*1 Sept. No. 23783. 1985.] [Crim. PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
THE SKINNER,
JESSE Defendant and Appellant.
Counsel Court, Cleary Sevilla, Supreme M. under
Charles appointment & Sevilla for Defendant and Appellant.
John K. de General, Sokolow, Van Kamp, Norman H. K. Attorney Beverly Schwab, Falk and General, Howard J. Attorneys for Plaintiff and Deputy Respondent.
Christopher N. Heard and L. Terry White Amici Curiae behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.
Opinion
GRODIN, J. over a century *4 to the decision in v. Drew prior For People Cal.3d 333 California courts framed this state’s definition cases, of insanity, as defense in criminal upon the two-pronged test the House adopted by of Lords M’Naghten’s Case Clark & Fin. Eng. Rep. 722]: “[T]o establish a defence on that, the of ground it must be insanity, clearly proved at the time of the committing the the accused was under party labouring reason, such a defect of mind, from disease of the not the to know or, and quality it, of the act he was doing; if he did know that he did not know he added; (Italics was what doing was see wrong.” People Coffman 24 Cal. 235.)
Over the the years M’Naghten test became to considerable criti- subject cism and was abandoned ain number of In Drew this court jurisdictions. suit, followed the test adopting for mental the Amer- incapacity by proposed “ ican Law Institute: ‘A is not if at person for criminal conduct responsible the time of such conduct as a result of mental or defect he disease lacks substantial either to capacity the appreciate criminality of [wrongfulness] ” his conduct or to conform his (Drew, conduct to the of law.’ requirements supra, 22 Cal.3d at p.
In June measure, California electorate an initiative adopted pop- known as ularly which other for the first time Proposition things) (among in this state established statutory definition of “In criminal insanity: any proceeding ... which a of not reason is en- plea by guilty tered, this defense shall be found when trier fact the accused proves by or preponderance the evidence that he she was inca- pable knowing the nature and her act and of time of the distinguishing right commission of the Code, (Pen. offense.” §25, (b) 25(b)], subd. section italics [hereafter added.)1
1Unless otherwise statutory indicated all future to the Penal references are Code. was 25(b) designed it of section It from the language is apparent test. the M’Naghten prongs and to reinstate the eliminate the Drew test However, disjunctive instead “and” the section uses conjunctive therefore, 25(b) section literally, the two Read prongs. “or” to connect It would strip test. would do more than reinstate M’Naghten disease, who, reason mental defense from accused is, fact, the inter- That act he was doing wrong. knowing court in this case. trial adopted pretation section adopting
Defendant claims that the of the electorate purpose prior in California 25(b) as it existed was to restore test Drew, 333. If read supra, this court’s decision in and federal 25(b) the state would violate both literally, argues, persons sanctions on Constitutions by imposing who lack the criminal culpability. mens rea essential to of the electorate do the intent proposition dispute however, argue, insanity. They to reinstate the pre-Drew Amicus test. 25(b), that section and “clarifies” “amplifies” *5 Foundation, curiae, the intent was Legal agrees the Criminal Justice Drew, suggest to but a prior to stricter test than that adopt applicable of the M’Naghten no the two prongs in fact there is difference between the knowledge to between test—ability distinguish wrong, nature and criminal act. the particular were we arise
Mindful of that might the serious constitutional questions our obli- and of language, a literal construction accept statutory electorate and the intent the carry wherever both out gation possible (Amador Valley constitutionality so their construe statutes as preserve (1978) 22 Cal.3d Union Bd. High Equalization Joint Sch. Dist. State 208, Builders 239, Home 1281]; Associated Cal.Rptr. etc., Cal.Rptr. Inc. v. City Livermore (1974) 12 Cal.3d v. Amor P.2d 92 A.L.R.3d section 1173]), shall conclude that does, it existed to, test as 25(b) was restore M’Naghten intended there that test that under this before Drew. We shall also conclude state not guilty a verdict of bases which upon exist two distinct and independent be returned. by insanity reason of might
I mur- degree of second of conviction Defendant from a judgment appeals not guilty of nolo contendere (§§ pleas der entered upon court, after 3,6), finding by subds. a (§ by reason of waived, a jury that he (§ was sane the time of the offense. (a).) subd. sane, the defendant finding that it judge acknowledged disease, more likely than not that defendant suffered from a mental paranoid schizophrenia, which played significant part killing. judge stated that under the Drew defendant would legal insanity insane, qualify as and also found that “under the prong right-wrong 25(b), section insane; defendant would but under the qualify legally other prong, clearly does not.” use of the con- Concluding junctive “and” 25(b), the electorate demonstrated an intent to establish a test, stricter test of than the and to legal insanity “virtually defense, eliminate” as a judge found defendant had not established that he was insane. legally
Probation was denied and defendant was sentenced to term of years to life in the state prison.
Defendant strangled his wife while he was on a Cam- day pass arillo State at which Hospital he was a Evidence offered at the trial patient. on his plea of not reason of guilty by insanity included the of a opinion clinical and forensic that defendant suffered from either clas- psychologist sical paranoic schizophrenia, significant schizoaffective illness with par- anoid features. A delusional of this illness was a belief held product defendant that the vow marriage “till death do us bestows a marital part” partner to kill has God-given right the other who violated was partner inclined vows, to violate the marital vows and that because the reflect God, direct wishes of is with moral and criminal im- killing complete punity. act is not wrongful because it is sanctified will and desire *6 of God. there
Although was also evidence a that would have that supported finding sane, defendant was it was the evidence summarized above apparently upon one, both, which the trial based his met but not judge finding that defendant of the prongs test. knew the nature and of his Defendant act. He knew that his act was homicidal. unable to He was distinguish and however, in that wrong, he did not know that this particular killing wrongful criminal.
