SAUL HILLEL BENJAMIN, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. NICHOLAS SPARKS; EPIPHANY SCHOOL OF GLOBAL STUDIES; NICHOLAS SPARKS FOUNDATION, Defendants - Appellees, and MISSY BLACKERBY; TRACY LORENTZEN; KEN GRAY, Defendants.
No. 19-2041
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
January 19, 2021
Before KING, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
PUBLISHED. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Greenville. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (4:14-cv-00186-D). Argued: October 28, 2020. Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Thacker joined.
Saul Hillel Benjamin, the former headmaster of the Epiphany School of Global Studies (“Epiphany School“), sued Epiphany School, its founder Nicholas Sparks, the Nicholas Sparks Foundation (the “Sparks Foundation“), and Epiphany School Board of Trustees members Missy Blackerby, Tracy Lorentzen, and Ken Gray (collectively “Defendants“). Benjamin alleged various acts of unlawful discrimination and retaliation, breach of contract, and tortious injuries. The district court dismissed some of Benjamin‘s claims and granted Defendants’ motions for summary judgment on others. At trial, the jury returned a verdict for Defendants on Benjamin‘s remaining claims.
On appeal, Benjamin asks this Court to find that the district court abused its discretion in its evidentiary and trial-management rulings. He also appeals the district court‘s dismissal of his claims against Lorentzen and Gray as well as the court‘s order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
I.
A.
Epiphany School is a private, non-denominational, faith-based school in New Bern, North Carolina serving students from kindergarten through twelfth grade. Sparks founded Epiphany School in 2005. Defendants Blackerby, Gray, Lorentzen, and Sparks all serve on Epiphany School‘s Board of Trustees (the “Epiphany School Board“), and Sparks is the chair of the Epiphany School Board. Separate from Epiphany School and the Epiphany
In 2012, the Epiphany School Board hired a recruiting firm to search for a new headmaster. The firm recommended Benjamin as a candidate prompting Benjamin and his wife at the time, Dr. Jennifer Dueck, to visit New Bern twice and meet with the Epiphany School Board and Epiphany School students, parents, faculty, and staff.
During these meetings, Epiphany School community members “evaluated Benjamin on various criteria[,] including ‘Christian Tradition.‘” J.A. 3993–94.1 Benjamin, who describes himself as a Quaker of Jewish ethnicity, alleges that he was asked by the Epiphany School Board members many times to explain and describe his religious upbringing and beliefs. He further alleges that he was told by Lorentzen that members of the Epiphany School community did not see him as a “true Christian” because “Quakers are really not Christians.” J.A. 2769.
In February 2013, Benjamin was hired as headmaster of Epiphany School. Benjamin entered into two contracts following his hiring: one with Epiphany School to serve as the headmaster and one with the Sparks Foundation to serve as an independent contractor. Both contracts were for a four-year term, but Defendants could terminate the contracts under preset conditions. Benjamin‘s employment agreement with Epiphany School noted that the agreement would terminate if he resigned or if he was terminated with or without cause.
From the beginning, Benjamin‘s time at Epiphany School was marked by conflicts with Epiphany School students, parents, faculty, and staff. The parties disagree about the role Benjamin played in causing these conflicts.
According to Defendants, Benjamin was condescending and hostile to faculty and staff; inattentive to important deadlines and the school‘s younger students; and frequently absent from school events. According to Benjamin, however, his conflicts with the Epiphany School community were driven by their hostility toward his Jewish background, Quaker faith, and his efforts to promote diversity on campus.2
In October 2013, the Epiphany School Board began to express frustration with Benjamin. At their monthly meeting with Benjamin, the Epiphany School Board discussed the challenges he had been experiencing at Epiphany School, as well as his successes, in the hope that the situation would improve.
But in the weeks following that meeting, Benjamin‘s relationship with the Epiphany School community further deteriorated. Accordingly, on November 18, 2013, Sparks sent
The next day, the Epiphany School Board held a forum attended by faculty and parents at which Benjamin gave a speech explaining his religious beliefs. The parties disagree as to whether this speech was voluntary. Benjamin contends that giving the speech went against his core religious obligation, as a Quaker, to practice his faith privately.
