Stearman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance

A.2d 539 STEARMAN, Jay H. et al. FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE

STATE COMPANY. INSURANCE Term, Sept. No. 2003. Maryland. Appeals

Court May Burch, (Mudd, Towson; Harrison & Janquitto Andrew Columbia, Adler, P.A., brief), Plaxen, on Plaxen & Bruce M. appellants/cross-appellees. Schimel, (Richard Ja- E. Laura Basem Budow Michael J. P.C., Bethesda, Noble, brief), cobs, appel- on Budow lee/cross-appellant. WILNER, C.J., RAKER, BELL, before

Argued BATTAGLIA, GREENE, CATHELL, HARRELL, JJ. GREENE, Judge. married. On and Carla Stearman are June

Jay Stearman of an injuries as a result Mrs. suffered serious Stearman in a vehicle passenger that occurred while she was accident Farm Mrs. Stearman sued State driven Mr. Stearman. Company and Mr. Stearman Mutual Automobile Insurance Mrs. County. for Baltimore Stearman the Circuit Court injuries. her caused alleged negligence that her husband’s that sought both a declaration and Mr. Stearman She liability Farm’s auto household exclusion in State argument trial court heard on invalid. The policy was Farm’s motion for and State July granted motions on household exclusion judgment, declaring summary appeal noted their and cross- was valid. The Stearmans Thereafter, Mr. filed a August 2003. Stearman on appeal certiorari, before granted for writ of which this Court petition Stearman heard the case. Appeals Special the Court Farm, (2003). State validity is the a house

The issue before Court limit of an auto hold exclusion that reduces the amount, if that statutory minimum policy in excess of the liability coverage provides otherwise policy limits. We hold that the exclusion is valid.

FACTS collision, Mrs. As a result of the June Stearman rib, broken a broken injuries, including serious a suffered bone, vehicle involved collapsed lung. collar The driven Mr. Mrs. the collision was the vehicle Stearman. negligence her caused the alleges Stearman husband’s injuries. collision and her collision,

At the of the and his wife were both appellant time an insured State Farm under automobile obli- Farm gates pay “damages which insured becomes ... legally pay bodily injury liable to because of to others resulting ownership, caused accident from the maintenance or use” anof insured vehicle. The declarations of the page $100,000 policy provides per bodily injury liabili- person ty coverage. following also includes the under the language

Liability Coverage section the policy: Who Insured is an car, your newly

When refer acquired car or a car, temporary substitute insured means: you; 1. your spouse;

2. 3. person the relatives of first named in the declara-

tions; person 4. other any while such using a car if its use is within the scope you your spouse; of consent of or person other organization liable use of a car by such one above insureds.

(Emphasis in the original.)1 The policy also included the following restriction on coverage: Coverage Apply.

When Not Does In addition the limitations of coverage in is an Who Coverage: Insured and Trailer THERE IS NO COVERAGE: ***

2. FOR ANY BODILY INJURY TO: policy, printed 1. In the defined words are in boldface italics. 440

* * * AN IN- INSURED OR ANY MEMBER OF c. ANY THE IN- IN SURED’S FAMILY RESIDING SURED’S THE EXTENT THE TO HOUSEHOLD EX- LIABILITY OF THIS POLICY LIMITS OF REQUIRED LIABILITY CEED THE LIMITS OF BY LAW. original.)

(Emphasis

DISCUSSION to reduce attempt State Farm’s argue Stearmans $100,000 from the stated amount of liability coverage policy $20,000 statutory per person to the limit of per person invalid and void as because such restriction is unsuccessful however, Farm, asserts that this public policy. State against Ins. State Farm Mut. Auto. Co. v. Nation- Court’s decision Co., (1986), Mut. Ins. invali- wide to exclude attempted dated household exclusions that mínimums, below statutory but also validated household above mini- provided coverage exclusions that position. We with Farm’s agree mum. State Nationwide, however, v. Farm this Court Prior Insurance Com- Jennings Employees Government decided (1985). Jennings, pany, A.2d 166 In held clause in an automobile that a household exclusion contrary was invalid because the clause was policy in the automobile public compulsory as embodied Id. at at 168. The requirements. case excluded all household exclusion in the and members his liability coverage injury insured insured, Id. at 488 A.2d at 167. The Jen- household. in an owned him and was a automobile nings, passenger Id. stepson Jennings’s injuries. at the time of operated his A.2d at 167. Jennings stepson judgment his and obtained a default sued $100,000. Id. amount of against Jennings brought declaratory judgment then action

441 GEICO, establish must seeking pay judg- to that GEICO against stepson. Jennings, ment that obtained Jennings his 354, 302 Md. at 488 A.2d at 167. contended that the Jennings contrary household exclusion was void because it was Id. sides summary statute. Both filed motions for judgment 354-55, and the circuit court granted GEICO’s motion. Id. at and, at 167. Jennings appealed, prior argu- ment the Court of Special Appeals, granted this Court 355, certiorari. Id. at at A.2d 167. noted, generally,

We clause in an State, that is contrary public of this as set forth statute, in any is invalid and Id. at unenforceable. concluded, 168. We specifically, that household Jennings exclusion clause in violated the public policy embod ied in Assembly’s require General action to compulso automobiles, ry automobile for Maryland all with specific mandatory Jennings, amounts.2 302 Md. at 488 A.2d at 168. The Assembly General expressly certain authorized exclusions from mandatory cover in the age statutory provisions enacted in 1972. Id. at 169. The household exclusion was among those expressed and, Legislature, consequently, stated that we “will not insert exclusions from the required coverages beyond those expressly set forth Legisla ture.” Id. at 488 A.2d at 169. Such exclusion “ would be ‘contrary to the legislative remedial purpose assuring compensation damages victims motor vehicle accidents....’” Id. 488 A.2d at 169 (quoting Pennsyl Gartelman, vania Nat’l 151, 156, Mut. v. 416 A.2d 734 by Judge Eldridge Jennings, As noted By Ch. 73 supplemented by of the Acts of later statutes such as Ch. 562 of primarily the Acts of §§ codified in 17-101 through Article, 234B, Transportation 17-110 of the §§ 240AA 243L, through through through 547 of the Insurance (Art. 48A), Assembly Code the General mandated that all ... automobiles be covered automobile insurance contain- ing types coverages. certain (1980) that excluded policy provision an insurance (invalidating from PIP coverage)). an insured in exclusions automobile many We that emphasized “[w]hile with and are legislative policy do not conflict com- valid, the so-called household exclusion from therefore insurance does not fall into such a pulsory automobile 362, category.” Jennings, (empha- 302 Md. at 488 A.2d at 171 added). of a Jennings provision policy invalidated a sis liability coverage. from all It did excluded an insured a exclusion of whether such household question address the coverage require- minimum mandatory valid above would be State in resolved this Court question ments. That was Co., Mut. Ins. Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide (1986). 631, 516 A.2d 586 Farm, a In State whether household exclusion we addressed invalid, invalidity or whether its extends “wholly was required by liability coverage the amount of the insurance law.” Id. at at 586-87. compulsory was concluded that such an exclusion invalid the extent We limits. Id. at A.2d at 587. statutory of Farm, State In Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance State Carroll, injuries as a result of insured who suffered Company in place passenger that took when he was a his an accident Id. A friend of Carroll’s, Glass, named own insured vehicle. overturned, killing the road and it Glass drove the vehicle off Id. injuring and Carroll. Carroll passenger, and another Farm, estate. State A.2d at at sued Glass’s had insured Nationwide Mutual Insurance 587. Glass been against liability any and her insured her Company policy vehicle belonging her use of motor involving accident who, Carroll, of her house- like was not a member someone hold. Id. at at included policy 516 A.2d 587. Carroll’s $100,000 $300,000 per liability coverage per person Id. 516 A.2d 587. Carroll’s also accident. member injury “any excluded insured residing in the insured’s household.” family insured’s Id. that the sought

