*1 Apr. S084616. [No. 2001.] DAY,
RUSSELL GLEN Plaintiff and Appellant, al., CITY OF et FONTANA Defendants and Respondents.
Counsel McClean, McClean; Marshall; Law Offices of Evan Wayne Wayne D. Law Brown, Jr., Offices of J. Russsell and for Plaintiff Kevin Campbell Appellant.
Miles, Eanni, Watters, & Sears Richard C. William J. Seiler L. Douglas Gordon for G. Michael Waski and Eileen Waski as Amici Curiae on behalf
of Plaintiff and Appellant. Piuze, Law Offices of Michael J. Michael J. Piuze and John Keiser for Consumer of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff Attorneys and Appellant.
Greines, Martin, Richland, Richland, & Stein Kent L. Dana Gardner Adelstein; Rinos, & Martin Dimitrios C. Rinos for Defendant Shephard of Fontana. City Respondent Counsel, Marks, Alan K. and Dennis E. County Wagner, County Deputy Counsel, for Defendant and County San Bernardino. Respondent Miles; Rothans, Dumont, Louis R. Marc P. Law Offices of & Carpenter Cook, Ball, (Carlsbad); Ronald R. John L. City Attorney City Attorney Conners, Larsen, (Indian Wells); (Loomis); Town William B. Attorney Dave (Redlands); Daniel J. McHugh, City Attorney City Attorney (Monterey); Jackson, Friamos, (Riverside); P. Samuel L. Gregory Deputy City Attorney (San Luis (Sacramento); G. City Attorney Jeffrey Jorgensen, City Attorney Corbett, (Santa Paula); H. Debra E. Obispo); Phillip Romney, City Attorney Valle-Riestra, and Paul M. Assistant City Attorney (Tracy); City Attorney (Walnut Creek), for California State Association of Counties and 13 Cali- fornia Cities as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. Opinion
BAXTER, J. (all refer 3333.4 Civil Code further statutory Section ences are indicated) to this code unless limits the otherwise ability uninsured motorists and convicted drunk drivers to recover losses suffered in certain accidents. The is the statute an whether question presented precludes in a vehicular accident from motorcyclist injured recovering award of noneconomic damages and a in an against county municipality action for nuisance and condition of dangerous public property. Application of settled construction leads us to conclude the is statutory answer principles yes. Background
Factual and Procedural Russell Glen Day his when a car driven driving motorcycle by William Honda struck him in an intersection. then filed this action Day Honda, (the against Schwartz owner of the to the Irving adjacent property intersection), (the of San Bernardino and the County County), City defendants, (the Fontana As City). public entity plaintiff alleged two theories of In his recovery. cause action for condition of dangerous that the and the created or had public property, plaintiff alleged County City actual or constructive notice of on overgrown vegetation public private intersection, and that such created a property surrounding vegetation vision obstruction for motorists the intersection. In his traveling through action, nuisance cause of entities maintained plaintiff alleged public correct, remove, reduce, a nuisance on by failing warn the vision obstruction caused overgrown vegetation. accident,
At the time of the did not have insurance on his plaintiff state of that fact motorcycle law. required Discovery prompted and the County file motion to exclude trial City evidence of motion, damages The trial court pain suffering. granted finding action subject to the restrictions of plaintiff’s section 3333.4. trial,
Plaintiff dismissed action his Schwartz to trial. At prior determined that jury was not at fault plaintiff in the accident. The jury $454,574.21 awarded him in economic and allocated for those (52 between Honda (5 percent), County percent), (43 The trial City percent). court entered judgment accordingly. affirmed,
The Court of Appeal rejecting that section plaintiff’s arguments 3333.4 is to actions for nuisance and inapplicable condition of dangerous unconstitutional, the statute is property, that retroactive statute to case application his violated due We process. granted review, plaintiff’s petition our review to the limiting first issue noted.
Discussion Does section 3333.4 restrict an uninsured driver’s recovery noneconomic local damages against entities in an action for nui sance and The issue is one of property? statutory construction.
