regulating practices Code, enforcement state and local authorities.” (Gov. inadequate by 81001.) §
“The enact this title to the following purposes; people accomplish should in election be “(a) campaigns fully Receipts expenditures be informed disclosed in order that the voters may fully truthfully inhibited; be and improper practices may in statewide elections should amounts that be
“(b) may expended such elections be limited in order may money importance reduced; be and their finances should be The activities
“(c) regulated directed at influences will not be disclosed in order that public improper officials; Assets and officials which income
“(d) may materially public and in affected their official actions should be disclosed appropriate in order circumstances the officials should be disqualified acting avoided; of interest that conflicts bemay ballot should be converted into a useful The state
“(e) pamphlet that voters will not be document so entirely dependent paid measure; for information state advertising regarding Laws and incumbents should be “(f) practices unfairly favoring in order that elections be conducted more abolished fairly; enforcement mechanisms should be provided public Adequate “(g) (cid:127) citizens in order that this title will be officials vigorously private Code, 81002.) enforced.” (Gov. §
“This title should be construed its liberally accomplish purposes.” Code, (Gov. § Who are section lobbyists? majority opinion correctly quotes “ follows; or who is contracts means ‘Lobbyist’ any person employed consideration,
for economic other than reimbursement for reasonable travel to communicate his with directly expenses, through agents any official, state for the elective official official agency purpose action, or administrative if a substantial or influencing legislative he activities for which receives consideration is regular portion or administrative action. No purpose influencing legislative person is a reason activities described Section 86300.” Not lobbyist by “ mentioned, however, is section us tells ‘[administra- consideration, tive action’ means the proposal, drafting, development, amendment, rule, enactment or defeat any agency *19 or other action in or regulation any rate-making proceeding which shall include quasi-legislative proceeding, any proceeding 4.5 Division of Title 2 of the Government Code governed Chapter definition, think, with Section That I 11371).” (beginning disposes broad, comment that “the definition of is to majority’s lobbyist extremely include who before administrative persons appear regularly agencies to influence administrative in favor of their determinations seeking ante, words, clients.” In other 45.) opn., (Majority p. presumably to because rule is statute the electors making comparable making,3 the as as I administrative well approved regulation lobbying. legislative unreasonable, do not that as and I do not that regard agree “[t]he held to warrant interests substantial restrictions governmental political . . . have no to than other rights greater application private contributors.” (Id., 45.) campaign p.
Nor do I the that of contribu- accept majority’s suggestion prohibition tions is when “the never have occasion to suspect lobbyist may lobby candidate.” (Id., relative, friend, What if the 45.) candidate is a a a p. whom the potential colleague, political professional, persons does intend to The search for influence lobby? “disproportionate over Code, decisions” subd. can (Gov. cause governmental (c)) § funds to flow in channels that become campaign labyrinthine, producing effects that sometimes seem almost subliminal.
How, wonder, I do the words from the following majority opinion Code, and citizens? statute enlighten legislators § [Gov. “[T]he 86202] not does discriminate between small but all contribu- large prohibits Thus, tion. it is not directed narrowly aspects political is the a 3“Rulemaking administrative what does counterpart legislative when it body (Davis, a enacts statute.” Administrative Law (2d 1975) 118.) and Government ed. p. be identified.” where association corruption might (Majority potential above, ante, was I 45.) As indicated imply “corruption” opn., eradicate seems almost sole evil electors sought simplistic, quaint. a Act of 1974 not Political Reform prototype drafting. sapient however, amendment. does, needs for
Section 81012 anticipate possible declarations, and Given the statements findings, purpose complex I contend the electors chose to set forth in 81001 and sections supra, are advised to await further consideration. that courts best that, not law now for under should comb the clauses varying They States Court as “strict of the United Supreme (particularly opinions motivated law in more scrutiny”), routinely might categorized instance, so labels “tailored.” insufficiently majority opinion, financial matters unrelat- clauses that involve “irrelevant private arguably To declared achieve ed (Ante, p. petition activity.” case, law before us in this I submit that aims of the defining legitimate of that kind of relevance is task best borderlines assigned appropriate administrators, not judges. legislators
MANUEL, J.
