*1 ruling precluding Farrell’s state Court’s contract claim.
law breach of
Timothy BOOTH, Appellant
CHURNER, C.O.; Workensher, Sgt.; Lt.;
Rikus, Gardner, Capt. W. 97-7487,
Nos. 97-7488.
United States of Appeals, Court
Third Circuit.
Argued: Sept.
Filed March *2 (Argued), Ralph
Nancy Winkelman Lewis, Sianni, & Segal Schnader Harrison LLP, PA, for Philadelphia, Appellant. General, Fisher, Attorney D. Michael (Argued), Senior Gwendolyn Mosley T. General, Knorr, Attorney John G. Deputy General, III, Attorney Deputy Chief Office General, PA, Attorney Harrisburg, Appellees. BECKER, Judge,
Before: Chief McKEE, NOONAN,* Judges. Circuit OF THE OPINION COURT BECKER, Judge. Chief by Timothy from an appeal This Booth dismissing his order of District Court two prisoner’s rights presents civil meaning of important questions about the exhaustion mandatory administrative Litigation in the Prison Re- requirement (the PLRA). al- Act of Booth form leges while he confined in the Pennsylvania’s State Commonwealth Smithfield, sever- Correctional Institute at occasions, prison guards, on several al face, cleaning punched him in threw face, him into a material his shoved * Noonan, Circuit, Jr., sitting designation. Judge T. Circuit Ninth Honorable John Appeals United Court of for the States shelf, his hand- tightened twisted requirement. injure cuffs such a manner as to him. argues if ap- even Eighth Amendment Asserting right action, his plies to his exhaustion would have futile, free of cruel and unusual punishment, been because the available adminis- Booth, se, acting pro brought process trative provide could not him with *3 § force action in U.S.C. 1983 excessive monetary relief he According- seeks. District Court for the Middle District of contends, ly, he his failure to exhaust such Pennsylvania, requesting various forms of procedures 1997e(a), § mandated by monetary injunctive and relief. He did so only requires which the exhaustion of ad- exhausting without first the administrative ministrative remedies “as are available.” him remedies available to at Smithfield. Reno, in Nyhuis Our recent decision Because of this failure to exhaust his ad- (3d Cir.2000), 204 F.3d rejected this remedies, ministrative the District Court argument. Nyhuis awas Bivens action pursuant dismissed his action to U.S.C. brought by inmate, a federal in which we 1997e(a). § 1997e(a) § held that “the PLRA amended 1997e(a) PLRA, § As amended a way such as to make exhaustion of all provides that action shall be brought “[n]o administrative mandatory— remedies conditions under they provide whether the inmate- title, any section 1983 this other plaintiff with the says relief he he desires law, aby prisoner in,any Federal in his federal action.” Id. at 67. The rea- jail, prison, or facility other correctional soning of Nyhuis applies in the equally such until administrative remedies as are context, 1997e(a) § Bi- treats available are exhausted.” U.S.C. vens and 1983 actions as func- 1997e(a) (amended by 104-134, Pub.L. equivalents. Nyhuis tional is therefore I, 101(a), (1996)). Title 1321-71 Stat. controlling in this case. question The first raised Booth’s appeal Accordingly, though even is an this ex- 1997e(a) applicability concerns the action, cessive force though and even actions; i.e., § 1983 excessive force wheth- Pennsylvania’s Commonwealth of inmate er a “prison excessive force is condition” grievance process could not provide Booth for PLRA. purposes important This money with the damages sought, he question and difficult is a of first matter required hold Booth was impression for this court. Booth contends to exhaust the administrative “action remedies him prior filing available to to language applies only action. admittedly this Because he has not complaints about physical conditions so, done we will affirm the judgment of the and prisons, does not to his apply District Court.1 Therefore, § 1983 excessive force action. concludes, he District Court erred I. 1997e(a). analyzing his action under We reject argument and hold that April began On applies to excessive force ac- Court, using the District a form tions. We base this decision the plain provided by filing the court to prisoners meaning of the language of the pro complaints se under U.S.C. 1983. circuits, case law our from sister and re- Churner, He named Corrections Officer Supreme cent Court precedent interpret- Workensher, Rikus, Sergeant Lieutenant ing prisoner litigation legislation. similar Captain W. Gardner as defendants. question second raised presented Booth’s He stated that he had the facts appeal has to do with the application prisoner grievance of the case in state court, express Nancy We appreciation request represented Mr. Winkelman, who, Esquire, pro ably acting zealously. bono Booth both kill I want each jail they me. And were before allegations and that Ms