Our fundamental task in a statute is to ascertain the intent construing of the lawmakers so as to (Torres effectuate the of the statute. v. purpose 771, (1997) Automobile Club So. 15 Cal.4th 777 Cal.Rptr.2d [63 California 859, 290].) P.2d 937 We begin by examining statutory language, giving the words their usual and (2000) v. 24 ordinary meaning. Lawrence (People 219, 570, Cal.4th 228].) 230 6 P.3d If there is no Cal.Rptr.2d ambiguity, [99 said, then we the lawmakers meant what and the presume they plain meaning (Id. 230-231; of the at language governs. (1995) v. Coronado 12 pp. People 145, 77, If, however, Cal.4th 151 1232].) 906 P.2d Cal.Rptr.2d [48 sources, terms are statutory then we ambiguous, may resort extrinsic the ostensible to be including achieved and the objects legislative history. Coronado, circumstances, (People v. 12 supra, Cal.4th at In such we “ ‘select the construction that most with intent comports closely apparent of the with a view to Legislature, rather than promoting defeating general statute, and avoid that would lead to absurd interpretation (Ibid.; (1997) see consequences.’ Escobedo v. Estate Snider 14 [Citation.]” 1214, 722, Cal.4th 979].) 1223 930 P.2d These rules Cal.Rptr.2d apply [60 (Hor statutes enacted equally construing the initiative through process. 272, 222, wich v. Court 21 Cal.4th 276 Superior Cal.Rptr.2d [87 927].) P.2d “(a) as here, provided Except 3333.4 provides:
As relevant drivers], action in any drunk convicted (c) with [dealing subdivision vehicle, a a motor use of out of operation damages arising suf- pain, losses compensate non-economic shall not recover person and other nonpe- inconvenience, disfigurement, impairment, physical fering, ftQ(2) . The injured . . of the following applies: if damages [f] cuniary and the vehicle in the accident involved of a vehicle was owner person this laws the financial responsibility was not insured required state.”1 v. recent In Horwich twice in the past. section 3333.4 have construed
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parallel analogous rise giving perceived ambiguity 109, Hodges, supra, here there was and causal necessary between the relationship of his and the plaintiff’s operation motorcycle accident for he which claimed the entities were Since responsible. entities,2 section 3333.4 contains no for suits exception against public barred from plaintiff statutorily noneconomic appears recovering damages and the against County City. we well here since the
Although might facts do not to raise stop appear shall, any as to the statute’s we “in ambiguity uncertainty application, caution, abundance of . . test . our construction those extrinsic aids that bear on (Powers the enactors’ intent.” City Richmond 10 85, 1160].) 893 P.2d As we shall demon- strate, the materials legislative history reinforce our conclusion that the statute action. applies plaintiff’s
Section 3333.4 was enacted in the through passage Proposition November 1996 General Election. Denominated and as the publicized Personal Act of Responsibility to restrict the Proposition sought motorists, ability uninsured convicted drunk drivers and felons convicted to sue for losses suffered in accidents. Because it bears on the issue directly intent, we legislative review and “Findings Declaration proposition’s That declaration states in full: Purpose.”
“(a) Insurance costs have for those Californians who skyrocketed have motorists, drivers, taken for their actions. Uninsured drunk breakers, and criminal felons are law and not should be rewarded for their However, laws, and law under current irresponsibility breaking. motorists drunk drivers are able to recover unreasonable accidents, law-abiding citizens as result of drunk driving other 2Although specifically section 3333.4 applies does state that it in actions entities, explicitly right it restricts the of uninsured and convicted drunk drivers to damages arising recover noneconomic “in action to recover out of the (§ (a), added), only or use of a subject exception motor vehicle” subd. italics one {id., (c) implicated injured by is not here of uninsured vehicles who [owners drivers]). accompanying drunk The ballot point. materials 213 also discussed the law, Notably, Legislative Analyst analysis existing informed voters in its that “[u]nder business, injury may someone who has suffered an in a car the person, accident sue government at fault for the in order to recover related losses.” Gen. (Nov. 1996) analysis Legis. Analyst, p. explaining Elec. After proposition ability voters that the would restrict of uninsured motorists and convicted suffering drunk to sue for pain drivers noneconomic losses such as that resulted from car *7 accidents, Legislative Analyst opined that such restrictions would “result in fewer lawsuits {Ibid.) governments.” analysis projected filed state and local The also “there be would savings governments avoiding an unknown to state and local as a result of these lawsuits.” {Ibid.)