In
view the trial court
held that the
I dissent. my
correctly
Act
void
its
because it
Political Reform
is invalid and
in
1974
entirety
in
of the
than one
violation
more
subject”
provisions
“embracfes]
Constitution,
8,
the so-called
II,
of the state
article
section
subdivision (d)
writ.
I would
the
rule.
deny
single subject
Accordingly,
court,
the case of
this
in
more than
since
It
now been
has
years
to
laid
787],
understanding and 208 subsections sections initiative consisting separate proposal wide 21,000 words, treated a which, than in the more variety compass we oleomargarine. Although subjects reapportionment ranging noted the inherent in such a manner dangers presentation,1 it, Constitution at that time contained no and we provision precluding were therefore our unable decision on this ground directly point. Because, however, of the and effect comprehensive scope proposal whole, a it viewed as we concluded that amounted a of the revision Constitution, which could be express provision accomplished only a constitutional convention submission through prior convening for ratification. people rule, II, 8, now in The initiative contained article section single subject Constitution, subdivision of the is a direct of the McFadden (d) outgrowth decision. The 1948 that some future Legislature, obviously perceiving “multifarious” initiative not be so amount to a might comprehensive revision, constitutional mindful of the obviously being dangers adverted, which we had to be caused on the November 1948 placed became, election ballot what general subsequently following approval by one, IV, voters of more than two to former article section by margin 1c Constitution, which was reenacted the voters in its present form as a of the 1966 constitutional revision. part
For reasons which I have set out at in length my opinion dissenting Schmitz v. 21 Cal.3d at 96-101 Younger pages [145 Cal.Rptr. 517, 577 I II, P.2d am of the view that the mandate of 652], article section subdivision satisfied when (d) of an initiative only provisions measure can be said related furtherance of “functionally standard, common Cal.3d at This (21 underlying purpose.” has been this court in Amador Joint Union recently applied by Valley Sch. Dist. State Bd. *21 Cal.3d High Equalization of 239, 583 P.2d the reflects the Cal.Rptr. 1281], accurately meaning initiative rule in of its and for this reason isit single subject light history, to be broader, in the initiative context to the more preferred vague test which is in the context of “reasonably germane” applicable however, statutes.2 As I I am that the proceed explain, persuaded measure now before us fails either test. 1“The we said as a proposal,” “is offered amendment but it is single obviously
multifarious. It does not the an give people opportunity express approval it, to each as rather does have disapproval severally major change suggested; apparently, the for purpose the measure the favorable votes from aggregating many electors of who, offered, suasions one or more wanting strongly enough any propositions grasp might want, at that which the remainder. Minorities each they favoring tacitly accepting might, thus severally (32 all.”' Cal.2d at aggregated, proposition adopt rule, 2It notable in is this that the respect unlike that legislative single subject applicable initiatives, in the case of a nullification in the event of violation. partial contemplates only
56 the outset it is itself we find at to the measure
Turning Containing separate chapters physical proportions. prodigious the voter’s sections, over 16 its text covered closely pages packed one Election, in its for the June 1974 printing Primary pamphlet codes no less than (37B of the annotated edition pages. requires 81000-91014, As 3-134.) Ann. Gov. Code (1976 ed.) §§ West’s pp. 20,000 enacted, of more than words—or it was approximately comprised case. we confronted in the McFadden 1,000 less than the measure which limit the of an is no constitutional on size there specific Although measure, this it be that one amount initiative requiring might expected undertake to address more than technical would itself legal verbiage below, this not as I out are in case one Such “subject.” point expectations, in held vain.
