Consolidated Civil Action No. 19-18083 (FLW)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
July 29, 2020
WOLFSON, Chief Judge
*FOR PUBLICATION*
On November 29, 2018, Gubrir S. Grewal (“Attorney General Grewal”), in his capacity as Attorney General for the State of New Jersey, issued Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2018-6, known as the Immigrant Trust Directive, to limit the ability of local, county, and state law enforcement agencies from assisting the federal government in the enforcement of federal civil immigration law.1 In this consolidated action against Attorney General Grewal, the State of New Jersey, Office of the Attorney General, and the Department of Law and Public Safety, Division of Criminal Justice (collectively “Defendants”), plaintiffs, the County of Ocean, the Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Ocean (collectively, the “Ocean County Plaintiffs”), Robert A. Nolan, in his capacity as Cape May County Sheriff, and the County of Cape May (the “Cape May County Plaintiffs”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), seek a declaration that the Immigrant Trust Directive is preempted by the United States Constitution and violates various state constitutional and statutory provisions. Presently before the Court are (1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaints pursuant to
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Federal Immigration Statutory Framework
“The Government of the United States has broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens” pursuant to its constitutional authority to “establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization” and its inherent power as a sovereign to control and conduct relations with foreign nations.” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395 (2012) (quoting
Notwithstanding the federal government‘s “broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens,” the “States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law.” City of Philadelphia v. Att‘y Gen. of United States, 916 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Arizona, 567 U.S. at 281).
Consistent with that sovereign power, the INA contemplates states’ participation in the enforcement of immigration law since “[c]onsultation between federal and state officials is an important feature of the immigration system.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 411-12. However,
Moreover, pursuant to the INA, state and local law enforcement agencies may voluntarily enter into agreements, known as “287(g) Agreements,”3 under which state or local law enforcement “officers [can] perform the duties of a federal immigration officer under the direction and supervision of the Attorney General after completing adequate immigration training.” City of South Miami v. Desantis, 408 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1293-94 (S.D. Fl. 2019) (citing
Finally, specifically relevant to the instant action are
[n]otwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State or local law, a Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, the [federal government] information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.
B. The Immigrant Trust Directive
On November 29, 2018, Attorney General Grewal issued Directive No. 2018-6 (the “Immigrant Trust Directive” or “Directive”), to amend certain rules governing the interaction of state and local law enforcement and federal immigration authorities.4 State of New Jersey, Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2018-6 v2.0 (“Directive No. 2018-6”). Attorney General Grewal expressed that the Directive was necessary based on the federal government‘s increased reliance “on state and local law enforcement agencies to enforce federal civil immigration,” which has “present[ed] significant challenges to New Jersey‘s law enforcement officers, who have worked hard to build trust with [the] state‘s large and diverse immigrant communities.” Id. For example, the Directive observes that “[i]t is well-established . . that individuals are less likely to report a crime if they fear that the responding officer will turn them over to immigration authorities,” making “it more difficult for officers to solve crimes and bring suspects to justice.”5 Id. Accordingly, the Directive places certain limitations on local, state, and county law enforcement agencies with respect to enforcement of federal civil immigration law.
Relevant to this matter, the Directive limits New Jersey agencies from stopping, arresting, searching, or detaining any individual based solely on the individual‘s actual or suspected citizenship or any suspected violation of federal civil immigration
The Directive further provides that, subject to certain enumerated exceptions:
[N]o state, county, or local law enforcement agency or official shall provide the following types of assistance to federal immigration authorities when the sole purpose of that assistance is to enforce federal civil immigration law:
- Participating in civil immigration enforcement operations.
- Providing any non-public personally identifying information regarding any individual.
- Providing access to any state, county, or local law enforcement equipment, office space, database, or property not available to the general public.
- Providing access to a detained individual for an interview, unless the detainee signs a written consent form . . .
- Providing notice of a detained individual‘s upcoming release from custody, unless the detainee:
- Is currently charged with, has ever been convicted of, has ever been adjudicated delinquent for, or has ever been found guilty by reason of insanity, a violent or serious offense as that term is defined in Appendix A;
- In the past five years, has been convicted of an indictable crime other than a violent or serious offense, or
- Is subject to a Final Order of Removal that has been signed by a federal judge and lodged with the county jail or state prison where the detainee is being held.
