MATTHEW MANNING, Plaintiff, v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERISTY, et al., Defendants.
No. 5:23-CV-331-D
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA WESTERN DIVISION
March
JAMES C. DEVER III, United States District Judge
ORDER
On June 19, 2023, Matthew Manning (“Manning” or “plaintiff“) filed this action against North Carolina State University (“State“) [D.E. 1]. On August 25, 2023, State moved to dismiss Manning‘s complaint [D.E. 9] and filed a memorandum in support [D.E. 10]. See
I.
Manning has “severe and chronic” Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD“), Major Depressive Disorder, and Generalized Anxiety Disorder. Am. Compl. [D.E. 12] ¶ 29. Manning experiences excessive worry, rumination, avoidance behaviors, perfectionism, insomnia, fatigue, low self-esteem, apathy, sadness, irritability, and poor motivation as a result. See id. at ¶ 30.
In fall 2016, Manning enrolled at State as a doctoral candidate in the materials science and engineering program. See id. at ¶ 26. To graduate, a doctoral candidate must earn 72 credit hours, including nine hours of materials science and engineering upper-level courses, 18 credit hours of other upper-level courses, and 45 credit hours of doctoral supervised research, teaching, and doctoral dissertation research, and complete a dissertation. See id. at ¶¶ 26-27. The program typically takes six academic years. See id. at ¶ 27.
Doctoral candidates may serve as graduate teaching assistants (“GTA“) or graduate research assistants (“GRA“). GTAs serve as instructors of record, lab instructors, recitation leaders, lab assistants, or lecture assistants, support classroom instruction, and provide general teaching support. See id. at ¶ 31. GRAs conduct research and provide general research support. See id. at ¶ 26. GRA work may contribute to a student‘s dissertation. See id.
From May 16, 2017, to August 16, 2018, and August 1, 2020, to December 22, 2020, Manning served as a GRA and earned an annual salary of $15,000 for 15 hours of
In fall 2019, Manning was hospitalized twice for depression. See id. at ¶ 37. In fall 2020, Manning‘s severe depression began interfering with his doctoral work and studies. See id. at ¶ 38. Consequently, Manning requested and received a leave of absence for fall 2020 through spring 2021. See id. at ¶ 39. Before returning to school, Manning‘s psychiatrist provided suggested accommodations to allow Manning to finish his degree. See id. at ¶ 40.
In fall 2021, Manning returned to school and work. From August 16, 2021, through May 15, 2022, Manning served as a GTA under Yingling‘s supervision and earned an annual salary of $25,000 for 20 hours of work per week. See id. at ¶ 41. When Manning returned to school and work in fall 2021, Yingling treated him differently. See id. at ¶ 43. Yingling told Manning that she needed to “push him” to help him become a better researcher and better doctoral student. Id. at ¶ 53. She criticized his work without constructive criticism and did not appoint him to a GRA position because there were no available funds. See id. at ¶¶ 43-44. Additionally, Yingling called Manning on his cell phone outside of business hours and required that he immediately respond to student inquiries. See id. at ¶ 49.
In September 2021, Manning requested accommodations from State‘s Disability Resources Office. See id. at ¶ 45. In October 2021, Manning spoke with Dean Peter Harries (“Harries“) concerning Yingling‘s treatment and requirement that Manning post his appointments, including medical appointments, on a public, shared calendar of doctoral candidates and faculty. See id. at ¶ 47. On October 4, 2021, Manning discussed his disabilities with Yingling, and she said that she also had “mental health issues.” Id. at ¶ 48. On October 10, 2021, Manning requested accommodations from the Office of Institutional Equity and Diversity (“OIED“). See id. at ¶ 51. On October 12, 2021, Manning filed a discrimination report against Yingling with the OIED alleging harassment, unrealistic expectations, and adding unnecessary stress to Manning‘s job. See id. at ¶ 52. On October 15, 2021, Dave Johnson (“Johnson“) in State‘s Equal Opportunity and Equity Office told Manning that no actions would be taken against Yingling. See id. at ¶ 54. Harries told Johnson to complete his degree or drop out. See id. at ¶ 55. On October 17, 2021, Manning again requested accommodations from the Disability Resources Office. See id. at ¶¶ 45, 56.
