Lead Opinion
OPINION
Plaintiff-Appellant A Society Without a Name, For People Without A Home Millennium Future-Present (ASWAN) is an unincorporated association made up of homeless and formerly homeless people that advocates for their rights. On February 17, 2009, ASWAN sued defendantsappellees Commonwealth of Virginia, doing business as Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU), City of Richmond (City), Homeward, a Virginia nonprofit corporation, and unidentified John Doe(s). It alleged that the defendants had conspired to establish the Conrad Center on Oliver Hill Way, a site removed from Richmond’s downtown community, for the purpose of reducing the presence of the homeless population in the downtown area by providing services for them in a remote
ASWAN claimed that the relocation of homeless services to thе Conrad Center violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The district court dismissed all of ASWAN’S claims either because they failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or because they were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I. Background
ASWAN filed suit in Virginia state court, but Homeward removed the action to federal court in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446. In its second amended complaint, ASWAN alleged that the Conrad Center is located about two miles from downtown Richmond; that this location is isolated and removed from Richmond’s downtown community and VCU’s campus; that the defendants took various actions to pressure organizations that provided services to the homeless in the downtown area, suсh as the Daily Planet, to relocate to the Conrad Center; that the defendants took these actions to make the homeless’ less visible to, and segregate them from, Richmond’s downtown community and the VCU campus; that creating the Conrad Center on Oliver Hill Way makes it difficult for homeless people to travel between the Center and the downtown area, an area that includes open spaces such as Monroe Park located near VCU’s campus; and that the efforts to make the homeless less visible have their roots in class, race, and disability prejudice. ASWAN contends there is a strong link between homelessness and disability, asserting that the public generally perceives and regards homeless people as being disabled due to mental illness, alcoholism, and substance abuse.
In addition to claiming that the defendаnts’ actions violated the ADA, the FHA, and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), ASWAN asserted that VCU retaliated against it in violation of the ADA for bringing this suit by withdrawing VCU’s earlier promise to help pay the cost of transporting homeless people to and from the Conrad Center. ASWAN separately alleged that the City violated the Equal Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In response to ASWAN’S complaint, all of the defendants filed motions to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that ASWAN’S complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and/or that the claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations'. The magistrate judge assigned to the case recommended that the motions be granted for the following reasons:
• ASWAN’S conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) should be dismissed “because it is comprised of conclusory allegations unsupported by concrete facts” and thereforе fails to state a plausible conspiracy claim.
• ASWAN’S ADA, FHA, equal-protection, and § 1983 claims should be dismissed because they fall outside the applicable statute of limitations.
• ASWAN’S claim that VCU retaliated against ASWAN for bringing this suit in violation of the ADA should be dismissed because (1) ASWAN failed to allege the necessary elements of a retaliation claim, and (2) VCU was not obligated to help pay the cost of transporting homeless people to and from the Conrad Center, so VCU’s withdrawal of its earlier promise to help pay these transportation costs, which occurred after ASWAN filed suit, doesnot amount to a discriminatory act or an adverse action.
The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation in its entirety and dismissed ASWAN’S lawsuit. ASWAN now appeals.
II. Analysis
A. Standard of review
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
Facts pled that are “merely consistent with” liability are not sufficient. Id. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557,
In addition, where a conspiracy is alleged, the plaintiff must plead facts amounting to more than “parallel conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy.... Without more, parallel conduct does not suggest conspiracy, and a conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point does not supply facts adequate to show illegality.” Twombly,
B. Conspiracy claim under § 1985(3)
The first issue on appeal is whether ASWAN’S complaint stated a valid 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) conspiracy claim. To state such a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), a plaintiff must prove the following:
(1) a conspiracy of two or more persons,
(2) who are motivated by a specific class-based, invidiously discriminаtory animus to (3) deprive the plaintiff of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all, (4) and which results in injury to the plaintiff as (5) a consequence of an overt act committed by the defendants in connection with the conspiracy.