- Continuing the detention of an individual past the time he or she would otherwise be eligible for release from custody based solely on a civil immigration detainer request . . . .
Id. § II.B. Section III.C of the Directive sets forth the exceptions to these limitations and provides that
Nothing in Sections II.A and II.B shall be construed to restrict, prohibit, or in any way prevent a state, county, or local law enforcement agency or official from:
- Enforcing the criminal laws of this state.
- Complying with all applicable federal, state, and local laws.
- Complying with a valid judicial warrant or other court order, or responding to any request authorized by a valid judicial warrant or other court order.
- Participating with federal authorities in a joint law enforcement taskforce the primary purpose of which is unrelated to federal civil immigration.
- Requesting proof of identity from an individual during the course of any arrest or when legally justified during an investigative stop or detention.
- Asking an arrested individual for information necessary to complete the required fields of the LIVESCAN database (or other law enforcement fingerprinting database), including information about the arrestee‘s place of birth and country of citizenship.
- Inquiring about a person‘s place of birth on a correctional facility
intake form and making risk-based classification assignments in such facilities. - Providing federal immigration authorities with information that is publicly available or readily available to the public in the method the public can obtain it.
- When required by exigent circumstances, providing federal immigration authorities with aid or assistance, . . . .
- Sending to, maintaining or receiving from federal immigration authorities information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual. See
8 U.S.C. §§ 1373 ,1644 .
Id. § II.C.
On September 27, 2019, Attorney General Grewal issued a revised version of the Directive to address questions that had “[a]risen regarding the ability of state and local law enforcement to notify ICE about individuals who have committed violent or serious offenses.” Id. In that connection, the Revised Directive also addresses § 287(g) agreements. Attorney General Grewal highlighted certain issues that are caused by such agreements, including that “they blur the distinction between federal civil immigration enforcement and local law enforcement.”6 Id. at 2. Moreover, Attorney General Grewal observed that this “ultimately creates confusion regarding the distinct roles of local law enforcement and federal agents, and it makes it less likely that victims and witnesses will cooperate with local police in criminal investigations.” Id. Accordingly, the Directive was revised to provide that “[n]o state, county, or local law enforcement authority shall enter into, modify, renew, or extend any agreement to exercise federal immigration authority pursuant to Section 287(g)
of the [INA], and they shall not exercise any law enforcement authority pursuant to a preexisting Section 287(g) agreement.” Id. § III.A.
C. Procedural History
On September 18, 2019, the Ocean County Plaintiffs filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment against Defendants. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) According to the Complaint, the Ocean County Department of Corrections voluntarily exchanges inmate information, including birthplace and citizenship, with ICE, in accordance with
On October 15, 2019, the Cape May County Plaintiffs filed a Complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the same grounds. (See Nolan v. Grewal, No. 19-18929, ECF No. 1.) According to their Complaint, the Cape May County Sheriff, Robert A. Nolan entered into an agreement with ICE, pursuant to section 287(g) of the INA, to provide information to permit ICE “to identify and remove aliens who are subject to removal from the United States.” (Id. ¶ 2.) The Cape May County Plaintiffs assert that the Immigrant Trust Directive, which prohibits municipalities in the State of New Jersey from entering into such agreements, is preempted by federal law and “frustrates and impedes the federal government‘s regulation and enforcement of immigration laws.” (Id. ¶¶ 24, 41-42.)7 The Cape May County Plaintiffs additionally assert that the Directive was enacted in violation of the New Jersey Administrative Procedure Act and violates the State‘s common law doctrine of intentional interference. (Id. ¶¶ 43-47.)
Because of the commonalities between the Ocean County and Cape May County Complaints, on November 7, 2019, this Court granted Defendants’ motion to consolidate the matters. (See ECF No. 11.) On December 16, 2019, the Cape May County Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the Directive. (Mot. for Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 13.) On December 17, 2019, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaints. (Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 14.)
