DYNA-MED, INC., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING COMMISSION, Defendant and Respondent.
L.A. No. 32145
Supreme Court of California
Nov. 2, 1987
1379
Mickeal Gehringer, Michael Wischkaemper, McDonald & Allen, Stephen P. McDonald and Rosemary A. Sullivan for Plaintiff and Appellant.
John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General, Andrea S. Ordin, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Beverly Tucker and Marian M. Johnston, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.
Joan M. Graff, Robert Barnes, Rebecca I. McKee, Patricia S. Mar, Martha J. Shaver, Feldman, Waldman & Kline, Judith E. Kurtz and Nancy L. Davis as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
OPINION
PANELLI, J.-In Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 211 [185 Cal.Rptr. 270, 649 P.2d 912] (hereafter Commodore Home), we held that a court may award punitive damages in a civil suit for job discrimination pursuant to the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA or Act) (
I. BACKGROUND
The California Fair Employment Practice Act (FEPA) was enacted in 1959 (former Lab. Code, § 1410 et seq.; see Stats. 1959, ch. 121, § 1, pp. 1999-2005) and recodified in 1980 as part of the FEHA (Stats. 1980, ch. 992, § 4, p. 3140 et seq.). “The law establishes that freedom from job discrimination on specified grounds, is a civil right. (
If an accusation is not issued within 150 days after the filing of the complaint or if the department earlier determines not to prosecute the case and the matter is not otherwise resolved, the department must give the complainant a “right to sue” letter. The complainant may then bring a civil suit in superior court. (
In the instant case Linda Olander initially filed a complaint with the department alleging that Dyna-Med, Inc. (Dyna-Med) discriminated against her with regard to wages and promotional opportunities on the basis of sex in violation of the FEPA. The complaint was resolved by means of a written settlement agreement pursuant to which Dyna-Med agreed, inter alia, not to engage in retaliatory action against Olander for filing the complaint.3 Approximately five hours after executing the agreement, Dyna-Med fired Olander. Olander filed a new complaint, alleging that she was fired in retaliation for her original complaint. Following a hearing, the commission issued its decision ordering Dyna-Med to pay Olander her lost wages, plus $7,500 in punitive damages.4 The superior court denied Dyna-Med‘s
The sole issue before us is whether the FEHA grants the commission authority to award punitive damages. Resolution of this issue depends on the meaning of section 12970, subdivision (a), which sets forth the scope of relief available from the commission. That section provides: “If the commission finds that a respondent has engaged in any unlawful practice under this part, it shall state its findings of fact and determination and shall issue . . . an order requiring such respondent to cease and desist from such unlawful practice and to take such action, including, but not limited to, hiring, reinstatement or upgrading of employees, with or without back pay, and restoration to membеrship in any respondent labor organization, as, in the judgment of the commission, will effectuate the purposes of this part, and including a requirement for report of the manner of compliance.”
Before addressing the parties’ arguments we state briefly the basis for the Court of Appeal‘s determination that the commission is authorized to award punitive damages.
“It is undisputed,” the Court of Appeal stated, “an administrative agency‘s power to award such damages must arise from express authorization. Here, the Legislature delegated broad authority to the Commission to fashion appropriate remedies for unlawful employment practices in section 12970, subdivision (a): ‘[[]] ‘If the commission finds that a respondent has engaged in any unlawful practice under this part, it . . . shall issue and cause to be served on the parties an order requiring such respondent . . . to take such action, including, but not limited to, hiring, reinstatement or upgrading of employees, with or without back pay, and restoration to membership in any respondent labor organization, as, in the judgment of the commission, will effectuate the purposes of this part, and including a requirement for report of the manner of compliance.’ . . . [[]] Attempting to harmonize this specific provision in context of the entire statutory framework, we find in section 12920 the underlying purpose of the act is to provide effective remedies to eliminate discriminatory employment practices. Consequently, considering the legislative mandate to liberally construe the act to further these purposes (
In the Court of Appeal‘s judgment, the facts of the instant case “prove ordinary restitutionary remedies are often ineffective in eliminating discriminatory practices.”5 The court thus determined thаt “in light of the limited remedial effect of [the] permissible compensatory remedies, the award of punitive damages may be the only method of fulfilling the purposes of the act, including encouraging plaintiffs to seek relief by increasing their potential recovery. . . .”
