United States v. State of MinnesotaUnited States v. State of Minnesota
Tiberius T. Davis and Lauri Wiesner, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff United States of America.
Joseph Robert Richie, Madeleine DeMeules, and Brian Scott Carter, Office of the Minnesota Attorney General, Saint Paul, MN, for Defendants State of Minnesota and Keith Ellison.
Heather Passe Robertson, Munazza Humayun, and Sara J. Lathrop, Minneapolis City Attorney‘s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendant City of Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Alexander Hsu, Saint Paul City Attorney‘s Office, Saint Paul, MN, for Defendant City of Saint Paul, Minnesota.
Alan Martinson, Sarah C.S. McLaren, Sparrowleaf Dilts McGregor, and Spencer Davis VanNess, Hennepin County Attorney‘s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendants Hennepin County, Minnesota, and Dawanna S. Witt.
The defendants in this case adopted and enforce so-called “sanctuary” laws and policies that restrict their participation in federal immigration enforcement. Some laws,
The United States claims these laws and policies violate the federal Constitution‘s Supremacy Clause in two ways: (1) It claims that federal law preempts them, and (2) it claims they burden the federal government in violation of the intergovernmental immunity doctrine. And it seeks a declaration that thе sanctuary laws and policies are unconstitutional and an injunction prohibiting Defendants from enforcing them. The claims raise legal questions regarding the balance of power between the national government on the one hand, and a state and its political subdivisions on the other.
Defendants seek the case‘s dismissal on various grounds. To varying degrees, they all challenge subject-matter jurisdiction under
The short version is this: The United States’ preemption challenge to the Minnesota Constitution fails for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, but no other claim will be dismissed on this basis. The United States’ service of process on the City of Minneapolis was deficient, but not so much as to warrant dismissal on this ground. The remaining claims fail on their merits. The preemption claims fail for several reasons, but primarily because, as the United States construes its assertedly preemptive laws, they violate the
I
A
Begin with a description of the United States’ claims. The United States claims in Count One that Article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution, as interpreted by an advisory opinion issued by Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison, “conflict[s] with, and create[s] obstacles to, the enforcement of federal immigration law.” Compl. [ECF No. 1] ¶ 91; see id. ¶¶ 90-98. The federal immigration law on which this preemption claim depends includes a statute and a regulation. The statute authorizes the United States Attorney General to
enter into a written agreement with a State, or any political subdivision of a State, pursuant to which an officer or employee of the State or subdivision, who is determined by the Attorney General to be qualified to perform a function of an immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in the United States (including the transportation of such aliens across State lines to detention centers), may carry out such function at the expense of the State or political subdivision and to the extent consistent with State and local law.
(d) Temporary detention at Department request. Upon a determination by the Department to issue a detainer for an alien not otherwise detained by a criminal justice agency, such agency shall maintain custody of the alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays in order to permit assumption of custody by the Department.
Article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution is “‘textually identical’ in all relevant respects” to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. City of Golden Valley v. Wiebesick, 899 N.W.2d 152, 158 (Minn. 2017) (quoting State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 209 (Minn. 2005)). It reads:
§ 10. Unreasonable searches and seizures prohibited. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized.
B
The United States claims in Count Two that several Minnesota statutes “conflict with, and create obstacles to, the enforcement of federal immigration law,” Compl. ¶ 100, and in Count Six that these same statutes “unlawfully discriminate against the Federal Government,” id. ¶ 129. See id. ¶¶ 99-107 (preemption claim), ¶¶ 128-34 (discrimination claim). The federal immigration laws on which the preemption aspect of this claim depends include two statutes governing information sharing between the Immigration and Naturalization Service and States or local government units,
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, no State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way restricted, from sending to or receiving from the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States.
Described at a high level, the challenged Minnesota statutes govern the management of driver‘s license information within the Department of Public Safety and forbid the Department from sharing immigration-status data with certain third parties, including federal immigration enforcement authorities. The first challenged statute is
Prior to disclosing to a data requester, other than the data subject, any data on individuals relating to a noncompliant driver‘s license or identification card, the commissioner [of the Minnesota Department of Public Safety] or a driver‘s license agent must require the data requester to certify that the data requester must not use the data for civil immigration enforcement purposes or disclose the data to a state or federal government entity that primarily enforces immigration law or to any employee or agent of any such government entity.
As authorized or required by state or federal law, the commissioner or a driver‘s license agent may share or disseminate data on individuals who have applied for or been issued a noncompliant driver‘s license or identification card that are not immigration status data to a government entity, as defined in section 13.02, subdivision 7a,3 or to a federal government entity that does not enforce immigration law, provided that the receiving entity must not use the data for civil immigration enforcement purposes or further disclose the data to a state or federal government entity that primarily enforces immigration law or to any employee or agent of any such government entity.
