Lewis v. Casey

LEWIS, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS, et al. v. CASEY et al. No. 94-1511. Argued 29, November 1995 Decided June Rehnquist, Court, which opinion J., Scalia, delivered I Parts JJ., joined, Thomas, Kennedy, and O’Connor, J., and C. Thomas, Breyer, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, and Souter, III which opinion J., Souter, filed p. 364. post, opinion, concurring

J., filed judgment, in the concurring part, dissenting part, concurring in J., Stevens, filed p. 393. post, JJ., Ginsburg Breyer, joined, which p. post, opinion, dissenting Grant Woods, Attorney General of Arizona, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Daniel P. Struck, David C. Lewis, Eileen J. Dennis, Rex Lee, E. Carter Phillips, G. Mark D. Hopson, C. Tim Delaney, Re- becca White Berch, and Thomas J. Dennis.

Elizabeth Alexander argued the cause for respondents. With her on the Ayesha brief were Margaret Khan, Winter, Alvin J. Bronstein, Alice L. Bendheim, and Steven R. Shapiro*

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Cali- fornia et al. by Daniel Lungren, Attorney General of California, Peter J. Siggins, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Lenk, Morris Senior Super- vising Attorney General, and Karl S. Mayer and Bruce Slavin, M. Deputy Attorneys General, by Pinkston, Garland Jr., Acting Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, the Attorneys General for their respec- jurisdictions tive as follows: Bruce M. Alaska, Botelho of Richard Blumen- thal of Connecticut, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert A. Butterworth Florida, of Michael J. Bowers of Georgia, Robert A. Marks of Hawaii, Alan G.Lance Idaho, of James E. Ryan Illinois, of Pamela Carter of Indi- ana, Carla J. Stovall Kansas, of J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Maryland, of Scott Harshbarger of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III Minnesota, of Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Joe Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa Nevada, of Jeffrey R. Howard of New Hampshire, Tom Udall of New Mexico, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Betty Montgomery Ohio, of Theo- dore R. Kulongoski of Oregon, Walter W. Cohen of Pennsylvania, Jeffrey B. Pine of Island, Rhode Charles W. Burson of Tennessee, Jan Graham Utah, of James S. III Gilmore of Virginia, 0. Christine Gregoire of Wash- ington, James E. Doyle of Wisconsin, and William U. Hill of Wyoming; for the National of Conference State Legislatures al. by et Richard Ruda Rothfeld; Charles for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger and Hobson; Charles L. and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Charles J. Cooper, Michael A. Carvin, Michael W. Kirk, Daniel J. Popeo, and D. Paul Kamenar. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney Patrick, General Deputy Solicitor Bender, General Jenkins, Alan Steven H. Rosenbaum, Lerner, Louise A. and Rebecca K. Troth; for the Legal Aid Bureau, Inc., by Stuart R. Cohen and Jeffery C. Taylor; for the Mexican American Legal Court. of opinion delivered Scalia Justice “the (1977), held we U. S. Smith, Bounds In re- courts right of access

fundamental preparation inmates to assist authorities quires prisoners by providing papers meaningful filing of per- assistance adequate or libraries adequate law are who Petitioners, 828. Id., at law.” trained sons (ADOC), Corrections Department Arizona officials Court District States United contend violation finding them erred of Arizona District law- exceeded order remedial court’s Bounds, and authority. ful

I operated prisons various inmates are Respondents “on action class they filed January 1990, In by ADOC. incarcerated bewill are who adult of all behalf App. Corrections,” Department Arizona by the State [respondents] “depriving were petitioners alleging that protected counsel courts to the rights of of their id., at Amendments,” Fourteenth Sixth, and First, by the ruled District trial, the bench Following a 3-month a con- “[prisoners finding respondents, in favor adequate, courts of access stitutional (1992), Supp. F. meaningful,” and' effective system fails “[ADOC’s] 822, and supra, at Bounds, citing Supp., at F. standards,” comply with shortcomings variety of identified court li- training of ranging matters system, in ADOC avail- materials, updating brary staff, gen- to these addition In services. photocopying ability R. Michael and Fernandez by David al. et Fund Educational and Defense E. Gir- Inc., by Richard Services, Legal Prisoner Carolina Cole; for North Girard; for and L. Sandra by Michigan Services Legal oux; Prison for Schwartz, Rosen, Amitai Jay by California Sanford Northern Prisoners Specter. Donald and findings, eral the court found that groups two of inmates were particularly by affected system’s inadequacies: “[l]ockdown (inmates prisoners” segregated from gen- eral prison population for disciplinary security reasons), who “are routinely physical denied access to the law library” “experience severe interference with their access to the courts,” id., at 1556; and illiterate or non-English-speaking inmates, who do not adequate receive legal assistance, id., at 1558.

Having thus found liability, the court appointed Special Master investigate “to report about” the appropriate (in relief—that is view), the court’s “how accomplish best to goal of constitutionally adequate inmate access to App. courts.” to Pet. for Cert. Following 87a. eight months of investigation, and degree some of consultation parties, both Special lodged Master with the court proposed permanent injunction, which proceeded the court adopt, substantially unchanged. The 25-page injunctive order, see id., at 61a-85a, mandated sweeping changes de- signed to ensure that ADOC would “provide meaningful ac- cess to the Courts for present all prisoners,” and future id., specified 61a. It in minute detail the times that libraries were to kept open, be the number of of library hours use to which (10 each inmate was per week), entitled the minimal requirements educational (a librarians library sci- degree, ence degree, law or paralegal degree), the content of a videotaped legal-research (to course for inmates pre- be pared by persons appointed by Special Master but funded by ADOC), and similar matters. Id., at 61a, 67a, 71a. The injunction addressed the court’s concern pris- lockdown oners ordering that “ADOC housing all areas custody levels provided shall be regular comparable visits to the law library,” except that such “may visits postponed on an individual basis because of prisoner’s inability documented to use the library law without creating 348 if de- condition a physical or security, or safety to threat Id., use.” library to prevent personnel medical termined non-English-speaking and illiterate to respect With 61a. at entitled were they that declared inmates, injunction sufficient “aor paralegals, lawyers, assistance” “direct Assist- Legal prisoner trained minimally at least number be must steps “[particular ADOC enjoined ants”; Legal bilingual train locate taken Id., 69a-70a.

Assistants.” for of Appeals review sought Petitioners to argu stay prior to grant refused which Circuit, Ninth and dis filing pending the injunction stayed thenWe ment. U. S. certiorari. a writ for aof petition position affirmed Circuit Ninth later, months Several (1994). excep minor with and, a Bounds violation finding both F. injunction. of the terms here, not important tions 1126 (1995). 514 U. certiorari, II (1994). granted We 3d review, question one only present petitioners Although con- “exceeds order Court’s District whether namely, Bounds,” Brief Peti- forth set requirements stitutional including challenges, distinct several raise they (i), tioners Bounds violations findings court’s on the attacks renewed lock- non-English-speaking, illiterate, respect with But injunction. of the breadth on the prisoners, down District contention fundamental most their to justify inadequate were of injury findings Court’s of sys- the granting hence systemwide injury finding components. related two has This argument relief. temwide violation establish order claim First, petitioners inadequa- the alleged show Bounds, must inmate program assistance or facilities library aof prison’s cies prejudice “actual is, injury” “actual him caused —that such litigation, existing or contemplated respect a claim.” to present deadline a filing meet inability 349 Brief for Petitioners they 30.1 Second, claim that the Dis- trict Court did not find enough instances of injury actual systemwide warrant agree relief. We that the success of respondents’ systemic challenge dependent on their abil- ity to widespread show injury, actual and that the court’s identify failure to anything more than isolated instances of injury actual renders finding its systemic of a Bounds viola- tion invalid.

A requirement that an alleging inmate violation Bounds must injury show actual ultimately derives from the doctrine standing, a constitutional principle prevents courts of law from undertaking assigned tasks political to the branches. See Wright, Allen v. 468 U. S. 737, 750-752 (1984);Valley Forge College Christian v. Americans United Separation Church and State, Inc., 454 U. 464, 471- (1982). It is the provide role courts to relief to claim- ants, in individual or class actions, who have suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual harm; it the role of courts, but political that of the shape branches, to the institutions of government in such fashion comply as to with the laws and In Constitution. the context present of the case: It is for the remedy courts to past or imminent official interfer- ence with presentation individual inmates’ of claims to the political courts; it is for the branches of the State and Federal manage Governments prisons in such fashion that official interference presentation with the of claims will not occur. 1Respondents contend petitioners failed properly present their “actual injury” argument to the Court of Appeals. Brief for Respondents 25-26. Our review of petitioners’ briefs before that court leads us to con otherwise, clude event, and in any discuss, we shall the point relates to standing, which is jurisdictional and not subject to waiver. See United States Hays, v. 737, FW/PBS, (1995); U. S. Dallas, Inc. 493 U. S. 215, (1990). Justice Souter recognizes jurisdictional na ture of this point, post, which is difficult to reconcile with his view that we should not “reach it, out to address” ibid. when coincide partially briefly and roles the two course,

Of been has harm against actual relief granting court, particular aby suffered, imminently will suffered, or anof alteration orders individuals, class individual harm. the causes procedure or organization institutional obliter- be would roles two the between distinction the But im- or actual no courts, intervention to invoke if, ated being merely status needed, but were harm minent organized was not institution governmental a subject to from example another take If—to properly. managed or depriva- no suffered had who healthy inmate life—a prison violation to claim able were treatment medical needed tion v. Estelle see care, medical to right constitutional his ground (1976),simply on 103 97, S.U. Gamble, 429 essential inadequate, were facilities medical prison disap- have would executive judge and between distinction to courts function become it would peared: prisons. care medical adequate assure if, here pertinent analysis would foregoing The right to issue—the right assume, the seem respondents pertain must harm threatened or —were actual which Bounds But legal assistance. library to or law right to established Estelle than any more right, such no established ac Bounds right that hospital. prison right to well-established) ac right of (already knowledged 821, 817, at S.,U. Bounds, 430 g., E. courts. cess pro we had roots, its traced Bounds which cases In officials prison state prohibiting by tected legal prepare attempts inmates’ interfering with actively 489- 484, 483, U. S. Avery, 393 v. g., Johnson documents, e. 546, S. U. Hull, 312 parte g., Ex them, e. (1969), file or filing waive courts state requiring (1941), (1959), tran or U. S. Ohio, 360 v. g., Burns e. fees, (1956),for 12, 19 S.U. Illinois, 351 g., e. fees, script Griffin entitlement the same focused Bounds indigent inmates. order a court affirmed Although it courts. requiring North Carolina to make law library facilities avail able to inmates, it stressed that that was merely “one consti tutionally acceptable method to meaningful assure access to the courts,” and that “our decision here ... does not foreclose alternative means to goal.” achieve that S.,U. at 830. In other words, law libraries legal pro assistance grams are not ends in only themselves, but the means for ensuring reasonably “a adequate opportunity present claimed violations fundamental rights to the courts.” Id., at 825.

Because Bounds did not create an abstract, freestanding right to a library law legal or assistance, an inmate cannot establish relevant injury actual simply by establishing that prison’s his library law program assistance subpar in some theoretical sense. That precise would be the analog healthy of the claiming inmate constitutional violation be- cause the inadequacy of the infirmary. Insofar as by vindicated Bounds is “meaningful concerned, access to the courts (internal is the touchstone,” id., at 823 quotation omitted), marks and the inmate go therefore must step one further and demonstrate alleged that the shortcom- ings in library legal program assistance hindered his pursue efforts to legal claim. might He example, show,for that a complaint prepared he was dismissed for failure to satisfy requirement some technical which, because of defi- prison’s in legal ciencies assistance facilities, he could not have known. Or that he had arguably suffered actionable harm that he bring wished to before the courts, but was so stymied by inadequacies of the library law that he was un- able to even file complaint.

Although Bounds itself made no mention of an actual- injury requirement, it can hardly thought to have elimi- nated that prerequisite. injury And actual is apparent on the face of almost opinions all the 35-year in the line of access-to-courts cases on which Bounds relied, see id.,

352 actual-injury an assumption of Moreover, the 821-825.2

at statement opinion’s in the implicit to us seems requirement meth- various in experimentation” encourage local “we that One such Id., at courts. assuring access ods some with libraries replace might example, experiment, court- system of advice legal minimal original contained that those such forms provided inmate-initiated significant more of the two complaints (1995), 472 S. Conner, 515 U. v. Sandin years, recent cases (1992) that 1S. McMillian, U. 503 —forms v. Hudson at- facts only the provide inmates asked we what that hardly think analysis. We any tempt sim- was alternative such “experimenting” meant immediately lie to would whereupon suit announcing it, ply experiment bring the inadequate and theoretically it declare new instead, that envisioned, we thinkWe close. ato (1941), 546 Hull, U. S. 312 Ex parte that suggests Stevens Justice com standing establishes claim a lost even establishes frivolous an initial As 408-409. at courts, post, see of access a denial plain nor challenged neither was standing since impossible, matter, quite is existence held repeatedly case, we discussed See, g., e. effect. precedential no has defects jurisdictional unaddressed Fund, U. Victory Political NRA v. Comm’n Election Federal J.) (Marshall, C. (1805) 159, 172 More, Cranch States (1994); United simply however, merits, On the argument). oral (statement at it be rejected We frivolous. Hull claim prisoner’s true that object alia, failure inter by, defaulted procedurally been it had cause S., U. at 312 petition, transcript include to failure trial and would 11 business frivolous, Kule were claims defaulted procedurally all If held “we assertion Stevens’s Justice indeed. brisk an answer require to even merit insufficient had petition smuggled of Michi attorney general The misleading. 408-409, is at State,” post, claim merits discussed opinion our ease, and appeared gan was case of the posture S., 549-551. U. at see length, some at file to leave a motion “as the claim treated however, we such, petitioner’s analyzing 550; after id., at corpus,” habeas writ petition warden requiring order compel “insufficient it case, found we equivalent remotely added). is not That (emphasis id., answer,” at 551 frivolous. was claim underlying finding program would place remain in at least until some inmate could demonstrate that a legal nonfrivolous3 claim had been frustrated or being impeded.4 3Justice Souter believes that Smith, Bounds v. 430 U. S. (1977),

guarantees prison inmates the right to present frivolous claims—the de termination of which suffices to confer standing, he says, because as “ sumes that dispute ‘will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable judicial o.f resolution,’” post, at 398- 399, quoting Cohen, Flast v. (1968). U. $3,101 This would perhaps have seemed like good law at the Flast, time of but our later opinions have made it explicitly clear that Flast erred in assuming that assurance of “serious and adversarial treatment” was the only value protected by standing. See, e. g., States United. v. Richardson, 166, 418 U. S. 176-180 (1974); Comm, Schlesinger v. Reservists War, Stop the 208, 418 U. S. (1974). Flast failed to recognize that this doctrine has a separation-of-powers component, which keeps courts within certain tradi tional bounds vis-a-vis the other branches, concrete adverseness or not. That is where the “actual injury” requirement comes from. Not everyone who can point to some “concrete” act and is “adverse” can call in the courts to examine the propriety of executive action, but only someone who has been actually injured. Depriving someone of an arguable (though not yet established) claim inflicts actual injury because it deprives him of something arguable claims settled, are bought, value — and sold. De priving someone of claim, frivolous on the hand, other deprives him of all, nothing at except perhaps the punishment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 sanctions. 4Justice Souter suggests that he would waive this actual-injury re quirement in cases “involving substantial, systemic deprivation of access “ is, court” —that in cases direct, ‘a involving substantial and continuous ” “ ... limit legal materials,’ “total denial of access to a library,” or ‘[a]n ” absolute deprivation of all access materials,’ legal post, 400, n. 2. That view rests upon the expansive understanding of Bounds that we have repudiated. Unless prisoners have a freestanding right to libraries, a showing the sort Justice Souter describes would estab lish no relevant injury fact, e., i. injury-in-fact caused the violation legal right. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, (1984). Denial of the courts could not possibly cause the harm of inadequate librar ies, but only the harm lost, rejected, or impeded legal claims. course, Of Justice Souter’s proposed exception is unlikely to be of much real-world significance in any event. Where the situation is so extreme as to constitute “an absolute deprivation of access to all

