Lead Opinion
Respondents in this matter, as plaintiffs, challenged in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County the adoption in 2011 by the County Council for Anne Arundel County of a comprehensive zoning ordinance for a large portion of Anne Arundel County. In order to maintain their litigation, they must demonstrate appropriate standing to do so. Respondents assert that property owner standing principles apply to a judicial challenge to comprehensive zoning legislation and that they satisfied those principles. We disagree. Plaintiffs wishing to challenge in Maryland courts the legislative action adopting a comprehensive zoning are required to demonstrate taxpayer standing. Respondents do not allege facts sufficient to meet the correct standing requirement. Thus, the dismissal by the Circuit Court of the two suits in the present case was correct. The contrary position taken by the Court of Special Appeals in this case must be reversed.
Bill 12-11, a comprehensive zoning ordinance adopted in 2011 by the County Council for Anne Arundel County (“the County”), embraced Councilmanic Districts I and IV, comprising approximately 59,045 individual parcels or lots totaling 4,265 acres in area. The two Districts include most of the property in the vicinity of the Baltimore/Washington International/Thurgood Marshall Airport and all of the property along the Baltimore-Washington Parkway corridor in Anne Arundel County. Of those 59,045 individual parcels or lots, Bill 12-11 changed the previous zoning classifications of 264 parcels or lots and maintained essentially the pre-existing zoning of the rest. Bill 12-11 was the culmination by local government of a 5-year comprehensive and thorough consideration of the zoning in the Districts.
Bill 12-11 was challenged by various Anne Arundel County property owners and community associations (“the Citizens”),
On direct appeal, the Court of Special Appeals disagreed with the Circuit Court, concluding that the Citizens enjoyed property owner standing to challenge Bill 12-11. Bell v. Anne Arundel County,
The intermediate appellate court applied, in two stages, the prima facie aggrievement standard to Parcel 114 on Tax Map 37 (“Parcel 114”), which was reclassified from a lower density residential zone to one allowing commercial offices and similar uses. First, the court concluded that properties belonging to two of the Citizens (William Chapin and Steve Bell) were close enough by distance to support “almost prima facie aggrievement” because they were located within approximately 500
Because that court concluded that at least one of the Citizens was prima facie aggrieved, based solely on the proximity of his/her property to a single property rezoned in Bill 12-11, all of the Citizens had standing with respect to the select parcels rezoned in Bill 12-11. See Bell,
Petitioners, in their successful petition for a writ of certiorari to us, asked us to consider three questions:
1. Whether the prima facie aggrievement standard established in [Bryniarski v. Montgomery County Board of Appeals,247 Md. 137 ,230 A.2d 289 , 294 (1967)] should be expanded beyond challenges to administrative land*551 use decisions to include challenges to comprehensive zoning?
2. Whether the “almost prima facie” standard as established in [Ray v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,430 Md. 74 ,59 A.3d 545 (2013)] should be expanded beyond challenges to administrative land use decisions to include challenges to comprehensive zoning?
3. Whether noise from a predicted increase in traffic constitutes “special damages”?
Anne Arundel County v. Bell,
The first two questions are, at their core, one and the same: are the principles of property owner standing applicable to plaintiffs maintaining a judicial challenge to the adoption of a comprehensive zoning ordinance, as has been the standard by which judicial challenges to quasi-judicial and other administrative “land use” actions have been measured? We conclude that extending property owner standing to challenges to comprehensive zoning legislative actions is contrary to our case law, and unprudential as well. The principles underlying property owner standing, heretofore applied to judicial review actions and other modalities of judicial challenges to quasi-judicial and other administrative land use decisions, should not be extended to apply to challenges to comprehensive zoning legislative actions. Comprehensive zoning on the one hand, and quasi-judicial or administrative land use actions on the other, are not similar sufficiently in process or justification to warrant extension by analogy of property owner standing principles from the latter to the former. Rather, taxpayer standing is the correct standing doctrine which Respondents/Plaintiffs must satisfy before they may be allowed to maintain a judicial challenge to comprehensive zoning legislation.