On January 24, 2020, the United States filed a Statement of Interest pursuant to
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
Under
III. DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiffs’ Standing to Sue
As a threshold matter, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs, as political subdivisions of the State of New Jersey, lack standing to bring this action because these subdivisions cannot “challenge state law on constitutional grounds in federal court.” (Defs.’ Moving Br., at 16 (quoting City of San Juan Capistrano v. Cal. PUC, 937 F.3d 1278, 1280 (9th Cir. 2019)).) Plaintiffs, however, maintain that the political subdivision doctrine does not bar suits brought by a municipality or political subdivision against their creating State under the Supremacy Clause. (See Cape May Pl.‘s Opp. To Def.‘s Mot. to Dismiss, at 3-9; Ocean Cty. Pl.‘s Opp. to Def.‘s Mot. to Dismiss, at 12-17.) I find that Plaintiffs have standing to bring suit.
Traditionally, political subdivisions have lacked judicial standing to sue their creating state. See Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933) (“A municipal corporation, created by a state for the better ordering of government, has no privileges or immunities under the Federal Constitution which it may invoke in opposition to the will of its creator.”); City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 186 (1923) (“This court has never held that these subdivisions may invoke [the Contracts Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment] upon the power of the state.”); Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 177-78 (1907). In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, however, the Supreme Court more clearly defined the parameters of the State‘s powers over its subdivisions. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). There, the Supreme Court considered a challenge brought by the residents of the City of Tuskegee, Alabama, to the State‘s definition of the City‘s boundaries. Id. at 340. The Court rejected Alabama‘s argument that the State‘s power over its subdivisions was unrestricted by the Constitution, and defined the contours of the “seemingly unconfined dicta of Hunter and kindred cases.” Id. at 344. Indeed, the Court clarified that
Since Gomillion, a growing number of circuits have recognized an exception to the political subdivision standing doctrine where the subdivision asserts claims based on the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. See Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth. v. Tong, 930 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2019); Brandon Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 628-30 (10th Cir. 1998); Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1979). Each of these courts has taken a different approach in crafting such an exception. For example, in Rogers, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that City of Trenton and Hunter when, “correctly interpreted, . . . do not deal with standing” and instead involve “substantive interpretations of the constitutional provisions involved.” 588 F.2d at 1068. The Fifth Circuit further distinguished those cases because when they were decided “‘standing’ generally meant something different from what it means today. A party had standing or a ‘right to sue’ if it was correct in its claim on the merits that the statutory or constitutional provision in question protected its interests; standing was not seen as a preliminary or threshold question.” Id. at 1070.
The Tenth Circuit, however, interprets City of Trenton as standing “only for the limited proposition that a municipality may not bring a constitutional challenge against its creating state when the constitutional provision that supplies the basis for the complaint was written to protect individual rights, as opposed to collective or structural rights.” Branson Sch. Dist., 161 F.3d at 628.9 And, finally, the Second Circuit focused its analysis on the purpose of the Supremacy Clause and reasoned that permitting subdivisions to sue states ensures that “a state is not free to enforce within its boundaries laws preempted by federal law.” Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth., 930 F.3d at 73. Indeed, the Second Circuit highlighted that since Gomillion, the Supreme Court “has repeatedly entertained suits against a state by a subdivision of the state, including cases under the Supremacy Clause.” Id. (citing, for example, Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 252-53 (2011)).10
Only the
The Third Circuit has not had the occasion to determine whether the political subdivision doctrine applies to claims under the Supremacy Clause. Nevertheless, in Amato v. Wilentz, the Third Circuit acknowledged that while the political subdivision doctrine “remain[s] the law of the land,” it further noted that “support for this rule may be waning with time.” 952 F.2d 742, 754-55 (3d Cir. 1991). In light of this observation, other courts in this Circuit have uniformly recognized the Supremacy Clause exception to the political subdivision standing doctrine, in line with the Second, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits. See Reach Academy for Boys & Girls, Inc. v. Delaware Dep‘t of Educ., 46 F. Supp. 3d 455, 466 (D. Del. 2014); Pocono Mountain Charter Sch. v. Pocono Mountain School Dist., 908 F. Supp. 2d 597, 612 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (“In particular, courts that have allowed a municipality or municipal corporation to assert claims against its creator have generally permitted claims only for violations of the Supremacy Clause.”); Atlantic Coast Demolition & Recycling, Inc. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Atlantic Cty., 893 F. Supp. 301, 315 (D.N.J. 1995) (“[M]unicipalities may assert claims against the creating state under the Supremacy Clause, but not under other substantive constitutional guarantees.”)