Following Benjamin‘s speech, Epiphany School Board member Gray explained the formal grievance process to the audience, and Benjamin alleges that Sparks solicited grievances from Epiphany School parents. The same day, Sparks emailed the Epiphany School Board saying that he needed “faculty evidence of terminable offenses.” J.A. 4000. He also told Gray that “we‘re going to try to get Benjamin to resign voluntarily.” Id.
Two days later, Benjamin met with Sparks, Gray, and Lorentzen in a conference room at Epiphany School. The parties are in considerable disagreement as to what happened next.
Benjamin alleges that he was berated and prevented from leaving the conference room during the entirety of the meeting, which lasted between ninety minutes and two hours. According to Benjamin, he was told that he was being fired from Epiphany School; that his contract with the Sparks Foundation was being terminated; and that if he left the room, he would be terminated for cause. On the other hand, Sparks maintains that the meeting was an attempt to negotiate the terms of Benjamin‘s resignation, and contends that
Dueck—who at the time was Benjamin‘s wife and was employed by the Sparks Foundation—joined the meeting after approximately forty-five minutes. Defendants argue that once Dueck joined the meeting, Benjamin negotiated the terms of his resignation and signed his own handwritten letter of resignation. By contrast, Benjamin contends that Gray instructed him to write the resignation letter and told him what to say in it.
Following that meeting, Benjamin emailed the recruiter who had recommended him to Epiphany School to notify the recruiter of his “resignation as Headmaster & CEO of [the school],” indicating that the position was not a good fit for either party and thanking the recruiter for his efforts. J.A. 8435. The following day, the Epiphany School Board notified Benjamin that his contract with the Sparks Foundation had been terminated. And on November 25, the Epiphany School Board sent Benjamin an updated letter referring to his “resignation” rather than his “termination.”
Benjamin alleges that Sparks subsequently began circulating rumors by telling the Epiphany School Board that Benjamin “may be suffering from dementia or Alzheimer‘s or something along those lines because [Benjamin] just did not appear rational in his actions.” J.A. 4002 (alteration in original). Additionally, he alleges that Sparks told an Epiphany
B.
On October 2, 2014, Benjamin sued Sparks, Epiphany School, the Sparks Foundation, Blackerby, Lorentzen, and Gray in the Eastern District of North Carolina. On May 28, 2015, he filed an amended complaint alleging sixteen counts: Count I (all Defendants—unlawful discrimination in violation of
On March 23, 2016, the district court dismissed Count I and II as to defendants Blackerby, Lorentzen, and Gray; Counts V, XII, and XIII in their entirety; Count XIV as
The remaining defendants—Sparks, Epiphany School, and the Sparks Foundation—moved for summary judgment on the outstanding claims. The district court granted in part and denied in part their motion, leaving four claims to go to trial: discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 against Epiphany School (Count VI); breach of contract against Epiphany School (Count VIII); breach of contract against the Sparks Foundation (Count IX); and defamation per se against Sparks (Count X).
In a case management order, the district court ordered that each party provide the other party with pretrial disclosures required under
The jury returned a verdict for Defendants on all claims. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Benjamin primarily asks this Court to find that the district court abused its discretion by (1) preventing Benjamin from introducing Dueck‘s deposition testimony; (2) implementing time limits for each side‘s presentation of its case; (3) admitting evidence about Benjamin‘s misrepresentations regarding his prior employment; and (4) declining to adopt Benjamin‘s proposed jury instructions and verdict form for the breach of contract and defamation per se claims. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion regarding any of these decisions. Accordingly, we affirm.
II.
We first consider Benjamin‘s challenge to the district court‘s decision to exclude the deposition testimony of one of his witnesses, his ex-wife Dueck.