354 statements several acknowledged that be must It recognized access right beyond the went

Bounds bring to right awas which relied, which cases earlier see, present, to wished inmate grievance to court Illinois, v. 547-548; S., at U. Hull, 312 Griffin parte g., Ex e. at 489. S.,U. Avery, 393 v. 13-16; Johnson S.,U. 351 must State suggest that to appear statements These litigate to grievances, discover prisoner enable 825-826, atS.,U. 430 Bounds, See in court. once effectively of access upon the elaborations These 14. n. cases, and pre-Bounds our no antecedent courts so- such conferral demand To them. disclaim nowwe mostly uneducated upon a capabilities phisticated effectively to is population largely illiterate indeed dowe which counsel, provision permanent demand requires. the Constitution believe requirement injury observe must Finally, we legal claim. frustrated type of any by just satisfied line Bounds cases access-to-courts Nearly all appeals from pursue direct attempts inmates involved Doug- see incarcerated, they were which convictions Ohio, (1963); v. Burns 353, 354 S.U. 372 California, v. las 18; 13, supra, at Illinois, v. 258; 253, at S.,U. 360 Griffin peti- (1942), habeas 256 Kansas, U. v. Cochran Bennett, v. Smith 489; supra, at Avery, v. Johnson tions, see at 547- supra, (1974), Hull, (1961); parte Ex 708, 709-710 S. U. ex- we S.U. McDonnell, 418 In 548. Wolff “civil slightly, only claims of relevant universe this tended § S. C. 42 U. under actions e., rights actions”—i. S., at 418 U. rights.” “basic vindicate slight ex- even justify compelled feltwe Significantly, stressing that courts, right of of the tension ha- rights actions civil between line demarcation “the will extremity by this affected claimawith prisoner finding materials,” extremity. proving than easier probably petitions beas is always clear,” “[i]t and that is futile to contend that Rights the Civil Act of 1871 importance has less in our constitutional scheme than does the Great Writ.” Ibid. The library imposed law in Bounds itself was far from an all-subject facility. rejecting In the contention proposed the State’s collection inadequate, the Dis- trict Court there said:

“This Court does not feel inmates need the entire U. S. Code Annotated. Most of that code deals with federal regulations laws and that would never involve a prisoner.. state . .

“It is opinion also the of this Court that the cost of N. Digest C. and Modern Federal Digest Practice will surpass the usefulness of these research aids. They mostly cover areas not of concern to Sup inmates.”5 plemental App. to Pet. for Cert. in Bounds v. Smith, O. T. 1976, p. No. 75-915,

In other words, guarantee Bounds does not inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines capable filing everything from shareholder derivative ac- slip-and-fall tions claims. requires The tools it pro- to vided are those that the inmates need order to attack their directly sentences, or collaterally, and in challenge order to the conditions of their Impairment confinement. any litigating other capacity (and simply one of the incidental constitutional) perfectly consequences of conviction and incarceration. 5The District Court order case, in this by contrast, required ADOC to stock alia, with, inter each library the Arizona Digest, the Modern Fed

eral Practice Digest, Corpus Secundum, Juris and a full set of the United States Annotated, Code provide a 30-40 hour videotaped legal re search course covering “relevant tort and law, civil including immigration and family issues.” App. 69a, Pet. for 71a; Cert. 834 F. Supp. (Ariz. 1992).

B instances only two identified District Here respect with failures describing ADOC’s In injury. actual found prisoners, non-English-speaking illiterate adequate inability receive of the “[a]s result their had readers slow are who assistance, “[ojther prisoners prejudice,” dismissed cases Supp., at 1558. F. 834 legal actions.” file unable been have prison several that suggests plural use of Although the only identified court harms, the actual these sustained ers (lawsuit nn. 1558, Id., at instance. each prisoner one (inmate prejudice), with dismissed Bartholic inmate action). legal file a unable Harris experienced of access “any lack that contend Petitioners to unconstitutional attributable is not inmates two by these itsmet “has ADOC because policies,” State claim 22. 32, n. Petitioners Brief obligations.” illiterate including the inmates, all that to be appears than nothing more right to a have speaking, non-English help from plus libraries, excellent “physical misreads This Id., clerks.” law assistants particular no guarantees said have we Bounds, which capability aof conferral rather methodology but —the to sentences challenges contemplated bringing capability any When courts. before of confinement conditions or inmate, non-English-speaking or illiterate an even inmate, de- he which nature this claim actionable that shows presenta- or rejected, or lost bring been has sired because prevented, being currently claim a of such tion demon- he provided, been has filing suit capability law “adequate furnish failed has the State strates trained persons assistance adequate or libraries added). course, Of (emphasis S., at U. Bounds, 430 law,” to ensure best how to determine prison officials it to leave we reasonably ade- problems language inmates challeng- legal claims nonfrivolous file opportunity quate it is But confinement. conditions convictions ing their capability, rather than the capability of turning pages in library, law that is the touchstone. C Having rejected petitioners’ argument that injuries by

suffered Bartholic and Harris do not count, we turn to question whether injuries, those and the other findings of the District support Court, injunction ordered in this case. The actual-injury requirement hardly would serve the purpose we have described above—of preventing courts from undertaking assigned tasks political to the branches— if once plaintiff demonstrated harm from particular one inadequacy government administration, the court were authorized to remedy all inadequacies in that administration. The remedy must of course be limited to the inadequacy that produced the injury in fact plaintiff that the has established. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 (1995) (“[T]he U. 88, 89 nature of the . remedy . . tois determined the nature scope of the (citation constitutional violation” and inter- quotation nal omitted)). marks

This is no less true respect to class actions than with respect to other suits. “That a may suit be a class action ... nothing adds question to the of standing, for even named plaintiffs represent who a class allege 'must and show that they personally have injured, been injury that has been by suffered other, unidentified members the class to which ” they belong and which they purport represent.’ Simon Ky. Eastern Rights Organization, 426 Welfare U. 26, (1976), 40, n. 20 quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 502 (1975). general allegations of the complaint in pres- the may ent case well have sufficed to injury claim by named plaintiffs, and hence standing to demand remediation, with respect to alleged various inadequacies in prison system, the including provide failure to adequate legal assistance to non- English-speaking inmates and prisoners. lockdown That point is irrelevant now, however, for we are beyond the pleading stage. but requirements, pleading mere they are

“Since each case, plaintiff’s the part of indispensable an- rather same the supported be standing] must [of element bears plaintiff the which on matter any other way as degree of manner the e., with i. proof, burden the litiga- stages of successive at required evidence allegations general factual stage, pleading theAt tion. may conduct defendant’s resulting from injury gen- presume we dismiss a motion on suffice,for are facts specific those embrace allegations eral sum- ato response In the claim. support necessary to no can plaintiff however, motion, judgment mary forth set must but allegations, mere such longer rest which facts, specific evidence other or by affidavit taken will be motion judgment summary of the purposes (if contro- facts stage, those final atAnd true. to be by evidence adequately verted) supported must Wildlife, Lujan v. trial.” at Defenders adduced quotation (citations internal (1992) S.U. omitted). marks injury on actual found court case, the this trial

After the cause Bartholic; plaintiff, named only one part of empowered suit which inadequacy injury —the provide failure remedy the court —was light of needed, would Bartholic services special outset, theAt case. his dismissal illiteracy, avoid his scope of proper eliminate can therefore, we special special services at directed provisions injunction by speakers, non-English by required facilities inade- large. If population inmate lockdown, and found been they have exist, character of this quacies were hence lawsuit, and this any plaintiff harmed remediation.6 Court’s District object of proper in Harris’s 6 Bartholic’s concludes, gross, Stevens Justice concerns,” post, [standing] any satisfy “sufficient are juries complain If the gross. dispensed is not standing But at As to remediation of inadequacy that caused Barthol injury, ic’s question a further remains: Was that inadequacy widespread enough justify systemwide only relief? The findings supporting proposition that, in all of ADOC’s facilities, an illiterate inmate wishing to file claim would be unable to receive the (1) necessary assistance to do so were finding respect to Bartholic, at facility, the Florence (2) the finding that Harris, while Perry incarcerated at ville, had once been [a] “unable to legal actio[n].” file Supp., F. at 1558. These two instances patently were a in adequate basis for a systemwide conclusion of violation and imposition systemwide Dayton relief. See Bd. Ed. v. (1977) (“[I]nstead Brinkman, 433 S. 406, U. tailoring remedy commensurate with specific the three violations, Appeals imposed systemwide remedy going beyond scope”); their id., (“[O]nly at 420 if there has been a systemwide impact may systemwide there be a remedy”); of one administrative deficiency conferred automatically the right to com plain of all deficiencies, administrative any citizen aggrieved in one respect could bring the whole structure of state administration before the courts for review. That is of course not the law. As said, we have “[n]or does a plaintiff who has been subject to injurious conduct of one possess kind virtue injury necessary stake in litigating conduct of another kind, although similar, to which he has not been subject.” Blum v. Yaret sky, 991, (1982). 457 U. S. As even Justice Souter concedes, inability of respondents to produce any evidence of actual injury other (Bartholic than illiterate Harris) inmates “disposed] of the challenge to remedial orders insofar as they touch non-English speakers lock- down Post, prisoners.” at 395. Contrary to Justice Stevens’s suggestion, 408, see 4, at post, n. our holding respondents lacked standing to complain of injuries to non- English speakers and lockdown does not amount to “a conclusion that the class was improper.” The standing determination is quite sepa- rate from certification of the class. Again, Blum proves the point: In “ case, we held that a class of ‘all residents of skilled nursing and health related nursing facilities in New York State who are recipients Medicaid ” benefits’ lacked standing to challenge transfers to higher care, levels of even though they had standing to challenge discharges and transfers to levels; lower but we did not disturb the class S., definition. See 457 U. 997, n. 999-1002. (“[T]he (1979) scope 682, 702 442 U. Yamasaki,

Califano of violation the of extent the is dictated injunctive relief plaintiff the extent geographical by the not established, class”). trial “the that noted also District the sure, beTo are who prisoners are there that indicated

testimony . . . illiter- functional of their law because research to unable however, discussed, have weAs Supp., at 1558. F. acy,” 834 (literate or prisoners require that not does Constitution only research, but generalized illiterate) conduct to able be courts— to grievances their present they able be that much by a produced can that capability limited a more the dis- from Apart legal assistance. degree limited more in- Harris’s prejudice, with claim of Bartholic’s missal we as far as finding, and is no claim, there ability his to file pris- Arizona evidence, that no record from discern can help neces- minimal cannot obtain prisoners illiterate ons bring before they wish claims particular sary file shown been has violation courts. was beyond what remedy granting systemwide, to be was Bartholic to Harris relief provide necessary to improper.7 therefore relief systemwide inappropriateness regarding holding Our rules, but standing application upon rest does inmates

illiterate failure respondents’ conclusion, “the upon Souter’s rather, Justice like State’s pervaded illiterate of access denials to prove Souter’s however, Justice respect, one In at post, system,” prison relief systemwide believes He ours. differs this issue view sham libraries shown findings “[h]ad appropriate been have would with his consistent That ibid. system,” throughout bles facili library adequate of access that lack rejected, view, we which 4, supra. fact, n. see injury as relevant qualifies ties sys- issue assertion, post, Souter’s Justice Contrary class actions. governing law with to do nothing has relief temwide claims nonfrivolous frustrated with plaintiffs class or not a Whether estab- was be, unless may class extensive how exists, no matter institutions all occurred that class respect violations lished imposed decree remedial for a no basis there system, of Arizona’s III There are further reasons why the order here cannot stand. We held in Turner v. Safley, 482 (1987), U. S. 78 prison regulation impinging on inmates’ constitutional rights “is valid if it is reasonably legitimate related to peno- logical interests.” Id., at 89. Such a deferential standard is necessary, explained, we 'prison “if administrators . . . , and not the [are] courts, to make the judgments difficult concerning institutional

operations.’ Subjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate secu- rity problems and adopt innovative solutions to the problems intractable prison administration.” Ibid. (citation omitted), quoting Jones v. North Carolina Pris- oners’ Labor Union, Inc., (1977). 433 U. S. 119, 128 These are the same concerns that led us to encourage “local experimentation” in Bounds, see supra, at 352, and we think quite obvious that Bounds and Turner must be read in pari materia. The District Court here failed adequate accord defer- ence to judgment prison of the authorities in at least