In this the trial court’s context must determine whether conclusion 25(b), that of section a defendant meet both prongs that requires correct, not, the M’Naghten test to establish and if wheth legal insanity er the court’s of the aspect that defendant met the finding “right-wrong” test requires reversal with of not directions to enter judgment guilty reason of insanity.
II Insanity California Defense can person system “It of jurisprudence is fundamental our v. Nash (People while insane. not be convicted for acts performed 565, 574 10 Cal.3d 36, 50-51; .)” Kelly . . (People of the equally one aspect This rule is intent wrongful principle well established and no less fundamental statutory crime, in the first reflected an element of essential principle Act Concern in 1850. The Legislature criminal law scheme our adopted forth this set ch. (Stats. Crimes and Punishments ing of first three sections its the insane as the principle applicability law: be a union or joint must 1. crime or offence there every public
Ҥ intention, or criminal operation negligence. with connected 2. Intention is the circumstances manifested
Ҥ offence, person the sound mind and discretion perpetration accused. idiot, neither A mind who is 3. shall be considered sound person
“§ at the lunatic, age who hath arrived nor nor affected with insanity, be- knew the distinction fourteen or before that if such years; age, tween and evil.”2 good is an essential mens rea intent or criminal wrongful principle which in- of 1872 Penal Code
element crime was carried over into the as and Punishments the Act Crimes corporated Concerning inca- code, deemed section 20 the classes persons expanded provided crime. Section committing adopted pable crimes, those belonging except are persons capable committing “[a]ll classes: following *7 of clear in the absence years, “1. fourteen Children under age them, knew they the act committing charged against at time proof itsof wrongfulness; with the enactment principle applied to the insane recognition given 2Further to this as 212.) (Stats. p. ch. Regulate Proceedings in Criminal Cases in 1851. of the Act to insanity cannot be person in a state of provided: “An Act done a
Section 583 of that act tried, punished offence, or punishment, adjudged be punished public as a nor can (Id., offence, 277.) p. while he is insane.” at public for Idiots; “2.
“3. Lunatics and insane persons; “4. Persons who committed or made the omission under charged, an or intent; ignorance mistake of fact which any disproves
“5. Persons who committed the act conscious charged, without being thereof;
“6. Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged, through accident, misfortune or by when it there was no evil appears intention, design, or culpable negligence; (unless
“7. Married death) women the crime with punishable acting threats, command, under the husbands; or coercion their “8. (unless Persons death) the crime be with who committed punishable act made the omission under threats or menaces sufficient charged, to show that they had reasonable cause to did believe their lives would if endangered they refused.”
When the Penal Code of 1872 was submitted to Legislature adop- tion, the accompanying comments of the code commissioners reflected sen- sitivity of criminal that had been principle expressed court in to section implementing regard law. With prior commissioners noted: “The vs. Harris of the Court opinion [(1866) 29 Cal. given length because it is a correct and authori- 678] 20; Law, tative . exposition (1 Sec. . . Cr. Says Mr. Bishop Bishop’s 227): Sec. ‘There is one criterion which the of men is to be guilt tested. It is whether mind is criminal. Criminal law relates only crime, and neither in nor in moral philosophical religious speculation sentiment would a man be deemed any people any age allow that should is, therefore, unless his guilty mind were so. of our It principle system, other, probably every that the essence of offense is the ’ intent, wrongful without which it of Mr. cannot exist. opinion Bishop finds full support cases.—United States vs. following adjudged Pearce, McLean, 14; Ward, Hob., 134; Fell, Weaver vs. Rex vs. p. p. Salk., Case, Leon., (Code p. . . . .” Commis- Lancaster’s p. note, sioners’ Pen. (1st Code of Cal. ed.
