*1 NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION
v. MORGAN No. 00-1614. Argued January 2002 Decided June *3 Stеvens, Court, in which Thomas, J., opinion delivered Rehnquist, JJ., in which Breyer, and Ginsburg, Souter, joined, and II-A. Kennedy, JJ., Part as to Scalia, and joined O’Connor, J., C. and part, in dissenting in and O’Connor, J., concurring an opinion filed Kennedy, JJ., which Scalia Rehnquist, J., in C. joined, which I, Part Breyer, J., as to joined I, and which Part to all but as joined p. 123. post, With petitioner. for argued the cause Jr.,
Roy Englert, T Rogers. B. Melissa was him on the briefs respondent. With argued the cause Y. Price Pamela and William Moore, Jr., Howard J. the brief on were her McNeill III. States argued for the United the cause
Austin C. Schlick brief him on the urging With curiae reversal. amicus as Attorney Acting Assistant Olson, General were Solicitor Mar- Clement, Deputy General Solicitor General Schiffer, Hoyle.* C. leigh Dover, and John D. opinion of the Court. delivered Thomas
Justice petitioner National Morgan, Jr., sued Abner Respondent (Amtrak) Title VII Corporation under Passenger Railroad amended, 78 Stat. Rights ofAct the Civil subjected alleging he been seq., had et 2000e U. S. C. retaliаtory and had ex- discriminatory acts to discrete throughout racially hostile environment perienced work 2000e-5(e)(l) requires that a Title employment. his Section *4 Bokat, Reesman, A Stephen Ann Elizabeth Cheung, Y.K. * Katherine Advisory Employment Equal for the and Robin S. Conrad filed a brief curiae et al. as amici reversal. urging Council Fund Impact for the were affirmance filed Briefs of amici curiae urging Larkin; D. for the Lake, Jocelyn Seligman, Brad and Ellen by et al. Stroup, by Robert H. Fund, Inc., and Educational Legal NAACP Defense Coitt, Chachkin, L. James Jones, Shaw, J. M. Norman R. Theodore Elaine Under for Civil Rights Committee Schnapper; Eric Lawyers’ for the and Johnson, T. Henderson, Gary Payton, John A. J Thomas Law al. et Arnwine, Marcia Hayes, Redlich, R. Dennis Courtland Barbara Norman Stern, Brantner. Paula A. Lichtman, L. Marc Judith Greenberger, D. plaintiff VII a charge file with Equal Employment Op- (EEOC) portunity Commission either 180 or 300 “after alleged employment practice unlawful occurred.” We consider whether, аnd under what circumstances, a Title VII plaintiff may file suit on events that fall outside this statu- tory period. time
The United States Appeals Court of for the Ninth Circuit held may that a sue on claims that ordinarily would be time long barred so they either “sufficiently are re lated” to incidents that fall within statutory period or part systematic are of a policy practice of discrimination place, that took part, at least in within the period. limitations We reverse in part. and affirm in We hold that the precludes statute recovery for discrete acts of discrimination or retaliation that occur outside the statutory period. time We also hold that consideration of the scope entire of a hos tile work environment claim, including alleged behavior out statutory side the period, permissible time for the pur poses assessing liability, long so as an act contributing to that hostile place environment takes statutory within the period. time aрplication equitable doctrines, how ever, either limit or toll period the within which a charge. employee must file I February On Morgan, 1995,Abner J. Jr., a black male, filed a of discrimination against and retaliation Am- trak with the EEOC and cross-filed with the California De- partment Employment Fair and Housing. Morgan al- leged during the time that he worked for Amtrak he was “consistently harassed disciplined more harshly than employees other on account of his App. race.”1 to Pet. 1Such discrimination, alleges, he began when the company him hired in August 1990 as an electrician helper, rather than as an electrician. Subsequent alleged racially motivated discriminatory acts included a ter mination for refusing orders, follow Amtrak’s refusal to allow him to *5 106 Right of to Sue” a “Notice The issued 25a. EEOC
for Cert.
2,
Morgan
on October
July
filed this lawsuit
on
discriminatory
allegedly
acts about
While some
1996.
days of the
300
Morgan complained occurred within
which
many took
charge
EEOC,
his
with the
that he filed
time
motion, ar-
Amtrak filed a
pеriod.
that
place prior to
summary
entitled to
among
things, that it was
guing,
other
more than
occurred
judgment on all incidents that
charge. The District
Morgan’s
filing of
EEOC
before
summary judgment
Amtrak,
in
hold-
granted
Court
occur-
company
for conduct
ing
could not be liable
May
fell
of
ring
3,1994, because that conduct
outside
before
employed
300-day
test estab-
filing period.