We will treat the Circuit Court’s grant of the County’s motions to dismiss as a grant of summary judgment because the trial court considered materials (specifically, affidavits) outside the complaints (i.e., the complaints and documents attached thereto). See Maryland Rule 2-322(c); see also Ray,
III. Quasi-Judicial and Administrative Land Use Decisions Versus Comprehensive Zoning: A Comparison
The zoning process, broadly viewed, is designed to implement growth
in a manner that allows for the expansion of economic activities and opportunities in the area or region for the benefit of its residents, while at the same time attempting to maintain the quality of life of the region, all without unduly disturbing the reasonable expectations of the citizenry as to the permissible uses they may make of real property.
Mayor and Council of Rockville v. Rylyns Enterprises, Inc.,
A. Comprehensive Zoning
Comprehensive zoning “is fundamentally legislative and no significant quasi-judicial function is involved.” Montgomery County v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc.,
1) cover a substantial area; 2) be the product of careful study and consideration; 3) control and direct the use of land and development according to present and planned future conditions, consistent with the public interest; and, 4) set forth and regulate all permitted land uses in all or substantially all of a given political subdivision, though it need not zone or rezone all of the land in the jurisdiction.
Rylyns Enterprises,
B. Quasi-Judicial Processes and Administrative Land Use Actions
Administrative land use actions, whether reached via quasi-judicial or executive processes, encompass a wide variety of things, including piecemeal rezonings, special exceptions, variances, and nonconforming uses, whether granted by local administrative hearing officers, boards of appeal, or the local
Original or comprehensive zoning may be changed only by a subsequent comprehensive zoning or by a subsequent piecemeal zoning. Rylyns Enterprises,
Bearing in mind these differences between comprehensive zoning and administrative land use decisions and the processes through which they are reached, we turn now to examine the two standing doctrines available to complainants by which they might maintain suits regarding land use actions generally: the doctrines of property owner standing and taxpayer standing. As we shall demonstrate, property owner standing is reserved for challenges to land use decisions reached through quasi-judicial or administrative/executive processes, and taxpayer standing is the appropriate doctrine applied to available modalities of judicial challenges to land use actions reached via a purely legislative process, such as comprehensive zoning actions.
IY. The “Aggrievement Standards” of Property Owner Standing
Taxpayer and property owner standing provide the “cause of action” standing sufficient for justiciability: “when asserted properly, [the doctrines] provide both the cause of action (or claim) and the right of the individual to assert the claim in the judicial forum.” State Center, LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P’ship,
We shall explain in greater depth the requirements of the property owner standing doctrine in Part IV.A of this opinion. Although we noted in 2014 in State Center that principles of zoning laws “permit eligible plaintiffs to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts to challenge a greater variety of ‘land use decisions’ and actions than thought to be the case previously,” State Center,
A. Property Owner Standing: What It Is
We discussed recently and at length property owner standing in several opinions. See, e.g., State Center,
First, “[a]n adjoining, confronting or nearby property owner is deemed, prima facie, to be specially damaged and, therefore, a person aggrieved.” Second, “[a] person whose property is far removed from the subject property ordinarily will not be considered a person aggrieved ... [unless] he meets the burden of alleging and proving ... that his personal or property rights are specially and adversely affected.”
Ray,
B. Property Owner Standing: When It Applies
As noted above, principles of zoning laws “permit eligible plaintiffs to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts [under the doctrine of property owner standing] to challenge a greater variety of ‘land use decisions’ and actions than thought to be the case previously.” State Center,
The basic facts underlying the Superblock Trilogy are as follows: In 1999, the Baltimore City Council (the “City”) adopted an urban renewal plan for the westside of downtown Baltimore. Superblock I,
In Superblock I, 120 West Fayette sought a declaratory judgment against the City, alleging that the LDA was illegal and ultra vires. Superblock I,
In the next part of the opinion, the Court considered the property owner standing argument. Superblock I,
In the Third Act of the Superblock Trilogy, the Court limited the holding of Superblock I. See State Center,
120 West Fayette argued in Superblock III that it retained the same taxpayer standing from Superblock I because it paid City and State taxes and challenged executive acts taken by government officials that were illegal and ultra vires. Super-block III,
Having determined that 120 West Fayette did not possess taxpayer standing, the Court in Superblock III turned to the plaintiffs property owner standing argument. 120 West Fayette argued that execution and interpretation of the MOA was a unique kind of action affecting land use because it provided a quasi-administrative body (the Trust) with control over demolition (or not) of historic (or arguably historic) structures in a designated historic area. Superblock III,
The Court determined that the principles in Superblock I extending property owner standing to challenge the LDA executed in furtherance of the adopted urban renewal plan did not justify extending property owner standing to 120 West Fayette in Superblock III as the MOA was not a land use action by any means. Superblock III,
[O]ur research discloses not a single case of this Court approving the grant of tax-payer or adjacent landowner standing to an individual or entity in any context other than a challenge to or pursuant to a land use decision, as that term is generally understood. Indeed, in every case of this Court that we have found, the land use decision a party was seeking to challenge or enforce was either an ordinance, variance, reclassification, or special exception provided by a local zoning body, or a permit or license issued by an administrative agency.
