CRAIG v. HARRY, 2:23-cv-03608

Background

Plaintiff Ruben R. Craig III, a state prisoner, sued multiple SCIP officials and a contract chaplain under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and RLUIPA for alleged First Amendment, Eighth Amendment, due process, access-to-courts, and related violations.
Central factual claim: chaplain David Dunn Bauer (and supervisors/staff) imposed an approximately 15‑month ban on Craig attending group Jewish services/study at SCI Phoenix after doctrinal disputes and disruptions; Bauer substituted Reconstructionist practices and allegedly disrespected Orthodox beliefs.
Other claims: denial/discipline affecting law‑library access and receipt of publications, alleged destruction/mishandling of sacred texts, an OC‑spray incident (Emminger), and placement in RHU and transfer to SCI Benner.
Procedural posture: Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6); court considered certain exhaustion materials and converted the Emminger excessive‑force issue to Rule 56 limited review. Craig was transferred and the ban expired while motions were pending.
Court dismissed all claims with prejudice: Free Exercise/Establishment, RLUIPA injunctive relief (moot), publication and access claims, excessive‑force claim (insufficient pleading and failure to exhaust), conditions/retaliation/due process claims.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1) First Amendment Free Exercise (ban from group religious activities)	Ban burdened Craig’s Orthodox practice; chaplain’s teachings and pronoun practices targeted his religion.	Ban was a security/order response to repeated disruptions; Turner factors justify restriction and alternatives existed.	Dismissed: defendants plausibly acted to prevent disruption; Turner factors support the ban; claims not plausible.
2) RLUIPA injunctive relief	Sought injunction to remove ban and restore religious access.	Ban expired and Craig was transferred; RLUIPA does not permit money damages against states.	Dismissed as moot: no live controversy and no basis for money damages under RLUIPA.
3) Excessive‑force (OC spray by Emminger)	Emminger sprayed Craig through the cell wicket without justification.	Complaint lacks context; force was to restore discipline; plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies.	Dismissed: pleadings do not plausibly allege malicious/sadistic use of force and exhaustion undisputedly incomplete.
4) Access to law library / publications / due process	Denied library access and publications (including "Lighting the Nude"); false IPRC procedure and deprivation of books violated First and Fourteenth Amendments.	Prison has legitimate penological interests in reviewing publications; no protected property interest in receiving books; no actual injury to access‑to‑courts claimed.	Dismissed: no atypical hardship or allegation of lost nonfrivolous claim (access); publications restriction reviewed under Turner/Thornburgh and plaintiff fails to plead unreasonableness.

Key Cases Cited

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (pleading must state plausible entitlement to relief).
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (plausibility standard for complaints).
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (U.S. 1987) (four‑factor test for reasonableness of prison regulations affecting constitutional rights).
O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (U.S. 1987) (prisoners retain First Amendment rights subject to legitimate penological constraints).
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (U.S. 1989) (standards for prison rejection of incoming publications).
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1992) (excessive‑force standard under the Eighth Amendment).
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (U.S. 1986) (use‑of‑force review factors).
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (U.S. 1995) (liberty interests and atypical, significant hardship test).
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (U.S. 1994) (deliberate indifference standard).
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (U.S. 2006) (PLRA requires exhaustion of available administrative remedies).
Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (U.S. 2011) (RLUIPA does not waive state sovereign immunity for money damages).