On October 18, 2021, Manning asked Yingling for a spring 2022 GRA position. See id. at ¶ 57. A GRA position Manning wanted became available, but Yingling chose a first-year graduate student for the position. See id. Yingling told Manning that he could not have the GRA job because he was a “liability.” See id. Manning found a different GRA position for the spring, though it paid less than his desired position. See id. at ¶¶ 58, 61.
On January 11, 2022, Claude Reynolds, Jr. (“Reynolds“) became Manning‘s supervisor. See id. at ¶ 60. In the spring, Yingling did not select Manning for the Materials Research Society Convention. See id. at ¶ 59.
On January 28, 2022, Manning met with April Baer (“Baer“) in the Office of Institutional Equity and Diversity to request accommodations. See id. at ¶ 62. Baer denied Manning‘s requested accommodations and instead assigned Manning a private office. See id. at ¶¶ 62-63.
On April 11, 2022, Manning filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Opportunity Commission (“EEOC“). See
In June 2022, Manning‘s GRA position ended. See id. at ¶ 65. He could not find another GRA or GTA position. See id. At some point, Reynolds withdrew as Manning‘s supervisor. See id. at ¶ 60. With no advisor or supervisor, Manning did not know how to proceed with his doctoral program. See id. at ¶¶ 60, 66. Accordingly, Manning took another leave of absence. See id. at ¶¶ 66, 67.
On March 21, 2023, the EEOC issued a right to sue notice. See id. at ¶ 20. On June 19, 2023, Manning filed suit. See [D.E. 1]. Manning seeks back pay, front pay, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and costs. See Am. Compl. 24-25.
II.
A.
Before addressing the merits, the court resolves various procedural issues. On August 25, 2023, State filed a motion to dismiss Manning‘s complaint. See [D.E. 9]. On October 10, 2023, Manning amended his complaint, adding Yingling as a party. See [D.E. 12, 13]. Accordingly, the court dismisses as moot State‘s motion to dismiss Manning‘s complaint.
B.
Defendants contend that some allegations in Manning‘s Title I ADA claims are unexhausted or time-barred. See [D.E. 20] 6-8. The ADA incorporates the administrative enforcement provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII“), including the requirement that a plaintiff exhaust his administrative remedies by filing a charge with the EEOC concerning the alleged discrimination before filing suit in federal court. See
Manning had to file an EEOC charge within 180 days of each alleged discrete act of discrimination under Title I of the ADA. See
On April 11, 2022, Manning filed his EEOC charge. See Am. Compl. ¶ 19. Manning concedes that only discrete acts of discrimination that occurred on or after October 13, 2021, are actionable under Title I of the ADA. See [D.E. 22] 14; [D.E. 23] 3. Thus, the court dismisses any claim under Title I of the ADA concerning a discrete act of discrimination that occurred before October 13, 2021.
As for Manning‘s ADA Title I hostile work environment claim, “a court sometimes may consider events beyond the 180-day charge-filing period when analyzing a hostile work environment claim.” McDougal-Wilson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 427 F. Supp. 2d 595, 616 (E.D.N.C. 2006); see Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115-21. A “hostile work environment claim is composed of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one ‘unlawful employment practice.‘” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117 (quoting
Defendants argue that Manning has not stated a hostile work environment claim but do not dispute that the alleged conduct could constitute a single act for a hostile work environment analysis. See [D.E. 23] 3 n.2; cf. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 43-52, 64-65. Accordingly, Manning‘s hostile work environment claim is not time-barred.
Defendants also argue that the applicable statute of limitations bars Manning‘s claims under Title II of the ADA and Section 504. See [D.E. 20] 8-9. Congress has not adopted a specific statute of limitations for actions under Title II of the ADA and Section 504. See McCullough v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 35 F.3d 127, 129 (4th Cir. 1994); Green v. Cafe, No. 4:04-CV-111, 2008 WL 7871053, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 5, 2008) (unpublished), aff‘d sub nom. Green v. Maroules, 328 F. App‘x 868 (4th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (unpublished). North Carolina‘s most analogous statute to Title II of the ADA and Section 504 is the Persons with Disabilities Protection Act (“PDPA“),
Although the limitations periods for claims brought under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 are borrowed from state law, federal law determines the time for accrual. See A Soc‘y Without a Name, 655 F.3d at 348; Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1975). A claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury forming the basis of an action. See A Soc‘y Without a Name, 655 F.3d at 348; Cox, 529 F.2d at 50.
As for the timeliness of Manning‘s section 504 retaliation claims, Manning‘s section 504 employment-related claim in count two is time-barred, and the court dismisses this claim. See
III.
