*1 v. McMILLIAN HUDSON et al. February Argued November 1991 Decided
No. 90-6531. *2 Rehnquist, Court, in which opinion of the O’Connor, J., delivered Souter, JJ., joined, in which Ste- White, Kennedy, and J.,C. J., Stevens, filed II-A, II-B, II-C. I, vens, J., joined to Parts as post, p. 12. judgment, concurring in the part and concurring in opinion post, p. 13. judgment, concurring in the Blackmun, J., opinion filed an p. Scalia, J., joined, post, opinion, in which Thomas, J., dissenting filed a Bronstein, by appointment Court, 500 Alvin J. him on the With the cause petitioner. S. argued Shapiro, Mark J. R. Powell, A. Steven were John *3 briefs Lopez, Alexander. and Elizabeth
Deputy Roberts for General the cause Solicitor argued as amicus curiae reversal. With urging States the United Assistant At- Starr, General him on the brief were Solicitor Acting Deputy Solici- torneys Mueller, Dunne and General Wright, Mann. J. and Ronald tor General Harry McCall, Jr., Special General Attorney Assistant him on With for respondents. the cause Louisiana, argued General, Jon Jr., Attorney Guste, J. the brief were William McCall, Special General, and athan C. Attorney Assistant Bingham, Schaye, Jr., Houston C. Gascon O. Clifton Jenifer Kopsa, Joseph Erwin III, and General.* Attorneys Assistant for were filed for Americans reversal urging curiae *Briefs of amici Jr., Plitt, Hales, Emory A Inc., by B. Enforcement, Daniel Effective Law Legal Manak; Prisoners’ for the D. C. Schmidt, P. and James Wayne W. Arsenault; J. and Richard Inc., by A Howard Project, Theodore Services Clark; Legal the Prisoners’ and for Rights by Cameron Human Watch Stephen M. Latimer. and by A Gresham of New York John Service State of was filed for the urging affirmance amici curiae A brief of Texas, Pryor, First Morales, Attorney Will General of by Texas et al. Dan General, Keller, Attorney Deputy General, Mary F. Attorney Assistant Palmer, L. Felfe, and Adrian A Sharon Hodge, P. Charles and Michael General, Attorneys General for Attorneys joined Young, Assistant Hawaii, Joseph Price Ill of follows: Warren respective their States as Nevada, A and Robert Papa Del Meyer Wyoming, Frankie Sue B. of Florida. Butterworth delivered of the Court. opinion
Justice O’Connor requires case us to decide whether the use of exces- This prisoner may physical against a constitute cruel force sive punishment when the inmate does not suffer and unusual injury. question in the serious We answer that affirmative. subject is the smt, I At thetime of the incident that this petitioner peniten an inmate at the state Keith Hudson was tiary Angola, Respondents McMillian, Jack in Louisiana. Mezo served as corrections secu Woods, Marvin and Arthur facility. During early rity Angola morn officers at the argued. ing Hudson and McMillian 30,1983, hours of October placed then Hudson hand Woods, Assisted McMillian prisoner cell, out of his shackles, cuffs and took the penitentiary’s lock- him “administrative walked toward way that, there, on the McMil- down” area. Hudson testified eyes, punched and stomach mouth, chest, lian Hudson in the place kicked and held the inmate while Woods punched Mezo, him from He further testified behind. merely beating duty, supervisor told but on watched App. a re much 23. As the officers “not to have too fun.” episode, and swell this suffered minor bruises sult of Hudson lip. ing Hud The also loosened face, mouth, of his blows *4 rendering plate, partial it teeth and cracked his dental son’s unusable for several months. officers Federal
Hudson sued the three corrections § § 1979, 42 S. C. District Court under Rev. Stat. prohibi- alleging Eighth Amendment’s a violation of the seeking punishments com- tion and on cruel and unusual disposition pensatory damages. parties The consented to Magistrate, McMillian the case before a who found that to do so used force when there was no need and Woods App. expressly that condoned their actions. and Mezo damages Magistrate Id., awarded Hudson $800. The at 29. Appeals reversed. 929 for the Fifth Circuit
The Court of alleging use of exces- It inmates 2d held that F. prove: Eighth Amendment must of the sive force violation (1) (2) only “directly injury; resulting significant from (3) clearly need”; excessive to the use of force that was objectively unreasonable; the excessiveness of which was (4) unnecessary and wanton that the action constituted pain. Id., The court determined infliction of at 1015. objectively respondents’ be- use of was unreasonable force “[t]he required. conduct Furthermore, cause no force was clearly qualified as excessive of McMillian and Woods pain.” unnecessary infliction of Ibid. occasioned and wanton prevail could not on his Amend- However, Hudson required injuries ment claim because were “minor” and his no medical Ibid. attention. (1991), granted to determine certiorari,
We
What is to establish an and wan- pain,” according ton infliction of said, we varies to the nature alleged constitutional S., violation. 475 U. at 320. example, appropriate inquiry alleges For when an inmate officialsfailed to attend to serious medical needs is whether the officials exhibited “deliberate indifference.”
6 Gamble,
See Estelle v. 429 97, 104 stand- This appropriate responsibility pro- ard is because the State’s to ordinarily vide inmates with medical care conflict does not competing Whitley, supra, with administrative concerns. at 320.
