United States of America,
No. 25 CV 1285
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION
July 25, 2025
Judge Lindsay C. Jenkins
Case: 1:25-cv-01285 Document #: 86 Filed: 07/25/25 PageID #:646
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The United States filed suit against Illinois, Cook County, the Cook County Board of Commissioners, the City of Chicago, and individual officials alleging that their Sanctuary Policies are preempted by federal law and violate the intergovernmental immunity doctrine. Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. [Dkts. 24, 27, 29, 31, 33.]1 For the reasons below, the motions are granted.
A. Statutory Framework
“Underlying this case are the sometimes-clashing interests between those of the federal government in enforcing its laws and those of the state or local government in policing and protecting its communities.” City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 280 (7th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted in part, vacated in part, 2018 WL 4268817, vacated to same extent, 2018 WL 4268814. The federal government “has broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens.” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394 (2012). That authority, arising from the “constitutional power to ‘establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,” id. at 421 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (quoting
The INA “sets out the terms and conditions of admission to the country and the subsequent treatment of aliens lawfully in the country.” Kansas, 589 U.S. at 195 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Agencies in the Department of Homeland Security [(“DHS“)] play a major role in enforcing” those laws. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 397. Among them, Customs and Border Protection (“CBP“) “is responsible for determining the admissibility of aliens and securing the country‘s borders,” while Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE“) “conducts criminal investigations involving the enforcement of immigration-related statutes.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also City of Chicago v. Barr (City of Chicago II), 961 F.3d 882, 888 n.1 (7th Cir. 2020).
Provisions of the INA relevant to this case fall into two broad categories: (1) use of immigration detainers and administrative warrants and (2) collaboration between federal and state or local governments. The statutory provisions require federal immigration officers to detain individuals who are in the United States unlawfully. See, e.g.,
Other provisions reinforce Congress‘s expectation that state and local law enforcement work collaboratively with federal immigration agents in various ways. Two statutes,
Illinois, Cook County, and Chicago all passed laws commonly referred to as Sanctuary Policies, a misnomer recognized by the Seventh Circuit. While “[t]he term signifies a place of refuge or protection,” “presence in such localities will not immunize anyone to the reach of the federal government.” City of Chicago, 888 F.3d at 281. Viewed together, as the court will in general, the Policies—the Illinois Way Forward Act (“WFA“) (
While they use slightly different language, the Policies largely mirror each other. One of the few relevant differences is that the WCO prohibits requesting, maintaining, or sharing “the citizenship or immigration status of any person,” WCO § 2-173-030(a)(1), while the other two Policies only prohibit sharing release dates, and/or incarceration status and contact information,
B. Factual Overview
This case springs from President Trump‘s declaration of a “national emergency at the southern border of the United States.” [Dkt. 1, ¶ 1.]3 That declaration was soon followed by Congress‘s passage of the Laken Riley Act. [Id., ¶ 4.] The Act amended
The Policies’ information and access restrictions cause federal immigration officers “to engage in difficult and dangerous efforts to re-arrest aliens who were previously in lоcal custody, endangering immigration officers, the particular alien, and others who may be nearby.” [Id., ¶ 70.] Furthermore, the United States argues that by restricting local law enforcement‘s ability to respond to administrative warrants, the Policies also “facilitate the release of dangerous criminals in the community.” [Id., ¶ 11.] Over a period of years, “countless criminals . . . who should have been held for immigration removal” were “released into Chicago.” [Id., ¶ 7.] The United States attributes this to “officials in Chicago and Illinois minimally enforcing—and oftentimes affirmatively thwarting—federal immigration laws.” [Id.]
Although the Policies permit local officers to respond to inquiries and requests accompanied by a criminal warrant, the United States contends that the Policies obstruct Congress‘s “explicit policy choice” that “removals can be effectuated by civil arrest warrants.” [Id., ¶ 11.] The Policies also prohibit law enforcement from complying with immigration detainers: requests for local law enforcement to advise immigration agents prior to releasing the noncitizen from local custody so ICE can arrange to assume custody. [Id., ¶ 33.] The United States argues that this jeopardizes safety because, rather than being released into federal immigration custody, noncitizens are released in the community, only to reoffend. [Id., ¶¶ 12, 57.] If local law enforcement responded to detainer requests, “the commission of numerous crimes likely would have been averted.” [Id.]
In addition to the Policies prohibiting compliance with detainers, the United States asserts on information and belief that neither Illinois, Cook County, nor Chicago permit their employees to place a detainer or administrative warrant in a noncitizen‘s file or a government database; as a result, if the noncitizen is transferred to another agency, that agency is unable to act on the detainer. [Id., ¶ 72.]