II. DISCUSSION
Petitioner Dyna-Med and its amici6 argue that although the Court of Appeal correctly recognized that the statutory language and legislative history of section 12970, subdivision (a) are determinative of the issue before us, the court misread the statute and misapplied common principles of statutory construction in concluding that the Legislature has authorized the commission to award punitive damages.
Respondent Commission and its amici7 maintain that the FEHA is unambiguous in authorizing broad relief limited only by the judgment of the commission as to what will effectuate the purposes of the Act, and that the commission has properly determined that the award of exemplary damages in appropriate cases is necessary to deter deliberate discrimination.
A. Statutory Language
Pursuant to established principles, our first task in construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. In determining such intent, a court must look first to the words of the statute themselves, giving to the language its usual, ordinary
We consider, therefore, the statutory language in the context of the legislative purpose. The Legislature has declared that the purpose of the FEHA is to provide effective remedies which will eliminate discriminatory practices. (
Punitive damages, by contrast, are neither equitable nor corrective; punitive damages serve but one purpose-to punish and through punishment, to deter. “Punitive damages by definition are not intended to compensate the injured party, but rather to punish the tortfeasor whose wrongful action was intentional or malicious, and to deter him and others from similar extreme conduct.” (Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. (1981) 453 U.S. 247, 266-267 [69 L.Ed.2d 616, 632, 101 S.Ct. 2748]; see Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1978) 21 Cal.3d 910, 928, fn. 13 [148 Cal.Rptr. 389, 582 P.2d 980].)
The general rule is that “[w]here the enabling statute is essentially remedial, and does not carry a penal program declaring certain practices to be crimes or provide penalties or fines in vindication of public rights, an agency does not have discretion to devise punitive measures such as the prescription of penalties or fines. The statutory power to command affirmative action is remedial, not punitive.” (Modjeska, Administrative Law Practice and Procedure (1982) Sanctions and Remedies, § 5.9, pp. 170-171, fns. omitted; see Edison Co. v. Labor Board (1938) 305 U.S. 197, 235-236 [83 L.Ed. 126, 143, 59 S.Ct. 206]; see also Youst v. Longo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 64, 82-83 [233 Cal.Rptr. 294, 729 P.2d 728] [where regulatory scheme provides for one kind of relief and is silent on another, it should be construed to exclude the latter].)
Commission acknowledges that punitive damages are different in kind from the enumerated remedies, but argues that in certain cases, as here, where there was “intentional egregious” discrimination and the make-whole remedies are inappropriate,8 the imposition of exemplary damages is necessary as a deterrent to effectuate the purpose of the Act to eliminate employment discrimination. Citing the statutory directive that the provisions of the Act shall be liberally construed (
The contemporaneous construction of a new enactment by the administrative agency charged with its enforcement, although not controlling, is entitled to great weight. (Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 245 [149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281]; People v. McGee (1977) 19 Cal.3d 948, 961 [140 Cal.Rptr. 657,
We take no issue with the premise that exemplary damages would serve to deter discrimination. Nor do we dispute that the phrase “including, but not limited to” is a phrase of enlargement. (See American National Ins. Co. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 611 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.); Fraser v. Bentel (1911) 161 Cal. 390, 394 [119 P. 509]; 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th ed. 1984) § 47.07, p. 133 [hereafter Sutherland].) Nevertheless, given the extraordinary nature of punitive damages, these factors, in our view, are insufficient to support an inference that the Legislature intended sub silentio to empower the commission to impose punitive damages. Commission‘s argument, taken to its logical conclusion, would authorize every administrative agency granted remedial powers to impose punitive damages so long as the statute directs that its provisions are to be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.10
Seeking to alleviate concern that a “flood of agencies” would arrogate to themselves similar authority, Commission states that only four other agencies have been granted comparable statutory authority to order actions that will effectuate the purposes of the acts they enforce the Agricultural La-
That no similarly empowered agency awards punitive damages lends support, in our view, to the conclusion that the power to make punitive assessments will not be implied merely from a legislative directive that an act‘s remedial provisions are to be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes. Indeed, in Youst v. Longo, supra, 43 Cal.3d 64, we specifically determined that the broad powers the Legislature vested in the California Horse Racing Board do not include the power to award compensatory or punitive tort damages. “[T]he power to award compensatory and punitive tort damages to an injured party is a judicial function. Although the [Horse Racing] Board has very broad power to regulate and discipline wrongful conduct which involves horseracing in California, the relevant statutes do not authorize affirmative compensatory relief such as tort damages.” (Id. at p. 80, italics omitted.)