275 for law-abiding criminals have able to recover from citizens been of their crimes. during suffered commission injuries “(b) must that individuals who system Californians rewards change fail to take them prevent seeking essential personal responsibility unreasonable or from citizens. law-abiding suing Therefore,
“(c) enact this hereby of the State California do People measure to balance to our to sue system right restore justice by limiting drivers, criminals, (Ballot and motorists.” Gen. drunk Elec., 213, 2, (Ballot text 102 Prop. Pamphlet).) § motor deny recovery injured noneconomic losses proposing vehicle drivers or use are owners or who vehicles that “not insured operate 3333.4, (§ as the financial laws of this required by state” responsibility (a)(2) (3)), & 213 to “restore balance to our sought justice that those to take system” by ensuring “who fail essential personal respon- would “not rewarded and law sibility” for irresponsibility breaking” 213, 2, 102). text Mindful Pamp., supra, express § terms of section we now examine whether the statute’s application actions such the instant one would undermine the initiative’s declared or otherwise lead to results. absurd It is beyond dispute law owners responsibility requires “ of motor vehicles ‘to be operators “financially responsible” (usually by insurance) means of for or any’ bodily damage injury property they may cause. Its its least to assure purpose—at primary purpose—is [Citation.] who persons damage have suffered or of this sort. compensation 332, (Mercury Superior (1998) Ins. v. Court Group [Citations.]” 1178].) 965 P.2d Stated another the financial Cal.Rptr.2d way, [79 is intended to responsibility law ensure the victims of drivers negligent are compensated only occasioned bodily injury property damage by accidents on occurring streets but also vehicular highways, ‘vehicles, resulting accidents other “damage buildings, property ” located on off streets and private highways.’ 348], (Campbell Zolin Cal.App.4th 808, 1, omitted.) Stats. ch. italics quoting § entities, Public many which infrastructure for provide transportation affected motorists who motoring among directly those public, violate the financial law. For when an uninsured example, driver to other on or damage causes roadways public property adjacent to the traffic directional traffic including signals, roadways, signs, signs, *8 suffers a direct street median lights, strips, landscaping, public entity at risk until to the harm sometimes public safety may placed repairs situations, are made. In is left to entity such property public generally bear the entire cost of the necessitated the uninsured tortfeasor’s repairs acts and financial irresponsibility. affect the detrimentally
Violators of law also responsibility of an interests of entities in a more indirect When the way. negligence public to uninsured driver and the condition of combine dangerous public property driver, cause to an insured both tortfeasors jointly jointly (See all to the liable for economic awarded insured driver. severally damages Buttram v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. however, 71].) entity’s right 941 P.2d Typically, public Proc., (Code is 875)
of contribution Civ. from the uninsured tortfeasor § circumstances, In because the tortfeasor is such meaningless judgment proof. ends all of the insured driver’s economic public entity up paying while the uninsured driver pays nothing. of the we are confident that our construction of section light foregoing, defeats, 3333.4 rather than its Coro- promotes, general purpose. (People nado, 151.) section 3333.4 as including supra, By reading one, its actions such as the instant entities are relieved of within scope remain for an driver’s noneconomic losses but would any liability ad- economic losses. This construction legally responsible pay vances 213’s declared purpose “change system fail to take essential and to rewards individuals who personal responsibility” (Ballot text of supra, “restore balance to our justice system.” Pamp., Prop. Moreover, 213, 2, lead to (b), (c), in no does it absurd way subds. § results. an to construe the statute as being were we
Conversely, inapplicable action based theories entity upon property-related such as nuisance and such would property, entity an uninsured for both remain driver legally responsible compensate accidents economic and noneconomic losses out of vehicular involv- arising could continue avoiding any its while the uninsured driver ing property, for his or her fault in such damaging injuring third Such a construction would appear perpetuate system parties. at the one-sided the uninsured driver recovery favoring expense such thus the initiative’s undermining goal prevent law-abiding entity, for their and law breaking.” drivers from “rewarded being irresponsibility 213, 2, (a), text of § construed as an unin- restricting section 3333.4 is Accordingly, properly in actions sured motorist’s to recover noneconomic ability *9 Not entities nuisance and property. public alleging 3333.4, (a) such does the of section subdivision only language encompass of action to recover out damages arising actions within its literal scope (“any vehicle”), the statute to have or use of a motor but construing operation intent such most with the initiative’s declared closely application comports to “restore balance to our who “fail to take justice system” by barring people essential or from unreasonable personal responsibility” “seeking citizens.” text of law-abiding suing (b), (c), subds. Neither the nor the of language § a statute basis for a that would provides statutory exemption implying for losses system fully drivers preserve whereby may time caused road and roadside conditions while at the same by public for their own evading negligence damaging public third roadways improvements3 injuring persons. that section