To redress these injuries, the United Statеs asserts three constitutional claims against Illinois, Cook County, the Cook County Board of Commissioners, Chicago, and individual officials associated with each: first, that the Sanctuary Policies are preempted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution (Count I); second, that the Policies unconstitutionally discriminate against the federal government (Count II); and third, that the Policies unconstitutionally regulate the federal government (Count III). It seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as costs and fees. [Id. at 22.] The Defendants all moved to dismiss for lack of standing or failure to state a claim. [Dkts. 24, 27, 29, 31, 33.]
II. Legal Standard
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction, while a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff‘s claims. In both cases, the court takes well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws reasonable inferences in the plaintiff‘s favor. Choice v. Kohn L. Firm, S.C., 77 F.4th 636, 638 (7th Cir. 2023); Reardon v. Danley, 74 F.4th 825, 826–27 (7th Cir. 2023).
“To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), plaintiff‘s complaint must allege facts which, when taken as true, plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a speculative level.” Cochran v. Ill. State Toll Highway Auth., 828 F.3d 597, 599 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This occurs when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Garrard v. Rust-Oleum Corp., 575 F. Supp. 3d 995, 999 (N.D. Ill. 2021) (quoting Boucher v. Fin. Sys. of Green Bay, Inc., 880 F.3d 362, 366 (7th Cir. 2018)).
III. Analysis
Before evaluating the legal sufficiency of the United States‘s claims, the court considers standing as to each Defendant. Federal courts have an “ongoing obligation” to assure themselves of their jurisdiction, so the court begins there. Flynn v. FCA US LLC, 39 F.4th 946, 953 (7th Cir. 2022).
A. Standing
1. Government Defendants
The court begins by evaluating the United States‘s standing to sue the Government Defendants. Only Cook County challenges standing, but the same analysis also applies to Illinois and Chicago.
An injury in fact is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Relevant here, “actual or threatened interference with the performance of . . . proper governmental functions” qualifies as a concrete harm. United States v. Ekblad, 732 F.2d 562, 563 (7th Cir. 1984); see United States v. West Virginia, 295 U.S. 463, 473 (1935) (finding no standing where there was “no case of an actual or threatened interference with the authority of the United States“); United States v. Missouri, 114 F.4th 980, 985 (8th Cir. 2024) (“Interference with the federal government‘s interest in enforcing federal law is sufficient to establish that the Act‘s implementation injured the United States. Whether the United States is entitled to relief from that injury is a question on the merits of the dispute.“).
Because the United States seeks injunctive relief, it must “demonstrate that [it] faces a ‘real and immediate’ threat of future injury; ‘a past injury alone is insufficient.‘” Carello v. Aurora Policemen Credit Union, 930 F.3d 830, 833 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Simic v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 2017)); see
Cook County takes issue with the injury prong of standing, arguing that the United States has not sufficiently alleged a risk of future injury to warrant injunctive relief because the complaint only references prior injuries—for example, the United States alleges instances in which detainers were not honored, but does not name a specific person currently detained about whom it seeks information or has submitted a dеtainer request. [Dkt. 28 at 10–11; see, e.g., id. at 10 (“At most, all that can be inferred from the United States‘[s] complaint is that it anticipates it will some day submit a detainer request . . . .“).] The standing inquiry is the same for Illinois, Cook County, and Chicago, so the court analyzes them as one.5
The United States has alleged enough plausible facts to show that there is a real and imminent threat that it will be injured through the Sanctuary Policies’ continued implementation. The challenged Policies explicitly prohibit state and local law enforcement from complying with detainers and administrative warrants, providing information about noncitizens, and granting federal immigration authorities access to detainees in state custody. [Dkt 1, ¶¶ 8–10.] Not only are these laws on the books, but the complaint illustrates concrete injuries arising from Defendants’ repeated implementation of the Sanctuary Policies over several years.
For instance, it alleges that Defendants’ refusal to honor detainer requests or provide information about noncitizens’ release dates from state or local custody makes it more difficult and dangerous for federal officials to quickly apprehend removable noncitizens, as contemplated by the INA. [Id., ¶¶ 11, 63, 70.] By not responding to administrative warrants, Defendants also allegedly withhold a tool of immigration enforcement specifically provided by the INA. [Id., ¶ 11.] Defendants have allegedly been implementing these policies over at least the last decade. The complaint alleges that there have been numerous instances since April 2024 where Cook County has not honored detainer requests. [Id., ¶ 57.] Although this allegation is made on information and belief, the complaint elsewhere cites a specific instance in which a detainer was not honored and a noncitizen released from Cook County jail was subsequently criminally charged. [Id., ¶ 12.] And it cites federal statistics from 2016 to 2025 on nоncitizens who have been arrested and criminally
make it more difficult for federal immigration agents “to comply with their mission to enforce the immigration laws.”7 [Id., ¶¶ 70, 74.]