three significant respects. First, the court concluded ADOC’s restrictions on prisoners’ lockdown access to law li- braries unjustified. were Turner’s principle of deference special has force regard to that issue, since the inmates in lockdown include “the dangerous most prison- violent ers in prison Arizona system,” and other pre- inmates senting special disciplinary and security concerns. Brief Petitioners 5. The District Court made much of the fact upon all those institutions. However inadequate the library facilities may be as a theoretical matter, prisons various may (active have other means assistance “jailhouse lawyers,” complaint etc.) forms, that suffice to prevent the legal harm of denial of access to the courts. Courts have no power to presume and remediate harm that has not been established. re- delays in experience routinely lockdown long as some assistance, legal materials ceiving they long as so 23, but n. Supp., at days, F. reasonably related regulations product are con- delays are interests, such penological legitimate in- in actual they result even where significance, stitutional here). find did Court District (which, course,

jury District imposed injunction Second, need is no There wildly inordinately indeed, —intrusive. — see order, only read need One point. belabor the ne it is appreciate 61a-85a, Cert. to Pet. App. court’s as a lamented opinions our what of ultra plus becoming] . enmeshed . . Constitution, the of name the “in Wolfish, v. Bell operations.” prison minutiae the (1979). 520, 562 S.U. that process through developed order Finally, the state views the consideration adequate give failed strong consider- “[t]he said haveWe authorities. prison system court state giving a require comity that ations its correct opportunity first the defendant convicted has oppor- first the States giving require also ... errors own administra- internal in the made errors correct tunity 411 U. Rodriguez, Preiser prisons.” their tion ain procedure proper (1973). illustration an For itself. Bounds than further no look need we this, such case inmates, summary judgment granting There, after “ precisely ‘dictating] from refrained Court District S.,U. Bounds, 430 follow.’” should State course what ‘appro- “determining the recognizing Rather, at ” problem,’ a difficult presents ... ordered relief priate “ with Correction Department ‘charge[d] court assure program’ Constitutionally sound devising a task State 818-819. at Id., courts.” inmate ulti- District which proposal, awith responded considering ob- after changes, minor approved mately jections by raised Id., inmates. praised 819-820. We procedure, this observing that the court had “scrupulously respected [its] the limits on role,” “not . thrust[ing] . . prison itself into administration” and permitting instead “[p]rison [to]exercis[e] administrators wide discretion within the bounds of requirements.” Id., at 832-833.

As Bounds was exemplar of what should be done, this case is a model of what should not. The District Court to- tally failed to heed the admonition of Preiser. Having found violation of the of access to the courts, it conferred upon special its master, professor a law Flushing, New York, rather upon than ADOC officials, responsibility devising a plan. remedial To make matters worse, it se- verely limited the remedies that the master could choose. Because, the court’s view, its order in an earlier access-to- (an courts case order adopted the recommendations of master) special the same had “resolved successfully” most of the issues involved litigation, the court instructed that as to those issues it implement would the earlier order any statewide, “with modifications parties that the Spe- cial Master determine necessary are particular due to the circumstances of the facility.” App. to Pet. for Cert. (footnote omitted). 88a This will not do. The State was entitled to far more than an opportunity for rebuttal, and on ground that alone this order would have to be set aside.8 8Justice Stevens believes that the of State Arizona “is most blame for the objectionable character of the final [injunctive] order,” post, 411, at for two First, reasons: because of its lack of cooperation in prison litigation three to years five earlier before the same judge, see Gluth v. Kangas, (Ariz. 1988). F. Supp. 1309 But the rule that federal courts “giv[e] must the States the first opportunity to-correct the errors made in the internal administration of their prisons,” Preiser Rodriguez, 411 U. (1973), is not to be set aside when a judge decides that a State was insuffi ciently cooperative in a different, earlier case. There was no indication of obstructive tactics by the State in the case, present from which one ought to have concluded that the State had learned its lesson. Second, * *

* of the judgment the reverse we reasons, foregoing the For proceed- further for case the remand and Appeals of Court opinion. with consistent ings ordered. is so It concurring. Thomas, Justice deciding judges with federal charges The Constitution prisons. running state not with controversies, and cases the of name the in courts district federal frequently, Yet, too correctional state takeovers wholesale effect Constitution ais case This decree. by judicial them run and facilities law the quality the with example. Dissatisfied textbook correctional at Arizona’s legal assistance the and libraries decree statewide a imposed Court District institutions, (ADOC), dictat- Corrections Department Arizona on in- to assist program detail excruciatingly minute ing in permissible right down filing of lawsuits— mates overreach- gross Such rooms. reading library levels noise tolerated be simply cannot court district by federal ing separation of federalism Principles system. federal our adminis- for responsibility exclusive that dictate powers its officials. State resides prisons tering state oppose ap- vigorously failed State that contends Stevens Justice surely But litigation. present to the methodology Gluth plication methodol- that objected State doubt reasonable no there unattain- think, an State, we demands Stevens Justice ogy. pun- been that, having insisting foolishness courage degree able Gluth imposition by case earlier in the its recalcitrance for ished in- “zealously” further District antagonize methodology, be must appeal, vindicated recently methodology, sisting record for to submit State think, sufficed, we It abandoned. modifica- suggestions objections “Defendants' turn every appeal Defendants’ of these waiver deemed shall tions final subsequent from appeal or orders rulings prior issues,” legal regarding relief injunctive forth setting Order 239, 231, 225, g., App. see, e. Of course, officials must maintain their facilities consistent with the restrictions obligations imposed by the Constitution. In Bounds v. Smith, 430 (1977), U. S. 817 recognized we part of the State’s obliga- constitutional duty tions a provide prison inmates with law libraries or other assistance at expense, state an obligation we de- part scribed as loosely “right defined of access to the enjoyed courts” by prisoners. While the may Constitution guarantee state inmates opportunity to bring suit to vin- dicate their federal rights, constitutional I find no basis in the Constitution—and Bounds cited right none—for the government finance the endeavor. join

I the majority opinion places because it sensible and much-needed limitations on the seemingly right limitless assistance created in Bounds and because it clarifies the scope of the federal authority courts’ subject prisons state to remedial decrees. I write separately to make my clear doubts about the validity of Bounds and my to reiterate ob- servation in Missouri v. Jenkins, (1995), 515 U. S. 70 that the judiciary federal has for the last half century been exercising “equitable” powers and issuing structural entirely decrees out of line with its constitutional mandate.

I

A This case is not about a “access the courts.” proof There is no prevented Arizona has single even a filing inmate rights a civil lawsuit or submitting peti- tion for a writ of corpus. habeas Instead, this case is about the extent to which the requires Constitution a State fi- nance otherwise prisoner’s assist a bring efforts to suit against the State and its officials. In Bounds v. supra, Smith, recognized we for the first time a “fundamental right” of all inmates to have the [them] State “assist preparation filing meaningful legal papers.” Id., at 828. explicit We were not did but we take, must assistance the State’s forms to the “with prisoners furnish must minimum, States aat that,

hold persons from assistance adequate or libraries law adequate to prior cases our Ibid. Although law.” in trained of ac- right a constitutional referenced occasionally Bounds a free- recognized before never had we courts, to cess to the States requires that right constitutional standing to “in- id., at order 824, in obligations,” affirmative “shoulder effective, is adequate, to the courts access inmate that sure id., at meaningful,” and constitu- novel principles broad of such Recognition I that of law system our under enough rare are law tional at length to explain Bounds Court expected would legal state-provided the right for basis constitutional opinion majority But assistance. and legal materials Constitu- provision a single identify Bounds failed that did a fact case, that created the right support tion Burger Justice Chief dissents in strong unnoticed not go id., at 838-834 (opinion See Rehnquist. then-JusTiCE toas unenlightened us leaves (“The Court J.)C. Burger, it per- which courts’ to the access Tight source for bill’ ‘foot States requirement or ceives as legal act want who prisoners for such assuring of Rehn- id., (opinion writers”); brief researchers of access ‘fundamental J.) (“[T]he quist, is created today announces which courts’ to the reference no little cloth whole out virtually derived”). The supposed which Constitution of the provision which toas explanation calls dissents’ a law consult a right guarantees Constitution unanswered. went however, assistant, aor library before years three Just surprising: is perhaps This ra- precise “[t]he admitted we decided Bounds which cases courts” to the “access of the many tionale” stated,” been explicitly “never had Bounds relied itself provides “by advanced been far thus had Clause no an entirely satisfactory basis for the result reached.” Ross Moffitt, U. S. (1974). weakness the Court’s constitutional analysis Bounds is punctuated our inability, in 20 years since, to agree upon constitutional source of the supposed right. We have described the right articulated in Bounds a “con sequence” of due Murray process, v. Giarratano, 492 U. S. 1, 11, (1989) n. 6 (plurality opinion) (citing Procunier v. Mar tinez, 416 U. S. 396, 419 (1974)), as an “aspect” of equal pro tection, 492 U. S., (citation at 11, n. 6 omitted), or as an “equal protection guarantee,” Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U. S. (1987). In no instance, however, have we engaged in rigorous constitutional of analysis the basis for the as serted right. Thus, even as we endeavor to address the question presented in this case —whether the District Court’s order “exceeds the constitutional requirements set Cert, forth in Bounds,” Pet. for i—we do so without knowing which Amendment to the Constitution our governs inquiry. It goes without that we saying ordinarily more require exactitude when evaluating asserted constitutional rights. “As a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant” to extend constitutional protection to “unchartered area[s],” where the “guideposts for responsible . . . decisionmaking are scarce and open-ended.” Collins Heights, Harker U. S. 115, (1992). It is a bedrock of principle judicial restraint that a right in lodged firmly the text or tradition of a specific constitutional provision before we will recognize it as fundamental. Strict adherence to this approach es sential if we are to fulfill our role constitutionally assigned of full giving effect to the mandate of the Framers without infusing fabric with our own political views.

B In lieu of constitutional text, tradition, Bounds or history, turned primarily precedent recognizing state assistance in the researching of filing prisoner right of recognized never however, had cases, Our

claims. could my opinion, and, Bounds, articulated kind Prior right. support such read been reasonably have “access so-called our dominated cases lines Bounds, two rooted lines, these One jurisprudence. courts” fil- state invalidated protection, equal principles largely in obli- affirmative limited imposed fees transcript ing and proce- criminal their ensure States on gations These poverty. basis discriminate did dures any affirmative access, and equal right to recognized cases obligations aon counsel or transcript (e. free g., a imposed ensuring strictly limited were right) appeal as first a second In right. own its access.,not equality regulations state we invalidated cases, line filing ha- inmates prohibited effectively restricted court federal in rights lawsuits civil or petitions corpus beas in cases While rights. protected federally vindicate to fed- of access amount certain a guarantee did line on obligations affirmative no imposed they courts, eral may not States only that held access, facilitate States a federal petition efforts prisoners’ impair” “abridge or Hull, 312 parte Ex rights. federal vindication court either consider pausing (1941). Without 546,549 U. S. each for, basis behind, or reasoning Bounds in Court law, the case lines independent these precedents reading our selective loose a engaged state- right novel freestanding and created purported Court’s Despite the legal assistance. supported major represented fact Bounds cases, prior reliance practice. historical precedent both departure Illinois, 351 v. beginning cases Griffin In aseries re rules state invalidated (1956), 12S.U. tran trial pay defendants indigent criminal quired appeals their necessary to have fees pay other toor scripts or corpus petitions habeas According heard. to the Bounds Court, these decisions “struck down restrictions and re- quired remedial measures to insure that inmate access to the adequate, courts is effective, meaningful.” 430 S.,U. at 822. This is inaccurate. Notwithstanding suggestion in Bounds, transcript our and fee cases did not establish freestanding right of access to the meaningful courts, or otherwise.

In for instance, Griffin, we an invalidated Illinois rule that charged criminal defendants a fee for a transcript trial neces- sary to secure full appellate direct review of a criminal con- viction. See 351 S.,U. at (Frankfurter, 13-14; id., 22at J., concurring judgment). See also Ross v. supra, Moffitt, at Though 605-606. we held the fee to be unconstitutional, our decision did not turn on the effectiveness adequacy the access afforded to criminal generally. defendants We quite explicit were in reaffirming century-old principle that “a State required is not by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts or a appellate review at all.” supra, added) (emphasis Griffin, (citing McKane (1894)). Durston, 153 U. Indeed, the Court in was unanimous point. on this See 351 S.,U. Griffin (Frankfurter, at 21 (“[I]t concurring J., judgment) is now process settled that due of law require does a State to afford review judgments”); of criminal (Burton, id., at 27 J., (“Illinois, dissenting) as the majority admit, deny could thus appeal altogether in a criminal case denying without due process law”); (Harlan, (“The id., at 36 dissenting) J., ma- jority of the Court concedes that the Fourteenth Amendment require does not provide to any States appel- kind of review”).1 late light In of the Court’s unanimous Griffin 1We reaffirmed this principle almost later, two decades and just three years before Smith, Bounds v. (1977), 430 U. S. 817 in Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. (1974), S. 600 where we observed Illinois, that v. 351 U. S. 12 Griffin “ (1956), and [succeeding cases invalidated . . . financial barriers to the appellate process, at the same time reaffirming the traditional principle