By
prison
contrast, officials confronted with a
disturbance
poses
prison
must balance the threat unrest
to inmates,
against
workers, administrators, and visitors
the harm in
may
guards
Despite
weight
mates
if
suffer
use force.
competing concerns,
these
corrections officials must make
pressure,
frequently
their
haste,
decisions “in
under
and
luxury
without the
of a second
at 320.
S.,
chance.”
U.
accordingly
Whitley
application
We
concluded in
inappropriate
deliberate indifference
au
standard is
when
put
prison
use
In
thorities
force to
down
disturbance.
question
“the
un
stead,
whether the
inflicted
measure taken
necessary
pain
ultimately
suffering
and wanton
on
and
turns
applied
good
‘whether force was
in a
maintain
faith effort to
discipline maliciously
sadistically
or restore
for the
very purpose
causing
(quoting
Id.,
harm.’”
at 320-321
(CA2),
Glick,
Johnson v.
F. 2d
denied
cert.
(1973)).
sub
Johnson,
nom. John v.
7 the using physical in violation of force of excessive cused judicial in- the core Clause, Punishments and Unusual Cruel applied Whitley: force was quiry whether is out in that set discipline, or ma- good-faith restore to maintain or effort in a liciously sadistically harm. to cause “unnecessary Extending Whitley’s application allegations pain” of ex to all standard wanton infliction of derived the This no innovation. force works cessive Friendly by Judge Whitley in John from one articulated test prisoner’s arising supra, of claim out a Glick, a case son v. guard. by Moreover, a been beaten and harassed to have Whitley already apply many Appeals the standard of Courts allegations of riot situation. the of excessive force outside to (CA2 1988); Coughlin, Miller 26 23, 842 F. 2d v. See Corselli 1990)(en (CA4 banc), cert. Leathers, 1085, 2d 1087 v. 913 F. (1991);Haynes 2d Marshall, 887 F. denied, 498 1109 (CA8 (CA6 1989); Ellis, 423, 2d 427 916 F. Stenzel v. 700, 1987). (CA11 1990); 1187, 2d Smith, Brown v. 813 F. 1988) (CA1 Campbell, 2d 863 F. see But Unwin v. Whitley (rejecting application absent “an actual standard disturbance”).
A injury Whitley approach, suffered extent the the Under may suggest by “whether an inmate one factor necessary” thought plausibly been have use force could particular such wantonness situation, evinced “or instead unjustified respect of harm as is tanta- infliction with to the willingness knowing at S., occur.” 475 U. that it mount to determining of force was wanton whether the use 321. In unnecessary, may proper to evaluate the need it also be relationship application between that need force, per- “reasonably used, threat and the amount of force “any responsible made officials,” and efforts ceived temper severity response.” Ibid. The of a forceful injury is relevant to the absence of serious therefore inquiry, it. Amendment but does not end significant injury Respondents nonetheless assert that imposed by requirement man- the Fifth the sort Circuit “objective component” dated what we have termed analysis. Seiter, Amendment See Wilson indif- extended the deliberate Wilson S. applied in- claims ference standard volving claims about conditions of confine- medical care to *7 subjective step, suggested taking that the In this we ment. (with aspect Eighth which the Court Amendment claim of an concerned) objective distinguished facet from the was can be considering prisoner’s Thus, courts of the same claim. sufficiently act[ed] if with a claim must ask both “the officials alleged wrongdoing culpable was if state of mind” and enough” objectively to establish a constitutional vi- “harmful at Id., 298, olation. Eighth respect objective component of an to the
With In no new rule. violation, Amendment Wilson announced suggested relationship the re between that decision stead, Eighth quirements types applicable Amend to different necessary sufficient harm for ment is to show claims. What purposes de Punishments Clause Cruel Unusual “[t]he pends upon First, two reasons. issue, the claim at for general Eighth requirement Amendment claimant that an allege prove unnecessary infliction of and wanton pain regard applied for differences should with due ... against Eighth an Amendment the kind of conduct which objection lodged.” Whitley, supra, Second, the is at 320. pun Eighth prohibition cruel and unusual Amendment’s “ (draw[s] meaning evolving ishments its from the standards ” maturing society,’ decency progress that mark the of a Chap Rhodes v. and so admits of few absolute limitations. (1981) Trop (quoting man, 337, Dulles, (1958)(plurality opinion)). U. S. objective component
The of an Amendment claim responsive “contemporary is therefore contextual and decency.” supra, Estelle, at in- standards of 103. For required deprivations make out a are extreme stance, discom- Because routine claim. conditions-of-confinement pay “part penalty offenders that criminal fort “only society,” supra, against at Rhodes, their offenses denying deprivations measure of minimal civilized ‘the those sufficiently grave to form the basis are life’s necessities’ supra, Wilson, at violation.” omitted). 347) (citation supra, A similar (quoting Rhodes, society analysis applies does not to medical needs. Because unqualified prisoners to health expect access will have amounts to an medical needs indifference to care, deliberate only “seri- if those needs are Amendment violation S., Gamble, 429 at 103-104. See Estelle v. ous.” society’s expectations are context, In the excessive force maliciously sadistically officials different. When decency contemporary harm, cause standards use force to Whitley, supra, always This at 327. See are violated. significant injury is evident. Other- true whether or *8 any physical Eighth permit would wise, the Amendment inflicting punishment, inhuman, or no matter how diabolic arbitrary injury. quantity Such a result of less than some unacceptable to the drafters of would have been as today. supra, Eighth Estelle, See at Amendment as it punishment (proscribing was “the torture and barbarous Amendment); Eighth primary of the concern of the drafters” (1879) (“[I]t is safe to Utah, Wilkerson punishments others in of torture . . . and all affirm that cruelty, [the unnecessary line of are forbidden same Amendment]”). Eighth say every a
That is not malevolent touch gives guard rise to a federal cause of action. See Johnson (“Not every push Glick, shove, 481 F. even 2d, may unnecessary peace judge’s it a if later seem in the of rights”). prisoner’s chambers, The violates constitutional Eighth prohibition pun- Amendment’s of “cruel and unusual” recognition necessarily ishments excludes from constitutional physical provided force, de minimis uses of that the use “ ‘repugnant force is not of a sort to the conscience of man- Whitley, (quoting supra, S., kind.’” at Estelle, 106) (internal omitted). quotation at marks
In this the Fifth Circuit case, found Hudson’sclaim untena- injuries ble because his 2d, were “minor.” 929 F. at 1015. Yet the directed at Hudson, bruises, blows which caused swelling, plate, teeth, loosened and a cracked dental are not purposes. de minimis for Amendment The extent injuries provides of Hudson’s thus no basis for dismissal §his 1983 claim.