Simmons v. Poe,
ASWAN alleges that a conspiracy has existed since at least 1995 to “segregate ... homeless people and to reduce the visibility of black homeless people and ADA protected people and handicapped homeless people from Richmond’s mainstream, its downtown,” which includes VCU’s main campus and the surrounding majority-white neighborhoods. But on the
ASWAN’S claim that the defendants conspired to force homeless people out of downtown Richmond by relocating homeless services to Oliver Hill Way fails because it is comprised almost entirely of conclusory allegatiоns unsupported by concrete facts. For example, the allegations that “Doe(s) and the City entered into a conspiracy” and that “Homeward was created as part of the conspiracy and ... became part of the conspiracy” are “[tjhreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” and are therefore not sufficient to state a claim. See Iqbal,
As the magistrate judge found, “ASWAN fails to allege with any specificity the persons who agreed to the alleged conspiracy, the specific communications amongst the conspirators, or the manner in which any such communications were made.” The allegations are thus insufficient to support a meeting of the minds by the defendants. At most, ASWAN’S allegations amount to “parallel conduct and a bare assertion of a conspiracy.” See Twombly,
C. ADA, § 1983, and equal-protection claims
The next issue is whether ASWAN’S ADA, § 1983, and equal-protection claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Answering this question requires that we first determine the limitations period for each type of claim.
Title II of the ADA does not contain a statute of limitations. Although “Congress enacted a catchall 4-year statute of limitations for actions arising under federal statutes enacted after December 1; 1990,” Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.,
The district court concluded that Virginia’s one-year limitations period for claims under the Virginia Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act (hereafter, the Virginia Disabilities Act), Va.Code Ann. § 51.5-40 et seq., should apply to the ADA claims here, and the parties do not dispute this conclusion on appeal. See Childress v. Clement, 5 F.Supp.2d -384, 388 (E.D.Va. 1998) (holding that the Virginia Disabilities Act constitutes the most analogous state statute of limitations for claims brought under the ADA).
This court has not previously determined what limitations period governs ADA claims brought in Virginia. But we have held that the Virginia Disabilities Act provides the limitations period for claims brought under the Federal Rehabilitation Act in Virginia because of the similarities between these acts. Wolsky v. Med. Coll, of Hampton Roads,
With regard to the § 1983 and equal-protection claims, the statute-of-limitations period for both is two years. Lewis v. Richmond City Police Dept.,
The applicable statute of limitations begins to run once a claim accrues, and federal law controls that determination. Cox v. Stanton,
ASWAN attempts to avoid this result by claiming that certain acts of the defendants constituted a continuing violation of the ADA. “In general, to establish a continuing violation[,] the plaintiff must establish that the unconstitutional or illegal act was a fixed and continuing practice.” Nat’l Adver. Co. v. City of Raleigh,
ASWAN claims that the following actions constitute a continuing violation of the ADA: (1) VCU’s withdrawal of its promise to help pay the cost of transporting homeless people to and from the Conrad Center, which withdrawal was allegedly made in retaliation for ASWAN’S filing the present lawsuit; (2) the attempt by VCU and Homeward in 2009 to persuade various organizations to relocate feeding programs from Monroe Park to the Conrad Center; and (3) the City’s communication to homeless people in 2009 that they would need to travel to the Conrad Center to sign up for the downtown overnight shelter.
The first action does not establish a continuing violation because it is an allegation of an entirely new violation — a retaliation claim instead of a discrimination claim. See id. at 1167 (concluding that a continuing violation requires that “the same alleged violation was committed at the time of each act” (internal quotation
D. FHA claims
We will now address whether the district court erred in dismissing ASWAN’S FHA claims. The district court determined that ASWAN’S FHA claims, which have a two-year statute of limitations, see 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A), were also time barred because ASWAN filed suit more than two years after the opening of the Conrad Center.