As the United States Supremе Court stated in another context: “[I]t is not enough to justify the Board‘s requirements to say that they would have the effect of deterring persons from violating the Act. That argument proves too much, for if such a deterrent effect is sufficient to sustain an order of the Board, it would be free to set up any system of penalties which it would deem adequate to that end. [[]] . . . [A]ffirmative action to ‘effectuate the policies of this Act’ is action to achieve the remedial objectives which the Act sets forth.” (Republic Steel Corp. v. Labor Board (1940) 311 U.S. 7, 12 [85 L.Ed. 6, 10, 61 S.Ct. 77]; accord, Carpenters Local v. Labor Board (1961) 365 U.S. 651, 655 [6 L.Ed.2d 1, 4, 81 S.Ct. 875]; see Laflin & Laflin v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 368, 380-381 [212 Cal.Rptr. 415].)
A more reasonable reading of the phrase “including, but not limited to,” is that the Legislature intended to authorize the commission to take such other remedial action as in its judgment seems appropriate to redress a particular unlawful employment practice and to prevent its recurrence, thus eliminating the practice.11 A reading of the phrase as permitting only additional corrective remedies
This reading, moreover, harmonizes the various parts of the statute. Section 12964, referring to resolution of allegedly unlawful practices through conciliation, provides that “such resolutions may be in the nature of, but are not limited to, types of remedies that might be ordered after accusation and hearing,” i.e., the section 12970 remedies. While the corrective remedies enumerated in section 12970 are appropriate to impose in the context of a resolution by conciliation, punitive damages are antithetical to the conciliation process and, as indicated, are not “in the nature of” the type of remedy authorized by section 12970.
A construction of section 12970 that limits the commission to corrective, nonpunitive remedies also harmonizes the Act with the statutory provisions governing the award of punitive damages in civil actions.
Further, subdivision (b) of
Finally,
Statutes are to be given a reasonable and commonsense interpretation consistent with the apparent legislative purpose and intent “and which, when applied, will result in wise policy rather than mischief or absurdity.” (Honey Springs Homeowners Assn. v. Board of Supervisors (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 1122, 1136, fn. 11 [203 Cal.Rptr. 886].) Absent express language dictating otherwise, it will not be presumed that the Legislature intended to authorize an administrative agency-free of guidelines or limitation-to award punitive damages in proceedings lacking the protections mandated in a court of law.
In sum, we are of the view that the statutory language, given its ordinary import and construed in context of the purposes and objectives of the law, together with the Legislature‘s silence on the issue of punitive damages, compels the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to grant the commission authority to award punitive damages. If, as Commission argues, the inability to award such damages deprives it of an effective means to redress and prevent unlawful discrimination, it is for the Legislature, rather than this court, to remedy this defect. We are not, however, convinced that the commission lacks sufficient means to redress and eliminate discrimination. The Act authorizes class actions and permits the director of the department to address systematic problems, such as pattern and practice matters, by bringing a complaint on his or her own motion. (
Although we believe that statutory interpretation disposes of the issue, we nevertheless address the additional arguments advanced by the parties.
B. Legislative History
In support of their respective arguments, both parties cite the legislative history of the Act and the Legislature‘s failure since its enactment to modify it or adopt various proposed amendments.
In 1963 the Hawkins Act was replaced by the Rumford Fair Housing Act (former Health & Saf. Code, § 35700 et seq., enacted by Stats. 1963, ch. 1853, §§ 1-4, pp. 3823-3830), which for the first time afforded an administrative remedy for housing discrimination. Although the Rumford Act retained language authorizing the award of damages, it transformed the statutory minimum recoverable in judicial proceedings (see fn. 16, ante) into a statutory maximum in administrative proceedings.17 In 1980 the employment and housing statutory schemes were combined to form the FEHA, with enforcement of both sections of the Act vested in the commission. (Stats. 1980, ch. 992, § 4, pp. 3140-3142.)