Nationwide declaration household exclu- sion in public State Farm’s was void as against policy. Id. at 516 A.2d at 587. State Farm argued Farm, exclusion valid. was State 307 Md. at 516 A.2d at Farm, 587. As noted State while that pending case was court, circuit this Court decided which we Jennings, decided that a household exclusion that all liability eliminated coverage was invalid. Id. at Conse- quently, Farm and agreed State Nationwide that Jennings eliminated Farm’s that the argument exclusion case was valid below the minimum personal injury $20,000 $40,000 incident, per person per 103(b)(1) by section the Transportation Article. 17— Nonetheless, Id. State Farm maintained exclusion should be considered valid above the minimum statutory re- 635, quirements. Id. at 516 A.2d at 587. Farm,

To the question answer in raised State this Court discussed Jennings and its review of the of the treat- history 635, ment of household exclusions. Id. at A.2d 516 at 588. 1972, that, We also noted before the upheld validity of Farm, exclusions that were not precluded by statute. State 635, 307 1972, Md. at 516 A.2d at 588. in Beginning the Assembly General changed public policy of State by mandating compulsory automobile insurance with minimum coverage amounts.3 Id.

We Jennings noted that spoke “broad terms” about the of invalidity the household exclusion in that case “because of its violation of statutory compulsory liability insurance policy.” concluded, 516 however, Id. at A.2d at 588. We that while Jennings did not specifically question deal with the Farm, before the Court State reasoning Jennings supported Farm’s argument excluding State household 3. of Section 19-504 Article Insurance states that each motor vehicle or delivered in the State “shall issued, sold, liability policy provide liability coverage specified the minimum in Title of added.) 17-103(b)(l) Transportation (Emphasis Article.” Section Transportation requires Article liability coverage minimum $20,000 $40,000 bodily injury per person per or death of accident. the mínimums statute

liability coverage required above Id. at A.2d 588- public violate policy. does not legislature prohibited simply, Put what the of less than the minimum amounts 103(b)(1) The Transportation Article.... 17— public violates “household exclusion” operates prevent mandatory it minimum extent that coverage.

Id. A.2d at 589. purpose Maryland compulsory “ for innocent victims motor recovery is to ‘[assure] statutes ” Farm, vehicle accidents.’ State 307 Md. 631 at Farm Auto. v. Maryland Mut. Ins. Co. at 590 (quoting Fund., (1976)). Auto. Ins. in State Farm that we Nonetheless, “do not view we stated extending beyond prescribed purpose coverage, so far as the ‘household exclusion’ stated, Id. Succinctly 516 A.2d at 590.4 concerned.” in State Farm in the case at public question bar is bodily contain

that all automobile shall in at the amount of liability coverage or death least injury $20,000/$40,000. permit To the “household exclusion” injured limits be operate “deprive within those would intended to protection Legislature which persons Hinds, 676, v. provide,” Keystone Mut. Cas. Co. 180 (1942), 682, 761, public policy. 763 and would violate 26 *** hold, therefore, the “insured” of a “house- segment We that hold clause in an automobile exclusion” statutory of the minimum is invalid to the extent by far coverage. public policy So as the evidenced Farm, repeating we also 4. all the citations recorded in State Without jurisdictions squarely majority note that the issue ‘‘[t]he that address with in this State before us has reached a result consistent ours case.” Farm, 641, 307 Md. at 516 at 591.

445 concerned, is insurance law it is valid and compulsory contractual as to above provision enforceable that minimum. 644,

Id. 643, 516 A.2d at 592.5 Farm, in State the clear the Stearmans Despite holding contend of that holding that “limited case facts general and is not a validation of statutory exclusions above minimum limits.”6 we that agree While would Farm is not a of “general validation” exclusion above a minimum, statutory quite we think it clear that the case does validate household those exclusions above mínimums. cite West

In of their support arguments, Stearmans Popa, American Insurance v. 455, Co. 723 A.2d 1 (1998). In that we invalidated insurance policy provi- sions that excluded or by vehicles owned a self- operated insurer any governmental or unit or from agency Id. definition of vehicles. uninsured/underinsured In A.2d at 10. support holding, that we stated that “this consistently Court has held that exclusions from statutorily noted, Similarly, very 5. we recently Progressive have v. Salamon (2004), Company, Classic Insurance 379 Md. 841 A.2d 858 that statute, Maryland’s compulsory "under automobile insurance contrac- tual exclusions in automobile insurance that excuse or reduce statutorily required benefits types below levels coverage, expressly are Assembly, authorized the General Salamon, (2004). are invalid.” 379 Md. at 841 A.2d at 860 We requirement also every stated that “the driver maintain at least these minimum levels of integral motor vehicle insurance remains part Maryland statutory public portion policy. Any law and of a motor statutory vehicle insurance inconsistent with this Salamon, scheme is void and unenforceable.” atMd. (2004) Co., 44, 47, (citing A.2d at 864-65 Lewis Allstate Ins. (2002)). Finally, "we declared that shall not exclusion, uphold any Assembly, not authorized the General ” Salamon, excuses or reduces benefits below the mínimums. (2004). Md. at A.2d at 867 Salamon invalidated the so- exclusion,” "pizza purports deny called which if an insured delivering "property compensation” driver was at the time of the Salamon, (2004). accident. 379 Md. at 841 A.2d at 860 Alternatively, argue Stearmans that we should overrule State Farm. authorized coverage expressly mandated insurance Id. at generally recognized.” will not be Legislature 10. at Nationwide, Farm v. State on American Relying West alternative, that in the event that the exclusions argued, invalidated, void to the extent of the they only are are $20,000/$40,000 minimum insur- statutorily required Popa, American Insurance Co. v. ance limits. West rejected argument 723 A.2d at 11. We from West American Insurance: State Farm distinguished Nationwide, supra, State Farm Mut. In this Court held liability coverage exclusion” to in an that a “household was to the extent of automobile insurance invalid $20,000/$40,000 prescribed minimum statutorily Farm Mut. State howev coverage. holding er, to other applied by any has not been Court automo Moreover, provisions. bile insurance exclusions or Farm Mut. State specifically apply we have declined in a than the household holding context other exclusion [Ins. See Van Horn v. Atlantic Mutual liability coverage. Co.], supra, ^{[669] [195]} at 207- Id. 11-12. also 723 A.2d at dismissed West We statutory exclusion above suggestion American’s be acceptable: minimum limits would of the broad advanced West Ameri Adoption proposition vehicle permit up can would insurers load motor insur exclusions, thereby ance with a multitude invalid limiting coverage numerous situations to mínimums set forth on instead the stated limits declaration page. the insured’s *** Persons who much more paid premiums circumstances, could, in receive many excess of mínimums only paid coverages. no more than those who holding we decline extend Consequently, Nationwide, v. supra, beyond Farm Mut the household clause which was in that case. exclusion involved 352 West American Insurance Co. v. Md. at 723 Popa, A.2d at 12. Insurance,