ASWAN responds by arguing that the accrual date for its FHA claims is not the opening of the Conrad Center in February 2007, but rather when the Center first offered intake services to the homeless that allowed them to sign up for the overnight shelter that continued to be located downtown. This took place in April 2007. ASWAN alleges that the relocation of the intake services violated the FHA. by running afoul of the statutory sections that prohibit discrimination in the provision of housing services. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), (f)(2). Similarly, ASWAN contends that the FHA was violated by the City’s communication to homeless people in 2009 that they would need to travel to the Conrad Center to sign up for the downtown overnight shelter using the intake services.
There are two problems with ASWAN’S argument. One is that the time gap between the opening of the Conrad Center and the actions complained of is not material because ASWAN knew or should have known that intake services were going to be shifted there from the very conception of the Center. In other words, the relocation of intake services is simply another continuing effect of the original decision to locate the Conrad Center on Oliver Hill Way. Indeed, ASWAN admits as much by arguing in its own brief that if the defendants had not conspired to establish the Conrad Center on Oliver Hill Way, then “there would have been no Conrad Center on Oliver Hill Way to receive relocation of the [intake services] and the City’s processing of applications for access to overflow shelter downtown on very cold nights.”
The other problem with ASWAN’S argument is that the intake services to sign up for overnight shelter do not constitute “services” within the meaning of the FHA. As explained by this court in Jersey Heights:
The Fair Housing Act’s services provision simply requires that “such things as garbage collection and other services of the kind usually provided by municipalities” not be denied on a discriminatory basis. [Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos.,724 F.2d 419 , 424 (4th Cir.1984).] It does not extend to every activity having any conceivable effect on neighborhood residents. See id. (hazard insurance is not a “service”); Clifton Terrace Assocs., Ltd. v. United Techs. Corp.,929 F.2d 714 , 720 (D.C.Cir.1991) (elevator manufacturer is not a provider of “services”); Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass’n [v. St. Clair County,743 F.2d 1207 , 1210 (7th Cir.1984)](maintenance of county-owned neighborhood property is not a “service”); Laramore v. Illinois Sports Facilities Auth., 722 F.Supp. 443 , 452 (N.D.Ill.1989) (stadium site selection is not the provision of a “service”). “To say that every discriminatory municipal policy is prohibited by the Fair Housing Act would be to expand that Act to a civil rights statute of general applicability rather than one dealing with the specific problems of fair housing opportunities.” Clifton Terrace Assocs.,929 F.2d at 720 (quoting Vercher v. Harrisburg Housing Auth.,454 F.Supp. 423 , 424 (M.D.Pa.1978)).
Although Jersey Heights dealt with the meaning of “services” in 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), the term has the same meaning in § 3604(f)(2) because the relevant language is materially the same. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) with 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2); see also Smith v. Pac. Prop, and Dev. Corp.,
Intake services to sign up for a homeless shelter are simply not within the type of services covered by the FHA because they are unlike “services generally provided by governmental units such as police and fire protection or garbage collection.” See Southend,
E. Retaliation claim under the ADA
The final issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in dismissing ASWAN’S ADA retaliation claim against VCU. ASWAN contends that VCU retaliated against ASWAN by retracting VCU’s earlier promise to help pay the cost of transporting homeless people to and from the Conrad Center.
The ADA’s retaliation provision provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual ... made a charge ... under this Chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). To establish a prima facie retaliation claim under the ADA, plaintiffs must allege (1) that they engaged in protected conduct, (2) that they suffered an adverse action, and (3) that a causal link exists between the protected conduct and the adverse action. Rhoads v. F.D.I.C.,
As ASWAN admits, however, VCU was under no obligation to help pay the cost of transporting homeless people to and from the Conrad Center. And retracting a gratuitous promise does not amount to a discriminatory act or an adverse action. See Stiltner v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,
Because VCU’s alleged promise to help pay the cost of transporting homeless people to and from the Conrad Center is gratuitous, VCU’s retraction of this promise does not amount to an adverse action. We therefore conclude that the district court prоperly dismissed ASWAN’S ADA retaliation claim against VCU.