As to section which 2 and 3 of sections essentially incorporated the commissioners noted that natural and conse- probable “[t]he *8 of quences every act to have been intended deliberately done are presumed
773 (Ibid.) understood, sane mind.’’'’ act, It was then the the author of by if of was not added sec- of by insanity the of not reason although plea guilty 2, 677, 1, 1148- 1927, (Stats. ch. pp. and 1017 until 1927 tions 1016 §§ of not guilty. be offered under 1149), plea that the defense could insanity note, (1st ed. Code of Cal. (Code Commissioners’ Pen. by Code of 1872 was adopted of when the Penal test this court recognized by M’Naghten
the was the Legislature two-prong 235; 230, mind, of People 24 “The unsoundness Coffman, supra, in v. Cal. well de- will a defense in a criminal action is insanity, constitute Tindal, J., in the House propounded scribed C. answer to questions establish a defense on He ‘that to Judges says, Lords the [citation]. that, at the time of com- clearly the it must ground insanity, proved act, under such a defect rea- mitting the the accused was party laboring the to know the nature or son, mind, as from disease what was it, doing or if he he know he was did know did not ’ ” test was wrong. italics.) of the (Original exposition Coffman's 1016, out confirming legislative set commissioners’ note definition of legal insanity. applicable For test as more than a after century recognized Coffman used, sometimes although this state it continued to applicable a finding stated in the so conjunctive, permit was fact applied if the test either of the test was satisfied.3 We stated prong in Drew trial court in that case disjunctive and the instructions given 336, (22 2, 339.)4 did so also. Cal.3d at fn. pp. 3See, 120, but (1882) stating disjunctive, test in the e.g., People v. 62 Cal. Hoin used, which, suggest in had English although conjunctive been
quoting two decisions both if the defendant meaning sanity context that the court’s would be found wrong. the same To the nature act knew that act was knew and character his his 543, (“Although may be (1907) he People v. 554 P. 124] effect Willard 150 Cal. [89 suffering some insane delusion laboring partial insanity,—as, for from under instance hallucination,—still action and its conse if he the nature and character of his understands criminal, the act he if he does and that quences,—if knowledge has that it is wrong, is not to relieve him partial insanity will do such ... sufficient acts.”). amplify the two- did more than the Willard formulation no That (1925) test, test, People Gilberg 197 made clear in v. prong change and did not (1926) P. 1000], 245 Sloper [244 v. 198 Cal. People Cal. 313-314 P. [240 application quoted disjunctive where it is formulation. as an disjunctive or have the test in the 4By majority have either stated far vast cases capable appreciating if affirmatively stating that the defendant sane he is worded it (1962) (See, Darling e.g., People v. wrong. it is nature of his and knows 36, 43-44, 316]; (1959) fn. 3 v. 52 Cal.2d People Nash P.2d [22 705]; People 416]; (1954) P.2d People Baker 42 Cal.2d 568 [268 P.2d 483]; (1931) 211 Cal. People v. Keaton Kimball , 646]; People v. P. 605 612 [279 P. v. Koehn Cal. 306, 313; P. 184 Cal. Gilberg, supra, Cal. v. Williams *9 774
Because rea, our statutes mens and our requiring formulation of past and ALI-Drew tests have afforded insanity defense adequate ill mentally persons who lack wrongful intent and might otherwise sanctions, subject penal not have been called to consider the upon constitutional implications on punishment who imposition persons act without that so, intent. Nor has the United States Court done Supreme court, too, that although has in recognized that repeatedly except regulatory offenses which the (United sanctions are relatively States v. Dotter- light (1943) 277, weich 48, 51-52, 320 134]), U.S. 280-281 L.Ed. 64 S.Ct. [88 the existence of (See intent is wrongful essential to criminal United liability. (1980) 394, 575, 585, States v. 444 Bailey U.S. 402 L.Ed.2d 100 S.Ct. [62 624]; (1952) Morissette v. United States 342 U.S. 250-251 L.Ed. [96 288, 293-294, 240]; 72 (1922) cf. S.Ct. United States v. Balint 258 U.S. 250 301].) L.Ed. 42 S.Ct. [66
Because mens rea or is a wrongful intent fundamental aspect law, the that a suggestion defendant whose mental illness results inability that his act is appreciate wrongful could be or by death punished impris- onment raises serious of constitutional questions dimension under both the due and cruel process and unusual of the Constitu- punishment provisions (1952) tion. In Leland v. 343 72 Oregon U.S. 790 L.Ed. S.Ct. [96 1002], the court upheld Oregon law the burden of in- placing proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant and affirmed the right the state to formulate the test of In so applicable legal insanity. doing, however, standards, the court measured law under due conclud- process that the ing irresistible impulse extension the traditional test was “ ” ‘implicit (343 of ordered U.S. at 801 concept p. liberty.’ [96 L.Ed. The court thus that seemingly accepted proposition to distinguish court approved the nature of his act. Both ment, defendant did not know evidence was in consciousness he ed. of knowing and understanding of knowing either [1] 1019]; People Both The instruction on However, 1970)) Cal. Cal. legally prong he must and quality stated the rule in both insane.” has satisfied the between if you v. Oxnam understanding Reid issue, what held responsible jury knowing find P. cases P. the court found the evidence was not sufficient he is instruction which stated: that his act (1915) are most doing wrong 193 Cal. People you state the test formulations: consistent with the rule that a defendant who establishes nature defendant was not his commonly given prior will Cal. v. as to his robbery test as find that he was was M’Donell conduct.’ affirmatively wrong, you and criminal that his act “If applied particular was “ you ‘If of his capable P. ” wrongful he find that in California. 859], P. legally will find that he was was has act to Drew act he is 47 Cal. Reid, 165]; People and, reasoning capacity wrong, you and will or knowing insane; conjunctive. where did (CALJIC subject defendant was doing, addition, not understand the or, sufficiency v. Hubert to establish that will find knowledge him to if understanding Bundy No. 4.00 In you legally was Bundy sufficient find that capable capable punish (1897) sane. (3d *10 (See defense, formulation, in some due required by process. 758, 762, 660, also L.Ed.2d (1962) Robinson v. 370 U.S. 666 [8 California 1417], mentally of being 82 S.Ct. for status suggesting that punishment too, Scholars, ill suggest would constitute cruel and unusual punishment.) im- constitutionally be may abolition traditional defense a mentally if the of result would be permissible punishment imposition & (See Haynes, ill for acts done intent. Robitscher person without criminal Note, 9; The L.J. Insanity (1982) 31 Emory Defense of Defense Proposed Mercy Federal Insanity Quality Should Sufferfor of Defense: (1984) the Sake 22 Safety Am.Crim. L.Rev. (1942) 20 People This court a similar view in v. Coleman suggested 399, an insane 407 P.2d we observed: “Obviously where [126 were his insanity accused crime be dealt with if inhumanely would considered to reduce of his crime or the merely punishment the degree therefor.”5 however,
We if sec- need not face these difficult constitutional questions, 25(b) tion no does more than to the version return California pre-Drew test.