Although plaintiff generally agrees 3333.4 may apply entities, actions he maintains the statute is intended to inure to the benefit of individuals and entities whose automobile insurance solely view, are in the lawsuit. Under policies implicated this recovery against is not public entity restricted unless its stems from a statutorily liability or of a vehicle. To public employee’s agent’s motor this support statute, (b) narrower construction relies subdivision plaintiff upon 3333.4, section the ballot arguments accompanying Proposition Hodges, supra, Cal.4th 109. We are not convinced. here, (b)
As relevant subdivision of section 3333.4 states “an insurer liable, shall not be or under a or directly indirectly, policy liability uninsured motorist insurance to for non-economic losses” of an indemnify uninsured motorist. injured According one infer may reasonably plaintiff, that section 3333.4 to actions accidents between applies solely involving (b) because subdivision curtail of a purports only liability insurer, defendant’s automobile other is insurer. Plaintiff type wrong. face,
On its subdivision refers to an insurer that statutory expressly otherwise be liable for might indemnification of noneconomic losses under Attorneys suggests 3Amicus curiae Consumer of California that section 3333.4 is not needed to achieve negligent damage balance fairness where a uninsured motorist causes property belonging entity entity to a because the is allowed a therefor setoff out, however, any judgment point obtained the uninsured As setoffs motorist. defendants generally protection public entity liability offer no ato unless both sides share for an accident Furthermore, that results in to them appear losses both. setoffs to fall short of the “balance” contemplated by Proposition they clearly subject 213 because are also available in actions 3333.4, e.g., by negligent against negligent section actions uninsured motorists insured motorists. 3333.4, (§ (b), insurance.” uninsured motorist “a liability policy be embraced added.) may insurance liability italics Although policy 1951) (4th Law Diet. ed. (see Black’s within an automobile insurance policy “Insurance,” classification]), insurance” “Automobile [definition of nonmo- are often issued to cover the liability insurance policies If automobile insurance.4 not associated with exclusively torists (b) term subdivision employs the fact that anything, *10 insurance, as “automobile” term such instead of more qualified “liability” insurance, the notion that the undercuts or “automobile liability” insurance motorists. and uninsured to accidents between insured statute pertains solely the ballot arguments accompanying relies on the that Plaintiff next fact uninsured motorists from going make reference to 213 stopping Proposition are in an “when these lawbreakers noneconomic awards after “big” rebuttal to supra, argument an driver.” accident with insured id., 213, 51, italics; of the also Brief Summary see original against Prop. p. Measures, . . . uninsured motor- on this measure means: yes 7 vote p. [“A from recovering . . . would be ‘pain involved in collisions prohibited ists drivers”].) awards from insured and suffering’ construction of the statute. do not The ballot arguments compel plaintiff’s course, to cite “are not briefs and not legal expected Such arguments, (Santa Transpor- Local County affect.” Clara case the every may proposition 207, 220, (1995) Cal.4th 237 Cal.Rptr.2d v. 11 Authority tation Guardino [45 785, (1990) 50 Cal.3d 225]; v. Court Delaney Superior P.2d see also 902 753, reasonable inference P.2d most 789 802-803 Cal.Rptr. 934] [“The [268 for (in limited available the space chose emphasize is proponents need”].) Here we may as greatest what they perceived ballot arguments) that a aim primary from the ballot arguments infer reasonably liability and automobile Dictionary lists insurance edition of Black’s Law 4The fourth Diet., (See pp. at of insurance. Black’s Law distinct classifications insurance as two former, dictionary “Liability insurance is that states: regard the law With person or against liability injuries account of indemnifies on insurance which form of title, (see supra), and ‘indemnity that distinguished from insurance’ another. It is property of carriers, contractors, of, employers, liability example, may to cover the be issued manufacturers, owners, landlords, may extend to automo Liability insurance and railroads. (Id. libel, theaters, [“Liability elevators, wheels, biles, at 944 and vessels. fly [Citation.]” insurance”], 1999) (7th 806 insurance”]; pp. ed. 803 [“automobile Law Diet. see also Black’s 1981) (3d [defining “liabil insurance”]; p. 1302 Diet. ed. [“liability Webster’s New Internal. damage to the resulting liability or ity as “insurance loss insurance” others”]; liability more [defining insurance” “automobile id. 148 persons or arising out of legal loss from or specifically as “insurance maintenance, “automobile insurance” as vehicle” and of motor ownership, vehicle”]; damage motor to an insured arising from destruction of against loss “insurance limiting the term to Code, and without “[[liability generally [defining insurance” Ins. 108 § vehicles].) by motor against losses caused insurance