It is to note that the the instant measure interesting parties supporting of the some the seem have “single difficulty agreeing upon identity Fair Political which it is asserted to Thus petitioner subject” comprehend. . . . claims that initiative Practices Commission “concern[s] Amici curiae Common of the reform and political process.” integrity hand, Club, other Cause, on the of Women Voters and Sierra League somewhat, that the at oral the focus asserting argument change appear more accountable is that “making government “single subject” A brief the influence of wealth governmental processes.” diminishing identifies curiae in of the measure filed other amici support matter, while its practices” subject “deceptive prevention General, for a return in who has filed petition Attorney support mandate, It is not in terms of reform.” simply “political prefers speak view, that such a lack should unanimity appear, my surprising, not the matter of the measure’s all of the aforesaid formulations speak IV, one “A shall embrace but shall subject, Article section statute provides: title, not in its not only in its title. If a statute embraces subject part expressed II, hand, added.) (d), on the (Italics Article section subdivision other is void.” expressed not be submitted measure more than one subject may “An initiative embracing provides: added.) context is (Italics The concern the legislative to the electors or have any effect.” or not “reasonably statute contains material extraneous thus whether a proposed title; does, it extraneous material simply in the if stated subject germane” context, hand, issue is more defined: sharply on the other the initiative stricken. *22 to be to or are not related a common subject purpose measure whose parts functionally extraneous; case, then, in the we seek to exclude the In the one only accorded no effect. other, at stake. whole which is it is the the validity commentator, himself the physical proportions 3It is one addressing noteworthy “Even the Political Reform here in was led to conclude: though of the measure question, successful, a the voters understood even it is unlikely Act was highly [of 1974] A (Note, Process: of the Act.” The Initiative Suggestion substantial portion California 922, 935, fn. (1975) 48 So. Cal. L.Rev. Reform but rather the it seeks achieve as a subject general policy objectives result of the short, it In the comprehensive legislative program represents. the of the Political parties’ difficulty expressing subject” “single Reform Act of 1974 the results from fact that there nois simple single which, rather the measure a multitude subject; speaks subjects by means a broad statement seek to objective, policy parties place rule, a however, under umbrella.4 The is not single single subject umbrellas; concerned with it is concerned with subjects.
No would here be served a I what purpose listing undertaking conceive to be the various in the measure before subjects comprehended obvious; suffices, think, us. It I out the of the point regulation election no defined, matter how has little to do with the process, broadly of the activities of of codes regulation day-to-day lobbyists. adoption conflicts of interest in all state of such governing agencies—the provisions codes to affect a which any employee occupying position “involve[s] in the of decisions making participation making foresee- may have a material effect on financial ably interest” (§ subd. another matter. (a))—is each of these yet Although might conceivably form of a unified directed toward the part legislative program policy reform,” each concerns an different and objective “political entirely discrete subject.
I do not of course
that the
of our
suggest
single subject requirement
Constitution
electorate,
on a
precludes
presentation
single
ballot, of a number of related
in furtherance of some
subjects
underlying
done,
What I do
is that when this is
our
policy objective.
suggest
Constitution
that each
set out
means
requires
subject
separately
an
so that voters
one
independent proposition,
aspect
favoring
but
to another
have the
program
opposed
opportunity
accurately
reflect these
result,
submit,
views
their votes.
I
other
has the
Any
effect
situation,
belieye,
4To be
from the
distinguished
instant
I
is that which was recently
before us in
(Amador
the so-called
13 cases”
“Proposition
Joint
Valley
Union
Sch.
High
Dist. v.
208).
Bd.
State
Equalization, supra,
Cal.3d
the measure there in
Although
limitation,
had four
question
major elements—a real
tax rate
a real
property
property
taxes,
limitation,
assessment
a restriction on state
and a restriction on local taxes—we
out that each was
pointed
of “an
part
deemed
interlocking “package’
necessary by
relief,” i.e.,
initiative’s
framers
to assure
real
tax
real
tax
property
property
effective
which could not be “withdrawn or
savings
additional
increased local levies
depleted by
(22
231).
of other than
taxes.
. . .”
at
property
Cal.3d
In this
we
respect
contrasted
case of
549],
Luhrs
I would
deny
of the
BIRD,
J.,C.
I cannot
with the
view
agree
Dissenting.
pinched
unconstitutional
First Amendment which the
adopt
declaring
majority
of
(d)
(e)
86202 and subdivisions
Government
section
Code.
court
In one fell
this
86107 and 86109.
Code sections
swoop,
Government
1974, which ended the undue
Act of
Reform
has
the Political
gutted
over our state
interests
government.
influence of
moneyed
to,
from,
a First
not closer
farther
moves California
decision
Today’s
are able
where individuals
meaningfully
speak
Amendment society
will
Once
and be heard.