Given the period over which Defendants have enforced their Sanctuary Policies, it is plausible to consider their implementation a continuing threat to federal immigration policy. It is of course theoretically possible that Defendants abruptly change course and cease implementing their long-held Sanctuary Policies the next time federal immigration authorities issue a detainer request or seek information about a person in state or local custody. It is also possible the United States ceases issuing detainers, administrative warrants, or requests for information about noncitizens in state and local custody. But both possibilities are remote based on the Policies, their track record of enforcement, and the United States‘s assertion that it wishes to use tools conferred by Congress to conduct civil immigration enforcement. Consequently, the threat of injury from future policy implementation is not unduly speculative. Cf. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 412 (finding no standing where risk of enforcement was purely speculative since plaintiffs had no reason to believe the Government would target their phone conversations).
The injuries alleged are also traceable to the Sanctuary Policies—without them, state and local law enforcement would be free to cooperate with federal immigration authorities. Enjoining the Policies would redress the alleged harm by removing definitive impediments to federal immigration policy.8 This would provide tangible relief beyond mere “psychic satisfaction.” Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 107. Thus, the United States‘s allegations are sufficient to establish standing to seek injunctive relief against Illinois, Cook County, and Chicago.
2. Individually Named Defendants
The United Stаtes‘s standing to sue Illinois, Cook County, and Chicago does not automatically extend to the individually named defendants: Illinois Governor J.B. Pritzker, Cook County Board of Commissioners President Toni Preckwinkle, Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart, Chicago Police Department (“CPD“) Superintendent Larry Snelling, and Chicago Mayor Brandon Johnson. Murthy, 603 U.S. at 61 (explaining that “plaintiffs must demonstrate standing for each claim that they press’ against each defendant” (citation modified)).
“[A]n official-capacity suit is . . . treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). Yet when an individual is named, a complaint must still allege injuries traceable to that individual defendant. See Wright, 1999 WL 1249313 at *3; Marie O. v. Edgar, 157 F.R.D. 433, 437 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
Here, the United States fails to allege that Governor Pritzker plays any role in enforcing the WFA, meaning that it has not established that injuries caused by the Act are traceable to him. To this point, the WFA vests enforcement power in the Illinois Attorney General, not the Governor.
The United States fails to show standing as to either Board President Preckwinkle or Sheriff Dart for similar reasons. Preckwinkle argues that she has no power independent of her official role as President of the Cook County Board of Commissioners and correctly observes that the complaint makes no allegations demonstrating traceability or redressability related to her role. [Dkt. 30 at 3–4.]
Sheriff Dart also challenges redressability, arguing that “[t]he United States does not seek an injunction as to any particular activity it would like for the Sheriff to take or eschew,” so it is not clear if or how an injunction would impact him. [Dkt. 32 at 3.] The United States makes no argument to the contrary and concedes that “any relief entered against Cook County” would redress its injuries because it “would run to the appropriate County Officers and entities.” [Dkt. 50 at
Finally, the United States fails to plead facts showing that it has standing to sue either CPD Superintendent Snelling or Mayor Johnson. The complaint references Snelling exactly once—in an allegation that identifies him as the Superintendent of CPD. [Dkt. 1, ¶ 23.] It references Mayor Johnson twice: once to identify him as Mayor of Chicago and once to allege that he and Governor Pritzker “profess a shared interest with the Federal Government in enforcing immigration laws.” [Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 5, 22.] These allegations are insufficient to show that the alleged injuries are traceable to Snelling or Johnson. All claims against them are dismissed.
Because the United States has not demonstrated standing as to the Cook County Board of Commissioners or any individual defendant, all claims against them are accordingly dismissed without prejudice. White v. Ill. State Police, 15 F.4th 801, 808 (7th Cir. 2021) (dismissal for lack of
B. Constitutional Principles
The court next considers whether the United States has stated legal claims against the remaining defendants: Illinois, Cook County, and Chicago.
The United States alleges that federal immigration law preempts the Sanctuary Policies expressly and because they obstruct the accomplishment of federal objectives. The collective thrust of Defendants’ response is that the INA provisions indicated have no preemptive effect, do not preempt the Sanctuary Poliсies, and indeed cannot be found to preempt them without running afoul of the
1. Dual Sovereignty
When this nation was governed by the Articles of Confederation, it was afflicted by an infamously ineffective central government and fiercely independent union of states. Among the nation‘s many ills—inability to coordinate, to speak with one voice in foreign affairs, and work towards common national goals—the central government had no ability to regulate individuals directly. See Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1448–49 (1987) (“The Articles of Confederation . . . failed because there was insufficient gravitational pull from the center to counter the centrifugal tendencies of each state.“).
