“[Jeremy] Bentham stated the case against retroactivity most succinctly when he likened it to ‘dog law.’ He was referring to the age-old method of training dogs by waiting until they do what they are to be forbidden to do, and then kicking them.” Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 41.02 (5th ed. 1992) [hereinafter Sutherland]; see Jeremy Bentham, Truth versus Ashhurst, in 5 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 235 (1863) (“They won’t tell a man beforehand what it is he should not do—they won’t so much as allow of his being told: they lie by till he has done something which they say he should not have done, and then they hang him for it. What way, then, has any man of coming at this dog-law?”). This case presents the question of whether Mary land Code (1974, 2006 RepLVol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, § 5-117—enacted in 2003 expressly to extend from three years to seven years the statute of limitations for civil 1 claims stemming from alleged child sexual abuse— permits, at least under certain circumstances, a kicking of Bentham’s dog, albeit in a procedural way.
James Doe challenges here the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, which reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court for Calvert County, the latter having reasoned that the Legislature intended § 5-117 to apply “partially retroactively” to sexual abuse claims filed against him that, as of the effective date of the extended limitations enactment, had not been barred by the previously-applicable three-year limitations period. We hold, for reasons to be explained more fully infra, that, assuming arguendo application of § 5-117 to the claims in the present case represents a retrospective application of the statute, § 5-117 is a procedural and remedial statute, and, accordingly, it may be given such retrospective application to claims that were not-yet barred by the previously-applicable three-year limitations period as of the extended period’s effective date, 1 October 2003.
FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
Mary Roe
2
(“Respondent” or “Roe”) was born on 29 September 1983. She reached the age of majority on 29 September
At the time Roe reached the age of majority, the limitations period on the civil claims stemming from the alleged sexual assaults was governed by Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl. Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Art., § 5-101, which provided that “[a] civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues.... ” Chapter 360 of the Acts of 2003, effective 1 October 2003, however, added § 5-117 to the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, establishing the statute of limitations “for damages arising out of an alleged incident or incidents of sexual abuse that occurred while the victim was a minor” as “7 years [from] the date that the victim attains the age of majority.” Section 2 of Chapter 360, which remains uncodified, provides that “[t]his Act may not be construed to apply retroactively to revive any action that was barred by the application of the period of limitations applicable before October 1, 2003.”
On 3 September 2008, Roe filed a five-count complaint against Doe, alleging (1) assault; (2) battery; (3) false imprisonment; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (5) negligence. Doe responded with a “Motion to Dismiss Complaint and Request for Hearing,” arguing that all of the claims were time-barred because Roe filed her complaint after 28 September 2004, one day shy of three years from the date on which Roe reached the age of majority. Doe asserted that the seven-year statute of limitations did not apply to Roe’s claims against Doe, asserting that “[t]he [Legislature made it clear that the new legislation was prospective only.”
The Circuit Court, on 22 January 2009, heard oral argument on Doe’s motion to dismiss and Roe’s opposition, and took the matter under advisement. On 3 February 2009, the Circuit Court issued a three-page memorandum opinion, holding that all of Roe’s claims 3 were time-barred:
The language is clear that [§ 5-117] cannot be applied retroactively. If the [Legislature intended for CJ § 5-117 to apply to those actions still viable as of October 1, 2003, it would have had to explicitly enact such language. “A statute is presumed to operate prospectively from its effective date, absent clear language to the contrary, or unless the manifest intention of the Legislature indicates otherwise.” Rawlings v. Rawlings,362 Md. 535 , 555[,766 A.2d 98 , 109] (2001). Here, there is no clear language to contradict the presumption that the statute is prospective or has selective retroactivity, as [Roe] contends. Even the legislative history of CJ § 5-117 indicates that the statute is not retroactive. Since the enactment of Chapter 360, the Maryland Legislature has introduced, and rejected, numerous attempts to make § 5-117 retroactive.