Ill Post-Proposition 8 Return to M’Naghten 25(b) If the use of the is not a drafts conjunctive “and” in section error, man’s a defendant must now establish both that he “was and of knowing the nature and of his or her act the basic distinguishing right recognize principle We wrong.” courts, statutory constitutional construction which mandates measure, not a undertake to rewrite its construing language. unambiguous (In re Waters Long Valley 25 Cal.3d System (1979) Creek Stream however, 348 656].) 599 rule Cal.Rptr. P.2d That is not applied, [158 used, when it clear that a a judicial word has been appears erroneously v. correction will best carry (Pepper out the intent of the body. adopting Board in (1958) 928].) Directors 4 The P.2d Cal.App.2d [327 clear advertent use of “and” or intent of statute seems where the purpose toly may “or” is a of a error which familiar require example drafting (See, Bigelow v. rectified construction. properly by judicial e.g., (1984) 994]; Bianco 37 Cal.3d P.2d 755-756 Cal.Rptr. 806]; v. Ind. Acc. Com. view, Morris, (Chi. page 5For 76. contrary see Law Press Madness and Criminal 1984). Fulton, (Nat. Insanity See also Keilitz and Center State Courts Defense Butler Abbey Cal.App.3d Supp. Board Directors P. Cal.App. is, fact, Whether can 25(b) the use of “arid” in error drafting determined and the intent by reference to the section purpose electorate it. adopting The ballot Gen Attorney summaries and are not arguments helpful. *11 eral’s of included a summary 8 advises that the measure Proposition only provision (Official summary, . . . of title and “regarding proof insanity.” Amends, Const, 8, Ballot to Cal. with Prop. Pamp., arguments Proposed voters, 8, (June Elec. Primary 32.) Legis analysis p. lative that the Analyst quotes only and states conjunctive language pro vision “could increase the of that a is not guilty difficulty proving reason of (Id., 55.) at No reference to the insanity.” insanity provi sion (Id., in the 34- appears for or 8. arguments against Proposition pp. 35.) These omissions are not without however. As we noted significance, earlier, the common insanity defense reflects a fundamental legal principle to the of law of jurisprudence England6 this and to the common country in sanctions are who act with only wrongful imposed persons tent in the (See commission of a malum in se offense. Morissette v. United States, 246, 288, 293-294].) 342 Since 1850 supra, U.S. 250-251 L.Ed. [96 of been as the rule disjunctive test has insanity accepted which the minimum intent function which constitutes cognitive wrongful will be measured in fundamental this state. As such it is itself among of our of criminal law. Had it been the intent of the drafters principles 8 or of Proposition the electorate which it both to adopted abrogate more AU-Drew fundamental expansive prin test and to abandon that prior crime, would be ciple we would that this intent culpability anticipate in some more of a expressed single obvious manner than the substitution Point, in a Ltd. v. conjunctive (Cf. initiative Marina lengthy provision. 115, 721, 496, (1982) 30 P.2d 30 734 640 Cal.Rptr. [180 Wolfson 1161], den., 111, A.L.R.4th 103 S.Ct. cert. U.S. L.Ed.2d 958 [74 129]; 351, Rooney (1973) v. Vermont Investment 364-365 Corp. 10 Cal.3d 297]; (1970) re P.2d In Cox 3 Cal.3d Cal.Rptr. Cas. Ins. Interinsurance v. Ohio Cal.Rptr. Exchange (1962) Co. Cal.Rptr. 25(b) would erase
Applying as a test conjunctive insanity fundamental It would return the law to that which preceded principle. country 6This concept of criminal is not one limited to the laws of this California, England. In Platt development their article on the defense law, and Diamond trace criminal re the defense to Hebrew and also find the doctrine of Diamond, (Platt sponsibility recognized & part philosophy. of Greek and Roman ” Origins “Right Wrong Responsibility Subsequent and Its De Test Criminal velopment Survey in the United States: An Historical 54 Cal.L.Rev. as the beast test” and a test known as the “wild M’Naghten, variously if insane evil could be found test” under which an accused “good and doth memory, of his “totally deprived infant, brute, beast or a wild he is more know what no than an than doing, We noth 765.)7 Tr. find (Rex . . . .” 16 Howell St. Arnold from which or in other source language any ing Proposition funda that such a intent of the electorate be divined which indicates may mental, intended. the law of far-reaching change 1029-1031 Horn Cal.App.3d indicia absence any the Court of considered the Appeal of intent to California version more than restoration of the accomplish traditional, century and found the old phrase- use of test, of an to return to that ology M’Naghten evidence intent persuasive *12 use “and.” notwithstanding the inadvertent of the conjunctive apparently conclude, 25(b) rein- We Court in section as did the Horn that Appeal stated the Drew as test as it to M’Naghten prior California applied the test of in criminal in this state.9 legal insanity prosecutions