And subdivision 11(d) reads:
Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the commissioner or a driver‘s license agent must not share or disseminate any data on individuals who have applied for or been issued a noncompliant driver‘s license or identification card to any federal government entity that primarily enforces immigration law, except pursuant to a valid search warrant or court order issued by a state or federal judge.
Finally,
The United States claims in Count Three that specific Minneapolis ordinances “conflict with, and create obstacles to, the enforcement of federal immigration law,” Compl. ¶ 109, and in Count Seven that these same ordinances “unlawfully discriminate against the federal government,” id. ¶ 136. See id. ¶¶ 108-114 (preemption claim), ¶¶ 135-38 (discrimination claim).4 The preemption aspect of this claim depends on each of the federal statutes and the regulation described above,
The challenged Minneapolis ordinances are part of a chapter that
clarifies the communication and enforcement relationship between the city and the federal government including the United States Department of Homeland Security [(“DHS“)] and other federal agencies with respect to any and all efforts to investigate, enforce, or assist in the investigation or enforcement of (collectively, “enforce“) any federal civil immigration law and any federal criminal immigration law that penalizes a person‘s presence in, entry, or reentry to, or employment in, the United States, when not accompanied by other criminal conduct (collectively, “federal immigration laws“).
Minneapolis, Minn., Code of Ordinances, tit. 2, ch. 19, § 19.10. Under this chapter, “[p]ublic safety officials shall not undertake any law enforcement action for the purpose of enforcing federal immigration laws, or to verify immigration status, including but not limited to questioning any person or persons about their immigration status.” Minneapolis,
[a] request made by a victim of crime, or the victim‘s attorney or other appropriate representative, to a city certifying agency for a U Nonimmigrant Status certification or a T Visa Declaration of Law Enforcement Officer for Victim of Trafficking in Persons for persons eligible under 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(15)(T) and (U) as provided in the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Prevention Act of 2000.
Minneapolis, Minn., Code of Ordinances, tit. 2, ch. 19, § 19.80(a)(1). A “city certifying agency” is “[a]ny city department having legal authority to sign a U Visa Nonimmigrant Status Certification or a T Visa Declaration of Law Enforcement Officer for Victim of Trafficking in Persons.” Minneapolis, Minn., Code of Ordinances, tit. 2, ch. 19, § 19.80(a)(2).
D
The United States claims in Count Four that specific Saint Paul ordinances “conflict with, and create obstacles to, the enforcement of federal immigration law,” Compl. ¶ 116, and it claims in Count Eight that these same ordinances “unlawfully discriminate against the federal Government,” id. ¶ 140. See id. ¶¶ 115-21 (preemption claim), ¶¶ 139-42
The challenged provisions appear in the Saint Paul Code of Ordinances, Part III, Title III, Chapter 44. Chapter 44 “clarifies the communication and enforcement relationship between the city and the United States Department of Homeland Security . . . and other federal agencies with respect to the enforcement of civil immigration laws.” Saint Paul, Minn., Code of Ordinances, pt. III, tit. III, ch. 44, § 44.01. One challenged provision instructs that “[p]ublic safety officials may not undertake any law enforcement action for the sole purpose of detecting the presence of undocumented persons, or to verify immigration status, including but not limited to questioning any person or persons about their immigration status.” Saint Paul, Minn., Code of Ordinances, pt. III, tit. III, ch. 44, § 44.03(a)(1). Another provision directs that “[p]ublic safety officials may not question, arrest or detain any person for violations of federal civil immigration laws except when immigration status is an element of the crime or when enforcing
E
The United States claims in Count Five that an administrative directive issued by the Hennepin County Sheriff “conflicts with, and create[s] obstacles to, the enforcement of federal immigration law,” Compl. ¶ 123, and it claims in Count Nine that the directive “unlawfully discriminates against the federal Government,” id. ¶ 144. See id. ¶¶ 122-27 (preemption claim), ¶¶ 143-46 (discrimination claim). Again, this claim‘s preemption aspect deрends on the federal statutes and the regulation described above,
The challenged directive reads:
The Hennepin County Sheriff‘s Office will not hold individuals in custody at the Adult Detention Center when the only documentation for that individual to be held in custody is a [DHS/ICE] Immigration Detainer. These detainers (1247G, 1247A, 1200, and 1205) are administrative warrants which are not signed by a judge and do not constitute judicial authority to hold an individual. ICE will not be notified of the admittance or release of any individual based on any of these detainers. If continued detention of an individual for ICE is authorized based on a judicially signed immigration warrant, ICE will be notified when they become the holding agency. Absent a judicially signed immigration warrant authorizing the continued detention of an individual for ICE, that individual will be released from custody when all local charges or other holds have been disposed of.