While Defendants urge the Court to adopt the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit on this issue, based on the overwhelming
B. Preemption and the Tenth Amendment
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that federal
law “shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”
1. Express Preemption
Plaintiffs and the United States contend that
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, [DHS] information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful of any individual.
individual‘s immigration status, i.e., an individual‘s legal and citizenship status. In that connection, Defendants argue that the Directive does not conflict with
Before reaching the parties’ arguments as to the reach of
Supreme Court clarified that all three types of preemption “work in the same way: Congress enacts a law that imposes restrictions or confers rights on private actors; a state law confers rights or imposes restrictions that conflict with the federal law; and therefore the federal law takes precedence and the state law is preempted.” 138 S. Ct. at 1480. In Murphy, the Court determined that the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA“), which barred states from adopting legal sports gambling schemes, did not constitute a preemption provision because there was “no way in which this provision can be understood as a regulation of private actors.” Id. at 1481.
Recognizing such a distinction, the United States instead argues that Murphy
does not apply because “the information covered by
ii. Express Preemption and Sections 1373(a) and 1644
The key to determining whether the information sharing provisions of the Directive are expressly preempted by
maintain that the section should be read broadly based on the inclusion of the term “regarding,” which they argue indicates an intent to broaden the scope of the provision. (See Cape May Opp. Br., at 13; USA Statement, at 14.)15 Defendants, on the other hand, maintain that the construction of
In construing a statute, courts must begin with the text itself, “and proceed from the understanding that ‘unless otherwise defined, statutory terms are generally interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning.‘” Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 376 (2013) (quoting BP America Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 91 (2006)). The first step of that analysis “is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.”
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)). If “the meaning of the statutory text is plain, [the court‘s] inquiry is at an end.” Roth v. Norfalco, LLC, 651 F.3d 367, 379 (3d Cir. 2011). If, however, the text is “reasonably susceptible of different interpretations,” it may be ambiguous. Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Dobrek v. Phelan, 419 F.3d 259, 264 (3d Cir. 2005)). Only when the statute is ambiguous may courts look to other portions of the statute for guidance, because “[s]tatutory interpretation focuses on ‘the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.‘” AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 354 (2002) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)). And, only when a statute is ambiguous and after consideration of the statutory scheme, may courts
Recently, and relevant here, a number of courts have considered the language of
federal immigration authorities personal identifying information, such as “the individual‘s home address or work address,” or “information regarding a person‘s release date.” Id. (quoting
the issue of whether
Courts have also considered the scope of
rejected this position, finding that the United States’ reading of the statute was “simply impossible to square with the statutory text.” Id. Indeed, the court held that the plain meaning of the phrase “citizenship or immigration status,” means “an individual‘s category of presence in the United States—e.g., undocumented, refugee, lawful permanent resident, U.S. citizen—and whether or not an individual is a U.S. citizen, and if not, of what country.” Id.17
In reaching this conclusion, the City of Philadelphia court relied on the Northern District of California‘s decision in Steinle v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 230 F. Supp. 3d 994 (N.D. Cal. 2017). Steinle involved a suit brought pursuant to
Here, I am persuaded by these decisions that a plain reading of
Rather, plainly, the phrase “regarding the citizenship or immigration, lawful or unlawful of any individual” means just that—information relating to the immigration status of an alien, including his/her citizenship.
Because the Court finds that
by allowing state, local, and county law enforcement agencies to “send[] to ... federal immigration authorities information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful of any individual.” Directive No. 2018-6 § II.C(10).
iii. Anticommandeering and the Tenth Amendment
If the Court were to accept the broad reading of
federal power within our dual system” of government. Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 643 (3d Cir. 2014). This doctrine serves several key purposes, including promoting “[a] healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government [which reduces] the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front,” “promot[ing] political accountability” by making it clear to “[v]oters who like or dislike the effects of the regulation . . . who to credit or blame,” and “prevent[ing] Congress from shifting the costs of regulation to the States.” Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1477.
The Supreme Court first addressed the anticommandeering doctrine in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), in which it considered the validity of a federal law regulating the disposal of radioactive waste by the states. Specifically, at issue was a provision that required states to, under certain conditions, either adopt the regulations for disposal advanced by Congress or “take title” to radioactive waste. Id. at 152-54. The Supreme Court held that the “take title” provision violated the
Court held that the provision unconstitutionally conscripted the states and their officers into the service of the federal government. Id. at 935. In that regard, the Court explained:
The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. It matters not whether policymaking is involved, and no case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.
