BENJAMIN HODGES, a Minor, etc., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA CLARA COUNTY, Respondent; FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Real Party in Interest.
No. S070935
Supreme Court of California
Aug. 2, 1999.
21 Cal. 4th 109
David J. Jung as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
Bell, McAndrews & Hiltachk, Charles H. Bell, Jr., Thomas W. Hiltachk and James F. Sweeney for California Insurance Commissioner Chuck Quackenbush as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
Remcho, Johansen & Purcell, Robin B. Johansen, Joseph Remcho, Kathleen J. Purcell and James C. Harrison for Congress of California Seniors, Consumer Attorneys of California, Latino Issues Forum, Greenlining Institute
Public Citizen Litigation Group, Brian Wolfman; Law Offices of Eugene N. Rosenberg and Eugene N. Rosenberg for Public Citizen and the Center for Auto Safety as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
Robert Stern and Craig N. Holman for the Center for Governmental Studies as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Dryden, Margoles, Schimaneck, Kelly & Wait, Frank P. Kelly II, H. Grant Law; McGuire, Woods, Battle & Boothe, Grace R. Den Hartog, William H. King, Jr., E. Duncan Getchell, Jr., Joseph K. Reid III; Howard, Rice, Nemerovski, Canady, Falk & Rabkin and Jerome B. Falk for Real Party in Interest.
Mayer, Brown & Platt, Alen E. Untereiner, Kathryn Schaefer; Charles H. Lockwood II; Phillip D. Brady and Andrew D. Koblenz for the American Automobile Manufacturers Association and the Association of International Automobile Manufacturers, Inc., as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.
Floyd Feeney and Carol S. Bruch as Amici Curiae.
OPINION
MOSK, J.—Petitioner Benjamin Hodges, an uninsured motorist, suffered injuries as the result of a rear-end collision that caused the gas tank of the Ford Mustang he was driving to rupture. He brought a products liability action against real party in interest Ford Motor Company (hereafter Ford), the manufacturer of the car, seeking compensatory and punitive damages.
I
On June 24, 1995, Hodges was driving a borrowed 1967 Ford Mustang. The Mustang was not insured by its owner; nor did Hodges have automobile insurance. The Mustang stalled on the freeway and was struck from the rear by another car driving at high speed. The gas tank of the Mustang, which was located in the trunk, ruptured and expelled gasoline vapor into the passenger compartment, causing an explosion. The driver‘s seat collapsed, delaying Hodges‘s exit. He suffered injuries, including second and third degree burns over 26 percent of his body.
Hodges brought an action against Ford for personal injury, alleging that the Mustang gas tank was defective in design and seeking both compensatory and punitive damages. Ford moved for summary adjudication, asserting, inter alia, that Hodges was an uninsured motorist and was therefore barred under
The superior court denied the motion with regard to the issue whether Hodges could recover “any ‘non-economic damages‘” because it would not dispose entirely of a cause of action; it granted the motion with regard to the claim for punitive damages. Describing punitive damages as “a subset of non-economic damages,” it characterized
Hodges filed a petition for writ of mandate and the Court of Appeal summarily denied relief. We granted review.
We now hold that the trial court erred. A products liability claim against an automobile manufacturer falls outside the scope of
II
The superior court apparently determined that the limits on recovery of noneconomic damages under
We begin by examining the meaning of the phrase “any action to recover damages arising out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle” as it appears in
Nor, as we have previously observed, is the sense of the phrase “arising out of” transparent. Thus, in Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 181 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 208, 832 P.2d 924] (Central Pathology), we considered the scope of a provision restricting claims for noneconomic damages “[i]n any action for damages arising out of
As the foregoing discussion shows, “[t]o seek the meaning of a statute is not simply to look up dictionary definitions and then stitch together the results. Rather, it is to discern the sense of the statute, and therefore its words, in the legal and broader culture. Obviously, a statute has no meaning apart from its words. Similarly, its words have no meaning apart from the world in which they are spoken.” (Kopp v. Fair Pol. Practices Com. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 607, 673 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 108, 905 P.2d 1248] (conc. opn. of Mosk J.), italics in original.) We do not interpret the meaning or intended application of a legislative enactment in a vacuum. In the case of a voters’ initiative statute, too, we may not properly interpret the measure in a way that the electorate did not contemplate: the voters should get what they enacted, not more and not less.
In this matter, therefore, we are obliged to interrogate the electorate‘s purpose, as indicated in the ballot arguments and elsewhere. Specifically, for the purposes of this matter, we address the narrow question whether the
It seems clear that a primary aim of Proposition 213, as relevant here, was to limit automobile insurance claims by uninsured motorists. The electorate wanted to ensure that uninsured motorists, who contribute nothing to the insurance pool, would be restricted in what they receive from it. This principle of fairness fueled the initiative. The right to recover fully for an injury caused by a design defect, even by an uninsured motorist, has no bearing on any principle of fairness having to do with the financial responsibility laws. It is not clear that anyone—either the sponsors of the measure or the voters—intended to protect from products liability claims manufacturers who do not contribute to that pool and whose other insurance rates are not affected by the existence of uninsured motorists.