Compl. ¶ 71.
A
Defendants raise a variety of Article III jurisdictional challenges under
Defendants challenge subject-matter jurisdiction on the face of the Complaint. See ECF No. 19 at 9 (“Nothing in the Complaint explains why Hennepin County, which is not a state agency, nor why Sheriff Witt, who is not a state commissioner, are included under Counts II and VI. There are zero allegations in the Complaint that allege any relationship between the Hennepin Defendants and the Statutes, let alone the traceability or redressability required for standing or a violation of law required to state a claim.” (first
In support of its opposition to Defendants’ motions, the United States filed a declaration that includes testimony regarding many facts not alleged in the Complaint, ECF No. 51-2, but it would be inappropriate to consider the declaration in view of the facial character of Defendants’ jurisdictional challenges. Fuller v. Honeywell Int‘l, Inc., No. 24-cv-279 (ECT/DJF), 2024 WL 3569496, at *2 n.4 (D. Minn. July 29, 2024) (noting that, in the
All of this means the familiar
B
Several general rules apply to all Defendants’ jurisdictional challenges. “As the party invoking federal jurisdiction, the plaintiff[] bear[s] the burden of demonstrating that [it has] standing.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 430-31 (2021) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). “[S]tanding is based on the facts as they existed at the time the lawsuit was filed.” Steger v. Franco, Inc., 228 F.3d 889, 893 (8th Cir. 2000). To establish Article III standing at the motion-to-dismiss stage, a plaintiff must allege facts plausibly showing that it has “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016); see Thole v. U.S. Bank N.A., 590 U.S. 538, 544 (2020) (noting that these elements must be “plausibly and clearly allege[d]“); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.5 “Jurisdictional issues, whether they involve questions of law or of fact, are for the court to decide.” Osborn, 918 F.2d at
C
1
Minneapolis, Saint Paul, Hennepin County, and the Hennepin County Sheriff raise a causation argument. They contend that any injuries resulting to the United States from the challenged Minnesota state laws (the Minnesota Constitution as interpreted by the Attorney General opinion and the Minnesota statutes) are not traceable to the cities, county, or sheriff because they did not enact and do not enforce these state provisions. These laws are challenged in Counts One, Two, and Six.
This contention is persuasive. In suits like this involving constitutional challenges to state laws, “the causation element of standing requires the named defendants to possess authority to enforce the complained-of provision.” Calzone v. Hawley, 866 F.3d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Digit. Recognition Network, Inc. v. Hutchinson, 803 F.3d 952, 958 (8th Cir. 2015)); accord Lackie v. Minn. State Univ. Student Ass‘n, No. 24-cv-1684 (LMP/LIB); 2025 WL 416764, at *4 (D. Minn. Feb. 6, 2026); Alexis Bailly Vineyard, Inc. v. Harrington, 931 F.3d 774, 779 (8th Cir. 2019) (explaining that an injury is “fairly
Here, the Complaint alleges no facts tending to show—and the challenged state provisions give no reason to think—that Minneapolis, Saint Paul, Hennepin County, or the Hennepin County Sheriff possess enforcement authority over any of the challenged state laws. Because these Defendants lack enforcement responsibility over these provisions, the United States’ injuries are not traceable to these Defendants, and injunctive or declaratory relief against them would have no effect. Cf. Iowa, 126 F.4th at 1343 (holding United States’ injury caused by Iowa law “is likely redressable by a favorable judicial decision, specifically, an injunction against enforcing the Act, which would prevent [Iowa] state officials from interfering with U.S. enforcement of federal immigration law“). For these reasons, the United States has not plausibly alleged standing to assert Counts One, Two, and Six against the City of Minneapolis, the City of Saint Paul, Hennepin County, and the Hennepin County Sheriff. These claims will be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction with respect to these Defendants.
Minneapolis argues that the United States has not plausibly alleged an injury-in-fаct resulting from the Minneapolis city ordinances. ECF No. 37 at 21-25. An injury-in-fact is the “invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citation modified). “The United States has a legally protected interest in enforcing federal law.” United States v. Missouri, 114 F.4th 980, 984 (8th Cir. 2024) (citing United States v. Colo. Sup. Ct., 87 F.3d 1161, 1165 (10th Cir. 1996)), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 90 (2025); see also United States v. Ekblad, 732 F.2d 562, 563 (7th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (“The United States has standing to seek relief from actual or threatened interference with the performance of its proper governmental functions.“). “Interference with the federal government‘s interest in enforcing federal law is sufficient to establish that [a state law] injured the United States.” Missouri, 114 F.4th at 985.