B theory requires The dissent’s that Wilson an who inmate alleges injury excessive use of force to show serious addi- unnecessary misap- pain tion to the and wanton infliction plies ignores body Wilson and of our jurisprudence. already question suggested, As we have “[wjhether prisoner before the Court in Wilson was claim- ing that conditions confinement constitute and un- cruel culpable usual must on the show state of mind part if officials, and, so, what of mind re- state quired.” supra, presented Wilson, neither 296. Wilson allegation any relating of excessive force nor issue to what “objective component” was dubbed the anof Amend- ment claim.
Wilson did touch on these matters in the course summa- rizing prior holdings, beginning our Gamble, with Estelle v. supra. applied Estelle, noted, we first Cruel Un- deprivations usual Punishments Clause that were specifically part prisoner’s supra, Wilson, sentence. *9 might expected primacy, at 297. As be from this Estelle principle underlying stated the the cases discussed in Wil- “incompatible evolving son: Punishments with the standards decency progress maturing society” that mark the aof “involving] unnecessary pain” the and wanton infliction of “repugnant Eighth are supra, to the Estelle, Amendment.” omitted). (internal quotation This is the marks 102-103 at respect reject. to the ob- With would rule the dissent same component Eighth however, jective claim, of an Amendment progeny. departure suggested its from Estelle and no Wilson argument excessive claims based on The dissent’s are no on confinement claims based conditions force and post, un- 24-25, 4, at and is likewise kind, n. different Whitley’s insight rejecting un- that the Far from founded. pain necessary standard must wanton infliction of Eighth alleged regard applied for the nature with adopted violation, the it. See Amendment Wilson it S., How could be otherwise Wilson, 501 U. at 302-303. punishment is is whether constitutional touchstone when the deny, does, To as the dissent differ- cruel and unusual? serving punching prisoner in face a ence between “ ‘concepts dignity, ignore unappetizing him food to humanity, decency’” that animate standards, civilized (quoting supra, Estelle, Amendment. (CA8 1968)). Bishop, F. 2d Jackson C injury argue significant Respondents that, aside from the applied by Circuit, conduct cannot consti- the Fifth their test it violation because was “isolated tute beating Respondents 28. The Brief for and unauthorized.” dispute they personal “a be- Hudson, contend, arose from security prisoner,” and a and was tween correctional officers against prison policy. Respondents rea- invoke the Ibid. soning held the use of force of courts that have beyond scope “pun- officers under such circumstances prohibited Amendment. See John- ishment” (“[Ajlthough spontaneous supra, Glick, at- son v. at 1032. by guard hope, ‘unusual,’ we it does not and, tack ‘cruel’ ”); any ordinary concept ‘punishment’ George Evans, fit (CA5 1980) (“[A]single, as- 633 F. 2d unauthorized pun- by guard sault does not constitute cruel and unusual *10 .”)(cid:127) Franzen, ishment . . But see Duckworth v. 2dF. (CA7 1985) (“If guard supplement 645, 652 a decided to a prisoner’s punishment beating official him, this would be punishment. denied, . cert. position respondents’ legal argument take no on
We be- inapposite we find it cause on this record. The Court Appeals Magistrate’s left intact the determination that the violence at issue in this case was “not an isolated assault.” testimony App. 27, Indeed, n. 1. there was that McMillian prisoner shortly they and Woods beat another after finished respondents rely with To the extent that Hudson. Ibid. on they acts, the unauthorized nature of their make a claim not presented by ques- Circuit, addressed the Fifth not granted accordingly, certiorari, and, tion on which we respondents ignore Mag- Moreover, before this Court. finding acting supervisor, that Mezo, istrate’s Lieutenant as “expressly in condoned the use of force this instance.” App. 26. judgment Appeals
The
Reversed.
concurring
part
concurring
Stevens,
Justice
judgment.
