ERNEST AND MARYANN ELSBERRY v. STANLEY MARTIN COMPANIES, LLC
No. 6, September Term, 2022
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
December 1, 2022
Opinion by Hotten, J.
Argued: September 8, 2022
Ernest and Maryann Elsberry v. Stanley Martin Companies, LLC, No. 6, September Term, 2022. Opinion by Hotten, J.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – REAL PROPERTY – MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. ARTICLE § 14-117 – ESTIMATED COSTS OF DEFERRED WATER AND SEWER CHARGES
Section 14-117(a)(3)(i) of the Real Property Article of the Maryland Code provides that a seller of residential real property in Prince George’s County must provide the purchaser certain disclosures in the initial contract of sale, including the estimated cost of any deferred water and sewer charges for which the purchaser may become liable. Section 14-117(a)(3)(ii) limits a seller to a schedule of charges for the amortized water and sewer costs to a charge period no longer than twenty years from the date of initial sale.
Petitioners purchased property in Charles County from Respondent, whereby Respondent prescribed a thirty-year amortization period for the property’s water and sewer assessments. Petitioners challenged the duration of the amortization period under § 14-117(a)(3)(ii). The Court of Appeals held that the plain language of § 14-117(a)(3)(ii), when viewed in context of the entire statutory scheme, indicates that the twenty-year amortization limit on deferred water and sewage costs only applies to Prince George’s County. The Court, therefore, analyzed the legislative history to confirm our plain text interpretation. The Court concluded that the legislative history of § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) confirms our plain language interpretation. The legislative history indicates that the General Assembly intended for the amortization provision to only apply to Prince George’s County. As such, the Court held that the Court of Special Appeals correctly interpreted § 14-117(a)(3)(ii), and the circuit court correctly dismissed the action.
Fader, C.J., Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Eaves, Getty, Joseph M., (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) JJ.
Opinion by Hotten, J.
Filed: December 1,
The present dispute arose over the purchase of residential real property in Charles County, Maryland. According to the real estate purchase agreement, the purchased property was subject to a declaration, which prescribed, at the discretion of the seller, a thirty-year collection period for the property’s water and sewer assessments. The purchasers filed suit, alleging that the seller violated
The purchasers appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed in an unpublished opinion. Elsberry v. Stanley Martin Cos., LLC, No. 172 Sept. Term, 2021, 2022 WL 94616 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Jan. 10, 2022). The Court of Special Appeals declined to extend the geographic application of
- Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred by determining that the “Prince George’s County—Deferred Water and Sewer Charges Homeowner Disclosure Act of 2014 PG 413-14[,]” codified in part at
Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) , is limited to residential real property located in Prince George’s County?
- Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred by consulting the legislative history of
Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) to help ascertain whether the intent of the General Assembly was to limit the effect of the statutory provision to residential real property located in Prince George’s County? - Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred by considering whether its plain text interpretation of
Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) would violate the “one subject rule” for bill titles pursuant toArt. III, § 29 of the Maryland Constitution ?
We answer these questions in the negative and shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Relevant Facts
On April 5, 2019, Petitioners, Ernest and Maryann Elsberry (the “Elsberrys”) entered into a New Home Sales Contract (the “Purchase Agreement”) with Respondent Stanley Martin Companies, LLC2 (“Stanley Martin”) for the purchase of residential real property and construction of a new home in Charles County (the “Property”). According to the Purchase Agreement, the Property was subject to a Declaration of Deferred Water and Sewer Charges (the “Declaration”) which required the Elsberrys to pay Stanley Martin annual installments in the amount of $550 for thirty years, subject to a six percent interest rate, to reimburse Stanley Martin for the construction and installation of water and sewer systems. The Declaration was recorded in the Land Records of Charles County, and serves as a lien on the Property. Stanley Martin conveyed the Property to the Elsberrys on May 9, 2019, and the Elsberrys made a prorated initial payment pursuant to the Declaration.