279 and to reduce automobile insurance 213 was to insured motorists protect however, Hodges, supra, (See Cal.4th at Such arguments, rates. 21 was the initiative’s sole did of insured not protection imply aim; did that reductions in automobile insurance they premiums nor suggest Rather, only effect. language would the initiative’s express enactment, declared as well ballot broader arguments’ focus that had rewarded need reform perceived system upon citizens,5 lawbreakers at the us responsible, law-abiding persuade expense one a fair and actions such as the instant fall within objective reading ex rel. Court (See (1996) v. 14 People Lungren Superior 3333.4. 308 P.2d to limit [refusing Cal.Rptr.2d 1042] initiative measure based scope Legislative Analyst’s upon Amwest Co. Surety Ins. Wilson analysis]; Cal.4th 1243 [48 P.2d insurance surety [Proposition applied 1112] even ballot had of that though materials told voters specifically *11 714, Grocery Calvillo-Silva Home cf. application]; 506, 732-733 968 P.2d that [rejecting argument Legis- 65] lature’s on focus a negligence principles limitation supported 847’s immunity acts].) to provisions negligent to our respect Hodges,
With in that case focused analysis specifically on whether ability section 3333.4 restricted the of an uninsured driver to recover a car manufacturer in a action. products liability Although law,” calling 5In upon system voters to “fix a that people supporters rewards who break the rewarded, Proposition emphasized “people that who break the law should be while (Ballot 213, abiding pick up argument law Pamp., supra, Prop. citizens the tab.” in favor 50, p. omitted.) original punctuation, Noting “[l]aw-abiding capitalization that citizens al motorists,” ready pay “[¡ille higher premiums insurance to they argued cover uninsured that gal driving behavior without be that “[p]eople [such shouldn’t rewarded” and insurance] (Ibid., omitted.) who break the law must be held accountable for their actions.” italics According supporters, proposition by to its the would preventing restore fairness recovering “huge monetary suffering, from awards” still pain for while allow ing expenses.” (Ibid., omitted.) them out-of-pocket They “medical and italics also claimed the (Id., initiative everyone.” would make “insurance argument more affordable for rebuttal to 213, omitted.) p. capitalization Prop. Conversely, urging proposition, in defeat of opponents told voters that the measure was sponsored by Quackenbush Insurance Quackenbush then Commissioner Charles and that had $1 received over companies. Pamp., supra, argu- million from insurance to rebuttal 50.) They p. emphasized legalize ment in favor of would it automobile no-fault California, insurance despite rejected that had fact two-thirds of California’s voters previous year, companies no-fault initiative earlier measure and that insurance would simply profits corresponding premium to boost their excessive levels without insurance rate (Id., savings 51.) argument against Prop. p. Opponents reductions or for consumers. also argued proposition to would allow “reckless drivers avoid actions,” high impossible many poor working cost of insurance makes it “[t]he insurance," people buy completely deny compensation to is to people and that “it unfair full (Ibid.) for a car that is not their fault.” accident even be read as to extending could perhaps products we statute recognized 118), our review of (see actions Hodges, supra, p. liability itus and the ballot materials convinced initiative measure accompanying observed, As we intended to have such a broad reach. was not “[t]he motorists, who contribute nothing wanted to ensure that uninsured electorate receive from it. This in what they to the insurance would restricted pool, The to fully fueled the initiative. right of fairness principle motorist, defect, has no even an uninsured by caused design to do with having respon- on of fairness bearing any principle of the measure It not clear that anyone—either sponsors laws. is sibility claims manufac- or the voters—intended protect products rates are other insurance who do not contribute to that whose turers pool (Id. at Neither the existence of uninsured motorists.” not affected by materials, concluded, reflected any we nor ballot language statutory insured motorists law-abiding “to reform a ‘unfair’ system intent (Id. at of defective vehicles.” a windfall manufacturers providing omitted.) fn. dissent, our and the the assertions of both plaintiff