The court
Appeals for the
by
of
Seventh
lished
the United States Court
Opera-
Galloway
Service Parts
v. General Motors
Circuit
(1996):
[the]
“plaintiff
not base
A
tions, 78 F. 3d
limita-
the statute of
conduct that occurred outside
suit on
expect the
been unreasonable
unless it would have
tions
conduct, as
ran on that
to sue before the statute
recog-
constitute, or be
which the conduct could
a case in
only
light
in the
of events
nized, as actionable harassment
limita-
period of the
later,
that occurred
within the
statute
“[be-
Id., at
District
held that
tions.”
1167. The
Court
being
Morgan
that he was
discriminated
cause
believed
would
against
occurred,
at the
acts
it
time that all
these
expect
Morgan
filed
should have
not be unreasonable
the limitations
on these acts before
EEOC
App.
40a.2
on these claims ran.”
to Pet. for Cert.
Appeals
Morgan appealed.
Court
The United States
relying
previous articu-
for the Ninth Circuit
on its
reversed,
counselings”
in an
numerous “written
participate
apprenticeship program,
absenteeism,
him
his
epithets against
as well as
use of racial
managers.
respect
to Amtrak with
summary
District
denied
judgment
timely
to those claims it held were
filed. The
claims then
remaining
pro
trial,
in favor
ceeded to
where the
returned a verdict
of Amtrak.
jury
*6
lation of the continuing violation doctrine, which “allows
courts to consider conduct that would ordinarily be time
barred
long
‘as
as the untimely
represent
incidents
ongo-
ing unlawful employment practice.’”
tinuing violation that allows recovery for claims filed outside of statutory period in one of ways. two plaintiff First, a may show “a series of related acts one or more of which are within the period.” limitations Ibid. a Such “serial viola- tion is established if the evidence indicates alleged that the acts of discrimination occurring prior to the pe- limitations riod are sufficiently related to those occurring within the period.” limitations Ibid. The alleged incidents, however, “cannot be sporadic, isolated, or discrete.” Ibid. Second, may establish a continuing violation if he shows “a systematic policy practice of discrimination oper- ated, in part, within the limitations systemic viola- —a tion.” Id., at 1015-1016.
To summary survive judgment under this test, Morgan had “raise genuine issue disputed of (1) fact as to existence of a continuing violation—be it systemic,” serial or (2) and the continuation of the violation into the limitations period. Id., at 1016. Morgan Because alleged types three 3The Fifth Circuit employs a test, multifactor which, among other things, takes (1) into account: whether the alleged acts involve same type of (2) discrimination; whether the incidents are recurring or inde pendent and events; (3) isolated and whether the earlier acts have suffi cient permanency to trigger employee’s awareness of and duty to chal lenge the alleged violation. See Berry v. Board Supervisors, 715 F. 2d of (1983). namely, environ claims, discrimination, Title hostile VII Appeals ment, retaliation, considered the Court allegations respect category separately of claim with to each sufficiently prelimitations that the conduct was found postlimitations related conduct to invoke the continu to the “[i]n light ing Therefore, for all violation doctrine three. found] [the Appeals incidents, Court of the relatedness sufficiently ha[d] Morgan presented genuine issue of disputed continuing fact to whether a violation existed.” Id., at 1017. Because the District should have al *7 occurring prelimitations period lowed events the to be “presented jury merely background to the not informa liability,” purposes tion, 1017-1018, but also for of the id., at Appeals Court of reversed for a and remanded new trial. (2001), granted We 533 927 certiorari, U. S. and now re in part. verse in and affirm II Appeals approaches of Courts have taken various question statutory- the whether acts that fall outside § period filing time charges in 42 set forth U. S. C. 2000e- 5(e) are supra. actionable under Title VII. 3, See n. While the lower courts offered divergent, reasonable, have albeit by compelled solutions, none are the text of In the statute. request the timely context of a filing require- to alter the ments of Title VII, this has stated Court thаt “strict adher- procedural ence requirements specified to the legisla- the guarantee ture is the best of evenhanded administration of (1980). Corp. law.” Silver, Mohasco v. 447 U. S. 826 rejected arguments Mohasco, In the Court that strict adher- statutory ence to a filing similar time restriction4 for 4The there considered both the 300-day time limit of 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(e) §2000e-5(c) that, requirement of in the case of an unlawful employment practice that occurs in a State that such prohibits practices, no charge may be filed with the EEOC before the expiration of days 60 after proceedings have been appropriate commenced state agency unless such have proceedings been earlier terminated.