To have standing to obtain injunctive relief, the plaintiff must show that it is likely to suffer future injury by the defendant and that the sought-after relief will prevent that future injury. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102-03 (1983). “In future injury cases, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the threatened injury is certainly impending, or there is a substantial risk that the harm will occur.” In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 769 (8th Cir. 2017) (citation modified); see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2 (“Although imminence is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is certainly impending.” (citation modified)).
Here, the Complaint plausibly alleges that the United States faces ongoing, certainly impending injuries stemming from the Minneapolis ordinances. The Complaint alleges that following the challenged ordinances’ enactmеnt, “local law enforcement officers have refused to provide ICE with information that aids ICE in immigration investigations” and that these “refusals have significantly impeded ICE‘s efforts to enforce our Nation‘s immigration laws.” Compl. ¶ 84. The Complaint alleges that, because of the ordinances, “the city police department[] ha[s] refused to assist ICE by providing marked units and patrol officers to establish a perimeter during ICE enforcement operations,” which would “reduce[] risks for ICE officers and the public because it creates a more secure environment.” Id. ¶ 85. These allegations plausibly show an impairment to the United States’ “legally protected interest in enforcing federal law.” Missouri, 114 F.4th at 984. And though these allegations are backward-looking, it seems reasonable to infer that the
3
Minnesota and its Attorney General raise jurisdictional challenges to the United States’ claim that federal immigration law preempts Article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution, as interpreted by the Attorney General‘s advisory opinion. They argue (a) that the United States has not shown an Article III injury resulting from the challenged constitutional provision, (b) that, if the United States plausibly alleged an injury-in-fact, it has not plausibly alleged that the injury is traceable to the challenged constitutional provision or redressable via the relief it seeks, and (c) that, regardless, the claim is not ripe. ECF No. 31 at 10-14.
a
With respect to the United States’ preemption claim against Minnesota and its Attorney General under
Minnesota and its Attorney General argue that the Complaint’s
With respect to the United States’
The opinion does not address the lawfulness of agreements entered under
b
“Causation [or traceability] requires the plaintiff to show ‘that the injury was likely caused by the defendant,’ and redressability requires the plaintiff to demonstrate ‘that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.’” Diamond Alt. Energy, LLC v. EPA, 606 U.S. 100, 111 (2025) (quoting TransUnion LLC, 594 U.S. at 423). “Where traceability and redressability depend on the conduct of a third party not before the court, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily substantially more difficult to establish.” Kohls v. Ellison, 166 F.4th 728, 731 (8th Cir. 2026) (citation modified). In this situation, “plaintiffs attempting to show causation generally cannot ‘rely on speculation about the unfettered choices made by independent actors not before the courts.’” FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 383 (2024) (quoting Clapper, 568 U.S. at 415 n.5). “Therefore, to thread the causation needle in those circumstances, the plaintiff must show that the third parties will likely react in predictable ways that in turn will likely injure the plaintiffs.” Id. (citation modified); see Iowa v. Wright, 154 F.4th 918, 939 (8th Cir. 2025) (“The Supreme Court has explained that an indirect harm to states by federal rules is still fairly traceable to the challenged rule if the harm is a ‘predictable effect’ of the rule ‘on the decisions of third parties.’” (quoting Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 588 U.S. 752, 768 (2019))).
Minneapolis seeks the case’s dismissal for insufficient process and insufficient service of process under Rules 12(b)(4) and 12(b)(5). ECF No. 37 at 16–21. Though Minneapolis was not properly served until after the 90-day Rule 4(m) deadline, the better answer is not to dismiss the case on these grounds.
“Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999). “In the absence of service of process (or waiver of service by the defendant), a court ordinarily may not exercise power over a party the complaint names as defendant.” Id. “If a defendant is improperly served, a federal court lacks jurisdiction over the defendant,” Printed Media Servs., Inc. v. Solna Web, Inc., 11 F.3d 838, 843 (8th Cir. 1993), even if the defendant “had actual notice of the lawsuit,” Adams v. AlliedSignal Gen. Aviation Avionics, 74 F.3d 882, 885–86 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Printed Media Servs., 11 F.3d at 843). “In reviewing a motion to dismiss for insufficient service, the Court is required to consider matters outside the pleadings, including affidavits of service.” Rimmer v. John Doe, Inc., No. 13-cv-548 (JNE/JJG), 2013 WL 5655865, at *2 (D. Minn. Oct. 16, 2013) (citing Devin v. Schwan’s Home Servs., Inc., No. 04-cv-4555 (RHK/AJB), 2005 WL 1323919, at *2 (D. Minn. May 20, 2005)). To survive a motion to dismiss for insufficient service, “the plaintiff must establish prima facie evidence that there was sufficient . . . service of process.” Hahn v. Bauer, No. 09-cv-2220 (JNE/JJK), 2010 WL 396228, at *6 (D. Minn. Jan. 27, 2010) (citing Northrup King Co. v. Compania Productora Semillas Algodoneras Selectas, S.A., 51 F.3d 1383, 1387 (8th Cir. 1995)). “A prima facie case is the establishment of a legally required rebuttable presumption or where a party’s production of enough evidence allows the fact-trier to infer the fact at issue and rule in the party’s favor.” Devin, 2005 WL 1323919, at *3 (citation modified).