In refused to West American extend the holding involving of Stale Farm to case uninsured motorist exclusions.7 It is clear equally holding that the of State Farm Mut. v. Nationwide applicable to other household exclusion cases, currently like one before the Court. The Stear- mans’s argument contrary simply persuasive. As in summarized Van Horn Atlantic Mutual Insurance Com- 694-95, (1994): 641

pany, 334 Md. A.2d Mut., In Farm Mut. v. Nationwide this Court supra, its holding Jennings reaffirmed earlier in v. Government Ins., Employees supra, that a “household clause in exclusion” an automobile insur- contrary ance was public policy embodied in Maryland’s motor law. compulsory vehicle insurance We Farm, however, went on in State to hold that the household exclusion clause was invalid to the extent only statu- $20,000/$40, torily prescribed minimum liability coverage of pointed 000. We out that it “readily could be inferred that the premium took in account exclusion contained (307 589), policy” Md. at majority A.2d at that the jurisdictions of compulsory insurance had invalidated house- hold only exclusion clauses to the extent of statutorily (307 prescribed minimum mandatory liability coverage "particularly inappro- We noted that West American Insurance was priate” apply holding case which to of State Farm because “the statutorily coverage which uninsured/underinsured $20,000/$40,000. Instead, an insurer must offer is not an insurer must offer coverage an amount of equal underinsured uninsured/ liability coverage provided policy.” West American Insurance 477-78, then, effect, Popa, Co. v. 352 Md. at at 12. In if a person $20,000/$40,000, coverage the minimum his or her coverage would have to be that same uninsured/underinsured amount, person liability coverage amount. If that greater had in a however, company the insurance would have offer uninsured/under- insured in the same amount. 591-592), and that a general “[a]s (307 rule, they free wish” Md. at are to contract parties 592). A.2d at 19~502(b) argue that Section The Stearmans also intention that legislative Article evidences a Insurance liability coverage provide automobile insurance level mínimums must not exclude that excess of the language We not see how the situation. do provides: such an intention. The statute cited declares by insurer.— liability coverage provided On amount of Title 17 of the Transportation Neither this subtitle nor issuing, selling, from or deliver- Article insurer prevents that ing policies provide vehicle insurance motor in of the of the liability coverage requirements excess Law. Maryland Vehicle Vol.) (1997, 19-502(b) Repl. 2002 Insurance

Md.Code quoted Article. The of the section evidences plain language to offer companies an intention permit by greater that than that statute.8 contain require companies provide It does not certainly than mandated statute. Nor does it coverage greater legislative change public policy a intention display cover- in the mandated minimum statutorily embodied have no The cited age requirements. Stearmans a supports case that such position. Connors, 24, 35, 339

8. As Court Oaks v. Md. 660 A.2d noted 423, (1995): 429 statutory interpretation The is to ascertain and cardinal rule G.A.A., legislature. Fish v. 337 effectuate the intention Market State, 255, 1, 8, (1994). Md. Md. 650 A.2d 705 See also Jones v. 336 State, 554, 559, 260, (1994); Md. A.2d 1204 Parrison v. 335 644 647 Pool, 351, 358, (1994); Md. A.2d 906 A.2d Rose v. Fox 335 643 537 (1994). step legislative determining intent is to look at first statute, statutory language and words of the construed "[i]f everyday meaning, are according to clear and their common meaning, give unambiguous express plain we will effect to the Jones, 261, supra, it is written.” 336 Md. at 647 A.2d 1204. statute as 537; 559, Rose, Parrison, supra, supra, See 335 Md. at 644 A.2d also 906; State, 20, 359, 41, Outmezguine A.2d v. 335 Md. 335 Md. at 643 (1994). 641 870 A.2d

449 however, They argue, Mary remedial nature of (that comprehensive land’s motor vehicle insurance scheme damages to victims of assuring compensation motor vehicle accidents, as noted in 302 Jennings, Md. at 488 A.2d 169), “a given must be liberal construction effectuate its Even a “liberal construction” of purpose.” employing Section 19-502(b), we cannot construe it to mean what Stearmans illogical To do so would be and unreasonable. See suggest. (1997) State, 423, 429, v. 422 Greco (noting that our is to statutes their “most reasonable goal give sense, logic accord with and common and to interpretation, avoid construction not otherwise evident words used”); State, 125, 137, Frost actually (1994) (stating that we will avoid constructions are unreasonable, sense”). or inconsistent “illogical, with common previously, As noted purpose Maryland com “ pulsory insurance statutes is to recovery for inno ‘[assure] ” Farm, cent victims of motor vehicle accidents.’ Md. at 516 A.2d at 590 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Fund., Ins. Co. v. Maryland Auto. Ins. (1976)). Despite allure of the idea of total

compensation innocent victim aof motor vehicle accident, no there is indication that the Assembly’s General purpose enacting the compulsory insurance statutes towas complete assure insurance recovery for all victims.9 As we contrast, Delaware, By 9. public policy in the is different: public policy The of Responsibility Delaware’s Financial Laws favors compensation to all victims of automobile accidents. The Gener- full Assembly al public policy implemented by intended for that be affording opportunities acquiring statutorily for more than the man- dated minimum coverage. amount of automobile insurance Nation- wide’s modified household statutory exclusion is with inconsistent the purpose encouraging driving public ol' the purchase Delaware statutory more than the minimum amount of automobile coverage. Seeman, 915, (Del.1997) Nationwide Gen. Co. Ins. v. 702 A.2d omitted). added) (citations (emphasis The Stearmans would like tous rely on Seeman to previous determine the outcome of case. this Our issue, interpretations however, Maryland public policy on this not do Farm, purpose view that as State in we “do not stated coverage, minimum beyond prescribed extending Farm, concerned.” State exclusion’ so far as ‘household 640, Clearly, at 590. if the General 307 Md. complete insur something had intended closer Assembly victims, or they all would have said so recovery ance minimum mandatory liability limits. increased the State Farm argue that we should overrule The Stearmans us, however, Mut. v. Nationwide. have convinced They not mandatory public (regarding that the exclusions) has State since changed and household have us Farm was decided. they why Neither shown Farm was flawed and should be overruled. State in reasoning Bozman, that Bozman v. 376 Md. argue do They Boblitz, (2003) 242, 462 A.2d and Boblitz v. (1983), policy regarding interspousal changed public result, we the public that as should rethink immunity10 and State the insurance discussed as outlined statutes Farm. interspousal immunity change relevant (three Farm and years in 1983 before doctrine occurred Jennings), with the issuance of this Court’s two before years Boblitz. abrogated In that opinion partially Therefore, agree public policy in Seeman. we are with the described persuaded follow Delaware's resolution issue. Bozman, complete we noted in statement of rationale As Lusby Lusby, underlying provided doctrine was Blackstone, (1978), (1 with attribution to W. 78-79 Blackstone, Commentaries, 443): pp. Ch. Book marriage, person "By wife one in the the husband and are law: is, during very being legal suspended woman existence marriage, incorporated into or at least is and consolidated cover, performs wing, protection, and the husband: under whose she feme-covert, everything; called in our law french a and is therefore covert-baron, co-operta; to be a or under viro is said foemina lord; husband, baron, protection her or her and influence of her marriage injured upon .... If wife be condition is called coverture bring person property, no in her her she can action redress concurrence, name, well in his as her without her husband's making be the husband a defen- own: neither can she sued without dant.” interspousal immunity common law doctrine of cases Boblitz, in 296 Md. at 462 A.2d at sounding negligence. If in change the Court believed that such common law required a declaration that household exclusions in liability invalidated, be completely automobile insurance should could have done so in State Farm or Jennings.11 Our Bozman, holding completely in which invalidated the doctrine (by taking of interspousal immunity away immunity tort), of analysis. kind intentional adds little The of whether of question abrogation interspousal in immunity sounding change cases negligence should our view household exclusions has not been before directly this however, Court. The Court Special Appeals, has addressed the issue and decided that Boblitz not did demand the invali dation of household exclusions above amounts required by statute. Walther v. Allstate Insurance Company, Md.App. (1990), denied, 575 A.2d 339 cert. (1990). In that the Walthers made the same argu ment made the Stearmans the case at bar.