(1986),
Whitley
In
Albers,
Although reliance on malicious I think that Court’s agree misplaced, I with the Court and sadistic standard demanding was met here. Ac- that even this more standard cordingly, II-A, II-B, and II-C of the I, I concur in Parts opinion judgment. and in its Court’s judgment. concurring in the Blackmun, Justice seriously today puts appropriately rest The Court misguided pain an excessive use of view that inflicted only Eighth when force is actionable under the requires coupled “significant injury,” g., injury e. with permanent Indeed, were medical attention or leaves marks. contrary, place might we to the we various kinds to hold state-sponsored ingeniously torture and the kind abuse—of pain “significant designed a telltale to cause but without beyond pale injury” entirely In of the Constitution. — prohibition and un- other the constitutional of “cruel words, punishments” might not constrain officials usual then straps, whipping lashing prisoners from with leather them beating shocking with hoses, fists, with them naked rubber asphyxiating currents, them short of them with electric intentionally exposing cold, them to undue heat or death, psychosis-inducing drugs. forcibly injecting them with commonly thought practiced only techniques, These to be hardly borders, are unknown within outside this Nation’s g., Campbell prisons. Grammer, 889 See, this Nation’s e. (CA8 1989) (use hoses); high-powered F. 2d fire 1968)(use (CA8 Bishop, Jackson v. 404 F. 2d 574-575 *12 Telephone,” gener- “Tucker a hand-cranked device body flogging parts, ated electric shocks to sensitive Finney, strap). with leather also Hutto v. 437 U. S. See 682, n. 5 Whitley Albers,
Because I was in the dissent in 475 U. S. (1986), join I of 312, 328 do not the Court’s extension Whit- ley’s allegations malicious-and-sadistic standard to all of ex- force, cessive even outside the context of a riot. Nev- join opinion I ertheless, otherwise Court’s solid judgment require that the Amendment does not showing “significant injury” of in the excessive-force context. separately highlight I write two concerns not addressed opinion. in its
I Citing rising respondents, represented caseloads, Attorney joined by Louisiana, General States Wyoming, Texas, Hawaii, Nevada, and Florida amici as cu- suggest “significant injury” requirement riae, that a is neces- sary filings by to curb the number of court inmates. “significant injury requirement We are informed that the has very helping been effective in the Fifth Circuit to control system-wide management problems.” its docket Brief for Texas et al. as Amici Curiae 15. approach Amendment as- to the
This audacious explicit interpretation of an constitutional sumes that the by pure policy preferences for the guided protection is to be judicial Perhaps prisoner petitions. over- paring down determining appropriate whether statu- concern in load is plain- upon standing tory certain should be conferred to sue g., Cal., Contractors e. Associated General See, tiffs. (1983)(identifying Carpenters, 529-546 Inc. circumscribing persons to sue “judge-made entitled rules” Act); §4 Chip Stamps Clayton v. Manor Blue under (1975) judi- (identifying Drug Stores, 723, 737-749 421 U. S. 10(b) § limiting standing “policy” under cial considerations 1934). inherently Exchange this Act of But the Securities interpret- appropriate role in no concern has self-interested right. ing constitutional the contours a substantive presumably worth bear- courts the burden on the Since prisoner’s ing “concern” merit, suit has States’ when simply aptly that such suits are a “conclusion” termed more experience on the federal bench merit. One’s without particular contrary. classes of were Moreover, teaches the court- from the federal exclusion to be nominated for cases law is might which federal to cases in house, we look first sensitively in which funda- to those rather than issue right rights to file are at stake. The constitutional mental prisoner legal is as valuable to redress in the courts *13 prisoner it any is more Indeed, for as to other citizen. of a crime as convicted serious Inasmuch one valuable. right usually to imprisoned franchise, is divested Hopkins, the words Yick Wov. stands, action in file a court (1886), political as his most “fundamental 370 356, 118 U. S. rights.” preservative right, of all because floodgates any open Today’s ruling, not event, does By prisoners filings statute, inmates. —alone §1983 required among to exhaust other claimants—are all 352, 94 42 U. S. C. See Stat. remedies. administrative 1997e(a); Regents § Patsy Florida, 457 S.U. Board v. entitled Moreover, officials are 496, 507-512 in an ob- acted they trial whether to a determination before to a them manner, thereby entitling reasonable jectively Navarette, Procunier v. defense. immunity qualified Fitzgerald, also Harlow v. (1978); see 555, 561-562 mal- (unsubstantiated (1982) allegations 817-818 800, S. immunity). qualified to overcome pretrial ice are insufficient to dismiss court is authorized federal district Additionally, pauperis “if satisfied complaint prisoner’s forma 1915(d). § 28 U. S. C. frivolous or malicious.” the action is docket- any to control should be adequate These measures result from meritless pris- that might management problems oner claims.
II
in
to limit
opinion
I
not read
in the Court’s
anything
do
in
Amendment
physical
under the Eighth
jury cognizable
inflictions of psychological
not hard to'
It is
imagine
jury.
harm —that might
corresponding physical
harm —without
g.,
See, e. Wis
cruel and unusual punishment.
prove
Kennard,
(CA5)
niewski v.