procedure for added, every punished as- officer to be up.” He covered “dismissed or Please, my I’m in fear of saulting me. help retaliation because of “There isn’t life.” up I abuse cor- spoke about because “Par- space provided In the ruption.” 19, 1997, May he In a document dated Superintendent Morgan to ties” added Appoint- “To Show Cause petitioned space In the la- of defendants. list Counsel, Keep To Officials as Top ment wrote noth- Claim” he beled “Statement Defendants, Amending Relief Plaintiff “Relief’ he ing. space labeled petition, he asked for “an Seeks.” In this “preliminary injunction,” both for a asked injunction beating,” continuous stop for transfer to “protection order and for get operation,” a transfer an order “to *4 safety and life is prison my another as “money damages prison, and another stake.” $750,000 In damages).” later (permanent injunc- an paragraphs, again he asked for filed with his
In a handwritten document transfer, damages in tion, money and for alleged a complaint, Booth the follow- form amounts; for an facts, he also asked rise his 1983 different ing gave which that, library law prison April improve He order complained first action. for contempt a fine officials Sgt prison “assaulted and to he had been ” court, paralegal for order to hire assis- named Thomas.... an and a Robinson C/O himself, assault, “money damages for alleges, he tance for and result he As a $300,000.” “Plaintiffs Amendment and slips “a shoulder that out.” incident, contends, Relief,” day, he Specific filed next Subsequent to that he for order to be trans- operation protective on his shoulder asked a he denied an was jail, appointment to another indifference to shoul- ferred [his] with “deliberate counsel, hearing, a a disclosure pretrial next averred that der and back.” Booth records, $400,000 6, 1997, water on order for and February on he threw Thomas, “nominal, exemplary, then com- punitive, who took Corrections Officer damages. pensatory” a room and threw a storage cup him to in his face. cleaning material Court, sponte acting The District sua an from the February requiring that on and without answer Booth further claimed Defendants, 7, 1997, Booth’s action with- exchange of words with dismissed after 30, 1997, Rikus, as had prejudice May him into out on Lieutenant Rikus shoved under 42 power room and Thomas to do U.S.C. storage the shelf 1997e(c). door, Sergeant for the Court’s pushed him into a while rationale shortly was that Booth had failed to exhaust alleges on. He order White looked cell, pursuant his administrative he was taken back to his remedies thereafter 1997e(a) tightened filing twisted his before his Thomas U.S.C. where that at the way a that bruised his action. The Court observed handcuffs in such that, Pennsylva- filed his action the complained Booth last on time Booth wrists. 23, 1997, Department Chur- nia of Corrections had Corrections Officer March mouth, three-step grievance procedure. face and Booth ner him the punched process first but Sergeant step and Correc- had taken the while Workensher result, taken the showing made no that he had Officer Kulian watched. As contends, required which open” steps, he his mouth “was busted second and third appeal the decision reached he received three stitches. Booth narrative, step.2 “I officials the first ended this need out this submitted, writing, for to the Pennsylvania’s De- initial review 2. The Commonwealth Coordinator, Facility/Regional partment Grievance of Corrections Consolidated Inmate days upon three-part after the events System ad- within fifteen Grievance consists based. See Common- process. which claims are Grievances must ministrative court that as Booth had not have appellate jurisdiction pursuant concluded to 28 remedies, exhausted his available dismissal U.S.C. 1291.3 1997e(a). required by reaching II. conclusion, this District Court as- sumed, discussion, without that Booth’s ex- first We examine whether governed cessive action was words “action 1997e(a). conditions” in were intended to apply to excessive force actions such as 9, 1997, June On Booth moved Booth’s. provides Section July reconsideration of order. On brought [n]o action shall be 3, the District Court denied motion. under conditions section 1983 to amend his complaint, moved title, law, of this 17, 1997,
on
other Federal
July
this motion was “dis
moot,
any jail,
prison,
missed
plaintiffs
case was
30,1997.”
May
facility
closed
other correctional
Booth thereafter
until such ad
appealed.
jurisdic
The District Court had
ministrative remedies as are available
tion pursuant
to 28 U.S.C.
1331. We
are exhausted.
review,
Pennsylvania, Department
(1)
wealth of
of Cor-
id.
On
VI.D.2.
final
the CORC
rections, Consolidated Inmate
Re-
*5
Grievance
power
require
has the
investiga
additional
System, Policy
view
No. DC-ADM 804
determination,
tion before it makes its
see id.
VI.A.l,
(Oct. 20, 1994).
§§
VI.B.2.
Exten-
VI.D.5; (2)
§
may consider matters related to
period may
granted
sions of this time
good
be
for
VI.D.6;
(3)
grievance,
§
the initial
see id.
§
See id. VI.B.2.
cause.
decision,
may,
approve, disap
in its final
procedures
filing
for
claim
such a
are
reverse,
prove, modify,
reassign
remand or
submitted,
straightforward.
griev-
Once
the
grievance
the
finding,
for
fact
further
see id.
investigated
persons having per-
ance is
§ VI.D.7. The CORC must issue its decision
knowledge
subject
may
sonal
of the
matter
be
twenty-one1 days
within
after receipt of an
griev-
§
See
interviewed.
id. VLB.3.