charge reading was “unfair” that “a less literal of the Act adequately policy deferring would effectuate the to state agencies.” Id., Instead, at 824-825. the Court noted that “[b]y choosing obviously quite what are deadlines, short Con- сlearly gress encourage prompt processing intended charges all Id., at discrimination.” 825. Similarly guidance here, our most salient source for is the statutory text. 2000e-5(e)(l) charge filing provision
Title U. is a S. C. “specifies precision” prerequisites with plain- that a satisfy filing tiff must before suit. Alexander v. Gardner- (1974). Co., Denver S. An U. individual must file charge statutory within the and serve notice upon person against charge whom the is In made. entity authority grant State has an with the or seek respect alleged practice, relief with to the unlawful an em- ployee initially grievance agency who files a with that must charge file the with the EEOC within 300 of the em- ployment practice; in charge all other States, the must be days. filed within 180 A claim is time barred if it not filed within these time limits. purposes,
For our filing critical sentence of the *8 provision charge is: “A under this section shall be filed eighty days alleged one hundred and un- after ” 2000e-5(e)(l) (em- employment practice occurred. lawful added). phasis operative The terms arе “shall,” “after . .. employment practice.” occurred,” “[S]hall” and “unlawful filing charge specified makes the act within the period mandatory. g., Milberg See, e. Lexecon Inc. v. Weiss (1998) (“[T]he Hynes Lerach, Bershad & 26, 523 S. 35 U. mandatory normally obligation imper- ‘shall,’.. . creates an discretion”). “[Ojccurred” judicial vious to means that the practice place happened past.5 require- took or in the
5“In the of an absence indication to the contrary, words a stat ute are assumed to bear their ‘ordinary, common contemporary, mean Inc., Walters v. Metropolitan Ed. Enterprises, ing.’” 519 U. S. 207 ment, charge practice therefore, be filed “after” the litigant “occurred” tells up days us has to 180 or 300 practice happened charge the unlawful file a to with after the EEOC. questions,
The critical then, are: What constitutes an “un- employment practice” lawful practice and when has that “occurred”? questions Our task is to answer these for both discriminatory discrete acts and hostile work environment practice. claims. The answer varies with the A We take question the easier retaliatory A first. discrete discriminatory day act “occurred” “hap- on the that it pened.” party, A charge therefore, must file a within either days 180 or 300 of the date of ability the act or lose the recover for it.
Morgan argues that statute require does not filing charge of a days within 180 or 300 act, each discrete but language that the requires filing of a within the specified number of after an “unlawful practice.” Morgan “Practice,” ongo- contends, connotes an ing violation that can endure or over a recur of time. See Respondent Brief for Morgan’s In 25-26. view, the “practice” term provides therefore statutory basis Ninth continuing Circuit’s violation argu- doctrine.6 This (1997) Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates (quoting Ltd. (1993) (internal Partnership, U. S. quotation marks and omitted)). citation Webster’s Third New Intеrnational Dictionary (1993) defines “occur” as “to present itself: come to pass: take place: happen.” See also (6th Black’s 1990) Law Dictionary 1080 ed. (defining “[o]ccur” as happen;... arise”). “[t]o place; take 6Morgan also argues that the EEOC’s discussion of continuing violations in its Manual, Compliance which provides that certain serial viola tions and systemic violations constitute continuing violations that allow relief for events, untimely well as the positions the EEOC has taken prior briefs, warrant deference under Chevron U.S. A. *9 Inc. Natural v.
111 isment unavailing, given however, §2000e-2 42 that U. S. C. explains great detail the sorts of actions qualify that “[u]nlawful employment practices” among includes such practices numerous 2000e-2(a) (“It discrete acts. g., See, e. shall be employment an unlawful practice an employer— for (1) to fail or refuse to or hire discharge any to individual, or otherwise to against any discriminate individual with re- spect to compensation, his terms, conditions, privileges or employment, because of such race, individual’s religion, color, or sex, origin national ..There simply no indication “practice” the term converts related discrete acts into single practice unlawful purposes of timely filing. §2000e-6(a) Cf. (providing Attorney that the General bring a civil “pattern cases). action in practice” We have repeatedly interpreted “practice” the term apply to a discrete single act or “occurrence,” even when it has a connection to other acts. example, For in Electrical Workers v. Robbins Myers, & Inc., 429 (1976), U. S. 229, 234 employee asserted complaint that his timely was filed be- cause the date alleged “the unlawful practice occurred” was the date after the grievance conclusion of a procedure, arbitration rather than the earlier date of his dis- charge. discharge, he contended, was “tеntative” and “nonfinal” grievance until procedure arbitration ended. Not so, the Court concluded, because the discrimina- tory act occurred on the date of discharge date —the parties understood the termination to be final. Id., at 284-235. Similarly, in Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U. S. 385 Resources Council, Inc., 467 (1984). U. S. 837 Defense Brief for Respond- ent 26-32. But we have held that the EEOC’s interpretive guidelines do not receive Chevron deference. See EEOC v. Arabian Co., American Oil “ 499 244, (1991). U. S. Such interpretations are ‘entitled to respect’ under our decision in Skidmore v. Co.,& U. S. (1944), Swift but only extent that those interpretations have the ‘power per- suade.’” Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U. S. (2000).