370 constitutionally required not is a State that

pronouncement chal- to wish who criminals to access any court provide to description Court’s Bounds convictions, the lenge their re- appellate effective "‘adequate and ensuring as Griffin 20), is supra, at (quoting Griffin, 822 S., at U. 430 view,”’ unsustainable. principle quite different on the rested Instead, Griffin crimi- appeals provide obliged to not is a State while that, be not must afford chooses a State review cases, the nal ap- from indigents excludes way that ain administered is There poverty. of their solely account on process pellate motivated that principle Griffin: mistaking the no Federal by the required not is a State that true is "It aor courts appellate provide Constitution a say that not is But all. at review appellate ainso do can review appellate grant does State defend- convicted some against discriminates way that stages [A]t all . . . poverty. their account on ants Protection Equal Process Due proceedings invidious persons] [indigent protect Clauses . . . discriminations. kind where justice equal no be can There . .“. has. money he amount depends gets man trial ap- adequate as afforded must defendants Destitute enough money who defendants review pellate opinion) (plurality S., at U. 351 transcripts.” buy omitted). (citation ma- vote fifth provided who Frankfurter, Justice invidious it writing that separate ain confirmed

jority, effective, adequate, denial discrimination, and Illinois rendered courts, meaningful wise deems State “[W]hen unconstitutional: regulation defend- for criminal all at appeal any provide obliged State (1894)). Durston, S. 684 U. McKane (citing S., at U. ants.” S., U. also See just that convictions susceptible by ap- review an pellate court, it cannot force of its exactions draw a line precludes which indigent convicted persons ... securing such a review . . . Id., (opinion at 23 concurring judg- ment). contrary Thus, to the characterization in Bounds, stands not proposition for the that all inmates are Griffin adequate entitled appellate review of their criminal con- victions, but for the more modest rule that, if the State appellate chooses to afford review, “can no more discrimi- nate on poverty account of than on account religion, race, or color.” supra, (plurality Griffin, at 17 opinion).2

If we any left doubt as to the basis of our decision Grif we fin, eliminated it two Douglas decades later in v. Califor (1963), nia, 372 U. S. 353 where we held for the first time that provide States must assistance of counsel on appeal first a right indigent for all defendants. Like Douglas Griffin, right turned on a per se, access but rather on the not to be denied, on the poverty, basis of access afforded others. We say did not Douglas indigents have a right to “meaningful appeal” that could not be realized absent appointed counsel. Cf. Bounds, S., 430 U. at 823. 2This is what Justice Brennan came call equality princi “Griffin ple,” United States v. MacCollom, 317, (1976) 426 U. S. (dissenting opinion), and it provided the rationale for a string of decisions that struck down variety of state transcript and filing as applied fees to' indigent prisoners. Bounds cited a number of these cases in support of the right to “adequate, effective and meaningful” the courts. See 430 S., 822, U. and n. 8. But none of the transcript fee eases which Bounds relied were premised on a substantive standard of court access. Rather, Griffin, like these cases were primarily concerned with invidious discrimination on the See, basis of wealth. e. g., Bennett, Smith v. (1961) 708, (“[T]o U. S. interpose financial any consideration between an indigent prisoner of the State and his exercise of a state right to sue for his liberty is deny that prisoner the equal protection laws”); of the Gardner California, (1969) 393 U. (“[I]n the context of California’s habeas corpus procedure denial transcript an indigent marks the same invidious discrimination which we held impermissible in ... Griffin”).

372 state-provided absence that, the in say is didwe

What by the demanded equality lacking that “[t]here is counsel, as appeals who man, rich the where Amendment Fourteenth indigent counse[l]... while benefit enjoys the right, supra, at 357- Douglas, himself.” for shift is forced . . . may a State held “we where in Griffin, as Just 358. way to discriminate a such in review appellate grant not pov of their on account defendants convicted some against deci motivating our evil 355,the S., at U. 372 Douglas, erty,” indigent,” against the “discrimination Douglas was in sion ibid.3 see Griffin, in plurality by 3 process of due discussion is some There Douglas, in procedure” “fair reference passing a 17-18, and S., at U.

351 in made process, due references unexplained These S., 357. at 372 U. for basis insufficient an provide analyses, protection equal course inde Douglas and in challenged regulations Griffin concluding that subsequent attempts And Clause. Process Due violated pendently and to context in this Clause Process Due role a salvage cases analy- process due and protection equal between difference explain v. Evitts See unpersuasive. been opinion, my have, in ses Griffin S.U. 461 Georgia, v. (1985); Bearden 387, 402-405 U. S. 469 Lucey, votes five been to have appear not do event, there any (1983). In Clause; subse Process Due under holding of a support in Griffin equal on exclusively, if not primarily, turned cases fee transcript quent 714; at Bennett, supra, v. Smith see, g., e. grounds, protection S.,U. protection, equal emphasis” “obvious Court, its with Douglas due reached appear does dissenting), J., (Harlan, at con to the supposition Harlan’s notwithstanding Justice question, process id., 360-361. at see trary, cases, these implicated could process due how to see It difficult ap- criminal abolish can States reaffirmation consistent our given Moffitt, Ross See, g., e. process. due consistently altogether peals “does access some affords State fact S., U. violates hence unfairly,” acts then State mean automatically way.” of the stage every “at assistance indigents denying by process, due singled are indigents if only results cases, “[u]nfairness our Under Ibid. system appellate to the meaningful denied State out under considered profitably “more question poverty,” their because Ibid. analysis.” protection equal transcript Our and fee cases were, therefore, limited hold- ings rooted in principles of equal protection. In Bounds, these cases were recharacterized beyond almost recognition, as the Court created a new and different on behalf of right to have the pay State —a law libraries or other forms of legal assistance regard without to the equality Only by access. divorcing prior our holdings from their reasoning, elevating dicta over princi- ple, was the Court able to reach a such result. unjustified

The transformation of right the to nondiscrimi- natory access to the courts into the broader, right untethered legal assistance generally would be enough reason for me to conclude that Bounds was wrongly decided. However, assuming even that Bounds properly upon relied the Griffin line of cases for proposition the for which those cases actu- ally stood, the Bounds Court failed to significant address a intervening development in jurisprudence: our the fact that equal protection the theory underlying prog- its Griffin eny largely had been prior abandoned to Bounds. pro- visions invalidated in our transcript and fee cases were all facially neutral regulations administrative that dispar- a had impact ate poor; on the there is no any indication of those cases that the imposed State challenged fee pur- with the pose of deliberately discriminating against indigent defend- g., ants. See, e. Douglas, supra, (Harlan, at J., dissent- ing) (criticizing the Court for invalidating a state law “of general applicability” solely “may because it poor affect harshly more rich”). than it does years In the between Douglas and Bounds, however, we rejected disparate- a impact theory Equal of the Protection Clause. That doctrinal basis progeny its largely has been Griffin undermined —and in fact had been before Bounds was de- cided—confirms the invalidity of to law libraries assistance created in Bounds.

We first cast doubt on proposition facially that a neu- tral law Equal violates the Protection solely Clause because Inde Antonio poor San on impact disparate it has (1973). In 411 U. S. Rodriguez, Dist.

pendent School traditional challenged Texas’ respondents Rodriguez, the Equal Protec under public education financing system “some system, that, under ground on tion Clause other than educations expensive less receive people poorer claim rejecting the In Id., at 19. people.” affluent more unconstitu impact amounted disparate sort invitation respondents’ declined we discrimination, tional cases. similar Douglas, and Griffin, rationale extend claim group cases, unless those under that, explained We it is show can poverty basis ing discrimination benefit, and desired pay some unable “completely of a deprivation absolute . sustained consequence, . . S., at U. benefit,” 411 enjoy that opportunity meaningful based scrutiny a classification added), strict (emphasis in Rod respondents Because apply. does on wealth having districts children “the shown riguez had receiving no are values property assessablé relatively low re “they are only that claimed rather but education,” public chil available than education quality poorer ceiving a id., 23at wealth,” having assessable more in districts dren not system does “Texas added), held we (emphasis class,” suspect any disadvantage peculiar operate dis “wealth clear Rodriguez, After 28. id., at adequate basis an provid[e] not] [does alone crimination where least “at that, 29, and id., at scrutiny,” invoking strict re does Clause Equal Protection involved, wealth id., advantages,” equal precisely equality quire absolute Schools, 487 Public Dickinson v. Kadrmas also See 297, 322-323 U. S. McRae, 448 (1988); v. Harris 450, S.U. (1977).4 464, Roe, 432 U. (1980); Maher assist legal state-provided or other library law a prison absence opportunity absolutely of inmates deprive be said hardly can ance Earl Gid Clarence court. a federal attention claims their bring time, was all litigant se pro prisoner celebrated the most eon, perhaps training no he had though even review obtain able rejected We a disparate-impact theory of Equal Pro- tection altogether Clause in Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. (1976), 229, 239 just decided one Term before Bounds. There flatly rejected we the idea that “a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise power within the govern- ment to pursue, is invalid under Equal Protection Clause simply may because it a greater affect proportion of one race than of another.” 426 U. S., at 242. We held that, absent proof of discriminatory purpose, a law or officialact does not violate the Constitution “solely because it has a dispro- . . . portionate impact.” Id., at (emphasis original). See also id., at 240 (acknowledging “the equal basic protection principle that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced ato ra- cially discriminatory purpose”). At bottom, Davis was a recognition of “the settled rule that the Fourteenth Amend- guarantees ment equal laws, equal results.” Personnel Administrator Mass. v. Feeney, (1979).5 442 U. S. 256, 273 and was incarcerated in a prison that apparently did not provide prisoners with lawbooks. See Answer to Respondent’s Response to Pet. for Cert. in Gideon v. Wainwright, 1962, O. T. (“[T]he No. 1p. petitioner is not attorney [sic] or versed in law nor does not have the law to copy books down the decisions of this Court.... Nor would the petitioner be allowed so”). to do anyone Like else seeking bring suit without the assistance of the State, prisoners can seek the advice of an attorney, pro whether bono or

paid, and can turn to family, friends, other inmates, or public interest groups. can Inmates also take advantage of the liberal pleading rules for pro se litigants and the liberal rules governing appointment of counsel. Federal fee-shifting statutes and the promise of a contingency fee should also provide sufficient incentive for counsel to take meritorious cases.

5Our decisions in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973),and Washington Davis, v. 426 S. (1976), U. 229 validated position the taken by Justice Harlan in his dissents in Illinois, v. Griffin 351 U. S. (1956), 12 and Douglas v. California, 372 (1963). U. S. 353 As Justice Harlan persuasively argued in Douglas, facially neutral laws that disproportionately impact the poor “do not deny equal protection to the less fortunate for one essential reason: the Equal Protection Clause does not impose on the States ‘an affirmative duty to lift the handicaps flowing from differences in economic circumstances.’ To so construe it would be

376 the by small part no in motivated Davis The ra- Griffin/Douglas the implications radical

potentially “Every Douglas: in recognized Harlan Justice As tionale. a uniform imposes State which exaction financial by than the well-to-do by satisfied easily more is basis Under opinion). (dissenting 361 S., at U. 372 indigent.” regulatory argued, Harlan Justice theory, disparate-impact valid, such constitutionally to be considered always measures penal- criminal tuition, and university taxes, state sales 361-362.6 id,., at See down. struck be to would ties, disparate- Davis in we Harlan, rejected Justice Echoing “[a] that the recognition because in part approach impact never- ends neutral serve designed a statute that rule foreign be would that leveling philosophy Constitution into to read government between relations proper of the concepts basic our many of evils eliminate obligation a moral may have State society. give Clause Protection Equal required not it is but poverty, opinion). (dissenting Id., at afford.” can others whatever to some (Bur- id., 29at dissenting); J., (Harlan, S., at U. Griffin, also See protection equal requires (“The Constitution dissenting) J., ton, means financial equal to provide States require not law, it does but laws”). such themselves to avail defendants all Frankfurter Justice Griffin, judgment concurred he Although protection equal “the that emphasized He concerns. similar expressed in law classifications make a State deny not] [does the laws “a State that id., reason,” at rooted are classifications such when Frankfurter id., Justice at 23. conditions,” economic equalize not need of life which “contingencies are in wealth differences acknowledged correct State duty, of alone let power, within hardly are equality absolute if concern expressed also He Ibid. cushion.” so itself “protect able be longer no would a State required, were needlessly not moneys public subsidized are appeals frivolous S., MacCollom, at 426 U. States United also Id., See spent.” “re does (the Constitution judgment) J., concurring (Blackmun, tool, no matter every possible furnished indigent quire may of assistance devoid how matter value, no its speculative how his to waste choose might means of unlimited a person be, because merely kind”). of that quest in a resources 377 theless invalid, absent compelling justification, in practice if it benefits or burdens one race more than another would be far reaching and would raise questions serious about, and perhaps invalidate, a range whole of tax, public welfare, service, regulatory, licensing statutes may be more burdensome poor to the and to the average black than to the more affluent white.” 426 S.,U. at 248. See also id., at 248, n. 14.

Given the unsettling ramifications of a disparate-impact theory, it is not surprising that we eventually reached the point where we could longer no extend the reasoning of Grif- Douglas. For instance, fin Ross v. 417 Moffitt, U. S. (1974), just decided years three before Bounds, we de- clined to Douglas extend require provide States to indi- gents with counsel in discretionary appeals state or in seek- ing discretionary review in this explained Court. We Ross “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment ‘does require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages/” 417 S.,U. at 612 (quoting Rodriguez, 24), 411 U. S., at and that it “does [not] require the ‘equalize State to economic conditions/” S.,U. at 612 (quoting (Frank- Griffin, S.,U. at 23 furter, J., concurring judgment)). again We declined to Douglas extend in Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U. at S., rejected where we a claim that the requires Constitution States provide counsel in postconviction state proceed- ings. And we found Ross Finley controlling Murray v. Giarratano, (1989), 492 U. 1 where we held that defend- ants sentenced to death, like all other defendants, have no right to state-appointed counsel in state proceed- collateral ings. See also United States v. MacColloon, 426 U. S. 317 (1976) (federal habeas statute permitting judge district deny free transcript indigent petitioner raising frivolous claim does not Constitution). violate the In sum, the Bounds Court’s reliance on transcript our fee cases was misplaced in significant two respects. First, which for proposition the for stand not did cases those access access, not equal about They were them: cited Bounds its for basis constitutional Griffin the Second, se.

per preced- years in seriously undermined been had progeny intended Bounds extent to Thus, even ing Bounds. they which for propositions for cases rely those on to largely been had rationale underlying their stood, actually theories obsolete largely in rooted cases, These discredited. libraries lawto right support the not do protection, equal repeated Our Bounds. in recognized assistance legal and holdings only confirm decisions these declining extend to conclusion. an- in cases line second on a relied Bounds The or libraries law right to state-financed nouncing the our with beginning cases, These prisoners. assistance imposing States prevent Hull, parte Ex decision claims file to prisoners attempts arbitrary obstacles line Although this rights. asserting federal inas access equal not right, and its own access with deals any affirma- impose not do cases Douglas, these Griffin prisoners’ improve States obligations tive of success. chances “recog- case first Hull parte Ex identified Bounds courts.” right “constitutional a niz[e]” prison a considered Hull, we parte Ex In 821-822. S., at U. habeas their submit required regulation filing them before administrator ato petitions corpus determined administrator Only the if court. ” “ submit prisoner could drawn’ ‘properly petition regula- (quoting atS.,U. court. federal ain ac-we right but regulation, tion). invalidated We right resemblance no bears doing so knowledged in Bounds. generated straightfor- aof consists parte Hull reasoning Ex Our principle: limited, rather ward, and “[T]he state and its may officers abridge impair or petitioner’s apply to a federal court for a writ corpus. habeas petition Whether for writ of habeas corpus addressed to a federal properly court is drawn allegations what it must questions contain are that court alone to determine.” 312 S.,U. at 549. “right of access” to the courts articulated in parte Ex imposed

Hull thus no obligations affirmative on the States; we only stated that a may State “abridge impair” prisoner’s ability to file a petition habeas in federal court.7 parte Ex Hull provides thus an extraordinarily weak start- ing point concluding that the requires Constitution States to fund and otherwise prisoner assist legal by pro- research viding law libraries or assistance.