(guard
2d
plac
F.
to blow
mouth and threatening
a revolver
in inmate’s
ing
(1990). The
To be as Court’s pain the not actionable under nonmeasurable minimis or psychological pain more can be But Amendment. clinically may Psychological pain often de minimis. than through diagnosed quantified methods, well-established damages pain ordinary where tort context as suffering the regularly no that to I have doubt are awarded. injury” requirement “physical “physical pain” into read pernicious be no less Amendment would injury” requirement “significant than the without foundation today. reject we joins, alia Thomas, whom Justice Sc with
Justice dissenting. following granted in this case “limited to certiorari
We parties: question,” we for the which formulated “ legal apply when the correct test ‘Did the Fifth Circuit determining petitioner’s his claim that that rights and Unusual Punish- under the Cruel single a result of a were not violated as ments Clause by respondents which did cause of force incident ” significant injury?’ evolving de- standards of what it considers “the Guided cency society,” maturing ante, progress that mark the (internal omitted), today quotation an- marks question negative. I would answer it in in the swers judgment affirmative, and therefore affirm would respectfully I dissent. the Fifth Circuit.
bH empha- Magistrate case who the facts this The found App. injuries petitioner’s “minor.” were sized judges on who heard case of the Fifth Circuit The three *15 appeal not assessment, did disturb that and it has not been challenged here. The sole issue in this it case, as comes to legal prisoner us, is a a one: Must who claims to have been subjected punishments” to “cruel and unusual establish at significant injury? minimum that he has suffered a The today only responds negative, broadly Court not in the but “unnecessary any physical asserts that and wanton” use of against prisoner automatically force amounts cruel and punishment, unusual whenever more than de minimis force goes is Even involved. a de minimis use of force, Court on to declare, cruel and inflicts unusual where it “repugnant is to the conscience of Ante, mankind.” (internal omitted).1 quotation marks The extent to which prisoner injured by is in- indeed, whether he is force— jured at all—is in the Court’s view irrelevant. my only insignificant
In view, a use force that causes prisoner may may harm to a immoral, tortious, be it it may may be criminal, and it even be remediable under other provisions Federal but it Constitution, is not cruel and punishment. concluding contrary, unusual In to the today goes beyond precedents. far our
A
years,
Until recent
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
apply
deprivations
Clause
not
was
deemed to
at all to
part
were not inflicted as
of the sentence for a
For
crime.
generations, judges
regarded
and commentators
only
applying
punishments
Amendment as
to torturous
by
sentencing judges,
gen-
meted out
statutes or
and not
erally
any hardship
might
prisoner during
befall a
In
incarceration.
Weems
States,
v. United
terpretation of
might regulate
that the Clause
even hint
Weems
where does
prisoners.
just
the treatment
but
criminal sentences
governing
commentary
as
Scholarly
the Clause
also viewed
Cooley,
part
See T.
punishments
of the sentence.
that were
(“It
certainly difficult to
*329
Limitations
Constitutional
pun-
and unusual
precisely
cruel
what is meant
determine
*16
by
Probably any punishment
statute for
declared
ishments.
way at the com-
punishable in the same
which was
an offence
in
regarded
unusual
the
cruel or
as
law, could not be
mon
statutory
any
probably
of-
new
And
constitutional sense.
permit-
may
punished
mode
and in the
to the extent
fence
But
similar nature.
law for offences of
the common
ted
any
become
degrading punishments
in
had
which
State
those
adopted,
existing
we
was
its
constitution
obsolete before
unusual”)
may
it as cruel and
held
well be
forbidden
think
added).
Story,
the
on
(emphasis
Commentaries
also 3 J.
See
(1833).
750-751
the United States
Constitution
early
congenial place
Surely prison
in the
was not a more
judges
today;
years
Republic
nor were our
than it is
the often
unaware of
as to be
so naive
and commentators
simply
they
did not
prison
Rather,
life.
harsh conditions
protecting inmates
Eighth
as
Amendment
conceive of
historically,
courts
the lower
Thus,
treatment.
from harsh
by explaining
grievances
routinely rejected prisoner
that the
“[I]t
prison
well set
regulating
life.
had no role
courts
superintend
the courts to
the function of
tled that it is not
penitentiaries,
discipline
prisoners in
treatment and
illegally
imprisonment
only
who are
those
from
but
to deliver
(CA9),
Swope,
850, 851-852
187 F. 2d
v.
confined.” Stroud
(1951).
Settle,
also Sutton v.