(1986) curiam), when consid- (per pattern-or-practice ease, a that discriminatory salary the noted ering structure, Court a prior although salary began to the date discrimination “[e]ach week’s VII, was actionable under Title that the act similarly delivered] a to a paycheck less to black than that wrong Title . . . white a actionable under VII situated is Id., at 395. discrete acts that fall
This Court has also held that
timely
fall
statutory
acts that
period do not make
Evans,
period.
Lines, Inc. v.
In
Air
outside the time
United
(1977),
resign
after she
We derive several principles from these cases. First, dis- crete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, they even when are related to alleged acts timely filed charges. Each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act. The charge, there- fore, must be filed within the 180- 300-day time after the discrete discriminatory act occurred. The exist- ence of past acts and the employee’sprior knowledge of their occurrence, however, does not bar employees filing from charges about related discrete long acts so as the acts are independently discriminatory and charges addressing those are acts themselves timely filed. Nor does the statute bar an employee from using prior acts as background evi- dence in support timely of a claim. As we have held, however, this time period filing for charge
a subject is equitable to doctrines such as tolling or estoppel. Zipes See v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., (1982) (“We U. 385, S. hold filing that a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is jurisdictional anot prereq uisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, subject to waiver, estoppel, equitable tolling”). may Cburts evaluate whether it would proper be apply to such doctrines, although they are to be applied sparingly. See Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, (1984) 466 U. S. curiam) (“Procedural 147, 152 (per requirements by established Congress for gaining access to out of disregarded courts to be not are the federal courts litigants”). particular sympathy for vague continuing violations applied Appeals of holding that violations,” it termed “serial to what doctrine period, charge filing dis- within falls long one act so plausibly or suffi- retaliatory acts that are criminatory and considered also be that act ciently to related respect 1015. With 3d, 232 F. at liability. See purposes reverse. therefore, we holding, to this de- promote, termination, failure such as acts Discrete identify. Each easy to are hire transfer, or refusal nial retaliatory em- adverse each discrimination incident “unlaw- actionable separate constitutes ployment decision only Morgan can file practice.” ful appropriate “occurred” acts that discrete cover from alleged he suffered Morgan that period.7 While retaliatory the date acts from discriminatory and numerous he the date that through hired March he was timely place within only took incidents fired, was *12 his Morgan filed first Because filing period are actionable. only acts that agency, those appropriate state with day that February days before occurred During that time charge, are actionable. Morgan filed his suspended wrongfully he that was Morgan period, contends L” for “Rule insub- Amtrak’s a violation of charged with him, to assigned complete failing to work while ordination threatening a man- falsely training, accused denied were action acts” that the “discrete Appeals Court of held Because violation, it to further no need for there was continuing part of a as able The act. District to run for each began time period when the contemplate discriminated was being he believed that noted that “Morgan to Pet. App. . . .” acts occurred. time all of these at that against to it be difficult will where may be circumstances There for Cert. 40a. may issue to run. One begin should when determine run when begins the time is whether in such circumstances arise been have should reasonably injury to when the opposed injury occurs that issue. to resolve occasion no this presents But case discоvered. ager.8 Id., at prior 1013. All discrete discriminatory acts untimely are filed longer and no actionable.9
B
Hostile environment claims are different in kind from dis
crete
very
acts. Their
nature
repeated
involves
conduct.
See 1 B. Lindemann & P.
Employment
Grossman,
Discrimi
(3d
1996) (hereinafter
nation Law 348-349
ed.
Lindemann)
(“The repeated nature of the
intensity
harassment or its
con
stitutes evidence
management
knew or should have
existence”).
known of its
employment
“unlawful
prac
tice” therefore cannot be said to
any
occur on
particular day.
It occurs over a
series
perhaps years
or
and, in direct
contrast to discrete acts,
single
act of
harassment
not
be actionable on its own. See Harris
Systems,
v. Forklift
(1993) (“As
Inc., 510
S. 17,
U.
pointed
we
out in Meritor
[Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
(1986),]
“We repeatedly have made clear [Title that although VII] specific mentions employment decisions with immediate con- sequences, scope prohibition ‘is not limited “eco-
8The final alleged discriminatory act, he contends, led to his termination on 3,1995. March Morgan alleges that after the manager reported that Morgan had him, threatened he was ordered into supervisor’s office. Then, after he asked for union representation presence of a witness, co-worker aas the supervisor both, denied ordered everyone out *13 of the office, and at yelled Morgan get his “black ass” into the office. Morgan refused and went home. He was subsequently suspended charged with violations two of company and, rules following an investiga tory hearing, terminated. 9We have no occasion here to consider the timely filing question with respect to “pattern-or-practice” claims brought by private litigants as none are at issue here.