“money
with their
again,
representatives
public
third house
of
with the
milk
owning
dairy.
be mother’s
politics”
The California freeing government Instead from the officials corruption. actuality appearance case, the in the contribution limits Buckley eveiyone imposing in on the money. law zeros California age-old problem who to influence are abuse inherent in policy, having persons, paid of state is all too to the formulators policy apparent. money pass it (1) 86202 overbroad because prohibits find section majority contributions contributions; as well as “small” prohibits “large” *24 59 influence; to other than those whom the state candidates lobbyist trying as well includes before state administrative agencies lobbying choose to elected officials in state The majority ignore government.
fact that there is a threat to the state heightened image integrity which results when a can use to money purchase government lobbyist influence. distinction between “small” majority’s “large” campaign
contributions misreads The federal election laws themselves Buckley. contain a total ban on small from contributions large campaign unions, and national banks to candidate for federal corporations, office. U.S.C. These have been held to (2 441b.) § be prohibitions constitutional. States v. (See, 1975) United Chestnut 394 (S.D.N.Y. e.g., 581, 587-591; United States v. 482 F.2d 1973) (D.C.Cir. F.Supp. Boyle 755, 763-764 Even A.L.R.Fed. States Court 144].) United Supreme [24 “has that one of the repeatedly recognized principal purposes [the] is ‘to avoid the deleterious on . . . elections influences prohibition from the use of those who control over exercise resulting money by large Workers, United v. Automobile 352 States U.S. aggregations capital.’ States, 585 (1957). See v. United 407 415-416 U.S. Pipefitters CIO, U.S., United States v. at 113.” (1972); (First National Bank of 707, 740, Boston v. Bellotti (1978) 435 U.S. L.Ed.2d 98 S.Ct. White, (dis. J.).) opn. 1407]
It has never been too held drastic to ban and union corporate Rather, contributions. the courts have that the campaign emphasized statutes allow unions establish corporations segregated political funds solicit contributions and from which they may voluntary Chestnut, make contributions. United States v. they (See campaign at The narrow reach of California’s supra, ban F.Supp. contributions is similar. The are free to employers lobbyists contribute as candidates. recom they please political Lobbyists may mend to their to whom should contribute and in what employers they amounts. (Institute Governmental Advocates v. Younger 878, 884 Further, are 233].) free to Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. lobbyists their own cannot express personal preferences politics, they except make contributions or certain size candidates campaign gifts office.
Section 86202 attempts prevent actuality appearance public as the officials interest captive special groups by removing the ear of state officials with ability buy money. *25 to the venal have prevent spectacle lobbyists passing every right people acts want to influence. This or officials whose to candidates they money on was restrictions state interest accomplished by placing compelling to officeholders.1 contributions gifts lobbyist narrow Political Reform Act beside the The restrictions pale Act on federal Those who come restrictions Hatch employees. Act “an within the coniines of the Hatch are from taking prohibited in or in This active part political political campaigns.” management results a ban on about all federal activity by just partisan political fact, Court has found this the United States Supreme employees. Despite the Hatch Act constitutional on two occasions. v. Letter Carriers (CSC 93 S.Ct. United Public 413 U.S. L.Ed.2d 2880]; [37 67 S.Ct. The 556].) v. U.S. L.Ed. Workers Mitchell was held on federal activity by employees prohibition partisan political the civil interest in preserving compelling justified government’s if came from the that result one’s service depend job might corruption (CSC Carriers, 564-567 U.S. at on one’s Letter pp. supra, politics. L.Ed.2d at 808-810].) pp. Carriers, Court the United States Letter acknowledged Supreme was its own interest the federal integrity government’s preserving federal on the First Amendment sufficient to restrictions rights justify its own interest in the state preserving employees. Similarly, government’s If Act survived the Hatch is integrity prohibitions equally compelling. on Act restrictive Political Reform strict less prohibitions scrutiny, should. lobbyists certainly and refer out of context case
The misuse Buckley majority contributions. The court involved with “large” political problems special the amount a statute restricted money anyone was reviewing Court election. could contribute in federal Consequently, Supreme on of candidates in the inherent focused on the dependence corruption not indicate that large does contributions. dependence Buckley large err fertile source majority is the contributions corruption. only without a new situation fact when Buckley language they apply the nature lobbying. considering views his express personal as allow a lobbyist 1If had been written so section 86202 to his employer’s, own money opposed