“We review for an abuse of discretion both the district court‘s finding of a disclosure violation and its decision to exclude evidence as a discovery sanction.” Russell v. Absolute Collection Servs., Inc., 763 F.3d 385, 396 (4th Cir. 2014). We adopt this deferential review because “the district court has an intimate familiarity with the relevant proceedings and, therefore, is in a superior[] . . . position to supervise the litigants and assess their good faith.” Bresler v. Wilmington Tr. Co., 855 F.3d 178, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (Wynn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, despite a case management order establishing a July 1, 2019 deadline for pretrial disclosures under
At an August 13, 2019 continuation of the pretrial conference, following the submission of supplemental briefing, Benjamin argued that his disclosure did not violate
The district court was not persuaded. In support of its decision to exclude the testimony, the court first noted that both parties were required under
The court then considered whether Benjamin‘s late designation was substantially justified or harmless. Finding that it was neither, the court stated:
[H]ere I do think that defendants and the court cannot easily cure the surprise at this late hour. I did read there were lateness designations and then counter-objections. Again, if this had all been done on time, I would have gone
through all of this, but I am in the process of working on a lot of different cases, as well as doing the charge in this case, and this is not something that can easily be cured by the court or the defense. Allowing this would disrupt the trial. I would then have to go through all of these objections and rule line by line. And the trial starts tomorrow. This is extremely prejudicial.
J.A. 6635.
On appeal, Benjamin argues that the court abused its discretion by (1) finding that Benjamin violated
Benjamin argues that “[t]he plain language of [Rule] 26 clearly limits parties’ requirement to designate deposition testimony to witnesses who the party expects to present by deposition,” and that parties must do so at least thirty days before trial. Opening Br. at 42. Accordingly, he argues that he complied with the rule because he did not expect to present Dueck‘s testimony by deposition until July 12, and because he disclosed his intention to do so on July 15, thirty days before trial began on August 14.
Benjamin cites no support for his claim that
Therefore, Benjamin was “not allowed” to use the deposition testimony unless his failure to abide by
Notably, a district court is “not required to tick through each of the Southern States factors,” Wilkins v. Montgomery, 751 F.3d 214, 222 (4th Cir. 2014), and retains “broad discretion in determining whether a party‘s nondisclosure or untimely disclosure of evidence is substantially justified or harmless,” Bresler, 855 F.3d at 190 (internal quotation marks omitted). And “[t]he burden of establishing these factors lies with the nondisclosing party.” Wilkins, 751 F.3d at 222.
Here, the district court properly considered the Southern States factors. Regarding harmlessness, the court acknowledged that the late disclosure of deposition designations
Finally, the court recognized that Dueck‘s deposition testimony would likely be important evidence supporting Benjamin‘s theory of the case because she was present at the meeting where Benjamin was allegedly terminated. But the court also viewed the importance of the testimony as weighing against Benjamin. In the court‘s view, “if you‘ve taken a deposition of somebody and they‘re outside the subpoena jurisdiction, I just don‘t see how you don‘t designate that deposition testimony“—particularly if there is reason to believe that the party will not voluntarily appear before the court. J.A. 6635–36. That analysis aligns with our precedent. We have held that the fourth factor, the importance of the evidence, “must be viewed from the perspective of both parties.” S. States, 318 F.3d at 598 (internal quotation marks omitted). “To that end, the more important the evidence, the more important it is for the proponent to disclose [the evidence] in a timely manner because
We conclude that the district court meaningfully engaged with the Southern States factors on harmlessness. We find no abuse of discretion in the court‘s determination that the untimely disclosure was not harmless.
As to whether the late disclosure was substantially justified, the district court found Benjamin‘s explanation lacking. Benjamin claimed that he did not designate Dueck‘s deposition testimony because, as of the designation deadline, he still expected her to testify live at trial. But the record reflects that on February 7, 2019—months before the deadline—Dueck‘s counsel responded to an email from Benjamin‘s counsel and informed him that Dueck was “generally available” during the trial dates, but that she was “not agreeing to anything at th[at] point” and that they should schedule a telephone call later that month to discuss specifics. J.A. 6220. That call was never scheduled.
Nor did Benjamin heed later warnings from Dueck. In a July 2, 2019 email, Dueck‘s counsel informed Benjamin‘s counsel that Dueck was “not inclined to participate voluntarily at the trial“—a fact that counsel had “intimated during [a] call” on June 27, 2019, several days before the court-ordered deadline. J.A. 6238. The record thus suggests that Benjamin was, in fact, aware that Dueck did not want to testify at the trial before the designation deadline.