Dyna-Med argues that in light of the parallel development of legislation governing employment and housing discrimination and the ultimate union of the respective acts in one, with common enforcement procedures, it is significant that the Legislature, while authorizing the award of damages in housing cases, has never done so in employment cases. Had the Legislature intended to authorize the commission to award damages in employment
Commission, in turn, asserts that the separate origins of the housing and employment discrimination statutes explain why one explicitly allows damages and the other does not. Moreover, the remedy provisions in the housing section expressly note punitive damages only to limit their availability. (
Commission‘s argument is unpersuasive. A review of the relevant statutes discloses that when the Legislature intends to authorize an agency to award damages for discrimination, it does so expressly (e.g.,
Commission observes that since 1980 when it first interpreted the FEHA as authorizing the award of punitive damages, the Legislature has amended the Act several times without addressing the remedy provisions.19 This inaction, Commission argues, is an indication that its ruling was consistent with the Legislature‘s intent. (See Coca-Cola Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1945) 25 Cal.2d 918, 922 [156 P.2d 1]; Action Trailer Sales, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 125, 133-134 [126 Cal.Rptr. 339].)
Dyna-Med, by contrast, relies on a bill introduced but not enacted by the Legislature in 1976 (Assem. Bill No. 3124, 2 Assem. Final Hist. (1975-1976 Sess.) p. 1658), which would expressly have authorized the commission to award limited damages in employment discrimination cases, and on the provision of Senate Bill No. 2012, introduced in 1984, which would have amended section 12970, subdivision (a) to specifically authorize compensatory and punitive damages as “declaratory of existing law,” but which was removed before the bill‘s enactment (see Stats. 1984, ch. 1754, § 3, p. 6406).
“[A]n erroneous administrative construction does not govern the interpretation of a statute, even though the statute is subsequently reenacted without change. [Citations.]” (Whitcomb Hotel, Inc. v. Cal. Emp. Com. (1944) 24 Cal.2d 753, 757-758 [151 P.2d 233, 155 A.L.R. 405].) Similarly inconclusive is the Legislature‘s rejection of specific provisions which would have expressly allowed the award of damages.
Unpassed bills, as evidences of legislative intent, have little value. (See Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721, 735, fn. 7 [180 Cal.Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115, 30 A.L.R.4th 1161]; Miles v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 243, 248, fn. 4 [136 Cal.Rptr. 508]; see also United States v. Wise (1962) 370 U.S. 405, 411 [8 L.Ed.2d 590, 594-595, 82 S.Ct. 1354]; 2A Sutherland, supra, § 49.10, pp. 407-408.) This is particularly true here, where the rejected provisions manifest conflicting legislative intents: the 1976 provision would have limited the amount of damages the commission could award; the 1981-1982 provisions would have prohibited the commission from awarding punitive damages (see fn. 19, ante); and the 1984 amendment would have authorized the award of compensatory and punitive damages “as declaratory of existing law.” (See generally Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Suprs. (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 41, 58 [69 Cal.Rptr. 480].)
Were we, however, to consider unpassed legislation, we would find it significant that at the same time the Legislature rejected the provision declaring the commission‘s authority to award damages, it amended the Civil Service Act to grant the Personnel Board authority identical to the commission‘s, plus the power to award compensatory damages. (Stats. 1984, ch. 1754, § 6, pp. 6408-6409; see
“[S]tatutes must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible. [Citations.] Interpretive constructions which render some words surplusage are to be avoided. [Citations.]” (California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Com., supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 844.)
As Justice Richardson, dissenting in Commodore Home, stated: “The express provision for damages in this parallel statutory scheme [the housing section of the FEHA]-strongly suggests . . . that the omission of [a punitive damages remedy] from the employment discrimination provisions was intentional. The Legislature has clearly demonstrated that it knows how to add a punitive remedy to this statute when it wishes to do so.” (32 Cal.3d at p. 225.)
