RUBEN R. CRAIG, III v. LAUREL HARRY, et al.
No. 23-cv-3608
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
March 11, 2025
Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. United States District Judge
Rubеn R. Craig, III, a prisoner in state custody currently housed at SCI Benner, filed this civil rights action pursuant to
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
After the Defendants initially moved to dismiss the Complaint, see ECF Nos. 20, 22, Craig filed an Amended Supplemental Complaint (“ASC“) including allegations about events that occurred after the filing of the Complaint, including the circumstances of his transfer to SCI Benner. ECF No. 26. The pending motions were denied and the Defendants were directed to respond to the ASC. ECF No. 27. Presently before the Court are renewed Motions by all Defendants to dismiss pursuant to
In an Order filed on December 10, 2024, see ECF No. 53, the Court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressed to whether Craig‘s claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA“) were rendered moot by his transfer to SCI Benner as well as the expiration of the ban imposed on his participation in certain religious activities at SCI Phoenix that forms the basis of his claim. The parties filed responses to the Order. ECF Nos. 54, 55, 56, 57. Subsequently, the Court advised the parties that material outside of the pleadings presented by the Commonwealth Defendants as part of their Motion pursuant to
II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS3
A. Religious Claims
Craig primarily asserts constitutional claims and a claim under the RLUIPA, but also raises myriad other allegations in his Complaint and ASC. He names all Defendants in their individual and official capacities. Compl. at 2. Craig alleges that he is a practitioner of Judaism who holds traditional religious views, adheres to the tenets of Orthodox Judaism, and is so listed by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC“). ASC at 2. At SCIP he attended Shabbat services, Jewish studies classes, and holiday observances. Id. Defendant David Dunn Bauer is a contract chaplain hired by the DOC to minister to the Jewish congregation at SCIP. He is allegedly a follower of Reconstructionist Judaism, which Craig asserts is a “fringe community that practices a vaguely Jewish, ‘Jewishly-informed’ form of secular humanism.” Id. Stated briefly, Craig does not agree with Bauer‘s religious teachings, which he believes to be cultural Marxism. See id. at 2-3. Craig asserts that Bauer harbors “animosity toward traditional, Orthodox Judaism and its practitioners” and views them as a “hate group” that discriminates
On December 6, 2022, Bauer allegedly attempted to impose an indefinite ban on Craig attending religious services because Bauer was offended by a comment that Craig made during a Shabbat service. Compl. at 2. He believes that Bauer interpreted his statement as antisemitic. Id. Defendant Rafael Torres, Bauer‘s supervisor, informed Craig that it was his policy to permit chaplains to deny anyone religious services based on conduct that made the chaplain uncomfortable. Id. Craig asked Torres how his policy would apply if Craig said to Bauer that he believed that homosexuality was a sin and Bauer, whom he alleges is gay, denied him services because of that belief, to which Torres responded that Bauer would have his permission to ban Craig. Id. at 3. He allegedly told Craig “to keep his religion to himself,” made the sign of the cross, and said “God bless you” in a dismissive way. Id. On two dates thereafter, Bauer “advocate[d] for transgenderism” during “religious services/study sessions by wearing a pro-transgenderism badge,” leading Craig to file a grievance over what he believed to be improper workplace activism and lack of respect for his religiоus convictions. Id. He also took issue with
Craig alleges that Torres, in his role as a grievance officer, demonstrated open hostility to him based on his Orthodox beliefs. Id. at 3-4. He sent Torres a Request to Staff on July 15, 2023 “to have Torres correct some false claims that were made in the response to a grievance” and request an apology from Torres for allegedly slandering him, but Torres did not respond. Id. at 4. Rather, Torres emailed his own supervisor, Gary Olinger, and Olinger‘s supervisor, Deputy Superintendent Mandy Sipple, advising them that Craig was restricted from participating in Shabbat and holiday observances, and study sessions for a fifteen-month period from July 15, 2023 to September 15, 2024. Id. Craig asserts it is unclear what policy or procedure permitted Torres to make this decision. Id. Bauer and Defendant Chaplain Abdul-Lateef Sabir4 notified Craig on July 21 of the ban and told guards on his housing unit to deny any request he made to attend religious activities. Id. at 4-5. Bauer apparently identified the incident involving pronouns as a disruptive action by Craig that led to his decision. Id. at 5. Craig was warned that he would be sent to the RHU if he attempted to attend a religious program that evening.