Moreover, while Dueck‘s counsel did indicate the possibility of Dueck testifying by videoconference, her counsel aptly noted that Benjamin “would need to take the steps necessary to secure an order permitting her testimony by video” pursuant to
Indeed,
The deadlines set forth in a court‘s case management order serve an important function in the flow of litigation. See, e.g., Saudi v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 427 F.3d 271, 278 (4th Cir. 2005) (“A party that fails to provide [
III.
We next turn to Benjamin‘s challenge to the imposition of a fourteen-hour time limit for each side‘s presentation of its case at trial. Before trial, the district court informed both parties of a tentative time limit of fourteen hours for each side and stressed that each party was to be a “steward of [its] own time.” J.A. 6517. Neither party objected.
At trial, Benjamin struggled to stay within these limits. In order to comply, he opted not to call one of his witnesses. And as he neared the end of his allotted time, he requested an extra forty-five minutes for his closing, a request the district court denied. Benjamin argues that the district court abused its discretion by setting rigid fourteen-hour time limits and by denying his request for additional time.
“[T]he district court has the authority in a civil case to limit the presentation of evidence by imposing overarching time limits on each party, although . . . district courts should not adopt this practice as a ‘matter of course.‘” Raynor v. G4S Secure Sols. (USA), Inc., 805 F. App‘x 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 610 (3d Cir. 1995)). We review the district court‘s imposition of time limits for abuse of discretion, keeping in mind both the importance of efficiency in the judicial system and the need for “fundamental fairness” at trial. Id.
Benjamin was “[a]pprised of [the fourteen-hour time limit] in advance of trial,” giving him “notice and adequate time to craft his case.” Id. at 179. That Benjamin chose not to “craft his case” in such a way that allowed him to remain within the time limits while
Moreover, the district court‘s denial of Benjamin‘s request for more time in order to ensure that both parties were bound by the same rules does not constitute an abuse of discretion. And while overarching time limits may not be warranted in every case, “the abuse of discretion standard requires a reviewing court to show enough deference to a primary decision-maker‘s judgment that the court does not reverse merely because it would have come to a different result in the first instance.” Evans v. Eaton Corp. Long Term Disability Plan, 514 F.3d 315, 322 (4th Cir. 2008).
It is within the authority of district courts to set time limits in civil cases. Because both parties had adequate notice to be able to craft their cases within the district court‘s fourteen-hour limit, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion.
IV.
Next, we consider Benjamin‘s appeal of the district court‘s decision to admit evidence regarding his past employment.
During discovery, Defendants learned that Benjamin had misrepresented his credentials and employment history to Epiphany School during the recruitment process. Specifically, when describing his prior work experience, Benjamin failed to mention his position as President of Deep Springs College (a position from which he resigned after less
At a pretrial conference, Benjamin urged the district court to exclude evidence related to these alleged misrepresentations or, in the alternative, bifurcate the trial. In Benjamin‘s view, evidence of employment misrepresentations he allegedly made decades ago was not relevant, and to the extent it was, its probative value was heavily outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
The district court allowed the evidence, concluding that it was relevant and that it did not need to be excluded pursuant to
“We review a trial court‘s rulings on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion, and we will only overturn an evidentiary ruling that is arbitrary and irrational. To that end, we look at the evidence in a light most favorable to its proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its prejudicial effect.” United States v. Cole, 631 F.3d 146, 153 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Even if the district court errs in admitting evidence, this Court will not reverse if the error was harmless and had no prejudicial affect. Cisson v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 810 F.3d 913, 923 (4th Cir. 2016). “To find [an] alleged error harmless, we need only be able to say with fair assurance, after
Benjamin argues that the court‘s decision to admit evidence concerning his prior employment was an abuse of discretion because “(a) [the evidence] was not relevant to the issues at trial, (b) any arguable probative value was substantially outweighed by its unduly prejudicial effect as ancient and largely hearsay evidence of decades-old events and (c) it served as impermissible character evidence transparently intended to make Benjamin seem a liar.” Opening Br. at 35. We find no abuse of discretion here.