If the
appeal,
it
a
and must include brief statement
interview,
personal
requests
policy
ant
of the reasons for the
it
decision reaches. See
provides
granted.
that one “shall” be
Id.
above,
id. As noted
Booth
that he
concedes
working days
receipt
Within ten
of the
did not avail himself of either the intermedi
Officer,
grievance by the
policy
Grievance
process.
ate or final review
provides
grievant
provided
that "the
shall be
response
grievance
a written
to the
to include
§
3. The District Court dismissed Booth’s 1983
rationale,
summarizing
brief
the conclu-
prejudice.
appealable
claim
To
without
any
sions and
action taken or recommended
1291,
§
under 28 U.S.C.
an order of dismissal
grievance.”
resolve the issues
raised
See,
ordinarily
prejudice.
e.g.,
must
be with
§Id. VI.B.2.
(3d
Capital Corp.,
Bhatla v. U.S.
'sion, plaint Additionally, without amendment.” appeal [to Central Office Review (the parties agree long CORC) past both time that the is Committee for final review.” ] cause, pursue § for Booth remedies; good Id. his normal administrative VI.D.l. Absent review final therefore, permitted grievant is cannot the de- if a cure has not com plied complaint procedures governing fect in with Initial his on which the District Appeal Review and Initial from Review. See Court based its dismissal. added). 1997e(a) 1997e to include var- amended (emphasis U.S.C. 42 U.S.C. as the on actions such his 1983 excessive ious limitations argues that Booth mandatory requirement governed by force action is First, 1997e(a), it also created U.S.C. he contends that three reasons. subsections, pre- in many can- which simply conditions” “prison the words ordering from broad prison guard’s to include a vents federal courts not be read Second, “any he ar- action with of violence. relief civil prospective intentional act that, Like the PLRA and conditions.” one reads gues whole, 1997e, there the extent to which history as a 3626 curbs legislative litigation interferes with the conclude that federal basis to ad- government’s to reference claims excessive states’ the federal meant Third, recent their own Be- points prisons. two force. ministration cases, in PLRA are which the Court these two sections Supreme Court cause line similar and are thus drawn a between excessive directed toward ends actions, related, substantially involve intentional acts it follows from which violence, in Stroop ac- interpretation and conditions-of-confinement canon of invoked that, two tions, do not. Booth submits the identical terms used which conveying evinced sections should be read enacting Freeman, when it 196 F.3d meaning. no intent to disturb distinction same language employed the 1997e(a). up We take did 3626(g)(2)provides Section in turn. arguments the term “civil action civil pro- means prison conditions” A. ceeding arising under Federal law begin analysis of normally would We *6 to respect the conditions of confinement § by looking plain meaning to the by government or of actions the effects respect of words “action with to persons officials on the lives of confined employed prison Congress conditions” that in not include prison, but does habeas drafting Congress,
in
section.
howev-
fact
proceedings challenging the
corpus
er,
re-
the term “civil action with
defined
in prison.
or
of confinement
duration
prison
in
sec-
spect to
another
added).
3626(g)(2) (emphasis
§
18 U.S.C.
PLRA,
§ 3626(g)(2),
tion of the
18 U.S.C.
inquiry,
thus
us from that
see
spared
sense,
un-
a matter of common
As
Francis,
641, Freeman v.
196 F.3d
of confinement”
derstand the “conditions
(6th Cir.1999) (holding
scope
that “the
to
language preceding the “or”
include
1997e(a)’s
requirement
is de-
cell
regarding
those
complaints such
termined
the definition of a 'civil
construction, in-
overcrowding, poor prison
respect
with
conditions’
set
facilities,
adequate
incomplete
medical
§ 3626(g)(2)”).
in
forth
Put
aris-
differently,
law libraries.
actions
ing
relate
under this clause
environ-
Supreme
To
from
borrow
live,
prisoners
physical
ment in which
Stroop,
in
sub
“[t]he
Court
Sullivan
environment,
conditions of that
two[provi
stantial
relation between
provided
services
therein.
nature
in
presents
sions
classic case
PLRA]
allegations
prison guards
Booth’s
rule
application
of the normal
of statu
against him
used excessive force
do
tory construction that identical words used
fall into this
of actions.
naturally
class
parts
of the same act are
different
does, however,
neatly
fit
meaning.”
have the
Booth’s action
intended to
same
478, 484,
following
§in
language
3626(g)(2)
110 L.Ed.2d
into the
U.S.
S.Ct.