Craig also had a meeting with Torres and Defendant Chaplain Michael Cornick on August 3, 2023, during which Torres unfavorably compared his beliefs to those of Southern
Craig also asserts a claim that Defendant Bauer did not conduct a celebration of Chanukah because he did not come to work on the day of the holiday and Terra, Bissel, Olinger and Torres failed to provide other staff to celebrate the holiday. ASC at 5. He concedes, however, that Bauer‘s presence was not needed to celebrate the holiday. Id.
B. Access to the Law Library
Separately, Craig asserts that on August 26, 2023, CO Alison Grenon terminated his pass to the law library because his shirt was allegedly untucked. Id. About one year earlier, on August 13, 2022, Defendant Cara Cloninger terminated his law library session after he questioned her about a DOC policy on access to the law library, requested a grievance form, and
Craig also alleges he was “attacked with [a] chemical weapon” wielded by Defendant Scott Emminger on September 18, 2021 because he was sprayed with oleoresin capsicum (“OC“) spray. He asserts that he was alone in his cell but “would not speak” and Emminger attacked him through the wicket in the cell door. Id. He also recounts that on November 20, 2022, CO Anthony Hamilton threatened to use OC spray when he requested to see a copy of a DOC policy. Hamilton‘s supervisor, CO Andrew Rodriguez, was present but did not intervene. Id. He was also exposed to OC spray when CO Green used the substance on another inmate on August 25, 2023.6 Id. at 12. Craig alleges that these uses of OC spray on these occasions violated his rights. Id.
D. Denial of Books
Craig claims in his Complaint that his due process rights were violated because the prison mailroom refused to deliver two books he had ordered, “Mechatronics For the Evil Genius” and “Complete Guide to Sniping.” Id. at 12; ASC at 11. Defendant Mailroom Supervisor Long falsified an Incoming Publication Review Committee (“IPRC“) denial form for the first book, which Craig claims is a middle school/high school level book about robotics. Compl. at 12. Long told Craig that the IPRC consisted of himself, CO Dusch, and Librarian Ephriam, but Ephriam allegedly told Craig he had not been on the IPRC for five years and had no knowledge of the book. Id. He claims another book he requested, “Lighting the Nude,” is on a Denied Publication List, he was not approved to receive it, and the book was confiscated, violating his First Amendment and due process rights, but he fails to attribute this to any particular Defendant.
E. Destruction of Sacred Texts
Craig adds additional religion claims in the ASC. He alleges that he had a collection of what he describes to be sacred texts that were no longer usable and he gave them to Bauer to dispose of in a manner conforming with Orthodox Jewish teachings, which he agreed to do. ASC at 4. Two weeks later, Craig tried to give Bauer additional materials for disposal but he refused to take them stating, “I don‘t want your trash. Throw away your own trash,” which Craig alleges denied him a religious accommodation. Id. Craig showed him a copy of DC-ADM 819, a policy he asserts applies to disposal of religious materials, but Bauer refused to give Craig information about how he disposed of the first group of materials, leading him to believe that they were not properly handled. Id. at 4-5.
Craig spoke with Defendant Torres and asked him to dispose of the materials properly, but he refused to do so. Id. at 5. Torres told him that DC-ADM 819 only applies to DOC-purchased items, and that he, Torres, “gets to determine what is and is not a sacred text to an Orthodox Jew.” Id. Defendant Olinger failed to correct Defendant Torres‘s alleged violation.7 Id.
F. Placement in the RHU
After the named Defendants were notified that Craig had filed this action, he again raised the issue of disposal of sacred texts with Bauer. Id. at 6. While unclear how this relates to the disposal of the sacred texts, Craig appears to allege that he received a misconduct accusing him
“A 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the allegations contained in the complaint.” Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss under
In resolving a
The Court has provided the parties notice that matters outside of the pleadings submitted by the Commonwealth Defendants will be considered limited to the excessive force claim asserted against Defendant Emminger, converting the motion to dismiss that claim to one filed pursuant to
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Official Capacity Claims Against Commonwealth Employees
Craig has named each Defendant in his or her official capacity, asserts that each Defendant other than Bauer is employed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and he seeks
B. Claims Against Uninvolved Individuals and Unattributed Claims
While Craig lists as Defendants Patrick Judge, Michael Palmerchuck, and Jacob Smith as Defendants, he asserts no substantive allegations against these individuals.9 Also, he alleges he was denied unspecified non-religious books and magazines because they were placed on a
“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs” to be liable. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). See also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (explaining that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to...