Maximizing the probative value of the disputed evidence and minimizing its prejudicial effect, as we are required to do on our review, Cole, 631 F.3d at 153, the district court‘s decision to admit the evidence was not unreasonable. At minimum, we agree with the district court that the allegations of employment misrepresentations were relevant to breach-of-contract liability. The evidence provided support for Defendants’ claim that they would not have hired Benjamin had they known his complete, accurate employment record and qualifications. Further, while some of the evidence was decades old, not all of it was. The record demonstrates that Benjamin submitted a resume to the recruiting firm—which was then considered by the Epiphany School Board—that incorrectly stated that he had a Doctor of Philosophy degree from Oxford. And, while the evidence had a potential prejudicial effect, the district court minimized the risk of prejudice by communicating limiting instructions to the jury throughout the trial.
V.
Finally, we consider Benjamin‘s challenge to the district court‘s verdict form and jury instructions regarding his breach-of-contract claims against Epiphany School and the Sparks Foundation, as well as his challenge to the verdict form related to his defamation per se claim against Sparks.
We employ an abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing a district court‘s verdict form and jury instructions, reviewing both holistically. See Horne v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 4 F.3d 276, 284 (4th Cir. 1993) (verdict forms); Noel v. Artson, 641 F.3d 580, 586 (4th Cir. 2011) (jury instructions). While the structure of the verdict form is left to the discretion of the district court, we must consider whether the form “adequately presented the contested issues to the jury when read as a whole and in conjunction with the general charge, whether submission of the issues to the jury was fair, and whether the ultimate questions of fact were clearly submitted to the jury.” Horne, 4 F.3d at 284 (quoting Klein v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 773 F.2d 1421, 1427 (4th Cir. 1985)).
And for jury instructions, we “simply determine whether the instructions construed as a whole, and in light of the whole record, adequately informed the jury of the controlling legal principles without misleading or confusing the jury to the prejudice of the objecting party.” Noel, 641 F.3d at 586 (internal quotation marks omitted). If a district court declines to give a party‘s proposed instructions, the court will be reversed only if the requested instructions “‘(1) w[ere] correct; (2) w[ere] not substantially covered by the court‘s charge
Considering the jury charge as a whole, we conclude that the trial court adequately informed the jury of the relevant issues and legal principles, and that its verdict form and instructions did not prejudice Benjamin.
A.
Benjamin contends that the district court‘s decision to draft the verdict form to exclude termination as a potential element of his breach-of contract claim was an abuse of discretion. And as to the jury instructions, he argues that the district court‘s breach-of contract instructions were an unsuccessful—and ultimately prejudicial—attempt at following this Court‘s opinion in Stone v. University of Maryland Medical System Corp., 855 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1988). We consider each argument in turn.
1.
In his proposed jury instructions, Benjamin suggested that the verdict form ask the jurors to determine whether he was terminated or forced to resign from his positions with Epiphany School and the Sparks Foundation. Instead, the district court instructed the jury that Benjamin had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his resignations from
The issues were presented to the jurors as follows:
1. Did plaintiff Saul Hillel Benjamin prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his resignation from defendant the Epiphany School of Global Studies was involuntary? . . .
3. Did plaintiff Saul Hillel Benjamin prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his resignation from the Nicholas Sparks Foundation was involuntary?
J.A. 8630–31. If the jurors found that Benjamin‘s resignation in either case was involuntary, they were instructed also to consider issues 2 and 4—any defenses Epiphany School or the Sparks Foundation may have had.5 But since the jury answered issues 1 and 3 in the negative, they never reached issues 2 and 4.
Benjamin argues that the district court abused its discretion by “presenting only the question of whether or not [his] resignations from Epiphany [School] and the [Sparks] Foundation were voluntary.” Opening Br. at 18. He argues that the formulation used in the verdict form assumes that he resigned and does away with the argument that he was in fact terminated. The facts and record, he argues, provided ample support for a finding that he was involuntarily terminated. In Benjamin‘s view, omitting the possibility that he was terminated from the verdict form “greatly and inevitably circumscribed the jury‘s factual analysis, and constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 22. We disagree.