Two subsequent decisions of this Court worked a moderate expansion parte of Ex Hull. The first, Johnson Avery, v. (1969),

393 U. S. 483 invalidated a Tennessee regula- tion prohibited that inmates advising from or assisting one another in preparation the of corpus habeas petitions. In striking down regulation, the the quoted Court twice Ex 7The Court’s rationale appears to have been motivated more notions of federalism and power of the federal courts than with the rights of prisoners. Our citation of three nonhabeas cases which held that a state court’s determination on a matter of federal law is not on binding Supreme Court supports this conclusion. See parte Hull, Ex S., 312 U. 549, at citing First Nat. Bank Guthrie Center Anderson, v. 269 U. S. 341, (1926) (the 346 power of the Supreme Court to review independently state-court determinations of claims “grounded on the Constitution or a law of the United States” is “general, and ais necessary element of this Court’s power to review judgments of state courts in cases involving the application and enforcement of laws”); Erie R. Co. v. Purdy, 185 federal U. 148, 152(1902)(“ question ‘[T]he whether a or right privilege, claimed under the Constitution or laws of the United States, was distinctly sufficiently pleaded and brought to the notice of court, a state is itself a Federal question, in the decision of court, which this on error, writ of is not ” concluded by the view taken by the highest (citation court of the State’ omitted)); Texas, Carter v. 177 (1900) (same). U. S. 447 impair” or “abridge not may a State

parte Hull’s holding of habeas writ file petition efforts a petitioner’s Ex contrast In 486-487, 488. at S.,U. See corpus. respective on the not however, Johnson focused Hull, parte but courts federal state prisons roles institutional corpus of habeas writ importance fundamental “the on Still, at 485. S., 393 U. scheme.” constitutional our in affirmative places Constitution hold not did Court peti- habeas the filing to facilitate States obligation “den[y] may State that a only held tions. Ibid. habeas petition. file a ability a prisoner’s obstruc[t]” McDonnell, of Johnson Wolff holding extended We regula- a similar down struck we where (1974), U. S. another one assisting inmates that prevented tion heldWe complaints. rights civil the preparation Avery was prem- which courts, upon to the “right and assures Clause Process Due founded ised, to present the opportunity denied be will no person fundamental violations concerning allegations judiciary Id., Again, rights.” ibid, (opportunity See negative. exclusively framed Thus, “denied”). prior may action rights civil file final a to pursuant incarcerated Bounds, a prisoner “if ac- from physical not prevented [was] conviction judgment therein file may he in order courts federal cess those authorized has Congress which relief petitions constitu- only accorded been he ha[d] to grant, courts articu- ha[d] cases our courts access right tional S., at Bounds, U. way.” reasoned lated Hull). parte Ex (citing dissenting) J., (Rehnquist, C decided Johnson, were Hull, Wolff parte Ex That Douglas Griffin grounds constitutional different “[essentially Bounds, however, According enough. clear these all applied” were standards same cases. 430 S.,U. at 823. This observation wrong, was but equation of these two lines of cases allowed the Bounds preserve Court to the “affirmative obligations” element of equal access eases, the rationale of which largely- had been prior undermined by Bounds, linking it with Ex parte Hull, which had not been undermined later cases but imposed which no obligations. affirmative In proc- ess, forged Bounds right with no precedent basis in right text: a to have the State “shoulder af- obligations” firmative in the form of law legal libraries or assistance to ensure prisoners can meaningful file law- By suits. detaching right equal Griffin’s, access and Ex parte right Hull’s physical access from the reasoning on which each of rights these was based, the Bounds Court cre- ated a virtually right. limitless though And right framed terms of law libraries and assistance in that case, the reasoning is much broader, and this Court should have prepared been under the Bounds require rationale to appointment capable state-financed any counsel for inmate who wishes to file a lawsuit. See supra, Bounds, at 841 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (observing that logical “the destination of the Court’s reasoning” “lawyers Bounds is appointed expense at State”). of See also ante, at 354. We have not, however, extended logical Bounds to its conclusion. though And we have not overruled Bounds, we undoubtedly repudiated its reasoning in our consistent rejection of the proposition that the provide States must beyond counsel the trial and appeal first right. as of See Ross, 417 S., U. Finley, 612; 481 S., U. at 555; Giarratano, 492 U. S., at 3-4 (plurality opinion).

In the agree end, I that Constitution affords what can be termed right of access to the courts. That right, rooted in the Due Process Clause and the principle parte articulated in Ex Hull, is a not to be arbitrarily prevented lodging from a claimed violation of a federal in a federal court. The State, however, is not constitution- ef- the prisoner’s assist otherwise or finance to required ally assistance. legal other or libraries law through either

forts, law- prisoner facilitate resources state to expend Whether Constitution the one and of policy ais question suits the States. discretion leaves the proposition for tradition history in is no basis There Al- broader. is any obligation State’s who thin, those relatively is record historical though as- legal state-sponsored development explored have law recently, very until that, agree for prisoners sistance Flores, A. nonexistent.” “nearly were in prisons libraries 1990). (2d1 ed. Libraries Law Prison for Manual Werner’s extent (to the Bounds, prison collections library Prior correctional reflected libraries) commonly had prisons edu- religious, advance, whether wished State goals may institutions some Although rehabilitative. cational, or materials of legal collection a minimal to acquire begun were generally lawbooks century, of this part early in W. See 1950’s. prior libraries in prison included exclusion (1987). 54-55 Prisons Libraries Coyle, recommendation consistent lawbooks adminis- advised prison Association, which Prison American from lawbooks state and federal omit nationwide trators Associa- Prison American See collections. library prison Prisons Adult Libraries for Standards tion, Objectives Insti- Correctional for Manual Library Reformatories, li- law rise (1950). The 106-107 tutions a recent phe- programs assistance legal other brary courts. federal largely one generated nomenon, and Count: Down supra, B. 54-55; Vogel, Coyle, See Ihrig, also (1995). See Handbook Library A Prison Practical A Inside: Libraries Access, Legal' Providing eds. Suvak D. & (R. Rubin Librarians Prison Guide pro- service libraries of law (establishment 1995) last within courts in the victories “inmate due grams tradition long recognizing Thus, far decades”). two state-sponsored legal assistance prisoners, Bounds was in fact major a “disruption to prison traditional operation.” Vogel, supra, at 87. prisoners

The idea that have legal a right to the assistance they were traditionally denied is also of recent vintage. The pre-Bounds traditional, view of the law regard with to the State’s obligation to prisoner facilitate by pro lawsuits viding law legal libraries and assistance was articulated v. Bailleaux, 290 (CA9), F. 2d 632 Hatfield cert. denied, 368 (1961): U. S. 862

“State authorities have no obligation under the federal provide Constitution to library facilities opportu- and an nity for their to use enable an inmate legal search for loopholes judgment in the and sentence under which he is held, perform or to services only which lawyer is to perform. trained All presumed inmates are to be confined under judgments valid and sentences. If an inmate believes he has a meritorious reason for attack- ing his, he given must be an opportunity to do so. But process he has no due right spend prison his time utilize facilities in an effort ground to discover a overturning a presumptively judgment. valid “Inmates have the right to waive coun- sel and act lawyers, as their own but this does not mean non-lawyer that a given must be opportunity ac- quire question education. One which an inmate must decide determining if he represent should him- self whether in view of his own competency gen- prison regulations eral he can adequately. do so He must make the light decision the of the circumstances existing. duty state has no to alter the circum- stances to conform with his decision.” 290 2d, F. 640-641.

Consistent with the traditional view, the lower courts un- derstood the only guarantee Constitution papers filing interference state free

courts: pre- opportunity means courts

“[A]ccess docu- or other pleadings whatever file and pare, serve com- to order in appropriate necessary or are ments affecting one’s proceedings court prosecute or mence a defense sustain and to assert liberty, or personal to and communications receive and to send therein, and mat- concerning such lawyers courts judges, 637. Id., at ters.” . 1970) (CA5 241, 242 2dF. Wainwright, 430 v. Oaks also

See alleging denial complaint prisoner’s (affirming dismissal prisoner that ground legal materials library and access access way denied any been in has “he alleged that not had to com- right lost ever has he that ,. . . courts been has he or court, any appeal prosecute mence, determination judicial obtaining a delayed in substantially prisoner held courts Thus, while proceeding”). any interference, state without sentence his attack is entitled not are regulations “[p]rison consistently held they also correspond- time, with provide required they desire facilities or other materials privileges, ence making way some find trying to purpose special against judgments valid presumptively upon attack 1965). (CA8 “If 970, 2dF. Tahash, Lee them.” reasonable gaining hamper inmates was purpose criminal respective their regard to with courts to the access interfere do practices regulations if the matters, end. inquiry was access,” reasonable such been could access That 2d, at F. Hatfield, prison administration effective impairing without facilitated Ibid. “immaterial.” considered pre- text, constitutional basis nois simply, there Quite conclusion tradition history, or precedent, Bounds imposes affirmative obligations on the States to finance support prisoner litigation.

II

A Even compared when judicial the federal overreaching to which we have now become truly accustomed, this is remarkable case. The District Court’s vividly order demon- danger strates the of continuing to afford judges federal virtually equitable unbridled power that we long have for too sanctioned. We have yet here example another of a federal judge attempting “direcft] or manag[e] the reconstruction of entire institutions and bureaucracies, regard with little for the inherent [his] limitations on authority.” Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U. S., at 126 (Thomas, J., concurring). And we will continue to see cases like this unless we take more seri- steps ous to curtail the use equitable of power by the fed- eral courts.

Principles of separation federalism and powers impose stringent limitations on equitable power of federal courts. When these principles are accorded their proper re- spect, Article III cannot be understood to authorize the Fed- eral Judiciary to take control of core state institutions like prisons, schools, hospitals, and and assume responsibility making the policy judgments difficult that state officials are both constitutionally entitled uniquely and qualified to make. See id,., at 131-133. Broad remedial strip decrees state ad- ministrators of authority their long-term set goals for the they institutions manage and of the flexibility necessary make judgments reasonable on short notice under difficult circumstances. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U. 472, 482- (1995). 483 At the state level, such decrees override “State’s discretionary authority over its program own and budgets forc[e] and state officials to reallocate state re- sources and [district funds to the court’s]plan expense at the of other government citizens, other programs, and other in- S., at U. Jenkins, 515 court.” in represented

stitutions ill is judiciary concurring). federal J., (Thomas, Framers judgments, types these equipped to make displace state judges would federal imagined never charting state legislatures state officials executive policy. judi- federal eyes to our closed sometimes have Though we desegregation, school context overreaching, inas cial sweep- opposing vigilant in been have 124-125,we id., at see prison administration. context in the decrees ing remedial ahas a State activity which imagine difficult “It is up intricately bound more one interest, stronger admin- than procedures, regulations, laws, state 411 U. S. Rodriguez, v. Preiser prisons.” itsof istration any other, than more perhaps (1973). area, In this sep- of federalism principles faithful been we have Judiciary’s exercise Federal limit powers aration all instances. powers equitable of its (1974), articulated U. S. Martinez, Procunier principles: governing a broad adopted courts

“Traditionally, federal prison administra- problems toward attitude hands-off limita- of various product policyis the part this In tion. state of conditions review scope federal tions attitude fundamentally, this More institutions. penal the na- about perceptions complementary springs judicial interven- efficacy and problems of the ture main- for responsible are administrators Prison tion. securing their for discipline, and order taining internal escape, and unauthorized against institutions nature human rehabilitating, the extent for their placed allow, inmates inadequate resources discharge to effective obstacles custody. Herculean explication. warrant apparent to too are duties of these in America prisons problems say toit Suffice

387 are complex intractable, and, more to the point, they are readily susceptible of resolution by decree. Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province the legislative and executive branches of government. For all of those reasons, courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism. Moreover, where state penal institutions are involved, federal courts have a further reason for deference to the appropriate prison authori- Id., ties.” (footnotes at 404-405 omitted).8 State prisons should be run state officials with the expertise primary authority such running insti tutions. Absent the most “extraordinary circumstances,” Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., U. S. (1977) 119, 137 (Burger, J.,C. concurring), federal courts should refrain from meddling such affairs. Prison admin istrators have a difficult enough without job federal-court intervention. An overbroad remedial decree can make an already task daunting virtually impossible.9 8Martinez was overruled on other grounds in Thornburgh Abbott, 401, U. S. (1989). 413-414 We have consistently Martinez, reaffirmed however, in all respects relevant case, namely, that “the judiciary is ‘ill equipped’ to deal with the difficult and delicate problems of prison management” and that prison administrators are entitled to “considerable deference.” S., 490 U. at 407-408. See also Turner v. Safley, S.U. (1987) (relying on Martinez principle that ‘“courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison admin ” (citation istration and reform’ omitted)). 9 The constitutional and practical concerns identified Martinez also resulted a more deferential standard review for prisoner claims of constitutional violations. In Turner v. Safley, we held that a prison regulation is valid if it is “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests,” even when it “impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights.” S.,U. at 89. A deferential standard was deemed necessary to keep the society, our in others than less “no judges, that realize I solu- individual their that tendency believe to a natural

have more and are better problems intractable often to tions charged actually are who persons of the those than workable institution particular running the of the in trained and 441 U. Wolfish, Bell examination.” under one role, limited and unique occupy (1979). judges But those for views their substitute to them allow does various of branches legislative and executive authority institu- and have who States, decisions nonjudicial uniquely these make to expertise tional decisions. these for ultimately accountable are who and succumb. must we great, may be temptation Though the further judges federal for a license is not Constitution The discre- their administrators, prison goals that policy social advance. declined have tion,

B little demonstrate order opinion Court’s District powers, of separation federalism, of principles respect fed- traditionally governed restraint judicial of arrogation striking aIn area. in this power judicial eral every as- micromanage sought to District power, institutions all program” “court Arizona’s pect sub- procedures operating dictating standard statewide, A supervision. federal ongoing system to state jecting administration, which prison business day-to-day of the out courts security anticipate ability officials’] [prison hamper seriously “would problems intractable solutions innovative adopt problems review standard stringent more A Ibid. administration.” prison every administrative process, decisionmaking distort also “would somewhere court some possibility subject would judgment problem solving way restrictive a less it had conclude would what arbiters primary become would inevitably Courts hand. thereby ‘un- problem, every administrative solution best constitutes affairs courts federal of the involvement perpetuating] necessarily 407). S., at Martinez, U. Ibid, (quoting administration.’” sweeping remedial order of this nature would inappropri- any ate in case. That the sought violation to be remedied was so minimal, to the extent any there was violation at all, makes this case all the more alarming.