Because [Roe]’s cause of action accrued in 2001, before the 2003 enactment of Chapter 360, the “period oflimitations applicable” to her claims is three years. Therefore, [Roe] had until September 28, 2004 to file a complaint, and, thus her complaint, filed September [3], 2008, is time-barred.[ 4 ]
Alternatively, the Circuit Court held that even “[i]f the Court were to apply CJ § 5-117 retrospectively, [Doe]’s due process rights would be infringed because he has a vested right to be free from a suit where the statute of limitations has run.”
Roe noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. A panel of our appellate brethren reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court, explaining that:
SECTION 2 [i.e., the uncodified section] manifests the legislative intent that Chapter 360 have some retroactive application. If Chapter 360 were intended to apply purely prospectively, then it would have sufficed to enact only SECTION 3. In that way, the ordinary rule would apply under which legislation is presumed to operate only prospectively. But, here, it cannot be concluded that Chapter 360 operates only prospectively because, to do so, would render SECTION 2 surplusage, in its entirety. That reading violates a cardinal rule of statutory construction.
SECTION 2, by its plain language, prohibits a construction of CJ § 5-117 that would effect a fully retroactive application that revived causes of action that were barred, prior to the enactment of Chapter 360, under the previously applicable law of limitations. Once again, if the Legislature intended, in addition, that CJ § 5-117 also bar causes of action on which limitations had not run, as of October 1, 2003, under the prior limitations law, then the Legislature did not say so. Further, if that were the legislative intent, it could have been accomplished simply by enacting SECTION 3 and omitting SECTION 2.
Defendant’s position seems to be that the prior limitations law continues to govern claims that arose prior to October 1, 2003, and that CJ § 5-117 governs only claims that arose on or after October 1, 2003. But, that is not what SECTION 2 says. Defendant’s reading would have SECTION 2 state, “That this Act may not be construed to apply retroactively to revive any action that was barred or becomes barred by the application of the period of limitations applicable before October 1, 2003.” Adding words to a statute to affect the meaning manifested by the statute’s plain language is unsound statutory construction.
Roe v. Doe,
[T]he General Assembly did not infringe any vested or substantial right of Defendant when it extended the period of limitations on claims of sexual abuse of minors and made that extension applicable to claims that were not barred, as ofthe effective date of the new legislation, by expiration of the prior limitations period.
Roe,
Doe filed a timely Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which we granted,
Doe v. Roe,
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As we explained in
Menefee v. State,
In reviewing the Circuit Court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, “our task is confined to determining whether the trial court was legally correct in its decision to dismiss.” Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n v. Phillips,413 Md. 606 , 618,994 A.2d 411 , 418 (2010) (quoting Debbas v. Nelson,389 Md. 364 , 372,885 A.2d 802 , 807 (2005)); see Fioretti v. Md. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs,351 Md. 66 , 71,716 A.2d 258 , 261 (1998); Shenker v. Laureate Educ., Inc.,411 Md. 317 , 334,983 A.2d 408 , 418 (2009) (“We review the grant of a motion to dismiss as a question of law.”); Price v. Upper Chesapeake Health Ventures, Inc.,192 Md.App. 695 , 702,995 A.2d 1054 , 1058 (2010), cert. denied,415 Md. 609 ,4 A.3d 514 (2010).
DISCUSSION
Recently, in
Alt v. CIT Technology Financing Services, Inc.,
I. The Making of § 5-117
In
Piselli v. 75th Street Medical,
Concerned that a three-year statute of limitations may effectuate a unique injustice in cases of child sexual abuse, the
By 2003, Maryland’s failure to address anew this issue since 1994 apparently reached critical mass. See Baltimore-Washington Conference Council on Ministries, Letter in Support of Senate Bill 68 (2003) (stating that, at the time Senate Bill 68 was being considered, “Maryland [wa]s one of only ten states that ha[d] not extended the statute of limitations in recognition of the special reporting difficulties often encountered in child sexual abuse and other serious crimes committed against children”). Numerous individuals and organizations renewed their support for an extension of the three-year statute of limitations for child sexual abuse cases. One organization expounded upon the unique circumstances inherent to child sexual abuse cases:
Perpetrators use many tactics to prevent their victims from disclosing abuse. These range from threats against the victim or loved ones, manipulating the victim, convincing the victim nothing is wrong, and exploiting the victim’s desire to keep a family together. Some victims remain financially and emotionally dependent on the perpetrator well into their late teens and twenties. Others face pressure from other family members to remain silent, or have a deep sense of shame. A short, three year statute of limitations effectively prevents many of these victims from ever obtaining justice in the civil courts.