C. First Amendment Claims
Craig asserts Free Exercise Clause claims against Bauer because Bauer barred him from participating in Shabbat services, religious study classes, and holiday celebrations for fifteen months; introduced Reconstructionist prayer books, advocated transgenderism, and pronouns that did not conform with Craig‘s religious views; and failed to be present to conduct Chanukah services. He asserts claims against Torres because, as Bauer‘s supervisor, it was his policy to permit chaplains to deny anyone religious services based on conduct that made the chaplain uncomfortable, and because he notified his own supervisors of Craig‘s ban from participating in
1. The Turner Test
The Supreme Court has recognized that the First Amendment guarantees that all prisoners must be afforded reasonable opportunities to exercise their religious freedom. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972); see also O‘Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (“Inmates clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, . . . including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.” (citations omitted)). Specific to the prison context, although inmates retain certain protections afforded by the First Amendment, “lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.” Id. at 348 (quotations omitted); see also DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 50-51 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[T]he fact of incarceration and the valid penological objectives of deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of prisoners, and institutional security justify limitations on the exercise of constitutional rights by inmates.” (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974))). While thе federal courts must take cognizance of valid constitutional claims of prison inmates, the Supreme Court repeatedly has cautioned that the task of prison administration has been committed to the responsibility of the legislative and executive branches of government and federal courts should be reluctant to second-guess these authorities. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987); O‘Lone, 482 U.S. at 353. Only beliefs that are (1) sincerely held, and (2) religious in nature are entitled to constitutional protection. See DeHart, 227 F.3d at 51. If a prisoner-plaintiff alleges plausibly that he has a sincerely held religious belief, he must also allege plausibly that the challenged prison practice or policy that allegedly infringes on his religious belief is not reasonably related to penological interests under the factors set forth in Turner. DeHart, 227 F.3d at 51.
In Turner, the Supreme Court held that a prison regulation that “impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights” is “valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Id., 482 U.S. at 89. A four-part test applies for assessing the overall reasonableness of the regulation: (1) whether the regulation or practice bears a “valid, rational connection” to a legitimate and neutral governmental objective; (2) whether prisoners have alternative ways of exercising the circumscribed right; (3) “[what] impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally“; and (4) whether alternatives exist that fully accommodate the prisoner‘s rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests. Id. at 89-90. The absence of de minimis cost alternatives can support the reasonableness of the action taken by prison officials. Id. at 91.
The Commonwealth Defendants and Bauer argue that Craig‘s constitutional claims must be dismissed citing Turner and Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 208 F. Supp. 2d 520 (E.D. Pa. 2002). See Commonwealth Defs’ Mem., ECF No. 32, at 11-12; Bauer Mem., ECF No. 34, at 7. In Allah, the court dismissed Free Exercise claims by an inmate who disagreed with a prison chaplain‘s teachings stating that, while the inmate did not raise his voice or stand when he interrupted a service, in a prison setting “avoiding conflict is critical to maintaining order as well as a safe environment.” Id. at 529. The prisoner was barred from religious services “until further notice,” although prison officials did permit him to attend “meetings” as well as services “as long as he is able to conduct himself in accordance with our rules during Services.” Id. at 523. The decision to bar the prisoner from religious services was held to be rationally related to the governmental interest in maintaining order and security inside the prison. Id. at 529.