On September 17, 2020, the Elsberrys filed suit in the Circuit Court for Charles County, alleging, inter alia,3 that Stanley Martin’s Declaration violated
On October 5, 2020, Stanley Martin filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that
Legal Proceedings
A. Circuit Court Proceedings
The Circuit Court for Charles County held a hearing on Stanley Martin’s motion to dismiss on February 23, 2021. Following the hearing, the circuit court agreed with Stanley Martin and granted the motion. Upon review of
Ultimately, the circuit court “believe[d] the legislative history supports the interpretation of the Court [], based upon its plain reading of the statute, that [
B. Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals
On January 10, 2022, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court in an unreported opinion. Elsberry, 2022 WL 94616. The intermediate court concluded that the General Assembly intended
The Court of Special Appeals began by examining the plain language of
The Court of Special Appeals determined that the legislative history of
The Elsberrys observed “that the language in [Real Prop.] § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) originated in [Real Prop.] § 14-117.1[,]” a statute limited to existing property in Prince George’s County. Id. The Court of Special Appeals, nonetheless, was unpersuaded by the Elsberrys’ argument that the relocation of statutory text from
Finally, the Court of Special Appeals observed that adopting the Elsberrys’ interpretation of
(“[E]very law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but one subject, and that shall be described in its title[.]”). Ultimately, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that
The Elsberrys filed a petition of certiorari, which we granted on May 9, 2022. Elsberry, 478 Md. at 510, 275 A.3d at 345.
The Contentions of the Parties
A. The Elsberrys
The Elsberrys outlined three arguments on appeal: (1) the plain language of
First, the Elsberrys contend that the plain text of
The Elsberrys insist that this Court’s “only role” is to determine what the General Assembly “actually said[]” and not what the General Assembly “meant to say[.]” The Elsberrys reiterate that “this Court has never interpreted a law to mean something contrary to the plain language unless . . . enforcing the plain language would lead to an absurd result.” To the Elsberrys, holding otherwise “is tantamount to inserting words into the statute in order to make the statute express an intention that was not evidenced in its original form.” According to the Elsberrys, Stanley Martin’s interpretation of
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court considers HB 1043’s legislative history, the Elsberrys request that the entire legislative history, not selective portions, be examined. According to the Elsberrys, the Court of Special Appeals erroneously “elevated” certain portions of legislative history over the plain language of
The Elsberrys also criticize Stanley Martin’s and the Court of Special Appeals’ reliance on the Task Force Report. Specifically, the Elsberrys argue that the General Assembly was not bound by the Task Force’s thirteen recommendations or its geographic representation. Rather, the Elsberrys assert that the General Assembly intended the statute to protect property owners “in all counties from the excessively long amortization periods that private developers impose throughout the state.” The removal of the words “Prince George’s County” from the Second Reading of HB 1043, the Elsberrys explain, further supports the General Assembly’s intent to apply
Lastly, the Elsberrys assert that construing
Therefore, the Elsberrys request this Court to reverse the Court of Special Appeals.
B. Stanley Martin
Stanley Martin outlines three arguments in response: (1)
First, Stanley Martin asserts that
Next, according to Stanley Martin, the legislative history demonstrates that the twenty-year deferred water and sewer charge limitation applies exclusively to Prince George’s County. Stanley Martin refers this Court to the Task Force Report. The Task Force studied private developers’ deferred water and sewer rates in Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties. Relying upon its findings, the Task Force compiled thirteen recommendations and, accordingly, submitted them to the General Assembly. Recommendation 7, for example, “[r]equire[d] a contract for the sale of new residential real property in Prince George’s County to contain a disclosure statement regarding the estimated cost of any deferred water and sewer charges for which the purchaser may become liable.” (Emphasis added). Likewise, as Stanley Martin identifies, Recommendation 9 proposed “[p]rohibit[ing] a person from amortizing for more than 20 years from the date of the initial sale the deferred water and sewer costs that are passed onto a purchaser. (Single-family residential property in Prince George’s County improved by four or fewer single-family units).” (Emphasis added). Stanley Martin notes that this recommendation is almost identical to
Stanley Martin maintains that the short title and text of HB 1043 further confirms that
Additionally, Stanley Martin claims that HB 1043’s purpose paragraph further underlines its intent to limit application to Prince George’s County. The purpose paragraph references either “Prince George’s County” or “in the county” several times, including the final phrase that the bill “generally relat[es] to deferred water and sewer charges in Prince George’s County.” (Emphasis omitted). Contrary to the Elsberrys, Stanley Martin argues there is nothing in the purpose paragraph, nor in the entirety of HB 1043’s file, that evidences the General Assembly’s intent to extend HB 1043 to any other county besides Prince George’s County. Between the First and Second Reading, the phrase “in the county” was removed from the clause pertaining to the deferred water and sewer costs limit, but this omission, Stanley Martin argues, does not signify that the bill is no longer limited to Prince George’s County. Rather, it was part of a general revision to track the proposed statutory language.