III. Conclusion
For all of the reason set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in Judge Gilman’s opinion with one exception. In my view, the text of the ADA and controlling precedent require the conclusion that ASWAN has alleged a cognizable ADA retaliation claim against VCU. ASWAN may not be able to prove this claim, but it should have been afforded the opportunity to do so. My colleagues err in affirming the district court’s dismissal of this claim.
I.
On February 17, 2009, ASWAN filed its first complaint in state court. After defendants removed the case to federal court and filed motions to dismiss, the district judge denied the motions without prejudice but ordered ASWAN to clarify the complaint in separately numbered counts identifying the “specific statute alleged to have been violated.”
On November 19, 2009, ASWAN filed its second amended complaint and in it alleges a retaliation claim against VCU in separately numbered counts and identifies the ADA as the source of this cause of action. Specifically, ASWAN alleges that sometime in 2008 or 2009, the Daily Planet (an affiliate of ASWAN) acquired a passenger van to transport homeless people from downtown to the Conrad Center; many of these homeless people were disabled. ASWAN alleges that VCU agreed to “provide some funding to the Daily Planet” to offset a portion of these transportation costs. ASWAN further alleges that after it filed its original complaint in February 2009, VCU retracted its “agreement” with the Daily Planet in order to “punish” ASWAN by (1) “depriving its members ... of the benefit of transportation”; and (2) “showing” ASWAN that “its decision to file a civil rights lawsuit against VCU had backfired, hurting the very homeless people” ASWAN seeks to serve.
II.
The ADA provides thаt “[n]o person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by [the ADA].” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). To state an ADA retaliation claim, ASWAN must allege that (1) it engaged in protected conduct, (2) suffered an adverse action, and (3) a causal link exists between the protected conduct and the adverse action. Rhoads v. F.D.I.C., 257 F.3d 373, 392 (4th Cir .2001).
VCU does not maintain that it arrived at its decision not to provide funding for transportation to the Conrad Center independent from this lawsuit. Rather, VCU conceded at oral argument that there was a “causal link” between its decision not to honor the transportation funding agreement and the filing of this lawsuit by ASWAN. See also Hunt-Golliday v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chi,
VCU’s principal contention on appeal is that ASWAN lacked any “reasonable, good faith belief’ that VCU violated the ADA and that ASWAN’S lawsuit therefore did not constitute the sort of activity protected by the ADA. As a fallback position, VCU asserts that its agreement to fund transportation to the Daily Planet constitutes a gratuitous benefit and so its decision to withdraw this benefit cannot amount to unlawful retaliation.
Given that the majority relies on VCU’s fallback position, I first address that argument and then VCU’s principal argument on this point.
III.
Five years ago, in the Title VII context, the Supreme Court interpreted precisely the same language as that at issue here— “discriminated against” — and held that it “refers to distinctions or differences in treatment that injure protected individuals.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,
Faithfully applying these principles seems to me to require the conclusion that ASWAN has alleged a clear case of ADA-barred retaliation. Revoking funding for transportation represents a “materially adverse” action that could dissuade a reasonable disabled homeless person from asserting his or her rights under the ADA.
Our holding in Stiltner v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,
In interpreting the ADA, we must look not to unrelated labor statutes, but to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. See A Helping Hand, LLC v. Baltimore County, MD, 515 F.3d 356, 362 (4th Cir.2008). Given that the ADA’s anti-retaliation provision is identical to Title VII’s, the standard laid out by the Supreme Court for purposes of Title VII controls in this ADA casе.
IV.
Perhaps recognizing that its fallback argument lacks any doctrinal support, VCU principally argues that ASWAN’S retaliation claim fails because ASWAN assertedly had no “reasonable, good faith belief’ that the ADA had been violated. Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc.,
First, governing regulations clearly prohibit public entities from “mak[ing] selections” for “determining the site or location of a facility” that “have the effect of excluding” the disabled. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(4). Thus, ASWAN could reasonably believe that selecting a hill for the location of a facility frequented by a substantial disabled population violates this regulation.