Because Boblitz abolished interspousal immunity in negli- cases, gence the Walthers aver that the limitation on house- hold claims imposed Maryland Financial Responsibil- ity the public Law violates policy derived from Boblitz. Walthers reason that abrogation of interspousal immuni- ty not permits Mrs. Walther to sue her husband for all damages she sustained as a result of his negligence but to assert that because the Financial Responsibility Law prohibits them from recovering damages in excess of $20,000 it public violates policy. Overlooked by that sim- plistic argument is the fact that Mrs. pre- Walther is not appear opinions 11. It Jennings does from the State Farm or anyone argued abrogation interspousal immunity that the Boblitz analysis validity should be considered its the Court in Nonetheless, policies. household exclusions clearly Court reasoning was aware of could have used its Boblitz exclusions, thought invalidate household if it such a course were necessary or desirable. 452 her husband in ex- recovering damages from from

eluded $20,000 $20,000 than merely obtaining cess but from more carrier, from her husband’s insurance Allstate.

Walther, agree at Md.App. 83 575 A.2d 340-41. We reasoning ques court’s on this appellate the intermediate with tion. no that question public policy regarding

There is The law may changed. sue each other has is spouses whether sue other for Spouses anything clear. can each crystal now could, no spouse fear that the defendant strangers with as a defense. interspousal immunity be to raise permitted will (2003) Bozman, (completing 830 A.2d 450 the 376 Md. doctrine, time, first including of the for the abrogation Boblitz, tort); 296 of intentional 506 type (1983) sounding negli the doctrine as cases (abrogating (1978) 334, 335, Lusby v. 390 77 gence); Lusby, constituting the the the doctrine where conduct (abrogating “intentional”). pre The question was “outrageous” tort bar, however, question in the case different sented is, pays judgment, who the altogether. question spouse’s compa or the insurance negligent spouse negligent change public policy regarding ny? Maryland’s Does interspousal immunity require common law doctrine of spouse pay of the for the company negligent insurance injured spouse, of the even contract recovery though spouse company the insurance negligent between will no above the recovery statutorily that there be provides provision clearly mínimums? a contract Such mandatory requirements under the minimum laid allowable Legislature. out represented by recognize public policy

We interspousal immunity doctrine complete abrogation public policy as a that conflicts with the could be viewed re mandatory in the embodied set For noted Legislature. example, quirements Bozman, of the of the inter- underpinnings this Court in one prevented the notion that it immunity doctrine was spousal

453 Bozman, claims. collusive and fraudulent Md. at “ Boblitz, unjust A.2d at 462. ‘it We noted seems of the deny many potentiality the claims of the because ” Boblitz, 268-69, fraud by the few.’ A.2d at Hack, Hack v. 495 Pa. 433 A.2d 859 (quoting Risko, (1981), in turn Immer v. quoting N.J. (1970)). Similarly, from protection insurer cozy traditionally

“collusive or claims” has been reason policies. household exclusions found State Farm Briscoe, 245 Company Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Md. (1967).12 147, 151, 270, 225 A.2d 271 Nonetheless, Assembly, we think that the not General the Court, is the appropriate body to reconcile those conflicting policies, light in that policy directly fact the at issue in this case is result of in place. statute the first There no power doubt that this Court had the abrogate to the law of Bozman, common doctrine interspousal immunity. 494, Moreover, 376 Md. at 830 at 470. the despite value “ of the doctrine of stare decisis and fact ‘changes the that decisional ordinarily doctrine should be left to legisla- the ” ture,’ Bozman, 492, 376 Md. at 830 A.2d at (quoting 468 Boblitz, 273, 521), 296 at 462 A.2d we recognized “eminently Bozman that it was wise” abrogate of Court to a common law doctrine that had an vestige become outmoded Bozman, of the past. 376 Md. 830 A.2d at 470. addition, 12. In provided the idea that divorce and criminal courts adequate injuries spouses provided underpin remedies for to another Bozman, ning interspousal immunity. of the doctrine of 376 Md. at rejecting good 830 In keep that as a to idea reason doctrine, punish the we noted in that criminal courts can Boblitz and " abuse, may provide escape 'equated divorce from but that cannot be " right with Boblitz, compensation personal injuries.' a civil and for redress (quoting 296 Md. at A.2d at Merenoff, Merenoff v. (1978)) (citations omitted). 76 N.J. 388 A.2d While it appears person signed clear to us that mere fact that permit insurance contract that not recovery injury does spouse necessarily one’s injured spouse does not with interfere compensation receiving injuries, keeping we see that can household abrogation interspousal immunity exclusions in the face of the of could appear inconsistent. contrast, stark that the

By public Stear a policy us to now is not that has been urge change mans Rather, common it was developed by through courts law. and Legislature policy, an act of the created ordinari of can As ly only Legislature change policy.13 an act Shearin, ex rel. Sonner noted this Court (1974), 502, 510, law 325 A.2d the common “[w]hen statute, constitutional, collide, if and a controls.” statute province Assembly will not invade the of General We them, may no how or fair just rewrite the law for matter think a new would be. formida public policy such law separation powers demands that the courts ble doctrine sphere belongs uniquely judiciary— remain in the Arti interpreting, creating, that of but law. Legis “[t]hat cle 8 of the Constitution declares lative, ought Executive and powers Judicial Government other; from no be forever and distinct each separate Departments of one of exercising the functions said person discharge shall assume or duties other.” Montgomery County As we stated Harrison v. Board of Education, 442, 460, (1983),

in a considering long-established whether common law of unchanged by legislature the and thus reflective rule — this unsound in the circumstances public policy State’s —is life, always recognized of modern have declaration the of normally of the is function public policy the Assembly.... General Harrison was whether in the question

The Court should modify negli- doctrine of judicially-created contributory Id. leaving The gence. principle at 894. Legislature strong- is even public policy the creation of one, in a in present public policy er case such as the where the in in- Legislature one the first question by is created unconstitutional, legislative question judiciary 13. If the in were act in power step has to in and it so. There is no contention declare however, constitutionally rights protected this are at stake. Harrison, in stance.14 As discussed rationale underly- “[t]he ing these refuse to a common abrogate [to decisions law legislature is declined doctrine] buttressed where to legislation enact the proposed change.” to effectuate Harri- son, 295 Md. at 456 A.2d at 904. The refusal of the Legislature act to a enacted change legislatively public to (as one) to a common law even opposed provides greater support the Court exercise restraint and refuse in change, and make the unless step constitutional violations exist.

Therefore, it is that we important attempts discuss the past the General recent Assembly change to make the urge Every Stearmans us to make now. year since legislators have introduced in the bills General Assembly would require companies to offer insureds liability coverage for claims made a member in family the same coverage amount for claims purchased made by nonfamily a member. None of these were bills enacted until year, this when the Bill signed Governor Senate 460 into law.15 Hart, 526, 532-33, 14. As we stated Allstate Insurance v. (1992): Jennings invalidity [I]t is clear from the and State Farm cases that the household exclusion clauses in motor vehicle insurance entirely upon specific statutory provisions mandating based motor insurance, particular coverages requiring specified vehicle mini- mums, exclusions, authorizing exceptions generally some and authorizing coverages. required Jennings other from exclusions and State support, reject, Farm do not fact the notion that public policy there a hostile household exclusion clauses which beyond scope statutorily extends insurance cover- ages. language requires 15. The law an insurer to offer to the first liability policy "liability named insured under a motor vehicle by family for claims made member in the same amount as die by nonfamily claims made member under the Laws, Chap. binder.” 2004 Md. case at bar is not affected law, terms, only apply new which its own will motor vehicle issued, delivered, insurance or binders or renewed on 1, Laws, 127, January Chap. or after 2005. 2004 Md. Section 3. requires study The new also law the Insurance Commissioner "to the impact on requir- motor vehicle rates” a result of ing coverage. insurers to offer report The Commissioner must recognized has Legislature further evidences that This As and chosen to do so. stated in this area need act Harrison, of the plaintiffs the force recognize “while we law, we ‘in state of the leave present argument, ” Har- Legislature.’ doctrine to the change in the established 463, rison, (quoting A.2d 894 at 905 White Md. 442 at 763, (1966)). 348, 355, v. 223 A.2d King, Md. Kim, 276, v. 829 A.2d 611 376 Md. In Allstate Insurance (2003), Assembly Act of the General we discussed the 2001 in a motor immunity of abolishing parent-child defense 281, discussing A.2d at 613. In action. Id. at vehicle tort Maryland, immunity doctrine history parent-child that: we noted excep- entreaties to add additional rejected several

