LILI BERNARD v. WILLIAM COSBY
1:21-cv-18566-NLH-MJS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
January 3, 2023
HILLMAN, District Judge
Document 17, PageID: 464
Appearances:
JORDAN KOEL MERSON
JORDAN K. RUTSKY
MERSON LAW, PLLC
950 THIRD AVENUE
18TH FLOOR
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022
On behalf of Plaintiff
JENNIFER ANN BONJEAN
ASHLEY BLAIR COHEN
BONJEAN LAW GROUP, PLLC
750 LEXINGTON AVENUE
9TH FLOOR
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022
On behalf of Defendant
HILLARY MARA NAPPI
HACH ROSE SCHIRRIPA & CHEVERIE LLP
112 MADISON AVENUE
10TH FLOOR
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10016
On behalf of Amicus Curiae
Pending before the Court is Defendant William Cosby’s (“Defendant”) motion to dismiss pursuant to
I. Background
For the purposes of the instant motion, the Court will treat as true all facts alleged in the Complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff Lili Bernard (“Plaintiff”). See Jones v. Pi Kappa Alpha Int‘l Fraternity, 431 F. Supp. 3d 518, 522 (D.N.J. Dec. 18, 2019).
Plaintiff, a citizen of California, (ECF 1 at ¶¶ 1, 6), met Defendant, a citizen of Pennsylvania, (id. at ¶¶ 2, 7), on the set of Defendant’s television program, The Cosby Show, (id. at ¶ 9). In July of 1990, Defendant offered to mentor Plaintiff in acting and for several weeks thereafter led her through theatrical exercises, asked her detailed personal questions, and promised that if she worked hard and followed his direction, he’d feature her in a principal speaking role on The Cosby Show. (Id. at ¶¶ 10-11). During one such mentoring session involving vocal projection, Defendant grabbed Plaintiff by the ribs without permission and then fondled her breasts. (Id. at ¶ 13).
In August of 1990, Defendant convinced Plaintiff to travel from New York to Trump Taj Mahal in Atlantic City, New Jersey
Plaintiff woke to Defendant undressing her despite her protest before falling back out of consciousness. (Id. at ¶¶ 23-24). When Plaintiff next regained temporary consciousness, Defendant was naked and on top of her, penetrating her vaginally with his penis. (Id. at ¶ 25). Plaintiff woke again in an empty bathtub or jacuzzi still unable to move and, next, the following morning naked and in bed. (Id. at ¶¶ 26-27). After Plaintiff woke, Defendant sat her up, dressed her, handed her money, and walked her to a waiting car that drove her back to New York. (Id. at ¶¶ 28-29).
Following the sexual assault in Atlantic City, Defendant threatened that he would file a police report against her, sue her for defamation, prevent her from working in the entertainment industry, and “erase” her if she reported the incident. (Id. at ¶¶ 31-33). Defendant drugged and assaulted Plaintiff on additional unspecified occasions. (Id. at ¶ 30).
Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint on October 24, 2021
Defendant moved for dismissal pursuant to
II. Discussion
A. Jurisdiction
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter as the parties are diverse in citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See
B. Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may assert by motion a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See
The sufficiency of a complaint is determined by “(1) identifying the elements of the claim, (2) reviewing the complaint to strike conclusory allegations, and then (3) looking
C. Interpretation and Constitutionality
Central to Defendant’s motion to dismiss is the application, and overall constitutionality, of New Jersey’s statute providing a two-year revival window for otherwise time-barred claims arising out of sexual offenses. The statute, in relevant part, provides:
Notwithstanding the statute of limitations provisions of
N.J.S.2A:14-2 , section 2 of P.L.2019, c. 120 (C.2A:14-2a), section 1 of P.L.1964, c. 214 (C.2A:14-2.1), or any other statute, an action at law for an injury resulting from the commission of sexual assault, any other crime of a sexual nature, a prohibited sexual act as defined in section 2 of P.L.1992, c. 7 (C.2A:30B-2), or sexual abuse as defined in section 1 of P.L.1992, c. 109 (C.2A:61B-1), that occurred prior to the effective date of P.L.2019, c. 120 (C.2A:14-2a et al.), and which action would otherwise be barred through application of the statute of limitations, may be commenced within two years immediately following the effective date.