The Commonwealth Defendants and Bauer argue that, similar to the situation in Allah, they had a legitimate and neutral governmental objective in barring Craig from attending group religious activities because of the numerous instances when he disrupted Defendant Bauer during the course of services and study sessions. They cite the need to avoid conflict to support Craig‘s prohibition from attending group religious activities. See ECF No. 32 at 12-13; ECF No. 34 at 2-3, 11. They contend that the second Turner factor also supports the ban since Craig was not prevented from practicing his religion in alternative ways, such as praying and studying with other inmates who share his Orthodox Judaism outside of Defendant Bauer‘s Reconstructionist
Craig responds that the ban on his attending group religious activities cannot be constitutional since DOC‘s policy, specifically DC-ADM 819 Religious Activities Policy and Procedures Manual, states that it is DOC policy to accommodate inmates’ religious beliefs “consistent with the security needs and orderly administration of the facility by providing for the orderly management of religious opportunities for all inmates.” Pl. Resp., ECF No. 48, at 49-50 (quoting DC-ADM 819); see also DC-ADM 819, “Religious Activities,” Pa. Department of Corrections Policy and Procedures Manual (effective December 13, 2023), https://perma.cc/TU3U-9CHV (last visited March 10, 2025).11 He asserts that the
Commonwealth Defendants “attempt to utilize [Turner] in a novel and unconvincing manner, expanding its findings to the point of utter absurdity.” Pl. Resp. at 48. Regarding the first Turner factor, he argues that “it would be irrational to assume that (1) PADOC policies are expertly drafted to facilitate and effectuate [ ] legitimate penological interests, while at the same time (2) PADOC has some sort of legitimate penological interests best served by allowing employees to arbitrarily and capriciously violated the very policies that we are to assume best embodies PADOC‘s legitimate interests.” Id. at 49. Regarding the fourth Turner factor, de minimis cost alternatives, Craig argues in circular fashion that, if he can point to an alternative that accommodates his rights at de minimis cost, “a court may consider that ready alternative as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard. So should there be [a de minimis cost alternative] that would both satisfy the legitimate penological interests of PADOC and preserve/protect the Constitutional rights of Ruben Craig . . . then defendants are required to adopt such an alternative, and the fact that they did not proves that their impinging conduct lacks a reasonable relationship to any legitimate penological interests of the PADOC.”12 Id. at 50.
2. Ban on Participation in Group Religious Events
The Court concludes that Craig‘s free exercise claims based on his ban from participating in Shabbat services, religious study classes, and holiday celebrations for fifteen months are not plausible under the Turner test against the Commonwealth Defendants and Bauer. Craig
admittedly disrupted Defendant Bauer during the course of services and study sessions over differences in religious teachings Compl. at 2; ASC at 3-4; ECF 32 at 12; ECF 34 at 2, 9. Craig concedes that he disagrees with Defendant Bauer‘s teachings on issues of faith, and that he made comments about Bauer‘s discussion of transgenderism and queer theory during two study sessions, objected to his use of Reconstructionist prayerbooks, would not participate in a discussion of preferred pronouns during a session, and interrupted a Shabbat service in a manner that Bauer found offensive and interpreted as antisemitic, leading to the imposition of the ban. Because Defendants’ ban on Craig‘s attending organized religious activities had a valid, rational connection to their legitimate and neutral objective of avoiding conflict and disruption during Bauer‘s organized religious activities, the free exercise claim is not plausible. Contrary to Craig‘s argument that the Commonwealth Defendants violatedPrison officials also argue that Craig has alternative ways of exercising his faith through private prayer and unorganized activities that do not involve Bauer. Craig responds that denial of communal prayer and one-on-one chaplaincy services meant that Bauer foreclosed all non-solitary forms of worship, “constituting a substantial burden indeed, for an adherent of a religion that requires group study and prayer, and which even has certain standard prayers - like Mourner‘s Kaddish - that may only be performed in groups.” Resp. at 9. This allegation is not
Prison officials also argue, with no response by Craig, that his disruptions of Bauer‘s activities impacted prison resources, and that an alternative in the form of individual chaplaincy services could not be provided at de minimis cost since Bauer was the only Jewish chaplain at SCIP and his fraught relationship with Bauer would only continue in one-on-one sessions. While Craig addresses the fourth Turner factor, he fails to suggest that a de minimis alternative to the ban existed.
Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss the Free Exercise Clause claims will be granted as to Defendants Bauer, Sabir, Valdez, and Beatty, all of whom were alleged to have violated Craig‘s rights by denying him access to religious services; and as to Defendant Torres based upon his alleged role in creating or applying a policy to permit chaplains to deny religious services. Allen v. Eckard, 804 F. App‘x 123, 127 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (concluding that a supervisory liability claim was meritless where the plaintiff failed to make a plausible showing of an underlying constitutional violation).