Maryland Coalition Against Sexual Assault, Inc., Testimony in Support of Senate Bill 68 (25 February 2003); see also Letter From Eileen King, Regional Director, Justice for Children, to the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee (24 February 2003) (“Child abuse victims may not know or understand the harm that has occurred as a result of the abuse; many problems may only develop gradually. A twenty-one year old victim will not have had the time to see the impact of abuse on his or her relationships, parenting, work, or studies.”); Citizens’ Review Board for Children, Statement to the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee (25 February 2003) (“A sexually abused child may have a variety of psychological reactions to his or her victimization.... In many cases, the child seeks to avoid thinking about the abuse____ In addition, children may experience serious mental health problems caused by the sexual abuse. These may divert attention from adult business affairs such as law suits.”).
At First Reading, Senate Bill 68 provided:
Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland, That the Laws of Maryland read as follows:
Article—Courts and Judicial Proceedings
5-117
(A) In this section, “sexual abuse” has the meaning stated in § 5-701 of the Family Law Article.
(B) An action for damages arising out of an alleged incident or incidents of sexual abuse that occurred while the victim was a minor shall be filed within 12 years of the latter of:
(1) the victim’s 21st birthday; or
(2) the date on which the victim knew or reasonably should have known that the alleged abuse was actionable.[ 6 ]
(C) This section may not be construed to preclude a court from applying any other applicable exception to the running of the applicable statute of limitations.
(D) This section shall apply to any action commenced on or after October 1, 2003, including any action that would have been barred by the application of the period of limitation applicable before October 1, 2003.
Section 2. And be it further enacted, That this Act shall take effect October 1, 2003.
Between the First and Third Readings of the Bill, Senator Brian E. Frosh, then-and-now Chairperson of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, wrote to Assistant Attorney General Kathryn M. Rowe regarding (1) “whether the application of the [initial version of the] bill to apply retroactively to cases that were barred prior to the effective date of the law would violate due process”; and (2) “what the effect would be if the bill is passed without any provision as to whether it is to be given retroactive or prospective effect.” 7 Letter from Kathryn M. Rowe to Sen. Brian E. Frosh, Chairman, Judicial Proceedings, at 1 (10 March 2003) [hereinafter “Rowe Letter”]. In her informal advice letter 8 addressing the initial inquiry, Ms. Rowe first noted a split in authority regarding whether statutes extending a statute of limitations for certain classes of actions would be read to revive causes of action barred by a previously-in-plaee limitations period, and then explained that “[t]he question that must be answered is wheth er Maryland courts would apply the federal rule [allowing such statutes to revive previously-barred claims], or the rule that appears to be the majority rule among the states in analyzing the constitutionality of a retroactive application of Senate Bill 68.” 9 On this point, Ms. Rowe concluded:
Having reviewed all of these cases,[ 10 ] it is my view that there is no reported case in Maryland that would mandate the unconstitutionality of [a fully] retroactive application of Senate Bill 68. However, it is possible, given the actions of other states, and its own statement in Dua [v. Comcast Cable of Md., Inc., 370 Md. 604 ,805 A.2d 1061 (2002) ], that the Court could conclude that retroactive application to revive barred causes of action violates Due Process.
Rowe Letter, at 4. Regarding the second inquiry, Ms. Rowe opined that it was her “view that in the absence of a specific provision, the statute could be interpreted to have prospective effect, and that most likely would mean that it would apply only to causes of action based on abuse occurring after the effective date.” Rowe Letter, at 5.
Less than two weeks after Ms. Rowe responded to Senator Frosh’s inquiries, a revised version of the bill surfaced. This version provided, as § 5-117(a) and (b) do currently:
Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland, That the Laws of Maryland read as follows:
Article—Courts and Judicial Proceedings
5-117
(A) In this section, “sexual abuse” has the meaning stated in § 5-701 of the Family Law Article.