IV to Although 25(b) the the of section agree that purpose return the test of version to California the pre-ALI-Drew test, not the is M’Naghten they argue judgment that reversal of this because same. The findings both that test are the required prongs actually inherent in this the trial in this case judge fallacy argument. illustrate It is true that a is of his act who unaware of the person quality M’Naghten’s development Case is “good England prior 7The of the and evil” to test Diamond, Platt op. supra. summarized in cit. insanity requiring M’Naghten 8A test of a of the test prongs that defendant meet both not, course, carry express Proposition would 8 and out intent that was intent, system con supplied justice materials to is the voters. That insofar as criminal cerned, (See People deterrence is of criminal behavior. v. Smith wrong is is not A does know his act who likely by prospect wrongful to be deterred conduct. Nor is there punishment prospect that one who not know of his act be deterred. does the nature will interpret to language, Appeal 9In somewhat “decline[d] more colorful the Court enacting M’Naghten drooling century statute as idiot of the old standard place new test in misused, That is merely single, conjunctive conjunctive because it ‘and.’ uses the and often ” Horn, supra, (People to support too thin a reed such a massive doctrinal transformation. 1014, 1032.) Cal.App.3d definition know by cannot that act is In this circumstance wrong. “nature and subsumes the quality” prong wrong” prong.10 “right
The follow, reverse does not testimony however. necessarily expert in this case of the trial court this defendant was supported findings that aware of the nature and He knew he was homicidal act. that would, to, an act of kill a committing and was intended strangulation human He was be- not able act was being. comprehend to that the cause his mental illness caused him to believe the act was not morally justified but was of him. He believed that the homicide expected was “right.” argue 25(b) further that section was intended “clarify” of the es-
meaning right/wrong California prong that the tablishing the defendant must “wrong” which comprehend defendant, legal, rather than a moral Under this formulation this wrong. unlawful, who was able that his act was would not recognize escape even was commanded believed his act though God. We fail see 25(b) which conveys manner in this clari- fication Moreover, assuming validity test. even of this argument, reversal here court did not find would be The trial necessary. able appellant was considered unlawful his act was comprehend or “wrong” even it That does not though theory was commanded God. *13 to have been Neither appear forth the at trial.11 put by appellant, People nor the trial court to legal addressed the of question ability comprehend right wrong. event,
In any past decisions do not the support People’s argument under the California version of defendant who could the test a M’Naghten that his act comprehend was unlawful could be insane. That was not legally time certainly not the of the Penal Code at the understanding adoption of 1872. The notes section 26 of that enactment refer accompanying People v. Richardson 10Illustrative of Cal.App.2d this 172-173 [13 192 Cal.Rptr. conjunctive insanity in which the use of the “and” in instruction the erroneous, criticized and held but was that the defendant prejudicial not because the defense circumstances, had “blacked-out.” “Under these of offered where the evidence by appellant the periods, was ‘blackout’ of a between there can be no relevance distinction ‘knowing wrong the and in quality right of his between and ‘distinguishing act’ relation to . . the act . .’” may inconsistency theory 11The so the explained part by failure to do in the of this 25(b), Attorney intent of section with in theory put Attorney forth the General the Proposition Proposition General’s After 8 (reprinted Guide to 8 in Criminal Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 1982) pp. CEB]), prosecutors 145-316 which was distributed [hereafter 25(b) other local law enforcement it was “restores officers. There stated that section People Kelly M’Naghten traditional rule insanity, as to v. Cal.3d 574.” (CEB, op. supra, cit. p. at observed, which, is the v. as we have Coffman, Cal. People supra, in this being applicable in which recognized case test was test, in considered addition stating state. opinion, Coffman Justice, Bil- “Mansfield, in Chief as it did so: standard proof, quoting case, a de- . . ‘To such support on .: Lunacy, Collinson lingham’s fense, . (insanity,) incapable it . . that the ought proved at he committed between . . . that the time judging wrong; God he did not laws against consider that murder was a crime (24 added.) nature . . . italics .’” Cal. defense was reflected
No such restriction on the availability 4.00, to Drew. the standard CALJIC No. prior instruction insanity, instruction and legal That did not make a between moral wrong distinction of un not advising capable that if the defendant was wrong, jury only Nor is be found insane.12 derstanding his act was should “wrong,” Kelly, the limitation v. supra, stated in urged by People our test. There last pre-Drew application test, denotes a mental “Insanity, stated: under the California M’Naghten condition which or understanding renders person incapable knowing the nature of his of distinguishing right relation 61 Cal.2d wrong to that act. v. (People Wolff 959].)” Cal.Rptr. (People Kelly, supra, 565, 574.) We was relevant to the did that such limitation suggest evidence and trial had determined that case where the court findings ” “ ’ the defendant wrong. ‘was not that her act was capable {Ibid.) concept was not limited to “wrong” (1964) 61 There this Cal.2d 795 959].
