ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF WASHINGTON v. JOHN DOE, ET AL.
Nos. 9 & 10; Misc. No. 2
In the Supreme Court of Maryland
February 3, 2025
September Term, 2024
The Constitution of Maryland prohibits all legislation that retroactively abrogates vested property rights without just compensation. There is a vested property right in a cause of action that has accrued, but there is no vested right to be free of liability upon the expiration of an ordinary statute of limitations. An ordinary statute of limitations is a procedural device intended to encourage the prompt resolution of claims and promote fairness by requiring suit to be filed while evidence is still likely to be available and untainted by the passage of time. It reflects a legislative determination to block access to a remedy for a cause of action that otherwise continues to exist after a designated period, not to absolve defendants from accountability.
VESTED RIGHT - STATUTE OF REPOSE - ART. 24, MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS - ART. III, § 40, CONSTITUTION OF MARYLAND
Unlike statutes of limitations, statutes of repose create a substantive right protecting a defendant from liability after a legislatively determined period. They do not merely render a remedy to a cause of action unavailable; they eliminate the cause of action itself. Statutes of repose therefore create a substantive immunity from liability that is not a mere byproduct of a desire to promote swift and fair resolution of claims and avoid unfairness in the prosecution of stale claims. Upon the running of a statute of repose, a defendant protected by such a statute has a vested right to be free of liability.
In 2017, the General Assembly enacted legislation that, among other things, altered an existing time restriction applicable to filing child sexual abuse claims and established a new time restriction. The new provision stated that “[i]n no event” may a civil action for child sexual abuse be filed against a defendant not alleged to have been the perpetrator of the abuse “more than 20 years after the date on which the victim reaches the age of majority.” In 2023, the General Assembly enacted the Child Victims Act of 2023. That law eliminated all time restrictions applicable to child sexual abuse claims, including the new provision that had been added in 2017. The new provision in the 2017 law was an ordinary statute of limitations, the expiration of which did not give rise to a vested right to be free of liability. Accordingly, the Child Victims Act of 2023, which eliminated that 2017 statute of limitations, did not retroactively abrogate vested rights in violation of the Constitution of Maryland and the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
Heightened rational basis review is the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to a statute that retroactively resurrects a remedy that had previously been precluded by a statute of limitations. Under heightened rational basis review, a court does not accept any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the challenged legislation, but rather will consider only those purposes that are obvious from the text or legislative history of the enactment, those plausibly identified by the litigants, or those provided by some other authoritative source. The legislation will be upheld only if it bears a real and substantial relation to the problem addressed by the statute. The Child Victims Act of 2023 bears a real and substantial relation to the problem addressed by the Act.
Circuit Court for Harford County Case No. C-12-CV-23-000767
United States District Court for the District of Maryland Case No. 1:23-cv-02662-MJM
Argued: September 10, 2024
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF WASHINGTON
v.
JOHN DOE, ET AL.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF HARFORD COUNTY, ET AL.
v.
JOHN DOE
THE KEY SCHOOL, INC., ET AL.
v.
VALERIE BUNKER
Fader, C.J., Watts, Booth, Biran, Eaves, Killough, McDonald, Robert N. (Senior Justice, Specially Assigned), JJ.
Opinion by Fader, C.J.
Biran, Eaves, and McDonald, JJ., dissent.
Filed: February 3, 2025
In 2017, the General Assembly enacted legislation that, among other things, established a new time restriction applicable to filing child sexual abuse claims. The new provision stated that “[i]n no event” may a civil action for child sexual abuse be filed against a defendant not alleged to have been the perpetrator of the abuse “more than 20 years after the date on which the victim reaches the age of majority.” 2017 Md. Laws, Ch. 12, § 1; 2017 Md. Laws, Ch. 656, § 1.
In 2023, the General Assembly enacted the Child Victims Act of 2023. That law eliminated all time restrictions applicable to child sexual abuse claims, including the new provision that had been added in 2017.
Following the effective date of the Child Victims Act, alleged survivors of childhood sexual abuse have filed numerous claims that were previously time-barred. Before this Court, three defendants in such lawsuits contend that the 2023 General Assembly lacked the authority to eliminate time restrictions that had already run. The parties’ respective arguments focus on (1) whether the new time restriction in the 2017 law was a statute of limitations or a statute of repose, and (2) whether either or both types of restriction create a vested right to be free of liability.
We hold that the relevant provision of the 2017 law created a statute of limitations and that the running of a statute of limitations does not establish a vested right to be free
BACKGROUND
A. Legal Background
At issue are civil claims for damages arising out of alleged incidents of sexual abuse that occurred while the alleged victim was a minor, which we will refer to as “child sexual abuse claims.” Until 2003, the only time restriction applicable to child sexual abuse claims was the generally applicable three-year statute of limitations on civil claims that is currently set forth in
As early as 1994, the General Assembly considered establishing a longer limitations period for child sexual abuse claims. Id. It first did so in 2003 when it adopted
First, it extended the existing seven-year limitations period in
Second, in a new
Third, in a new
In no event may an action for damages arising out of an alleged incident or incidents of sexual abuse that occurred while the victim was a minor be filed against a person or governmental entity that is not the alleged perpetrator more than 20 years after the date on which the victim reaches the age of majority.
Fourth, the 2017 Act exempted child sexual abuse claims from the notice provisions of both the Local Government Tort Claims Act and the Maryland Tort Claims Act.4
The 2017 Act became effective on October 1, 2017.
In 2023, the General Assembly passed the Child Victims Act of 2023, 2023 Md. Laws, Ch. 6, which we will refer to as the “2023 Act.” As relevant here, the 2023 Act also contained four categories of changes.
First, the 2023 Act amended
Second, the 2023 Act deleted the heightened requirements to obtain an award of damages against a non-perpetrator defendant for lawsuits filed more than seven years after the alleged victim reaches the age of majority.
Third, the 2023 Act established limits on damages awards available in child sexual abuse cases. The Act permitted greater awards of damages against governmental entities, up to $890,000 per claimant, than are available for most other types of claims.5
Fourth, the 2023 Act permitted a party to take an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss a child sexual abuse claim on the ground
The 2023 Act became effective on October 1, 2023.
B. Factual and Procedural Background
After the 2023 Act went into effect, numerous adult plaintiffs whose claims had been time-barred before October 1, 2023 filed child sexual abuse claims in State and federal courts in Maryland. Three cases are at issue here.
1. Case No. 9, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington v. Doe
Plaintiffs proceeding under pseudonyms filed a putative class action in the Circuit Court for Prince George‘s County seeking to hold the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington liable for alleged sexual and emotional abuse by clergy. The Archbishop moved to dismiss. The circuit court denied the motion based on its determination that Subsection (d) established a statute of limitations, not a statute of repose, and so did not give rise to vested rights. The Archbishop noted an interlocutory appeal and the parties jointly petitioned for certiorari, which this Court granted. Roman Cath. Archbishop of Washington v. Doe, 487 Md. 196 (2024).
2. Case Misc. No. 2, The Key School, Inc. v. Bunker
Ms. Valerie Bunker filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland seeking to hold The Key School, Inc. and The Key School Building Finance Corporation (collectively, “The Key School“) liable for alleged sexual and emotional abuse by The Key School teachers between 1973 and 1977. Ms. Bunker moved
3. Case No. 10, Board of Education of Harford County v. Doe
A plaintiff proceeding under the pseudonym John Doe sued the Board of Education of Harford County and several individuals in the Circuit Court for Harford County, seeking to hold the defendants liable for alleged sexual abuse by a teacher and a custodian. The Board moved to dismiss. The circuit court denied the motion based on its determination that Subsection (d) established a statute of limitations, not a statute of repose, and so did not give rise to vested rights. The Board noted an interlocutory appeal and petitioned for certiorari, which this Court granted. Bd. of Educ. of Harford County v. Doe, 487 Md. 196 (2024).
In all three cases, the underlying factual allegations establish that the claims would have been barred by Subsection (d) before the effective date of the 2023 Act. The question presented or certified in all three cases is the same:
Does the Maryland Child Victims Act of 2023, 2023 Md. Laws Ch. 5 (S.B. 686) (codified at
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-117 ), constitute an impermissible abrogation of a vested right in violation ofArticle 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and/orArticle III, Section 40 of the Maryland Constitution ?
DISCUSSION
I. STANDING OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF HARFORD COUNTY
Before we turn to the merits, we must address a threshold standing question in Case No. 10, which is whether the Board of Education of Harford County, as a subdivision of the State, has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the 2023 Act. The Board concedes that political subdivisions generally lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of State statutes. See Bd. of Educ. of Prince George‘s County v. Sec‘y of Personnel, 317 Md. 34, 44-45 (1989). However, the Board contends that several exceptions apply here, one of which is that “[w]here one party has standing, we do not inquire typically as to whether another party on the same side also has standing.” Anne Arundel County v. Bell, 442 Md. 539, 583 (2015).
The complaint against the Board names as additional defendants “John Does (1-10),” who are alleged to be Board employees who “employed, supervised, controlled and/or oversaw” the alleged perpetrators. The Board contends that it has a legal obligation to defend its employees, all of whom would have standing to contest the constitutionality of the 2023 Act.6 As a result, the Board asserts, the Court should not inquire into its standing.
The difficulty for the Board is that its John Doe co-defendants have not been served and joined as parties to the litigation. Although in an ordinary case that would prevent us from relying on the standing of those other would-be parties, this case is not ordinary. The procedural status in which this case is presented is due to the 2023 Act, in which the General Assembly encouraged the early resolution of constitutional challenges by permitting interlocutory appeals by “[a] party” from the denial of motions to dismiss. 2023 Act, § 1 (adding
II. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS, STATUTES OF REPOSE, AND VESTED RIGHTS
Over two decades ago, this Court surveyed more than a century of jurisprudence and held that the Constitution of Maryland prohibits all legislation that retroactively abrogates vested property rights without just compensation, no matter the circumstances.7
See Dua v. Comcast Cable of Maryland, Inc., 370 Md. 604, 623 (2002); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kim, 376 Md. 276, 296 (2003); Muskin v. State Dep‘t of Assessments & Tax‘n, 422 Md. 544, 557 & n.8 (2011); State v. Goldberg, 437 Md. 191, 204-05, 205 n.13 (2014); Ellis v. McKenzie, 457 Md. 323, 334-35 (2018).
None of the parties challenge the premise that the 2023 Act would be unconstitutional to the extent, if any, that it retroactively abrogates vested rights. Instead, they spar over whether the 2017 Act - specifically Subsection (d) - created vested rights. In doing so, their arguments focus on two questions: (1) whether Subsection (d) established a statute of repose or a statute of limitations; and (2) whether the running of either type of restriction period establishes a vested right in a defendant to be free of liability from a cause of action. The Institutions’ primary argument is that Subsection (d) established a statute of repose, the running of which creates a vested right in a prospective defendant not to be sued. In the alternative, they contend that the running of a statute of limitations has the same effect. The Plaintiffs’ primary argument is that Subsection (d) established a statute of limitations, the running of which does not create any vested rights. In the alternative,
We will begin by exploring differences between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose. We will then consider the nature of vested rights in Maryland jurisprudence, especially in the context of those two types of restrictions, to determine whether it matters which type Subsection (d) created. Because our answer will be that it does matter, we will then analyze which type of restriction period that subsection created.
A. Statutes of Limitations and Statutes of Repose
Civil statutes of limitations and statutes of repose are both time-based restrictions that can bar proceeding on a cause of action. CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 7 (2014) (“Statutes of limitations and statutes of repose both are mechanisms used to limit the temporal extent or duration of liability for tortious acts.“). As such, they have several overlapping features, such as establishing time periods within which certain types of actions must be filed after an identifiable triggering event. Although there are distinct features more commonly associated with one of these types of restriction than the other, the ability to blend features of each in a single statute means that it is not always easy to tell which one a legislative body intended to adopt.