The District Court only cited one prison instance inmate having a case dismissed due to the alleged State’s provide failure to sufficient assistance, and one instance of another inmate who was unable to file an action. See 834 Supp. (Ariz. F. 1553, 1558, 1992). and nn. 37-38 All of the alleged other “violations” found the District Court related not to court access, but library legal facilities and assist- Many ance. of the found violations trivial, were such as a missing pocket part to a small number of just volumes in few Id., institutions. at 1562. though And every facility in system the Arizona already contained law libraries that greatly prisoner exceeded needs,10the District Court found the State to be in violation because some of prison its librar- ies lacked Pacific Reporters. Second Ibid. The District Court also struck regulations down clearly pass muster under Turner Safley, (1987), 482 U. S. 78 such as restric- tions at some facilities on “brows[ing] the shelves,” 834 Supp., F. at physical 1555,the exclusion library from “lockdown” inmates, who are the dangerous most and disobe- 10The Arizona prison system had already adopted a policy statewide compliance with an injunction that the same District Judge in this case imposed aon single institution in an earlier case. In compliance with that decree, which the District Court termed list,” the “Muecke 834 F. Supp., 1561, at every facility in the Arizona correctional system had at least one library minimum, at a containing, the following volumes: United States Code Annotated; Supreme Court Reporter; Federal Reporter Second; Federal Supplement; Shepard’s Citations; U. S. Shepard’s Federal Cita tions; Local Rules the Federal Court; District Modern Federal Practice Digests; Federal Practice Digest (Second); Arizona Annotated; Code Ari zona Reports; Shepard’s Citations; Arizona Arizona Appeals Reports; Ari zona Law of (Udall); Evidence ADC Manual; Policy 108 Institutional Man agement Procedures; Federal Practice and Procedure (Wright); Corpus Juris Secundum; and Arizona Id., Digest. at 1561-1562. id., population,

dient pressing “legitimate only for phone calls allowance id., at issues,” District “violations,” similar remedy these To systemwide indiscriminate, sweeping, imposed stone no leaves order detailed microscopically decree. legal re- training in everything covers It unturned. facility. each prisoners to typewriters of ratio the to search libraries prison all for operation hours the dictates It staffing, cost. or use, inmate to regard without statewide, to the visit two-hour a minimum prisoner each guarantees It officials, prison prisoner, the allows trip, and library per order The use. will he room reading which determine to re- and take to use must forms types of ADOC tells li- all requires It materials. for requests prisoner spond to law, science, library degree advanced an have to brarians pris- remove to wishes State If the studies. paralegal or order reasons, the disciplinary library for law from oner notice written provided prisoner requires hours 48 within decision for basis factual and reasons permissible dictate toas far so goes order The removal. requires and reading rooms library lawin levels noise any structural correct steps, and necessary all “take to State 68a. Cert. for Pet. App. to problems.” acoustical or im- program,” “legal assistance creates also order legal prisoner retention and selection rules posing all provide to State requires It 69a. Id., at assistants. course, research legal videotaped hour a inmates under claims corpus habeas everything covering Pris- family law. immigration, torts, § C.S. U. additional an required are legal assistants oner a entitled also are Prisoners instruction. live hours an week each calls phone 20-minute three minimum purpose regard without organization, attorney or install Arizona requires expressly order call; course, Of use. increased accommodate phones extra legal supplies are covered under the order, pro- which even vides for “ko-rec-type” to correct typographical errors. A Special Master retains ongoing supervisory power to ensure that the order is followed.

The District Court even usurped authority prison over the administrator’s core responsibility: institutional security and discipline. See Bell v. (“[MJain- Wolfish, 441 S.,U. at 546 taining institutional security and preserving internal order discipline” are the goals central administra- tion). Apparently undeterred repeated Court’s ad- monitions that security concerns are to be by prison handled g., administrators, see, e. ibid., the District Court decreed “ADOC custody all. . . levels pro- shall be regular vided comparable visits to the library.” law App. added). to Pet. for (emphasis Cert. 61a Only if prison administrators “documen[t]” can prisoner’s individual “in- ability to use library the law without creating a threat to safety security” may a potentially dangerous prisoner be kept out of library, ibid., and even then the decision must reported be Special to the Master. And since, in the Dis- trict “[a] prisoner view, Court’s adequately cannot use the library law under restraint, including handcuffs and shack- les,” id., at 67a, the State apparently powerless to take steps to ensure that known inmates to be violent do not in- jure other prison guards inmates or while in the library law “researching” their claims. This “one approach free bite” conflicts both with our case law, see Hewitt v. Helms, 459 (1983), S. U. and with basic common sense. The District apparently Court prison misunderstood that is nei- ther a legal law firm nor a aid bureau. Prisons are inher- ently dangerous institutions, and concerning safety, decisions discipline order, and must always be, and been, left to prison the sound discretion of administrators.

Like the remedial decree in Jenkins, the District Court’s order suffers from flaws overly characteristic of broad reme- dial First, decrees. “the jurisdic- District Court retained reme- the of modification and implementation the over

tion after involvement terminating its decree, instead dial J., concur- S., at (Thomas, remedy.’' issuing its U. report continually must officials correctional Arizona ring). administra- of internal matters Master Special to a change the to discretion retained Court District the tion, and future, the in point unspecified some at if, game the rules court enough to facilitate done has Arizona that feels it judi- the “inject[ed] has Court District Thus, the access. institutions management of day-to-day the ciary into III Article our lies outside function policies local —a “failed also Court District The Id., 135. competence.” to specifically case in remedies equitable its target to of unconstitutional victims” suffered harm cure “the in Jenkins reaffirmed We at Id., conduct. by the determined be remedy is [equitable] nature 88at Id., violation.” scope of nature marks quotation (citation internal opinion) (majority omitted). found Court District when case, in this Yet, deficient, institutions handful library at a law de- requirements system entire subjected it found once And supervision. federal ongoing cree receiving law delays in experienced inmates lockdown all required Court District institutions, some books inmates, all physical provide statewide facilities it found when again, And custody level. regardless re- untrained were facilities in some some all provide State required District search, videotaped hour awith institutions all inmates exceeded remedy far legal research. course exceeded far District violation, any scope of authority. its scope any circum- under stand cannot order Court’s District The court a district what example of stark ais It stances. vio- has institution state finds when do should appro- never is relief Systemwide Constitution. lated priate in the absence systemwide of a violation, and even then should be no broader and longer last no than necessary to remedy the discrete constitutional violation. Justice Souter, Ginsburg with whom Justice Breyer

Justice join, concurring part, dissenting part, and in the concurring judgment. agree

I with the Court on certain, points: fundamental case before us injunction involves an scope whose has not yet justified been by the findings factual of the District Court, ante, at 359-360, one that imposed through a “process that give failed to adequate consideration to the prison views of state authorities,” ante, at 362, and that does not reflect the deference we accord to state officials under Safley, Turner v. (1987), 482 U. S. 78 ante, at 361. Al- though I therefore concur in the judgment portions and in of the opinion, Court’s reservations about the Court’s treat- ment of standing doctrine and points about certain unneces- sary to the decision lead me to write separately.

I question The accepted for review was a broadside chal- lenge scope to the of the District systemic Court’s order of or classwide relief, issued in reliance on Bounds v. Smith, (1977), 430 U. S. 817 proof whether injury actual necessary to establish standing litigate a Bounds claim. parties’ discussions injury, actual petition their certiorari, in their briefs, and during argument, oral focused upon finding ultimate liability scope of the injunction. petitioners Indeed, specifically “[al- stated that though the lack of a showing injury Respond- means that ents are not any entitled to relief, the State does not contend Respondents standing lacked to raise these claims in the first Respondents instance. clearly met the threshold of an actual case or controversy pursuant to Article III of the United States They Constitution. simply prove failed to

394 including causa- violation, a constitutional of existence

the for Brief relief.” them entitle would injury, that of tion 23.1 33, n. Petitioners of issue to raise ourselves certainly free arewe While sodo must and jurisdiction, III Article going to standing as merits, see the deal jurisdiction lack would we when 274, Doyle, 429 U. v. Ed. City Bd. Healthy Mount of standing atof the question apparent (1977), nois there jurisdic- our for suffices plaintiffs class-action the of one least address not standing does doctrine dispute that no tion dis- adequately may thus We case. issue principal evidentiary referring to by simply issue the basic of pose cases of my review for do, I would is what That record. bearing on treating or either Appeals Courts is there me standing convinces Bounds subject of elements appropriate its about debate for enough reason espe- is That it. about conclusions no final reach should we briefing “benefit had the have we since cially true potential of the appreciation by an informed argument S.U. Jenkins, 515 v. ruling.” Missouri breadth Addressing issues dissenting). (1995) (Souter, J., our breakdown significant may amount standing by Missouri represented adjudication orderly process difficult address -out reach does Court Jenkins, but unnecessary resolution question conceptual or Court by District addressed never case, was presumably otherwise would what divides Appeals, Court. unanimous been parties, framed even injury, of actual Moreover, the issue briefs parties’ of the portions shrift; small only relatively short

received for Brief 30-33; Reply Petitioners for issue, Brief see addressed portion significant 25-30, Respondents 11-13; Brief Petitioners even should issue whether upon concentrated discussion of that 12-13; Brief Petitioners Brief for Court, Reply by the addressed 25-27. Respondents

That said, I say cannot that I am convinced that the Court has fallen any into by error invoking standing to deal with the District Court’s orders addressing by claims and on behalf of non-English speakers in lockdown. While it is true that the demise of prisoners’ these Bounds claims could be expressed as a failure of proof on the merits (and I would so express it), it would be equally correct to see plaintiffs these as losing on standing. “A determination even at the end of trial that the court is not prepared to any award remedy that would benefit plaintiff[s] may be expressed as a conclusion plaintiff[s] that the lac[k] stand- ing.” 13 Wright, C. A. Miller, & Cooper, E. Federal Practice and Procedure (2d p. §3531.6, 1984) ed. (Wright & Miller). Although application of standing may doctrine pur- our poses dispose of the challenge to remedial orders insofar as they touch non-English speakers and prisoners, lockdown standing principles cannot do job the same in reviewing chal- lenges to the orders aimed at providing court access for the prisoners. illiterate One representative class has standing, as the Court concedes, and with to sue thus estab- lished, standing doctrine has no part further to play in con- sidering prisoners’ illiterate claims. More specifically, the propriety of awarding (in classwide relief this case, af- fecting the entire system) does require a demon- stration that some or all of the unnamed class could them- satisfy selves standing requirements for plaintiffs. named “[Unnamed plaintiffs] need not make any individual showing of standing [in order to obtain relief], because the standing issue focuses on whether plaintiff is properly before the court, not represented whether par- ties or absent class members are properly before the court. Whether or not the plaintiff named who meets individual standing requirements may assert rights of absent class members is neither a standing issue nor an Article III case or controversy issue but depends 23 govern- of Rule the prerequisites meeting on

rather Newberg Conte, A.& Newberg H.1 actions.” class ing 1992). (3d ed. 2-41 §2.07, pp. Actions Class on (“As long 1785.1, § & Miller Wright 7B also See interest, substantial direct have parties representative al- may they whether the question standing; they . depends .. others on behalf claims to present lowed adequacy of typicality assessment on but standing, treat- our confirmed analysis This of representation”). plain- class-action a named case when standing ment becomes requirement residence durational a tiff protesting sat- becomes requirement the because litigation during moot can proceed suit whether not is the question then even isfied; but class, of members unnamed some standing on the ‘fairly continue] [can representative named “the whether Sosna class.’” interests protect adequately Civ. Rule Fed. (1975) (quoting 393, Iowa, S.U. 23(a)). Proc. standing applying not is he that says Scalia Justice is relief do) systemic that also (as I concludes he when rule as- his accept I n. 7. 360-361, Ante, here. inappropriate footnote, same clear, by it makes also he But surance. mine) on solely rest (as I his conclusion rest not does he that even prison, Arizona every that to prove failure illiterate court denied the State them, many Member every I take which a point prisoners, to prove failure Instead, he explains agrees. prejudice suffered prisoners illiterate two than more re- reason (at part) least claims nonfrivolous standing his be applying intend he does Since versal. rule a class-action is applying he I assume saying, so rule evidence trial when relief classwide denial (requiring claimants). of injured class aof existence show does as complicating unnecessary as is just route But between distinction (Indeed, standing. through route irrele- be practically might rules class-action standing vant in this case, important however precedent for other cases.) While the propriety of the systemic order of relief for illit- prisoners erate does not turn on the standing, of class mem- bers, and certainly need not turn on class-action rules, it clearly does turn on respondents’ prove failure to denials of access to prisoners illiterate pervaded the State’s prison system. Leaving aside the question whether that proof failure of might have been dealt reconsidering the class certification, see Fed. Rule 23(c)(1); Civ. Proc. Gen- eral Telephone Co. Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U. (1982);7B Wright § & Miller 1785, at 128-136, the state of the evidence simply left the District Court without an ade- quate basis for the exercise of equitable its discretion in issu- ing an order covering the system. entire