Contrary begin conclusion here. To do not similar Hodges support observations with, 213 was to that a aim of primary Hodges merely posited uninsured motorists. (Hodges, limit automobile insurance claims by did not the ballot our decision arguments, suggest 21 Cal.4th at Like More section 3333.4’s it the initiative’s exclusive aim. point, *12 statute, the of the which in case flows from terms directly this applicability . . out “in action . arising of noneconomic recovery any precludes (id., (a)) if injured of a motor vehicle” subd. or use “[t]he the accident and the vehicle was the owner of a vehicle involved in person (id., (a)(2)). not insured . . .” subd. automobile manufac- in to the situation involving contrast Additionally, to turers, should be allowed an uninsured motorist the of whether question a condition of by public accident caused in part for vehicular fully to do with the fairness having on a of directly “principle bears property 115.) at As 21 Cal.4th laws.”6 (Hodges, supra, p. financial responsibility that victims of noted, enacted to ensure the law was financial responsibility their for both to damage persons receive drivers negligent compensation Court, at supra, v. (Mercury Group Superior their Ins. to property. Zolin, 495-496.) 341; Motorists at pp. Campbell Cal.App.4th p. in actions addressing application 3333.4’s from 6Hodges specifically refrained the reason that design,” road for governments, e.g., for defective “against state and local liability against automo products from actions may implicate concerns distinct “such matters fn. (Hodges, supra, at manufacturers.” bile damage roadways who drive in violation of that law and cause negligently however, fail to for compensate other public typically property, circumstances, such entities wind damage; up paying repairs public for their while uninsured tortfeasors escape responsibility property To of as a actions. 213’s declaration pose Proposition question, such and law break should “rewarded their irresponsibility 213, 2, when (a), 102) of subd. ing” supra, text § turn, seek recover for caused conditions of they, injuries by The answer we discern is no. in the property? Nothing language or in the initiative ballot materials indicates electorate intended to (ibid.) “balance” entities are forgo whose interests placed directly who by risk motorists fail to with the financial law. comply responsibility notes, As correctly observed that neither plaintiff Hodges 213’s nor voters intended to sponsors protect products claims whose manufacturers insurance rates “not affected the exist by ence of uninsured motorists.” Cal.4th at (Hodges, supra, Contrary however, suggestion, observation should not be read to plaintiff’s costs, otherwise, that insurance suggest whether automobile-related or must be affected for necessarily section 3333.4 to apply. 3333.4, course,
Section makes no as a mention insurance costs does, however, consideration in its in an action. limit application It clearly recovery whose “not injured vehicles are insured as persons required (§ (a)(2).) laws of this state.” While responsibility Hodges on the absence placed effect on the emphasis particular costs, there, defendant’s insurance it must be remembered that the defendant manufacturer, in its as a car faced capacity no direct harm to potential itself or its from uninsured who drivers failed to with comply case, state financial law. car consideration that had manufacturers also no insurance affected rates existence of uninsured motorists was to our significant conclusion that manufacturers defective cars were not those whom initiative was intended to among *13 Here, however, protect.7 the situation is otherwise and the entity public defendants are sued in a that being capacity directly implicates “principle discussed, portion arguments “[l]aw-abiding 7As of ballot voters that told citizens (Ballot already higher premiums supra, pay insurance cover Pamp., uninsured motorists” argument 50) in Prop. p. Proposition “by favor of and that 213 would benefit consumers (Ballot making everyone” Pamp., supra, argument insurance more affordable for rebuttal to omitted). against Prop. capitalization Although “[¿Insurance purpose finding the initiative’s declaration of included a that costs skyrocketed have responsibility for those Californians who have taken for their actions” 213, 2, 102), (a), supra, text of subd. it that makes little sense to read § finding limiting protective finding as Were scope we to view that as initiative. of to do the financial (Hodges, fairness with laws.” having responsibility these, In circumstances such as insurance cost considerations no basis section 3333.4’s provide negating application. no materials “reflect intent to Finally, plaintiff argues legislative. for dangerous overturn well-established legal policies governing liability real or for with use of He nuisances safe roads.” property interfering public also there is no was intended to claims indication alter Proposition of liability scheme condition special statutory governing dangerous Code, 830, 835), (Gov. or other not public based property public liability §§ of a negligent on a defendant’s vehicle. We operation disagree. ex Personal Act voters By approving Responsibility collective law existing intent overturn and pressed legislatively to recover determinations noneco policy regarding right nomic out of their or use of uninsured motor damages arising operation 3333.4, discussed, (§ (a).) it vehicles. As is of no here consequence that the ballot materials refer to the act’s in did specifically application local nuisance actions entities for against public dangerous actions fall within the of section Such terms property. squarely the statute’s in cases than defeats de such rather promotes clared 213 to restore balance to the Proposition justice system purpose with to violators of the financial law. No more was respect .8 required
Disposition Both the of section a construc- 3333.4 language support tion that drivers from noneconomic precludes recovering in local entities for nuisance and condition actions against We therefore affirm the of the Court of judgment Appeal. property. J., Chin, J., J., J., Brown, concurred. Werdegar, C.