Wolff been court test had explained that California version the M’Naghten liberalized able to verbalize the sense of holding “knowing” being *14 the sanity. and was to establish concepts legal insufficient wrong Rather, the must defendant must “know” in a broader sense—he appreciate test or understand these the California evolution of concepts. Tracing had we summarized from instruction the cases which the then applicable derived, 543, “(See, (1907) been 150 Cal. v. Willard stating: People e.g., 554 action P. he the nature character of his understands and [83 124] [‘if 53, P. and its (1914) v. Harris 169 Cal. 61 consequences’]; People [145 char mental to and understand the nature and [‘having know capacity 520] 211, act (1915) acter of the v. 170 Cal. People was Oxnam committing’] 213 . . had mental capacity sufficient appellant. [149 165] [‘If act, that it and understood character and of his knew appreciate quality 4, footnote 12See ante.
780 ,
was violation of the if thus to rights another . . . he had the capacity appreciate and of his character comprehend possible consequence act’]; 148, People (1919) v. 150 Morisawa 180 Cal. P. [‘if [179 888] . . defendant . did v. appreciate People the act he was committing’]; Gilberg (1925) 197 Cal. 314 [3] [240 P. 1000] [‘he appreciated nature and the act’]; (1949) Wells 33 Cal.2d v. People 351 P.2d know the nature his act and appreciate [20] [202 [‘to 53] was it v. wrongful .)” (People and could him to . . . subject punishment’] Wolff, 61 supra, of these 800-801.) Cal.2d In none cases is it suggested that defendant whose mental illness to believe act was caused him that his morally correct could not found insane if he understood that the act unlawful. Cases moral subsequent inability appreciate wrong accept Coffman
aas (See, the California component insanity. e.g., People test of legal v. (1896) Cal. McCarthy 263 as a correct P. approving statement of the law an instruction moral did not encompass act, of a who perversion defendant knew that deed is a criminal “the itself”; 306, 314, wrong v. People rejecting 197 Cal. Gilberg, supra, moral perversion as commit a defendant acceptable might because serious crimes “and know at the time that the deed is itself,” Thus, it has yet long escape punishment.) although been held that sense insanity,” “moral from a moral “perverted” arising illness, Nash brought (see mental is v. People not legal 416]; Cal.2d P.2d v. Cal. People Kerrigan 222, 224 849]), P. our that an cases awareness repeatedly distinguish effect, is i.e., “wrong” of its that it is unlawful. knowledge Coleman, (See 795, 801; v. su- People Wolff, supra, Cal.2d v. People 409; pra, People v. French 730 [87 1014]; 238, 245; v. Willard People Sloper, supra, 198 Cal. (1907) 150 Cal. Cal. P. Kerrigan, supra, 222, 225 had defendant sufficient mental capacity appreciate [“If act; her if knew and violating she understood she was of another an act which rights pro- was in itself and which wrong, law, hibited commission of which would entail punishment herself,—. of any . . she to the law . . . upon responsible regardless senses, however, .”].) the moral . . perversion great *15 The rule that and “wrong a defendant must know what is is doing criminal” first has been recognized as the formulation “since the accepted M’Donell, in fol decision this v. Cal. been (People state 47 and has (1953) lowed 893- ...” v. 40 Cal.2d consistently. (People Daughterly 911], People 894 P.2d in noting that the rule had been approved again [256
781 Wells, in People 330, 349-350.) Affirming judgment v. supra, we Rittger v. be understood testimony could this test and concluded that expert applied not “his conduct did accord that meaning recognize as that the defendant did (See also of justification.” with social standards of and standards right Koehn, v. People v. P. Sloper 198 Cal. People Reid, 491, 496; 605, 612; People v. 193 Cal. supra, Cal. supra, 777, 779.) v. 168 Cal. Bundy, supra, mental illness whose of the defense to a insanity applicability defendant, if that the cause of an insane such as that suifered by delusion was was wrong,
delusion rendered him that his act incapable appreciating in There the made clear Cal. 216 P. Hubert 329]. delu- trial court had under insane instructed that “defendant ‘was laboring knowing which him from sions so his reason as to incapacitate permeated in the infor- the difference the acts wrong, charged between and as to mation, actions, motives, deceased, her his with the relations ” him, intentions delusions.’ toward he acted in of such pursuance (119 erred in this Cal. that the court had concluded Although and other instructions on the factual issues jury which took from delusions, as to the existence of the no as to appli- raised question of the which render the cability test to insane delusions M’Naghten insanity individual his conduct.13 appreciating wrongfulness
This affirmed People test was further M’Naghten Willard, 543, 554, “That 150 Cal. this court supra, explained: where may be available it must as a defense to a crime charged, appear defendant, committed, that the and dis- deranged when was so the act eased he was the act mentally wrongful not conscious of the 13Application type anticipated test to this of mental illness was judges question posed who first the House response formulated the the fourth test. to facts, person, existing of Lords—“If under an delusion commits offense insane as to thereof, answer must of consequence thereby judges replied: is he excused?”—the “[T]he but, depend assumption as we did making course on the nature of the delusion: the same before, namely only, respects in other partial that he labors and is not under such delusion insane, if the we think he must be situation as to considered same respect the influence example, facts with to which the exists For if under delusion were real. life, away attempting take his supposes of his delusion he another man to be the act of man, self-defence, punishment. exempt supposes, and he kills as he he would injury If delusion to his character was that the deceased had inflicted a serious fortune, injury, and he him in he would liable revenge supposed killed for such Case, (M’Naghten’s supra, Eng. Rep. punishment.” & Fin. Clark response to an insane delusion applies right/wrong prong This suggested first applied insanity. in the same manner as it is other The delusion forms judges wrong. The defendant inability appreciate results in an that the act is more, delusion, suggest he is defending believes himself. second without does morally justified. the defendant believes his act is lawful or *16 If committed. he has sufficient to between reasoning capacity distinguish and as to the act con- wrong he is and particular doing, knowledge sciousness that what is will he is and criminal and him doing wrong subject he punishment, must be held for his conduct. he responsible Although instance, may be labouring partial insanity,—as, under from suffering hallucination,—still some insane delusion or if he understands nature and character of his action and has its he that consequences,—if knowledge criminal, it is if he does the act he will do such wrong, or partial insanity the existence of such delusion or is hallucination not him sufficient to relieve for his criminal acts.” Our nature mental illness has appreciation developed greatly decided, since Hubert and Willard were medical now community characterizes some delusional such as that mental illness suffered de- disorder,”14 fendant as a rather than “monomania” or “schizophrenic “par- tial insanity.” rule in these cases has not expressed changed, however. If the mental in illness is manifested delusions which render the individual either of of his or of un- knowing character that it is for- derstanding wrong, is insane under the California legally mulation test. M’Naghten cites no