A motion to dismiss under
“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” the complaint does not suffice. Id.
When evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court considers the pleadings and any materials “attached or incorporated into the complaint.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 448 (4th Cir. 2011); see
North Carolina law applies to some claims in this case. For those claims, this court must predict how the Supreme Court of North Carolina would rule on any disputed state-law issue. See Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Ben Arnold-Sunbelt Beverage Co., 433 F.3d 365, 369 (4th Cir. 2005). First, the court looks to opinions of the Supreme Court of North Carolina. See Stahle v. CTS Corp., 817 F.3d 96, 100 (4th Cir. 2016). “If there are no governing opinions from that court, this court may consider the opinions of North Carolina Court of Appeals, treatises, and ‘the practices of other states.‘” Ben Arnold-Sunbelt Beverage Co., 433 F.3d at 369 (quotation and citation omitted). In predicting how the highest court of a state would address an issue, this court must “follow the decision of an intermediate state appellate court unless there is persuasive data that the highest court would decide differently.” Town of Nags Head v. Toloczko, 728 F.3d 391, 398 (4th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted); see Hicks ex. rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 630 & n.8 (1988).
Moreover, in predicting how the highest court of a state would address an issue, this court “should not create or expand a [s]tate‘s public policy.” Time Warner Ent.-Advance/Newhouse P‘ship v. Carteret-Craven Elec. Membership Corp., 506 F.3d 304, 314 (4th Cir. 2007) (alteration and quotation omitted); see Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4 (1975) (per curiam); Wade v. Danek Med., Inc., 182 F.3d 281, 286 (4th Cir. 1999).
A.
In count one, Manning alleges Title I disparate treatment and failure-to-accommodate claims against State and Yingling. See id. at ¶¶ 68-82. Title I of the ADA applies to employment and prevents discrimination “against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”
A plaintiff may assert a Title I ADA claim against his employer based on (1) intentional discrimination or disparate treatment; (2) disparate impact; and (3) failure to make reasonable accommodations. See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52-53 (2003); Prentice v. North Carolina, No. 5:20-CT-3150, 2023 WL 2533164, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 3, 2023) (unpublished), aff‘d sub nom. Prentice v. Haynes, No. 23-6243, 2023 WL 6442566 (4th Cir. Oct. 3, 2023) (per curiam) (unpublished); see also A Helping Hand, LLC v. Balt. Cnty., 515 F.3d 356, 362 (4th Cir. 2008). A plaintiff may prove such discrimination through direct evidence or through the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 49-50 & n.3; Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
i.
A shareholder, officer, supervisor, or co-worker of a corporate “employer” (as defined in the ADA) cannot be held individually liable for an alleged Title I ADA violation. The definition of “employer” under the ADA does not encompass such person in her individual capacity. See
ii.
Even though a plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case to survive a motion to dismiss,1 Swierkiewicz “left untouched the burden of a plaintiff to allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of [his] claim.” Jordan v. Alt. Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 346 (4th Cir. 2006) (cleaned up), overruled on other grounds by Boyer-Liberto v. Fountainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569-70; McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep‘t of Transp., 780 F.3d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 2015). In order to state a discrimination claim under Title I of the ADA, Manning must plausibly allege that State violated Title I of the ADA.
To establish a disability discrimination claim under Title I of the ADA, a plaintiff must prove “(1) that [he] has a disability, (2) that [he] is a ‘qualified individual’ for the employment in question, and (3) that [his] employer discharged [him] (or took other adverse employment action) because of [his] disability.” Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 572 (4th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted); see EEOC v. McLeod Health, Inc., 914 F.3d 876, 883 (4th Cir. 2019). A disability under the ADA must “substantially limit[] one or more [of the plaintiff‘s] major life activities.”
Direct evidence requires “conduct or statements that both reflect directly the alleged discriminatory attitude and that bear directly on the contested employment decision.” Rhoads v. F.D.I.C., 257 F.3d 373, 391-92 (4th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted); see Warch v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 435 F.3d 510, 520 (4th Cir. 2006), abrogated in part on other grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177-80 (2009); Brinkley v. Harbour Recreation Club, 180 F.3d 598, 607 (4th Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds by Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); EEOC v. Mfrs. & Traders Tr. Co., 429 F. Supp. 3d 89, 118-19 (D. Md. 2019).