George, restricting application, compelled the initiative’s we that both section would to conclude (another 213) through passage and section 3333.3 statute enacted would 3333.4 (and “citizens”) only perhaps and in actions apply in actions where “Californians” previously “skyrocketed” had due to the at issue. insurance costs conduct argues inapplicable liability additionally premises 8Plaintiff 3333.4 is actions such this private property application owners and that section 3333.4 actions exempt damages in impermissibly would entities from for noneconomic private where a owner would be liable. Because the instant action circumstances owner, *14 and do not private property does not involve the of a we need not address such may in the arguments possibility justify a different result case of that other concerns such owners.
MOSK, J. dissent. I 3333.4,
The extend the Civil Code section majority broadly scope motorists, which limits automobile insurance claims to this by claim not an insured driver but entities against against public responsible maintain a I The voters failing safely roadway. disagree. who 213, 3333.4, Civil Code section did not passed Proposition thereby enacting intend to limit to motorists based on a damages injuries or nuisance. 109,
As we Court emphasized Hodges Superior 884, P.2d “In the a case of voters’ initiative statute 433]: ... we not may measure in a that the electorate properly interpret way enacted, did not the voters should what not more and contemplate: get they not less.” Consistent with the Russell Glen Day, whose was hit motorcycle car because the of Fontana and by City County (hereafter of San Bernardino and failed to correct or city county) warn intersection, an obstruction the motorists’ blocking view in should to seek permitted recovery damages city county noneconomic as well as economic damages.
I old, then September Day, years suffered devastating injuries intersection; when his was struck a car in an motorcycle the accident was the result of the of the intersection configuration and obstructions seriously limiting The visibility. motorcycle was insured. commenced this Day action in August a claim including for a city county dangerous condition of and nuisance. public property action, the case was
Although classified as a fast track it was not called 1997; then, for trial until Civil May Code section enacted as part of the Personal Act of Responsibility had into effect. The gone city moved to exclude all county successfully evidence or recovery noneconomic under the The found no fault on the provision. jury part Day, for the accident about between allocating responsibility equally the driver of the car and the The court entered a city county. judgment for economic which the Court of affirmed. only, Appeal
II Civil Code section 3333.4 in relevant action to provides, part: “[I]n vehicle, out of the of a damages arising use motor *15 suf- for pain, non-economic losses to compensate shall person inconvenience, other nonpe- impairment, disfigurement, fering, physical the HQ H[| . injured person if ... ... .. cuniary damages [t]he can not in the accident and the operator of a involved vehicle operator financial as the her financial required establish his or responsibility, (Id., (a)(3).) laws of this state.” responsibility Court, the we looked beyond 21 Cal.4th supra, v. Hodges Superior (id. were “not which we concluded pellucid” literal words provision, 113; J.) to “this (cone. [referring of Werdegar, see also id. opn. atp. atp. drafted, statute”]), the voters’ as to discern purpose, ambiguous poorly We “It seems ballot and elsewhere. explained: indicated arguments to limit automobile 213 .. . was clear that a aim Proposition primary electorate wanted to ensure uninsured motorists. The insurance claims by motorists, contribute insurance pool, that uninsured who nothing it. of fairness receive from This principle would be restricted what they of legislative 213’s statement fueled the initiative. ... Proposition [ID view, intended beneficiaries this identifying principal supports purpose laws.” who the financial responsibility die measure as Californians obey for the measure (Id. “ specify at The ballot materials ” made clear: (Ibid.) As system.’ Hodges balance to our justice ‘restoring] motorists, in need of in order the ‘system’ change “With to uninsured regard one that those who do is the permits to ‘restore balance to our justice system’ the costs of drive up to the insurance thereby not contribute pool—and of coverage insurance—to benefits reap paid for automobile premiums Moreover, use of the words ‘Califor- motorists. . . . for by law-abiding was aimed indicates that the initiative citizens’ ‘law-abiding nians’ obey responsibil- those who balance principally providing (Ibid.) laws . . . .” ity to limit intended that 213 “was primarily concluded