Superblock III,
A thorough consideration of the Superblock Trilogy figured in our reasoning in State Center,
Appellants in State Center argued that property owner standing was not available to the appellees because such standing is available “only to challenges of pure-bred land-use decisions, such as zoning and nuisance claims.” State Center,
We reasoned that, although the MDA and First Amendment were not “traditional land use regulations or ordinances,” they were “formative contracts” that “govern[ed] the development of real estate at the State Center.” State Center,
As demonstrated by Superblock I, Superblock III, and State Center, the doctrine of property owner standing may apply to administrative land use decisions and other land use actions undertaken as executive functions. We have not applied heretofore the doctrine to purely legislative processes and actions, nor does our body of case law on the subject warrant applying the doctrine to judicial challenges to legislative acts reached through solely legislative processes.
C. Property Owner Standing: Why Extending It Further Is Ill-Advised
It takes scant imagination to foresee the problems that would arise if complainants may satisfy the judicial requirement of standing based on the doctrine of property owner standing when challenging comprehensive zoning ordinances. As noted above, the comprehensive zoning ordinance at issue here examined approximately 59,045 discrete parcels or lots spread across 4,265 acres of Anne Arundel County. Of those 59,045 parcels or lots, the pre-existing zoning classifications for 264 individual parcels or lots were changed. If one of those reclassifications were found to be improper, do all fall because the overall process was a comprehensive one? How might severability be approached, if at all?
In Ray, two individual residents located approximately 0.4 miles away from an approved PUD argued that they were specially aggrieved in a manner different from the general public in their attempt to challenge judicially the PUD’s approval. Ray,
*572 Creating a bright-line rule, under which each person in the entire neighborhood qualifies as a member of the specially aggrieved class in every PUD case, as [petitioners propose, would be tantamount to abandoning the Bryniarski rule that the facts and circumstances of each case would govern. We decline to adopt such a bright-line rule. Instead, we will examine the specific facts alleged to show aggrievement in this case and compare that injury to harm suffered by the general public.
Appellees in State Center attempted to distinguish themselves from the petitioners in Ray by explaining that the TOD area simply expanded the area of the State Center Project, not the class of aggrieved persons. State Center,
similarly fails ... to explain how such a definition would support the notion of a “special aggrievement.” At the core of this argument (and that rejected in Ray) is the failure to recognize that such a wide sweep is not consistent with the “roots” of this concept of special aggrievement....
[T]he “special damage” rule was an outgrowth of the law of public nuisance. Inasmuch as public nuisance was an offense against the state and, accordingly, was subject to abatement on motion of the proper governmental agency, an individual could not maintain an action for public nuisance unless he suffered some special damage from the public nuisance.
Ray,
Imposing limitations on the numerical class of potential claimants is consistent with the point of standing laws generally. As noted by the venerable scribe of all things involving Maryland zoning and land use, Stanley D. Abrams, Esquire, the standing requirement is
based upon the necessity of limiting the parties to the proceeding to those who are uniquely affected by the decision which is being appealed and precluding frivolous appeals, harassment, or merely crowding the courts with litigation instituted by or involving those persons who are not specially affected by the decision and have no statutory right of appeal.
Stanley D. Abrams, Guide to Maryland Zoning Decisions, § 4.01 (5th ed. 2012). Extending the doctrine of property owner standing to challenges to the legislative process of
The Dissent expresses concern that property owners believing themselves impacted negatively by select rezonings with a comprehensive zoning would have no judicial recourse to challenge judicially such legislative action unless their ability to maintain a challenge were measured by property owner standing principles.