Our deferential standard of review of the district court‘s instructions and presentation of issues to the jury is rooted in an acknowledgment that the district court is better positioned than we are to craft instructions that reflect the evidence produced at trial. See Nelson v. Green Ford, Inc., 788 F.2d 205, 208–09 (4th Cir. 1986). Having heard the evidence and the witnesses, the district court focused the jury on the issue of resignation.
That decision fell within the limits of the district court‘s discretion. A review of the record reveals that Benjamin signed a handwritten resignation note, subsequently referred to the end of his employment with Epiphany School as a resignation, and informed the Epiphany School Board of his plan to “strictly follow[] the letter and spirit of [their] intended separation agreement.” J.A. 8434. Furthermore, the Sparks Foundation ultimately
Our role is not to ask how we would have drafted the verdict form given the opportunity, but to determine whether the district court abused its discretion when it presented the issues to the jury in the manner that it did. The record reflects evidence supporting the district court‘s framing of the issue as one of resignation as opposed to termination. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in drawing up the verdict form, we affirm.
2.
Benjamin also contends that the district court abused its discretion in its jury instructions on his breach-of-contract claim because the district court diverged from this Court‘s language in Stone. In Stone, we held that in deciding whether a resignation was voluntary, we must “determine whether the employee was denied the opportunity to make a free choice.” Stone, 855 F.2d at 174. Four factors guided our inquiry: “(1) whether the employee was given some alternative to resignation; (2) whether the employee understood the nature of the choice he was given; (3) whether the employee was given a reasonable time in which to choose; and (4) whether he was permitted to select the effective date of
Moreover, we noted that “the assessment whether real alternatives were offered must be gauged by an objective standard rather than by the employee‘s purely subjective evaluation; that the employee may perceive his only option to be resignation—for example, because of concerns about his reputation—is irrelevant.” Id. And we explained that “the mere fact that [an employee‘s] choice is between comparably unpleasant alternatives—e.g., resignation or facing disciplinary charges—does not of itself establish that a resignation was induced by duress or coercion, hence was involuntary.” Id.
The district court recited our language from Stone in its jury instructions almost verbatim. Where the question of voluntary resignation was relevant, the court instructed the jury as follows:
You may find a resignation involuntary if, under the totality of the circumstances, the employer‘s conduct concerning the resignation deprived the employee of free choice. Factors that you may consider include: (1) whether plaintiff Saul Hillel Benjamin was given some alternative to resignation (including a severance agreement or being terminated for cause); (2) whether plaintiff Saul Hillel Benjamin understood the nature of the choice he was given; (3) whether plaintiff Saul Hillel Benjamin was given a reasonable time in which to choose whether to resign; (4) whether plaintiff Saul Hillel Benjamin was permitted to select the effective date of resignation or other terms of the resignation or severance agreement; and (5) statements or actions by Saul Hillel Benjamin or the Epiphany School of Global Studies during or after the meeting on November 21, 2013, concerning the alleged resignation.
No one factor is controlling. You must consider the totality of the circumstances in evaluating whether plaintiff Saul Hillel Benjamin proved that his resignation was involuntary. In applying this totality of the circumstances test, the assessment whether alternatives were offered must be gauged by an objective standard rather than by plaintiff Saul Hillel
Benjamin‘s purely subjective evaluation. The fact that plaintiff Saul Hillel Benjamin may have perceived his only option to be resignation—for example, because of concerns about his reputation or being terminated for cause under the contract—is irrelevant. Similarly, the mere fact that the choice is between comparably unpleasant alternatives—such as, resignation or termination for cause under the contract—does not of itself establish that a resignation was involuntary. This principle applies even where the only alternative to resignation for the employee is facing possible termination for cause, unless the employer actually lacked good cause to believe that a basis for termination for cause existed.
J.A. 8592–93, 8601–02, 8610–11.