Federal courts sitting in diversity “are required to apply the substantive law of the state whose law governs the action.” Spence v. ESAB Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)); see also Schmigel v. Uchal, 800 F.3d 113, 119 (3d Cir. 2015)
Where, as here, a court is tasked with interpreting a
III. Analysis
A. Defendant’s Interpretive Challenges to N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2b
The Court will first consider Defendant’s arguments pertaining to interpretation of
Relatedly, Defendant, relying on the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Hardwicke v. American Boychoir School, 902 A.2d 900 (N.J. 2006), asserts that Plaintiff’s common-law tort claims cannot be revived without a statutory cause of action not presented here, (ECF 10-2 at 13-15). With the specifically cited triggers for revival unavailable, Defendant claims that Plaintiff cannot state a cause of action for an injury resulting from the commission of a sexual assault or “other crime of a sexual nature” because she has not pled that Defendant was convicted of a crime. (ECF 10-2 at 9-12).
The Court is unpersuaded. The Court first holds that Plaintiff need not plead that Defendant has been convicted of sexual assault or other sexual offense. Defendant’s position is based, in part, on the fact that “sexual assault” is defined in the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice and that the Code
The revival statute unambiguously provides the two-year revival window for “an action at law for an injury resulting from the commission of” a sexual assault or other crime of a sexual nature.
Had the New Jersey Legislature intended to require conviction, rather than commission, to trigger the revival window, the Court finds that it surely would have done so in plain and simple language. Instead, it chose the broader term – “commission” – over the narrower one – “conviction.” In the
Moreover, Defendant’s conflation of commission and conviction further ignores the differences between criminal and civil matters – including different objectives, evidentiary burdens, and penalties. See Johnson v. Elk Lake Sch. Dist., 283 F.3d 138, 147 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that evidence of non-arrest is generally inadmissible at related civil trials because of “the fact that criminal and civil trials require different burdens of proof for proving guilt and liability, respectively”). State and federal courts in New Jersey have consistently drawn a distinction between civil and criminal liability. See, e.g., Sec. and Exch. Comm‘n v. Hatch, 128 F.R.D. 58, 63 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 1989) (declining to vacate a consent injunction on the basis that related criminal charges were dismissed, concluding that “criminal action dismissals are of no relevance to a determination of civil liability”); Velazquez v. City of Camden, 146 A.3d 681, 687-89 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016) (holding that testimony that defendant police officer was not to be prosecuted was violative of the New Jersey Rules of Evidence); see also cf. State v. Damiano, 730 A.2d 376, 384 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (“Obviously, criminal liability cannot attach simply because civil liability attaches.”).
Further, as recognized by the Third Circuit in Johnson, a decision not to pursue criminal charges may be influenced not only by more stringent evidentiary burdens, but other factors such as allocation of resources. See 283 F.3d at 147; see also Velazquez, 146 A.3d at 688-89 (discussing Johnson). The New Jersey Legislature is presumed to be aware of such decisions. See Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Salem v. N.J. Prop.-Liab. Ins. Guar. Ass‘n, 74 A.3d 860, 872 (N.J. 2013).
Although, given the lack of ambiguity in the statutory language, the Court need not undertake the oft-times perilous task of reviewing legislative history, this interpretation is further supported by statements by members of the New Jersey Legislature emphasizing the time sometimes necessary for victims of sexual offenses to come forward. See Governor Murphy Signs Legislation Extending the Civil Statute of Limitations for Sexual Abuse Claims in New Jersey, Governor Phil Murphy (May 13, 2019), https://www.nj.gov/governor/news/news/562019/approved/20190513c.shtml (“Because those who have been sexually abused
As the plain language of the revival statute, existing distinctions between criminal and civil law, and legislative intent all point toward a finding that civil liability within the revival window is not premised on conviction, the Court holds that Defendant’s argument must fail. While, as will be discussed infra, Plaintiff must sufficiently demonstrate that a sexual assault or other sexual offense occurred, such a showing need not take place at this juncture, satisfy criminal evidentiary burdens, or be supported by a prior conviction.
Because the Court concludes that plaintiffs may access the revival window by alleging commission of sexual assault or other sexual offense, Defendant’s argument contending that Plaintiff must tether her intentional tort claims to a statutory cause of action must fail. Defendant’s argument is based on a reading of Hardwicke, which noted that the plaintiff’s common-law claims were based on sexual abuse as defined by the Child Sexual Abuse
However, Defendant fails to acknowledge that the same bill referenced in his brief that amended the CSAA amended or otherwise changed multiple statutes and created the revival window expressly applicable to “Child and Adult Victims.” See N.J. S. Judiciary Comm. Statement to S. Comm. For S. No. 477, § 9 (Mar. 7, 2019). The Court holds that this statement provides evidence of legislative intent for the revival statute to apply to adults and, logically, not be limited by the language of the CSAA. As Defendant appears to understand, “[a]s written, the reviver statute requires a claim to be tethered to a statutory cause of action either ‘based on sexual abuse’ or ‘resulting from’ the commission of a crime.” (ECF 10-2 at 15).