(1990) (citations
“or,”
civil action
quota
and internal
which refers
omitted).
effects of actions
The PLRA not
with
to “the
persons
subcategories.
officials on the lives of
On
government
contrary,
prison.”
18 U.S.C.
the relevant
section
read
its entire-
ty,
suggests
read this
to refer
3626(g)(2).
We
clause
intended to
to,
from
ranging
civil actions
excessive
authorize the nonconsensual
reference
actions,
Booth’s,
all prisoner petitions
force
such as
to actions
to a magistrate.
to”
official’sdecision
“with
(citations
Id. at
conditions”
—without
argument
by Booth and
precise
held
raised
recently
Circuit
Appeals
the Sixth
v.
See Wendell
adopted
used
the dissent.
‘prison conditions’ as
“that the term
(5th
889,
Asher,
887,
891-92
Cir.
162 F.3d
of excessive
§ 1997e includes claims
1998)
re
Freeman,
exhaustion
(applying
F.3d at 644.
196
force....”
inmate-plaintiffs excessive
quirement
Fifth and
to
Appeals
for the
Courts
claim);
Hawk,
v.
127 F.3d
reached
Garrett
implicitly
Tenth
have
Circuits
(10th Cir.1997) (same).4
1263,
ac-
1264-66
excessive force
same conclusion—that
to the
margin,
respond,
part,
actions and
conditions”
position.5
of Booth’s
adoption
set
dissent’s
subject
requirements
to
139-44,
McCarthy,
U.S. at
111
appeals that have been
Court
500
4. The other courts of
1737,
query
language
have
to re
to
whether this
presented issue
declined
v.
to
employed
See Miller
in the context of the statute
it for different reasons.
was
solve
(11th
Tanner,
1190,
something
Cir.
F.3d
n. 1
its
natu-
196
1191
connote
other than most
1999)
(The
(declining
light
meaning.
supra
to
the issue in
resolve
ral
Section II.B.
disposed
appeal
analysis
the fact that the court
engages in
"contextual”
dissent
Goord,
grounds);
v.
F.3d
other
Liner
196
explained
on
in note
of the
9,
but
reasons
132,
(2d
1999)
(recognizing that the
reading.)
135
Cir.
infra,
by its
we are unconvinced
concerning the PLRA’s "action ... with
law
Addressing the second half of the definition
language
respect
flux,
was in
provided
3626(g)(2),
the dissent contin-
refusing
question
but
to resolve the
guard
you
ues: "A
hits
on the mouth. Would
complete
rec
"without the benefit of more
you report
by saying,
government
blow
‘A
Hill,
ord”);
v.
182 F.3d
1066
Rumbles
having
effect
official has taken an action
(9th
1999) (declining
n. 2
to address
Cir.
my
speaker English
use
on
life?’ No
would
below”).
"it was not raised
issue because
at 302. Re-
such circumlocution.” Dissent
split on
courts are
the issue. Those
District
lying
“[s]nippets of
on
it concedes are
what
holding that excessive force actions fall under
id.,
legislative history,”
the dissent concludes
include the District Court in
statutory phrase
that the
"effects of actions
present appeal,
v.
Beeson Fishkill Conectional
government
persons
officials on
lives
(S.D.N.Y.1998)
Facility,
F.Supp.2d
3626(g)(2),
prisons,”
28 U.S.C.
J.),
(Mukasey,
Garraghty,
v.
Johnson
pris-
was intended to refer
(E.D.Va.1999)
(Ellis, J.).
F.Supp.2d 321
delivery
on officials such
luke-
"[the
of]
rely McCarthy and
defini
These courts
on
food;
employing]
. ..
bar-
warm
unlicensed
of "action with
condi
tion
bers;
admitting]
prisoners
...
more
than
3626(g)(2)
support
tions” in
their hold
for;
designed
deciding]
....
contrary
holding
ing. District courts
provide creamy peanut
butter
instead
Fauver,
F.Supp.2d
include White
(D.N.J.1998)
chunky;
deciding]
bars
...
offer salad
J.),
(Orlofsky,
and Carter v. Kier
brunches;
deciding] to
[or]
or weekend
nan,
2664(JGK),
Civ.
WL
No. 98
sys-
play
classical music on
stereo
(S.D.N.Y.
1999) (Koeltl, J.).
Jan.
punch
jaw a
tem”—not a
in the
or blow to
(citing
body.
Cong. Rec.
Id. at 301-302
McCarthy, except
addressing
Without
S14611-01,
29, 1995)).
it,
(Sept.
S14627
ad-
mention our reliance
dissent
reading of
plain
history
We find this
the second half
meaning
legislative
vances
3626(g)(2) unconvincing.
support
position.