(B) An action for damages arising out of an alleged incident or incidents of sexual abuse that occurred while the victim was a minor shall be filed within 7 years of the date that the victim attains the age of majority.
Section 2. And be it further enacted, That this Act may not be construed to apply retroactively to revive any action that was barred by the application of the period of limitations applicable before October 1, 2003.
Section 3. And be it further enacted, That this Act shall take effect October 1, 2003.
As codified, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-117, provides:
§ 5-117. Actions arising from alleged sexual abuse.
(a) “Sexual abuse” defined.—In this section, “sexual abuse” has the meaning stated in § 5-701 of the Family Law Article.
(b) Limitations period.—An action for damages arising out of an alleged incident or incidents of sexual abuse that occurred while the victim was a minor shall be filed within 7 years of the date that the victim attains the age of majority.
Sections 2 and 3 of Chapter 360 of the Acts of 2003, however, are not codified. 11
Generally speaking, “[t]he legislative
[sjeveral well settled rules of statutory interpretation ... applicable in seeking to ascertain the actual intention of the legislature. These are: (1) A statute is presumed to operate prospectively from its effective date, absent clear language to the contrary, or unless the manifest intention of the Legislature indicates otherwise; (2) Despite the presumption of prospectivity, a statute effecting a change in procedure only, and not in substantive rights, ordinarily applies to all actions whether accrued, pending or future, unless a contrary intention is expressed; and (3) A statute affecting or impairing substantive rights will not operate retrospectively as to transactions, matters, and events not in litigation at the time the statute takes effect unless its language clearly so indicates.[ 14 ]
Rawlings v. Rawlings,
In
Langston v. Riffe,
Generally, remedial statutes are those which provide a remedy, or improve or facilitate remedies already existing for the enforcement of rights and the redress of injuries. They also include statutes intended for the correction of defects, mistakes and omissions in the civil institutions and the administration of the state. The definition of a remedial statute has also been stated as a statute that relates to practice, procedure, or remedies and does not affect substantive or vested rights.
Every statute that makes any change in the existing body of law, excluding only those enactments which merely restate or codify prior law, can be said to “remedy” some flaw in the prior law or some social evil.
The appellate courts of this state have also defined remedial legislation. For instance, we [have] said that an act is remedial in nature when it provides only for a new method of enforcement of a preexisting right. Under Maryland law, statutes are remedial in nature if they are designed to correct existing law, to redress existing grievances and to introduce regulations conducive to the public good.
(Citations and quotation marks omitted.)
We think that § 5-117 is remedial. The extended limitations period “improves remedies already existing for the enforcement of rights and the redress of injuries,” as an extended period of time during which alleged victims of child sexual abuse may seek redress in the courts “improves” the child’s right to seek compensation for the alleged wrongs committed against him or her. Further, it may be said fairly that § 5-117 is “designed to correct [then-]existing law,” and to “introduce regulations conducive to the public good,” as the legislative history of the statute reflects that the extended limitations period—both in Maryland
15
and in other jurisdictions—was passed (at least in part) “in response to the outcry and evolving understanding of childhood sexual abuse.” Sandee L. Chadwick,
The Disappearing
Ex Post Facto
Clause
and Reviving Time-Barred Prosecutions,
30 Sw. U.L. Rev. 197, 215 (2000);
see People v. Frazer,
It would be an oversimplification of the law, of course, to say that every application of a statute expanding a statute
of limitations period is remedial or procedural.
There is a substantial body of law to the effect that where a limitation period is stipulated in a statute creating a cause of action it is not to be considered as an ordinary statute of limitations, but is to be considered as a limitation upon the right as well as the remedy, with the result that as to causes of action already accrued at the time of the enactment of a subsequent statute enlarging the limitation period on such causes of action the subsequent statute will not be held applicable so as to extend or enlarge the original limitation period, particularly where no legislative intent to give the subsequent statute a retroactive application clearly appears ■ from its language.