A bit more than a decade ago, recognizing that our case law had been inconsistent in describing the two types of restrictions, we set out to analyze the typical distinctions between them and establish a framework for courts to use in distinguishing them. See Anderson v. United States, 427 Md. 99, 106 (2012). The issue in Anderson was whether
Purpose. A statute of limitations is typically adopted “to encourage prompt resolution of claims, to suppress stale claims, and to avoid the problems associated with extended delays in bringing a cause of action, including missing witnesses, faded memories, and the loss of evidence.” Id. at 118. Statutes of limitations thus “promote judicial economy and fairness[.]” Id. They are “enacted in an effort to balance the competing interests of potential plaintiffs, potential defendants, and the public.” Pennwalt Corp. v. Nasios, 314 Md. 433, 437 (1988). In doing so, they “are designed to (1) provide adequate time for diligent plaintiffs to file suit, (2) grant repose8 to defendants when
In contrast, “[t]he purpose of a statute of repose is to provide an absolute bar to an action or to provide a grant of immunity to a class of potential defendants after a designated time period.” Anderson, 427 Md. at 118. A statute of repose thus “shelters legislatively[ ]designated groups from an action after a certain period of time.” Id. “Statutes of repose are based on considerations of the economic best interests of the public as a whole[.]” First United Methodist Church of Hyattsville v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862, 866 (4th Cir. 1989). They represent principles, rather than expedients.
To be sure, “there is substantial overlap between the policies of the two types of statute[.]” Waldburger, 573 U.S. at 8. Both encourage plaintiffs to bring claims in a timely manner, provide some measure of repose to defendants, and are based on a balancing of the interests of the parties and society. But “each has a distinct purpose[.]” Id. Statutes of limitations are procedural mechanisms that require plaintiffs to pursue claims with
Operation. The different purposes of statutes of repose and statutes of limitations are reflected in differences in how each typically operates. Statutes of limitations are remedial or procedural devices that “do not create any substantive rights in a defendant to be free from liability.” Anderson, 427 Md. at 118. They therefore “are generally understood to extinguish the remedy for enforcing a right, not the right itself.” Park Plus, Inc. v. Palisades of Towson, LLC, 478 Md. 35, 54 (2022); see also First United Methodist Church, 882 F.2d at 866 (“A statute of limitations is a procedural device that operates as a defense to limit the remedy available from an existing cause of action.“). In other words, “[a] statute of limitations . . . neither creates a right of action nor pertains to the merits of a cause of action; rather, it regulates the plaintiff‘s exercise of that right.” Murphy v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 478 Md. 333, 375 (2022); see also Doe v. Roe, 419 Md. 687, 706 (2011) (contrasting “an ordinary statute of limitations,” which limits only a remedy, with a statute of limitations period that “is stipulated in a statute creating a cause of action,” which is “a
Statutes of repose, by contrast, “create a substantive right protecting a defendant from liability[.]” Anderson, 427 Md. at 120. They are the product of a legislative balancing of “the economic best interests of the public against the rights of potential plaintiffs,” to determine an amount of time “after which liability no longer exists.” Id. at 121; see also First United Methodist Church, 882 F.2d at 866 (stating that a statute of repose, unlike a statute of limitations, “is typically an absolute time limit beyond which liability no longer exists“). “Like a discharge from bankruptcy, a statute of repose can be said to provide a fresh start or freedom from liability.” Waldburger, 573 U.S. at 9. The running of a statute
Trigger. Statutes of limitations and statutes of repose are also distinguished by their respective triggering events. Id. at 118. The trigger for a statute of limitations is “typically . . . the accrual of a claim,” which is most often the occurrence or discovery of injury. Id. By contrast, the trigger for a statute of repose is “unrelated to when the injury or discovery of the injury occurs.” Id. at 118-19. That trigger is an unrelated “event, act, or omission,” id., often “the last culpable act or omission of the defendant,” Waldburger, 573 U.S. at 8. Because the trigger for a statute of repose is unrelated to accrual, such a statute may even extinguish a “right to bring a claim before the cause of action accrues.” Anderson, 427 Md. at 119.
“In common parlance, statutes of limitation[s] and statutes of repose are differentiated consistently and confidently by whether the triggering event is an injury or an unrelated event; the latter applying to a statute of repose.” Id.; see also Mathews v. Cassidy Turley Maryland, Inc., 435 Md. 584, 611-12 (2013) (“The chief feature of a statute of repose is that it runs from a date that is unrelated to the date of injury, whereas a statute of limitations always runs from the time the wrong is complete and actionable - and injury is always the final element of a wrong.“). Thus, in Anderson, we identified the triggers as the “key difference” between two statutes of repose on the one hand,
Tolling. Also reflective of their different purposes, statutes of limitations are generally subject to tolling during the plaintiff‘s minority and for fraudulent concealment, while statutes of repose are not. Id. at 118. The United States Supreme Court referred to this as a “central distinction between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose [that] underscores their differing purposes.” Waldburger, 573 U.S. at 9 (“Statutes of limitations, but not statutes of repose, are subject to equitable tolling,” whereas statutes of repose “generally may not be tolled, even in cases of extraordinary circumstances beyond a plaintiff‘s control.“). The difference arises because the “main thrust” of a statute of
Recognizing the “overlapping features” of statutes of repose and statutes of limitations, and the numerous and varied definitions in the case law of each, we concluded in Anderson that “[t]here is, apparently, no hard and fast rule to use as a guide” in determining whether a particular statute creates one versus the other. 427 Md. at 123. We concluded that it was therefore inappropriate to rely on any single feature of a restriction,
In Anderson, we recognized that the underlying legislative purpose was to help stem a crisis in the availability of medical malpractice insurance by cutting off claims against medical professionals after a certain period—providing repose to those defendants—which favored interpreting the provision as a statute of repose. Id. at 124. However, applying our holistic approach, we refused to give that purpose dispositive weight. Id. at 125. Instead, we stated that our reading would be controlled “[f]irst and foremost[ by] the plain language of the statute[.]” Id. at 125.
Turning to that plain language, we focused primarily on the trigger: the General Assembly‘s choice to run the statutory period from the victim‘s injury, rather than the medical professional‘s act or omission. Based largely on that feature, we concluded that the Legislature “chose . . . to adopt a statute of limitations.” Id. To support that conclusion, we also looked to (1) statutory history, which revealed that the General Assembly considered and rejected a legislative change that would have “put in place a strict statute of repose,” and (2) the General Assembly‘s choice to expressly allow tolling for fraudulent concealment. Id. at 125-26.
In sum, a statute of limitations is a remedial or procedural mechanism to encourage the diligent prosecution of claims and protect against unfairness and complication associated with stale claims by making a remedy unavailable to a plaintiff after a certain period. As such, a statute of limitations is ordinarily triggered by the accrual of a plaintiff‘s
B. Vested Rights Jurisprudence
Having explored differences between the two types of restriction periods, we now consider whether it ultimately matters how Subsection (d) is classified. The answer turns on whether either or both restrictions create a vested right to be free of liability upon the running of the prescribed period. As to both statutes of limitations and statutes of repose, this is a question of first impression in Maryland.
1. Vested Rights in Tangible Property and Contracts
As an initial matter, “substantive rights” and “vested rights” are not synonyms. As we have explained, “[a] law is substantive if it creates rights, duties and obligations, while a remedial or procedural law simply prescribes the methods of enforcement of those rights.” Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 419 (2000) (alteration in original) (quoting 2 Norman J. Singer, Sutherland‘s Statutory Construction § 41.09, at 56 (1999 Supp.)).
“A vested right is ‘something more than a mere expectation based on the anticipated continuance of the existing law; it must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enjoyment of a property.‘” Muskin v. State Dep‘t of Assessments & Tax‘n, 422 Md. 544, 560 (2011) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kim, 376 Md. 276, 298 (2003)). Our case law has identified vested rights most frequently in connection with tangible property interests and present contractual rights, including in:
- the ownership of real property, Thistle v. Frostburg Coal Co., 10 Md. 129, 144-45 (1856) (finding unconstitutional the retroactive application of an alteration in the law of adverse possession that would have resulted in the transfer of real property); Berrett v. Oliver, 7 G. & J. 191, 206-07 (Md. 1835) (finding void the retroactive application of a statute vacating and annulling deeds);
- the property rights of a ground rent owner, Muskin, 422 Md. at 560;
- the right to property devised in a will upon the testator‘s death, Remington v. Metro. Sav. Bank of Balt., 76 Md. 546, 547-48 (1893); Garrison v. Hill, 81 Md. 551, 557 (1895); Wilderman v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 8 Md. 551, 556 (1855);
- rights created by valid deeds of trust, Dryfoos v. Hostetter, 268 Md. 396, 408 (1973) (holding that it would be unconstitutional to permit a curative statute to
give priority to a defective deed of trust over that of proper deeds of trust, even though the latter were originally intended to have lower priority); - rights created by existing contracts, State, use of Isaac v. Jones, 21 Md. 432, 437 (1864) (stating that the “abrogation or suspension of a remedy, necessary to enforce the obligation of an existing contract, . . . is . . . void“);
- the right in the continuing invalidity of a void deed, Grove v. Todd, 41 Md. 633, 642 (1875);
- the right to receipt of a sum of money owed, Bramble v. State, use of Twilley, 41 Md. 435, 442 (1875); and
- the right to maintain the settled consequences of completed financial transactions, see, e.g., Vytar Assocs. v. Mayor & Aldermen of City of Annapolis, 301 Md. 558, 574 (1984) (holding invalid the retroactive application of legislation imposing rental dwelling license fees); Washington Nat‘l Arena, 287 Md. at 55 (holding unconstitutional the retroactive application of a statute increasing property tax rates); Cooper v. Wicomico County, 284 Md. 576, 584 (1979) (holding unconstitutional statutory attempts to retroactively increase amounts payable under prior worker‘s compensation awards).
The asserted right at issue here is to be free from liability for past alleged tortious conduct. The Institutions argue that this asserted right is analogous to a plaintiff‘s right in an accrued cause of action, which this Court has long recognized as a vested right, see, e.g., Dua, 370 Md. at 633; Muskin, 422 Md. at 561-62, albeit one that is “not as important” as vested real property and contractual rights, see Muskin, 422 Md. at 561-62 (stating that “[v]ested causes of action . . . are not as important as the vested real property and contractual rights which have been almost sacrosanct in our history“). Accordingly, we turn next to our case law addressing vested rights in accrued causes of action.
2. Vested Rights in an Accrued Cause of Action
An accrued cause of action or “chose in action” is a form of property. Hoffman Chevrolet, Inc. v. Washington Co. Nat‘l Savings Bank, 297 Md. 691, 701 n.4 (1983). We
As support for our conclusion that “there normally is a vested property right in a cause of action which has accrued prior to the legislative action,” we relied primarily on
We also relied on our decision in Williar v. Baltimore Butchers’ Loan & Annuity Association, 45 Md. 546 (1877), in which we held that the General Assembly could not retroactively eliminate a borrower‘s accrued cause of action to recover interest. Dua, 370 Md. at 636-38; Williar, 45 Md. at 560 (“A vested right of action is property in the same sense in which tangible things are property, and is equally protected against arbitrary interference.” (quoting Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union 362 (3d ed. 1874))).
In sum, Dua and the cases on which it relies stand for the proposition that there is a vested right in an accrued cause of action. But the constitutional protection even for an accrued cause of action—an existing, actionable property right—extends only to ensuring
3. Vested Rights and Statutes of Limitations
This Court has never squarely addressed whether reviving a claim that is time-barred by an ordinary statute of limitations abrogates a vested right. We have, however, made a handful of statements that have been interpreted by some as weighing in on that issue. We will begin with those.