Respondent decisional of this state for the authority argument right/wrong California test of does not prong M’Naghten awareness, thereof, encompass lack inher- that the defendant’s act was ently, morally wrong. Reliance instead on a out-of-state placed single case, (Alaska 1962) Chase v. State an- P.2d overruled on (Alaska other in Fields point 1971) v. State A.L.R.3d Manifestly, we cannot infer that a decision of the Alaska 20-year-old 680]. Supreme Court drafters 8 to believe that the prompted Proposition law of California “clarification.”15 The decision that case no required Association, Psychiatric Diagnostic 14American and Statistical Manual of Mental Disor (3d ders pages ed. 181-193. 15We do find reasoning persuasive. not of Chase The court that if the two concluded prongs disjunctive, test were “the intellect be two must divided into rational, parts. part distinct One so would that the nature and of the act would be understood; irrational, part and the other would be so there could be no generally community wrongful. ap was one condemned and therefore parent implication simultaneously here mind would that one could be normal and abnor mal, supported by sane and insane. psychi That this could be is established medical or principles. atric ...” problems First, At analysis. least two appear recognized this even before Chase sanity that the test of under the formulation is a test that does not encom- pass community all of the mental psychiatric recognize conditions which the medical and Drew, (See Nash, 36, 48; mental supra, disorders. see also Therefore, supra, 341-342.) inconsistency recognizing there is no legally may capacity who is mental insane nonetheless have the understand *17 clarification to believed such a the electorate conclusion that way supports by to be established test of legal or understood the necessary of who because to be found sane 25(b) a defendant would permit him kill an- commanded to expected God mental illness believed that morally justified was the killing other human and that therefore being was not “wrong.” the question of which have considered jurisdictions
Courts in a number do, is the we that a defendant who have come to conclusion as merely liable criminally act is not morally wrong that his is v. Wood (See, act e.g., People because he knows the is unlawful. 116]; Schmidt 187 N.E.2d N.Y.2d N.Y.S.2d [236 945]; Kirkham
(1915) 216 N.Y. 338-340 N.E. State v. 859]; (1957) 231 S.C. Utah 2d State Allen cf. S.Ed.2d State v. 93 N.J.L. Carrigan Cardozo, for New York Court of Appeal, A. Justice in an the opinion “In the the of all these underlying light
eloquently expressed philosophy: think, it is that is decisive to there precedents, impossible, say any definition to adjudication ‘wrong’ statutory which limits the word to moral . . . wrong. interpretation placed upon opposed statute its A mother kills by the trial tested judge may consequences. She her child to whom has been attached. knows the devotedly infant she it; act; but nature and of the she law condemns she knows quality is God has to her and ordained insane delusion that inspired appeared that, the sacrifice. It a to mockery say meaning seems within statute, she is If wrong. knows that the definition propounded trial is it be the to hold her right, duty would a judge jury responsible rule, for the crime. We find either in the of the its nothing history reason or or in its to a purpose, meaning, justify judicial exposition forbidden by conclusion so abhorrent. . . . that an act is law Knowledge [f] Further, appreciate physical performing. the nature of the acts he is as the evidence this suggests, person case it is a who not uncommon that suffers from one various forms category fully falling schizophrenic of mental illness within the disorders understands the act, expert, appreciate wrongfulness. nature and is unable to its One of his but addressing question testimony, explained: particular this in his case is a act in this “[t]he strangulation so appreciation the—the that a would have to have is that stran- gulation great bodily could indicated me in no result in death or harm. The defendant harm, doing great bodily believing uncertain with intent terms he executed this act in fact purpose; course that had a do but that was his that was his intent. He in no admits to that uncertain terms. “Furthermore, general, paranoid that it not interfere schizophrenia is does abilities; say, possession relate to people’s cognitive with the that is to those abilities that knowledge, strangling kill knowledge of mere like the could them is one someone capacities negated by paranoid schizophrenia .... cord; holding he knew regard “With the nature of the ... he knew that he was hands, wrapped holding cord what cord was around that what was neck, being.” that was the neck of a human that, will most cases the inference of to the permit knowledge according mankind, accepted standards it is also condemned as an offense against If, however, morals. good Obedience the law is itself a there moral duty. *18 is an insane delusion that God has to the defendant and ordained appeared crime, the commission aof we think it cannot be said of the offender that he knows 324, act to N.Y. (People v. Schmidt wrong.” 338-340 949-950], added.)16 N.E. italics found, evidence, The trial court sufficient that defendant could clearly not distinguish and right with to his act. No further wrong regard hearing on the issue of sanity at the time the act is is required. judgment reversed and the superior court is directed to of not guilty enter judgment reason of and to thereafter to section 1026. proceed pursuant
Kaus, J., Broussard, J., J., Lucas, J., concurred. Reynoso, MOSK, J. concur in the excellent I write analysis majority. only I to relate observed, some relevant As background. Oliver Wendell Holmes “a is worth page (New a volume of York Trust Co. v. history logic.” Eisner 256 U.S. L.Ed. 41 S.Ct. 349 [65 A.L.R.