C. Federal and Other State Legislation
The remedy language of section 12970 bears a close resemblance to section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) (
Dyna-Med invokes the principle that the use of identical language in analogous statutes requires like interpretation. (Belridge Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 551, 557 [147 Cal.Rptr. 165, 580 P.2d 665].) Commission argues that the foregoing principle is inapposite because of the limiting reference in the NLRA to affirmative action and in title VII to equitable relief, as contrasted with section 12970‘s reference without modification to “action.” Commission points further to the differing purposes of the NLRA and the FEPA: the first exists to promote industrial peace and stability through collective bargaining and to create a cooperative atmosphere of recognition between labor and management (Carey v. Westinghouse Corp. (1964) 375 U.S. 261, 271 [11 L.Ed.2d 320, 327-328, 84 S.Ct. 401]; N.L.R.B. v. Pincus Bros., Inc.-Maxwell (3rd Cir. 1980) 620 F.2d 367, 372-373; Bloom v. N.L.R.B. (D.C. Cir. 1979) 603 F.2d 1015, 1019), whereas the latter is designed to provide effective remedies to vindicate the individual‘s constitutional right to be free from employment discrimination and to eliminate discriminatory employment practices (State Personnel Bd. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 39 Cal.3d at 432).
When first enacted, the FEPA, like the NLRA, combined the prosecutorial and adjudicative functions and provided only for administrative relief.22 (Stats. 1959, ch. 121, § 1, pp. 1999-2005; see Commodore Home, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 218; cf. NLRA, § 10(b) & (c), 49 Stat. at pp. 453-454; Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin (1937) 301 U.S. 1, 24-25 [81 L.Ed. 893, 904-905, 57 S.Ct. 615]; Haleston Drug Stores v. National Labor Relations Bd., supra, 187 F.2d 418, 421.) The FEPA also contained the identical “affirmative action” language as the NLRA. (Stats. 1959, supra, at p. 2004; Commodore Home, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 224 (dis. opn. of Richardson, J.).) In 1969 the Legislature amended Labor Code section 1426 to delete the word “affirmative.” (Stats. 1969, ch. 526, § 1, p. 1142.) The legislative history
In Commodore Home, in the context of a civil action for punitive damages, we stated that differences between the federal laws and the FEHA—the
In the instant case, by contrast, the issue is the nature of administrative remedies—the only remedies provided by the
Although courts in other states are divided on the availability of compensatory damages under statutory schemes similar to the FEHA (see Annot. (1978) 85 A.L.R.3d 351, 356-357), we are unaware of any case upholding the award of punitive damages. Rather, the courts seem uniformly to hold that the authority of a state agency to assess exemplary damages must be express and will not be implied from a broad authority to implement the objectives of the fair employment statute. (E.g., Woods v. Midwest Conveyor Co., Inc. (1982) 231 Kan. 763 [648 P.2d 234, 244-245]; McDaniel v. Cory, supra, 631 P.2d 82, 86-89; Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Lysyj (1974) 38 Ohio St.2d 217 [67 Ohio Ops.2d 287, 313 N.E.2d 3, 6-7, 70 A.L.R.3d 1137]; see also High v. Sperry Corp. (S.D. Iowa 1984) 581 F.Supp. 1246, 1248; see Annot., supra, 85 A.L.R.3d at p. 357.)
D. Equal Protection and Policy Considerations
The FEHA, as indicated, provides two avenues for resolution of claims: “first, a complaint to the Department; second, if that agency fails to act, a private court action.” (Commodore Home, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 217; see
Further, denying exemplary damages in the administrative adjudication, Commission asserts, will create two classes of complainants: those who can afford to hire a private attorney and file a civil action and those “equally or even more deserving victims who lack the resources to pursue litigation by themselves and rely, instead, on the administrative process.” Because economic standing is often strongly correlated with race, sex and other forms of prohibited discrimination (see Brown v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d 477, 486), denial of the opportunity to obtain a punitive damages award solely because of the complainant‘s economic or social circumstances is contrary to the Legislature‘s intent to eliminate discrimination and raises serious equal protection concerns.