Rule 4(m) requires that service be completed “within 90 days after the complaint is filed.”
The facts relevant to this issue are straightforward. The Complaint was filed on September 29, 2025, ECF No. 1, meaning service was required to be completed on or before December 28, 2025. Two days after the Complaint was filed, the United States notes, “the longest government shutdown in history began, making it impossible for [the United States] to serve Defendants until the shutdown ended on November 12.” ECF No. 51 at 59. The United States explains that the shutdown “had significant effects on government operations that took time to ameliorate.” Id. The United States mistakenly attempted to serve Minneapolis by “deliver[ing] a copy of the summons and complaint to the Hennepin County Auditor’s Office on November 20, 2025.” Id.; see ECF No. 51-3 at 4 (proof of service form dated November 20, 2025). The United States corrected service
“An objection under Rule 12(b)(4) concerns the form of the process rather than the manner or method of its service.” 5B Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 1353 (4th ed. Apr. 2026 Update). This includes issues with the content of the summons. Id. By contrast, “[a] Rule 12(b)(5) motion is the proper vehicle for challenging the mode of delivery, the lack of delivery, or the timeliness of delivery of the summons and complaint.” Id. (footnotes omitted). Although the distinction between a Rule 12(b)(4) issue and Rule 12(b)(5) problem “is often blurred, and it is appropriate to present and analyze service issues under both rules,” Adams, 74 F.3d at 884 n.2, the issue here is a straightforward problem with the timeliness of service, meaning it should be analyzed under Rule 12(b)(5).
Typically, where service has not been completed by the Rule 4(m) deadline,
a district court must engage in a two-step analysis . . . . First, it must inquire whether the plaintiff has demonstrated good cause for his failure to serve within the prescribed . . . period. If the district cоurt concludes that good cause is shown, it must extend the time for service. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (stating that “if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court shall extend the time for service for an appropriate period”); see also Adams v. AlliedSignal Gen. Aviation Avionics, 74 F.3d 882, 887 (8th Cir. 1996). Second, if good cause is not shown, the district court still retains the discretion to grant an extension of the time for service. Adams, 74 F.3d at 887. To warrant such a permissive extension, a plaintiff must demonstrate excusable neglect. Coleman v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 290 F.3d 932, 934 (7th Cir. 2002).
In determining whether neglect is excusable, the following factors are particularly important: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the defendant, (2) the length of the delay and the potential impact on judicial proceedings, (3) the reason for the delay, including whether the delay was within the party’s reasonable control, and (4) whether the party acted in good faith. See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. [v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd.], 507 U.S. [380,] 395 [(1993)]; In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., 496 F.3d 863, 866 (8th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). These factors do not bear equal weight as the reason for delay is generally a key factor in the analysis. See In re Guidant Corp., 496 F.3d at 867.
I conclude the United States has demonstrated at least excusаble neglect. It is difficult to see how delayed service prejudiced Minneapolis. To show it suffered prejudice, Minneapolis cites federal immigration-enforcement activities, including Operation Metro Surge and its consequences, ECF No. 37 at 20, but these enforcement activities had nothing to do with the missed service deadline. The length of the delay was not great—eleven
IV
A
In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept “as true all factual allegations in the complaint” and draw “all reasonable inferences” in the plaintiff’s favor. Gorog, 760 F.3d at 792. Although the factual allegations need not be detailed, they “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Considering “matters outside the pleadings” generally transforms a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary judgment, but not when the relevant materials are “necessarily embraced” by the pleadings. Zean v. Fairview Health Servs., 858 F.3d 520, 526 (8th Cir. 2017). Materials embraced by the complaint include “matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint whose authenticity is unquestioned.” Id. (quoting Miller v. Redwood Toxicology Lab’y, Inc., 688 F.3d 928, 931 n.3 (8th Cir. 2012)).