[w]e torts, despite from motor exis- arising tion actions Frye Maryland. limited compulsory tence of Warren, 542, (1986); Warren v. 305 Md. 505 A.2d 826 Frye, [(1994)]; Renko v. Mc- 650 A.2d 252 supra, 336 Md. [(1997)]; Lean, Eagan v. 697 A.2d 468 supra, 346 Md. Calhoun, supra, ^[72] at 698 A.2d ^[1097] at 1102 Warren, [(1997)]. the beliefs expressed we Frye In immunity of torts from the doctrine that exclusion motor inevitably impact compulsory some on the insur- would have that, if an Legislature ance mandated program made, it created kind was to be should “be exception Assembly appropri- after an examination by the General current light ate considerations 839; 505 A.2d supra, scheme.” Frye, Warren, at 257. supra, 336 Md. at not make an If we would 829 A.2d at Id. doctrine for motor parent-child immunity exception so would impact that to do recognition torts because of laws, why no should see reason we compulsory insurance compulso- Legislature to affect province invade immunity. they interspousal relate to ry insurance laws as January findings Assembly on 2008. 2004 to the General or before Laws, Chap. Section 2. It is interesting to note that when the Legislature acted 2001 to the doctrine abrogate parent-child immunity actions, motor tort it did so within the limits of the mandatory by amounts the Trans- required 806(b) portation Article. Section of the Courts and Judicial 5— Proceedings Article provides:

The right of action a parent or the estate of a parent against a child of the parent, byor a child or the estate of a against child, child parent death, for wrongful personal injury, or property damage out of arising operation of a motor vehicle ... not be may restricted the doctrine of parent-child immunity by any insurance poliey provisions, up to the mandatory minimum liability 17-103(b) § levels required by of the Transporta- tion Article. (1974, VoL), 5-806(b)

Md.Code 2002 Repl. of the Courts and Judicial Article. Proceedings Contrary Stearmans’ arguments that the current compulsory insurance laws display a public policy that would demand complete insurance cover- age for injury to spouses, Legislature did not see fit to provide complete insurance coverage for injury to children and parents. There is no reason presume an undeclared public is more favorable to husbands and wives than to children parents. Nor can we assume that we misread Farm, public policy when we decided State and later cases Farm,. that cited State We see no reason to overrule that case, especially view of the fact that to do so way Stearmans suggest would constitute an unlawful intrusion into the province of the Legislature.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTI- MORE COUNTY AFFIRMED. APPELLANT TO PAY ALL COSTS.

BELL, C.J., dissents and files opinion joined by BATTAGLIA, J.

BELL, Chief Judge, dissenting, joined BATTAGLIA, J. It is well settled that the Maryland General Assembly mandated that Maryland all automobiles be covered poli insurance that contain certain

cies of automobile (1977, Vol.), §§ 17- Repl. Code coverages. Maryland See Article and Transportation 101 to 17-110 of the (1995, Vol.), §§ 19-501 19-516 of Repl. Code G.E.I.C.O., Article; Jennings v. Insurance 166, 167 (1985). automo Pertinent each include minimally must bile arising for or bodily injury the claims death “payment for of $20,000 one to any person up to and up from an accident of 17-103(b)(1) § $40,000 more of persons,” two or Article, Article; § and 19-504 of Insurance Transportation $10,000. 17- up § of liability insurance property damage 103(b)(2) Article; § 19-504 of the Insur Transportation of the Article, § Article.1 19-502 of the Insurance ance Section nevertheless, prevented] clear that “an insurer not [is makes vehicle insur issuing, or motor selling, delivering from of the provide liability coverage ance excess Law.” In this requirements Maryland Vehicle liability coverage was for a face amount of insurance contract required of statutorily in excess amounts. lawfully contracts and may appropriately While insurance risks, consistently held that particular exclude this Court has mandated, statutorily “exclusions from by will Legislature generally not authorized expressly See, Allstate, v. e.g., be 341 Md. recognized. Enterprise not 547, (1996) (‘Where 541, 509, Legislature 671 512 A.2d this Court not create coverage, has mandated insurance will statute’); specifically exclusions that are not set out in the 669, Mutual, 686, Horn Md. 641 A.2d v. Atlantic 334 Van 203(1994) (‘this 195, invalid insur generally Court has held waived, include, medical, required coverages hospital, 1. Other unless $2,500, ("P.I.P.") disability covering up and funeral benefits insureds families, regard- specified persons, of and their well as classes other fault, (1977, Vol.), 17-103(b)(3) Repl. Maryland § Code 2002 less Article; (1995, Vol.) Transportation Repl. Code 2002 19-505(a) Article, coverage, § uninsured motorist of the Insurance and Any permitted § Article. the PIP or 19-509 of the Insurance waiver of § accomplished pursuant 19- uninsured motorist must be respectively, of the Insurance Article. 506 19-510

459 limitations, exclusions exceptions anee which were statutorily required coverages expressly not Hart, v. Allstate Ins. Co. Legislature’); authorized v. 526, 531-532, 100, 102(1992); Larimore 611 327 Md. Co., 622, Ins. 617, 889, American 552 G, Ins. & (1989); Nationwide Mutual Co. v. USF Co., v. 131, 141, 69, (1988); Gable Colonial Ins. 550 A.2d 135, (1988) (‘As 313 Md. 548 A.2d matter construction, Legislature where insurance, specified coverages particular category and has provided exceptions for certain exclusions to the required coverages, generally additional exclusions are Wheeler, Lee v. permitted’); 310 Md. 528 A.2d (‘we (1987) imply will not exclusions nor recognize exclusions beyond those enumerated expressly legis v. lature’); Jennings Government Employees, (Ve (1985) will not insert exclu sions from the required coverages beyond expressly those Nationwide Mutual Legislature’); set forth Ins. Webb, 721, 730, 465, (1981)] (“condi Md. [291 436 471 endorsement, in tions or limitations uninsured motorist than provide which less the coverage required by the stat ute, Gartelman, void”); Pennsylvania Natl v.Mut. are 288 151, 160-161, (1980).” Md. 416 A.2d 739 West Am. Ins. Co. Popa, v. 455, 475, 352 Md. 723 A.2d 10- 11(1998). also Progressive See Salamon v. Classic Insurance 301, 303-304, Company, (2004). 379 860 Boblitz, The Boblitz v. Court of in Appeals, 296 Md. (1983), A.2d 506 abolished inter-spousal immunity in negli- gence cases.2 In so holding, concluding there was no “subsisting public policy” justify doctrine, retention of the it rejected the reasons asserted favor of that immunity “no providing reasonable basis denial of recovery for tortious personal injury.” 296 Md. at 462 A.2d at 521. 2. This completely inter-spousal immunity. Court since abolished Bozman, (2003) v. (abrogating Bozman A.2d 450 cases). inter-spousal immunity in intentional tort result, and, indeed, or signifi- the necessary logical