V. Taxpayer Standing: The Appropriate Doctrine To Apply
Challengers to comprehensive zoning ordinances, i.e., legislation such as Bill 12-11, are required to satisfy the requirements of taxpayer standing, rather than property owner standing.
We discussed the doctrine of taxpayer standing at length in State Center,
In this state the Courts have always maintained with jealous vigilance the restraints and limitations imposed by law upon the exercise of power by municipal and other corporations; and have not hesitated to exercise their rightful jurisdiction for the purpose of restraining them within the limits of their lawful authority, and of protecting the citizen from the consequence of their unauthorized or illegal acts.
State Center,
Due to the “disorganized” and “seemingly contradictory” state of our earlier cases discussing the doctrine of taxpayer standing, the- State Center opinion took some pain to examine the application of the doctrine, clarify it, and set it
To establish eligibility to maintain a suit under the taxpayer standing doctrine, a “complainant must allege two things: (1) that the complainant is a taxpayer and (2) that the suit is brought, either expressly or implicitly, on behalf of all other taxpayers.” State Center,
[T]he doctrine may apply yet, if the action is, in fact, on behalf of the taxpayers as a class, by necessary implication from the nature of the alleged injury pleaded in the [com*578 plaint]. In other words, the allegations of the injury must apply to all taxpayers in the assumed class and not merely the plaintiffs as private complainants, in order for the taxpayer standing doctrine to apply.
State Center,
Once a complainant establishes eligibility to bring a suit, he, she, or it must allege, as noted above, both a governmental action that is illegal or ultra vires and that the action may affect injuriously the taxpayer’s property (meaning that it reasonably may result in a pecuniary loss to the taxpayer or an increase in taxes). See State Center,
Naturally, there must be a “nexus” between the showing of potential pecuniary damage and the challenged act. State Center,
[a] review of the cases reveals that the taxpayer must be asserting a challenge and seeking a remedy that, if granted, would alleviate the tax burden on that individual and others; otherwise, standing does not exist. The corollary to this requirement is also that taxpayers may challenge only certain statutes. In viewing other areas of law, we have not permitted taxpayers to enforce any statute unless it affects the taxpayers’ individual tax burden.
State Center,
B. Taxpayer Standing: When It Applies
In light of its requirement that “an action by a municipal corporation or public official” be illegal or ultra vires, State Center,
Challenges to comprehensive zoning ordinances are brought often by parties whose properties were rezoned, usually to categories less desirable by the owner or contract purchaser than enjoyed previously. See, e.g., Anderson House,
Requiring taxpayer standing for challenges to comprehensive legislative enactments regulating land use is consistent with our case law. In Boitnott v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,
Before addressing the taxpayers’ substantive arguments, the Court addressed first their standing. Id. Noting that “Maryland has gone rather far in sustaining the standing of taxpayers to challenge ... alleged illegal and ultra vires actions of public officials,” the Court found that the taxpayers alleged appropriately taxpayer standing in filing their complaint. Id. (internal quotations omitted). Because the taxpayers alleged that the City of Baltimore expended twenty million dollars in developing the urban renewal area, they alleged sufficiently potential pecuniary damage by way of an increase in taxes to sustain taxpayer standing. Id. Of note to the present case, the Court in Boitnott did not determine that the taxpayers had standing because they owned property located
The Citizens here did not satisfy the requirements of the taxpayer standing doctrine in this case. At least two
In their Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, the Citizens alleged that the actions taken by the County in adopting “the
61. ... A trade school will create constant traffic and will destroy a forest buffer screening the over-congested Crain Highway from Plaintiffs’ homes....
68. Noise is a primary concern for Plaintiffs who live in close proximity to the land subject to Proposal Nos. 4-4 and 4-12____Proposal Nos. 4-4 and 4-12 will allow commercial land uses on land located closer to Plaintiffs than the businesses located on the Median of Route 3 and will drastically increase the already unreasonable noise pollution in Plaintiffs’ community----
37.[28 ] Plaintiffs’ right to participation in zoning changes and in the enforcement of the orderly planning procedures specified in the County Code have been harmed.[29 ]
Notably, the Citizens did not allege that their taxes would be increased or that the illegal action would result in any other form of pecuniary loss.