Commission‘s policy and equal protection arguments rest on speculative and seemingly conflicting premises: on the one hand, that when a case is appropriate for punitive damages, complainants will bypass the administrative forum and the department will forego seeking administrative relief, thus defeating the Act‘s objective of administrative resolution; and, on the other hand, that given the substantial volume of complaints received, the department pursues only the most egregious cases, with the result that claimants with weaker cases who can afford to sue will have access to exemplary damages while the most worthy victims whose cases are heard by the commission will be denied such recompense. We are aware of no authority supportive of either premise. Although Justice Richardson, dissenting in Commodore Home, spoke of the anomaly of allowing punitive damages to “accusors who have been unsuccessful administratively before the commission, [while denying] such damages to those whose claims have been successfully established” (32 Cal.3d at p. 222), this comment mistakenly assumes that a civil action is open only to those whose complaints the commission has refused to prosecute and overlooks the department‘s evident policy to permit any complainant to sue who wishes to, as well as the unlikelihood in any event of judicial recovery by a litigant whose claim the department has in fact found unworthy.
Concerning department policy, a former counsel to the department states: “Some respondents have asserted that a private right of action cannot be pursued before 150 days have passed, but this argument has not been accepted by most courts to which it is addressed. Because the investigation process . . . takes time, and because the Department, as a matter of sound administrative policy, handles employment cases on a first-in-first-out basis, it is virtually impossible for an accusation to issue in an employment case before 150 days have passed. Furthermore, because of the incredible volume
Thus, while the department no doubt pursues only cases it deems meritorious (State Personnel Bd. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 434, fn. 14; see Mahdavi v. Fair Employment Practice Com. (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 326 [136 Cal.Rptr. 421]; Marshall v. Fair Employment Practice Com. (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 680 [98 Cal.Rptr. 698]), because its case load precludes the pursuit of all such claims, any complainant who so wishes may bring a private court action. In these circumstance neither policy considerations nor equal protection concerns require that the administrative and judicial remedies be identical. To the contrary, the separate avenues justify different remedies. We recognized as much in Commodore Home where, having noted that “the FEHA leaves an aggrieved party on his own if the Department declines to pursue an administrative claim in his behalf,” we stated that “[t]o limit the damages available in a lawsuit might substantially deter the pursuit of meritorious claims, . . .” (32 Cal.3d at pp. 220-221.)
Nor is an indigent complainant denied an equal opportunity to go to court. An eligible plaintiff may sue in forma pauperis (
One recognized purpose of punitive damages is to make a civil action economically feasible. As one commentator has stated: “All serious misdeeds cannot possibly be punished by government prosecution. . . . [L]imited judicial and prosecutorial resources permit prosecution for only a fraction of the crimes and violations committed. For these reasons, individual members of society must play a significant role in instituting actions to impose sanctions for serious misconduct. Society‘s interest in bringing a wrongdoer to justice is especially strong where the wrongdoer‘s conduct exceeds all bounds of decency. [¶] The doctrine of punitive damages promotes this interest. By offering the potential for recovery in excess of actual
Mоreover, in appropriate cases a complainant can seek punitive damages by filing an independent civil action alleging tort causes of action either with or without an FEHA count. (Commodore Home, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 220; see Brown v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 486-487; Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932 [160 Cal.Rptr. 141, 603 P.2d 58]; cf. Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., supra, 2 Cal.3d 493.) “The FEHA was meant to supplement, not supplant or be supplanted by, existing antidiscrimination remedies, in order to give employees the maximum opportunity to vindicate their civil rights against discrimination.” (State Personnel Bd. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 431, citing
Although Commission asserts that denying it authority to award punitive damages will impede the administrative resolution of cases, the converse may well be true. As we recognized in Commodore Home, “One basis for federal holdings under title VII is a fear that the availability of punitive damages might hamper the EEOC‘s efforts to resolve discrimination disputes by ‘conference, conciliation, and persuasion.’ [Citations.]” (32 Cal.3d at p. 217; cf. Naton v. Bank of California (9th Cir. 1981) 649 F.2d 691, 699 [same re pain and suffering damages under Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act].) In Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co. (3d Cir. 1977) 550 F.2d 834, cited by the Ninth Circuit in Naton, supra, the court stated with respect to emotional distress damages: “While the existence of such an item of damages might strengthen the claimant‘s bargaining position with the employer, it would also introduce an element of uncertainty which would impair the conciliation process. Haggling over an appropriate sum could become a three-sided conflict among the employer, the Secretary, and the claimant.” (Id. at p. 841, italics added.) A fortiori the availability without limitation of punitive damages—usually a matter within the broad discretion of the jury after consideration of the defendant‘s wealth, the egregiousness of his conduct and the amount of the plaintiff‘s actual damages (see Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 266, 270-272 [95 Cal.Rptr. 678]; BAJI No. 14.71 (7th ed. 1986); 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1974) Torts, §§ 867-869, pp. 3155-3158,
Nor does effective conciliation require that the administrative and judicial remedies be identical. Rejecting such a contention in Commodore Home, supra, we stated: “We are not persuaded. In the first place there is no right to sue, even after conciliation breaks down, unless the Department fails to file an accusation before the Commission. To that extent the availability of court remedies remains within the Department‘s control. More importantly, the compliance structure of the FEHA encourages cooperation in the administrative process. While that process continues the Department acts on the victim‘s behalf and absorbs costs of pursuing his claim. Court action inevitably is speculative, and the FEHA makes civil suit the claimant‘s sole responsibility. That helps deter strategies of ‘holding out’ for court damages in inappropriate cases. Further, the possibility that an action might lead to punitive damages may enhance the willingness of persons charged with violations to offer fair settlements during the conciliation process. [Fn. omitted.]” (32 Cal.3d at p. 218.)