3. Other Claims Against Torres and Chaplain Cornick
Additionally, to the extent Craig asserts a free exercise claim against Torres because he demonstrated hostility, made the sign of the cross in Craig‘s presence, compared him to a Southern Baptist, told him to keep his religion to himself, and spoke to him dismissively when Craig confronted him about the ban, the claim is dismissed. Verbal abuse or taunts, without more, are insufficient to violate the Constitution. See Ayala v. Terhune, 195 F. App‘x 87, 92 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“[A]llegations of verbal abuse, no matter how deplorable, do not present actionable claims under § 1983.“); DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2000)
4. Failure to Conduct Chanukah Service
Bauer also seeks dismissal of Craig‘s Free Exercise Clause claim based on Bauer not personally conducting Chanukah services. ECF No. 34 at 7. This claim will be dismissed. The United States Supreme Court has held that “[a] special chapel or place of worship need not be provided for every faith regardless of size; nor must a chaplain, priest, or minister be provided without regard to the extent of the demand.” Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322 n. 2 (per curiam); see also Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 4 (3d Cir. 1970) (holding that there is no affirmative duty to provide an inmate with a clergyman of his choice); Garraway v. Lappin, 490 F. App‘x 440, 445 (3d Cir. 2012) (same); Weir v. Nix, 114 F.3d 817, 820-21 (8th Cir. 1997) (“The Constitution does not, however, require that a religious advisor be provided for every sect in a penitentiary. Nor is a prisoner entitled to insist on a religious advisor whose beliefs are completely congruent with [her] own.” (citations omitted)). Because Craig had no First Amendment right to have a
5. Claims Against Bauer Based on Doctrinal Disagreements
Craig may also be asserting an Establishment Clause claim based on his assertions that Bauer introduced Reconstructionist prayer books, and advocated transgenderism and the use of pronouns that did not conform with Craig‘s religious views. See Resp. at 10 (“The defendants’ actions dеnied Mr. Craig a tolerant, neutral environment to exercise the free expression of his religious beliefs, subjecting him to bias and open hostility due to said beliefs.“) (citing Compl. Count 2 (alleging that Defendants Torres‘s policy to permit his chaplains to deny anyone religious services) and 10 (alleging that Torres made the sign of the cross and demonstrated hostility toward Orthodox Jewish views), ECF No. 2 at 2-3 5); see also id. at 63 (challenging whether that the Defendants’ need to prevent conflict “is so critical that a chaplain can and must be permitted to define what is orthodox and permissible for one to believe, and he/she must be able to take action against any deviation from this norm.“). This claim is also dismissed.
While Bauer cites to the test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (holding that state action must satisfy three conditions to avoid violating the Establishment Clause: it “must have a secular legislative purpose,” “its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion,” and it “must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion‘“), see ECF No. 34-1 at 11, which was formerly the central framework for Establishment Clause challenges, it is no longer the applicable test in the prison context or otherwise, since the Supreme Court has “instructed that the Establishment Clause
6. Disposal Of Sacred Texts
Craig‘s claim in the ASC concerning Bauer‘s allegedly improper disposal of sacred texts, see ADC at 5, is also dismissed. Craig‘s clam is based on Section 3A, ¶ 12c of
The claim is also not plausible under the Turner test. While Craig appears to assert that any material that contains the four-letter name of his deity is a “sacred text,” he does not otherwise describe the materials, particularly whether they were officially sanctioned materials. Notably,
D. Denial of Secular Books
1. Due Process Claims
Craig alleges a due process violation based on the prison mailroom refusing to deliver two books he had ordered, “Mechatronics For the Evil Genius” and “Complete Guide to Sniping.” Id. at 12; ASC at 11. Defendant Mailroom Supervisor Long allegedly falsified an
The Commonwealth argues that the due process claim involving these books is not plausible because Craig had no protected property interest in receiving these books, the prison had a reasonable interest in reviewing incoming publications, and the prison grievance process provided Craig with an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Def. Mem. at 20-21. Craig responds that his claim is plausible because the Defendants violated their own regulation,
Craig argues that any assertion that he was denied the robotics book and the sniping book because their subject matters posed a threat to institutional security should be rejected since the DOC “readily accepts publications including the very same information that this screener found objectionable.” Id. at 56. He argues his claim is plausible because Long denied the robotics book feeling it posed a threat to security, while the prison library contains books about electronics and transformers; and she denied the sniping book even though its publisher‘s magazine, Guns and Ammo, and other books about ballistics and long guns are permitted in DOC institutions. Id. He concludes that Long denied the books based on personal prejudice rather than institutional security. Id.