Property owner standing does not apply to judicial challenges to comprehensive zoning legislation. Rather, complainants must satisfy the requirements of taxpayer standing to challenge such legislation. Because the Citizens did not allege sufficiently the elements of taxpayer standing, the trial court granted appropriately Petitioners’ Motions to Dismiss.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE RESPONDENTS.
BATTAGLIA, ADKINS, and McDONALD, JJ., dissent.
Notes
. The Respondents are comprised of the following individuals and entities: Steve Bell, William Chapin, Maria Murphy, Leslie Dolan, Sharon Miles, Rosie Shorter, Sandra Bowie, Robert Smith, Jerry Ball-man, the Patuxent Riverkeeper, Canter Farms Home Owners Association, Inc., the Greater Crolton Council, Inc., and Crofton First (which may or may not be incorporated (see infra note 25)).
. The Citizens challenged the legality of Amendment 25 to Bill 12-11 and three rezoning proposals that were included in the original Bill:
At the hearing on Petitioners' motion to dismiss, the Citizens agreed ultimately to dismiss their claim that the County enacted Bill 12-11 without proper notice. As a result, United Properties, LLP, BWI Technology Park Phase III, LLC, Sincaltom Associates, and David Callahan, whose properties had been reclassified by Bill 12-11 and who had intervened as defendants, withdrew as parties from the case.
. The following parties intervened as defendants: BBSS, Inc., WACH, LLC, Towser Developers, Inc., South Shores Development Company, Inc., BWI Technology Park Phase III, LLC, Sincaltom Associates, David Callahan (the General Partner in Sincaltom Associates), and United Properties, LLP.
. Petitioners also argued that the Citizens failed (1) to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, (2) to exhaust administrative remedies, and (3) to join all necessary parties.
. It is well-established that a judicial review action is not available as a vehicle to challenge a comprehensive zoning legislative action. See
. Zoning, so established, may be changed thereafter
by the zoning authority only by the adoption of a subsequent comprehensive rezoning, or, in the case of a piecemeal Euclidean zoning application, upon a showing that there was a mistake in the prior original or comprehensive zoning or evidence that there has been a substantial change in the character of the neighborhood since the time the original or comprehensive zoning was put in place.
Mayor and Council of Rockville v. Rylyns Enterprises, Inc.,
. Special exceptions, variances, and nonconforming uses granted by local administrative hearing officers, boards of appeal, or legislative bodies were designed as a response to “the imperfect nature of planning and zoning and the need for greater flexibility in responding to the impacts of these imperfections.” Rylyns Enterprises,
. This statute was recodified ultimately at Maryland Code (2012), § 10-501 of the Land Use Article. The requirement for “aggrievement” appears in various other section of the Land Use Article, as well as various local zoning ordinances.
. We noted in Ray that dicta in Maryland cases suggests “a third, poorly-defined category of protestants with standing who, despite being ‘far removed from the subject property,’ may nevertheless be able to establish 'the fact that his personal or property rights are specially and adversely affected by the board’s action.’ ” Ray v. Mayor and City
. To implement the urban renewal plan, the Baltimore Board of Estimates delegated various "ministerial and administrative” functions to a nonprofit corporation called the Baltimore Development Corporation, Inc. (the "BDC"). 120 West Fayette St., LLLP v. Major and City Council of Baltimore,
. 120 West Fayette filed timely an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Before that court could consider the case, we issued a writ of certiorari. Superblock I,
. As a preliminary matter, we considered whether the Circuit Court treated the City's motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. Superblock I,
. In relating its understanding of this quotation from Superblock I, the Dissent in the present case emphasizes the words “land use.” Dissent Op. at 586-87,
The existence of a “decision” by an executive, administrative, or quasi-judicial body was critical to the Court’s holding in Superblock I. The phrase "land use” must be read in the context of the rest of the discussion, where the Court limited its holding to instances where property owners challenged a municipality’s allegedly illegal avoidance of legislation pertaining to land use. To interpret Superblock I otherwise is an over-extension of the limited holding of the Court.