For us
arguments
The dis-
as for
Freeman,
*8
"prison
phrase
parses
phrase
court in
196 F.3d at
the
sent
the
conditions” in
naturally
§
Web-
acts taken
1997e(a) looking to its definition in
references isolated
—
prisoners’
3626(g)(2)
rights,
§
that
28
con-
affect
ster’s
in U.S.C.
officials
—and
force,
phrase
encompass
including alleged
see
the
not
acts of excessive
cludes that
does
supra
accept
do
ad-
II.A.
one were to
the
claims of excessive force. As
we in
Section
If
definition,
reading
3626(g)(2),
dressing
3626(g)(2)’s
the dissent
dissent's narrower
employed
3626(g)(2)
language into
two
the two clauses
in
divides the section’s
its
"statutory
components.
be
opines
It
that
would
narrower than
lone "conditions
employed Congress
phrase
[in
of confinement” clause
‘conditions
confinement'
139-44,
McCarthy,
§ 3626(g)(2))
encompass specific
in
297 things C. There are wrong four with this argument. First, obvious, and most Con reading attempts Booth buttress his gress made its regarding intentions clear 1997e(a) by Supreme §of pointing what “actions with respect to condi that drawn a precedent Court distinc- 1997e(a), tions” in meant defining tion claims and between excessive force expressly that term expansively in pressed by condition claims. When § 3626(g)(2). Congress’s explicit language however, logic, argument proves PLRA, therefore, in the obviates the need analysis it was brittle erected NLRB, to resort to the maxim. 453 support. 329, 101 U.S. at S.Ct. 2789. Second, ignore if we were to statutory A familiar maxim of con import of 3626(g)(2)’s ap definition and “ provides Congress struction ‘[w]here ply the maxim language based
uses
that have
terms
accumulated settled
Hudson,
ignore
Farmer and
we would
meaning
equity
under either
or the com
difference
the nature of
power
allo
law,
infer,
mon
a court must
unless
Congress
cated to the
courts
in our
dictates,
Congress
statute otherwise
tripartite
system.
federal
Mu
Judge
to incorporate
means
the established
kasey
opinion
noted
his forceful
in Bee
”
meaning of these terms.’ United States
son
Facility,
v. Fishkill Correctional
(3d
Rosero,
166,
Cir.1994)
42 F.Sd
which held that
applied
ex
Co.,
NLRB v.
(quoting
Amax Coal
claims,
cessive
responsibili
force
“a court’s
322, 329,
2789,
U.S.
101 S.Ct.
69 L.Ed.2d
ty
reading
1997e is to
determine
(1981)).
maxim,
Invoking
Booth
intent of
when it
referred
Supreme
cites
recent
Court
two
cases
statute,
‘prison
conditions’
which the
distinguished
Court
between
intent of the Supreme Court when it used
conditions-of-confinement claims and ex
similar,
identical,
but not
term in a case
claims,
cessive force
and treated the two decided
passed.”
before the statute was
(S.D.N.Y.1998) (re
884,
types
differently.
F.Supp.2d
of claims
See Farmer v.
Hudson).
Brennan,
825, 832,
ferring to Farmer and
511 U.S.
114 S.Ct.
1970,
(1994);
McMillian,
995,
9, 112
503 U.S.
S.Ct.
the Court’s
language
use of similar
(1992).6
of art invoked of force and conditions confinement maxim even claims in makes resort this case claims, presented despite effectively being more unreliable. F.Supp.2d 28 at squarely.” with the issue Fourth, Supreme the as evidenced (citation omitted). The the fact that 891 McCarthy, phrase in the opinion Court’s “prison conditions” and “conditions terms confinement,” which Booth of “conditions seem to have different of confinement” the equate phrase us would have again in contexts meanings different conditions,” commonly is not so “prison interpre- of maxim of makes invocation the McCarthy de- was understood. —which tation inappropriate. Hud- near the time that Farmer cided were, the son prior to PLRA’s enact- but Farmer and Hudson cast With Supreme interpret had to ment —the Court proper light, their we confident condi- phrase “petitions challenging 1997e(a)’s re that exhaustion holding in 28 U.S.C. of confinement” apply to excessive force quirement does 636(b)(1)(B). above, As noted the Court hold that 1983 claims.8 we Booth’s phrase challenges not read the to include governed by excessive force action conditions, also only ongoing prison 1997e(a), but turn we attention allegedly of unconsti- episodes isolated require whether officials, so, by prison such doing tutional conduct ment it. Before we address bars (in id. at 141-43, assault. See argument 1737. ad margin) another it well