Proposition 213‘s statement of legislative purpose supports this view, identifying the principal intended beneficiaries of the measure as Californians who obey the financial responsibility laws. Thus, section 2 states the following “Findings and Declaration of Purpose“: “(a) Insurance costs have skyrocketed for those Californians who have taken responsibility for their actions. Uninsured motorists . . . are law breakers and should not be rewarded for their irresponsibility and law breaking. However, under current laws, uninsured motorists . . . are able to recover unreasonable damages from law-abiding citizens as a result of . . . accidents . . . . [¶] (b) Californians must change the system that rewards individuals who fail to take essential personal responsibility to prevent them from seeking unreasonable damages or from suing law-abiding citizens. [¶] (c) Therefore, the People of the State of California do hereby enact this measure to restore balance to our justice system by limiting the right to sue of . . . uninsured motorists.” (Ballot Pamp., text of Prop. 213 as presented to the voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996), at p. 102.)
With regard to uninsured motorists, the “system” in need of change in order to “restore balance to our justice system” is the one that permits those who do not contribute to the insurance pool—and thereby drive up the costs of premiums for automobile insurance—to reap the benefits of the coverage paid for by law-abiding motorists. There is no suggestion that the proposed law would also change the “system” with regard to products liability claims, or that any such change is needed. Moreover, use of the words “Californians” and “law-abiding citizens” indicates that the initiative was aimed principally at providing balance for those who obey the financial responsibility laws, not benefitting manufacturers whose design and manufacturing processes are not subject to those laws.
The ballot arguments, considered as a whole, similarly indicate that voters were being urged to distinguish between law-abiding motorists who pay for liability insurance, on the one hand, and law-breaking uninsured motorists who refuse to pay for such insurance, on the other. By limiting the amount of damages available to uninsured motorists, the law-abiding motorists would receive some savings in the form of reduced premiums. The arguments for and against the measure refer principally to remedying an imbalance in the justice system that resulted in unfairness when an accident occurred between two motorists—one insured and the other not. There is no suggestion that it was intended to apply in the case of a vehicle design defect.5
The ballot arguments thus emphasize that Proposition 213 was designed primarily for the benefit of “law-abiding citizens“—i.e., drivers who obey the financial responsibility laws: “[U]ninsured motorists can sue law-abiding citizens for huge monetary awards in addition to being compensated for medical and other expenses. [¶] These huge awards cost Californians who play by the rules and obey the law $327 million every year! That‘s not fair!” (Ballot Pamp., argument in favor of Prop. 213 as presented to the voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996), at p. 50.) “Law-abiding drivers pay additional premiums to protect themselves from uninsured drivers. Eliminating huge monetary awards for irresponsible drivers will save $327 million each year!”
It is true that the ballot arguments also demonstrate that the measure was intended to punish and deter scofflaws, i.e., drivers who do not obey the financial responsibility laws. By imposing heavy costs on disobeying the law, it would create an economic incentive for drivers to obey the law and to hold accountable those who do not. (See Yoshioka v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 972, 983 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 553] [describing the purposes of Proposition 213 as including “increasing the costs of . . . disobeying California‘s Financial Responsibility Law” and “avoiding unreasonable damages being awarded to the uninsured“].) Thus, proponents of the measure argued: “PROPOSITION 213 SAYS PEOPLE WHO BREAK THE LAW SHOULD NOT BE REWARDED, WHILE LAW ABIDING CITIZENS PICK UP THE TAB. [¶] Law-abiding citizens already pay higher insurance premiums to cover uninsured motorists. Law-abiding citizens should not be punished for living responsibly! The system needs to be fixed. Illegal behavior shouldn‘t be rewarded. People who break the law must be held accountable for their actions. [¶] . . . [¶] STOP LAWBREAKERS FROM PROFITING FROM THEIR CRIMES. [¶] VOTE YES FOR PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY.” (Ballot Pamp., argument in favor of Prop. 213 as presented to the voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996), at p. 50, italics and all capitals in original.) The rebuttal to the argument against the initiative measure, similarly, urges: “PROPOSITION 213 REFORMS AN UNFAIR SYSTEM THAT REWARDS LAWBREAKERS AND PUNISHES THOSE WHO PLAY BY THE RULES. [¶] . . . [¶] VOTE YES FOR PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY.” (Id., rebuttal to argument against Prop. 213 as presented to the voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996) at p. 51, uppercase in original.)