The Dissent here concludes its discussion of Superblock I by stating, "[t]he Court did not ground its decision on the administrative nature of the land use decisions approving the Land Disposition Agreement." Dissent Op. at 587,
. 120 West Fayette argued also that it had ''leftover” standing based on a footnote in Superblock II. Superblock III,
. The Court in Superblock III characterized the allegation of a violation of law as "necessary” to the holding in Superblock I that 120 West Fayette had taxpayer standing and the "alternative holding” that it had property owner standing as well. Superblock III,
. The Dissent in the present case reads incorrectly Superblock III as "adopting] a broad definition of land use decision,’ ” which included legislative actions, concluding in turn that "proximity standing is not limited to administrative land use decisions, but also applies to legislative land use decisions like comprehensive zoning." Dissent Op. at 587-88,
. Ultimately, we concluded that the claims of the plaintiffs were before the Circuit Court improperly, as barred by the doctrine of laches. State Center,
. There is no severability provision in Bill 12-11. It is unclear whether § 1-210 of the General Provisions Article of the Maryland Code (or its immediate predecessor, Md. Code (1957, 2011 Repl. Vol.), Article 1, § 23), although applicable to state statutes, applies to ordinances enacted by local governments. Maryland Code (2014), General Provisions Article, § l-210(b) (“When part of statute found to be unconstitutional or void. — The finding by a court that part of a statute is unconstitutional or void does not affect the validity of the remaining portions of the statute, unless the court finds that the remaining valid provisions alone are incomplete and incapable of being executed in accordance with the legislative intent.”). Section 1-210 appears to be
Thus, the question lingers — is the comprehensive nature of the interrelated policy decisions underlying a comprehensive zoning a contraindication that the legislative body did not intend severability to be available?
The Anne Arundel County Code contains a severability provision in the "Definitions; Rules of Construction; Citation” title of the General Provisions Article similar to that of the Maryland Code discussed above. Anne Arundel County Code (2005), Article 1, § 1-1-106 ("Severability. If any word, phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph, or section of this Code is declared invalid or unconstitutional by a court of competent jurisdiction, the invalidity or unconstitutionality shall not affect any of the remaining words, phrases, clauses, sentences, paragraphs, or sections of this Code because the remaining language would have been enacted without the incorporation in this Code of the invalid or unconstitutional word, phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph, or section.”). This portion of the County Code falls victim to the same outstanding questions regarding the legislative intent to be inferred from comprehensive zoning actions.
We shall leave completion to fruition of this rhetorical exercise for another day.
. The Dissent accuses us of hyperbolizing, and counters that "[o]nly those property owners living in very close proximity to the 260 parcels that underwent zoning changes under Bill 12-11 could have standing to challenge the comprehensive rezoning.” Dissent Op. at 589,
. The Dissent refers to this concerning result as the "floodgates” argument. Dissent Op. at 588-89,
Next, the Dissent suggests:
There is no reason to think that most comprehensive rezonings, which are adopted by elected officials, will be so offensive to property owners that, as the Majority projects, thousands (or even hundreds) of them will pursue judicial relief. Surely, the costs of conducting such a lawsuit, together with the dismal prospects for success on the merits, will be unpalatable to most.
Even with standing secured, property owners face a precipitous uphill battle to win a declaration that a comprehensive rezoning ordinance is invalid.
Dissent Op. at 590,
Finally, the Dissent suggests that the cost of the potential increase in declaratory judgment actions "is justified by the need to provide a judicial means to challenge an illegal legislative action injurious to a property interest.” Dissent Op. at 591,
. The Dissent notes that, in Anne Arundel County, property owners may challenge comprehensive zoning by petitioning the ordinance to referendum. Dissent Op. at 591 n. 7,
. See supra note 23.
. The taxpayers offered three arguments in support of their contention that the ordinance was invalid: 1) the property may not be changed from private to public ownership after the adoption of an urban renewal plan; 2) zoning ordinances may not be incorporated into urban renewal plans by reference; and 3) the title of the ordinance was defective. Boitnott,
. Although all actions of rezoning result in adoption of an ordinance or resolution of some kind expressing the final decision to rezone (by whatever process leading to that decision), not all rezoning ordinances or resolutions are of the same nature, nor should they be treated the same for all purposes. None of the preceding cases (Habliston v. City of Salisbury,
The focus should be on the nature of the underlying process culminating in a rezoning action to determine its true character, not the fact that an ordinance results nor the modality by which the plaintiff sought judicial review. As discussed at length above, see supra pp. 552-56,
. Crofton First may also be an incorporated entity. Although it is named on the Complaint for Declaratory Judgment (originating in C-11-163163, Steve Bell, et al. v. Anne Arundel County, Maryland) ''Crofton First,” on the Amended Petition for Judicial Review (originating in C-l 1-161930, In the Matter of Steve Bell, et al.) it is named “Crofton First, Inc.”