The injured cance, place spouse the Boblitz was decision i.e., one permit spouse with equal footing strangers, on an to recover the negligence damages other for to sue the a stranger to the same extent as which he or she is entitled dependent upon the decision was not Significantly, could. so, and, existence, nonexistence, if of insurance. Whether how, Responsibility impact Financial law would Maryland in which insurance is resource was inter-spousal on suits presented. this kept must be mind when issue foregoing

The first impression considered. An issue of case presents Court,3 validity it an household exclusion involves to wife recovery amount of the available that reduces the as a of the injured negligence in an accident result automobile insur- from the face amount of husband’s her husband The limits. ance policy at issue in this case of automobile car, a temporary “insured” in terms of the insured defines car included the newly acquired car or a replacement addition, provided In spouse. named insured’s by the excludes IN- ANY MEMBER OF AN

“ANY INSURED OR THE FAMILY RESIDING IN INSURED’S SURED’S Special Appeals precise issue of Court of has addressed "whether, light Appeals Court of decision v. Boblitz Boblitz, (1983), declaring interspous 462 A.2d 506 invalid immunity, determining ‘in the limit of al circuit court erred is the liability for insurance for claims household members’ ” ‘required by Responsibility Financial Law.’ amount 405, 406, Company, Md.App. Insurance Walther Allstate 339, held, (1990). again precisely, That court "that household 48A, by [pres § exclusionary clause sanctioned Md. Ann.Code art. 19-509(f) ently applies to insured Article] of the Insurance the named his, her, or their to the extent that and all members of household minimum,” "a policy coverage exceeds the household may the amount a household member recover to exclusion limits by Matyland Responsibility Id. at Financial Law.” sum mandated 411-12, injured In at 342-43. Mrs. Walther was getting insured and was while out of the automobile that Mr. Walther driving. TO THE EXTENT THE HOUSEHOLD LIMITS OF LIA- BILITY THIS OF POLICY EXCEED THE LIMITS OF REQUIRED LIABILITY BY LAW.” Stearman, Stearman, Jay Carla the wife of collectively the “Stearmans,” appellants injured or the was in a collision car, involving a of which her husband single was driver. alleged injuries She that her her were result of husband’s negligence. holds majority that the household is valid. exclusion It Ins., Jennings

relies on Employees Government 302 Md. (1985) and, State Farm 488 A.2d 166 Mut. v. primarily, Mut., al, Nationwide et (1986). In Jennings, injured insured was while a passenger car owned him driven his stepson, who resided in the insured’s household. The automobile liability insurance policy which the insured carried on the car contained an exclusion “[bjodily to an injury insured or family member of an insured residing the insured’s household.” 302 Md. at In A.2d at 167. response to insured’s action, declaratory judgment in which he sought declaration that, because the household exclusion in was “void contrary statute,” because it is obligated GEICO was pay judgment default he had obtained his against stepson, judgment GEICO filed a declaratory action its own. It sought that, a declaration exclusion, virtue of the insured Id. was “not entitled any coverage.” A.2d at 167. This Court reversed the judgment the trial court, upheld which had validity of the household exclusion Id. provision. 488 A.2d at 171. Rejecting GEICO’s defense of the validity the household exclusion clause on the basis that no Maryland statutory provision expressly forbids it, we held

“the household exclusion clause is inconsistent with public policy which the Assembly General adopted Ch. 73 of the Acts providing for compulsory automobile 462 re- specified for all automobiles with

insurance quired coverages.”

Id. at 357, at 488 A.2d 168. nor

State Farm addressed an issue neither decid presented Jennings, wholly the ‘household exclusion’ ed in “[w]hether invalid, invalidity only extends to the amount or whether its by compulsory liability coverage required the minimum 633, A.2d at In that insurance law.” 307 Md. at 516 586-87. provided insurance at issue policy the automobile liability by injury limits above the minimum bodily coverage law, insured or injury “any it but excluded in the insured’s house family residing of an insured’s member 633, hold.” Id. at at 586. The named insured was 516 A.2d automobile, he a in which was injured when his insured friend, was off the road who passenger, was driven The the insured’s driver’s permission. car with driving sought declaratory judgment carrier insurance exclusion,” issue, a “household exclusion at denominated 634, Id. 516 A.2d at 586. against public policy. was as void of a exclusion’ segment held “that the ‘insured’ ‘household We in an is invalid clause4 automobile liability coverage. far of the minimum So extent compulsory evidenced public policy as the concerned, it is contractual law is a valid and enforceable 1, deliberate, as in which the Court 4. The limitation was footnote exclusion,” clear: of the ‘‘household makes defined nature before us in this case involves two distinct ‘‘The ‘household exclusion’ components. is the of the insured. The second is the One exclusion family residing in the members insured's household. exclusion implicate only components.” first of facts before us these Mut., 1, n. Mut. v. Nationwide 307 633 State Farm Court, (1986). while n. 1 See footnote which the why Company, Meyer v. Farm Auto. Insurance explaining Mutual banc), (Colo.1984) (en which dealt with intra- a case 689 P.2d inter-spousal immunity, persua- family immunity, was rather than that, sive, only case us with the pointed out “Since the before deals exclusion,’ intra-family portion ... of the ‘household ‘insured’ court no immunity considered the Colorado have concerns that were pertinence n. n. 4. See also 307 Md. at 640 at 590 here.” footnote Md. at above that provision minimum.” Id.

A.2d at 592. We provision “[a] reasoned contractual invalid, but public policy violates the extent of the conflict between the stated the contractual public policy provision,” explaining:

“The here that all public policy involved automobile bodily injury liability shall contain or death $20,000/$40,000. in at the coverage least amount of To permit operate the ‘household exclusion’ to within those limits would be to of ‘deprive injured persons protection the Legislature which the intended to ... and provide’ would violate But public policy.... liability coverage in excess of expressly that minimum is in ‘Nothing authorized. in subtitle or 17 of Transportation prevents Title the Article issuing, selling, an insurer from delivering or of motor vehicle providing liability in excess the requirements Maryland Vehicle Law.’ ... ‘There shall be to available the insured the opportunity to for higher contract amounts than provided those under Title 17 of the ... Transportation Article ’. The General Assembly has not of parties restricted the ability contract or to limit respect with that ‘excess’ or those ‘higher amounts.’ The public policy embodied in the com- pulsory insurance law extends to liability coverage up to and including the statutory coverage.” Id. Keystone 592 (quoting Mut. Cas. Co. Hinds, 676, 682, (1942); 26 A.2d Maryland (1957, Vol., 48A, Code 1979 Repl. Supp.), Cum. Art. 541(b) 541(c)(2)) (some omitted). § citations indicated, As this Court considered before the impact of the abolition of immunity on the inter-spousal viabili of a ty clause an insurance an policy containing household exclusion bodily from injury coverage above the minimum Nevertheless, statutorily mandated amount. rather than do afresh, analysis ing noting that the Court Special Appeals addressed the issue in Walther v. Allstate Insurance Company, 83 Md.App. (1990), 575 A.2d majority sets simply out the made argument by Walthers argument it is acknowledges that identical agrees that it with make in this case states

the Stearmans reasoning. court’s at 451- appellate the intermediate Moreover, public it that the 548-49. concedes clear[, can “crystal s]pouses sue each could, strangers with no fear that anything other for raise im permitted interspousal will be spouse defendant reminiscent of munity Taking approach as a defense.” Id. court, howev majority argues, that taken Walther er: is, negligent pays judgment,

“The who question Does spouse’s company? spouse negligent the common Maryland’s policy regarding change public the insurance immunity require law of interspousal doctrine recovery for the spouse pay company negligent though even the contract between injured spouse, spouse company provides and the insurance negligent recovery statutorily required no above the there will be clearly a contract is allowable provision mínimums? Such mandatory requirements by laid out the under the minimum Legislature.” event, that, 452, In it concludes