116 [510 at Harris, S.,U. discrimination,’ “tangible” or
nomic” [477 Vinson, Savings Bank, FSB v. 21] (quoting Meritor 64), and ‘condi than ‘terms’ more and that it covers S.,] at U. Faragher v. Boca sense.” contractual in narrow tions’ (1998) Sun (quoting v. Oncale 775, 786 Raton, 524 U. S. (1998)). As Inc., 75, 523 78 Services, U. S. downer Offshore conditions, phrase “[t]he ‘terms, Harris, in stated the Court 2000e-2(a)(l)] [of employment’ 42 U. S. C. privileges of or spec at the entire ‘to strike congressional intent evinces employ and women’ disparate treatment men of of trum a discrimi- requiring people to work in includes which ment, S., at 510 U. natorily environment.” or abusive hostile omitted) (some (quoting Meritor, quotation marks internal Dept. Angeles Water quoting in turn Los S., 64, 477 U. at (1978)).10 702, 707, n. 13 Manhart, 435 U. S. and Power v. . . . .” “Workplace isolation conduct is not measured 268, 270 County Breeden, 532 U. S. Dist. v. School Clark curiam). (2001) perme workplace “[w]hen (per Thus, insult,’ ‘discriminatory ridicule, and intimidation, ated with ‘sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions severe that is working an abusive create victim’s at Harris, S., 510 U. is violated.” environment,’ Title VII omitted). (citations work envi- determining actionable hostile whether an In circumstances,” to “all the exists, we ronment look claim discriminatory conduct; its frequency including “the threatening or humiliat- severity; physically it is whether it unreason- ing, utterance; and whether offensive or a mere Id., employee’s performance.” work ably with an interferes may, purposes for the a court whether at 23. To assess including those conduct, liability, such review all determining again filing look to the period, we acts that occur outside are re on racial harassment environment based Hostile claims work on harassment. standard those based sexual viewed under the same Mer (1998); 786-787, Raton, and n. Faragher Boca v. 524 U. S. See (1986). Vinson, Bank, 66-67 FSB v. 477 U. S. Savings itor *14 statute. provides It charge that a must be filed within 180 days “after the alleged employment unlawful practice ocсurred.” A hostile work environment claim composed of separate series of acts that collectively constitute one “unlawful practice.” §2000e-5(e)(l). 42 U. S. C. timely filing provision only requires that a Title VII plaintiff file a within a certain number of after the practice unlawful happened.. It does not pur- matter, for poses of the statute, that some of component acts of the hostile work environment fall outside the statutory pe- time riod. Provided that an act contributing to the claim occurs filing period, the entire of the hostile may environment be considered a court for purposes of determining liability.11 That act need not, however, be the last act. long As the employer engaged has enough activity to make out an actionable hostile environment claim, an unlawful employ- practice ment has “occurred,” even if it is still occurring.. Subsequent events, however, still be part of the one hostile work environmеnt claim and charge may be filed at a later date and still encompass the whole.
It is precisely because the entire hostile work environment encompasses a single unlawful employment practice that we do not hold, as have some of the Circuits, plaintiff that may not base a suit on individual acts that occurred outside the statute of limitations unless it would have been unrea- sonable expect to sue before the statute ran
11Amtrak argues that recovery for conduct taking place outside the time period for filing a timely charge should be available only in hostile environ ment cases where the plaintiff reasonably did not know such conduct was discriminatory or where the discriminatory nature of such conduct is rec ognized as discriminatory only in light of later events. See Brief for Peti tioner 38. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit adopted this approach in Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts Operations, F. (1996). 3d 1164 supra, See at 106. Although reject we the test pro posed by petitioner, other avenues of relief are available to employers. infra, See at 121-122. separate individual does not The statute such conduct.
on claim from environment of the hostile that are acts liability. And the filing and timely purposes of whole *15 file employee that the requirement a not contain does statute single unlawful days “after” the charge prior to 180or 300 a incidents therefore, that the practice Given, “occurred.” one un- part are of constituting work environment a hostile for liable employer be practice, the lawful for the single claim. In order part of this are all acts that charge only employee need file timely, the to be part days any of the hostile that is of act within 180 or environment. work (1) point: on Acts following our scenarios illustrate
The em- work environment. days a hostile 1-400 create employee re- day Can charge on 401. the ployee the files oc- that part environment the work of hostile cover for that (2) days? a hostile contribute to Acts first 100 curred in the day no there are days 401, but 1-100 on on and environment day occurring on act days the 101-400. Can acts between liability? In purposes the pull acts in for the other difference equal, there is things being little all other truth, consti- a hostile environment two scenarios as between the it not employment practice” does tutes one “unlawful intervening 301 nothing within the occurred matter whether Nor, if suffi- whole. days long each act is so as day claim, does by make out activity occurred 100 to cient day that an ac- employee knows on that it matter that day incidents are still 401 all happened; on tionable claim day an act on hand, the other if part of the claim. On same for 1-100, to the between no acts 401 had relation by the intervening action as certain reason, other such some environ- longer part of same hostile employer, no was previ- employee for cannot recover claim, ment then the day to the 401 act. acts, not at least reference ous may be respect to the incidents with Our conclusion by the liability purposes is reinforced considered for fact that the statute way no bars plaintiff from recover- ing damages for portion of the hostile environment that falls outside period for filing a timely charge. Morgan correctly notes that the requirement timeliness does not dic- tate the amount of recoverable damages. It is but one in a provisions series of requiring that parties take action specified periods, g., see, e. §§2000e-5(b), (c),(d), none of which function specific limitations on damages. Explicit damages limitations on are found elsewhere in the statute. 1981a(b)(3), Section for example, spe- details cific limitations on compensatоry punitive damages. Likewise, 2000e-5(g)(l) allows for recovery of backpay lia- bility up years two prior to the filing of the charge. If Congress intended to limit liability to conduct occurring in the within which the party must file the charge, it *16 seems unlikely that Congress would have allowed recovery years for two of backpay. And the fact that Congress ex- pressly limited the amount of recoverable damages else- where to particular a period time indicates that timely the provision filing was not meant to serve as specific a limita- tion either on damages or the conduct that may be consid- ered for purposes the of one actionable hostile work environ- ment claim.