The injunction, for example, imposed detailed rules and requirements upon each of the prison State’s libraries, in- cluding rules about library hours, supervision within the request facilities, forms, educational and training requirements for librarians and their staff prison- members, ers’ access to the stacks, and inventory. Had findings shown libraries in shambles throughout system, degree this of intrusion might have been reasonable. But the findings specific included the acknowledgment that “[generally, the facilities appear to have complete libraries.’’ Supp. F. (Ariz. 1992). The District Court found only that certain prison of the libraries did not allow inmates to browse the only shelves, that some of the volumes in some of the pocket libraries lacked parts, only that certain librarians at some of the libraries lacked law library or sci- degrees, ence only that prison some staff members have no training in research. Given that adequately stocked go libraries far in satisfying the requirements, Bounds it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to aggregate discrete, problems small-bore prisons individual and to treat them if prevailed as each throughout prison the system, covering order remedial broad justifying of purpose the

for library. each of aspect every virtually unsupported simply were injunction the of elements Other example, for Court, District finding. The any factual may have prisoners problems findings about factual no made findings any alone library, let any noise with encountered the to access prisoners’ with interfered violations noise that that board the across requirement imposed itYet courts. problems.” acoustical “structural all correct the State overreaching the of this It 68a. for Cert. Pet. to App. even standing or of application the record, not evidentiary reversed. to judgment the for calls rules, that class-action injunction the of portions the regard to with Finally, even violation, I a Bounds evidence stronger upon much based to failed Court District because simply remand would participate to opportunity ample an the State provide it seems remedy because fashioning a process for holds Turner implications considered have cor- Court District while example, For case. re- delays in experience who prisoners conclude rect books number only a limited receive ceiving books courts, access denied been delay have end have would Turner application proper unlikely is grant lockdown the State order decision its justified significance given the stacks, physical lockdown maintaining the safety interest State’s improved alternative, an existence system Brief respondents. acceptable system, paging Respondents

II I however, question, standing to reach Iif were Even In established. has standard adopt would spo- standing, we requirement injury describing the controversy or case III Article an essential as itof ken presented bewill adjudicated be sought to dispute “the historically viewed formain adversary context an capable judicial resolution.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. 83, (1968). We plaintiff ask a prove “actual or threatened injury” to ensure legal questions “the presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a appreciation realistic of the consequences judicial ac- tion.” Valley Forge College Christian v. Americans United Separation Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, (1982).

I do disagree with the Court that in order to meet (in these standards a case that does not involve substantial systemic deprivation access), prisoner a suing under Bounds must assert something more than an abstract desire to have adequate library or some other access mechanism. Nevertheless, while I believe prisoner that a must generally have some underlying grievance claim or for which he seeks judicial relief, I cannot endorse the standing requirement the imposes. Court now On the Court’s view, a district court may required

examine the merits plaintiff’s of each underlying claim in order to determine whether he standing has litigate a Bounds claim. Ante, at 353,n. 3. The require would a determination that the claim is “nonfrivolous,”ante, at in the legal sense that it states a claim for relief that is at arguable least in law and in I, fact. in contrast, go would no further require than to prisoner that have some concrete grievance gripe about the conditions of his confinement, the validity of his conviction, or perhaps problem some other for which he would legal seek redress, see Part III-B, infra (even though a claim based on grievance might well fail sooner or judicial later in the process).

There are three reasons supporting this as a sufficient standard. First, it is the existence of an underlying griev- ance, not its ultimate gives merit, that prisoner concrete interest in litigation and will thus assure the serious and adversarial treatment of the Bounds claim.

400 who those for of access right recognized a Bounds

Second, likely winners winners sure just not adjudication, seek 828 825, 824, atS., Bounds, 430 U. See possible winners. or (describing limiting without access of ante, claims); also see meritorious with prisoners right to as Bounds before even access right of (describing the 354 present.. wished inmate that grievance “a covering “nonfrivolous aon omitted)). Finally, insistence (citations standing re- aas grievance” “concrete a than rather claim” prelimi- of a lot guarantee than more no dowill quirement so system nois nothing. There over litigation nary complaints. nonfrivolous with prisoners lack toas blessed way or one up, and turned be up, or always turn They will occur. will litigation Bounds the other says, the answer the Court may be, point last That re- underlying claim be no need there that suggestion any systemic de- complete and of claim Bounds a quirement of the Courts view inBut access. court means of all nial cer- I would otherwise,2 issue seen have that Appeals 1992) (waiving (CA7 2 e, Lane, F. 977 2d v. Jenkins g., See, al prisoner “where prove prejudice prisoner a that requirement indi ‘minor a continuous, than rather direct, substantial leges any without “a prisoner that ground on materials” legal rect,’ limit his requirements pleading determine cannot materials access v. Wa cf. Strickler prejudice”); necessity pleading case, including possibility 1993) (acknowledging (CA4 16 1375, 1385,n. ters, 2d 989 F. denial g., situations, total e. in some presumed may be injury 2d Vose, F. 941 Sowell (1993); v. 949 S. denied, U. cert. library), ato prove need may not prisoner 1991) (acknowledging (CA1 32, 35 to all of access deprivation absolute “[a]n alleges he when prejudice claim underlying any with Dispensing original)). (emphases materials” equity the rule be consistent would instances such requirement Brennan, 511 U. See, g., Farmer e. injury. threatened dealing with injury physical suffer need prisoner (1994) (holding 825, 845 “ the consum to await does ‘[o]ne because relief obtaining before ” Penn (quoting relief’ preventive to obtain injury threatened mation v. McKin (1923))); Helling 553, 593 U. S. Virginia, v. West sylvania relief may obtain (1993) (observing 25, 33 U. S. ney, tainly reserve that issue for the day might actually addressed in a parties case before us.

In sum, I would no go (in further than to hold a case not substantial, involving systemic of deprivation access to court) that Article III will requirements be satis- normally fied if a prisoner (1) demonstrates he has a or complaint grievance, meritorious or not,3 about the prison system the validity his conviction4 that he would raise if his li- (or brary research advice, or judicial review aof form com- plaint, or other means of “access” chosen State) by were to indicate that he had an actionable (2) claim; and the access scheme provided is by so prison inadequate that he can- not research, consult about, file, or litigate claim, as the case be. may

“even it though was not alleged that the likely harm would occur immedi- ately and even though possible [harm] might not affect all of [at those risk]” (discussing Hutto v. Finney, (1978))). 437 U. S. 678 If the State denies prisoners all access to courts, it is hardly implausible for a prisoner to claim a protected stake in opening some channel of access. 3See Harris v. (CA4 718 Young, 620, 1983) F. 2d (“It 622 is unfair to force inmate prove that he has a meritorious claim which will require access until after he has had an opportunity to see just what his rights are”); see also Magee Waters, v. (CA4 451, 810 1987) F. 2d 452 (suggesting that a prisoner must research”); identify the “specific problem he wishe[s] to . Moses, v. 31 (CA9 F. 794, 1994) 3d cf 798 Vandelft (dismissing Bounds claim in part because the prisoner “simply failed to show that the restrictions library access had any effect on his access to the court relative to his personal restraint petition” (emphases in original)), cert. denied, 516 U. S. (1995); 825 Pieschek, Casteel v. (CA7 F. 1050, 3 3d 1056 1993) (it is if enough the prisoner merely “identifies] the constitutional right the defendant allegedly violated and the specific facts constituting the deprivation”); Baird, Chandler v. (CA11 926 1057, F. 2d 1991) 1063 (“[T]here no was allegation in the complaint or plaintiff’s deposition that he contemplating challenge at that [of time the deprivation] the conditions of his confinement”); Martin v. Tyson, 1451, 845 F. 2d 1456 (CA7) (dismissing a claim in part because prisoner “does point any claim that he was unable pursue”), denied, (1988). cert. U. S. 4 I do not foreclose the possibility of certain complaints, other see text accompanying n. supra, III-B, and Part infra. would, of standing requirement stringent more aWhile prison with interference courts curb

course, serve served adequately object is legitimate administration, that it clear makes itself Bounds existing law. rules by two State’s subject to access providing means judicial to avoid wishes example, a State If, for choice. own library adequacy of library standards itsof review involving use means can choose services, today. mentioned procedure complaint-form chosen remedy, whatever judicial any And Ante, at 352. rule consistent access, must court means (1987), restrictions U. Safley, 482 S. Turner interests. penological valid reasonably related if valid are intru- undue limit surely serves scrutiny level Turner’s In protection. further need the obviates thus and sions does framework Turner that evidence of absence courts, there federal discretion adequately channel provide standing doctrine toughen no reason would against protection unnecessary, perhaps and additional, danger. this existing reasonable these relying on instead But resolution Court’s interference, against safeguards and, extensive engage in court district forces case underlying merit enquiries into needless believe, I trial, stages of final initial during claims prisoners’ constant vulnerable classes certified properly renders risk litigation. course throughout challenges class prisoner conclude simply will courts district least, at the What, unmanageable. are actions systemwide to a lending itself action a class is that overlooks multiplicity avoids Turner consistent of relief order undermine orders and remedial separate suits surely just as court district States efficiency aof United state much-sued of a legal resources exhaust can itas system. III

A There are, finally, two additional points on which I dis agree with the Court. First, I cannot concur in sugges tion that Bounds should be overruled to the extent that it requires choosing States provide law libraries for court access to make them available prisoner’s for a use in the period filing between complaint and its disposition. final Ante, at 354. Bounds stated the obvious reasons for making libraries available for these purposes, 430 S.,U. at 825-826, developments since Bounds have confirmed its reason ing. With respect to habeas claims, for example, the need for some legal form of assistance is even more obvious now than it was then, because the restrictions developed since Bounds have created a “substantial risk” prisoners pro ceeding without assistance will never be able to obtain review of the merits of their claims. See McFarland v. (1994) Scott, 512 U. S. 849 (discussing developments). these Nor should discouragement from the number of frivolous prison suits lead us to practical doubt the justifiability of providing pro assistance to a prisoner se during trial. In past years few alone, we petitions considered the several represented who themselves at trial and appeal, and who ultimately prevailed. g., See, e. Farmer v. Brennan, (1994); 511 U. S. 825 Helling v. McKinney, (1993); U. S. 25 Hudson v. (1992). McMillian, 503 U. 1

B Second, I see no reason point at this accept to the Court’s view that the right Bounds of access necessarily is restricted to attacks on sentences or challenges to conditions of con- finement. See ante, at 354-355. It is not clear to me that may State prisoner force a to abandon opportunities all rights vindicate outside these categories two no matter how significant. We have already prisoners held that do not en-

404 right including the rights, fundamental certain

tirely forfeit free right to 95; supra, Safley, v. marry, Turner (1989);and 401, 407 S.U. Abbott, 490 Thornburgh v. speech, v. Estate O’Lone religion, see of of exercise free right to imagine others (1987). can One 342 S.U. Shabazz, 482 of limited some prisoner entitle arguably would Social Department v. g., Lassiter of See, e. court. rights); (1981)(parental 18S. Cty., U. 452 Durham Servs. of (divorce); (1971) cf. S.U. Connecticut, 401 v. Boddie (1950) 33, S.U. McGrath, 339 Sung v. Yang Wong consider tous require not does case This (deportation). prisoner’s principle, of matter aas whether, may be spheres these in rights vindicate opportunities here. issues such address not I would foreclosed, IV opinion, Court’s of III I and Parts in concur I therefore judgment. concur II, and Part from dissent dissenting. Stevens, Justice de from States prohibits Amendment Fourteenth due without property liberty, or life, any person priving char 19th-century court one least at While law. process State,” “slave a mere inmate acterized (1871), recent 790, 62 Va. Commonwealth, v. Ruffin decades convicted held repeatedly has Safley, 482 v. Turner See total. liberty loss felon’s (1972). 319, S.U. Beto, 405 (1987); g., Cruz e. S.U. inmates . . . separate] .. . do walls “Prison 84, at S., 482 U. Turner, Constitution,” protections enjoyed liberties some retain criminals convicted even which communities walls those outside live by all who someday return. will most are by prisoners liberty retained residuum Within the Constitu- Amendment First identified freedoms

405 tion: freedom to worship according to the dictates of their own g., e. conscience, O’Lone v. Estate Shabazz, 482 U. S. (1987); 342, 348 Cruz, 405 U. S., at 321, freedom to communi- cate with the outside g., world, e. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U. S. 401, (1989), 411-412 and the petition freedom to their government for a grievances, redress of g.,e. Johnson v.