As for Manning‘s prima facie case, Manning alleges he has “[m]ajor [r]ecurrent [d]epressive [d]isorder” that resulted in “severe depression,” caused two hospitalizations, and “interfere[d] with [Manning‘s] doctoral work and studies.” Am. Comp. ¶¶ 37-38, 69. Manning also alleges that his depression interfered with his work by limiting “his ability to concentrate, think, work, and communicate under certain circumstances.” Id. at ¶ 70. Accordingly, Manning plausibly alleges a disability.
Manning alleges that he was qualified to perform his job and performed the essential functions of his job without reasonable accommodation, including completing a GRA position and co-authoring three publications. See id. at ¶ 71. The court assumes without deciding that Manning has plausibly alleged that he was qualified.
Manning alleges that he was treated differently than his non-disabled classmates when Yingling required him to “post his medical appointments on a public, shared calendar,” repeatedly called Manning “on his cell phone outside of business hours and demand[ed] that he answer student inquiries immediately,” and removed “him as a co-author” from one publication. Id. at ¶¶ 47, 85, 107. Manning‘s amended complaint, however, does not allege that he had to disclose the specific nature of his medical appointments. A supervisor asking an employee to provide availability on a shared calendar and respond to calls and inquiries outside of normal business hours does not violate the ADA. Furthermore, Manning simply states that Yingling removed him as a co-author of a publication but does not allege a reason for removal, if she replaced him, or any other facts that plausibly allege disability discrimination. Thus, these actions do not constitute disability discrimination.
As for Yingling‘s alleged refusal to “appoint [Manning] to a GRA position” and to require him to take a lower-paying GTA position, id. at ¶ 72, from May 16, 2017, to August 16, 2018, and August 1, 2020, to December 22, 2020, Manning served as a GRA making $15,000 per year for 15 hours of work per week. See id. at ¶¶ 33, 36. On August 16, 2021, following Manning‘s return to State, Manning served as a GTA making $25,000 per year for 20 hours of work per week. See id. at ¶ 41. Manning alleges that Yingling refused to appoint him to a GRA position because there was no funding for his previous GRA position and because of his disabilities. See id. at ¶¶ 43-44. Manning also alleges that work performed as a GRA is essential to his dissertation and to graduating. See id. at ¶ 34. Furthermore, Manning alleges that Yingling hired a less qualified first-year graduate student for an open GRA position that Manning wanted. See id. at ¶ 57.
From fall 2020 through spring 2021, Manning chose to take a leave of absence from State. See id. at ¶ 39. He does not allege that State promised him a GRA position upon return. He also does not allege that State guarantees a GRA position to every doctoral candidate in his
iii.
Under the ADA, unlawful discrimination can include the failure to make “reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an . . . employee....”
Manning lacks direct evidence of disability discrimination. To establish a prima facie case for a failure-to-accommodate claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) he has a disability within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the employer had notice of his disability; (3) with a reasonable accommodation, he could perform the essential functions of the position; and (4) the employer refused to make such an accommodation. See, e.g., Cowgill v. First Data Techs., Inc., 41 F.4th 370, 378 (4th Cir. 2022); Wilson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. 2013). A plaintiff‘s failure to prove any element of his prima facie case defeats his ADA failure-to-accommodate claim. See Wilson, 717 F.3d at 345; see also EEOC v. Kohl‘s Dep‘t Stores, Inc., 774 F.3d 127, 131-32 (1st Cir. 2014).