First, although the issue in Dua was whether the General Assembly could retroactively abolish accrued causes of action, our predecessors also observed, in dicta, that “[t]his Court has consistently held that the Maryland Constitution ordinarily precludes the Legislature . . . from retroactively creating a cause of action, or reviving a barred cause of action, thereby violating the vested right of the defendant.” 370 Md. at 633. The Institutions interpret the reference to “reviving a barred cause of action” as including the revival of a claim barred by an ordinary statute of limitations. We interpret it differently.
The relevant portion of our predecessors’ observation in Dua was based on Smith v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 266 Md. 52 (1972). The issue in Smith was whether a retroactive expansion of the statute of limitations embedded in the wrongful death statute was constitutional as applied to a claim that was time-barred before the expansion took effect. Id. at 55. In determining that it was not, our rationale turned on the special character
Second, following Dua, in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Kim, 376 Md. 276 (2003), we repeated the same observation we made in Dua in analyzing whether the General Assembly‘s retroactive abrogation of the parent-child immunity doctrine in motor vehicle tort cases “ha[d], in effect, retroactively created a cause of action and thereby violated a vested right of Allstate.” 376 Md. 276, 296 (2003). We ultimately adopted the view that the General Assembly‘s change did not abrogate a vested right because the right to assert the immunity doctrine as a defense to liability did not vest until a lawsuit was filed in which the defense
Third, in Doe v. Roe, 419 Md. 687 (2011), we interpreted the General Assembly‘s 2003 expansion of the limitations period for child sexual abuse claims from three years to seven years. 419 Md. 687, 689 (2011). Concluding that the statutory change was remedial, we held that it should be interpreted to apply retroactively to a claim for which the prior limitations period had not yet expired as of the effective date of the change. Id. at 703. In dicta, we stated that we “would be faced with a different situation entirely” if the plaintiff‘s “claim had been barred under the [prior] three-year limitations period” as of the effective date of the change. Id. at 707. In a footnote to that sentence, we observed that even “a remedial or procedural statute may not be applied retroactively if it will interfere with vested or substantive rights.” Id. at 707 n.18 (quoting Rawlings v. Rawlings, 362 Md. 535, 559 (2001)). However, because the issue was not presented, we “express[ed] no holding” on it. Id. at 707.
In sum, this Court has never had occasion to determine whether the expiration of an
Our case law has long recognized that an ordinary statute of limitations is addressed only to the remedy for a cause of action, not the cause of action itself. See discussion above at 14-15. It follows that the cause of action continues to exist and to be subject to legislative regulation.15 Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (stating that a
We recognize that some parties, after receiving a “certain degree of repose” from a statute of limitations, Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296 Md. 656, 665 (1983), may
Notably, however, it is relatively rare for the General Assembly to extend an existing limitations period, and extremely rare, perhaps unprecedented, for it to retroactively eliminate one. Doing so has serious implications for the fairness of cases in which defendants may lack access to evidence to assess the claims against them or mount a defense. See Pennwalt Corp., 314 Md. at 455 (“The inconvenience and unfairness to defendants that occur because of delay in bringing suit is primarily due to the loss of evidence, fading of memories, and disappearance of witnesses.“). As such, it is reasonable to expect the General Assembly to tread very carefully when considering the retroactive application of an expansion or elimination of a statute of limitations, and to do so only to advance substantial interests. We will have more to say on that later.
4. Vested Rights and Statutes of Repose
We reach a different conclusion with respect to whether the running of a statute of repose creates a vested right in a defendant. Statutes of repose create substantive rights with the purpose of protecting the defendant from liability. Anderson, 427 Md. at 120. And they do not merely render a remedy to a cause of action unavailable; they eliminate the cause of action itself. Id. at 119-20. They therefore create a substantive immunity that is the very purpose of the restriction, not a byproduct of a desire to promote the swift resolution of claims and to avoid unfairness in the prosecution of stale claims.
In sum: (a) the Constitution of Maryland prohibits the retroactive abrogation of a vested right; (b) the running of an ordinary limitations period does not provide a potential defendant with a vested right in remaining free from liability; but (c) the running of a statute of repose period provides a potential defendant with a vested right in remaining free from liability. Accordingly, we must now resolve whether Subsection (d) established a statute of limitations or a statute of repose.
1. Principles of Statutory Construction
Determining whether Subsection (d) of the 2017 Act established a statute of limitations or a statute of repose requires an exercise in statutory construction. As we stated recently in Westminster Management, LLC v. Smith:
The goal of statutory construction is to discern and carry out the intent of the Legislature. Our search for legislative intent begins with the text of the provision we are interpreting, viewed not in isolation but within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs. Our review of the text is wholistic, seeking to give effect to all of what the General Assembly included and not to add anything that the General Assembly omitted. In our analysis of statutory text, we therefore take the language as we find it, neither adding to nor deleting from it; we avoid forced or subtle interpretations; and we avoid constructions that would negate portions of the language or render them meaningless. When statutory terms are undefined, we often look to dictionary definitions as a starting point, to identify the ordinary and popular meaning of the terms, before broadening our analysis to consider the other language of the provisions in which the terms appear and the statutory scheme as a whole, including any legislative purpose that is discernible from the statutory text. Presuming the General Assembly intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law, we also seek to reconcile and harmonize the parts of a statute, to the extent possible consistent with the statute‘s object and scope.
After exhausting the tools available for our textual analysis, viewed in context of the statutory scheme and in light of apparent legislative purpose, we determine whether the statute is ambiguous. Ambiguity can arise in two different ways: Where the words of a statute are ambiguous and subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, or where the words are clear and unambiguous when viewed in isolation, but become ambiguous when read as part of a larger statutory scheme. If neither applies, our inquiry generally ceases at that point and we apply the statute as written. If, however, the statute is ambiguous, we seek to resolve the ambiguity by searching for legislative intent in other indicia, including the history of the legislation or other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the legislative process. Such sources include the derivation of the statute, comments and explanations
regarding it by authoritative sources during the legislative process, and amendments proposed or added to it. Finally, in every case, the statute must be given a reasonable interpretation, not one that is absurd, illogical, or incompatible with common sense. When one interpretation of statutory language would produce such a result, we will reject that interpretation in favor of another that does not suffer the same flaw.
486 Md. 616, 644-46 (2024) (footnote, internal citations and quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
2. Plain Language and Context
The language we are interpreting is Subsection (d), which provided:
In no event may an action for damages arising out of an alleged incident or incidents of sexual abuse that occurred while the victim was a minor be filed against a person or governmental entity that is not the alleged perpetrator more than 20 years after the date on which the victim reaches the age of majority.
We are interested in other language in the 2017 Act but only to the extent it informs the proper interpretation of Subsection (d), because it is Subsection (d) that established the restriction period whose nature we must determine.
The Institutions’ plain language argument is primarily focused on the General Assembly‘s use of the terms “statute of repose” and “repose” in other, uncodified provisions in the 2017 Act in reference to the period created in Subsection (d). Our analysis in Anderson, by contrast, focuses on the plain language of the operative provisions of the statute, specifically as they relate to distinguishing features of statutes of limitations and statutes of repose. Our plain language analysis is ordinarily focused on what a statute does,
Subsection (d) contains three reasonably straightforward components. The opening phrase, “[i]n no event,” establishes that this provision occupies a position of precedence. The provision itself does not say precedence over what, although, as we will see, subsection (b) is expressly made subject to Subsection (d). Subsection (d) then identifies what it regulates, which is the filing of child sexual abuse claims. And finally, the provision identifies what it accomplishes with respect to such claims, which is to preclude their filing against non-perpetrator defendants more than 20 years after the alleged victim reaches the age of majority.
Of course, we interpret Subsection (d) in context, not in isolation. Nationstar Mortg. LLC v. Kemp, 476 Md. 149, 169 (2021). We begin with the context provided by other operative provisions of
- First, in subsection (b), the Act modified the sole existing restriction period to provide that child sexual abuse claims could be filed (1) before the alleged victim reaches the age of majority, or (2) “subject to subsections (c) and (d),” within the later of 20 years after the alleged victim reaches the age of majority or three years after the defendant is convicted of certain related crimes.
- Second, in a new subsection (c), the Act imposed heightened requirements to obtain damages against non-perpetrator defendants in claims filed more than seven years after the alleged victim reaches the age of majority, including proof of a duty of care and gross negligence.
- First, § 3 provides: “AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That the statute of repose under § 5-117(d) of the Courts Article as enacted by Section 1 of this Act shall be construed to apply both prospectively and retroactively to provide repose to defendants regarding actions that were barred by the application of the period of limitations applicable before October 1, 2017.”
- Second, the statement of purpose provides, as relevant here, that the Act was: “FOR the purpose of altering the statute of limitations in certain civil actions relating to child sexual abuse; establishing a statute of repose for certain civil actions relating to child sexual abuse . . . .”19
Unlike the codified provisions, these uncodified provisions expressly refer to a “statute of repose,” with § 3 tying that reference directly to Subsection (d).20
Our plain language analysis of Subsection (d), considered in relevant context, must be carried out in relation to our goal, which is to determine whether the General Assembly
Purpose. A statute of limitations serves primarily to encourage prompt resolution of claims and avoid elements of unfairness associated with the delayed prosecution of claims, including missing witnesses, faded memories, and the loss of evidence. Id. at 118.
The Institutions point to two features of Subsection (d) that they contend demonstrate an intent to create “an absolute bar” to causes of action against a specific “class of potential defendants.” First, they argue that the opening words, “[i]n no event,” suggest an intent to create an absolute bar. We agree to the limited extent that “[i]n no event” suggests that the provisions of Subsection (d) were to take precedence over any competing provisions that were more permissive. But “[i]n no event” is most naturally read as an expression of the order of precedence of co-existing statutory provisions—i.e., with former subsection (b), which is expressly made “subject to” Subsection (d). That is consistent with both a statute of limitations and a statute of repose. The phrase does not suggest that the limitation in Subsection (d) was intended to be permanent, with effects that could not be altered by a future General Assembly.
Second, the Institutions point out that although subsection (b) applied to all defendants, Subsection (d) applied only to non-perpetrator defendants, which they contend is a specific “class of potential defendants” carved out for special protection. We disagree. The category of non-perpetrator defendants is distinguished only by the role those in it are alleged to have played in the alleged abuse. To be sure, non-perpetrator defendants may
Operation. A statute of limitations typically makes a remedy for a cause of action unavailable, while a statute of repose eliminates the cause of action itself. See discussion above at 14-15. The plain language of Subsection (d) operated like a typical statute of limitations, in that it prohibited the filing of a child sexual abuse claim after expiration of the statutory period—“In no event may [a child sexual abuse claim] be filed . . .“—without
Trigger. Statutes of limitations are typically triggered by the accrual of the plaintiff‘s claim, which generally accompanies the plaintiff‘s injury or discovery of injury. Statutes of repose are typically triggered by something entirely unrelated to accrual, often an act or omission of the defendant or an event relevant to the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant. See discussion above at 16-17. In Subsection (d), the trigger was the alleged victim reaching the age of majority. The Institutions contend that trigger is consistent with a statute of repose because it is unrelated to the alleged victim‘s injury. The Plaintiffs argue that the trigger is consistent with a statute of limitations because it effectively runs from the date of injury, while incorporating Maryland‘s minority-tolling rule.