Stanley Martin contends that the changes between HB 1043’s First and Second Reading provide additional evidence that the General Assembly intended for HB 1043 to apply only to Prince George’s County. As previously discussed, the disputed language of
Finally, Stanley Martin argues that the overall statutory scheme of
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
This Court reviews the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim de novo. Davis v. Frostburg Facility Operations, LLC, 457 Md. 275, 284, 177 A.3d 709, 714 (2018); Lamson v. Montgomery Cnty., 460 Md. 349, 360, 190 A.3d 316, 323 (2018). Whether the circuit court was legally correct in dismissing the Elsberrys’ complaint turns on a question of statutory interpretation. Sullivan, 251 Md. App. at 317, 253 A.3d at 1149. “Where questions of law and statutory interpretation are presented, this Court reviews them de novo . . . .” Wheeling v. Selene Fin. LP, 473 Md. 356, 373, 250 A.3d 197, 207 (2021) (citations omitted). We first conduct a statutory analysis of
Analysis
A. The plain text of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) , when viewed in context of the entire statutory scheme, indicates that the twenty-year amortization limit on deferred water and sewage costs only applies to Prince George’s County.
Well-settled principles of statutory construction guide our interpretation of
Consideration of the plain meaning of the statutory language does not entail a bare, isolated, or literal reading of the statutory language. See id. at 275–76, 987 A.2d at 29 (citations omitted). This Court construes the statute “‘as a whole, so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.’” Wheeling, 473 Md. at 376, 250 A.3d at 209 (quoting Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14, 25–26, 63 A.3d 582, 589 (2013)). Still, this Court will neither “add nor delete language . . . to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain . . . language . . . .” Lockshin, 412 Md. at 275, 987 A.2d at 29 (citations omitted). Nor does this Court
cannot assume authority to read into the Act what the [General Assembly] apparently deliberately left out.“) (citation omitted). Nevertheless,
[i]t is important . . . to keep in mind that the meaning of the plainest language in a statute may be controlled by the context, and if the language is fairly susceptible of more than one construction, the Court may seek the legislative intention by considering the facts of contemporary history, the prior state of the law, and the particular evil, abuse, or defect which the statute was designed to correct and the remedy which was intended.
Dep‘t of Tidewater Fisheries v. Sollers, 201 Md. 603, 611, 95 A.2d 306, 309 (1953). Therefore, our case law demonstrates that the plainest language does not mean limiting its construction of a particular statutory provision to its bare text alone. As this Court explained in Lockshin, “[w]e . . . do not read statutory language in a vacuum, nor do we confine strictly our interpretation of a statute‘s plain language to the isolated section alone.” Lockshin, 412 Md. at 275, 987 A.2d at 29 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). “Rather, the plain language must be viewed within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the [General Assembly] in enacting the statute.” Id. at 276, 987 A.2d at 29 (citations omitted). “We presume that [the General Assembly] intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law, and, thus, we seek to reconcile and harmonize the parts of a statute, to the extent possible consistent with the statute‘s object and scope.” Id. (citations omitted).
Contrary to the Elsberrys’ assertion, this Court does not confine its plain text analysis to the literal text. We “are not limited to the words of the statute as they are printed in the Annotated Code.” Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 514-15, 525 A.2d at 632. In fact, as this Court stated in Kaczorowski, “[t]he circumstances of the enactment of particular legislation may persuade a court that [the General Assembly] did not intend words of common meaning to have this literal effect.” Id. (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). “This process allows courts to discern that construction which avoids an illogical or unreasonable result, or one which is inconsistent with common sense.” Patton v. Wells Fargo Fin. Maryland, Inc., 437 Md. 83, 97-98, 85 A.3d 167, 175 (2014) (internal citation omitted). Similarly,
[w]here the words of a statute are ambiguous and subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, or where the words are clear and unambiguous when viewed in isolation, but become ambiguous when read as part of a larger statutory scheme, a court must resolve the ambiguity by searching for legislative intent in other indicia, including the history of the legislation or other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the legislative process.