Avery, 393 (1969). U. 483, S. 485 While the exercise of these may freedoms of course regulated constrained their they may custodians, not be obliterated either actively or passively. Indeed, our cases make it clear that the States must take certain affirmative steps protect some of the aspects essential of liberty might not otherwise survive in the prison controlled environment. right “well-established” of access to the courts, ante,

at 350, is one aspects of these liberty that States must affirmatively protect. Where provide States appellate review of criminal convictions, example, they have an affirmative duty to make transcripts available indigent prisoners free charge. v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, Griffin (1956) (requiring States to waive transcript fees for indigent inmates); see also Burns Ohio, v. 360 U. 252, S. 257- (1959) 258 (requiring States filing to waive indigent fees for prisoners). protects It also right inmate’s to file com- plaints, whether meritorious parte not, see Ex Hull, 312 (1941) S.U. 546 right (affirming petitions file habeas even if officialsdeem them meritless, in peti- case in which tion at meritless), issue was and an right inmate’s to have access to fellow inmates who are able to assist an inmate preparing, “with adequacy,” reasonable such complaints. Johnson, 393 U. S., at 489; v. McDonnell, 418 U. 539, Wolff (1974).1 And for almost two decades, explicitly has 1See also Motor Transport Co. Unlimited, Trucking California 508, (1972) (“The S.U. access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right petition. See Johnson v. Avery, 483, 393 U. S. 485; parte Hull, Ex U. S. 549”); Bill Johnson’s Restaurants,

406 “adequate to access to of prisoners right the

included in trained from persons assistance adequate or libraries law As (1977). 828 Smith, 430 S.U. v. Bounds law.” the to “experiment” free are out, States points Court the inmates, to provide they that assistance legal of types the adequate provides experiment the long ante, 352—as at access. simi are case this in alleged violations constitutional The one in found previously Court District the that those to lar Kangas, 773 F. Supp. v. Gluth See nine prisons. Arizona’s of com 1991). The (CA9 1504 2dF. 951 aff’d, 1988), (Ariz. 1309 behalf 22 prisoners by 1990 in filed case plaint system. Arizona the inmates all including class aof provided institutions State’s the alleged prisoners The assistance, App. other materials to legal access inadequate the by harmed are result, “[prisoners aas 31-33, Id., The at courts.” the access meaningful of denial failed, had State the concluding agreed, District access adequate to provide system, its prison throughout seg- administrative those materials, particularly courts to the access of (“[T]he right (1983) 731, 741 NLRB, U. 461 v. Inc. Government petition right Amendment First of aspect anis id., at 743. grievances”); redress manner ain provision constitutional aof violation claim rights those embedded is also courts by recognized be will With- it.of interpretations our text Constitution's recognized constitu- attention their draw courts access ability to out alike— citizens free behavior, all us— improper tionally defense” only often first —and —“line deprived be would 817, 828 Smith, U. S. 430 v. Bounds violations. against con- (recognition S., 579 McDonnell, U. v. (1977); see Wolff func- ‘totally or inmates, often if diluted “would rights stitutional complaints their articulate unable illiterate,’ were tionally S.U. Agents, Narcotics Fed. Unknown Six Bivens courts”); cf. Amendment Fourth violation alleging plaintiff (allowing (1971) under directly action a cause through courts to the rights Constitution). regation, or “lockdown,”and that the State had pro- failed to adequate vide legal assistance to illiterate and non-English speaking inmates. After giving all parties opportu- nity to participate process in the of drafting remedy, (and court entered a detailed agree I excessively so, see 409) infra, at order to correct the State’s violations. As I understand the record, the State argued has not right of effective access to the courts, as articulated in Bounds, should be any limited in way. It has not challenged the standing of the plaintiffs named represent to the class, nor questioned has it the propriety of the District Court’s order allowing the proceed case to as a class action. I am also unaware any objection having been made in the Dis- trict Court plaintiffs’ to the constitutional standing in this case, and the State appears to have standing conceded with respect to most claims in the Appeals.2 Court of Yet the majority chooses to address these issues unnecessarily and, in some instances, incorrectly.

For example, although injury in fact certainly jurisdic- is a tional issue into which inquire we objection absent from the parties, even majority finds on the record that at least two plaintiffs had standing in this case, ante, at 356,3 2See Opening Brief for Appellant in No. 93-17169 (CA9), pp. 29-30; Reply Brief for Defendant/Appellants in No. (CA9), p. n. 20. The State directly questioned constitutional standing only respect to two narrow classes of claims: the standard (a for indigency claim on which the State was below) successful and, in brief, its reply photocopying. 3In all likelihood, the District Court’s failure to articulate additional specific examples of missing claims was due more to the fact that the State did not challenge the constitutional standing of the prisoners in the Dis trict Court than to a lack of actual evidence relating to such lost claims. Now that the District Court and prisoners are on notice that is standing a matter of specific concern, it is free on remand to investigate the record or other evidence that the parties could make available regarding other claims that have been lost because of inadequate facilities. con- any constitutional satisfy sufficient should

which disagreeing. pages spends 10 theYet cerns.4 requirements standing into to delve reason had if we Even exces- requirements of those view Court’s case, the this clear perfectly think I sively strict. failed examples of specific absent even standing, had ac- effective is a There complaints. been has personally alleges that he prisoner aif cess, first our ofOne standing to sue.5 has right, he denied courts access right of directly the address cases parte In Ex well. particularly principle illustrates prison’s constitutionality a state reviewed Hull, we rule courts. to the inmate’s impeded rule addressed intercept mail officers corrections authorized parole investigator toit refer court in the merit sufficient there whether to determine board claims Meritless court. to a submission its justify claim succeeded Hull Petitioner delivered. simply not were them delivered turn father, who his to papers smuggling petition smuggled the that held Although we Court. to this the answer an require to even merit insufficient had mem the class standing standing, have plaintiffs class If named H. New certification. for class requirements by satisfied is bers 1992); (3d §2.01, ed. p. Actions on Newberg Class Conte, & A. berg con part, dissenting in part, (Souter, J., concurring ante, at 395-396 certifica that challenge not did State Because in judgment). curring conclusion aof advantage it the give nowto game in the late tion, is rather it inmates, it illiterate (even although if it improper is— class English to respect differently with much me, positioned not are seems prisoners). speaking non-English are than materials language alleged he if the merits lose would prisoner Although a not did example, State, for because occurred right of that deprivation cer also databases, he would computer to on-line him provide argument Court’s his claim. to make “standing” tainly me, case, seems in this prisoners most respect contrary with creation but the standing, principles explication as much demonstrate claims Bounds making prisoners requiring rule a new access. lack of flowing from prejudice State, 312 U. S., at 551,we nevertheless held regula- that the tion was invalid simple for the and sufficient reason that “the state and its may officers abridge impair petitioner’s or right apply to a federal court for writ of corpus.” habeas Id., at 549. glance,

At first approach novel adopted by the Court today suggests only prisoners those who have been re- claims, fused the opportunity to file later found argu- to have able merit should be able to challenge a clearly rule as un- constitutional as the one addressed in Perhaps Hull. standard is somewhat lower than it appears in the first in- using stance; Hull as an example, the suggests even facially petitions meritless provide can a sufficient basis for standing. ante, See at 352, n. 2. Nonetheless, because prisoners are uniquely subject to the control of the State, and because unconstitutional restrictions on the of access to through courts—whether nearly absolute bars like that in Hull through inadequate legal resources—frustrate the ability to identify, present articulate, and injuries courts flowing from that control, I any believe that prisoner who claims to impeded by such barriers has alleged constitutionally injury sufficient in fact.

My disagreement with the Court is not complete: I am persuaded respondents’ counsel —as essentially has con- ceded—that the relief ordered the District Court was broader than necessary to redress the constitutional viola- tions identified in the District findings. Court’s I therefore agree that the case should be remanded. I agree, cannot however, with the Court’s decision to use the op- case as an portunity to meander through the laws of standing and ac- cess to the courts, expanding standing requirements here limiting rights there,6 when the most obvious concern in 6In addition to the Court’s discussion “standing,” the opinion unneces sarily enters into discussion about at least two other aspects of the scope of the Bounds right. First, the Court concludes that the Bounds right does not extend to any claims beyond attacks on sentences and conditions limited the disjunct between simple the with is case

the find- Court’s District the articulated injuries scope the most Because aas result. remedy ordered the ings and be could order the regarding concerns petitioners’ or all of resolve no need I see remand, simple awith addressed out reaches Court the that issues constitutional other the address. preced- its discussion much that aware well is Court Reflecting on unnecessary decision. to the III is ing Part into State the railroaded Court District the that view its con- Court the barrel, stock, lock, order accepting its was “[t]he State that its page of decision last on the cludes on rebuttal, opportunity than far more entitled aside.” set have would order this ground alone that that suggests majority the that extent To the Ante, 363. at in the a breakdown flawed because is case order generally should that negotiation court-supervised process of agree that also I it. agree with I relief, systemic precede remand justify a would “alone” process in that failure only that finding subsequent its Ante, given But at of confinement. ibid., its standing, see rule conjured newly itsmet have plaintiffs two Second, the dicta. is purely right scope regarding conclusion “dis- right to the extend does Bounds argues Court Ante, court. once effectively” “litigate toor grievances, cover” given unnecessary largely also deleted). This statement (emphasis both Court District for the on need III in Part emphasis Court’s discovered it has violations remedy to the its tailor state faced job difficult of the respectful it remain requirement administrators. on limitations for these asked has State that the Moreover, I note wind- unexpected to its object will Arizona doubt that While I Bounds. Court and this Appeals, Court, Court the District fall, its briefs than further went simply order Court District argued Brief See opinion. own in its identified injuries necessary given nonetheless but proposition agreeing By 13-16. Petitioners scope of oversteps relief, unrequested to extend going we step, such we take case. Whenever in this presented debate ground. dangerous onto unnecessarily venture in this case. I emphatically- disagree, however, with the Court’s characterization of who is most to blame for the ob- jectionable character of the final order. Much of the blame for its breadth, I propose, can be placed squarely in lap of the State. A fair evaluation of procedures followed in this case begin must with a reference to Gluth, the earlier case in which the same Judge District petitioners found guilty of a systemic constitutional violation in one facility. In that case the District Court expressly found that the state officialshad demonstrated “a callous unwillingness to face the issues” and pursued had “diversionary] tactics” that [the “forced court] to take extraordinary measures.” 773 Supp., F. at 1312, 1314. Despite the Court’s request they propose ap- propriate remedy, the officialsrefused to do so. appar- It is ent that these defense played tactics an important role in the court’s decision appoint a Special Master to assist in the fashioning of remedy that was ordered in Only Gluth. after that order had been affirmed the Court Appeals respondents did commencethis action seeking to obtain simi- lar relief for the entire population. inmate

After a trial that lasted for days over the course of two months, the District Court found that petitioners’ several of policies denied illiterate and non-English-speaking prisoners meaningful access to the courts. precedent Given estab- lished in Gluth, express approval plan by Court Appeals, and the District Court’s evaluation of State’s conclusions regarding the likelihood of voluntary re- medial schemes, particularly in view of the State’s unwilling- ness play a constructive role remedy stage of case, the District Court not unreasonably entered an order appointing the Special same Master directing pro- him pose a remedy similar in this Although case. the District parties instructed the specific submit objections to template remedial derived from Gluth, App. see to Pet. for Cert. 89a, nothing in the court’s prevented order waiving its without proposals own submitting its from

State its or liability issues the findings on challenge the right to Mas- the either proposals any remedial object to right to the told also Court District respondents. the ter in- and offers, settlement consider would it that parties counsel guidance “such provide to Master the structed á settle- such effect to may request parties the of as either Id., at 95a. ment.” reme- the participate to invitations these response to In sets only half-hearted four filed State the process, dial during months six the course the objections over written pro- court’s evaluating the Master Special the which 239- 231-238, and 225-228, 218-221, App. See order. posed nar- these half about rejected Although Master the noting number, equal about accepted he objections, row “im- been had participation formal limited State’s the that (Permanent Proposed Order helpful.” “very portant” the Ariz.), (D. After p. iii. 90-0054 CIV No. Injunction) an- offered State the order, proposed his released Master Although App. 243-250. See objections. round other objections the that Master the informed Court District the rea- the court be; have they did considered, could months six aware been had State the that sonably noted have could order, scope the potential the about the deadline the prior objections same mounted at Id., process. beginning at set had court 251-253. faced State, imagined might have One wildly “inordinately indeed, —intrusive” potential — care more taken have 362, would ante, scheme, remedial Court District before interests its protect willingness express given particularly Master, Special Having failed objections. State’s consider both of zealously represent Court, the District interests its belated; rather complaints seem present State’s claims solicitous less than been generally has adequately pressed been g., below. e.Cf., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. (1991); compare ante, at 363- (State 364, n. 8 made boilerplate rights reservation of each objections), set of with Gray v. Netherland, ante, at (“[I]t enough is not general to make a appeal to a consti- guarantee tutional as broad process as due present court”). ‘substance’ of such a claim to a state The State’s lack of interest in representing its interests only clear not sparse objections in the District Court, but from proceedings both here and in the Court of Appeals. argument In before both courts, counsel for the prisoners have conceded that aspects certain of the consent decree exceeded necessary e.g., relief. See, 43 F. 3d (CA9 1994) 1261, 1271 (prisoners agree typewriters are required); Arg. Tr. of (provisions Oral regarding noise library are unnecessary). flexibility This sug- further gests that the State could sought have aspects relief from plan through negotiation. argument Indeed, at oral the Ninth parties Circuit, the for suggested both sides they willing were to settle the case, and the court deferred submission of the case days for 30 to enable a settlement. “However, before the settlement process begun, had even [the State] declined to mediate.” 43 3d, at F. n. Notably, only this is the by comment made appellate regarding court process fashioning led of the remedy in this case.

A reading fair of the record, therefore, reveals that the State had more than six months within which it could have initiated presented settlement discussions, more ambitious objections proposed decree reflecting the concerns it has raised before this Court, up or offered plan its own for the review of the plaintiffs Special and Master. It took none of steps. these Instead, it piecemeal settled for challenges belated scope proposed plan.

The implies Court that the District Court’s decision to use the decree entered in Gluth starting as the point for fashion- petitioners and was unfair to to be ordered

ing the relief comparable repeated circumstances. should not suggests, far “entitled to was State, Court browbeaten Ante, at 363. I opportunity for rebuttal.” more than process. of the disagree characterization with this strongly approves disapproves of the con- this Court now Whether affirmed Appeals had decree, tents the Gluth surely was entirety tried, case and it in its when it Court, starting- to use it as appropriate for the District were Petitioners task this case. point its remedial for by competent could advanced counsel who represented they thought expedient proposals if had relief their own necessary correct the By going further than to do so. the State the Court’s decision rewards order, of the excesses throughout the posture it assumed uncooperative has ante, case. litigating and this See long period both Gluth Although Supp., Gluth, at 1312-1316. 773 F. 354-355; tactics, proven approach as matter has sound the State’s is not as inhibited prevail in a forum that allowing it to decision courts, the Court’s precedent are federal other only equitable powers authority of not undermines throughout the Na- Court, District but Courts this District my judgment, quite wrong, for this Court is tion. It oppor- fair suggest the State a that the District Court denied dispose entirely unnecessary for it to tunity heard, that it consumes smorgasbord issues of constitutional of the in Part II. appropriate, agree

Accordingly, that a remand while I opinion. join I the Court’s cannot

Case Details

Case Name: Lewis v. Casey

Court Name: Supreme Court of the United States

Date Published: Jun 24, 1996

Citation: 518 U.S. 343

Docket Number: 94-1511

Court Abbreviation: SCOTUS