Second, limitations is an affirmative defense that a defendant, not a plaintiff, must prove; ASWAN opposed an “act or practice made unlawful” by the ADA, which limitations does not necessarily bar. Moreover, no case law еxists assessing whether a clearly meritorious affirmative defense negates a “reasonable, good faith belief’ of an “act or practice made unlawful” by the ADA. Further, no appellate court had even settled the question of which statute of limitations applies in Virginia, making it hard for ASWAN to “reasonably believe” its claims time-barred given that the ADA itself does not prescribe a limitations period.
Third, a public entity that donates land may well be treated as a segregating zoning authority because the regulations prohibit “a public entity, in providing any aid, benefit, or service ... directly or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements,” from denying a disabled person access to the benefit. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(l)(i)-(vii) (emphasis added).
Finally, the governing regulations also provide that a public entity may not “subject[ ]” a disabled person to “discrimination,” including segregationist policies. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(a); see also § 35.130(d) (“A public entity shall administer services ... in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of [the. disabled].”); Olmstead v. L.C.,
V.
In sum, I believe ASWAN has pled allegations sufficient to state an ADA retaliation claim. Accordingly, I would reverse the contrary judgment of the district court as to that claim.
Notes
That Title VII generally governs employment discrimination does not render the Title VII standard any less applicable. The Supreme Court has specifically rejected the argument that the unique context of employment animates Title VII’s antiretaliation provision. See Burlington Northern,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Like Judge Motz, I join Judge Gilman’s conclusion that the conspiracy claim was properly dismissed because an agreement was not sufficiently alleged. I also join Judge Gilman’s conclusion that the retaliation claim was properly dismissed because Virginia Commonwealth University’s (“VCU”) alleged promise to provide transportation was merely gratuitous. However, I disagree with Judge Gilman’s and Judge Motz’s conclusion that A Society Without A Name’s (“ASWAN”) claims under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Equal Protection Clause, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 accrued when the Conrad Center opened and that subsequent acts alleged in the Second Amended Complaint do not constitute continuing violations.
The majority opinion correctly observes that ASWAN’S FHA, equal protection and § 1983 claims are subject to a two-year limitations period, and its ADA claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a) (FHA); Al-Amin v. Shear,
The Second Amended Complaint alleges that the systematic relocation of services— not the siting, construction or opening of the Conrad Center — is the practice that is causing homelеss persons to be isolated from downtown Richmond. Therefore, I cannot join the view of the Magistrate Judge and the majority opinion that “ASWAN knew or should have known of its purported injury stemming from the alleged conspiracy to relocate homeless services from downtown to Oliver Hill Way when the Conrad Center opened on February 5, 2007.” Ante at 348.
Certainly, ASWAN suffered no discriminatory treatment by the mere construction or opening of the Conrad Center if its members could continue to receive needed services in the downtown, mainstream community. Rather, it is the relocation of those services, allegedly with the discriminatory motive of isolating homeless persons from downtown, that is the actionable injury. Cf. Frame v. City of Arlington,
Accordingly, the majority errs by holding that ASWAN’S claims accrued on the date the Conrad Center opened and by dismissing the subsequent relocation of services to the Conrad Center as mere effects of its opening. As this Court has previously explained:
If the discrimination alleged is a single act, the statute begins to run at the time of the act. If, on the other hand, the statutory violation does not occur at a single moment but in a series of separate acts and if the same alleged violation was committed at the time of each act, then the limitations period begins anew with each violation and only those violations preceding the filing of the complaint by the full limitations period are foreclosed.