about a candidate his by contributing personal interest Special law a nullity beginning. would have rendered the exception salaries, on the their lobbyists’ could have increased simply groups employing tacit make money campaign would use that extra that the understanding contributions. are interest to achieve a Lobbyists employed by special groups result. are successful to the extent are able particular They they only influence the vote or officials. are policy legislators public Lobbyists to advocate their are paid viewpoint. employers’ employers usually interests. contact with those seek to influence “big money” Daily they essential. *26 set about their task of officials
Lobbyists influencing government contact. the to establishing personal Obviously, ability gifts, buy give lunches, contribute to a that ensure his campaigns helps lobbyist invitations to talk over matters with officials are Access is public accepted. the to door, influence. the the contribution key Having opened campaign whether or small is in a to not but to large itself position only speak deliver a the resources the interest message amplified by special groups the interest employing because lobbyist. Special lobbyists groups employ such believe officials, the the to access have state the groups greater they that these officials will reflect their The greater possibility viewpoint. contribution, size, to is sufficient giving campaign regardless establish the access. necessary
The unfettered access of a to state officials can defeat the basic lobbyist idea of a that is based on elective officials who all the society represent to this people. parties stipulated litigation prior passage Act, the Political Reform meals and drinks lobbyists regularly purchased officials; for state and vacation for officials provided hunting, fishing trips families; and clubs; their art work and held purchased liquor, golf weekly meals, at which drinks and entertainment were gatherings provided; had control over the funds of their complete campaign employers, included the determine who how much an official would power receive contributions. in the political lobbyists engaged “[S]ome enumerated for the undue practices influence purpose gaining [above] over and state officials.” legislators
The United States Court the Federal Supreme many years ago upheld Act and Regulation “the voice of the Lobbying recognized people all too be drowned out may voice of easily interest special groups favored treatment while seeking of the masquerading proponents weal.” v. (United 612, States Harriss 347 U.S. public LEd. 989, 74 S.Ct. 808].) the voters of this state decided insulate state from officials and their undue influence from by removing them access and will ability “buy” good by dispensing gifts contributions. our citizens from
The First Amendment has never precluded taking a certain action to restore integrity government by achieving the access of the individual citizen and the access balance between lobbyist public representatives. on the fact that 86202 based invalidates section opinion majority all even candidates to contributions “prohibition applies candidate.” occasion to never have lobby
though ante, section at fact How can this invalidating (Maj. opn., justify not been invoked when overbreadth has limiting 86202? “Facial statute.” on the or could be construction has been challenged placed 841, 93 L.Ed.2d Oklahoma U.S. (Broadrick overbroad, could If consider the statute S.Ct. 2908].) they majority 86202 so as have construed section preclude lobbyists narrowly *27 Instead, the strike whom to candidates lobby. majority they contributing to contribute down section thereby allowing lobbyists words, In other the do in fact of candidates lobby. campaigns they a result it does not seek defend. achieves today majority opinion who Further, between the make a distinction lobbyists majority not over contribute to who do and those who do have officials jurisdiction This distinction is to influence. the kind of decisions the lobbyist seeking and the of the overlooks a “[Mjembers reality. Legislature practical . a role in (1) constitutional . . officers defining agency’s powers; play [an] (3) on the work (2) agency; adopting legislation bearing [an] making confirming budget agency; determining [an] future appointments considering agency; appointments [an] In addition officials. the incumbent other for agency posts governmental officials these elected to these factors is give prestige administrative communications with agency their upon urgings influence, the Because of this extensive purposes officials special weight. on . . . the . . . Act necessitate that Political Reform prohibitions for and candidates to all state officers elected contributions applicable officials, case of even in the to all such offices and lobbyist (Cal. to one or more administrative activities who confines his agencies.” the Fair Political Practices Code, 18600.) This Admin. tit. § opinion by overbreadth in the the fatal weakness Commission majority’s up points to all elective are Unless contributing lobbyists prevented analysis. office, Act the Political Reform for state or to the candidates state officers that led to its the abuses never its aim passage could achieve curbing first place. Next, find that “the definition section majority lobbyist [in broad, is who extremely persons appear regularly 86202] [and] include[s] ante, . . .” 