In the present case, however, § 5-117 is not a limitations period that “is stipulated in a statute creating a cause of action.” Stated differently, the remaining “live” counts brought by Roe against Doe—(1) battery; (2) false imprisonment; and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress— were viable claims prior to the enactment of § 5-117. Additionally, the placement of § 5-117 within Subtitle 1 (“Limitations”) of Title 5 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article supports further our view that the Legislature intended to extend the limitations period in cases of child sexual abuse, and nothing more (i.e., no new cause of action was created thereby).
We would be faced with a different situation entirely had Roe’s claim been barred under the three-year limitations period as of 1 October 2003, the effective date of § 5-117. 18 Because we are not presented with that scenario, we express no holding regarding the applicability of § 5-117 to child sexual abuse claims barred under the three-year statute as of 1 October 2003, the effective date of the new statute.
Because we deem § 5-117—at least as applied to those claims not-yet barred by the previously-applicable three-year limitations period as of the effective date of § 5-117—a procedural and remedial statute, and because we see no indication in the record
19
that this procedural and remedial
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.
Notes
. In the criminal law context, the Supreme Court has held that “a law enacted after expiration of a previously applicable limitations period violates the
Ex Post Facto
Clause when it is applied to revive a previously time-barred prosecution.”
Stogner v. California,
. The Court of Special Appeals ordered the parties to be referred to by fictitious names,
see Roe v. Doe,
. Roe dismissed voluntarily the assault count. See Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl.Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, § 5-105 ("An action for assault ... shall be filed within one year from the date it accrues.”).
. The Circuit Court also ruled that the negligence claim, were it not barred by the statute of limitations, “may be dismissed on other grounds.” The Circuit Court explained that the duty of care alleged in Roe’s complaint—"that [Doe] owed his granddaughter, [Roe], a duty to foster an environment to [Roe]'s growth and education while she was residing at [his] home”—“is not a recognized duty in Maryland, and, thus cannot support a claim of negligence.” Roe failed to appeal this alternate ground for dismissal and, therefore, a judgment rendered in Roe's favor here does not revive the negligence count.
See Roe,
. Petitioner also presented another question of whether “a retroactive application of ... § 5-117 impair[s] Petitioner’s vested right and thereby violatefs] his right to due process under Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights.” Although we granted certiorari to consider this second question, on 20 December 2010, counsel for Petitioner wrote to the Court, stating that ''Petitioner hereby abandons any contention that the application of ... § 5-117 to this case would impair a vested right.” Accordingly, this second question is no longer before the Court.
. The proposed statute, in this early iteration, would have adopted a "discoveiy rule” for child sexual abuse cases. Under the "discovery rule” a cause of action does not "accrue” within the contemplation of a statute of limitations until a potential plaintiff knows or should have known that he or she suffered an injury.
See Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp.,
. Senator Frosh also sought guidance as to “whether the bill could constitutionally be amended to allow a one year window in which plaintiffs could bring suits that have already been barred by the statute of limitations.” Letter from Kathryn M. Rowe to Brian E. Frosh, Chairman, Judicial Proceedings, at 1 (10 March 2003). Resolution of this issue has no bearing on the present case.
. We have noticed in earlier cases that an informal advice letter issued by an Assistant Attorney General "has no significance of its own.”
State Ethics Comm’n v. Evans,
.
See
op. at 707-08,
. Ms. Rowe, although not asked to opine specifically on the issue presented to us—i.e., whether § 5-117 was intended to apply to causes of action that had accrued, but were not yet barred by expiration of the three-year statute of limitations—recognized that “[a]ll of the relevant cases involve application of a change in the statute of limitations to revive a barred cause of action, and do not address the validity of retroactive application to extend a statute of limitations that has not yet run.” Rowe Letter, at 4 n. 1.
.
See
Maryland Department of Legislative Services, Legislative Drafting Manual 2011, at 97 (2010) (“Provisions of law need not be codified in order to be legally binding.”);
Prince George’s County v. Maringo,
. Logically preceding the issue of whether the Legislature intends a particular statute to be given retrospective effect is the issue of whether
the proposed application of the statute to the facts of a particular case, in the first instance, is a retrospective application of that statute at all.