In short, Commission‘s policy and equal protection arguments are fallacious. If a complainant wants relatively prompt restitutionary redress free of personal financial risk he or she can elect the administrative avenue of relief, with all expenses paid by the department. (State Personnel Bd. v. Fair Employment Housing & Com., supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 432.) If, however, the complainant prefers to seek the potentially more lucrative redress of punitive damages, he or she can go to court like any other litigant.
III. CONCLUSION
In view of the foregoing, we conclude that the commission is not authorized to award punitive damages.25 The Court of Appeal therefore erred in affirming the judgment of the trial court.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. The Court of Appeal is directed to enter judgment reversing the trial court and directing it to issue a writ of mandate commanding Commission to vacate and set aside that part of its decision awarding Olander punitive damages and thereafter to take such further action not inconsistent with this opinion as it deems appropriate.
Lucas, C. J., Mosk, J., Arguelles, J., Eagleson, J., and Kaufman, J., concurred.
Dyna-Med, [Inc. (Dyna-Med),] supported by amic[i] Merchants and Manufacturers Association (MMA) [and others],2 set forth multiple challenges to the [Fair Employment and Housing] Commission‘s [(Commission)] authority to award punitive damages. In essence, they contend [the Fair Employment and Housing Act‘s (FEHA [or act)] language and legislative history preclude awarding punitive damages at the agency level. They stress the statutory language, construed according to settled rules of statutory construction, does not empower the Commission to award punitive damages but limits it to remedial action designed to effectuate the underlying purposes of the act. Absent express legislative authorization, they argue it is the settled rule an administrative agency may not lawfully impose a penalty, whether civil or criminal in character.
Moreover, emphasizing the similarity between the language of
Applying the rules of construction summarized in Honey Springs Homeowners Assn. v. Board of Supervisors (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 1122, 1136 [-1137], fn. 11 [203 Cal.Rptr. 886], we [must] interpret the FEHA to ascertain and effectuate the purpose of the law, attempting to give effect to the usual and ordinary import of the statutory language; harmonizing any provision within the context of the statutory framework as a whole; seeking a reasonable and commonsense interpretation consistent with the apparent legislative purpose and intent, practical rather than technical in character and upon application resultant of wise policy rather than absurdity; and, considering generally the context, the object in view, the evils to be remedied, the history of the times, legislation upon the same subject, public policy and contemporaneous construction.
The [Fair Employment Practice Act (FEPA[)] was enacted in 1959 and recodified in 1980 as part of the FEHA. The FEHA sets forth a comprehensive scheme for combating employment discrimination, recognizing “the need to protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons to seek and hold employment free from discrimination. (
The FEHA establishes the Department [of Fair Employment and Housing (the Department)] (
[My] conclusion [that] the Commission is empowered to award punitive damages arises from the statutory authority summarized above. It is undisputed an administrative agency‘s power to award such damages must arise from express statutory authorization. Here, the Legislature delegated broad authority to the Commission to fashion appropriate remedies for unlawful employment practices in
Contrary to Dyna-Med‘s assertions, imposing punitive damages for deliberate violations is designed to effectively eliminate discriminatory employment practices. Potential liability for punitive damages is a substantial incentive for employers to eliminate, or refrain from committing, unlawful employment practices. Further, the possibility of “punitive damages may enhance the willingness of persons charged with violations to offer fair settlements during the conciliation process. [Fn. omitted.]” (Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 32 Cal.3d 211, 218.) Moreover, such damages are designed not only to punish the wrongdoer, but also to set an example to deter others from similar conduct.