Most recently, the Supreme Court invoked the anticommandeering doctrine in Murphy to invalidate a provision in PASPA that prohibited states from authorizing sports gambling. The provision specifically made it “unlawful” for a State or any of its subdivisions “to sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact . . . a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, wagering scheme based . . . on’ competitive sporting events.” Id. at 1465. (quoting
In light of these principles, it is clear that if
Put simply, even if the Directive “obstructs federal immigration enforcement, the United States’ position that such obstruction is unlawful runs directly afoul of the
it explicitly allows state, local, and county officials to share information regarding an individual‘s immigration status. See Directive § II.C(10). New Jersey has elected to bar its localities from sharing other information that is plainly not covered by those provisions. This is, therefore, a legitimate exercise of the State‘s police power and regulation of its law enforcement resources. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ express preemption claims are rejected.
2. Conflict Preemption
Next, Plaintiffs and the United States argue that the Directive is conflict preempted by certain provisions of the INA. The Supreme Court has explained that state laws may be preempted where they conflict with federal law, including “cases where ‘compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,’ and those instances where the challenged state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.‘” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 399-400 (citations omitted) (first quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963); and then Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); see also Farnia v. Nokia, Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 122 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Conflict preemption exists (1) ‘where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements’ or (2) ‘where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.‘” (quoting Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, LLC, 539 F.3d 237, 251 (3d Cir. 2008))). There is, however, “a strong presumption against preemption when Congress legislates in an area traditionally occupied by the States.” United States v. California, 314 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 1088 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (California I). In
that connection, “courts should assume that ‘the historic police powers of the States’ are not superseded ‘unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.‘” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 400 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
i. Information Sharing Provisions
First, Plaintiffs and the United States argue that the prohibitions on information
DHS‘s ability to execute administrative warrants pursuant to
(A) In general
Except as otherwise provided in this section, when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as the “removal period“).
(B) Beginning of Period
The removal period begins on the latest of the following:
. . .
(iii) If the alien is detained or confined (except under an immigration process), the date the alien is released from detention or confinement.
Here, Plaintiffs and the United States’ conflict preemption arguments ignore that
Pointedly, the Seventh Circuit found a similar argument raised by Plaintiffs, here, to be a “red herring.” In City of Chicago v. Sessions, the Seventh Circuit considered whether certain conditions imposed upon recipients of a Byrne Grant violated the Constitution, including the “notice” condition mandating advance notice to federal authorities of the release date of persons in state or local custody who are believed to be aliens.” 888 F.3d 272, 277 (7th Cir.), vacated in part, 2018 WL 4268817 (2018) (en banc). The City of Chicago challenged those conditions as they were inconsistent with the provisions of the City‘s Welcoming City Ordinance, which, among other things, restricts the type of information shared with federal immigration authorities. Id. at 278-81. As related to the City‘s challenge, the United States framed the central issue as “whether localities can be allowed to thwart federal law enforcement” by declining to provide advance notice of inmate release dates. Id. at 282. While City of Chicago did not present a question of conflict preemption, the court saliently observed that a state‘s decision not to participate in the enforcement of federal civil immigration law did not prevent the federal government from fulfilling the objectives of Congress:
[N]othing in this case involves any affirmative interference with federal law enforcement at all, nor is there any interference whatsoever with federal immigration authorities. The only conduct at issue . . . is the refusal of the local law enforcement to aid in civil immigration enforcement through informing the federal authorities when persons are in their custody . . . Some localities might choose to cooperate with federal immigration efforts, and others may see such cooperation as impeding the community relationships necessary to identify and solve crimes. The choice as to how to devote law enforcement resources—including whether or not to use such resources to aid in federal immigration efforts—would traditionally be one left to state and local authorities.