Here, Minnesota, the Minnesota Attorney General, Minneapolis, and Saint Paul submitted exhibits that may be considered in adjudicating the motions to dismiss. See ECF Nos. 26, 32-1, 38-1 to 38-6, 64-1. Minnesota and its Attorney General filed the Attorney General’s advisory opinion, ECF No. 32-1, and a copy of the United States’ amicus brief filed in Esparza, 2019 WL 4594512, ECF No. 64-1. Minneapolis filed publicly available information regarding ports of entry in Minnesota, ECF No. 38-1, and the relevant Minneapolis ordinances and related public records, ECF Nos. 38-2 to 38-6. And Saint Paul submitted its relevant ordinances. ECF No. 26. No party questions these exhibits’ authenticity, and they are matters of public record that may be considered in ruling on the motions to dismiss. At the same time, the United States submitted information that cannot be considered in adjudicating the motions. The United States cites Field Office Director Olson’s declaration, ECF No. 51-2, to oppose Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions. See, e.g., ECF No. 51 at 31. For the same reasons this declaration testimony could not be considered in evaluating Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1)–based facial jurisdictional challenges,
B
Turn to the merits of the preemption claims for which the United States established its Article III standing to pursue. To recap, these include the claim that
1
Several background principles and rules apply across the board to all of these claims. The Supremacy Clause provides that the “Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”
“Notwithstanding the supremacy of federal law, consideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause starts with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States are not to be superseded by Federal Act unless that is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Pharm. Rsch. & Mfrs. of Am. v. McClain, 95 F.4th 1136, 1140 (8th Cir. 2024) (citation modified), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 768 (2024)). But “an ‘assumption’ of nonpre-emption is not triggered when the State regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant federal presence.” United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000). And immigration enforcement fits this category. Bird, 157 F.4th at 919 (explaining that “immigration is not a traditional subject of state regulation” and that “the Supreme Court has ‘long recognized the preeminent role of the Federal Government with respect to the regulation of aliens within our borders.’” (quoting Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982))). For this reason, I assume the non-preemption assumption does not apply here.
2
The United States’ legal theories implicate the
As the United States interprets its assertedly preemptive statutes and regulation in this case, they would violate the
So construed, these provisions would commandeer Defendants’ legislative and executive processes in significant ways. They would prohibit Defendants from enacting and enforcing immigration-specific information-sharing and immigration-cooperation restrictions, see Murphy, 584 U.S. at 472 (explaining that Congress “lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit” acts (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 166)), thereby undermining political control and accountability, see New York, 505 U.S. at 169 (“Accountability is thus diminished when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views of the local electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation.”). The prohibitions would deprive Defendants of control over important resources. For example, “a state would be unable to limit or contrоl how much work time employees spend assisting federal immigration agencies with their
This conclusion finds support in several cases. See, e.g., United States v. California, 921 F.3d 865, 891 (9th Cir. 2019) (explaining that a State “has the right, pursuant to the anticommandeering rule, to refrain from assisting with federal [immigration enforcement] efforts”), cert. denied, 590 U.S. 1015 (2020); United States v. New York, 810 F. Supp. 3d 329, 350 (N.D.N.Y. 2025) (“The
3
Anticommandeering aside, the United States’ preemption claims fail for other reasons. To the extent they are based on
The analysis of these claims begins with a review of the statute and regulation. Again, the statute authorizes the Attorney General to
The regulation permits “authorized immigration officer[s]” to issue “detainers.”
(d) Temporary detention at Department request. Upon a determination by the Department to issue a detainer for an alien not otherwise detained by a criminal justice agency, such agency shall maintain custody of the alien for a period not to
exceed 48 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays in order to permit assumption of custody by the Department.
Id.
The disputed issue is whether
The better answer is that the regulation describes a process by which the Department may request—not require—that a noncitizen “not otherwise detained by a criminal justice agency” be detained. Interpretation “begins with the regulation’s plain language.” Solis v. Summit Contractors, Inc., 558 F.3d 815, 823 (8th Cir. 2009). And courts should interpret provisions within a regulatory regime to be consistent and harmonious with one another and avoid readings that render provisions contradictory. A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 180 (2012) (“The provisions of a text should be interpreted in a way that renders them compatible, not contradictory.”). According to their ordinary meaning, the words “seek” and “request” in
This interpretation finds support in every case to have addressed the issue. See N.S. v. Dixon, 141 F.4th 279, 282 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (“[A]n ICE detainer is a ‘request,’ not an order, for another law enforcement agency hold a particular alien.“); Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 639–45 (3d Cir. 2014) (observing that “no U.S. Court of Appeals has ever described ICE detainers as anything but requests” and agreeing with that interpretation of
As a fallback, the United States argues that the challenged ordinances and directive are conflict preempted because they pose obstacles to the INA‘s “comprehensive federal statutory scheme for regulation of immigration and naturalization,” ECF No. 51 at 29 (quoting Whiting, 563 U.S. at 587), of which
This description of the legal landscape may be accurate, but it does not persuasively explain how the challenged ordinances and directive pose an obstacle to the implementation of either
Again, this conclusion finds support in several cases. In California, for example, the Ninth Circuit explained:
California‘s decision not to assist federal immigration enforcement in its endeavors is not an “obstacle” to that enforcement effort. The United States’ argument that SB 54 makes immigration enforcement far more burdensome begs the question: more burdensome than what? The laws make enforcement more burdensome than it would be if state and local law enforcement provided immigration officers with their assistance. But refusing to help is not the same as impeding. If such were the rule, obstacle preemption could be used to commandeer state resources and subvert Tenth Amendment principles.