Lockshin, 412 Md. at 276, 987 A.2d at 29 (citations omitted). “In resolving ambiguities, a court considers the structure of the statute, how it relates to other laws, its general purpose, and the relative rationality and legal effect of various competing constructions.” Id. (citations omitted). As this Court explained in Building Materials Corp. of America v. Board of Education of Baltimore County,
[a] preliminary matter . . . is to identify the statutory or regulatory language to be construed. Consider the well-known
phrase “She loves me; she loves me not.” If one focuses only on the first clause, the plain meaning appears clear—no need for further exploration. Similarly, if one considers only the second clause, the meaning seems equally clear though quite different. But when the sentence is considered as a whole, there is ambiguity and one must know more than the language alone to discern its meaning. Context and history matter. As this Court has said, “the meaning of the plainest language is controlled by the context in which it appears.”
428 Md. 572, 585, 53 A.3d 347, 354-55 (2012) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).At the outset, this Court begins its analysis with
(a)(1) In this subsection, “water and sewer authority” includes a person to which the duties and responsibilities of the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission have been delegated by a written agreement or in accordance with a local ordinance.
(2) A contract for the initial sale of improved, residential real property to a member of the public who intends to occupy or rent the property for residential purposes shall disclose the estimated cost, as established by the appropriate water and sewer authority, of any deferred water and sewer charges for which the purchaser may become liable.
(3)(i) In Prince George‘s County, a contract for the initial sale of residential real property for which there are deferred private water and sewer assessments recorded by a covenant or declaration deferring costs for water and sewer improvements for which the purchaser may be liable shall contain a disclosure that includes:
- The existence of the deferred private water and sewer assessments;
- The amount of the annual assessment;
- The approximate number of payments remaining on the assessment;
- The amount remaining on the assessment, including interest;
- The name and address of the person or entity most recently responsible for collection of the assessment;
- The interest rate on the assessment;
- The estimated payoff amount of the assessment; and
- A statement that payoff of the assessment is allowed without prepayment penalty.
(ii) A person or entity establishing water and sewer costs for the initial sale of residential real property may not amortize costs that are passed on to a purchaser by imposing a deferred water and sewer charge for a period longer than 20 years after the date of the initial sale.
(4) If the appropriate water and sewer authority has not established a schedule of charges for the water and sewer project that benefits residential real property or if a local jurisdiction has adopted a plan to benefit residential real property in the future, the contract for the initial sale of the residential real property shall disclose that fact.
(5)(i) This paragraph does not apply in a county that has adopted a disclosure requirement that is substantially similar to the disclosure requirement in subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph.
(ii) A contract for the resale of residential real property that is served
by public water or wastewater facilities for which deferred water and sewer charges have been established by a recorded covenant or declaration shall contain a notice in substantially the following form[.]7
(Emphasis added).
The challenged language sits within a paragraph, (a)(3), split into two subparagraphs, (a)(3)(i) and (a)(3)(ii). The first subparagraph, denoted by romanette (i), begins with the phrase, “In Prince George‘s County[.]”
The literal text of
Once the plain text of the statute is viewed in the context of its broader statutory scheme and its entire title as enacted by the General Assembly, it is clear that
It is true that an introductory sentence or header usually pertains to everything that follows until the next paragraph, section, or heading. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 79, 115 S. Ct. 464, 472 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that “the normal, commonsense reading of a subsection” is for the introductory term to modify the remainder of the subsection). The Maryland Style Manual also recommends “plac[ing] an exception or limitation at the earliest possible point in the statutory unit to which it applies[,]” unless doing so “would impair the clarity of the statute[.]” Maryland Style Manual for Statutory Law, DEP‘T LEGIS. SERVS., at 41 (Oct. 2018) [“Maryland Style Manual“], https://dls.maryland.gov/pubs/prod/LegisBillDrafting/MarylandStyleManualforStatutoryLaw2018.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/L4ES-QXFP.