Id. Similarly, here, New Jersey has made the decision not to cooperate with the enforcement of federal immigration law in an effort to strengthen the relationship between its communities and police, and shore up more effective enforcement of state criminal law. That choice is a clear exercise of the State‘s police power to regulate the conduct of its own law enforcement agencies. See California I, 314 F. Supp. 3d at 1105. There is no indication that Congress, in enacting
Moreover, it is significant that the Directive does not interfere with the federal government‘s inherent power to regulate immigration. As Defendants and Amici note, the Directive “does not give anyone the right to remain in the country, or set limits on whom federal authorities can detain or when or where they can detain them.” (Defs.’ Moving Br., at 27-28; ACLU Br., at 29.) While immigration is undoubtedly the subject of the Directive, that alone does not render the Directive a regulation on immigration that
In sum, the Court finds that the information sharing provisions of the Directive are not conflict preempted by
ii. Prohibition on § 287(g) Agreements
Further, the Cape May County Plaintiffs argue that the Directive‘s prohibition of
pursuant to which an officer or employee of the State or subdivision, who is determined by the Attorney General to be qualified to perform a function of an immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention
of aliens in the United States (including the transportation of such aliens across State lines to detention centers), may carry out such function at the expense of the State or political subdivision and to the extent consistent with State and local law.
The Cape May County Plaintiffs’ argument in this regard requires little analysis.
3. Field Preemption
Finally, only the Ocean County Plaintiffs, in a conclusory fashion, argue that the Directive is preempted by
The doctrine of field preemption provides that “the States are precluded from regulating conduct in a field that Congress, acting within its proper authority, has determined must be regulated by its exclusive governance.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 399. Put differently,
C. Intergovernmental Immunity
Finally, the United States argues, in two paragraphs, that the Directive is unlawful because it violates the principles of intergovernmental immunity embodied by
First, as to the procedural defect, Defendants’ argument has facial appeal. It is true that the United States is not a named party, but rather, under statutory authority of
Here, there is no question that the Directive does not regulate the United States directly; it regulates only the conduct of state and local law enforcement agencies in the State of New Jersey. In that regard, the United States has failed to demonstrate how the Directive “discriminates” against it, except to generally allege that the Directive interferes with Congress‘s inherent authority to regulate federal immigration law, a position that this Court has already rejected. Nor has the United States suggested that New Jersey permits its law enforcement to share nonpublic personal identifying information or inmate‘s release dates with any similarly situated law enforcement agency. Accordingly, because the Directive neither regulates the United States nor discriminates against it, the Directive is not invalid under the principles of intergovernmental immunity.
D. State Law Claims
Plaintiffs also bring several claims for relief under the New Jersey Constitution and other New Jersey state laws. Specifically, the Ocean County Plaintiffs claim that the Directive violates the
Because I have dismissed Plaintiffs’ federal claims, the only basis for this Court‘s jurisdiction over the state law claims is supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to
Here, the Court declines to exercise such discretion because the New Jersey state courts should have the opportunity to determine whether the provisions of the Directive comport with the New Jersey Constitution and other related state law. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ state law claims are dismissed without prejudice, and they may re-file in state court pursuant to
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs’ federal claims, and those claims are dismissed with prejudice. Because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims, the Court does not reach Defendants’ Motion to dismiss those claims. Rather, Defendants may renew their Motion in that regard in state court should Plaintiffs choose to proceed in that forum pursuant to
Dated: July 29, 2020
/s/ Freda L. Wolfson
Freda L. Wolfson
U.S. Chief District Judge
Notes
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require an agreement under this subsection in order for any officer or employee of a State or political subdivision of a State—
(A) to communicate with the Attorney General regarding the immigration status of an individual, including reporting knowledge that a particular alien is not lawfully present in the United States; or
(B) otherwise to cooperate with the Attorney General in the identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the United States.
(emphasis added).
[t]reating legislative reports as binding law [ ] undermines our constitutional structure of separated powers, because legislative reports do not come with the traditional and constitutionally-mandated political safeguards of legislation. As noted above, legislative reports are not acts of law satisfying the precise requirements of Article I, which were devised by the Framers to ensure separation of powers and a careful legislative process. By contrast, legislative reports may in some cases be written by an individual legislator, congressional staffers, or even lobbyists. Giving binding effect to passages in legislative reports may thus give binding legal effect to the unchecked will of a lone person, and that is not what our Constitution envisions.
Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 477 F.3d 668, 684-85 (9th Cir. 2007) (footnotes omitted). In that regard, “Congress‘s ‘authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history.‘” Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 599 (2011) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005)). Because the plain language of