But the express goal of the initiative statute was restoring balance to the system, not simple retribution. Its stated purposes of punishing illegal behavior and encouraging personal responsibility are emphatically directed at “reform[ing] an unfair system” with respect to law-abiding drivers who “pick up the tab“—i.e., those who “play by the rules” and take “personal responsibility” (Ballot Pamp., argument in favor of Prop. 213 and rebuttal to argument against Prop. 213 as presented to the voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996), at pp. 50, 51) but have been required to “pay additional premiums to protect themselves from uninsured drivers” (id., rebuttal to argument against Prop. 213 as presented to the voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996) at p. 51). There is no suggestion that such punishment or incentive was also intended—or should be permitted—to benefit manufacturers of defective vehicles, which are not reasonably included among “those who play by the rules” or “take personal responsibility” or “pick up the tab” for the “skyrocket[ing]” costs of automobile insurance. Thus, although it might
Indeed, such a windfall would appear inconsistent with the long-standing public policy goal of requiring manufacturers to bear the costs of injuries from defective products. (See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 57, 63 [27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897, 13 A.L.R.3d 1049].) As Insurance Commissioner Chuck Quackenbush, a proponent of Proposition 213, urges in an amicus curiae letter: “California motorists have a vital and ongoing interest in deterring manufacturers from shipping dangerous and unsafe products into California and in fairly compensating persons injured by defective products. That interest would not be well served by applying Proposition 213 to product liability claims.” Nor does limiting damages against manufacturers of dangerous vehicles, which do not contribute to the insurance pool, appear to serve the core purpose of Proposition 213 of restoring balance to the insurance system by reinforcing the financial responsibility laws.
Nothing in the legislative history of the initiative suggests that the voters intended that result. In the absence of a clear expression of such intent, we decline to adopt a broad literal interpretation of the initiative that would raise such “substantial policy concerns.” (Calatayud v. State of California (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1057, 1068 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 202, 959 P.2d 360].)
III
For the foregoing reasons, we remand the matter to the Court of Appeal with directions to cause issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate directing
George, C. J., Kennard, J., Baxter, J., Chin, J., and Brown, J., concurred.
WERDEGAR, J., Concurring.—I agree with the majority that this poorly drafted, ambiguous statute should not be construed to apply to product liability actions. As we have said many times, when a statute‘s terms are ambiguous in a critical respect, we may properly look beyond the law‘s language to its history for clues to its intended meaning; this is as true of initiative measures as of statutes enacted in the Legislature. (See, e.g., Legislature v. Eu (1991) 54 Cal.3d 492, 504-505 [286 Cal.Rptr. 283, 816 P.2d 1309].) Proposition 213, as the majority opinion amply demonstrates, is ambiguous in its stated application to “any action to recover damages arising out of” operation or use of a motor vehicle. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 113-114; see Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 181, 187-188 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 208, 832 P.2d 924].) Consequently, we may appropriately look to its legislative history. That history, as the majority opinion illustrates, supports our decision in this case.
I write separately because I cannot agree with the broadly nontextual approach to statutory interpretation reflected in the majority‘s statements that “we may not properly interpret [an initiative] measure in a way that the electorate did not contemplate” and that we must, therefore, look first to the electorate‘s “purpose.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 114.) Initiative measures, no less than statutes enacted by the Legislature, should, when possible, be interpreted according to the usual and ordinary meaning of their terms. (DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 601 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 238, 828 P.2d 140].) With an initiative, as with a statute passed by bill, we should “focus first on the language” of the measure and seek therein its meaning. (Legislature v. Eu, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 503.) At times this will, indeed, mean that the law has consequences the voters did not specifically “contemplate.” The majority‘s cure for this problem, however, is worse than the disease.
The legislative process is inherently laborious. Done well, it requires that a law‘s proponents take special care in drafting its provisions, and consult with those knowledgeable in the particular area of law involved, to ensure the statute is tailored to address the problem at hand and will not have too many unintended consequences. Initiative measures, which do not undergo the same review by legislative committees and the Governor as do bills, may not be well suited to making complex changes to statutory law in certain areas. Drafters of statutory initiatives may be well advised to narrow their
In my view, however, the alternative—judicial revision of statutes to give the legislators or voters what the court thinks they “really” wanted—is worse. Without a bedrock assumption that this court will enforce the law as enacted, private individuals, government agencies, attorneys and lower courts have no firm basis for their decisions; drafters of legislation have little incentive to craft their products carefully; and, most important, the public has less assurance the court‘s decision will not be influenced by its members’ personal policy views. (See People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 103-104 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 893, 980 P.2d 441] (dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.).) For these reasons, our goal in construing initiative measures, as with legislatively enacted statutes, should ordinarily be to determine the objective meaning of the measure‘s provisions, not what specific applications we discern the voters subjectively “contemplate[d]” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 114) the measure would have.
There are occasions, of course, when literal construction of a statute is not possible, either because the law‘s terms are critically ambiguous or because literal interpretation would create a logically absurd application of the law, one completely beyond the subject matter of the legislation or one directly contrary to its expressed intent. But we should reach that conclusion only after making a sincere and thorough attempt to apply a statute—however it was enacted—according to its terms.