See
denied,
B We made clear in Estelle that plays very regulating limited role administration. The case involved claim that doctors had inade quately rejected attended an inmate’s medical needs. We allege inmate to claim because the failed “acts or omis sufficiently sions to harmful evidence deliberate indifference added). (emphasis Id., serious medical needs.” specified From we outset, that the Amend thus, every every apply deprivation, ment does un even necessary deprivation, by prisoner, only suffered but deprivations involving injury narrow class of in “serious” by prison acting culpable flicted officials with a of mind. state “objec We have since these twin described elements as the *17 “subjective” components Eighth tive” and anof Amendment prison-claim. Seiter, See Wilson v. 501 U. 294, 298 S. Eighth
We have never a found violation of the Amendment the-prison when an context inmate has failed establish to Chapman, either these elements. In Rhodes v. 452 U. S. (1981), upheld practice placing for instance, we a two single ground alleged injury in a on inmates cell the that the insufficiently Only was serious. where conditions deny an inmate “the minimal civilized measure life’s ne- they id., cessities,” at said, we be could considered cruel punishment. Similarly, Whitley and unusual Albers, (1986), guard we held that a did not violate the Eighth during Amendment he when shot an inmate sufficiently culpable riot because he had not acted with a quell state of mind. When an official riot, uses force to we Eighth said, he does the not violate Amendment unless he “‘maliciously sadistically very purpose acts the and (quoting Glick, causing Johnson v. Id., at 320-321 harm.’” (CA2) J.), (Friendly, sub cert. denied 2d 481 F. (1973)). Johnson, 414 U. S. nom. John v. prison jurispru- Eighth synthesized our Amendment
We alleged supra. the Wilson, There inmate last Term in dence per poor se amounted of his confinement that the conditions argued punishment, that he should to cruel and unusual required that officials acted to establish not be in addition emphasizing argument, culpably. rejected We prison deprivation seeking that a an to establish inmate always must sat- amounts to cruel and unusual (Was deprivation component. isfy “objective . . both (Did serious?)” “subjective component sufficiently and the mind?)” culpable sufficiently state of act the officials with a necessary are Id., Both Amendment. at 298. components; neither suffices itself. components, objective subjective course, are
These jurisprudence, implicit Amendment in the traditional penalties statutes or sentenc- meted out focuses on which ordering pass ing judges. statute Thus, if a were State we would not wheel, at the felons be broken that convicted legislature inquire separately had acted with whether statute, as an intentional indifference,” since a “deliberate higher necessarily thresh- state-of-mind even act, satisfies deprivation objec- inquiry Likewise, whether old. encompassed determina- tively within our serious would it “cruel and unusual.” tion whether was loose from its histor- cut the When we range prison depri- moorings applied to a broad it ical explicit appropriate limita- make it vations, we found Whitley, “If Rhodes, and Wilson. Estelle, tions described in *18 formally pain meted out as is not the inflicted sentencing judge, element by some mental the the statute or qual- inflicting can officer before it to the be attributed must original) (emphasis ify,” in thus, Wilson, S., 501 U. — Similarly, deprivations subjective component. because the imprisonment, very we made essence of of all sorts are the requirement explicit deprivation to ensure that the serious regu- the not transfer wholesale the Amendment did judges. prison That executive officials lation of life from by inquiry why, mandated the described the Wilson, is we deprivation sufficiently component “[W]as objective as: added). (emphasis That formulation Id., serious?” assumption depriva- prior plainly that a serious reveals our analysis, always required. a court’s task Under tion is challenged any given whether the to determine case was “sufficiently” deprivation not, It was as the serious. was today interpretation it, would have to determine Court’s required deprivation at all.2 a “serious” whether C Whitley, might Wilson, one Rhodes, Estelle, Given difficulty an- would have little assumed that the Court have by upholding swering question presented in this case injury” requirement.3 “significant Instead, Fifth Circuit’s objective component “[t]he of an announces that the Court responsive Amendment claim is . . . contextual (internal decency.” contemporary Ante, at 8 standards of omitted). alleging quotation In the context of claims marks physical asserts, then force, use of the Court the excessive by deprivation requirement is satisfied no serious the serious maliciously deprivation at all. “When officials claim, petitioner Eighth Amendment granting While relief on his open the issue whether isolated and unauthorized acts are leaves will, course, question be the critical in future “punishment” at all. This ultimately type. we that isolated and unauthorized cases of this If decide today’s “punishment,” then decision is a dead letter. That acts are not anomaly artificiality applying Amend simply highlights prisoner grievances, whether caused the random misdeeds of ment to policy. official officials any there difference between the 3 1 do not believe substantive precedents in our and the Fifth deprivation” requirement found “serious injury” requirement. “significant Circuit’s *19 contemporary sadistically harm, standards use force to cause Ascertaining decency always Ante, are violated.” of only the words, is mind, of in other officials’ state deciding inquiry cases involve cruel whether such relevant approach my punishment. is an view, In this unusual Eighth Amend- with our and unfortunate break unwarranted prison jurisprudence. ment purports this case from to the answer to derive
The Court Whitley. an Amendment The sum and substance ‘“ unnecessary and wan- is “the asserts, the violation, Whitley, (quoting pain.’”” at 5 Ante, ton infliction 319). advantage, from the has the S., at This formulation objective component. eliminating perspective, Court’s dispute only Whitley con- however, the above, noted As subjective prisoner, component; the who had been cerned objectively subjected self-evidently an seri- been to shot, had today, Whitley say, injury. does did not as the Court ous objective component and that an contextual, is may prisoner where is Amendment claim succeed injured. Whitley prop- seriously for the stands Rather, objectively assuming the of an serious that, existence osition culpability deprivation, state of mind de- of an official’s “Whitley pends in which he teaches on the context acts. enough satisfy assuming is that, the conduct harmful objective component claim, see (1981), Chapman, whether it can be Rhodes depends upon the ‘wanton’ constraints fac- characterized as modified). (emphasis supra, ing Wilson, the official.” subject prisoner “unnecessary to the officials Whether way pain” simply one to describe the infliction wanton Whitley inquiry issue in mind that was at itself. state necessary inquiry but not clear, Wilson made As suf- prisoner when a seeks to show that he has been sub- ficient punishment. jected to cruel and unusual objective Perhaps compensate for its elimination of component cases, the Court simultane- in excessive force ously prisoners subjec- makes it harder for to establish the component. explained tive As we in Wilson, “deliberate in- *20 required difference” is the baseline mental state to establish an Depar- Amendment violation. 501 atS.,U. justified Whitley, ture from this baseline is as in where, response emergency; officialsact in to an in such situ- ations their conduct cannot be characterized as un- “wanton” “maliciously sadistically very pur- less it is taken pose for the (internal causing harm.” 475 U. omitted). at S., 320-321 quotation today marks The Court extends the heightened applied Whitley mental state to all excessive competing force cases, even where no institutional concerns present. simply are “[m]any The Court asserts that underlying holding Whitley the concerns our arise when- guards keep (emphasis ever use force to Ante, order.” at 6 added). agree. Many I do not excessive force cases do not (In guards’ attempts “keep very arise from to order.” this petitioner’s Eighth case, the basis for Amendment claim is guards that the himhit when there was no need for them to all.) any physical use force at The use of excessive force is (in by invariably perhaps predomi- no means fact, not even nantly) accompanied by a “malicious and sadistic” state of justification applying mind. I see extraordinary no for Whitley regard standard to all excessive force cases, without facing prison to the constraints officials. The Court’s un- Whitley, only suppose, warranted extension of I can is driven implausibility saying injuries imposed that minor upon prisoners anything with less than a “malicious and sadistic” state of mind can amount to cruel and unusual punishment.