921 F.3d at 888 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation modified); see also McHenry County v. Raoul, 44 F.4th 581, 592 (7th Cir. 2022) (“[T]he choice of a state to refrain from participation cannot be invalid under the doctrine of obstacle preemption where, as here, it retains the right of refusal.” (quoting California, 921 F.3d at 890); United States v. Colorado, --- F.3d ---, No. 25-cv-01391, 2026 WL 878882 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2026) (“The Supremacy Clause undoubtedly prevents states from contradicting or obstructing the federal immigration scheme, Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 407 (2012), but it does not go so far as to compel state assistance.“), appeal filed, 2026 WL 878882 (10th Cir. June 2, 2026). In drafting legislation, “Congress may have hoped or expected that States would cooperate with” any detainer requests, but states are not “bound by that hope or expectation.” McHenry, 44 F.4th at 592; accord California, 921 F.3d at 891 (“[W]hen questions of federalism are involved, we must distinguish between expectations and requirements.“);
4
Though the parties understandably dispute at some length whether any of the challenged provisions conflict with
Prеemption is based on the Supremacy Clause, and that Clause is not an independent grant of legislative power to Congress. Instead, it simply provides “a rule of decision.” Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 324 (2015). It specifies that federal law is supreme in case of a conflict with state law. Therefore, in order for the PASPA provision to preempt state law, it must satisfy two requirements. First, it must represent the exercise of a power conferred on Congress by the Constitution; pointing to the Supremacy Clause will not do. Second, since the Constitution “confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States,” New York, 505 U.S., at 166, the PASPA provision at issue must be best read as one that regulates private actors.
Murphy, 584 U.S. at 477; see Ocean Cnty. Bd. of Comm‘rs, 8 F.4th at 181 (explaining that these two requirements apply “regardless of the type of preemption claimed“). Sections 1373 and 1644 “cannot satisfy the second prerequisite” because neither statute regulates private actors. Ocean Cnty. Bd. of Comm‘rs, 8 F.4th at 181–82; see Illinois, 796 F. Supp. 3d at 521–22 (same); Colorado v. U.S. Dep‘t of Just., 455 F. Supp. 3d 1034, 1059 (D. Colo. 2020) (same). If it mattered, the same could be said of
C
Turn next to the United States’ Supremacy Clause-based discrimination claims. “The Constitution‘s Supremacy Clause generally immunizes the Federal Government from state laws that directly regulate or discriminate against it.” United States v Washington (“Washington II“), 596 U.S. 832, 835 (2022) (citing South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 523 (1988)). “A state law discriminates against the Federal Government or its contractors if it singles them out for less favorable treatment or if it regulates them unfavorably on some basis related to their governmental status.” Id. at 839 (citation modified). A State “does not discriminate against the Federal Government and those with whom it deals unless it treats someone else better than it treats them.” Washington v. United States (“Washington I“), 460 U.S. 536, 544–45 (1983). A state law is not “unconstitutional just because it indirectly increases” the federal government‘s costs, “so long as the law imposes those costs in a neutral, nondiscriminatory way.” Washington II, 596 U.S. at 839. The rule forbidding States from direсtly regulating or discriminating against the federal government is “often called the intergovernmental immunity doctrine.” Id. at 838.