See State Ethics Comm’n v. Evans,
To be sure, ”[o]ur cases, for the most part ... have not considered in any depth the definition of, or developed an analytical paradigm for determining in the first instance, what constitutes retroactive application of a statute.”
Evans,
. By way of example,
Mayor and Council of Hagerstown v. Sehner,
We stated, on one hand, that “the weight of authority elsewhere sustains th[e] proposition” that “it is not within the scope of legislative power to pass a law which will have the effect to revive ... a cause of action which was completely barred by limitations before its passage,” and that "[b]y the current decisions in other States the right to plead the Statute of Limitations when it has once run and become a bar to a demand ... is treated as a vested right, beyond the reach of retrospective legislation.”
Sehner,
. Of these principles, only the first and second "rules” are in play potentially, as Doe waived his argument regarding impairment of a vested right. See supra note 5.
.
See supra,
op. at 695-97,
.
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Massarella v. Elrod,
. Holding that this extension of a limitations period is remedial and procedural is also in line with what the appellate courts of this State have said regarding statutes of limitation generally.
See, e.g., Polakoff v. Turner,
. As we said in
Rawlings
v.
Rawlings,
. Doe argues that "[t]he [Ljegislature unequivocally prohibited any such [partially-retrospective] application” in Section 2 of the Act, where it states that the Act "may not be construed to apply retroactively to revive any action that was barred by the application of the period of limitations applicable before October 1, 2003.” We would disagree. Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1993) defines "revive” as "to live again” or "to return to consciousness or life.” Accordingly, Section 2 only acts to prohibit application of the Act to those claims that were dead or barred as of the effective date of the statute, and does not speak directly to an application of the act to those claims that were not yet dead or barred as of the effective date.
See Dolezal v. Blevins,
Section 2 of Senate Bill 68 provides explicitly: "[Tjhis Act may not be construed to apply retroactively to revive any action that was barred by
the application of the period of limitations applicable before October 1, 2003.” Put simply, as of 1 October 2003—the effective date of the statute—(save the assault count), Roe’s claims were not yet barred by § 5-101 and thus, Section 2 is inapplicable to the present scenario.
See Roe,
. We have applied the presumption of prospectivity to statutes effectuating an extension of the generally-applicable three-year limitations period for certain types of claims. For instance, in
Slate v. Zitomer,
. That notwithstanding, even if we were to hold that the statute is not procedural or remedial—thus engaging the presumption of prospectivity—we think that recourse to the legislative history of § 5-117 does not dictate a different result. Petitioner argues that ”[w]here two competing, reasonable interpretations exist, the uncodified section cannot possibly be a clear expression of legislative intent in favor of retroactive application.” Yet, we have held for over a century-and-a-half that:
It must be admitted, that by construction, if it can be avoided, no statute should have a retrospect anterior to the time of its commencement. This principle is founded on the supposition that laws are intended to be prospective only. But when a statute, either by explicit provision or necessary implication, is retroactive, there is no room for construction....
Grinder v. Nelson, 9
Gill 299, 303 (1850) (quoting
Goshen v. Stonington,
As noted
supra,
the First Reading of Senate Bill 68, by providing that the statute would "apply to any action commenced on or after October 1, 2003, including any action that would have been barred by the application of the [original limitations period],” would have provided for full retrospectivity. For the next piece of the puzzle, we consider that Assistant Attorney General Rowe advised Senator Frosh that "in the absence of a specific provision, the statute could be interpreted to have prospective effect, and that [that] most likely would mean that it would apply only to causes of action based on abuse occurring after the effective date.” Rowe Letter, at 5. Although because, as explained
supra,
we hold that § 5-117 is procedural and remedial in nature and thus presumed to be retrospective—thus disagreeing with Ms. Rowe’s advice—apparently in reliance on Ms. Rowe's advice, the Legislature, nevertheless, decided to keep a modified version of Section 2 (the retrospectivity provision) in the Third Reading of Senate Bill 68. If the Legislature intended for the Bill to apply prospectively only, why would it, armed with advice that becoming silent on the issue of retrospectivity would render the legislation presumed prospective, retain a retrospectivity clause?
See Roe,