in Beeson Mukasey put support of Booth’s Judge vanced the dissent wrote, lan Court made of the McCarthy] reading [in “the absolutely guage mention of the PLRA.9 supposedly Hudson, reading do not actions and excessive Farmer tions-of-confinemenl actions, addressing we have blurred the distinction believe that force or even those See, drawn these cases between excessive prisoners’ rights. brutal of violations 19, ac- actions and conditions-of-confinement e.g., Apr. Cong. (daily Rec. ed. S3703 distinctions, course, ob- tions. Those still Abraham) 1996) (statement (noting of Sen. eighth juris- . tain in substantive amendment 65,000 prisoner were lawsuits "[i]n However, many prudence. for the reasons filed federal courts alone” without distin- text, appeared detailed in the distinction filed); guishing among many types of suits Congress's did it not to be on mind—nor Cong. (daily Sept, Rec. S14626-27 ed. Congress’s it hand —when crafted control (statement Hatch) 1995) (cataloguing of Sen. procedural it in the PLRA. bars did 39,000 filed some non-habeas lawsuits 1994, and, inmates in federal courts enacting 9. The reasons tbat in dissent Abraham, distinguishing Sen. be- Congress with friv- PLRA was concerned tween conditions-of-confinement actions and lawsuits, prisoner enu- olous such as those " actions). way data excessive force 5, supra, merated in note rather than 'actual supports presented conclusion prisoners' rights,'" Dissent violations lawsuits, all applies all S14408-01, Cong. (quoting 141 Rec. potential to of which have the be frivolous 27, 1995) (Sen. Hatch)). (Sept. S14418 courts, particu- unduly burden rather than Therefore, concludes, it was not claims, subcategory lar as the dissent con- encompass force claims. intended excessive tends. argu- things wrong with We find three Second, legisla- of the examination PLRA’s ment. history opponents tive reveals that First, recounting large number objected ground it it PLRA on brought years by prisoners in the lawsuits preceding few prisoners attempts frustrate in their would PLRA, passage several pursue meritorious force ac- excessive Congress evi members of cited statistical (1995) Cong. Rec. S14628 tions. regarding filed dence the number (statement Biden) (discussing Sen. two by prisoners, crushing burden examples prison assault cases as of meritori- have federal courts. See Blas v. suits Endicott, by passage ous that would be suits F.Supp.2d hindered 1133 n. PLRA). (E.D.Wis.1999) (collecting examples These remonstrations —and of this that, suggest Congress's history). failure heed legislative studies statistical them — distinguish enacting they cited condi- knew what did between
299
facility
other
correctional
until such ad-
III.
as
ministrative remedies
are available
application
our attention to the
Turning
are exhausted.
1997e(a)
action,
§
to
Booth con-
Booth’s
1997e(a)
added).
§
(emphasis
U.S.C.
advantage
that he did not take full
cedes
to
available
procedures
the administrative
Booth reads this language to
allegedly
him at
After he was
Smithfield.
mean
he did not need to take advan
Defendants,
assaulted
he filed sev-
tage
System’s
the Inmate Grievance
administrative grievances with the
eral
procedures
administrative
they
because
Pennsylvania’s Depart-
Commonwealth of
not provide
could
him with the monetary
ment of Corrections Consolidated Inmate
sought
relief
he
in his federal action.
(the
System
Grievance
Inmate Grievance
cites,
proposition
among
For this
he
other
System).
requests
for
When his
relief
cases,
(5th
Hunt,
v.
Whitley
158 F.3d 882
however,
denied,
he
to appeal
were
failed
Cir.1998),
Jumao-As,
v.
Lunsford
his right
those decisions as was
under the
(9th Cir.1998),
F.3d 1178
v.
Garrett
supra
System.
Inmate Grievance
See
note
(10th
Hawk,
Cir.1997).
No
shall
inmate-plaintiff
pure money
be
with the
damages
to
conditions under
section
relief
seeks
his federal ac
title,
law, by tion,
or any
other federal
exhaustion of those administrative
or
prisoner
any jail, prison,
remedies
would
futile.10
doing,
subsequent proceed-
was
and intended that excessive
to create a
record for
ings,
help
it
subject
require-
clarify
can be used to
actions be
to
focus and
claims,
1997e(a).
poorly pled
confusing
it
forces
ments in
justify
explain
Third,
its internal
sections
the PLRA other
than
Cir.2000).
(3d
procedures."