On balance, the Plaintiffs have the better of the argument. At first blush, a victim reaching the age of majority seems unrelated to both that victim‘s injury or discovery of injury and any act or omission of the defendant. However, unlike most other causes of action, child sexual abuse, by definition, can be committed only against a minor. And as all parties acknowledge, a claim for child sexual abuse accrues at the time of the abuse. Accordingly, where tolling is recognized, the date on which a potential plaintiff reaches the age of majority is the date when an accrual-based statute of limitations may begin to run. The trigger in Subsection (d) thus functioned as an accrual-based trigger with built-in
A trigger that is truly unrelated to the alleged victim‘s injury might, in this context, be the date on which the defendant ceased having any supervisory authority or control over the alleged perpetrator or ceased having any duty of care for the alleged victim.24 Cf. CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 7 (2014) (stating that a statute of repose is measured “from the date of the last culpable act or omission of the defendant“). Those triggers are both unrelated to the injury and calculated to provide protection to defendants within a certain period of time after their own involvement with the underlying circumstances ended, akin to the trigger in the statutes of repose in
In sum, the statutory features we identified in Anderson weigh in favor of a conclusion that Subsection (d) was a statute of limitations.
Beyond the Features. The Institutions rely on the statement of purpose and § 3 of the 2017 Act as establishing that Subsection (d) was, in fact, a statute of repose. The former identifies a purpose of the Act as “establishing a statute of repose,” and further identifies a separate purpose of “altering the statute of limitations.” Even more directly, § 3 refers to “the statute of repose under § 5-117(d)” and states that it shall be construed to “provide repose to defendants regarding actions that were barred by the application of the period of limitations applicable before October 1, 2017.” The Institutions argue that those references are clear indications that the General Assembly intended to enact a statute of repose as distinct from a statute of limitations.
We agree that these references strongly support the Institutions’ position that the General Assembly intended Subsection (d) to create a statute of repose. But, of course, we do not consider them in isolation, and there are several reasons to question whether that label accurately reflected the General Assembly‘s intent. Most significantly, as already discussed, the key features of Subsection (d) are more typical of a statute of limitations, suggesting that whatever the 2017 General Assembly thought a “statute of repose” is when
Moreover, although we ordinarily afford terms in legislative enactments their common, ordinary meaning, Comptroller v. FC-GEN Operations Invs. LLC, 482 Md. 343, 390 (2022), it is not clear that there is a common, ordinary meaning of “statute of repose,” or even “repose,” in this context. For example, neither Merriam-Webster‘s Collegiate Dictionary nor the New Oxford American Dictionary, two dictionaries we frequently consult, define “statute of repose.” They do, however, define “statute of limitations.” Statute of limitations, Merriam-Webster‘s Collegiate Dictionary 1220 (11th ed. 2014) (describing statute of limitations as “a statute assigning a certain time after which rights cannot be enforced by legal action or offenses cannot be punished“); Statute of limitations, New Oxford American Dictionary 1704 (3d ed. 2010) (defining statute of limitations as “a
The Institutions also point to the structure of the 2017 Act, which contains one 20-year limitations period in subsection (b)(2)(i), which all parties agree is a statute of limitations, and a separate 20-year period in Subsection (d). And, the Institutions point out, the limitations period in subsection (b)(2)(i) is expressly identified as being “[s]ubject
The Plaintiffs respond that the two provisions are not entirely duplicative under their interpretation. They point out that subsection (b)(2), which applies to both perpetrator and non-perpetrator defendants, allows for a limitations period longer than 20 years after the alleged victim reaches the age of majority if “the defendant is [later] convicted of a [certain] crime relating to the alleged incident or incidents[.]” The Plaintiffs contend that Subsection (d) eliminated the possibility of such an extended period for non-perpetrator defendants.
We do not need to resolve here whether the Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the interplay between subsections (b)(2) and (d) is correct. Even if it is, there would be only a narrow set of claims that would have been potentially permitted under subsection (b)(2) but restricted under Subsection (d) and far more straightforward ways of achieving that result.28 We agree with the Institutions that the apparent total or near total overlap between these two provisions, if both are interpreted to be statutes of limitations, suggests that the General Assembly did not intend for both of them to operate in the same way.29
In sum, our plain language analysis of the features of Subsection (d) weighs in favor of a determination that the General Assembly intended it to be a statute of limitations but references to Subsection (d) in the statement of purpose and § 3 as a statute of repose and elements of the structure of the statute weigh in the other direction. Because Subsection (d) becomes “ambiguous when read as part of a larger statutory scheme,” Bennett v. Harford County, 485 Md. 461, 485-86 (2023) (quoting Wheeling, 473 Md. at 377), we will consult legislative history for further evidence of the General Assembly‘s intent.30
3. Legislative History
A focus of the parties’ briefing is a compromise that was reached after the 2017 bills were first introduced. As originally introduced, the bills did not include a subsection (d). Instead, they would have created identical 20-years-after-majority limitations periods for alleged perpetrators and alleged non-perpetrators but with alleged perpetrators being potentially subject to a separate limitation period of three years after conviction. H.B. 642, 437th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2017); S.B. 505, 437th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2017). The initial drafts also would have precluded the award of damages against any non-perpetrator defendant for all claims—not only those filed more than seven years after the victim reached the age of majority—absent proof of: (1) actual knowledge of an
Initially, the Catholic Church neither supported nor opposed the bills. The Church acknowledged that the bills “reflect positive changes” from bills submitted in previous years but continued to have concerns. Some legislators expressed the different concern that the bill set too high a standard for alleged victims to recover damages against non-perpetrator defendants. S. Jud. Proc. Comm. Hearing on S.B. 505, 437th Gen. Assemb., Sess. 1. at 51:30-59:55 (Feb. 14, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/W73G-A6J7.
Ultimately, the General Assembly struck a compromise, extending the limitations period to 20 years and applying a heightened standard of proof to obtain damages, but only to claims against non-perpetrator defendants filed more than seven years after the alleged victim reached the age of majority. H. Jud. Comm. Hearing on H.B. 642, 437th Gen. Assemb., Sess. 1. at 35:59-36:27 (Mar. 15, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/2SGQ-4H5N. As the bill sponsor explained, that compromise served “to preserve an individual‘s rights and their voice and allow them to at least be able to face their accuser” by “extend[ing] the time [to] sue them in civil court,” while at the same time “rais[ing] the bar” for damages. Id. at 36:27-36:39, 39:57-40:02. A representative of the Maryland Catholic Conference testified that the bill represented a “very fair compromise.” Id. at 37:29-37:45. Referencing the heightened gross negligence standard, she noted that the bill “is a fair way of allowing those people to have their time in court while still being fair to
In the same version of the bill in which the General Assembly adopted that compromise, it added Subsection (d) and the references to it as a “statute of repose” in § 3 and the statement of purpose. Yet those changes are not referred to in the statements describing the compromise, in the records of committee hearings, or in seven of the eight sessions when the two chambers considered the legislation, with the only exception being a Senator‘s recitation of the purpose paragraph on the Senate Floor. Senate Floor Action, Mar. 23, 2017, at 2:16:46-2:17:26, available at https://perma.cc/RDG6-ZUXA.
The Institutions claim that the legislative history reflects an intent to enact a statute of repose in three categories of documents: (1) floor reports; (2) fiscal and policy notes; and (3) an unsigned and undated “Discussion” document. However, the floor reports include only the following recitation: “The bill establishes a ‘statute of repose’ prohibiting a person from filing an action for damages arising out of an alleged incident . . . of [childhood] sexual abuse . . . against a [third party] . . . more than 20 years after the date on which the victim reaches the age of majority.” That language, the substance of which would describe a statute of limitations at least as much as a statute of repose, sheds no light beyond the language of the statute. The fiscal and policy note prepared by the Department
The final paper on which the Institutions rely is an unsigned, undated, two-page document from the bill file titled “Discussion of certain amendments in SB0505[.]” Alone among everything else in the file, that document reflects an understanding of the distinctions between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose, including some of the distinctions we drew in Anderson. The document concludes, among other things, that the “statute of repose” in the 2017 Act would provide vested rights to defendants.
Recognizing the difficulty of reliance on a single, unsigned, undated, unexplained document, and lacking evidence that any legislator ever saw or discussed, much less read, it, the Institutions assert that we can rely on it as a dependable indicator of legislative intent because we have relied on similar documents in the past. The Institutions rely specifically on our opinion in Warfield v. State, in which we quoted a “handwritten note, undated and unidentified” in the bill file that identified the purpose of the legislation at issue. 315 Md. 474, 497-98 (1989). The quote from the note in Warfield, however, was located in a sparse, 22-page bill file that otherwise contains only official records generated by the General Assembly, the Department of Legislative Services, and the Attorney General.33 The other
Ultimately, what stands out most in the legislative history of the 2017 Act is the near complete absence of discussion of what a statute of repose is, of a legislative purpose consistent with such a statute, or of what the effect of enacting such a statute would be.35 Given the significance of enacting a true statute of repose, it is an understatement to say
4. Statutory History
Statutory history also favors the conclusion that Subsection (d) was a statute of limitations. See Blackstone v. Sharma, 461 Md. 87, 135 (2018) (“In addition to the legislative history, we will also look at the statute‘s relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation . . . [which] can assist this Court in narrowing the purpose and scope of the ambiguous statute.” (quotation marks omitted)). Just six years after unanimously passing
5. Subsection (d) Was a Statute of Limitations that Did Not Establish a Vested Right to Be Free of Liability
Elements of our analysis point to the conclusion that the General Assembly intended Subsection (d) to be a statute of repose. Most significantly, the General Assembly referred to it as a statute of repose in the statement of purpose and § 3 and differentiated it from another provision that it called a statute of limitations. However, the label the General Assembly chose to affix to the provision is not dispositive because it is inconsistent with the features established by the plain language of the provision, legislative history, and statutory history. Giving primacy to “the General Assembly‘s purpose and intent when it
6. The 2023 Act Is Not Unconstitutional as Applied to the Institutions
The determination that the 2023 Act did not retroactively abrogate vested rights does not fully resolve the issues before us. The Plaintiffs appear to assume that if the 2023 Act did not retroactively abrogate vested rights, it is subject only to rational basis review. We disagree. Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights does not protect only rights that have become vested, nor does it establish a dichotomy where a type of regulation is either wholly beyond the capacity of the General Assembly to alter or subject only to rational basis review. To be sure, we have applied what amounts to rational basis review to the General Assembly‘s alteration of statutes of limitations as applied to claims that were not yet outside the limitations period at the time of the alteration. See, e.g., Allen v. Dovell, 193 Md. 359, 363-64 (1949) (relying on reasonability of time after enactment for plaintiffs to assert existing rights); Dua, 370 Md. at 633-35 (discussing similar cases). But that does not mean the same level of scrutiny applies to claims that were already outside the limitations period at the time of the alteration.
As explained most recently in Pizza di Joey, LLC v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, we have applied different levels of scrutiny to different types of substantive due
Between those poles are statutes that implicate interests that do not “merit strict scrutiny but [are] deserving of more protection than a perfunctory review would accord.” Id. at 347 (citation omitted). In Pizza di Joey, we identified two such categories of intermediate review. One is “intermediate scrutiny,” which has been applied to “quasi-suspect” classifications, such as sex. Id. at 347-48. Under intermediate scrutiny, a statute must “serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.” Id. The 2023 Act does not create a suspect or quasi-suspect classification, so intermediate scrutiny is not applicable.