Courts analyzing an ADA failure-to-accommodate claim generally focus on whether, with a reasonable accommodation, an employee with a disability can perform the essential functions of a given job. See, e.g., Jacobs, 780 F.3d at 579-80. The failure-to-accommodate inquiry generally proceeds in two steps: (1) whether the specific accommodation that the disabled employee requested was reasonable and (2) if the employer granted the reasonable accommodation, whether the disabled employee could perform the essential functions of the job. See id. at 580-81. A reasonable accommodation “is connected to what the employer knows about the specific limitations affecting an employee who is a qualified individual with a disability.” Jackson v. City of Chi., 414 F.3d 806, 813 (7th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added); see Allen v. City of Raleigh, 140 F. Supp. 3d 470, 483 (E.D.N.C. 2015);
“The interactive process involves an informal dialogue between the employee and the employer in which the two parties discuss the issues affecting the employee and potential reasonable accommodations that might address those issues.” Kohl‘s Dep‘t Stores, Inc., 774 F.3d at 132. The interactive process requires bilateral cooperation, open communication, and good faith. See id. “If an employer engages in the interactive process with the employee in good faith, for the purpose of discussing alternative reasonable accommodations, but the employee fails to cooperate in the process, then the employer cannot be held liable under the ADA for failure to provide reasonable accommodations.” Id.; see EEOC v. Agro Distrib., LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 472 (5th Cir. 2009); Jackson, 414 F.3d at 813-14. An employer need not provide a reasonable accommodation if accommodating the employee would create an “undue hardship.” See
Manning plausibly alleged he has a disability. See Am. Comp. ¶¶ 37-38, 69-70. Moreover, in July 2021, Manning put State on notice of his disabilities when his psychiatrist told State about Manning‘s “chronic diagnoses and recommend[ed] disability accommodations for him.” Id. at ¶ 40. Furthermore, on October 4, 2021, Manning placed Yingling on notice during a one one-on-one meeting. See id. at ¶¶ 48, 50.
As for a reasonable accommodation, on October 10, 2021, Manning requested the following accommodations: not contacting him on his personal cell phone, limiting communications with him to business hours, providing him exemplars of graded assignments from previous semesters, and providing him a solution key and grading rubric for assignments. See id. at ¶ 51. On October 17, 2021, Manning again requested these accommodations. See id. at ¶ 56.
Students’ schedules at universities are not 9:00 AM to 5:00 PM jobs. Students and professors must work around classes, research, and mandatory university requirements, particularly when an essential job function is “support[ing] the teaching mission of the department.” Id. at ¶ 31. Moreover, Manning does not plausibly allege that his requested accommodations are connected to what State knew about Manning‘s specific limitations or that he would be able to attain an equal level of achievement as a non-disabled person with the requested accommodations. See Jackson, 414 F.3d at 813. Thus, Manning has not met his burden of plausibly alleging that his requested accommodations are reasonable.
Alternatively, even if the court assumes without deciding that the requested accommodations are reasonable, Manning failed to cooperate in the interactive process. On January 28, 2022, Manning met with the appropriate representatives from
B.
In count three, Manning alleges that State through Yingling created a hostile work environment in violation of the ADA. See id. at ¶¶ 90-101. To state a hostile work environment claim under the ADA, Manning must plausibly allege:
(1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on his disability; (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) some factual basis exists to impute liability for the harassment to the employer.
Fox v. Gen. Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 177 (4th Cir. 2001); accord EEOC v. Fairbrook Med. Clinic, P.A., 609 F.3d 320, 327 (4th Cir. 2010) (Title VII); Ziskie v. Mineta, 547 F.3d 220, 224 (4th Cir. 2008) (Title VII); Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Title VII). An employee must show that his protected characteristic under the ADA was the “but for” cause of the alleged harassment. See, e.g., Gentry v. East West Partners Club Mgt. Co., 816 F.3d 228, 234-36 (4th Cir. 2016); Gilliam v. S.C. Dep‘t of Juv. Just., 474 F.3d 134, 142 (4th Cir. 2007). “[C]onclusory statements that [an employer] treated [the plaintiff] less favorably than” other employees of “similar rank” who lacked the relevant protected characteristic “cannot support an actionable claim for harassment.” Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 801-02 (4th Cir. 1998).
To determine whether alleged harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the employee‘s terms and conditions of employment and to create an abusive working environment, the court examines the allegations both subjectively and objectively. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993). First, the employee must subjectively consider the harassment to be sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter his conditions of employment. See, e.g., Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270-71 (2001) (per curiam); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-88 (1998); Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 277. Second, a court views the conduct from the perspective of a reasonable person in the employee‘s position to determine whether it is objectively severe or pervasive. See, e.g., Breeden, 532 U.S. at 271; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787-88; Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998); Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 277.
The objective component helps courts “to police the baseline for hostile
The court assumes without deciding that Manning plausibly alleged he has a disability, that Yingling‘s “comments, harassment, and hostility” were unwelcome, that the alleged harassment was because of Manning‘s disability, and that Manning subjectively believed that the alleged harassment altered a term, condition, or privilege of employment. See Am. Comp. ¶¶ 37-38, 43, 69-70, 91, 94-95.