(3) In Prince George‘s County, (i) a contract for the initial sale of residential real property for which there are deferred private water and sewer assessments recorded by a covenant or declaration deferring costs for water and sewer improvements for which the purchaser may be liable shall contain a disclosure that includes:
- The existence of the deferred private water and sewer assessments;
- The amount of the annual assessment;
- The approximate number of payments remaining on the assessment;
- The amount remaining on the assessment, including interest;
- The name and address of the person or entity most recently responsible for collection of the assessment;
- The interest rate on the assessment;
- The estimated payoff amount of the assessment; and
- A statement that payoff of the assessment is allowed without prepayment penalty.
(ii) A person or entity establishing water and sewer costs for the initial sale of residential real property may not amortize costs that are passed on to a purchaser by imposing a deferred water and sewer charge for a period longer than 20 years after the date of the initial sale.
See id. Written that way, the opening phrase of
Common expectations of normal paragraph structures indicate that a second subparagraph labeled “(a)(3)(ii)” would ordinarily relate in substance to the first subparagraph labeled “(a)(3)(i).” See Cain v. State, 386 Md. 320, 328, 872 A.2d 681, 686 (2005) (noting that statutory “provisions must be read in a commonsensical perspective to avoid a farfetched interpretation“) (internal citation omitted). In this case, the first subparagraph, (a)(3)(i), pertains to deferred water and sewer costs in Prince George‘s County—a proposition not contested by the Elsberrys.
The Elsberrys argue HB 1043‘s title and purpose paragraphs constitute legislative history—not plain text. In support of this contention, the Elsberrys cite to Motor Vehicle Administration v. Lytle, 374 Md. 37, 821 A.2d 62 (2003). As the Lytle Court explained,
[a]s we stated in Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, . . . even where the language of the statute is plain, its meaning is controlled by its context. In short, the statutory language must be construed in light of and governed by its context within the overall statutory scheme. An appellate court may consider evidence such as a bill‘s title and function paragraphs, amendments that occurred as it passed through the [General Assembly], and its relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation to ascertain the [General Assembly‘s] goal in enacting the statute.
Id. at 57, 821 A.2d at 74 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Contrary to the Elsberrys’ claim, the Lytle Court did not expressly state that a bill‘s title and function paragraphs constitute legislative history; rather, a bill‘s title and function paragraphs are indicative of legislative intent. Id.; Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 515, 525 A.2d at 632.The dividing line between plain text and legislative history may seem academic since both support the same construction of an ambiguous statutory provision. As provided in Lytle, this Court may use the bill title, purpose, amendments, and earlier and subsequent litigation as tools in reaching the correct statutory construction. Lytle, 374 Md. at 57, 821 A.2d at 74 (citations omitted). As a matter of precision, the bill title and purpose are part of the statutory text—not the legislative history—even if both are used in service of ascertaining the intent of the General Assembly.
Generally, the title of the bill consists of three parts: the short title, the purpose paragraph, and one or more function paragraphs. Legislative Drafting Manual, supra, at 36. First, “[t]he purpose of the short title is to give a general indication of the content of the bill.” Id. It essentially “tells the reader what the bill is about.” Id. “If a bill relates to only one or two counties, their names should appear first [in the short title], with a word or two about the subject matter after the dash.” Id. “A local bill number, assigned by the county delegation that has charge of the bill, appears on a separate line.” Id. Second, “[t]he purpose paragraph is the part of the title that describes in constitutionally acceptable detail what the bill does.” Id. at 37. Lastly, “[t]he function paragraph describes the action being taken, specifies the article and section of the Annotated Code or public local laws or the Session Laws that the bill affects, and identifies where the affected law is found.” Id. at 39.