Hodges Court, (Hodges Superior insured drivers.” awards against whole, Thus, . . . indicate the ballot “considered arguments, at p. law-abiding between distinguish voters were being urged hand, insurance, on the one law-breaking for liability who pay on the other. By limiting for such insurance motorists who refuse to pay motorists, motor- the law-abiding available to uninsured amount The in the form of reduced premiums. receive savings ists would some remedying refer the measure principally arguments when an accident in unfairness resulted system imbalance in justice (Ibid.) The the other not.” insured and two motorists—one occurred between and encouraging behavior illegal stated statute “punishing purposes an unfair at ‘reform[ing] directed are emphatically personal *16 tab’—i.e., drivers who the with system’ respect law-abiding ‘pick up but the and ‘take personal those who rules’ ‘play by responsibility’ [citation] have been additional themselves required protect ‘pay premiums ” 117.) (Id. uninsured drivers.’ determined was in- We that Civil Code section 3333.4 Hodges thus motor- tended to resolve the allocation of costs between involving inequities not. The carry liability ists who automobile insurance and motorists who do a former—scofflaw uninsured motorists—are held accountable as both pun- incentive; the ishment and the latter—motorists who obey respon- found in the laws—are the beneficiaries. We ballot materials sibility nothing “that such or incentive was intended—or should also suggesting punishment benefit” other “not included reasonably defendants permitted—to among ‘those who the rules’ or ‘take or the play by up personal responsibility’ ‘pick ’ tab’ for the ‘skyrocketing] (Hodges costs of automobile insurance.” Court, Superior 21 Cal.4th at itself a Hodges involved claim the products liability manufacturer of the car. In the absence of intent, a clear of voter we declined to “a broad literal expression adopt claim, of the initiative” that would limit in such interpretation damages “ ” that to (Id. do so would raise emphasizing ‘substantial concerns.’ policy at p. view, it my follows from our ineluctably Hodges analysis at issue in this case—based
liability on dangerous public and nuisance—does not fall within the of Civil Code purview section 3333.4. The city which failed to maintain safe county, roadways did which not contribute to the relevant insurance not reason- pool, numbered those ably among who the rules” or “take by “play personal or responsibility” tab” for “pick up automobile insurance skyrocketing costs. aWhen claim for is or based on defective condition dangerous driver, of an property, insured opposed negligence by applying statute does nothing advance the voters’ intent under 213. The Proposition ballot materials do not indicate that 213 intended to Proposition change “system” with to a nuisance regard public entity’s liability dangerous conditions such is property—or suggest any change needed. Moreover, as in the of the case claim in broad products liability Hodges, literal to this case application county provision city failure to remedy unsafe condition in intersection obvious public raises and substantial concerns. caused policy victims Compensating injuries unsafe by maintenance of streets for design pain suffering aas incentive for cities and counties to or abate operates strong prevent conditions, thus risks to the It also serves the minimizing public. caused social important goal injured persons compensating acts of entities. The broad by negligent majority’s application Civil Code section cities and counties of for all relieving will erode aimed at caused negligence, public policy all safety motorists. securing
Nor is there indication in legislative history it intended to tort regarding that was alter the special statutory provisions *17 Code a claims entities. Government against public provision Act, a the Tort Claims makes liable caused expressly public entity injury whatever, There a is no mention either by dangerous property.1 in Civil Code section or in the ballot materials 3333.4 regarding 213, of condition cases. Unlike dangerous limiting governmental liability I that the tailored Tort disagree carefully majority, provisions Claims Act be modified Nor do I discern may any justifica- by implication. tion for windfall to entities providing responsible failing safe motorists. roadways keep reasons,
For these I would reverse the of the Court judgment Appeal. J., Kennard, concurred. entity pertinent part, “a is liable for provides, 1Government Code section 835 dangerous plaintiff if that the of its establishes injury caused condition dangerous injury, injury in a at the time
property was condition condition, dangerous proximately dangerous condition created a caused reasonably injury public entity risk of which was incurred” and the foreseeable the kind of time dangerous prior condition . . . and sufficient “had actual or constructive notice protect have taken condition.” measures