In 1973 I wrote a separate Kelly (1973) opinion Cal.Rptr. M’Naughton that the urging test1 as outmoded and in either medical sci- unsupportable “disavowed] law,” ence and that action the American Law Institute pending legislative formulation be (ALI trial Model courts as the test adopted insanity. Code, 4.01.) formulation, Pen. At time the ALI six states had adopted § as had every (Id. 582.) federal circuit but one. at p.
Within five years of this court had come around to view in majority my Kelly ALI judicially test in v. Drew adopted opinion liability, 16Justice Cardozo’s “It enough, continued: is not to relieve from criminal prisoner morally that the depraved enough is that he views of It is not has [citation]. at variance with expression those that find in the law. The variance must have origin in its some liberty disease mind is not at to break the anarchist [citation]. law because he government wrong. religious reasons all is The devotee of a cult that enjoins polygamy duty thereby or human sacrifice as a is not relieved from belief, before law according In such false to our own [citations]. cases however standards, product not the will take disease. Cases will doubtless arise where criminals God, professed shelter behind a just belief that this defendant their crime was ordained as attempted safely shelter himself leave to the behind that belief. We can such fabrications (Schmidt, supra, 949-950].) common sense juries.” pp. 216 N.Y. at N.E. at M’Naghten. M’Naugh majority spell 1The test it spelled All the members of this court Kelly, (Ibid., ton although spelling. there fn. I noted the numerous variants of of clarity consistency spelling interests adhere to the we used I believe should Kelly. invitation my Despite Cal.3d 333 1318]. action, after it not do so did any not taken Kelly had Legislature was born I disinterest legislators’ Drew. can surmise that the M’Naughton since a judicial problem, belief that the test had been court-created. originally courts, achieving counsel were Just as trial and defense prosecutors Drew, known Proposition the initiative measure reasonable détente with am- the latent It contained and submitted the electorate. prepared one of the problems Therein lies discussed biguity majority opinion. and arcane principles inherent in rules evidence adopt attempting *19 deciding by to the by law vote. It is somewhat public popular comparable sur- in brain to surgeons employ vote popular appropriate technique gery. been instead “or” would have
I am convinced that the use “and” committee, assembly an discovered in traditional legislative process. committee, the floor on the floor of the in assembly, a senate senate, likely would in the veto such inadvertence Governor’s opportunity, deliberate, intent detected, such have been or if the choice of words however, measure, no would been In an initiative clearly have declared. available; the revision is no intent is opportunity possible legislative has nothing. voter the choice of all or enigmatic least 12 by In this instance the choice at given voters encumbered numerous sub subsumed within what was titled 8. The subjects Proposition title for sub jects were itemized General in his by Attorney prepared catchall, mission other matters.” to the voters he concluded with a “and I remain convinced that as a clear violation was invalid Proposition II, Const., art. (Cal. prohibition against subjects. constitutional multiple (d); & v. Eu my subd. see conc. dis. in Brosnahan opn. § it would For example, rationalize, to the as one a return subject, but appear impossible M’Naughton safety. Regrettably, rule of and a of school insanity guarantee to invalidate failed my colleagues expediently four-to-three majority, so, much uncertainties subsequent initiative. Had done they in the law would have been avoided. incongruities result, I must Since I am bound decisis to that untoward accept stare some inject now thankless task of join trying the often undertaking by Proposi- covered rational into the numerous meaning disparate subjects con- is but the latest tion 8. The to M’Naughton” effort to “return clumsy troversy. analysis as majority being reasonable and as the pragmatic
circumstances I endorse justify, their opinion. BIRD, J., C. Dissenting. In Juneof the voters ballot adopted measure which altered the radically test for criminal in this state. Code, (Pen. (b), Measure, subd. § added Initiative Elec. Primary 8, 1982, June known I popularly ignore cannot the fact that Prop. they adopted which to dem language the accused unambiguously requires onstrate “he or she was or knowing nature and her distinguishing (Ibid., time of the commission added.) of the offense.” italics There statute, nothing whole, 8 as a the ballot Proposition argu ments that implies that the electorate intended “and” be “or.” However choice, unwise that within it is not this court’s power ignore expres sion of will and rewrite popular the statute.
Since failed to appellant establish his under enunciated Penal Code section (b), subdivision I cannot the decision join my brethren.