45.) administrative . at before This (Maj. agencies opn., lacks merit. criticism Administrative often deal with the most agencies Therefore, decisions our makes. it would have important government been sheer law to have purporting folly regulate lobbying from its excluded before administrative scope appearance which are involved in agencies rule-making, rate-making quasi- Code, The Fair Political Practices (Gov. § legislative proceedings. Commission’s own of the Political Reform Act interpretation scope limits its reach as it relates to administrative “The lobbying. purpose and disclosure the Political Reform prohibitions requirements [of Act] as officials to assure that no undue economic applied agency influences will be to bear on such officials when undertake brought they administrative actions. This would not be furthered if the purpose and disclosure were prohibitions requirements interpreted being to all officials, without to whether the applicable agency regard lobbyist or the filer had to influence administrative actions of the attempted Therefore, official’s the commission has limited the agency.” lobbying disclosure of the act “to requirements officials of prohibitions the administrative actions of which the or filer agencies has *28 Code, Admin. 2, influence.” tit. (Cal. attempted §
Even more is the decision to invalidate subdivi- perplexing majority’s sions of (d) (e) Government Code sections and 86109. Section 86107, subdivision to file (d) a all requires lobbyists report listing economic official, official, transactions with elective state any legislative official, candidate, or with a member of the immediate agency of such official or candidate. Section subdivision family (e) any transactions with business in which requires lobbyists report any entity “the or knows has reason to know that state official or state lobbyist [a director, ais officer or or has proprietor, partner, manager, candidate] more interest,”, than a if the transactions total fifty percent ownership $500 a or more in calendar Section subdivisions (d) (e) year. similar disclosure of or impose requirements employers lobbyists any $250 who more month to influence person pays legislative administrative action.
These are held to be onerous reporting requirements unduly by because transactions must be disclosed “which majority entirely unrelated to ante, activities.” at 48.) The (Maj. opn., majority fail realize that it if were not for these and their provisions, lobbyists of avoid the disclosure the act could by entirely requirements
employers
of
their
families or
and other
items
value through
money
giving
The drafters of the Political
to state officials or candidates.
businesses
and, therefore,
foresaw
not be criticized because
Reform Act should
they
the expected loopholes.2
plugged
In Nevada v. MacMillen Cal.Rptr. County Conflict of the Governmental this court 1345], P.2d upheld Code, similar 3600 et and Disclosure Act (Gov. § Interests against seq.) A candidate had to disclose into finances. personal charges prying his children. nature of the economic dependent spouse holdings because this This was held be reasonable provision prevented of his finances candidate from disclosure entirely transferring avoiding down the 675-676.) at title his or children. (Id., striking spouse pp. Act that disclose Political Reform disclosure lobbyists requirements or officehold- families of state candidates transactions with the immediate MacMillen, Nevada v. ers, County majority ignore authority supra. to state Reform Act of 1974
The Political government brought was First Amendment not measure previously present. integrity not officials did that access to elected belong only served the assurance the First not advance does to those with majority opinion money. to the times Rather, it takes us a backward Amendment step today. giant and most were the loudest interests when represented by special in our halls. voices powerful 11, 1979. was denied October for a
Petitioner’s rehearing application Newman, J., were Bird, J., and C. application opinion *29 should be granted. when their own is in are obvious example 2The flaws the majority’s argument 48.) shareholder of the {Ante, If a official is a director or
considered. at majority America, is also engaging then the fact that official lobbying Bank of person relevant is $500 or more with the Bank of America highly transactions of business on the state official. a lobbyist bring assess the economic pressure information to economic impact has a material substantial with the Bank of America official’s position onerous trivial reporting $500 is protection threshold against that person. requirements. Further, a regulation has adopted Fair Practices Commission Political with an and transactions dealings to disclose his various an agency requires (Cal. Admin. before official’s agency. if he lobbying official agency only engaged Code, tit. §