D attempts distinguish expressly The Court’s the cases resting upon objective component equally are unconvinc ing. required depriva As noted above, we have extreme an challenging tion in cases conditions of confinement, Rhodes Chapman, Why such should an ob- deprivation required jectively there and not here? serious ‘part explanation “routine discomfort is that The Court’s pay their offenses penalty that criminal offenders supra, (quoting society.’” Rhodes, against Ante, 347). gap quite “routine discomfort” between But there ne- life’s measure of of “the minimal civilized and the denial viola- required an establish cessities” society’s view, our standards then, In tion. the Court’s anything con- decency of uncivilized short are not violated (no mental how malicious the matter ditions of confinement involved), automatically violated are but state of officials regardless it even by any of whether force, use malicious why puzzling. injury. I our see no reason This is causes *21 readily decency society’s of- more should be standards of subject culpable of mind, a state fended when with officials, deprivation prisoner than on one discrete occasion a to a they subject deprivations time. continuous over when him to deprivation anything, con- a inflicted I would think that If greater tinuously long period concern a would over particular society deprivation one inflicted on than a to occasion.4 unper- attempted is also distinction Estelle
The Court’s expect prisoners society will does not that suasive: “Because cases, Moreover, from by distinguishing case “conditions” this repudiated only unsup have as “not resurrects a distinction that we Seiter, Wilson portable principle practice.” in but in unworkable against prisoner, a 294, 299, n. 1 When officials use force It every day, once is a “condition” of his confinement. whether or unwise, my view, very deprivation in the serious to make the existence of as one depend particular on claim is characterized requirement whether McCar act.” challenging challenging “specific Cf. a “condition” or one (1991) (“[Cjonditions Bronson, 136, 139, thy of confine S. 636(b)(1)(B) only challenges § include not to ment” under 28 U. S. C. challenges “isolated incidents” of ongoing but also to conditions force, challenging part excessive because “the between cases distinction specific alleged miscon ongoing challenging conditions and those acts identify”). duct will often be difficult to unqualified
have care, access to health deliberate indiffer- ence to medical needs amounts to an vio- ” only my Ante, lation if are those needs ‘serious.’ In society similarly expectation prisoners view, our has no “unqualified” forcibly will have freedom from force, since keeping prisoners prisons in detention is what are all about. Why injury should the seriousness of matter when doctors maliciously to decide not treat an but inmate, not when guards maliciously decide strike him? way
At bottom, course, there is no conclusive to refute society’s “contemporary the Court’s assertions about our no- decency.” why precisely long tions of That is this Court has insisted that determinations whether is cruel by objective and unusual “should be informed factors to the (internal possible supra, maximum extent,” Rhodes, omitted). quotation marks attempts justify departure prece-
The Court its from by saying showing injury dent that if a of serious re- were quired, permit any physical “the Amendment would punishment, inflicting no matter how or inhuman, diabolic arbitrary quantity injury.” less than some Ante, at 9. my statement, That view, reveals central flaw in the “[Djiabolic reasoning. punishments by Court’s or inhuman” injury. say inflict serious That is not to that the definition injury always “Many physical. things— be, must will be, *22 beating with a rubber water truncheon, torture, electric ‘Space may shock, incessant noise, reruns of cause 1999’— agony they yet enduring injury. as occur leave no The state pains just long is not free to inflict such without so cause as it is careful leave no Boles, to marks.” Williams 841 F. 2d (CA7 1988). Surely prisoner alleges a who that prison officialstortured him with a device the like notorious Telephone” “Tucker ante, described Blackmun, Justice alleged injury. petitioner has a serious But not has alleged deprivation type; injuries alleged of this the he has entirely physical are and were below to be found “minor.” require- injury serious the Furthermore, to characterize why explain “arbitrary” be elimi- it should not to as is ment applicable it particular remains this context while nated in al- deprivations. sure, it will not To to all other injuries ways But simi- “serious.” which are be obvious always are larly, which medical needs it be obvious will not deny “the mini- of confinement or which conditions “serious,” These determi- necessities.” civilized measure of life’s mal required Amendment, the are, however, nations only punishments prohibits that are “cruel and those which precedents explained I think our above, As unusual.” seeking prove clearly prisoner he that that a establish subjected must to “cruel and unusual” has been deprivation. always serious that he has suffered a show unneces- at word “the the be taken its If prisoner upon per sary pain” se and wanton infliction of implications punishment, the to cruel and unusual amounts opinion sweeping. re- today’s For this formulation are prior places objective component in our cases described the Many deprivations, “necessity” component. awith any meaning- “necessary,” at least under however, are not analysis, today’s Thus, under ful definition of that word. celling” Surely wrongly the “double was decided. Rhodes “necessary” penal to fulfill State’s of inmates was designed prison in case had been fact, in mission; simply 452 U. cells, S., but was overcrowded. for individual rejected prisoners’ be- claim Rhodes not at 343. We “necessary,” celling was cause we determined that double sufficiently alleged deprivations were not but because the punishment. serious to state a claim of cruel and unusual apparently today, “necessity” deprivation After only inquiry beyond of official relevant the wantonness my approach, view, This extends conduct. beyond all reasonable limits.