The other category of intermediate review is “heightened rational basis” review, which we have applied to certain types of economic regulations, such as those prohibiting an individual from practicing a trade or those discriminating based on a factor unrelated to their stated purpose. Id. at 348. Under heightened rational basis review, the statute “must
Heightened rational basis review is the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to a statute that retroactively resurrects a remedy that had previously been precluded by a statute of limitations. Although the running of a statute of limitations does not give rise to a vested property right, it does ordinarily preclude plaintiffs from successfully pursuing a defendant in court based on a cause of action and provides “a certain degree of repose” to defendants. Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296 Md. 656, 665 (1983). And since retroactive changes to statutes of limitations are exceptionally rare, we anticipate that some parties might reasonably base their conduct on an expectation that such a change is unlikely, in a manner that is different in kind and degree from the way parties ordinarily conform their conduct to the current state of the law. Given that, due process demands more than a mere rational basis to justify the retroactive resurrection of an available remedy that had previously been precluded by a statute of limitations.
Heightened rational basis review provides the appropriate level of scrutiny, ensuring that a retroactive legislative change does not upset reasonable expectations created upon the running of a limitations period without sufficient justification, while also not imposing too high a burden on the General Assembly‘s ability to exercise its police powers when it determines, based on a sufficient factual foundation, that it is necessary and appropriate to do so. Cf. Waldron, 289 Md. at 727-28 (striking down statute that prohibited pensioner retired judges from practicing law because it “effectively denie[d] persons the ability to
In a case where the evidence relevant to legislative purpose were in dispute, we would remand to the trial courts to assess whether the 2023 Act satisfied heightened rational basis review. Here, based on the briefing submitted, the undisputed purpose of the 2023 Act, and the undisputed basis for it, we readily conclude that the 2023 Act bears a real and substantial relation to the problem it addressed. That problem, as presented to the General Assembly, was that numerous child sexual abuse claims, more prevalent than previously understood, were never pursued during the then-applicable limitations period through no fault of the victims and too often based at least in part on efforts of both perpetrator and non-perpetrator defendants to hide the misconduct. Further, the General Assembly was presented with a growing body of evidence that many individuals do not
Included among evidence of the extent of prior child sexual abuse presented to the 2023 General Assembly was the testimony of several victims who testified that they made contemporaneous childhood reports of abuse but were ignored. Several organizations also submitted testimony in support of the legislation. The State Council on Child Abuse and Neglect submitted testimony that “a child may attempt disclosure to an adult who is distracted, disbelieving, or in denial, and no further action is taken.” SCCAN, Testimony in Support of SB 686, at 2 (Mar. 24, 2023). Similarly, the Maryland Coalition Against Sexual Assault submitted testimony that “Children molested and sexually exploited are especially unlikely to be able to promptly file suit. Perpetrators use many tactics to prevent their victims from disclosing abuse. These range from threats against the victim or loved ones, manipulating the victim, convincing the victim nothing is wrong, and exploiting the victim‘s desire to keep a family together. Some victims remain financially and emotionally depend[e]nt on the perpetrator well into their early adulthood. Others face pressure from
The General Assembly also received testimony regarding delayed reporting and the life-long effects of childhood sexual abuse. The State Council on Child Abuse and Neglect submitted testimony that “[e]xtensive research” established “profound, long-lasting, and sometimes lifetime-long negative effects on children” with costs borne by both the individual survivors and their families, as well as the State. Another organization, CHILD
Based on the evidence before the General Assembly concerning the historical prevalence of child sexual abuse, prior cover-ups, and significantly delayed reporting by victims well beyond the 20-year window provided by Subsection (d), the elimination of the statute of limitations in the 2023 Act bore a real and substantial relation to the problem being addressed. To be sure, the General Assembly could have more closely tailored its solution, such as by maintaining heightened proof requirements or lower damages caps applicable to older claims. It also could have opened a window for pursuing claims, as some other states have done.39 But heightened rational basis review does not require that the chosen legislative solution be the most narrowly tailored. Absent a constitutional limitation, it is the prerogative of the political branches, not the Judiciary, to make those policy choices.
In sum, former
Accordingly: (1) in Nos. 9 and 10, the judgments of the respective circuit courts are affirmed and the cases will be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion; and (2) in Misc. No. 2, the certified question presented by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, as reformulated by this Court, is: “Does the Maryland Child Victims Act of 2023, 2023 Md. Laws ch. 5 (S.B. 686) (codified at
IN MISC. NO. 2, THE CERTIFIED QUESTION OF LAW IS ANSWERED AS SET FORTH ABOVE; COSTS TO BE
IN NO. 9, JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE‘S COUNTY AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
IN NO. 10, JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR HARFORD COUNTY AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
Case No. C-16-CV-23-004497
Circuit Court for Harford County
Case No. C-12-CV-23-000767
United States District Court for the District of Maryland
Case No. 1:23-cv-02662-MJM
Argued: September 10, 2024
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF MARYLAND
Nos. 9 & 10; Misc. No. 2
September Term, 2024
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF WASHINGTON
v.
JOHN DOE, ET AL.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF HARFORD COUNTY, ET AL.
v.
JOHN DOE
THE KEY SCHOOL, INC., ET AL.
v.
VALERIE BUNKER
Fader, C.J.
Watts
Booth
Biran
Eaves
Killough
McDonald, Robert N.
(Senior Justice, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by Biran, J.,
which Eaves and McDonald, JJ., join.
Filed: February 3, 2025
In concluding that Subsection (d) was a statute of limitations rather than a statute of repose, the Majority opinion fails to interpret the 2017 Act as the General Assembly wrote it. It is difficult to imagine how the General Assembly could more plainly state that Subsection (d) was a statute of repose. The purpose paragraph of the bill states that the bill establishes a “statute of repose” – words also used in Section 3 of that bill with specific
The Majority opinion‘s analysis is based on the remarkable premise that the General Assembly did not know what it meant when it used the phrase “statute of repose” in the 2017 Act. A general principle of statutory construction under this Court‘s precedents is that the General Assembly knows what it is saying when it uses specific language. This is a particularly apt presumption with respect to the use of the phrase “statute of repose” in the 2017 Act, which was enacted only five years after this Court made clear in Anderson v. United States, 427 Md. 99 (2012), what a “statute of repose” is, and explained that a “statute of repose” has very different consequences from a “statute of limitations.” The Majority opinion also casts aside the House and Senate Floor Reports, Fiscal and Policy Note, and other indicia of legislative intent that all specify the General Assembly added Subsection (d) to “establish[] a statute of repose.”
The decision to establish a statute of repose was, without question, a significant policy choice. As the Majority opinion correctly explains, a statute of repose confers a right not to be sued that vests once the repose period expires. That vested right cannot be
But our task is not to sift through legislative history to determine whether the General Assembly articulated the precise policy rationale or ramifications of its decisions. Rather, we respect the political process and determine legislative intent primarily through statutory text.
The Majority opinion charts a different course with undesirable results. It calls into question past judicial statements about the primacy of the plain language of legislation and the importance of a bill‘s title, particularly its purpose paragraph. It also suggests that a legal term that does not appear in non-legal dictionaries might not be given effect unless the General Assembly says enough in the legislative history to satisfy a reviewing court that it knows what the term means. And it uses the decision to repeal a law as evidence that the predecessor Legislature which enacted the repealed law did not understand its plain language, rather than as evidence that the successor Legislature opted to substitute one conscious policy choice for another. In all of these ways, the Majority opinion is a departure from our principles of statutory interpretation from which I respectfully dissent.1
This Court has stated its core principles of statutory interpretation many times. To summarize, always “the goal is to discern and implement the intent of the Legislature.” In re O.P., 470 Md. 225, 255 (2020). “That quest starts with the text of the particular provision within the context of the statutory scheme of which it is part. Review of the legislative history of the provision may help confirm conclusions drawn from the text or resolve its ambiguities. Prior case law concerning the provision or similar statutes, both in Maryland and other jurisdictions, may provide helpful guidance. Finally, consideration of the consequences of alternative interpretations of the statute grounds the analysis.” Id.
A. Statutory Text
The Majority opinion distinguishes between the codified portions of the 2017 Act – what the opinion calls the “operative provisions” of the session law – and the uncodified portions of the law. See Maj. Op. at 34. This leads the Majority to downplay the significance of the uncodified portions of the 2017 Act. However, the uncodified portions, including the 2017 Act‘s purpose paragraph, are equally “part of the statutory text” for our statutory interpretation analysis. See Elsberry v. Stanley Martin Cos., LLC, 482 Md. 159, 187 (2022). When one reads the 2017 Act in its entirety, one begins with the title, including the purpose paragraph, and then moves on to the other portions of the bill. I will go through the plain language of the 2017 Act in that sequence. Then, I will discuss the Majority‘s interpretation of the statutory text.
The Title of the 2017 Act, Including the Purpose Paragraph
In the purpose paragraph of the 2017 Act, the General Assembly‘s stated intent, as pertinent here, was to (1) “alter[ ] the statute of limitations in certain civil actions relating to child sexual abuse” and (2) “establish[] a statute of repose for certain civil actions relating to child sexual abuse[.]” 2017 Md. Laws 3895 (ch. 656).
Section 1 of the 2017 Act: the Amendments to CJP § 5-117
Section 1 of the 2017 Act was the part of the bill in which the General Assembly amended
Before the 2017 Act, Subsection (b) of
(1) at any time before the victim reaches the age of majority; or
(2) subject to subsections (c) and (d) of this section, within the later of:
- 20 years after the date that the victim reaches the age of majority; or
- 3 years after the date that the defendant is convicted of a crime relating to the alleged incident or incidents under:
§ 3-602 of the Criminal Law Article ; or- The laws of another state or the United States that would be a crime under
§ 3-602 of the Criminal Law Article .
2017 Md. Laws 3896-97 (ch. 656). This was what the purpose paragraph of the 2017 Act referred to as “altering the statute of limitations in certain civil actions relating to child sexual abuse[.]”
In a new Subsection (d), the General Assembly created a time period that applied only to non-perpetrator defendants:
In no event may an action for damages arising out of an alleged incident or incidents of sexual abuse that occurred while the victim was a minor be filed against a person or governmental entity that is not the alleged perpetrator more than 20 years after the date on which the victim reaches the age of majority.
Id. at 3898. This was what the purpose paragraph of the 2017 Act referred to as “establishing a statute of repose for certain civil actions relating to child sexual abuse.”2
Section 2 of the 2017 Act: Uncodified Language Concerning Non-Retroactive Application of Longer Period of Limitations
In Section 2 of the 2017 Act – like the purpose paragraph, an uncodified portion of the bill – the General Assembly provided: “That this Act may not be construed to apply retroactively to revive any action that was barred by the application of the period of limitations applicable before October 1, 2017.” See 2017 Md. Laws 3899. In other words, where a victim had reached the age of 25 (seven years after the age of majority) without
Section 3 of the 2017 Act: Uncodified Language Concerning the New “Statute of Repose”
In Section 3 of the 2017 Act, the General Assembly addressed the new “statute of repose” that it referred to in the purpose paragraph and placed in new Subsection (d) of
That the statute of repose under
§ 5-117(d) of the Courts Article as enacted by Section 1 of this Act shall be construed to apply both prospectively and retroactively to provide repose to defendants regarding actions that were barred by the application of the period of limitations applicable before October 1, 2017.
2017 Laws 3899 (ch. 656).4
Thus, where a victim had reached the age of 25 (seven years after the age of majority) without filing suit against a non-perpetrator defendant before the effective date of the 2017 Act, Subsection (d) “provide[d] repose” to that non-perpetrator defendant. In other words, that claim could not be revived “retroactively.” And if, after the effective date of the 2017 Act, i.e., “prospectively,” a victim who was not yet 25 as of October 1, 2017, reached the age of 38 without filing suit against a non-perpetrator defendant, Section 3
2. The Majority Opinion‘s Interpretation of the 2017 Act
The Majority Opinion Downplays the Significance of the Purpose Paragraph.