It also makes little sense to limit the assessment of liabil-
ity in a hostile work environment claim to the conduct that
falls within the 180- or 300-day period given that this time
period varies based on whether the violation occurs in a
political
State or
subdivision that has
agenсy
an
with author-
ity
grant
to
or seek relief.
It
important
is
to remember that
the statute requires that a
Title VII
must wait days after proceedings have commenced under state or local
law to file charge
with the EEOC, unless such proceedings
have earlier
§2000e-5(c).
terminated.
In such circum-
stances, however, the charge must still be filed within 300
days of the occurrence. See Mohasco,
charges in a State charges with filing their later from time barred neither agency. filing a state with first from nor dissuaded EEOC (“The only for one reason history identifies at 821 id., See differently from workers States deferral treating workers to re- opportunity agencies an give state other States: and aimed, was legislation the federal at which the evil dress was demon- its need unless intervention avoid federal strated”). import a limit- such cannot Surely, therefore, we would be its effеct where provision principle into ing upon dependent liability time reviewable make own reme- its that has in a State employee lives whether scheme.12 dial 2000e-5(e)(l) specifying when provision is a put,
Simply consequence of limit- only timely filed has is prerequisite to timely charge filing is a liability ing because to determine task A court’s having claim. an actionable complains are employee which an about the acts whether prac- environment work hostile same actionable statutory any falls act so, if whether tice, and period. claim, the Morgan’s environment respect to hostile With post- pre- “the Appeals concluded type involve[d] same period incidents limitations were relatively frequently, and employment actions, occurred To 3d, at 1017. managers.” 232 F. same perpetrated pre- Morgan environment, a hostile claims of support his *17 employees that of other from number a sentеd evidence racially derogatory jokes, performed managers racial made capacity of regarding negative comments acts, made epithets. racial supervisors, various and used blacks be his upon which many Although the acts of Id., at 1013. filing period, day depends outside the 300 occurred claim that, un acts given is with discrete implicated concern not same upon depend not claims, liability there does like hostile work environment time. a conduct over repeated extending proof say we cannot they are not of the same actionable hostile environment claim.13 point, On this we affirm.
C holding Our does not employers leave against defenseless employees bring who hostile work environment claims that extend long periods over of time. Employers have recourse plaintiff when unreasonably delays filing charge. As Zipes noted v. Trans World Inc., Airlines, S.U. (1982), filing period jurisdictional is anot prerequisite to filing a Title VII suit. Rather, requirement is a it subject estoppel, waiver, equitable tolling equity “when so requires.” Id., at equitable 398. These doctrines allow us to honor Title VII’s purpose remedial negating “without particular purpose filing of the requirement, give prompt notice to employer.” Ibid.
This previously noted despite procedural protections of the statute “a defendant in a Title VII enforce ment might action still be significantly handicapped in mak ing his defense because of an inordinate delay EEOC in filing the action after exhausting its conciliation efforts.” Occi dental Ins. Co. Cal. (1977). v. EEOC, 432 U. 355, 373 S. Life The same is true delay when the by caused employee, rather than the EEOC. Cf. Paper Albemarle Co. v. Moody, (1975) (“[A] 422 U. 405, 424 S. party may not be ‘enti tled’ to relief if its conduct of the cause improperly has substantially prejudiced the party”). other In such cases, the federal courts have the discretionary power to “to locate just ‘a light result’ in peculiar circumstances to Id., case.” at 424-425. In addition equitable to other defenses, therefore, em-
ployer may raise a laches defense, which bars from maintaining a suit if he unreasonably delays filing a suit and as a result harms the defendant. This defense “‘re-
13We make no however, judgment, on the merits of Morgan’s claim. *18 122 (1)
quires proof diligence by party of against lack of (2) whom the defense is prejudice party asserted, and to the ” asserting the defense.’ Colorado, Kansas v. 673, 514 U. S. (1995) (quoting v. Costello States, United 265, 365 U. S. (1961)). questions We do not address here such as prejudice “how—and how must be shown” or “what much— consequences follow if laches is established.” 2 Lindemann only employers 1496-1500.14 We may observe raise various defenses in the face of prejudicial unreasonable and delay.