The
The procedural aspect of the Due Process Clause guarantees the availability of certain procedural mechanisms, typically the right to notice and a hearing before the government can deprive an individual of a liberty or property interest. To establish a procedural due process violation, a person must first demonstrate that he has been deprived of a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest. Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 325 (3d Cir. 2010).
Craig‘s due process claims involving the robotics and sniping books are dismissed. First, accepting as true that Defendant Long failed to follow the procedures in
2. First Amendment Claim
“Inmates have a First Amendment right to receive information while in prison to the extent the right is not inconsistent with prisoner status or the legitimate penological objectives of the prison.” Jacklovich v. Simmons, 392 F.3d 420, 426 (10th Cir. 2004). Regulations affecting prisoners’ access to publications are valid in terms of the First Amendment if they are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413 (1989) (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). Thus, regulations that should be viewed with caution include those which categorically prohibit access to a broad range of materials. See Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 1996), amended, 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998) (allowing challenge to prison‘s “publisher‘s only” rule that applied to soft-cover books); see also Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 520 (9th Cir. 1991) (rule categorically preventing inmates from receiving soft-cover books and magazines not sent directly from publisher must be scrutinized closely). At issue in Thornburgh was a federal Bureau of Prisons regulation that allowed the prison warden to reject outside publications mailed to a prisoner if the publication was deemed to be detrimental to the “security, good order, or discipline of the institution or if it might facilitate criminal
Under Thornburgh, courts generally apply the Turner four-factor test to determine whether the restriction on a book is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.
While not binding on this Court, in Key the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court rejected the prisoner-plaintiff‘s assertion that the ban on books containing nudity in the then-applicable version of
No leave to amend the First Amendment claim regarding “Lighting the Nude” will be afforded because courts have found that the DOC has legitimate penological interests supporting its ban on books containing nudity and Craig does not allege facts to support an inference that the policy is unreasonable, that he has no alternate way to create or appreciate art without access to the book, that there is no impact on correctional resources, or that there is not more than a de minimis cost involved. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90. In other words, given the long line of precedents about prison officials’ legitimate penological interests in banning books containing nudity, any attempt to amend the claim involving “Lighting the Nude” would be futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108, 110 (3d Cir. 2002) (district courts should dismiss complaints under the PLRA with leave to amend “unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.“).
E. RLUIPA Claims
Craig also asserts claims for injunctive relief under the
The RLUIPA claim is dismissed as moot. Under
Because RLUIPA does not permit the recovery of money damages against individual defendants, and Craig can no longer receive injunctive relief as (1) he has been transferred from SCIP, (2) the fifteen-month ban on his participation in group religious activities has expired, and (3) there is no suggestion that he is unable to engage in group religious activities at SCI Benner. The RLUIPA claims are therefore moot. See, e.g., Banks v. Sec‘y Pa. Dep‘t of Corr., 601 F. App‘x 101, 103-04 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[T]o the extent that Banks seeks that relief against defendants at SCI-Retreat, his claims are moot because he was transferred to SCI-Somerset“). Because the ban was imposed due to specific past сonduct and there is also no suggestion that Craig will be incarcerated at SCIP in future, his case not does not present an issue capable of repetition, yet evading review.16
F. Law Library Access
Craig asserts that he was denied access to the prison law library (1) by CO Alison Grenon because his shirt was allegedly untucked even though he told an unnamed correctional officer who was Grenon‘s superior that he had to meet a deadline; (2) by Defendant Cloninger after he questioned her about a DOC policy about access to the law library, requested a grievance form and she refused to provide one; when she charged him for overdue books; and when she wrote a misconduct accusing him of possessing contraband and tampering with prison property; (3) by
Prisoners maintain a “fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts,” embodied in the
“A prisoner making an access-to-the-courts claim is required to show that the denial of access caused actual injury.”
Craig fails to allege that he “lost” a non-frivolous claim concerning a direct or collateral attack on his sentence or the conditions of his confinement. Although he mentions a deadline, for none of the instances where he asserts that a Defendant impeded his access to the law library does he make any allegation about his need to use the law library, let alone that the Defendants’ actions caused an actual injury. The claims concerning his access to the law library will be dismissed.