The facts of this case prove ordinary restitutionary remedies are oftеn ineffective in eliminating discriminatory practices. Awards of back pay are frequently insignificant because interim earnings are deducted or offset. Also, the value of reinstatement may be negligible because by the time employment discrimination cases are resolved, the plaintiff has had to find another job. Upgrading, back pay and reinstatement in cases of retaliation may not be effective deterrents or satisfactory remedies for complainants because the original work environment may no longer be conducive to continued employment. Consequently, in light of the limited remedial effect of these permissible compensatory remedies, the award of punitive damages may be the only method of fulfilling the purposes of the act, including encouraging plaintiffs to seek relief by increasing their potential recovery
Although the language of
Dyna-Med argues applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis to
Properly analyzed, these rules do not sustain Dyna-Med‘s proffered statutory construction. These principles are mere guides to determining legislative intent and will not be applied to defeat the underlying legislative intent. (Cal. State Employees’ Assn. v. Regents of University of California (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 667, 670 [73 Cal.Rptr. 449]; Claiborne v. Illinois Central Railroad, supra, 401 F.Supp. 1022, 1026.) Moreover, in evaluating legisla-
Dyna-Med next argues the underlying legislative history of the FEHA, and specifically
The cited language of
In 1969, the word “affirmative” preceding the word “action” was removed from
Critical differences between the
Dyna-Med‘s reliance on
[][T]he FEHA provides alternative avenues of relief through either the administrative or the judicial process. As already explained, both procedures commence with the filing of a complaint with the Department. (
In Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 32 Cal.3d 211, 221, this [] Court held compensatory and punitive damages are available to persons who “elect” the judicial avenue of relief under the FEHA.15 Thus, an anomaly arises if punitive damages are not likewise available within the administrative avenue of relief. As Justice Richardson pointed out in his dissent in Commodore, supra, at pages 222-223, “it would be wholly anomalous to allow punitive damages to accusors [sic] who have been unsuccessful administratively before the commission, but to deny such damages to those whose claims have been successfully established. The result of any such disparity of remedy would be to encourage [claimants to file insufficient or inadequate] complaints with the commission in order to avoid or circumvent administrative proceedings in the hope of obtaining punitive damages in subsequent civil actions. Such a consequence would be contrary to FEHA‘s policy of eliminating employment discrimination through administrative ‘conference, conciliation, and persuasion.’ (
Moreover, if the Commission is prohibited from awarding punitive damages while courts are free to do so, the underlying purposes of the administrative avenue of adjudication will be undermined. The Commission was created to interpret and implement the act and concomitantly to develop expertise in employment discrimination practices in California. (See
Further, the Commission is authorized to interpret the FEHA both by regulation (
Dyna-Med next argues the express authorization in
In 1959, when the FEPA was enacted, the Legislature also enacted the Hawkins Act (former
As the foregoing history illustratеs, although both the housing and employment discrimination statutes are now contained within a single act, the FEHA, they followed different legislative routes of treatment resulting in totally separate, original enactments. The Legislature has consistently placed limitations on remedies available in the housing context while at the same time granting the Commission broad discretion to fashion appropriate awards in the employment context. Consequently, because the limitation on recovery within the housing context in
Further, [this] construction of the FEHA coincides with public policy. The public commitment to eliminate discrimination as explicitly set forth in
Dyna-Med next contends the absence of procedural safeguards existing within the judicial system requires a conclusion punitive damages not be available in administrative proceedings. [I] recognize there may be differences in general procedure, rules of evidence, discovery, etc. However, the Commission is expressly permitted to award punitive damages in hous-
Finally, Dyna-Med direly predicts giving the Commission authority to award punitive damages will open a Pandora‘s Box concerning the authority of administrative agencies generally to award punitive damages. However, although many administrative agencies are governed by the APA, it is the FEHA, not the APA, which gives the Commission the authority to order “such action . . . as, in the judgment of the commission [,] will effectuate the purposes” of the FEHA (