. In State Center, we assumed that various incorporated entities were taxpaying corporations based on their legal identities. See State Center,
. The Amended Petition for Judicial Review is extremely short and contains no allegations of harm of any kind to the Citizens.
. The Complaint contains two paragraphs numbered 37 and 38. The second set (including the language quoted here) appears to have been inserted between paragraphs number 86 and 87 and mis-numbered inadvertently.
. Paragraphs numbered 90 and 96 contain identical allegations to this one.
. Attached to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Opposition to Intervenor Defendants Sincaltom Associates, David Callahan, BWI Technology Park Phase III, LLC, and United Properties, LLP’s Motions to Dismiss and Request for a Hearing are Exhibits D, H, and I, consisting of the Affidavits of Rosie M. Shorter (“Shorter”), William S.
6. It is my opinion that my property value will be affected by Amendment No. 25’s zoning changes and that the tax assessment for my property will increase.
7. It is my opinion that Amendment No. 25’s zoning changes will increase traffic on Route 3, which will make it more dangerous for me to access Route 3 from Capital Raceway Road.
8. It is my opinion that Amendment No. 25’s zoning changes will alter the character of my neighborhood and the way that I live. The wooded environment and quiet nature of my neighborhood will be destroyed.
Chapin owns residential property located approximately 100 feet from one parcel of land which was reclassified from a residential to a commercial zone and 500 feet from another. He stated, inter alia:
15. I am familiar with the property values in my neighborhood. My home is currently worth approximately $550,000. It is my opinion that Proposal Nos. 4-4 and 4-12 will adversely affect my property value for reasons related to traffic, noise, privacy, and a change in the neighborhood.... I estimate that my property value will decline by 15-20% due to Proposal Nos. 4-4 and 4-12.
Bell owns residential property situated approximately 80 feet from one parcel of land which was reclassified from a residential to a commercial zone and 500 feet from another. His statements echo those of Chapin.
As these statements were not made in support of allegations contained in the Complaint for Declaratory Judgment nor the Amended Petition for Judicial Review, they are not available to make out a prima facie showing of the "harm” required by taxpayer standing.
. The trial judge considered that these problems were not specific to the Citizens in the context of discussing (apparently) property owner standing. Although she did not mention the standing doctrine as such, she discussed, inter alia, Bryniarski. and Ray.
. Because the Citizens have not alleged properly that they would suffer the requisite harm, we need not determine whether the Citizens alleged sufficiently that their suit was brought on behalf of all other taxpayers similarly situated.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting, which BATTAGLIA and McDonald, jj., join.
Respectfully, I dissent. Contrary to the Majority, I would hold that the property owner standing doctrine (“proximity standing”) applied in Bryniarski and Ray is appropriate when a protestant challenges legislative comprehensive zoning. Use of this doctrine will protect landowners who are specially aggrieved by a zoning change and will not unduly burden either local governments or the courts. It is more consistent with our recent case law than the standard adopted by the Majority — taxpayer standing. The latter doctrine, applicable to challenges to governmental expenditures of taxpayer dollars, is unsuitable to address governmental land use decisions.
In its attempt to disavow a trend towards broad use of proximity standing, the Majority re-interprets our decisions in
In Superblock I, we applied proximity standing because the protestants were challenging land use decisions. We reasoned that “[bjecause land use ... is at least one of the prime considerations with which an urban renewal plan is reasonably sure to be concerned, ... the principles that confer standing upon an adjoining, confronting or neighboring property owner to seek judicial review of land use decisions, logically extend to an adjoining, confronting or neighboring property owner that is challenging a municipalit[y’s] allegedly illegal avoidance of urban renewal and procurement ordinances.” Superblock I,
In Superblock III, this Court adopted a broad definition of “land use decision”: any ordinance or regulation “enacted or promulgated by a legislative or administrative body for the purpose of directing the development of real estate.”