Nat’l Adver. Co. v. City of Raleigh,
To make out a continuing violation, ASWAN must therefore allege a discrete act of discrimination — related to the larger asserted isolation effort — that occurred within the applicable limitations period. Glendening,
Instructive on this point is Lendo v. Garrett County Board of Education,
Similarly, in this case, the opening of the Conrad Center is related to the relocation of services there only insofar as the location of the Conrad Center has enabled the isolation of homeless persons from downtown Richmond. As demonstrated" by Lendo, however, this relationship does not mean that the relocation of a service to the Conrad Center — allegedly motivated by isоlationist animus — is not a discrete act of discrimination. Indeed, the opening of the Conrad Center in no sense caused homeless persons to be isolated from downtown Richmond. Rather, defendants’ alleged acts that caused services to relocate from downtown to the Conrad Center are responsible for the alleged isolation. See Lendo,
ASWAN plausibly alleges that the City of Richmond, Homeward, and VCU in April 2007 “pressured and encouraged Commonwealth Catholic Charities to locate at the Conrad Center on Oliver Hill Way a service called ‘Central Intake’ for homeless people to sign up for and be processed to obtain overnight shelter рrovided at local churches by CARITAS.” Joint Appendix at 294, 307, 327. ASWAN
Additionally, ASWAN alleges additional discrete acts in 2009. ASWAN alleges that, in 2009, “City officials advised homeless people ... that during the winter of 2009-2010, homeless people would be required to go through Central Intake at the Conrad Center in order to receive shelter at the City’s overflow shelter on very cold nights.” By relocating access to the overflow shelter, ASWAN clаims that the City has “succeeded in materially segregating disabled homeless people during daylight hours from Richmond’s mainstream because of their ADA protected status.” Joint Appendix at 328. This is a plausible allegation of a discrete discriminatory act by the City less than one year before the complaint was filed, rendering ASWAN’S ADA claim against the City timely.
Similarly, ASWAN makes the following allegation against VCU:
As part of VCU’s actions against disabled homeless people, after Catholic Charities located Central Intake at the Conrad Center, VCU has sought to persuade faith-based providers of homeless meals now at Monroe Park to relocate their homeless feeding programs to the Conrad Center. Such actions by VCU ... have included actions in 2009 to persuade faith-based organizations to move homeless meals programs to the Conrad Center. VCU’s рurpose in seeking to persuade such faith-based organizations to relocate such programs from Monroe Park to the Conrad Center have been to reduce the visibility of homeless people ... near VCU’s main campus.
Joint Appendix at 294. This too is a plausible allegation of a discrete discriminatory act by VCU less than one year before the complaint was filed, rendering the ADA claim against VCU timely.
In contrast, I find no allegation of a discrete discriminatory act by Homeward less than one year before the complaint was filed. Therefore, I agree that the ADA claim against Homeward is time-barred. I also agree with the dismissal of all claims against the Doe(s) defendants because I find no plausible allegation of any discriminatory act by them after 1996. The only act plausibly alleged against Doe(s) is an offer to contribute $2 million toward the construction of a facility for homeless persons on Oliver Hill Way in “late 1995 or early 1996.” Joint Appendix at 282. Absent some discrete act during the limitations period, no continuing violation has been alleged against Doe(s). Glendening,
In sum, I conclude that ASWAN has plausibly alleged continuing violations of the FHA against the City of Richmond, VCU, and Homeward. In my view, ASWAN also makes out continuing ADA violations against the City of Richmond and VCU. I would also permit the equal protection and § 1983 claims against the City of Richmond to proceed under the continuing violation doctrine. To the extent that the majority opinion holds differently, I respectfully dissent.
. For convenience, I hereafter refer to this particular conclusion as "the majority opinion.”
. I give here only a brief summary of the exhaustive and detailed allegations of historical facts (many of which are substantiated by documents in the Joint Appendix) leading to the recent isolation efforts that are the gravamen of the Second Amended Complaint. ASWAN alleges that through most of the '80s and '90s, the Daily Planet provided overnight shelter, daytime residency, meals, and employment assistance services to Richmond's homeless population at the Street Center, which was located on West Canal Street downtown. ASWAN further alleges that: In 1993, the City of Richmond sold the West Canal Street location and promised to assist in finding a new site for the Street Center. The Daily Planet settled on a site on West Grace Street "in Richmond’s mainstream near VCU’s campus.” Despite a substantial grant from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development to purchase and develop the West Grace Street site, the Daily Planet did not pursue the site because VCU and the City threatened to curtail finan