FOR the purpose of [1] requiring a registered home builder in Prince George‘s County to include certain information relating to deferred water and sewer charges in certain sales contracts under certain circumstances; [2] requiring a certain contract for the initial sale of residential real property in the county to include certain information relating to deferred water and sewer charges; [3] prohibiting a person or entity establishing certain water and sewer costs for the initial sale of residential real property from amortizing certain costs for more than a certain period of time; [4] authorizing the purchaser to recover certain damages or take certain actions under certain circumstances; [5] applying certain provisions of law to existing single family residential property in Prince George‘s County; [6] requiring a certain person that imposes a deferred water and sewer charge to provide the property owner with a bill including certain information; [7] authorizing the balance owed on a deferred water and sewer assessment to be redeemed for a certain amount; [8] requiring the county to study certain issues relating to deferred water and sewer charges and report its findings to the Prince George‘s County Senators and the House Delegation on or before certain dates; [9] authorizing the county, in completing the studies required under this Act, to consult with certain water and sewer companies; and [10] generally relating to deferred water and sewer charges in Prince George‘s County.”
(Emphasis added). The bracketed numbers denote the ten clauses in the purpose paragraph. Of the ten clauses, six expressly include the phrase “in Prince George‘s County” or “the county.” Both the opening clause and the final summation clause, “relating to deferred water and sewer charges[,]” are limited to applying “in Prince George‘s County.” The third clause directly relates to the challenged statutory language, which does not include either “in Prince George‘s County” or “the county.” However, the third clause immediately follows these references. Notably, no other county is referenced, and the purpose paragraph makes no mention of a statewide application.
Following the statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis,8 “if the [General Assembly] had intended the general words to be construed in an unrestricted sense, it would not have enumerated the specific things.” In re Wallace W., 333 Md. 186, 190, 634 A.2d 53, 56 (1993)
B. The legislative history of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) confirms that the amortization provision only applies to Prince George‘s County.
This Court may use legislative history as a “check” on its plain text interpretation. Brown v. State, 454 Md. 546, 551, 165 A.3d 398, 401 (2017); see also Nationstar Mortg. LLC v. Kemp, 476 Md. 149, 170, 258 A.3d 296, 308 (2021) (“We also review the legislative history of the statute to confirm conclusions drawn from the text or to resolve ambiguities.“) (emphasis added); In re S.K., 466 Md. 31, 50, 215 A.3d 300, 311 (2019) (“In addition to the plain language, the modern tendency of this Court is to continue the analysis of the statute beyond the plain meaning to examine ‘extrinsic sources of legislative intent’ in order to ‘check [ ] our reading of a statute‘s plain language’ . . . .“) (citations omitted). The Elsberrys contend that Court of Special Appeals should not have consulted the legislative history of
In Patton, a purchaser and lender disagreed regarding the appropriate statute of limitations for actions brought under the Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Law (“CLEC“), a Maryland statute that governed the parties’ loan contract. Id. at 95-96, 85 A.3d at 173-74.
Contrary to the Elsberrys’ stance, at no point did this Court or the Court of Special Appeals use legislative history to contradict the plain meaning of the statute. Rather, both courts employed legislative history (along with consideration of the context, objectives, and purpose of the statute) to evince the intent of the General Assembly. What this Court did in Patton is precisely what the Court of Special Appeals did in the instant case. Both recognized
Our review of the legislative history of
Montgomery County did not adopt the recommendations from the Task Force Report, but nonetheless voted for HB 1043. The decision to not adopt the recommendation for a twenty-year amortization limit, but overall vote for the bill, indicates Montgomery County‘s support for the amortization cap in Prince George‘s County, but not in Montgomery County. It seems less than likely that the Montgomery County delegation would endorse a statewide amortization cap when it declined to specifically adopt one from the bi-county Task Force Report. Additionally, feasibility reports in the uncodified section of the bill were directed to the Prince George‘s County delegation. “The bill requires Prince George‘s County to study specified issues relating to deferred water and sewer charges and report its preliminary findings to the Prince George‘s County Senators and House Delegation . . . .” (Emphasis added).