As for whether the harassment was objectively sufficiently severe or pervasive, Manning alleges that Yingling mocked him, refused to help him improve his work, criticized his work, told him that he was a “risk” and a “liability,” told Manning she also had mental health issues, and made Manning post his appointments, including medical appointments, on a shared calendar. See id. at ¶ 92. Even viewing Yingling‘s alleged behavior in the light most favorable to Manning, Manning has failed to plausibly allege behavior that is objectively severe or pervasive enough to alter Manning‘s term, condition, or privilege of employment. See, e.g., White, 548 U.S. at 68-69; Breeden, 532 U.S. at 270-71; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788; Baqir, 434 F.3d at 746-47. Accordingly, the court dismisses Manning‘s hostile work environment claim.
C.
In count four and five, Manning alleges Title II ADA disparate treatment and failure-to-accommodate claims against State in his student capacity. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 102-119. Under Title II, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by
“Title II unambiguously does not provide a vehicle for public employment discrimination claims.” Reyazuddin, 789 F.3d at 421; see Boone v. Bd. of Governors of Univ. of N.C., 858 F. App‘x 622, 622 (4th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (unpublished). Accordingly, the court dismisses Manning‘s employment-related allegations in counts four and five and proceeds only on Manning‘s academic-related allegations in count four and five.
Title II of the ADA applies to educational claims against universities. See, e.g., Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 484 (4th Cir. 2005). To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that: (1) he has a disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified for the benefits of a public service, program, or activity; and (3) he was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of such service on the basis of his disability. See, e.g., Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 461 (4th Cir. 2012); Constantine, 411 F.3d at 498; Baird, 192 F.3d at 467; Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1264-65 (4th Cir. 1995). To show that a plaintiff has a disability, “[h]e must prove (1) that he has a physical or mental impairment, (2) that this impairment implicates at least one major life activity, and (3) that the limitation is substantial.” Heiko v. Colombo Sav. Bank, F.S.B., 434 F.3d 249, 254 (4th Cir. 2006); see
Manning plausibly alleged he has a disability. See Am. Comp. ¶¶ 37-38, 69-70. Manning also plausibly alleges that he was admitted to State and was not on academic probation. See id. at ¶ 26. Manning, however, has not plausibly alleged that State excluded him from participation in the benefits of his education based on his disability. Rather, Manning chose to take a leave of absence when he could not secure another GRA or GTA position at State, but these positions were not required to graduate. See id. at ¶¶ 27-28, 65-67. Manning simply viewed them as necessary to “adequately progress.” Id. at ¶ 66. In fact, Manning remains in the graduate program. See id. at ¶ 67.
As for disparate treatment as a student under Title II of the ADA, Manning alleges that he was required to share his calendar availability and that Yingling mocked and rebuked him. See id. at ¶¶ 107-08. Sharing availability on a calendar, however, as all graduate students and faculty must do, does not violate the ADA. Furthermore, Manning does not plausibly allege that State excluded him or denied him benefits on the basis of his alleged disability. Accordingly, the court dismisses Manning‘s Title II disparate treatment claim.
As for Manning‘s failure to accommodate claim under Title II of the ADA, Manning fails to plausibly allege a failure to accommodate. In July 2021, Manning‘s psychiatrist recommended accommodations to State to allow Manning to finish his degree. See id. at ¶ 40. Specifically, the psychiatrist recommended extended time for assignments and exams, course adjustments for absences due to illness or to attend appointments concerning his illness, priority registration to allow for flexibility around his doctor appointments, and testing space with reduced distractions. See id.
At bottom, Manning does not allege that State refused to provide the accommodations he requested. See id. at ¶¶ 102-19. Rather, Manning alleges that he met with Baer to discuss potential accommodations for his disabilities and used this meeting to seek to avoid Yingling, not to accommodate his disabilities. See id. at ¶¶ 60-64. Even viewing the amended complaint in the light most favorable to Manning, Manning‘s Title II failure-to-accommodate claim fails, and the court dismisses counts four and five.
D.
In count six, Manning alleges retaliation in violation of Title II of the ADA against State in his student capacity. See id. at ¶¶ 120-25. The ADA‘s retaliation provision makes it unlawful to “discriminate against any individual because such individual” engaged in protected activity under the ADA.
As for protected activity, on October 12, 2021, Manning filed a harassment complaint with State. See id. at ¶ 52. On October 15, 2021, Manning complained to Harries. See id. at ¶ 55. The court assumes without deciding that these acts constitute protected activity under the ADA.