Id. at 849 A.2d at 549. public policy displayed by that the though “recognizing] even interspousal immunity doctrine abrogation the complete with public policy viewed as a that conflicts the could be insurance mandatory liability the minimum re- displayed by id., “the Assem- set the General by Legislature,” quirements Court, body not is to reconcile these bly, appropriate the 453, at 849 A.2d at 549. conflicting policies.” Id. Farm, stating than respect holding

With to State other it, holding underlying characterizing and the rationale “clear,” juris- majority its conclusion that noting “[t]he the issue before us has reached squarely dictions that address case,” majority in this a result consistent with ours its that it analysis logic support little conclusion provides Id. at 849 A.2d dispositive. is sure, rejects advanced majority argument be To Am. Ins. Co. v. 352 Md. appellants, Popa, that West (1998) dispositive, consistently 723 A.2d as “this Court has held that exclusions from mandated cov- statutorily erage expressly Legislature not authorized generally will be their recognized.” Stating argument not persuasive, the what we majority simply repeats said Van Co., 669, 694-95, Horn v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. (1994), 207-08 in distinguishing State Farm from that case: Mut.,

“In Farm v. supra., Mut. Nationwide this Court Jennings reaffirmed its earlier holding Government Ins., Employees supra Md. that a ‘household exclusion’ clause in an automobile insur- contrary ance was public policy embodied Maryland’s compulsory motor vehicle insurance law. We Farm, however, went inon State to hold that the household only exclusion clause was invalid to the extent of the statu- $20,000/$40,- minimum torily prescribed liability coverage of pointed 000. We that it ‘readily out could be inferred that the premium took account of the exclusion in the contained (307 589), policy’ 516 A.2d at majority jurisdictions compulsory insurance had invalidated house- hold exclusion clauses to the extent of statutorily (307 prescribed mandatory 591-592), 516 A.2d at and that a general ‘[a]s rule, (307 parties they are free contract as wish’ Md. at 592).” 516 A.2d at 19-502(b) argument To the appellants Article, pursuant Insurance to which the company more may provide than the minimum amount of insurance carried, that, required to be reflects a legislative intent once greater amount been provided, exclusions from that amount coverage may not made except when explicitly permit- legislative act, ted by the majority’s only response is that: 502(b)] “The plain language [§ of evidences an intention 19— companies to insurance permit to offer that contain greater coverage than that statute. required certainly It does not to require provide insurance companies coverage than greater that mandated display statute. Nor does it embodied change public policy a intention to legislative re- liability coverage minimum statutorily in the mandated have cited no case The Stearmans quirements. such position.” that supports 448, 849 A.2d at 546-47. 381 Md. at majority simply wrong. The majority states that citing any authority, Without and a in an contract between an insurer insurance provision recovery by spouse’s for no negligent spouse, providing statutorily mandated amount injured above spouse mandatory minimum “is allowable under clearly at 549. 381 Md. at On requirements.” Indeed, it is the opposite that is not at all clear. contrary, clear, an is not allowable clearly that is exclusion such vehicle motor provides “[e]ach Section 19-504 issued, sold, in the State or delivered shall specified in Title 17 of the minimum provide 17-103(b) of Trans- Article.” Transportation Section Article, turn, provides: portation “(b) shall security provide under subtitle required The for least:

“(1) injury for or death bodily The of claims payment $20,000 any person from an to one arising up accident $40,000 more two or addition up persons, to costs; to interest and

“(2) others property damaged of claims for payment $15,000, in addition destroyed up an accident of costs; interest and

“(3) waived, § under 19-505 the benefits described Unless required primary Article as basic cover- the Insurance age; and

“(4) under 19-509 of the Insurance required The benefits coverage.” Article additional 19-502, however, more makes clear that than Section insurer, be offered an insured may providing:

“(b) nor 17 of Transportation Neither this subtitle Title or issuing, selling, Article an insurer from deliver- prevents ing provide motor vehicle in liability coverage excess of the requirements Maryland Vehicle Law.” that,

It is in addition significant required 17-103(b) includes, coverage injury, § for bodily unless waived, P.I.P. in a basic amount primary Even coverage. significantly, uninsured motorist more the General Assembly provided that those latter expressly coverages be excluded with may respect particular persons. 19-505(c)(l)

Section states: “An insurer may exclude from the described this section benefits for:

* * * * “(ii) family The named insured or a member the named insured who resides in the named insured’s household for an injury that occurs while the named family insured or mem- is ber an motor occupying by: uninsured vehicle owned insured; “1. The named or “2. An family immediate member the named insured

who resides the named insured’s household. “(2) In the case of motorcycles, an insurer may:

“(i) Exclude economic loss benefits described in this

section; or “(ii) deductibles, Offer the economic loss benefits with or

options, specific exclusions.” 19-509(f) Similarly, an permits insurer to exclude from the required uninsured motorist coverage:

“(1) The named or family insured member the named insured who resides the named insured’s household an injury that occurs when the named insured family or mem- ber or occupying pedestrian is struck as a by an unin- sured motor vehicle owned the named insured family immediate member of the named insured who household; resides the named insured’s “(2) insured, family member the named The named household, in and the named insured’s insured who resides applicable has other motor vehicle other individual who any insured, injury when the named insurance for an occurs member, is occupying other individual is or struck family or by insured motor vehicle while pedestrian as a by who is or used an individual operated motor vehicle is coverage under 27-606 of this article.” excluded from applicable to the provision There no exclusion comparable liability coverage. primary Assembly the General ex Jennings, noting

In after be by all automobiles covered pressly mandated that required coverages, 302 containing certain policies automobile 168-69, out that pointed 488 A.2d at this Court specified authorized provisions “expressly same statutory Id. at required coverages.” from the exclusions those related cancellations Mentioning specifically at 169. driving claims a result records or or non-renewals as 240C-1, 48A, § Art. permit in former experience, codified coverage, motorist ted exclusions from P.I.P. and uninsured 541(c)(2) 48A, §§ in Art. the Court stated prescribed we will not from rule: insert exclusions general “generally expressly set forth required coverages beyond by those on v. Federal Legislature.” Kemper relied DeJarnette We Co., (1984); Pennsylvania 475 A.2d 454 299 Md. Ins. Gartelman, 151, 156, 159-160, 416 Nat’l Mut. Gartelman, (1980). to validate an In we refused injured while a occupying exclusion for insured who was insured, it was not one of by noting a named car owned provided Legislature. expressly the four exclusions seen, in Popa. that rule was reiterated As we have Moreover, that, we noted that case Farm ... not been holding of the State Mut. “[t]he other automobile insurance this Court applied so, This provisions.” explained, because: exclusions Amer- of the broad advanced West “Adoption proposition motor vehicle insur- permit up ican would insurers load exclusions, thereby of invalid anee with multitude limiting numerous situations coverage on mínimums instead of the stated limits set forth example, the insured’s declaration For an insured page. $300,000 he was insur- purchase could what believed ance, $300,000 insurance, and, pay for premium accident, $20,000/$40,000 after an discover that he has liability insurance fell within one because the circumstances many exceptions or more of the invalid exclusions or in the more in policy. paid Persons who much premi- could, ums many excess mínimums circumstances, receive no more than those who only paid coverages.” 352 Md. at 723 A.2d at 12. We refused extend the Farm holding beyond State the household exclusion clause which was involved that case. Farm, terms,