The Elsberrys rely upon Taylor v. Friedman, 344 Md. 572, 689 A.2d 59 (1997), for the proposition that the Task Force Report cannot be used to thwart the intent of the General Assembly. However, Taylor is distinguishable in two respects. First, Taylor concerned whether
In the case at bar, the Task Force Report underscores the same conclusion manifested in the plain text of the statute, its short title, and purpose:
One final indicia of our conclusion: The vote for HB 1043 was unanimous, but there was no indication in the legislative record that other jurisdictions intended for (a)(3)(ii) to apply statewide. Some jurisdictions, such as Baltimore County, already impose an amortization limit that exceeds the twenty-year cap provided by (a)(3)(ii). If we adopt the Elsberrys’ posture, then these jurisdictions’ existing laws would be rescinded by HB 1043; however, there is no indication of discussion or debate from these jurisdictions, either challenging or acquiescing, to a new statewide regime. Therefore, we conclude that HB 1043‘s legislative history confirms our plain text interpretation that
C. The Court of Special Appeals correctly interpreted Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) to avoid violating Article III, § 29 of the Maryland Constitution .
Finally, the Court of Special Appeals determined that the Elsberrys’ proposed statutory construction would violate
This Court generally construes statutory language in a way that avoids violating the Constitution. Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 404, 425-26, 921 A.2d 171, 183 (2007) (“the . . . canon of constitutional avoidance . . . provides that a statute will be construed so as to avoid a conflict with the Constitution whenever that course is
The style of all Laws of this State shall be, “Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland:” and all Laws shall be passed by original bill; and every Law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but one subject, and that shall be described in its title; and no Law, nor section of Law, shall be revived, or amended by reference to its title, or section only; nor shall any Law be construed by reason of its title, to grant powers, or confer rights which are not expressly contained in the body of the Act . . . .
The Legislative Drafting Manual similarly provides guidance on bill short titles. Legislative Drafting Manual, supra, at 36. In short, “[the] short title tells the reader what the bill is about.” Id. Its “purpose . . . is to give a general indication of the content of the bill.” Id. Generally, “no more than six to eight words need be used, and the drafter should avoid short titles that exceed 100 characters in length.” Id. “Short titles commonly state the general subject of the bill first, followed by successively more detailed phrases separated by dashes.” Id. Notably, “[i]f a bill relates to only one or two counties, their names should appear first, with a word or two about the subject matter after the dash.”10 Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, “[b]icounty agency bills should include the full name of the agency, followed by a very brief description of the content of the bill.” Id. For local bills, “[a] local bill number, assigned by the county delegation that has charge of the bill, appears on a separate line.” Id.
While this Court has “historically construed the one subject rule liberally in order to give effect to legislation, more recently the court has become stricter in its interpretation and has warned that there are limits to its willingness to find
As discussed previously, both the short title and purpose paragraph of HB 1043 pertain to one subject: deferred water and sewer charges in Prince George‘s County. While the purpose paragraph provides several detailed applications of the law, including notice requirements and limits on amortization, each provision “generally relat[es] to deferred water and sewer charges in Prince George‘s County.” Therefore, this interpretation of the title squarely falls within the “one subject rule” because it restrains the subject of HB 1043 to one item, deferred water and sewer costs, to one particular county, Prince George‘s County. The Court of Special Appeals avoided a violation of
Conversely, if this Court adopted the Elsberrys’ interpretation of the law, then it would conceivably jeopardize compliance with
CONCLUSION
We hold that
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS IS AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONERS.
Notes
[1.] Whether a court may rely on legislative history unrelated to the specific statutory text at issue to override the consumer protections granted in the plain language and tabulation of [Real Prop.] §14-117(a)(3), an unambiguous remedial statute?
[2.] Whether the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland violated Article III, Section 29 of the Maryland Constitution by using the title of the bill “Prince George’s County – Deferred Water and Sewer Charges Homeowner Disclosure Act of 2014” to contradict the plain language of [Real Prop.] § 14-117(a)(3)(ii)?
(Emphasis added).(i) In Prince George’s County, a contract for the initial sale of residential real property for which there are deferred private water and sewer assessments recorded by a covenant or declaration deferring costs for water and sewer improvements for which the purchaser may be liable shall contain a disclosure . . . .
(ii) A person or entity establishing water and sewer costs for the initial sale of residential real property may not amortize costs that are passed on to a purchaser by imposing a deferred water and sewer charge for a period longer than 20 years after the date of the initial sale.