In Washington II, the Supreme Court concluded that a Washington workers’ compensation statute unlawfully discriminated against the federal government. Id. at 835. The statute applied only to federal contract workers at the “Hanford” federal nuclear site. Id. at 836. The statute “ma[de] it easier for federal contract workers at Hanford to establish
Though our Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has not addressed intergovernmental immunity (the parties cite no Eighth Circuit case, and I have found none), other circuits have, and four relatively recent decisions applying the doctrine to immigration-related state and municipal laws are informative. Begin with United States v. King County, 122 F.4th 740 (9th Cir. 2024). There, the United States sued to challenge a King County executive order. Id. at 747. The ordеr governed contracts between the County and entities that provided essential services to flights operating out of a County-owned airport. Id. The order directed County officials to ensure that these essential-service providers were contractually prohibited from servicing ICE charter flights. Id. Soon after the County issued the order, the three essential-service providers “announced that [they] would no longer service ICE.” Id. ICE relocated its flights to another airport, resulting in “increased operational costs” and “increased security concerns.” Id. at 749. For two reasons, the court
In GEO Group, Inc. v. Newsom, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether a California statute prohibiting the operation of private detention facilities within the state violated the intergovernmental immunity doctrine. 50 F.4th 745, 750 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc). Federal law requires the Department of Homeland Security to “arrange for appropriate places of detention for aliens detained pending removal or a decision on removal.” Id. at 751 (quoting
In McHenry County v. Raoul, the Seventh Circuit held that an Illinois statute “prohibiting State agencies and political subdivisions from contracting to house immigration detainees” did not violate the intergovernmental immunity doctrine. 44 F.4th 581, 585, 592–94 (7th Cir. 2022). The plaintiffs in the case were Illinois counties that had contracted with the federal government to house immigration detainees and who stood to lose those contracts and associated revenue if the statute remained in effect. Id. at 586. To support their intergovernmental immunity challenge, the counties invoked federal statutes addressing immigration detention, including
Finally, in United States v. California, the Ninth Circuit preliminarily addressed the intergovernmental immunity doctrine‘s application to three California statutes designed to protect California residents from federal immigration enforcement. 921 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2019). The first statute required, among other things, that California employers give their employees notice of immigration inspections. Id. at 875. The court concluded that this provision likely did not violate the intergovernmental immunity doctrine because its notice requirement was “directed at the conduct of employers, not the United States or its agents, and no federal activity is regulated.” Id. at 880. As the court explained, “the mere fact that the actions of the federal government are incidentally targeted by [the statute] does not mean that they are incidentally burdened.” Id. (citation modified). The second statute “require[d] the California Attorney General to conduct ‘reviews of county, local, or private locked detention facilities in which noncitizens are being housed or detained for purposes of civil immigration proceedings in California.” Id. at 875 (quoting
prohibite[d] state and local law enforcement agencies from “[i]nquiring into an individual‘s immigration status“; “[d]etaining an individual on the basis of a hold request“; “[p]roviding information regarding a pеrson‘s release date or” other “personal information,” such as “the individual‘s home address or work address“; and “[a]ssisting immigration authorities” in certain activities.
The state laws and municipal provisions the United States challenges here do not violate the intergovernmental immunity doctrine. The challenged provisions do not regulate the federal government. With one exception, the challenged Minnesota statutes regulate only Minnesota officials. Three of the four challenged statutes govern the management of driver‘s license information within the Department of Public Safety and restrict the Department‘s disclosure of specific immigration-status data with third parties. See
The challenged provisions do not single the federal government out for less favorable treatment, at least not in any sense that shows an intergovernmental immunity violation. The Minnesota Statutes’ immigration-related disclosure prohibitions apply, not just to the federal government, but to private entities and state governments as well.
Finally, accepting the United States’ intergovernmental-immunity claims here would seem inconsistent with the anticommandeering-rule-based rejection of its preemption claims. At least to some degree, the doctrines are opposite sides of the same coin. In other words, a finding that any of the challenged provisions violates intergovernmental immunity would imply that a Defendant must assist with the federal government‘s immigration enforcement efforts. See United States v. California, 921 F.3d at 891. But I‘ve separately concluded that a state or political subdivision‘s forced assistance would violate the anticommandeering doctrine. The United States does not explain how that conflict might be reconciled or appropriate.
Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
- The Motion to Dismiss of Hennepin County and Dawanna S. Witt, Hennepin County Sheriff [ECF No. 17] is GRANTED as follows: Insofar as they are asserted against Hennepin County and Sheriff Witt, Counts One, Two, and Six are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Counts Five and Nine are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
- The Motion to Dismiss of the City of Saint Paul [ECF No. 23] is GRANTED as follows: Insofar as they are asserted against the City of Saint Paul, Counts One, Two, and Six are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Counts Four and Eight are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
- The Motion to Dismiss of the State of Minnesota and Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison [ECF No. 29] is GRANTED as follows: Insofar as it is asserted against the State of Minnesota and Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison, Count One is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Insofar as they are asserted against the State of Minnesota and Attorney General Keith Ellison, Counts Two and Six are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
- The Motion to Dismiss of the City of Minneapolis [ECF No. 36] is GRANTED as follows: Insofar as they are asserted against the City of Minneapolis, Counts One, Two, and Six are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. Counts Three and Seven are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: July 20, 2026
s/ Eric C. Tostrud
Eric C. Tostrud
Chief Judge, United States District Court
Notes
8.07 OPINIONS: QUESTIONS OF PUBLIC IMPORTANCE; PUBLIC SCHOOLS.
The attorney general on application shall give an opinion, in writing, to county, city, town, public pension fund attorneys, or the attorneys for the board of a school district or unorganized territory on questions of public importance; and on application of the commissioner of education shall give an opinion, in writing, upon any question arising under the laws relating to public schools. On all school matters such opinion shall be decisive until the question involved shall be decided otherwise by a court of competent jurisdiction.