Ill We conclude that a raising Title VII claims of dis- discriminatory crete retaliatory acts must file his appropriate time or 300 —180 —set 2000e-5(e)(l). forth in 42 U. S. C. charge alleging A a hos- tile work claim, environment however, will be not long barred so as all acts which part constitute claim are the same unlawful practice and at least one act falls period. within the time holding, Neither however, precludes a applying equitable court from may doctrines that toll or period. limit the time
For foregoing reasons, Appeals’ judgment is affirmed in part, and reversed in is re- the case manded for further proceedings opinion. consistent with this
It so ordered. 14Nor do we have occasion to consider whether may laches defense be asserted against EEOC, even though traditionally the doctrine not be applied against the note, sovereign. however, We that in Occiden tal there seemed be general agreement that courts can provide relief to defendants against delay inordinate by the EEOC. See Occidental Ins. EEOC, Co. Cal. (1977). v. 432 U. S. id., Life Cf. at (Rehnquist, J., (“Since dissenting part) the suit here is to recover back- pay for an individual suit, could have brought her own it is impossible to think that the EEOC was suing the sovereign capacity States”). United *19 Justice O’Connor, with whom joins, Chief Justice with whom Justice and Justice Kennedy join as Scalia to but all Part I, and with whom Breyer joins Justice as to I, Part concurring and dissenting part. join
I Part II-A of the opinion Court’s agree because I that Title VII suits on based discrete discriminatory acts are time barred when the fails file a charge with the Equal Employment (EEOC) Opportunity Commission the 300-day 180- or period designated in the statute. §2000e-5(e)(l). 42 U. S. C. I dissent from the remainder of the opinion, Court’s however, I because believe a similar re- striction applies to types all of Title VII suits, including those based on a claim that a plaintiff subjected has been a hostile work environment. .
I today The Court holds that, for discrete discriminatory §2000e-5(e)(l) acts, serves as a form of statute of limitations, barring recovery for actions that place take outside the charge-filing period. The Cоurt acknowledges, however, that this period limitations adjusted be by equitable doctrines. See ante, at 114, n. 7; see Zipes also v. Trans World Airlines, (1982)(“We Inc., 455 U. S. hold that filing a timely charge of with discrimination is EEOC not jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in court, federal but requirement that, like a statute subject limitations, waiver, estoppel, equitable tolling”). Like the Court, I no see need to fully resolve application discovery rule to claims based on discrete discriminatory acts. See ante, at 114, n. 7. I believe, however, that some version discovery applies rule to discrete-act claims. See 2 B. Lindemann P. & Grossman, Employment Discrimination (3d 1996) Law 1349 ed. (“Although [Supreme prece- dents] seem to establish relatively simple ‘notice’rule as to (so when discrimination ‘occurs’ as to start the running of the charge-filing period), courts continue to disagree on what my view, In original)). (emphasis in be must the notice of” recovery based precludes charge-filing periоd therefore, or 300 than more that occurred actions discrete on had, notice have employee or should had, after the discriminatory act.