Our (3d Cir.2000), rejected may have 65, difficulty the federal courts greater 72 204 F.3d in recognized con- futility exception predicting narrow the interpreting and/or Garrett; Lunsford, the and and Whitley, law and state administrative tours of state dispositive Nyhuis is rule announced at n. regulations practices. and See id. 75 Nyhuis, we held that “the case. text. we noted accompanying 10 and way in such a PLRA amended Nyhuis, the has “made Supreme Court of all administrative as to make exhaustion plain ‘in the of a indi- clear that absence they mandatory or not remedies Congress should contrary,’ cation to the —whether relief provide inmate-plaintiff with the applica- ‘mak[e] not be understood to in his federal action.” says he desires dependent act tion federal state of[a] ” opinion, In a we detailed lengthy Id. at 67. Mississippi at n. (quoting law.’ Id. 75 10 many supporting posi- arguments Holyfield, v. 490 Choctaw Indians Band of tion, rejected the ultimately approach 43, 1597, 30, L.Ed.2d 29 U.S. 109 S.Ct. 104 futility recognizing taken courts (cita- (1989)) (emphasis by Nyhuis) added id. at 71-78. exception. See omitted). quotations tions and internal ac Although Nyhuis involved a Bivens “Congress gave drafting inmate, brought by tion federal the rule ‘plain alone a indication’— indication —let equal we force in Nyhuis announced de- application should context, 1997e(a), which 1983 law.” pend vagaries on the of state Id. brought by to actions applies reasons, For therefore hold that these we title, any “under section 1983 of this in Nyhuis applies the rule announced law,” other federal treats Bivens actions here. equiva 1983 actions as functional Nyhuis, As in because Booth “failed 68; Nyhuis, Lavis lents. See 204 F.3d to exhaust his available administrative (6th Beeler, 254, ta 195 F.3d Cir. v. (rather remedies than those he believed 1999); Hawk, 1321, v. Alexander F.3d effective)” his filing would be before (11th Cir.1998); Hawk, 1324-25 Garrett action; appropri- District Court Cir.1997). (10th 127 F.3d 1264-66 ately his preju- dismissed action without Indeed, Nyhuis greater rule has even Accordingly, dice. Id. at order actions. will be affirmed. District Court First, explained Nyhuis, as we addition comity al considerations obtain in the NOONAN, Judge, concurring Circuit implicated 1983 context—which are not dissenting: given strength of a Bivens action— prisons’ the interest state and state crux is what The case (cid:127) resolving complaints courts’ have filed statutory “prison meant term condi- prisoners. Nyhuis, state 204 F.3d words, two is tions.” Of the “conditions” Rodriguez, at 76 n. 11 Preiser v. (citing key. plural. equiva- noun It is is 475, 491-92, 411 U.S. lent It to “circumstances.” does iden- (1973) (discussing comi L.Ed.2d 439 tify momentary single matter. Web- concerns)). ty six provides us with definitions. ster’s Second, germane. Five are not relevant defi- additional federalism and affairs,” efficiency “existing nition is state of implicated considerations conditions,” reviewing phrases “living 1983 actions—as corn- the common separate pleadings days responsive pleading filed seven and a time before entries, original complaint, Judging his served....” from the docket month after allegations again responsive plead- re- served no made reference his Defendants ings April garding money damages. between the time Booth filed his R. Fed. Civ. Pro. 15(a) provides may complaint party amend the time that he filed “[a] pleading pleadings. party’s as a once matter course at these later conditions,” meaning “adverse weather ed to extend the “playing con- *12 defini- slight A variant of this beyond conditions.” ditions” ordinary sense of the in “something needing remedy,” as tion is knew phrase it how to do so. In this sentence, “Trains late Phila- were definition, Congress did not extend the of on the Main delphia because conditions meaning “prison of conditions” to include suggest, Line.” As these instances “condi- battery acts carried by out officers affecting every- are circumstances tions” prison. a statutory phrase The “condi- by one in the area affected them. “Condi- tions of confinement” not encompass does large affect or small. populations, tions” specific batteries. “Conditions of confine- ment” apt “prison is no more than condi- gives statute thus us a noun of The designate tions” to an battery. act of meaning frequent established and use. i§ noun, use “conditions” a constrains by This noun modified second is sense so that what is a meant continu- “prison.” ambiguity No exists as ing state of affairs. The meaning. It court concedes popula- identifies the affected then, part have, statutory of the statutory tion. We a term definition has “prison application conditions” that mean “a here. can a prison” “something state of affairs in or Bronson, McCarthy The court invokes needing slight a remedy prison.” The U.S. L.Ed.2d conveyed variation does not alter the sense (1991), but does rely then on the by momentary of more than a “conditions” statutory language there on construed but event; something “conditions” means the alternative definition afforded by period. has in effect a continued prison statute. This definition defines con- jaw A punch on the is not “conditions.” by ditions as “the govern- effects actions A punch jaw prison “prison is not persons ment officials on the lives of con- jaw A an punch conditions.” on the is act. fined prison.” by What are actions alleged busting Churner’s of Booth’s government impact officials that lives mouth is not a state of affairs. Circum- of prisoners appropriately fit within plural stances are at issue. No the framework of conditions? Illustrations population is affected. An individual alone by PLRA, are proponent afforded a is involved. That Churner’s blow alleged is, Senator Abraham: “how warm the food place prison took does not make it are, bright lights how whether there “prison Reading conditions.” the statute cell, electrical outlets each whether impossible as it is written it is next to cut prisoners’ hair is licensed bar- specific complaint characterize Booth’s of a bers,” are “the regarding conditions” battery as a suit “with which prisoner litigation has occurred and conditions.” courts have intervened because of the ef- rightly may The court aid *13 brunches; a