Legislative drafters, and the Assistant Attorneys General who assess the legal sufficiency of a bill, thus pay close attention to the bill‘s title, particularly the purpose
The Majority opinion characterizes the statement that the bill establishes a “statute of repose” as a mere “label.” See, e.g., Maj. Op. at 43. But, as noted above, this is not just language from documents in the legislative history or commentary on the bill. These are the General Assembly‘s own words in the bill itself. The Majority opinion thus fails to fully appreciate that the purpose paragraph is itself part of the legislation we are interpreting, see, e.g., Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm‘n v. Pride Homes, Inc., 291 Md. 537, 543 n.4 (1981) (“The enactments contained in the various volumes of the session laws are the law.“), and performs important functions to ensure the legal and constitutional
The cases upon which the Majority opinion relies in downplaying the importance of the purpose paragraph (and other uncodified provisions of the 2017 Act), see Maj. Op. at 35-36, are distinguishable or inapposite. In Martin v. Howard County, 349 Md. 469 (1998), this Court interpreted
Here, the purpose paragraph of the 2017 Act contains two legal terms of art: “statute of repose” and “statute of limitations.” “Statute of repose,” unlike “abate” in
Finally, in CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, the United States Supreme Court held that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA“),
Not only does Waldburger have nothing to do with uncodified provisions of a law; it also highlights the weakness of the Majority opinion‘s position here. Unlike CERCLA‘s preemption provision, the purpose paragraph of the 2017 Act (as well as other provisions of the 2017 Act) explicitly referred both to a “statute of repose” and a “statute of
The Majority Opinion Also Downplays the Significance of Section 3 of the 2017 Act.
Another part of the 2017 Act that the Majority opinion downplays is Section 3. Like the purpose paragraph, Section 3 was an uncodified provision but nevertheless part of the text of the 2017 Act. Section 3 provided that “the statute of repose under
Three things about Section 3 stand out. First, it refers to a “statute of repose” – another express reference to this type of time period. This reference confirms that the mention of a “statute of repose” in the purpose paragraph is not – as the Majority opinion believes – an inaccurate “label,” but rather that one of the purposes of the law, in fact, is to enact a “statute of repose” in Subsection (d).
Second, Section 3 says that Subsection (d) must be construed to “provide repose” to the defendants to whom Subsection (d) applies. This shows that, in enacting Subsection (d), the General Assembly was not concerned about denying a remedy to plaintiffs after a certain period of time (which it already had covered in Subsection (b)(2) and addressed in Section 2 of the session law), but rather was providing “repose” to certain defendants.
The Majority Opinion Fails to Recognize That the General Assembly May Enact a “Statute of Repose” Having the Particular Features It Believes Are Appropriate.
After analyzing Subsection (d), the Majority opinion concludes that, based on our description in Anderson of the typical features of statutes of repose and statutes of limitation, “the key features of Subsection (d) are more typical of a statute of limitations[.]” Maj. Op. at 43. As discussed below, I disagree with the Majority opinion‘s analysis of Subsection (d)‘s language. As I see it, the language of Subsection (d) reflects an intent to create a statute of repose, and Anderson does not compel a different conclusion.
However, there is a more fundamental problem with the Majority opinion: It fails to recognize that the General Assembly may create a “statute of repose” with any set of features it deems appropriate. The General Assembly‘s authority to enact a statute of repose containing any particular set of features is not constrained by anything we said in Anderson.10 If the General Assembly wants to enact a statute of repose that uses as its trigger an event that is related wholly to the victim‘s injury, it may do so. If it wants to
Under the Majority Opinion‘s Reading of Subsection (d), It Is Superfluous.
One of our fundamental canons of statutory interpretation is that “[w]e will not interpret a statute in a manner so as to render a ‘word, clause, sentence, or phrase ...
In the Majority opinion‘s view, both Subsection (b) and Subsection (d) were statutes of limitation. Subsection (b) of the 2017 Act was a statute of limitations that, on its face, applied both to non-perpetrator defendants and to those defendants who committed the acts of abuse. It required that an action for damages arising out of an alleged incident or incidents of child sexual abuse be filed at any time before the victim reaches the age of majority or, subject to Subsection (d), within the later of 20 years after the date that the victim reaches the age of majority, or three years after the date that the defendant is convicted of a crime relating to the alleged incident or incidents of abuse. Thus, as to non-perpetrator defendants, such as the Institutions in these cases, the statute of limitations under Subsection (b) expired when the victim reached the age of 38 (20 years after the age of majority).
Subsection (d)‘s time period applied only to non-perpetrator defendants, and it, too, provided an outer filing limit of 20 years after the victim reaches the age of majority. Thus, if the Majority opinion is correct that Subsection (d) was a statute of limitations, it was duplicative of Subsection (b) as that subsection applied to non-perpetrator defendants. In other words, if the General Assembly only wanted to provide a statute of limitations that,
The Majority opinion recognizes this redundancy, “agree[ing] with the Institutions that the apparent total or near total overlap between these two provisions, if both are interpreted to be statutes of limitations, suggests that the General Assembly did not intend for both of them to operate in the same way.” Maj. Op. at 46. This acknowledgment of the superfluousness of Subsection (d) if it is a statute of limitations, in my view, is all but dispositive of the question before us.
Nothing in Subsection (d) Is Inconsistent with an Intent to Create a Statute of Repose.
But if we continue the analysis and look at Subsection (d) on its own, nothing in that subsection is inconsistent with the General Assembly‘s stated purpose to enact a statute of repose, nor is the conclusion that Subsection (d) is a statute of repose inconsistent with Anderson.
As the Majority opinion notes, Subsection (d) consists of three components. Maj. Op. at 36. First, the opening “[i]n no event” phrase: “In no event may an action for damages ... be filed ....” Second, Subsection (d) identifies what it regulates, which is child sexual abuse claims against non-perpetrator defendants. Third, the statute identifies what it
The “in no event” language. The Majority opinion rejects the Institutions’ argument that the phrase “[i]n no event” reflects an intent to establish an absolute bar consistent with a statute of repose. Respectfully, I disagree.
Start with the principle that we give statutory terms their common, ordinary meaning. See, e.g., Buarque de Macedo v. Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford, 480 Md. 200, 215 (2022). The phrase “in no event” conveys a clear and absolute prohibition or limitation. For Subsection (d), the prohibition applies to pursuing claims against non-perpetrator defendants more than 20 years after the date on which the victim turns 18. The import of “in no event” is clear: No exceptions.
This language is not unique. The “in no event” language is commonly used nationwide to establish the absolute bars provided by statutes of repose, including in statutes governing claims related to the sexual abuse of minors. See, e.g., M.E.H. v. L.H., 685 N.E.2d 335, 339 (Ill. 1997) (applying the statute of repose in
We also read statutory language not in isolation, but “within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute.” Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 275-76 (2010). Recall that Subsection (b) extended the existing seven-year limitations period to permit filing of an action before the victim reaches 18 or within the later of 20 years after the victim reaches 18 or three years after the defendant is convicted of certain related crimes. Notably, Subsection (b) mirrors the typical structure of a statute of limitations: identification of the cause of action followed by a mandatory timeframe for filing suit with applicable exceptions. Compare
In contrast, if Subsection (d) is a statute of repose, it makes sense for it to begin with “[i]n no event,” as many other statutes of repose do to signal an absolute bar.14 And, it makes sense for Subsection (b) to be “subject to” Subsection (d), to make clear that any tolling that otherwise would be possible under Subsection (b) is not permissible with respect to claims against non-perpetrator defendants.
Regulating claims “against a person or governmental entity that is not the alleged perpetrator.” This Court has recognized that a “statute of repose” describes a statute that “shelters legislatively-designated groups from an action” for the purpose of
Subsection (d) applies only to a “person or governmental entity that is not the alleged perpetrator.” Accordingly, the statutory scheme differentiates between perpetrator and non-perpetrator defendants. The Majority opinion, however, dismisses this distinction, contending that this reference to this class of potential defendants – non-perpetrator defendants – does not demonstrate an intent to shelter non-perpetrator defendants from an action after the designated amount of time. See Maj. Op. at 39-40. The Majority‘s reasoning is that: (1) the legislatively-designated group is distinguished only by relative culpability; (2) the General Assembly may have been concerned about the effects of time on non-perpetrator defendants’ ability to defend against stale claims; and (3) the General Assembly might have been concerned about stale claims for both defendant groups but carved out perpetrators for special exposure due to their greater culpability. Maj. Op. at 39-40. These are all possible reasons for why a legislature might single out a class of defendants for immunity after a certain period of time. However, the General Assembly just as reasonably could have concluded that non-perpetrator defendants may often be institutions that can reform themselves, rid themselves of leaders who failed children in the past, and provide valuable services to children and adults going forward. As such, the General Assembly could have concluded that there was a societal benefit to providing repose 20 years after the age of majority to such institutional defendants, but not to perpetrators.15
Ultimately, what motivated the General Assembly to single out non-perpetrator defendants to receive repose is irrelevant to the textual analysis. Consider another statute of repose.
Precluding claims against non-perpetrator defendants more than 20 years after the alleged victim reaches the age of majority. Finally, we come to the last
Second, the Majority opinion reasons that the General Assembly‘s chosen trigger for running the time period in Subsection (d) – the victim reaching the age of majority – evidences an intent to create a statute of limitations. The argument is that while the trigger differs from the date of injury, a child sexual abuse claim accrues at the time of the abuse, and so Subsection (d) essentially provides for “an accrual-based trigger with built-in tolling” due to the victim‘s minority. Maj. Op. at 41-42. Therefore, the Majority opinion concludes, because the trigger in Subsection (d) is not “truly unrelated to the alleged victim‘s injury,” Subsection (d) aligns more with a statute of limitations. Maj. Op. at 42.
As noted above, the Majority opinion tries to overcome this distinction between a classic statute of limitations that runs from the date of injury and Subsection (d) by claiming that the General Assembly built minority tolling into the trigger. But, significantly, the 2017 Act added a provision expressly permitting victims to bring civil claims before
Even accepting for the sake of argument that Subsection (d)‘s age-based trigger is, at least to some extent, related to the plaintiff‘s injury, that nevertheless does not lead to the conclusion that Subsection (d) is a statute of limitations under Anderson. In Anderson, we answered a certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit as to whether a deadline in
In answering the certified question, the Court confronted its contradictory statements about whether
To accomplish that task, the Anderson Court identified various characteristics that might help distinguish a statute of limitations from a statute of repose. Ultimately, it concluded that the two concepts contained “overlapping features” and that there were “definitions aplenty from which to choose.” 427 Md. at 123. In deciding the question before it, the Court “[chose] not to rely on any single feature” of the statute. Rather, it looked at the statute “holistically” and applied the usual tools of statutory construction. Id. at 123-24. Thus, “[f]irst and foremost, the plain language of the statute controls.” Id. at 125. Given
Here, the Majority treats some combination of the features we described in Anderson as essential to a statute of repose, most significantly, the trigger for the time limitation. But Anderson did not require a statute of repose to be triggered from a date “truly” unrelated to the victim‘s injury in order to be a statute of repose. It is true that statutes of repose can run from such a date. However, our predecessors observed that while the trigger date is important in distinguishing statutes of limitation from statutes of repose, we look “holistically at the statute” and ultimately that the plain language of the statute comes “[f]irst and foremost.” Id. at 124-25. Our case law provides guideposts for interpreting statutes but does not impose legislative mandates. Indeed, the Anderson Court‘s description of common features of statutes of limitation and statutes of repose is drawn from case law that is, of course, common law as the product of court decision. But common law cannot override explicit language of a statute properly enacted by the General Assembly. See Stearman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 381 Md. 436, 454 (2004) (“When the common law and a statute collide, the statute, if constitutional, controls.“) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In sum, a holistic review of the text of the 2017 Act, with the plain language being given due consideration “first and foremost,” demonstrates that Subsection (d) is a statute of repose.