II 2000e-5(e)(l) serves hold Court, I would Unlike Title brought under actions for all as a limitations being sub alleging discrimination including VII, those 2000e- working Section environment. jected to a hostile *20 5(e)(1) charge with a file provides must that a alleged unlawful “after , 180 or 300 EEOC within no distinction It draws practice occurred.”* on based claims acts and on discrete claims based between file a plaintiff fails to If a environments. hostile work assessed, may liability be period, not that time charge within part awarded, for that be damages must not charge-filing outside that occurred hostile environment period. contrary a char- based on is conclusion to
The Court’s com- discrimination environment of hostile acterization spanning potentially single on conduct posing claim based a charac- agree this I with years. ante, at 117. several See conclusion the Court’s disagree, however, with I terization. if violation, of the of the nature that, cumulative because occurs within any forming of the violation part conduct damages can period, liability proved be charge-filing can Although a hostile environment. for the entire be collected general atmos- nature, its is, hostile claim environment particu- completely reducible phere not of discrimination exposed to day worker discriminatory each acts, lar separate as a may treated still be environment the hostile those occurrences on some of “occurrence,” and based claims rule discovery whether the determine no provides *This case occasion claims. work environment of hostile operates the context forfeited. In other words, a hostile environment is a form of discrimination that every occurs day; somó of daily those occurrences be time barred, while others are not. The Court’s treatment of hostile environment claims as constituting single occurrence leads to results that contra- policies dict the § 2000e-5(e)(l). behind U. S. C. Consider employee who has subjected been to a hostile work envi- ronment years. for 10 Under the Court’s approach, such an employee may, subject only to the uncertain restrictions of equity, see ante, at sleep on rights his or her for a dec- ade, bringing only suit year based in on actions for which charge could, and should, have been many filed years previously in accordance with statutory mandate. (“A 2000e-5(e)(l) charge under this section shall be filed [within 180 days] or 300 after the alleged employ- unlawful occurred”). practice ment Allowing suits based on such re- mote actions raises all problems that statutes of limi- tations and other similar time limitations designed are address:
“Statutes of promote limitation... justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memo- *21 ries have faded, and witnesses disappeared. have The theory is that even if one just has a claim it unjust is put not to the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that right to be free of stale claims in time prevail comes to right over the prose- to cute them.” Telegraphers Railroad Railway v. Ex- press Agency, Inc., (1944). 321 U. S. 348-349 Although 2-year statute’s limitation on backpay partially § addresses these concerns, 2000e-5(g)(l), under the Court’s liability
view, may still be assessed and other sorts of dam- (such ages damages as pain for and suffering) awarded based long-past on occurrences. employer An asked to defend such stale actions, when a suit challenging them could have rightly may timely manner, more brought in a much been unjust treatment. of precisely this sort complain of 2000e-5(e)(l) § be can nothing in that is correct The Court §20Q0e- rеading damages. But cap on imposing a read as 5(e)(1) charge bring EEOC an plaintiff a require that to consti- incidents individual the time of or 300 ability lose or occur work environment tuting a hostile equivalent to not incidents on those bring suit based is one limitation damages cap. The a transforming it into too occurrences damages for on liability. The restriction on consequence. only obvious as an past follows in the far 2000e-5(e)(l) as reading claims, would Nor, the Court VII’s with Title conflict claims limiting hostile environment years up two period liability a backpay allowance §2000e-5(g)(l). Because filing. charge’s prior to on period based charge-filing adjustments potential be sometimes backpay will years of doctrines, two equitable years example, two my For view. under available even file a failed to employee where backpay be available employer deceived his because EEOC timely with the of a discrimination thе existence in order to conceal him claim. to base “little sense” makes argues that it also Court period varies that period, charge-filing since
relief on subdivision political State whether the depending on agency to deal designated an violation occurs has where the concludes The Court 119. ante, at claims. See with such limiting princi- import “[sjurely such ... we cannot reviewable make the be to its effect would ple .. . where an em- liability upon whether dependent period for remedial scheme.” has its own ployee in a lives State principle precisely But this is Ante, at 120. depending on discriminatory adopted for has discrete acts— changes which as to lives, the time where *22 justi- The reviewed. discriminatory be actions discrete discrimina- for discrete is the same the variation fication for tory acts itas is for claims based on hostile work environ- ments. longer period give intended to States political аnd other subdivisions time to review claims them- they selves, if have a mechanism doing for so. The same applies rationale to review of the daily occurrences that up make part of a hostile environment claim. My approach is also consistent with that by taken the
Court in other contexts. When describing an ongoing anti- trust violation, for instance, we have stated:
“[E]ach overt act
that is
of the violation and that
injures
plaintiff...
the
starts
statutory
[limitations]
period running again, regardless
plaintiff’s
of the
knowl
edge of the alleged illegality at
,
much earlier times. .
.
But the commission of
separate
new overt
gener
act
ally does
permit
not
plaintiff
to recover for the
injury
by
caused
old overt acts outside the limitations
period.” Klehr v. A. O. Smith Corp.,
Similarly, in actions under the Racketeer Influenced and Cor rupt Organizations (RICO), Act 18 U. S. C. 1961et seq., con cerning pattern of racketeering activity, rejected we a rule that would have plaintiffs allowed to recover for all acts that up made pattern long so as at least one occurred within period. limitations In doing so, we endorsed rule of several Circuits that, although “commission sepa of a rable, predicate new act [the] limitations per mits a plaintiff to recover for the additional damages caused by that act. . . the cannot use independent, new predicate act aas bootstrap to recover injuries caused by other predicate earlier acts place that took outside the period.” limitations S., U. at 190; but cf. Rotella v. Wood,528 U. S. (2000) 549, 554, 2,n. 557 (reserving ques tion of whether injury discovery applies rule in civil RICO and, Clayton extension, cases). Act The Court today allows precisely this sort of bootstrapping in the Title *23 hos- ato exposure may recover plaintiffs context; VII simply because long passed has whose environment tile charge-filing into has continued environment the hostile period. the Court judgment reverse therefore, would, I entirety. in its Appeals