Benjamin nevertheless contends that these instructions were an abuse of discretion because the district court broke from the language in Stone by including factual examples beyond those provided by Stone.6 He argues that these examples both weighed in favor of the Defendants and improperly influenced the jury to consider only the first Stone factor
We find no abuse of discretion in the court‘s instructions. In ascertaining the voluntariness of a resignation, the crux of the matter is whether the employee was denied the opportunity to make a free choice. Stone, 855 F.2d at 174. To assist in that determination, we rely on the four Stone factors, mindful that no one factor is determinative. In its instructions, the district court properly homed in on the pertinent legal principle without tilting the scales in favor of one party over the other.7
We recognize that district courts are often well-advised not to comment on specific evidence in their jury instructions. See Hardin, 50 F.3d at 1294. For “such comments may carry unacceptable risks of removing from the jury its critical task of assigning weight to the evidence presented.” Id. Nevertheless, the choice to comment on such evidence ultimately belongs to the district court. Id. As long as the instructions, on the one hand, “are not merely statements of abstract principles of law with no relation to the facts,” and on the other, “do[] not effectively direct a verdict for one side or the other,” “the choice of generality versus specificity in the charge is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial courts.” Id. at 1294–95.
Under the case law in this Circuit, there are numerous factors that you can consider in evaluating whether an individual was forced to resign due to duress or coercion. For example, factors that may be considered under the totality of all the circumstances include: (1) whether the employee was given some alternative to the ending of the employment relationship; (2) whether the employee understood the nature of the choice he was given; (3) whether the employee was given a reasonable time within which to choose whether to resign from the employment relationship (for example, whether he was given time to consult with an attorney before making the decision); and/or (4) whether the employee was permitted to select the effective date for termination of the employment relationship.
J.A. 5407. Benjamin‘s proposal also instructed the jury that it would be asked to determine whether Benjamin proved by a preponderance of the evidence that “the [Sparks] Foundation terminated the Independent Contractor Agreement” and that “Epiphany [School] terminated the Employment Agreement.” J.A. 5407–08.
To reverse the district court, we must determine that Benjamin‘s instructions were correct, were not substantially covered by the district court‘s given instructions, and “dealt with some point in the trial so important, that failure to give the requested instruction[s] seriously impaired [Benjamin‘s] ability to make [his] case.” Noel, 641 F.3d at 586 (internal quotation marks omitted). Even assuming that Benjamin‘s proposed instructions were correct, we decline to reverse the district court because Benjamin‘s proposed instructions were substantially covered by the instructions actually given to the jury.
Regarding the instructions’ discussion of the Stone factors, we note the substantial similarity between Benjamin‘s proposed instructions and the court‘s actual instructions. Each factor was addressed and, as noted above, the court‘s instructions focused the jury on
3.
Our determination that the district court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury or drafting the verdict form with regard to Benjamin‘s breach-of-contract claims allows us to quickly dispose of several other issues Benjamin raises on appeal.
First, Benjamin argues that the after-acquired evidence defense should not have been available as a complete defense to breach of contract.8 But the jury found no breach of contract, so it never reached the issue of related defenses. We need not determine the breadth of a defense that was never considered at trial.
Second, Benjamin also appeals the district court‘s orders dismissing some claims and parties and granting summary judgment to Defendants on other claims. We apply a de novo standard of review for appeals of both motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
Benjamin‘s appeal of these orders stems from what he alleges to be unlawful discrimination in violation of
Finally, we consider Benjamin‘s arguments related to his claim for defamation per se. While Benjamin based his defamation per se claim on several statements Sparks allegedly made about Benjamin‘s mental health, only two of those statements were ultimately submitted to the jury: (1) Sparks‘s statement to the Epiphany School Board that Benjamin “may be suffering from dementia or Alzheimer‘s or something along those lines” because “he just did not appear rational“; and (2) Sparks‘s statement to two parents of Epiphany School students that Sparks had to terminate Benjamin because Benjamin “had dementia and bipolar disease” and that “bipolar disease runs in Benjamin‘s family.”10 J.A. 8633.
The verdict form assumed these two statements were slander per se and simply tasked the jury with determining whether Benjamin had proved by a preponderance of the
(a) Did the plaintiff, Saul Hillel Benjamin, prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant, Nicholas Sparks, slandered him by saying to the Board of Trustees of the Epiphany School of Global Studies that Saul Hillel Benjamin “may be suffering from dementia or Alzheimer‘s or something along those lines” because “he just did not appear rational” in his actions in their meeting on November 21, 2013? . . .