G. Use of OC Spray
Craig also appears to assert an excessive force claim against Defendant Emminger based on his use of OC spray on September 18, 2021. Craig asserts that he was alone in his cell but
The
The Eighth Amendment does not protect against a de minimis use of physical force, so long as it is not of a sort “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Brooks, 204 F.3d at 107 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10). Moreover, “[t]he use of chemical agents to subdue recalcitrant prisoners is not cruel and unusual when reasonably necessary.” Gibson v. Flemming, 837 F. App‘x 860, 862 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1270 (7th Cir. 1984)); see also Passmore v. Ianello, 528 F. App‘x 144, 147 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (explaining that the use of chemical agents is not a per se constitutional violation).
1. Defendant Emminger
Craig‘s limited allegations fail to allege plausibly that Defendant Emminger used OC spray maliciously and sadistically to cause harm, rather than in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. He alleges only that Emminger used the substance by spraying it through the wicket in the cell door when Craig refused to communicate with him. He provides no other facts to explain the context of the use of force, specifically, the nature of their interaction, why he refused to communicate with Emminger, or any circumstances that may have required Emminger to communicate with him. Nonetheless, from his limited statement of facts, Craig concedes that there was a nеed for the application of force - to restore discipline in the face of his otherwise unexplained recalcitrance. He has not alleged sufficient facts to make plausible an assertion that there was no relationship between the need to end his recalcitrance and the amount of force that was used. See, e.g., Jones v. Shields, 207 F.3d 491, 496 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[L]imited application of [OC spray] to control a recalcitrant inmate constitutes ‘a tempered response by prison
Craig will not be granted an opportunity to amend this claim for the additional reason that he failed to exhaust his prison grievance remedies. The
“There is one exception to the mandatory exhaustion requirement: administrative remedies must be available to the prisoner.” Downey, 968 F.3d at 305 (citing Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632 (2016)). “An administrative remedy is unavailable when it ‘operates as a simple dead-end[,] is so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use, or when prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.‘”
Craig does not respond to the Court‘s Order directing the parties to present any material that may be pertinent to the exhaustion issue.17 Because the indisputably authentic documents
2. Defendants Hamilton and Green
The other excessive force claims involving the use of OC spray are not plausible and will be dismissed without leave to amend. Defendant Hamilton‘s mere threat to use OC spray is not plausible because there is no allegation that force was actually used. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. City of Albuquerque, 991 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1993) (“The mere threat of force, while perhaps intimidating, is not excessive force.“); Cabral v. City of New York, No. 12-4659, 2014 WL 4636433, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2014) (collecting cases and dismissing claim based on drawing of gun stating that threats of force cannot constitute excessive force as a matter of law), aff‘d, 662 F. App‘x 11 (2d Cir. 2016). Finally, the excessive force claim against Defendant Green, based on Craig being exposed to OC spray when it was used it to control another inmate
H. Due Process and Retaliation Claims - Placement in the RHU/Transfer
Craig asserts two distinct claims based on his placement in the RHU. First, he asserts that Defendant Cloninger issued a retaliatory misconduct accusing him of possessing contraband and tampering with prison property when he tried to make a photocopy of a Christmas - New Years holiday closing schedule for the library. Compl. at 9. He asserts that Defendants Charles Hensley, Terra, and other members of the Program Review Committed (“PRC“) did not initially know what the misconduct was for, but ultimately determined that he was investigated and confined to the RHU for reading and discussing the holiday closing schedule. Id. He claims he was held in the RHU for the maximum time allowed without charges before being released, during which time he could not access the law library even though he had legal deadlines pending, as punishment for misusing the law library. Id.