The Court is not alone in finding that causes of action defined within the CSAA are not required to trigger the revival window. In S.Y. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Paterson, No. 20-2605, 2021 WL 4473153, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2021), the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the assault and abuse he
B. Defendant’s Vagueness Argument
Defendant next contends that if the revival statute does not require a plaintiff to be a minor or demonstrate that the defendant was convicted of a sexual offense, the statute must be void for vagueness. The Court disagrees.
“The ‘void for vagueness’ doctrine arises under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and is designed to give ‘fair warning’ of prohibited conduct.” Scavone v. Pa. State Police, 501 Fed. Appx. 179, 181 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting
The vagueness doctrine applies to both criminal and civil matters. Mateo v. Att‘y Gen., 870 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2017). Lesser degrees of specificity are required in civil matters as compared to criminal due to the less severe potential penalties implicated, id. (citing San Filippo, 961 F.2d at 1135), and “[w]hether a law ‘threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights’ is critical in determining the level of clarity demanded by the Constitution,” Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 317 (quoting Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982)).
Here, Defendant concedes that – had he been convicted of sexual assault – the revival statute would apply to Plaintiff’s tort claims. However, “the amendment as applied to any other set of facts is vague, and the remainder of its language is vague on its face.” (ECF 10-2 at 16-17). This is because, while “sexual assault” is defined in the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, it is not defined in the statute, and courts may similarly be forced to interpret what other crimes of a sexual nature might be. (Id. at 17-18). However, as noted by Plaintiff, (ECF 12-19 at 14), Chapter 14 of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice lists a finite number of recognized sexual
Therefore, the Court concludes that the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice provides sufficient clarity as to what constitutes “sexual assault” and “any other crime of a sexual nature” in the revival statute. For the reasons described above, the Court finds that, while civil plaintiffs must demonstrate that a sexual offense was committed, that showing need not include a criminal conviction or criminal evidentiary standards. Because
C. Defendant’s Vested Right in the Statute of Limitations
Defendant next contends that the revival statute violates Due Process under both the United States and New Jersey Constitutions because it retroactively deprives Defendant of a vested right – an absolute defense under the statute of limitations – and should thus be struck down. (ECF 10-2 at 19-22). The Court joins other decisions within the District and
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
The language of Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution has been found to “embrace the fundamental guarantee of due process,” see Jamgochian v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 952 A.2d 1060, 1070 (N.J. 2008), and the New Jersey Constitution “affords greater protection for individual rights than its federal counterpart,” State v. Melvin, 258 A.3d 1075, 1091 (N.J. 2021). “Retroactive legislation that impairs or destroys a ‘vested right’ may violate the due process clauses” of the United States or New Jersey Constitutions. See Twiss v. State Dep‘t of Treasury, 591 A.2d 913, 917 (N.J. 1991) (citing Panzino v. Cont’l Can Co., 364 A.2d 1043 (N.J. 1976)).
Though Defendant claims that the revival statute is violative of both the United States and New Jersey
A finding of manifest injustice generally looks to reliance on existing law and the unfairness of changing that law retroactively. See D.C., 679 A.2d at 648 (citing Gibbons v. Gibbons, 432 A.2d 80 (N.J. 1981)); see also Nobrega v. Edison Glen Assocs., 772 A.2d 368, 384 (N.J. 2001) (“The manifest injustice analysis requires ‘a weighing of the public interest in the retroactive application of the statute against the affected party‘s reliance on previous law, and the consequences of that reliance.’” (quoting Nelson v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. of Old Bridge, 689 A.2d 1342, 1349 (N.J. 1997))); Phillips v. Curiale, 608 A.2d 895, 904 (N.J. 1992) (“[W]e must consider in the weighing process the extent to which plaintiff changed his position in reliance on the existing law . . . or had his reasonable expectations defeated.”).
Courts within the District of New Jersey have arrived at same conclusion with respect to the constitutionality of the revival statute, albeit with focuses limited to the New Jersey Constitution. See S.Y., 2021 WL 4473153, at *5-8; W.F. v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Paterson, No. 20-7020, 2021 WL 2500616, at *3-4 (D.N.J. June 7, 2021). These decisions provide persuasive
The Court finds that turning to the United States Constitution does not produce a different result. See Pittsburgh Can Co. v. United States, 113 F.2d 821, 824 (3d Cir. 1940) (discussing Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885) and recognizing that statutes of limitations “confer no vested rights“); see also Evan H., ex rel. Kosta H. v. Unionville-Chadds Ford Sch. Dist., No. 07-4990, 2008 WL 4791634, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2008) (“[A] party possesses no vested right in a statute of limitations.” (citing Pittsburgh Can Co., 113 F.2d at 824 and Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628, 633 (1877)))).