The Majority relies heavily on a “floodgates” rationale, arguing that because Bill 12-11 encompassed the entirety of Councilmanic Districts I and TV, applying proximity standing to challenges to Bill 12-11 would arguably permit every property owner in these Districts to gain standing. The Majority hypothesizes as follows:
This could mean, practically speaking, that the owners of 59,045 parcels or lots in Councilmanic Districts I and IV, along with other property owners located adjoining, confronting, or nearby the external boundaries of those Districts, as well as other property owners located between 200 to 1000 feet from the borders of the Districts (so long as they allege additional “plus factors”) may all have standing to challenge Bill 12-11. Hypothetically, thousands of plaintiffs with the benefit of property owner standing could have standing to challenge comprehensive zoning legislation.
Indeed, existing law already provides a dam against flooding. The Bryniarski
In Ray, we concluded that “proximity is the most important factor to be considered” when determining whether a protestant has been specially aggrieved. Id. at 82-83,
There is no reason to think that most comprehensive rezonings, which are adopted by elected officials, will be so offensive to property owners that, as the Majority projects, thousands (or even hundreds) of them will pursue judicial relief. See Maj. Op. at 570-71,
Even with standing secured, property owners face a precipitous up-hill battle to win a declaration that a comprehensive rezoning ordinance is invalid. We have long recognized that comprehensive rezoning ordinances are entitled to a strong presumption of correctness. See, e.g., Howard Cnty., Md. v. Dorsey,
As we said in Anderson House, LLC v. Mayor & City Council of Rockville:
Zoning decisions which are made during a comprehensive rezoning process are strongly presumed to be correct.*591 Comprehensive rezoning is a vital legislative function, and in making zoning decisions during the comprehensive rezoning process, a [zoning authority] is exercising what has been described as its ‘plenary’ legislative power.
Indisputably, [the challenger] carries the heavy burden of establishing, by clear and affirmative evidence, that [the Ordinance] is invalid. Even where reasonable doubt exists, the Ordinance must be sustained. “In other words, the legislature is presumed to have acted within [its police powers] so that if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain [the Ordinance], the existence of that state of facts as a basis for the passage of the [regulation] must be assumed.”
Id. at 724,
Even if declaratory judgment actions do modestly increase, that cost is justified by the need to provide a judicial means to challenge an illegal legislative action injurious to a property interest.
The Majority holds that “[t]he doctrine of taxpayer standing — already available to some complainants challenging administrative land use decisions — is the appropriate standing doctrine that complainants challenging comprehensive zoning legislation must satisfy.” Maj. Op. at 575,
With taxpayer standing “there must be a ‘nexus’ between the showing of potential pecuniary damage and the challenged act.” Maj. Op. at 579,
In this case, several Respondents produced affidavits stating that their property values will decrease as a result of Bill 12-11. They cannot achieve taxpayer standing because, with reduced property values, their taxes will not increase. They would have proximity standing because they live no more than 1000 feet from the rezoned parcel, and we have concluded that a depreciated property value is a “plus factor” supporting special aggrievement. See Habliston v. City of Salisbury,
We have long held that protestants who are specially aggrieved have standing to challenge land use decisions. See, e.g., Cassel v. Mayor of Balt.,
In conclusion, I would hold that proximity standing is the appropriate basis upon which a judicial challenge to a comprehensive zoning legislative action may be maintained. This conclusion is the one most consistent with our precedent, and it ensures that all property owners who are specially aggrieved by an act of legislative comprehensive rezoning have a means to challenge it in the courts.
Judge BATTAGLIA and Judge McDONALD authorize me to state that they join in the views expressed in this opinion.
. 120 W. Fayette St., LLLP v. Mayor of Balt.,
. 120 W. Fayette St., LLLP v. Mayor of Balt.,
. State Center, LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P’ship,
. See Superblock I,
. Bryniarski v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Appeals,
. Ray v. Mayor of Balt.,
. Of course, a properly owner may challenge a comprehensive rezoning without resorting to the courts by petitioning the ordinance to referendum. See Anne Arundel Cnty. Charter, § 308. For an individual property owner to challenge a comprehensive zoning ordinance through the referendum power, however, he would have to obtain signatures from “ten per centum of the qualified voters of the County!.] ” Id. This presents a formidable and costly challenge.