Separately, he asserts that after the named Defendants were notified that Craig had filed this action, and he again raised the issue of disposal of sacred texts with Bauer, he also received a misconduct accusing him of using a homophobic slur during his interaction with Bauer. ASC at 6-7. He claims the misconduct report for this latter incident was dismissed with prejudice following a hearing. Id. at 7. Nonetheless, he was taken to the RHU later that day, allegedly at Bauer‘s “behest” and that Bauer requested that he be transferred to a different prison. Id. The PRC, consisting of Defendants Hensley, Kertes, Muick and others, allegedly denied him due process by ordering him transferred to SCI Benner, even though he concedes that he received a
Craig‘s allegations concerning his two placements in the RHU do not state plausible claims. First, it is well-settled that a convicted prisoner‘s placement in segregated confinement will generally not create a liberty interest. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486; Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 224 (3d Cir. 2000). Also, because a prisoner has no liberty interest in his housing placement, he has failed to allege a plausible due process claim based upon his subsequent transfer to SCI Benner. See Thompson v. Pitkins, 514 F. App‘x 88, 89 (3d Cir. 2013) (“prisoners have no liberty interest arising from the Due Process Clause in a particular place of confinement“) (citing Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245-46 (1983)). Thus, there can be no plausible due process claim arising from his placement in the RHU.
In order to state a plausible
A prisoner‘s filing of a grievance is constitutionally protected conduct. See Robinson v. Taylor, 204 F. App‘x 155, 157 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Mitchell, 318 F.3d at 530; Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 352-53 (2d Cir. 2003)). The filing of a lawsuit also generally “satisfies the constitutionally protected conduct prong of a retaliation claim.” DeFranco v. Wolfe, 387 F. App‘x 147, 157 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating that there is “no doubt that filing a lawsuit is constitutionally protected conduct” for purposes of a retaliatory transfer claim). A prisoner must allege a causal link between the protected conduct and the alleged act of retaliation. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Headman, 645 F. App‘x 149, 152 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (“[B]ecause Hammonds’ conclusory allegations fail to raise the required inference of a causal link between his grievance and the filing of misconduct reports, he failed to state a retaliation claim.“); Thomas v. Brinich, 579 F. App‘x 60, 62 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (“Thomas’ claims against Dr. Ahner consist of conclusory and somewhat cryptic allegations that Dr. Ahner took Thomas off medication, directed others to do the same, and ordered others to create an extreme and stressful prison environment in retaliation for his 2001 lawsuit. The complaint lacks all detail as to the time, place, or manner surrounding the alleged deprivation and it is entirely unclear from the allegations what level of involvement, if any, Dr. Ahner had in Thomas’ care“).
Craig also fails to allege plausible retaliation claims. His placement in the RHU following his attempt to photocopy the library‘s holiday closing schedule does not implicate arguably protected conduct. While he asserts that he could not conduct legal research while he
I. Conditions of Confinement in the RHU
Finally, Craig alleges that while in the RHU from February 2 to 14, 2024, he was exposed to raw sewage leaking into his cell through cracks in the wall, RHU “staff” acknowledged knowing about the problem, he had to eat his meals in these conditions, and his complaints about this were ignored. ASC at 8-9. He asserts that Defendant Taylor supervised the RHU. Id. at 9. He also complains that the window in his cell was opaque causing sensory deprivation and he did not have access to his property. Id. at 9, 11.
The
To establish an
A prisoner must also establish that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. A claim based on mere negligence is insufficient to allege a plausible
Craig‘s allegations about the twelve days he spent in the RHU do not allege an objectively serious deprivation. While exposure to human waste “carries particular weight in the conditions calculus,” Martin v. Gearhart, 712 F. App‘x 179, 187 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (quoting DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 974 (10th Cir. 2001)), the assertion that Craig‘s cell simply had a sewage leak and he had to have his meals in his cell are generally not the type of claims that courts deem to be an objectively serious deprivation. See Smith v. U.S. Penitentiary Lee, No. 11-77, 2011 WL 767165, at *2 (W.D. Va. Feb. 25, 2011) (plaintiff failed to state claim based on allegations that he was required to eat meals in cell with toilet sometimes filled with excrement). More importantly, Craig does not tie this allegation to a named Defendant who had both objective knowledge of the condition and the subjective state of mind to make the claim plausible, alleging only that “staff” on the unit were supervised by Defendant Taylor. The assertion that his cell window was opaque is also not a serious deprivation since he does not allege he was deprived of light. Although lack of access to natural light over a lengthy period
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated at length, the Motions to Dismiss Craig‘s Complaint filed by David Dunn Bauer and the Commonwealth Defendants will be granted.18 A final Order of dismissal will be entered separately.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Joseph F. Leeson, Jr.
JOSEPH F. LEESON, JR.
United States District Judge