Ultimately, the Majority opinion concedes, as it must, that the purpose paragraph and Section 3 of the 2017 Act “strongly support” the conclusion that the bill created a statute of repose. Maj. Op. at 43. To overcome that support, the Majority opinion necessarily concludes that the General Assembly in 2017 did not understand what a “statute of repose” is (and that the General Assembly in 2023 continued to fail to understand the meaning of the term when it said in the purpose paragraph of the 2023 Act that it was repealing the “statute of repose”17). This premise is flawed for several reasons.
First, it runs contrary to a bedrock principle under this Court‘s precedents that the General Assembly knows what it is saying when it uses specific language. In that regard, we discern legislative intent starting with the text “on the tacit theory that the General Assembly is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant.” In re Emergency Remedy, 483 Md. 371, 404 (2023); see also Peterson v. State, 467 Md. 713, 727 (2020) (repeating the same phrase); Haile v. State, 431 Md. 448, 466 (2013) (same).
Second, the Majority opinion fails to appreciate that “statute of repose” is a legal term of art. Thus, while the Majority opinion correctly observes that “we ordinarily afford terms in legislative enactments their common, ordinary meaning,” Maj. Op. at 44, “when the term in a statute is a legal term, absent any legislative intent to the contrary, the term is presumed to be used in its legal sense.” Dean v. Pinder, 312 Md. 154, 161 (1988). “Statute of repose” is a specific legal term. Thus, the Majority opinion‘s attempted end-run around
Third, just five years before the 2017 Act, as discussed above, this Court thoroughly explained the meaning of this legal term of art in Anderson, in the process detailing the differences between, and consequences of establishing, a statute of limitations versus a statute of repose. Because we generally presume that the Legislature is familiar with our prior decisions, our traditional analysis leads to the conclusion that the General Assembly acted with full knowledge regarding the distinction between a statute of repose and a statute of limitations. See, e.g., Taylor v. Mandel, 402 Md. 109, 131 (2007) (noting that courts “presume that the Legislature has acted with full knowledge of prior and existing law, legislation and policy[.]“); Bellard v. State, 452 Md. 467, 494 (2017) (“The General Assembly is presumed to be aware of this Court‘s interpretations of statutes.“).
The three presumptions described in the preceding paragraphs may often be fictions, but they are necessary ones lest the Court arrogate to itself the Legislature‘s policy-making role. Abandonment of these presumptions is an easy path to deconstructing any legislation
In sum, the Majority‘s analysis does not comport with our principles of statutory construction. It casts prior judicial statements about the primacy of the “plain language” of legislation and the importance of a bill‘s title, particularly its purpose paragraph, into doubt. It suggests that common legal terms that do not appear in non-legal dictionaries might not be given effect at the whim of the construing court. Legislators and those who advise them are left wondering how much detail will satisfy a reviewing court that the plain language of a bill means what it says. How much detail will suffice presumably will be fleshed out in future cases.
B. Legislative History
As discussed above, the plain language of the 2017 Act makes the General Assembly‘s intent to enact a statute of repose crystal clear. Subsection (d) not only exhibits the hallmarks of a statute of repose, but the General Assembly essentially provided a flashing neon sign in the purpose paragraph, and Section 3 of the 2017 Act that announces Subsection (d) as a statute of repose. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how the General Assembly could more “plainly” state that the bill created a statute of repose distinct from
That legislative history is replete with references that are consistent with the purpose paragraph and Section 3‘s express statements that Subsection (d) is a statute of repose. In the 2017 bill file, House and Senate Committee Floor Reports explained that the new law “establishes a ‘statute of repose’ prohibiting a person from filing an action for damages ... against a [non-perpetrator] ... more than 20 years after the date on which the victim reaches the age of majority.” See Floor Report, H.B. 642 (2017 Sess.), at 2 (Summary of Bill); Floor Report, S.B. 505 (2017 Sess.) (Summary of Bill), at 2. The Fiscal and Policy Note contained the same language. Fiscal and Policy Note, S.B. 505 (2017 Sess.), at 1.19 Floor statements also confirmed that the bill “prohibit[ed] the filing of an action against [non-
Not all legislative documents are created equal. Thus, “[t]he legislative sources and documents in a bill file that are most authoritative in any given appeal will vary, depending on the issues presented.” In the Matter of Lewis, 262 Md. App. 32, 50 n.10 (2024) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But the documents most likely to reflect actual legislative purpose are “fiscal notes, committee bill analyses, and floor reports.” Id. (quoting Jack Schwartz & Amanda Stakem Conn, The Court of Appeals at the Cocktail Party: the Use and Misuse of Legislative History, 54 Md. L. Rev. 432, 462 (1995)); see also Blackstone v. Sharma, 461 Md. 87, 130 (2018) (describing the floor reports and fiscal note as “key” legislative history documents). Here, the legislative documents “most likely” to reflect legislative purpose, id., all confirm the plain text of the statute. That is, they all expressly refer to the creation of a “statute of repose” with respect to claims against non-perpetrator defendants. Ordinarily, this would be considered overwhelming evidence of legislative intent.
Not so here. The Majority opinion disregards the repeated references to a “statute of repose” primarily for two reasons: (1) the language in the legislative documents could equally describe a statute of limitations; and (2) the term “statute of repose” lacks a
As for the first point, that language describing a statute of repose may sound like language describing a statute of limitations is not surprising. As discussed above, the two time periods share overlapping features and serve similar objectives. See also Maj. Op. at 11 (“Civil statutes of limitations and statutes of repose are both time-based restrictions that can bar proceeding on a cause of action.“); Waldburger, 573 U.S. at 7 (“Statutes of limitations and statutes of repose both are mechanisms used to limit the temporal extent or duration of liability for tortious acts.“). Regarding the second point, I have already explained that when the Legislature uses a legal term of art, we assume it does so intentionally, not haphazardly.
The Majority opinion maintains that “the most notable feature of the legislative history of the 2017 Act is the near complete silence concerning the topic, and especially the effect, of a statute of repose.” Majority Op. at 48. Given the consequences of enacting a statute of repose, the Majority finds it “quite odd” that if the General Assembly intended to do so, the legislative record contains “nearly no discussion of it.” Majority Op. at 53.
When the Majority opinion refers to “near complete silence concerning the topic,” it seems implicitly to be acknowledging the existence of a document in the 2017 bill file that is far from silent about the consequences of enacting a statute of repose. That document, entitled “Discussion of certain amendments in SB0505/818470/1,” distinguishes statutes of limitations from statutes of repose. It states that, if adopted, the
The Majority opinion notes that the document is unsigned and undated. See Majority Op. at 51-52. True enough, but the document nevertheless is part of the bill file, accurately describes the state of the law at that time, and is the type of informal evidence that this Court on occasion has relied on to tertiarily confirm what the Court‘s traditional analytical tools already made clear. See Warfield v. State, 315 Md. 474, 497 (1989) (reviewing a handwritten note, undated and unidentified, when analyzing the meaning of statute). If a floor report, committee analysis, or fiscal note provided support for the proposition that the General Assembly intended Subsection (d) to be a statute of limitations (despite its superfluity), I would not ascribe significance to the document in the bill file that discusses the consequences of enacting a statute of repose. But all of the other materials in the bill file that refer to Subsection (d) confirm that it is a statute of repose. Against that backdrop, the unsigned document provides further support for the conclusion that the General Assembly in fact intended Subsection (d) to be a statute of repose.
But even if we discount the unsigned document in the bill file, the absence of additional discussion in the legislative history of the consequences of adopting a statute of repose is not evidence that the General Assembly intended Subsection (d) to be a superfluous statute of limitations. I am unaware of an instance where a perceived gap in the legislative history has led us to disregard repeated, objective statements of legislative intent. The Majority opinion cites no prior case of this Court that takes such an approach.
The Majority Opinion Improperly Relies on the Decision to Repeal the 2017 Act As Evidence That the General Assembly Did Not Understand the Plain Language of the 2017 Act.
The Majority opinion further supports its claim that the General Assembly did not know what it was doing when it passed the 2017 Act explicitly for the purpose of “establishing a statute of repose,” by pointing to the decision to repeal the 2017 Act in 2023. The Majority opinion notes that the General Assembly passed the 2017 Act “unanimously[,]” and that “[j]ust six years” later, the 2023 Act received “only six
This is a novel approach to statutory construction. The Majority opinion cites no prior case in which this Court has relied on the repeal of a law as evidence that the legislators who enacted the repealed law did not understand the meaning of that law‘s plain language. To the contrary, the repeal of a law is normally understood to reflect a Legislature‘s decision to substitute one conscious policy choice for another, whether it happens six years or 60 years after the enactment of the prior law. And, “after-the-fact statements – even those of legislators and even as to the purpose or meaning of legislation that did pass – are discounted.” Brown v. State, 470 Md. 503, 544 n.45 (2020) (emphasis omitted); see also id. (explaining that, “[i]n general, ‘[p]ost-enactment legislative history (a contradiction in terms) is not a legitimate tool of statutory interpretation’ and ‘by definition could have had no effect on the legislature‘s vote‘“) (quoting Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 242 (2011) (some internal quotations marks and alterations omitted)); Collier v. Connolley, 285 Md. 123, 126 (1979) (“[W]e do not place much weight upon what the Legislature, in 1977, said was intended in a 1974 statute.“); see also Dissenting Op. of McDonald, J., at 5 n.8.
The 2023 General Assembly‘s decision to repeal the 2017 Act is a better reflection of the political will of the 2023 General Assembly than the intent of the 2017 General Assembly. Indeed, prior to 2023, the General Assembly in 2019 and 2021 debated bills that would have revived claims barred by the 2017 Act. Both times the Attorney General‘s office advised that the 2017 Act should be read to include a statute of repose and that interfering with the vested rights provided by a statute of repose would likely be unconstitutional. Letter from Kathryn M. Rowe, Asst. Att‘y Gen., to Hon. Kathleen M. Dumais (Mar. 16, 2019), at 1-2; Letter from Kathryn M. Rowe, Asst. Att‘y Gen., to Hon. William C. Smith, Jr. (June 23, 2021), at 2-3. This shaky ground explains why the 2023 General Assembly “encouraged the early resolution of constitutional challenges” by providing a special interlocutory appeal right. See Maj. Op. at 9 (citing 2023 Md. Laws,
Conclusion
Ultimately, my colleagues in the Majority and I are both seeking to ascertain legislative intent. We part ways, however, in the application of our principles of statutory interpretation, which are grounded in respect for the Legislature as a co-equal branch of government. Respecting the General Assembly‘s authority means applying the statute before us as written. The text of the 2017 Act is unambiguous. In that legislation, the General Assembly created a statute of repose with respect to claims against non-perpetrator defendants. Thus, any claims against non-perpetrator defendants that were untimely on the effective date of the 2017 Act, or that became untimely before the effective date of the 2023 Act, could not be revived without violating the vested rights of the affected defendants. To the extent the General Assembly retroactively repealed the 2017 Act‘s statute of repose by enacting the 2023 Act, it violated
Justice Eaves and Justice McDonald have authorized me to state that they join in this opinion.
Construing Statutory Language as Meaningless
First, the Majority Opinion reiterates a standard expression of the principles of statutory interpretation, including that the Court “avoid[s] forced or subtle interpretations [and] constructions that would negate portions of the language or render them meaningless.”1 Nevertheless, as Justice Biran points out and as the Majority Opinion concedes, its decision that Subsection (d)2 is a statute of limitations renders that subsection superfluous of Subsection (b) and thus meaningless. Dissent of Justice Biran at 15-17; Majority Opinion at 46.