As for adverse action and causation, Manning alleges that Yingling “ostracized” him from the doctoral program by excluding him from a funded research trip to the Materials Research Society Convention. See id. at ¶ 59. Manning fails to allege, however, the requirements for attending the convention or allege that he was the only GRA or GTA who was excluded. Thus, Manning does not causally link these decisions to his protected conduct.
Manning also alleges that on January 11, 2022, after Manning complained about Yingling‘s performance as his supervisor, State assigned him to a new supervisor (i.e., Reynolds) and closed his complaint. See id. at ¶ 60. Although Reynolds later withdrew as Manning‘s supervisor, Manning does not causally link Reynold‘s withdrawal to his protected conduct and Reynold‘s appointment as his supervisor. See id. at ¶¶ 60, 66.
On January 28, 2022, Manning met with Baer to discuss his issues with Yingling. In response, Baer assigned Manning a private office. See id. at ¶ 63. Even if this assignment constituted an adverse action (and it is hard to see how it is), Manning does not causally link this decision to his protected activity.
On April 11, 2022, Manning filed an EEOC charge. See id. at ¶ 19. Manning does not plausibly allege a causal connection between this protected conduct and any adverse action. See id. at ¶¶ 64-67. Accordingly, Manning has failed to plausibly allege his Title II retaliation claim under the ADA, and the court dismisses this claim.
E.
In count seven, Manning alleges tortious interference with contract against Yingling. See id. at ¶¶ 126-33. Under North Carolina law, tortious interference
A plaintiff can overcome this presumption by showing that the non-outsider took the action for an improper reason. See Embree, 330 N.C. at 498, 411 S.E.2d at 924; Stec v. Fuzion Inv. Cap., LLC, No. 11-CVS-4241, 2012 WL 1524487, at *8 (N.C. Super. Apr. 30, 2012) (unpublished). To do so, a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with malice and for a reason “not reasonably related to the protection of a legitimate business interest.” Sellers v. Morton, 191 N.C. App. 75, 82, 661 S.E.2d 915, 921 (2008); Market Am., Inc. v. Christman-Orth, 135 N.C. App. 143, 158, 520 S.E.2d 570, 581 (1999). Merely alleging an improper actual or primary motive, however, will not suffice. Instead, the “complaint must admit of no motive for interference other than malice.” Pinewood Homes, Inc. v. Harris, 184 N.C. App. 597, 605, 646 S.E.2d 826, 832-33 (2007); see Filmar Racing, Inc. v. Stewart, 141 N.C. App. 668, 674-75, 541 S.E.2d 733, 738 (2001); Privette, 96 N.C. App. at 135, 385 S.E.2d at 191; see also Welch-Walker v. Guilford Cnty. Bd. Educ., No. 1:12-CV-149, 2014 WL 6997596, at *7, n.5 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 10, 2014) (unpublished); Jones v. Am. Airlines Inc., No. 5:08-CV-236, 2008 WL 9411160, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 16, 2008) (unpublished).
The court assumes without deciding that a “current student in good standing who is paying [his] tuition and other fees [has] a contractual right to return to school, nothing else appearing.” Rouse v. Duke Univ., 869 F. Supp. 2d 674, 683 (M.D.N.C. 2012); see Dickinson v. Univ. of N.C., 91 F. Supp. 3d 755, 770 (M.D.N.C. 2015); Ryan v. Univ. of N.C. Hosps., 128 N.C. App. 300, 303, 494 S.E.2d 789, 791 (1998). Dismissal from an extracurricular university activity, however, does not create a breach of the underlying contractual right earn a degree. See Giuliani v. Duke Univ., No. 1:08CV502, 2009 WL 1408869, at *1-4 (M.D.N.C. May 19, 2009) (unpublished) (holding that dismissal from the golf team is not a secret expulsion from the university creating a breach of contract).
Manning alleges that State and Manning had a contract that Manning would obtain a doctorate in Materials Science and Engineering from State, and Yingling was aware of this contract. See id. at ¶¶ 127-28. Manning also alleges that Yingling interfered with this contract by refusing to allow Manning to fill an open GRA position so that he could obtain his doctorate degree. See id. at ¶ 128.
IV.
In sum, the court DISMISSES AS MOOT defendant State‘s motion to dismiss [D.E. 9] and GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss [D.E. 19]. The court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE plaintiff‘s amended complaint.
SO ORDERED. This 19 day of March, 2024.
JAMES C. DEVER III
United States District Judge