(b) Did the plaintiff, Saul Hillel Benjamin, prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant, Nicholas Sparks, slandered him by saying to [an Epiphany School parent] and her husband that he terminated Saul Hillel Benjamin because Saul Hillel Benjamin “had dementia and bipolar disease” and that “bipolar disease runs in Benjamin‘s family?”
Id. The jury answered both questions in the negative.
Benjamin claims that the district court erred by using quoted language in the verdict form because the “[u]se of quotations without qualifying language . . . incorrectly directed the jury to find whether or not Plaintiff had proven those precise, quoted statements in order to prevail on his defamation claims, rather than similar statements testified to by witnesses that also would be defamatory.” Opening Br. at 28.
Again, we review the district court‘s choices in drafting the verdict form for abuse of discretion. Horne, 4 F.3d at 284. In North Carolina, a claim of slander per se requires, as relevant here: “(1) [the] defendant spoke base or defamatory words which tended to prejudice [the plaintiff] in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood or hold him up to disgrace, ridicule, or contempt; (2) the statement was false; and (3) the statement was published or communicated to and understood by a third person.” West v. King‘s Dep‘t Store, Inc., 365 S.E.2d 621, 624 (N.C. 1988). The plaintiff must allege
Benjamin‘s assertion that the jury should have been allowed to consider whether he proved statements “similar” to those quoted on the verdict form is incorrect. The trial judge determined, as a matter of law, that the quoted statements were defamatory; no such determination was made for “similar” statements. And the court properly limited the jury‘s inquiry by quoting only those defamatory statements. Without this limitation, even the most diligent and well-intentioned jury could have improperly returned a verdict finding that Sparks had made some slanderous statement, without knowing if the district court would have found that statement defamatory as a matter of law.
Furthermore, the use of pattern instructions is the preferred method of jury instruction in North Carolina—and North Carolina‘s pattern jury instructions recommend quoting the allegedly defamatory claims to the jury. N.C.P.I.–Civil, 806.65 (2012); see In re Will of Leonard, 323 S.E.2d 377, 379 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984). The district court‘s language aligned with the pattern instructions.11
The formulation of the language on a verdict form falls within the discretion of the district court. Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it drafted the form, in reliance on North Carolina‘s pattern jury instructions, in such a manner that properly limited the jury‘s consideration to the narrow question before it.
VI.
For the reasons given above, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED
Notes
2. Did defendant the Epiphany School of Global Studies prove by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that it would have terminated plaintiff Saul Hillel Benjamin “for cause” under § 7(b) of the Employment Contract based on information that it possessed in November 2013; or (2) that it would have terminated plaintiff Saul Hillel Benjamin “for cause” under § 7(b) of the Employment Contract based on after-acquired evidence of plaintiff Saul Hillel Benjamin‘s misconduct; or (3) that it never would have hired plaintiff Saul Hillel Benjamin based on after-acquired evidence of plaintiff Saul Hillel Benjamin‘s misconduct? . . .
4. Did defendant the Nicholas Sparks Foundation prove by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that it did or would have terminated plaintiff Saul Hillel Benjamin “for cause” under § 6 of the Independent Contractor Agreement based on information that it possessed in November 2013; or (2) that it would have terminated plaintiff Saul Hillel Benjamin “for cause” under § 6 of the Independent Contractor Agreement based on after-acquired evidence of plaintiff Saul Hillel Benjamin‘s misconduct; or (3) that it never would have
J.A. 8592–93, 8601–02, 8610–11.You may find a resignation involuntary if, under the totality of the circumstances, the employer‘s conduct concerning the resignation deprived the employee of free choice. Factors that you may consider include: (1) whether plaintiff Saul Hillel Benjamin was given some alternative to resignation (including a severance agreement or being terminated for cause) . . . . No one factor is controlling. You must consider the totality of the circumstances in evaluating whether plaintiff Saul Hillel Benjamin proved that his resignation was involuntary. … Similarly, the mere fact that the choice is between comparably unpleasant alternatives—such as, resignation or termination for cause under the contract—does not of itself establish that a resignation was involuntary. This principle applies even where the only alternative to resignation for the employee is facing possible termination for cause, unless the employer actually lacked good cause to believe that a basis for termination for cause existed.