State its by express to be “professed” very footnote, narrow decision—in its first acknowledged the Court exclusion, the two of the components household out pointing one, the insured component, and applied, expressed its on holding that basis. 307 Md. at 516 A.2d at 587. Walther, reasoning whose the majority professes accept, relied if on State Farm. Although entirely, wholly, almost not Walther so, majority this to recognized be it was persuad- ed “to draw the inference [in State opinion Court’s Farm Nationwide] more sweeping than the footnote be,” professes it to the fact that the Court Appeals cases,5 rejected Md.App. certain 575 A.2d at 341- reason, For 342. the same it conclude that “State Farm implicitly approved household exclusion clause’s applica- id., spouses tion to of insured motor vehicle operators,” told, strengthened, inference are “those foreign cases which State Farm relied and ‘aligned’ upon Court Co., Estep v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 103 N.M. P.2d (1985); Co., Hughes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 236 N.W.2d 870 (N.D.1975); Co., Meyer v. State Mut. Farm Auto. Ins. P.2d (Colo. 1984). express 342. The exclusion itself.”6 Id. holding was one on which the Walther premised court its 545(c), 19-509(1), § 48A, permitting now in Art. contained “the uninsured motorist to exclude from the insurer in the family residing of his named insured members that is an uninsured motor vehicle occupying household when of his immediate named insured or member owned his residing in household.” family from not an exclusion That does sanction provision comparable there is no exclu- primary liability coverage, and Therefore, coverage. from that expressly provided sion Moreover, our precedents. flies in the face of Walther holding Farm State on the breadth of Walther wrong also policy question. as the public decision well in scope, Farm to be narrow only professed crafted, was, fact, narrowly it from the it was judging way in dissent Walther: I explained drawn. As its by necessary implication, “The and scope opinion, on. The Court was very early limitations were established footnote, out, what at issue in the first was point careful to and, indeed, not. it eases pro what As discussed the was con, legisla- presented, pertinent issue note, subject, on the it was careful bearing tive action actions, footnote, or the usually they, in a how it was that fact, it. In careful pertinent to the issue before were context, footnotes, in makes obvious reading of the rationale, rather upon focused the Court’s entire discussion context, the of the various cases and how that than factual the of ‘insured’ viability related to the issue of the rationale Thus, may only the household exclusion. we aspect of cases, con, both pro assess the Court’s discussion aspect of the exclusion. in the context of the ‘insured’ (1981); Pennsylvania Young, P.2d Dewitt 229 Kan. v. Parker, (1984); Mut. Ins. 282 S.C. 320 S.E.2d 458 Nat. Cas. Co., Bishop (Ky.1981); Arceneaux v. v. Allstate Ins. 623 S.W.2d 865 Co., P.2d Ins. 113 Ariz. State Farm Mutual Automobile Exch., ; (1976) Farmers 93 Nev. 566 P.2d 81 Estate Neal v. Ins. of (1977) . Farm, terms, Indeed, very I its does believe segment of family not even address the ‘other members’ the sufficient, the household exclusion. If were Court’s seen, holding, explicitly as have addressed “ segment” ‘insured’ of household exclusion. Conse- very I do not believe that broad quently, majority’s reading of State Farm is correct.” “And, in my opinion, holding, the Court’s limitation of its so, it particularly way in view of the careful in which did is significant. Since are but of they segments different and, indeed, issue, very same it would have been simple, would have Court provided guidance, clearer simply have unitary addressed the household exclusion And, of given fashion. the different foci the cases discussed Court, incentive, every there was if consider- same, are ations indeed the for the Court to have addressed not, however, together. them It I did as we have seen. believe it did recognized not because it that there are different applicable considerations each segment of the exclusion; the ‘other household members’ segment involves different than considerations does the ‘insured’ segment. itself, And within segment, the ‘other household members’ there are ... sub-segments as to of may each which there considerations, also be different depending the rela- upon ” tionship household member to insured.... 83 Md.App. (Bell, A.2d at 343-44 dissenting). J. might I have mentioned is expressly, certainly what implicit the foregoing, that it one thing allow an insured contract or away his her even when rights, Legislature spoken when, not specifically subject, on the and quite another doing, so he she affects adversely rights of third party strangers, legislative to which the has expressly spoken.

In reality, in the absence of inter-spousal immunity, nature the relationship between spouses, purposes litigation, not that of related persons; rather it is one stranger to stranger: if meaning only immunity

“The abolition of inter-spousal the to maintain an action other spouse against one is able the and, recover from that to importantly, spouse more present No is stranger problem same extent that a could. involved; injured is the as spouse, ed not when insurance solely spouse the stranger, negligent would the looks to however, Where, act is negligence compensation. insurance, exists. covered a somewhat different situation Ordinarily, judice, is the situation sub as “for an damages will for the all provide payment bodily inju to because of obligated pay is legally insured Thus, scenario, a successful unrelated ry....” to from the insurer all of his or is entitled recover litigant After damages policy. her to the face amount of the up Boblitz, spouse an was to recover to same injured able decision, validity majority upholding Under the extent. to excess of the household insurance above exclusion however, injured coming minimum an required, spouse who, in all negligent policy coverage, within the spouse’s insured, to in the same relationship save respects minimum stranger, may as a recover situation result, to paying lip This while service required coverage. immunity, substitutes interspousal Boblitz’s abolition immunity, form of which has the effect of more subtle ” undermining Boblitz. (Bell, This dissenting). Id. 575 A.2d at 345 J. judice. sub reasoning apposite case equally and, majority because it with agrees The Walther case, see Md. at 849 A.2d at rationale of that their support find majority position that the “[njothing purports facts that Boblitz declare 103(b)(1) by Transp. mandated Art. 17— spouse,” does an insured’s apply Md.App. permits provision and that uninsured motorist in an insurance an insurer insert household exclusion They in connection with an uninsured motor vehicle. policy, find in the to limit its right comfort also insurer’s contract, conditions, long such it wishes so impose as it “[contravene] does inhibition or state’s public policy.” Id. at at 342. to those As arguments: is, course, correct,

“The majority purport Boblitz does not to coverage by § declare the minimum 17- mandated 103(b)(1) does not to spouse, an insured’s neither apply but does it to declare that it purport apply. majority’s does 545(c) irrelevant; Art. 48A it permits reliance on is simply such an respect exclusion with to an uninsured motor vehi- cle, not, here, as majority’s insured one. Nor does the upon right reliance the insurer’s limit its have validity.

“To totally hold household exclusion insofar invalid as violence, whatsoever, husband and wife is concerned does no right insured, of an insurer to contract with its case, with public policy. consistent In this public policy spouse favors one permitting negligence sue the other for and to recover for injuries caused that spouse’s negli- gence. That public insured, contravened when the insurer, by contracting with the can limit his or spouse’s her because, effect, contract, This is recovery. so such a least partially, abrogates prior Court’s of inter- abolition spousal sure, would, be immunity. To a holding such and does, as majority says, with right interfere the insurer’s contract; however, with, it does so consistent in the same sense that the requirement of mandatory minimum such, does. As far goes only it as the permits law and no further.” (Bell,

Id. at 575 A.2d at dissenting). J. In this insured insurer contracted insured to provide excess of the minimum amount time, statutorily required to be carried. At the same they purported to exclude that coverage from category risk that the did Assembly General not expressly authorize to be excluded, household, members of the insured’s including, therefore, who, spouse, insured’s virtue of the abolition cases, inter-spousal immunity negligence stranger like a insured, to the is under no with restrictions respect I the at- be recovered. would hold may amount I dissent. Accordingly, exclusion is void. tempted joins expressed. in the views herein BATTAGLIA Judge

Case Details

Case Name: Stearman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance

Court Name: Court of Appeals of Maryland

Date Published: May 14, 2004

Citation: 849 A.2d 539

Docket Number: 67, Sept. Term, 2003

Court Abbreviation: Md.