28 Today's expansion of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments II history beyond precedent all
Clause bounds I is, sus pect, yet pervasive another manifestation of the view that society. the Federal must address all ills in Constitution our by prison guards deplorable Abusive behavior conduct properly outrage contempt. evokes But that does invariably not mean that it is unconstitutional. The not, Amendment is and should not be into, turned a National Regulation. reject Code Prison To the notion that the injuries concededly infliction of “minor” can be considered (much either “cruel” or “unusual” less cruel and punishment) say accept unusual is not to that it amounts to recognize primary Rather, able it is to conduct. re sponsibility preventing punishing such conduct rests reg not with the Federal Constitution but with the laws and ulations the various States. apparently
Petitioner
could have,
not,
but did
seek redress
injuries
Respondents
for his
under state law.5
concede that
5According
respondents:
“Louisiana
state courts
open
prisoners
purpose
are
for the
suing
prison personnel
wrongs.
have
them unjustified
example,
who
caused
For
State,
denied,
see Parker v.
(La.
cert.
483,
1973),
282 So. 2d
486-87
414
Phelps,
(La.
Anderson v.
(1973);
U.
1284, 1286
S. 1093
App.
451 So. 2d
Ct.
State,
McGee v.
1984);
(La.
416,
1st Cir.
417
Ct. App.
Cir.),
So. 2d
418
1st
denied,
State,
writ
Neathery
(La.
1982);
420
2d
407,
So.
871
v.
395 So. 2d
(La.
Through Dep’t
Shields v. State
Correc
410
App.
1981);
Ct.
Cir.
3d
tions,
denied,
(La.
writ
App.
1979),
380 So.
123
2d
Ct.
1st Cir.
382 So. 2d
State,
denied,
(La.
164;
290,
writ
v.
App.
Cir.),
308 So. 2d
295
Ct.
1st
Craft
denied,
(La. 1975),
cert.
319
441
1075,
859,
So. 2d
U.
423
S.
96 S. Ct.
47 L.
Listi,
Lewis v.
(1976);
(La.
551,
Ed.
84
2d
377
App.
So. 2d
553
Ct.
3d Cir.
State,
Bastida v.
1979);
(La.
544,
App.
1972);
2d
So.
Ct.
1st Cir.
State,
Adams
(La.
149, 151
St. Julian
v.
App.
1971);
247 So. 2d
Ct.
1st Cir.
State,
State,
(La.
Nedd
v.
App.
1957);
2d
1484,
S.
Ct.
94 S.
39 L. Ed.
State,
Mack
(1974);
(La.
2d 572
App.
529 So. 2d
Ct.
1st
Cir.
denied,
State,
writ
(La.
1988),
Walden
1988);
29 constitutionally ade- were state remedies if available the Due Process petitioner under quate, have claim would v. Cf. Davidson Amendment. the Fourteenth Clause (1986); Palmer, 468 v. Hudson 348 Cannon, 344, (1984); 474 U. S. Taylor, 527, 451 U. S. Parratt v. 517, 532-534 appro- respondents agree that this is the I with 541 in- appropriately limited, federal constitutional priate, and quiry in this case. prisoner precedents, a our that, I under
Because conclude subjected to cruel and seeking been that he has establish always has show that he suffered must unusual judgment of the Fifth injury, I would affirm a serious Circuit. 1980); Hampton v. (La. Phelps, White 1st Cir. App. Ct. v. So. 2d 1188 387 State,
State,
Davis
(La.
1978);
v.
356
257,
1st Cir.
App.
2d
258
Ct.
361 So.
State,
Betsch
1977);
v.
So. 2d
(La.
353
App.
Ct.
1st Cir.
454
So. 2d
refused, 354 So.
(La.
1977), writ
(La.
1389
2d
[358],
App. 1st Cir.
359
Ct.
State,
Jones
(La.
1977);
Williams
App.
Ct.
1st Cir.
1978);
v.