Discounting a Bill‘s Title
Second, in effectively excising Subsection (d) from the 2017 law, the Majority opinion deviates from another longstanding principle derived from the
These two deviations from the principles of statutory interpretation are related. The addition of Subsection (d) to the body of the bill and the inclusion of the phrase “establishing a statute of repose” in the bill‘s title were part of the same amendment to the identical cross-filed 2017 bills while they were progressing through the Legislature. See Amendments SB0505/458675/1, HB0642/252810/1 (2017).
The Majority Opinion cites no precedent in which this Court – or any other Maryland court – has concluded that key language of a bill was meaningless and also ignored clear direction in the bill‘s title as to the meaning of that language.
In my view, the General Assembly established a statute of repose in 2017 and then for various reasons decided to repeal that provision six years later. It is not unusual for the General Assembly to change its mind as to whether particular legislation it enacted in the past remains a good idea – and it is perfectly constitutional for the General Assembly to act on that change of mind so long as it does not violate vested rights. Thus, as Justice Biran points out, the General Assembly‘s 2023 repeal of the previously-enacted statute of repose was valid; the only defect in the 2023 legislation was the unusual6 and uncodified Sections 2 and 3 of the 2023 legislation that purported to apply it retroactively. Dissent of Justice Biran at 30 n.18. The severability provision of the 2023 law (uncodified Section 4), which saves any portion of the 2023 law that is not invalid, makes clear that the General
The explanation offered in the Majority Opinion is not that the General Assembly changed its mind in 2023, but that the General Assembly did not know what it was doing in 2017. Majority Opinion at 52-54.7 The Majority Opinion thus sets a precedent that, in construing legislation enacted by the policy-making branch of State government, the Court will be the arbiter of when the General Assembly knows what it is doing and when it does not. Whether and when the Court will revert to its oft-stated presumption that the Legislature “meant what it said and said what it meant”8 is not clear from the Majority Opinion.
Justice Biran and Justice Eaves have authorized me to state that they join this opinion.
Notes
On appeal, this Court held that, regardless of other aids to statutory interpretation, “the first rule of statutory construction [is] that the intent of the General Assembly is to be determined from the purpose and language of the enactment” and, to that end, looked to the title of the bill that enacted the statute. 267 Md. at 695. In particular, the Court referred to two parts of the bill‘s title: (1) the short title (“Tax Exemption“) and (2) the purpose paragraph (“to exempt ... the property, activities and income of [the MTA] from taxation“). Id.
The Court concluded that the title resolved the dispute over the meaning of the operative provisions:
That the title of an act is relevant to ascertainment of its intent and purpose is well settled. In view of the requirement of the
Maryland Constitution, Article III, § 29 – that every law enacted by the General Assembly embrace but one subject and shall be described in its title – to expand the use of the word “charges” to embrace tolls, which clearly are neither taxes nor charges in the nature of taxes, is to fail to conform the substance of the statute with its title description....
Id. at 695-96 (citations omitted). Because a bridge toll is neither a tax nor a charge in the nature of a tax, the Court held that the MTA was not exempt from paying the tolls. Id. at 697.
As is evident in the briefs filed by the parties in Anderson and available on Westlaw, neither party in that case relied on the language of the bill‘s title. And, apart from quoting the title of the original enactment of the statute in question, the Anderson Court also did not address the significance of the bill‘s title. Rather, the Court undertook an extended analysis to clear up its own disparate descriptions of the statute. In the end, the Court arrived at a conclusion that matched the bill‘s title.
(a) Except as provided by this section, no cause of action for damages accrues and a person may not seek contribution or indemnity for damages incurred when wrongful death, personal injury, or injury to real or personal property resulting from the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property occurs more than 20 years after the date the entire improvement first becomes available for its intended use.
(b) Except as provided by this section, a cause of action for damages does not accrue and a person may not seek contribution or indemnity from any architect, professional engineer, or contractor for damages incurred when wrongful death, personal injury, or injury to real or personal property, resulting from the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property, occurs more than 10 years after the date the entire improvement first became available for its intended use.
(c) Upon accrual of a cause of action referred to in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, an action shall be filed within 3 years.
One of the statutes purported to retroactively authorize late fees in certain consumer contracts. Dua, 370 Md. at 611-12. That was in response to this Court‘s decision in United Cable Television of Baltimore, Ltd. v. Burch, in which we held that the measure of damages for late payment at common law was limited to “the amount of money promised to be paid, with legal interest.” 354 Md. 658, 669 (1999) (quoting 1 J.P. Poe, Pleading and Practice in the Courts of Law in Maryland § 584C, at 608 (5th Tiffany ed. 1925)). Accordingly, we held that cable television providers who charged higher fees were required to provide a refund. Id. at 685.
The second statute at issue in Dua retroactively authorized health maintenance organizations (“HMOs“) to be subrogated to their subscribers’ rights against third party tortfeasors. 370 Md. at 614-15. That was in response to this Court‘s decision in Riemer v. Columbia Medical Plan, Inc., in which we held that HMOs had no common law right to pursue subscribers for subrogation based on the subscribers’ financial settlement with a third-party tortfeasor. 358 Md. 222, 258 (2000).
With respect to both statutes, the challenge was not to the General Assembly‘s authority to abrogate the common law; only its ability to do so with retroactive effect.
The Majority opinion claims that I “treat[] the General Assembly‘s use of the term ‘statute of repose’ to describe Subsection (d) in the 2017 Act as a declaration that the Legislature intended the provision to establish a vested right to be free from liability.” Maj. Op. at 35 n.18. To the contrary, I treat the General Assembly‘s use of the term “statute of repose” to describe Subsection (d) as a declaration that the Legislature intended the provision to establish a statute of repose. It is the Majority opinion that does the “conflat[ing]” here (Maj. Op. at 35 n.18) when, in the course of analyzing what Subsection (d) is (a statute of repose or a statute of limitations), it sets out on a search for evidence that the General Assembly understood that a consequence of enacting Subsection (d) would be the establishment of a vested right to be immune from suit.Although we have not previously reached this issue directly, several cases in which we have described one purpose of a statute of limitations as providing “repose” to defendants, see discussion above at n.8, suggest that repose in the limitations context was not viewed as a vested right. First, in Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 71 (1978), our predecessors considered whether to apply the discovery rule to the accrual of a plaintiff‘s cause of action for latent disease. In doing so, the Court departed from the existing “general rule,” which was “that limitations against a right or cause of action begin to run from the date of the alleged wrong and not from the time the wrong is discovered.” Id. at 76. That ruling thus had the effect of extending the limitations period for causes of action that had previously been time-barred under the application of existing law, in some cases for decades. See id. at 71 (stating that exposure to asbestos ended in 1955 and suit was filed in 1977).
Second, in determining how to resolve issues in which the answer would determine whether a claim would be time-barred by a statute of limitations, the Court has engaged in a balancing of the plaintiffs’ interest in being able to prosecute claims, the defendants’ interest in repose, and the public interest. In reaching resolutions, our predecessors have often acknowledged that the defendants’ interest in repose would be adversely impacted but determined that other interests outweighed it. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Nasios, 314 Md. 433, 456 (1988) (in determining that a statute of limitations does not begin to run until a plaintiff has knowledge of manufacturer wrongdoing in addition to possible causation, stating: “A weighing of these three interests in a products liability case dictates that fairness to diligent plaintiffs and the promotion of judicial efficiency outweigh defendants’ interest in repose[.]“); Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296 Md. 656, 667-68 (1983) (in determining that a cause of action for damages resulting from lung cancer due to exposure to asbestos arose when the plaintiff was diagnosed with lung cancer and not at an earlier diagnosis of asbestosis, stating: “In our view, the partial infringement of the right to repose is far outweighed by the unfairness of barring a reasonably diligent person from recovery from a latent disease, and by a needless interference with the efficient operation of the judicial system.“); Harig, 284 Md. at 80 (in extending the discovery rule to latent disease claims, stating: “Avoiding possible injustice in such cases outweighs the desire for repose and administrative expediency, which are the primary underpinnings of the limitations statute.“).
The Majority opinion suggests that the date when the non-perpetrator defendant “ceased having any supervisory authority or control over the alleged perpetrator or ceased having any duty of care for the alleged victim” would be a more appropriate trigger for a statute of repose. Maj. Op. at 42. If this Court were drafting a statute of repose for claims of sexual abuse, we might prefer such a trigger to the one the General Assembly chose, but nothing in the law compelled the General Assembly to write a statute of repose in the way the Majority opinion suggests it should have. As discussed above, it is the General Assembly‘s prerogative to draft statutes as it sees fit.Sharing the Institutions’ focus, Justice Biran says that this opinion “fails to recognize that the General Assembly may create a ‘statute of repose’ with any set of features it deems appropriate.” Dissenting Op. of Biran, J., at 14. In doing so, Justice Biran conflates the type of restriction legally categorized as a “statute of repose” with one specific consequence of enacting such a statute: the establishment of a vested right to be free from liability. Justice Biran treats the General Assembly‘s use of the term “statute of repose” to describe Subsection (d) in the 2017 Act as a declaration that the Legislature intended the provision to establish a vested right to be free from liability. But a statute of repose, as we set forth in Anderson, is a type of time-based restriction on bringing claims that typically has certain features. The establishment of a vested right in defendants to be free from future liability is a consequence of the creation of a statute of repose, not a feature of such a statute.
To the extent Justice Biran‘s point is that the General Assembly can create a time-based restriction on bringing claims containing none of the features typically associated with a statute of repose that also creates a vested right to be free from liability, we agree. Indeed, if the General Assembly were to state in such a law that the running of the period establishes a vested right in the potential defendant to be free of future liability, it would have that effect even if the General Assembly labeled it a statute of limitations.
Justice Biran‘s concern that this opinion will make it more difficult for the General Assembly to enact future legislation, op. at 30, is mistaken for the same reason. If the General Assembly wants to create a statute of repose with the typical features of such a statute, they are clearly identified in Anderson and in this opinion. If the General Assembly wants to create a time-based restriction on bringing claims with features that are not typical of a statute of repose but still have a consequence of the period expiring be the establishment of a vested right, it can say so.
The Majority opinion responds to this concern by saying that it is my position “that would lead to the invalidation of a portion of a legislative enactment.” Maj. Op. at 46-47 n.29. In my view, this Court should hold that the 2023 Act is an effective law that repeals the statute of repose prospectively without retroactively affecting vested rights. The only thing that this Court should “invalidate” is the unconstitutional violation of vested rights through the direction to apply the 2023 Act retroactively.A bill‘s statement of purpose, which is “part of the title,” is “part of the statutory text” and “describes in constitutionally acceptable detail what the bill does.” Elsberry v. Stanley Martin Cos., 482 Md. 159, 187 (2022) (quoting Legislative Drafting Manual 2015, Dep‘t of Legis. Servs., at 37 (2014)). The complete statement of purpose of the 2017 Act is:
FOR the purpose of altering the statute of limitations in certain civil actions relating to child sexual abuse; establishing a statute of repose for certain civil actions relating to child sexual abuse; providing that, in a certain action filed more than a certain number of years after the victim reaches the age of majority, damages may be awarded against a person or governmental entity that is not the alleged perpetrator only under certain circumstances; providing that a certain action is exempt from certain provisions of the Local Government Tort[] Claims Act; providing that a certain action is exempt from certain provisions of the Maryland Tort[] Claims Act; defining a certain term; making certain stylistic changes; providing for the application of this Act; and generally relating to child sexual abuse.
Notably, the Fiscal and Policy Note and both Floor Reports put the term “statute of repose” in quotation marks. That makes sense, because “statute of repose” is a legal term of art, distinct from “statute of limitations,” another legal term of art.