offer salad bars or weekend offering the bill for the first time 1995: mu- play to classical prison official decides help legislation will also restore bal- “Our system. Cong. stereo prison sic on litigation and prison ance to conditions will 1995). S14611-01, (Sept. Rec. S14627 are limit- that Federal court orders ensure indubitably an These had effect actions prison- of remedying ed to actual violations that, prisoners’ creating conditions lives S14408-01, Rec. rights.” Cong. ers’ to prior passage gave to of the rise 1995). (Sept. he summa- S14418 of no are prison litigation. way “I not sponsors’ rized the intent: do want acts of comparable specific these to legitimate prevent raising to inmates from intentional violence. Brutal batteries prevent legislation This will not claims. sponsors from what the said far removed being those claims from raised.” chose on their minds. The senators S14611-01, (Sept. Cong. Rec. S14662 mirroring their language for statute 1995). The the bill were nei- sponsors of concerns. nor ther inhumane nor insensitive deter- mined to foreclose federal fora to claims of history
Snippets legislative of such cruelty. unconstitutional acts of necessary explain the to these are however, are, statutory They to phrase. a legislative history The serves to refute interpretations that point way in a statutory suspicion unsupported legislation opponents offered guide reading a to fair text. As a moreover, are, They in debate are not. us, English language in the statute before to use illuminating why Congress had suspicion is mischievous. It leads to seemingly elephantine fifteen words language construction of that cannot be wanted to way Congress define suits sustained. The canons construction restrain. The multitude of trivial occa- tongue our native should not contorted be might prisoners’ affect lives sions that deny remedy conscientious by a calculated captured could be Congress to provide. continues that excludes individu- comprehensiveness are, sure, There to be issues raised as to beating. al acts or rape prison conditions in amended com- Booth’s you guard A hits on the mouth. Would library, plaint state of the —the you report by saying, govern- the blow “A Booth’s need for a example, paralegal, having an action ment official taken prevent the failure authorities my speaker English effect on life?” No alleged beatings. No cause Why would use such a circumlocution. Morgan, Captain against Superintendent should we attribute such circuitousness can Sergeant Gardner or Workensher be Congress? When bones are broken or discerned that does not fall within the mauled, earth, edu- mouths are one on meaning conditions. These com- uneducated, such cated would use Booth plaints processed should have express phraseology to roundabout grievance system. through blow. so, pursue cannot Failing do claims, so them I Congress spoke now. As these concur supposition may suspicion put with the court. But that he ineptly sustained complaint get wanted rid of all matters into his does mean forfeits the claims whose treatment required begin administratively. was not Rikus, injury Lieutenant no specific
As to compensation for which is alleged
is asked. too, here, complaint properly dis- Churner, allegations against
missed. The and Thomas survive. As to
Robinson respectfully
them I dissent. *14 Appellant A.
Barbara TODISH CORP.; Airlines,
CIGNA Eastern Inc.
No. 98-6089. of Appeals,
United States Court
Third Circuit.
Argued: Sept.
Filed: March (Argued),
Nadine H. Taub Uni- Rutgers Clinic, versity, Environmental Law New- ark, N.J., Attorney Appellant. (Argued), J. Fannan Karosen & John Grabler, Roseland, N.J., Attorney Ap- pellee. notes fect prisoners’ of these conditions on lives. reading by consulting another section S10576-02, 142 Cong. (Sept. Rec. S10576 of the statute where Congress has defined 16, 1996). illustration, To take another “prison purpose. conditions” for another according “even worse” to Senator Abra- good It makes sense to assume that the ham, judge releasing prisoners is a “to applies throughout definition the statute keep prison population down what use the definition whenever judge appropriate considered an level.” conditions” are mentioned. Id. an each these instances a government provide official—to a kitchen § 3626(g)(2) Congress “pris- defined delivery leading or on service lukewarm “conditions confine- food; em- electricity; or to save on or to ment the effects of actions govern- barbers; on or to admit more ploy ment officials the lives of unlicensed persons prison.” designed The definition than prisoners is on good Congress impact prisoners’ evidence that when want- for' —has an lives that, litigation, therefore but for the creates conditions allegations have intended to embrace subject of a suit. Other must might become battery. guess specific lives of acts of having prisoners’ effect Reid, policy, speculation are these: unarticulated such referenced Senator creamy dispelled provide suspicion official decides its attraction. chunky pro- peanut by leading sponsors butter instead of the PLRA such as butter instead chunky peanut Judiciary Com- vides the chairman of the Senate creamy; official decides not mittee, As he put Hatch. Senator