Defendant acknowledges decisions contrary to his position, but “urges this Court to strongly consider Justice Bradley‘s dissent in Campbell” and distinguish cases such as W.F. as being unique to minor victims. (ECF 10-2 at 20-22). For reasons articulated throughout this Opinion, the Court finds that the
D. Defendant‘s Ex Post Facto Challenge
Finally, Defendant asserts that the revival statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and New Jersey Constitutions. (ECF 10-2 at 23-31). The Court disagrees.
The Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law . . . .”
The prohibition against ex post facto statutes has been understood to be limited to laws that are penal in nature. See, e.g., Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41 (1990) (“[I]t has
Defendant does not dispute the general application of the Ex Post Facto Clauses. Rather, Defendant – citing scholarly articles – asserts that Calder was wrongly decided in so far as it does not extend the ex post facto prohibition to civil laws. (ECF 10-2 at 23-28). The revival statute, according to Defendant, either increases the punishment of those who have been convicted of a sexual offense or decreases the burden of proof necessary to find that defendant committed a sexual offense. (Id. at 29-30). Finally, Defendant argues that, because the CSAA, which is referenced in the revival statute, permits punitive damages, the revival statute may be deemed punitive. (Id. at 30-31).
The Court will decline Defendant‘s invitation to challenge Calder and its more than two centuries of precedent. For the reasons discussed above, the Court also finds that Defendant
With respect to Defendant‘s reference to punitive damages, the Court notes that the revival statute itself does not reference punitive or treble damages and that Plaintiff here seeks punitive damages under the common law and Punitive Damages Act. (ECF 1 at ¶¶ 63-67). Such damages, in the Court‘s view, do not implicate the Ex Post Facto Clauses. See Roman Cath. Bishop of Oakland v. Superior Ct., 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 355, 362 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (“[A] statute reviving the limitations period for a common law tort cause of action, thereby allowing the plaintiff to seek punitive damages, does not implicate the ex post facto doctrine . . . .“).3
An analysis on the merits does not lead to a different result. To be sure, “it is possible for a civil statute to be criminally punitive in effect.” United States ex rel. Int‘l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers Loc. Union No. 98 v. Farfield Co., 5 F.4th 315, 336 (3d Cir. 2021). However, so finding requires “clearest proof” based on factors including whether the civil
Of particular relevance, the Third Circuit concluded that the FCA‘s treble damages and civil fines did not restrict individuals’ physical liberty as imprisonment would and that monetary penalties have “not historically been viewed as punishment.” Id. at 336. Further, the Circuit Court found that though the FCA promoted deterrence, “all civil penalties have some deterrent effect,” id. at 337 (quoting Hudson, 522 U.S. at 102), and that “the separate existence of a criminal statute suggest[ed] that the civil statute serve[d] a different purpose,” id.
Applied here, the Court agrees that potential punitive damages do not restrict Defendant‘s liberty, that monetary damages are not generally viewed as punishment, and that the
Therefore, the Court holds that the punitive damages made available under the revival statute do not implicate the Ex Post Facto Clauses and, for the sake of completeness, that Defendant has failed to provide “clearest proof” to override legislative intent as to the civil nature of the revival statute.
IV. Merits of Plaintiff‘s Claims
Having rejected Defendant‘s challenges to the revival statute, the Court moves to the merits of Plaintiff‘s claims.
In his reply to Plaintiff‘s opposition, Defendant raises several concerns regarding the use of an alleged sexual assault
Therefore, while the Court agrees with Defendant that “Plaintiff must, at some point, demonstrate a commission of a sexual assault,” (id. at 4) (emphasis in original), that point is not the dismissal stage. Federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law, but federal procedural law. See Schmigel, 800 F.3d at 119. A plaintiff‘s burden at the dismissal stage is to sufficiently plead, not prove their case. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[A] plaintiff is not required to establish the elements of a prima facie case but instead, need only put forth allegations that ‘raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.‘” (quoting Graff v. Subbiah Cardiology Assocs., Ltd., No. 08-207, 2008 WL 2312671, at *4 (W.D. Pa. June 4, 2008))); Tarrant v. Hamilton Twp. Sch. Dist., No. 16-7058, 2017 WL 3023211, at *5 (D.N.J. July 14, 2017) (citing Fowler and finding that “[a]t the pleading stage . . . Plaintiff is not required to prove the elements of her prima facie case“).
Applied here, sexual assault as defined in the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice may be found upon the commission of an act of sexual penetration using coercion or “without the victim‘s affirmative and freely-given permission.”
Because Plaintiff has satisfied the threshold part of the
Under New Jersey law, common-law assault requires: (1) an action intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact or place a person in imminent apprehension of such contact; and (2) the person is placed in imminent apprehension, see Leang v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 969 A.2d 1097, 1117 (N.J. 2009) (citing Wigginton v. Servidio, 734 A.2d 798 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999)), while battery is premised “upon a nonconsensual touching,” id. (citing Perna v. Pirozzi, 457 A.2d 431 (N.J. 1983)). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant physically undressed her despite her protestation and then vaginally penetrated her while she was falling in and out of consciousness. (ECF 1 at ¶¶ 23-25). Such factual assertions – which are to be accepted as true at this stage – are sufficient to support Plaintiff‘s battery and assault claims.
Similarly, false imprisonment requires (1) arrest or detention against a person‘s will and (2) lack of legal authority or justification. Leang, 969 A.2d at 1117 (citing
Next, to establish an IIED claim a plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly, (2) the conduct was “so ‘extreme and outrageous . . . as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency,‘” (3) proximate cause, and (4) severe emotional distress beyond which a reasonable person may be expected to endure. Juzwiak v. Doe, 2 A.3d 428, 433 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (omission in original) (citing Buckley v. Trenton Sav. Fund Soc‘y, 544 A.2d 857 (N.J. 1988)). An IIED claim may be premised on sexual conduct. See Wilson v. Parisi, 633 A.2d 113, 115 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (reversing summary judgment in a New Jersey Law Against
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant intentionally served her a beverage that caused her to lose consciousness and thereafter assaulted her, (ECF 1 at ¶¶ 20-26), and claims that as a result of Defendant‘s actions she has suffered permanent injuries including post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, depression, inability to sleep, and other injuries, (id. at ¶¶ 34-36). These allegations, taken as true, are sufficient to support Plaintiff‘s IIED claim at the dismissal stage.
Finally, pursuant to the Punitive Damages Act, a plaintiff may be awarded punitive damages only when it is proven “by clear and convincing evidence, that the harm suffered was the result of the defendant‘s acts or omissions, and such acts or omissions were actuated by actual malice or accompanied by a wanton and willful disregard of persons who foreseeably might be harmed by those acts or omissions.”
Here, in addition to alleging that Defendant served her a beverage that caused her to lose consciousness, undressed her, and raped her, Plaintiff also claims that Defendant attempted to conceal these acts by threatening to file a police report against her, sue her for defamation, and harm her career. (ECF 1 at ¶¶ 31-33). The Court holds that those allegations, if proven, are sufficient to support Plaintiff‘s claim for punitive damages. To summarize, the Court holds that Plaintiff‘s Complaint alleges facts sufficient to revive her otherwise time-barred claims, survive dismissal of those claims, and allow a claim for punitive damages to proceed.
In so doing, the Court limits its holding to the alleged incidents that took place in Atlantic City in August 1990. Defendant correctly contends in his supporting brief that Plaintiff fails to provide similar details with respect to allegations that Defendant fondled her during a theatrical exercise and that she was assaulted, battered, and drugged by Defendant on additional occasions. (ECF 10-2 at 4 n.2). This lack of clarity and specificity raises a fair doubt as to which acts Plaintiff relies upon in asserting this Court is the proper venue for the allegations in the four counts of the Complaint and if those other alleged acts are intended to form the basis of a separate cause of action. See E. Controls, Inc. v. Borysowski, No. 22-96, 2022 WL 740761, slip op. at 5 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2022) (recognizing that transfer, or even dismissal, for improper venue is within the discretion of district courts).4 However, Plaintiff lumps together without reference to time or place all of the background facts when setting forth her four causes of action.
If Plaintiff intended the allegations related to Atlantic City to form the core allegations of each of the four counts – which would be sufficient for venue and is admittedly a fair reading of the Complaint – and merely offers the other allegations as evidence that such an assault occurred then she should say so in an amended pleading.5 If on the other hand, Plaintiff alleges these other acts to form the basis for a separate cause of action, her amended pleading should set forth when and where such acts occurred or be said to disavow them as standalone counts. Accordingly, the Court will provide Plaintiff thirty days to file an amended complaint specifying
V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Defendant‘s Motion to Dismiss, (ECF 10), will be denied. Plaintiff will be provided thirty days to file an amended complaint to provide the clarity required above.
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Date: January 3, 2023
At Camden, New Jersey NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.