The Constitution rectified these defects by crafting a federalist system that would strengthen the federal government by allowing it to legislate upon individuals while preserving the sovereignty of States. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 163-66 (1992). “Thus, both the Federal Government and the States wield sovereign powers, and that is why our system of government is said to be one of ‘dual sovereignty.‘” Murphy v. Nat‘l Collegiate Athletic Ass‘n, 584 U.S. 453, 470 (2018) (citation omitted); see also Cameron v. EMW Women‘s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C., 595 U.S. 267, 277 (2022) (“[O]ur Constitution ‘spli[t] the atom of sovereignty.‘” (second alteration in original) (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999))). The careful balance of power between dual sovereigns offers “double security”
Dual sovereignty is enshrined in the Constitution‘s text and structure. It “indirectly restricts the States by granting” Congress certain legislative powers, Murphy, 584 U.S. at 471; see
Congress‘s powers are undoubtedly vast, as reflected by its prerogative to make all other laws “necessary and proper” to the execution of powers granted to the federal government.
2. Preemption
Federal law can preempt state law in three ways: express preemption, conflict preemption, or field preemption. Murphy, 584 U.S. at 477. Each type of preemption works the same way: “Congress enacts a law that imposes restrictions or confers rights on private actors; a state law confers rights or imposes restrictions that conflict with the federal law; and therefore the federal law takes precedence and the state law is preempted.” Id.
Certain rules of preemption flow from federalism. First, given Congress‘s limited powers, preemption of a state law must be based in the Constitution or a validly enacted federal law, not “some brooding federal interest.” Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 587 U.S. 761, 767 (2019); see also Kansas, 589 U.S. at 202.
Second, a federal law only has preemptive effect if it regulates private individuals, whether alone or in conjunction with regulation of States. Murphy, 584 U.S. at 477–78. This is so because Congress may only legislate upon individuals, as is reflected in the Framers’ debates during the Constitutional Convention and their deliberate rejection of a plan that would have allowed Congress to legislate on States. See New York, 505 U.S. at 164–66.
Third, courts assume that Congress does not preempt lightly. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460. Although Congress may legislate in areas traditionally
3. Anticommandeering
Federal preemption is also bounded by the anticommandeering doctrine. Although recognized long after the Founding Era, anticommandeering “is simply the expression of a fundamental structural decision incorporated into the Constitution, i.e., the decision to withhold from Congress the power to issue orders directly to the States.” Murphy, 584 U.S. at 470. Centered on the principle of voluntariness, the anticommandeering doctrine holds that “[t]he Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.” New York, 505 U.S. at 188. Nor can it conscript state or local officers directly, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997), or coerce States to action through improper influence, Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 578. This holds true no matter how strong the federal interest at play. New York, 505 U.S. at 178. Therefore, while Congress has many enumerated powers, and may even overtake state law, it may not wield States as federal tools. In this way, anticommandeering is a bulwark against abuse of government power. It also promotes political accountability by enabling voters to distinguish which sovereign is responsible for a specific policy, and “prevents Congress from shifting the costs of regulation to the States.” Murphy, 584 U.S. at 473-74.
With these principles in mind, the court turns to the claims at issue.
C. Express Preemption Challenge
The first question is whether the INA expressly preempts the Sanctuary Policies. “Express preemption applies when Congress clearly declares its intention to preempt state law” and thereby “presents a question of statutory interpretation.” Nelson v. Great Lakes Edu. Loan Servs., Inc., 928 F.3d 639, 646–47 (7th Cir. 2019). “The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone” in every preemption case. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). While “the plain wording of [an express preemption] clause . . . necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent,” Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-free Tr., 579 U.S. 115, 125 (2016), “the structure and purpose of the statute as a whole” may also be relevant where the plain text is ambiguous or fails to define the scope of preemption, Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 486 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995); Nelson, 928 F.3d at 647.
The United States contends that
Section 1373(a) provides that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from,
[DHS] information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful of any individual.
1. Statutory Interpretation
The court begins with the parties’ statutory arguments before reaching Defendants’ argument on preemptive effect. Three of the four challenged Sanctuary Policy provisions similarly restrict government entities and officials from providing information about a criminally detained individual‘s contact information, custody status, and/or release date to immigration authorities. The court analyzes these provisions together.
Illinois‘s WFA provides that:
Unless presented with a federal criminal warrant, or otherwise required by federal law, a law enforcement agency or official may not: . . . (6) provide information in response to any immigration agent‘s inquiry or request for information regarding any individual in the agency‘s custody; or (7) provide to any immigration agent information not otherwise available to the public relating to an individual‘s release or contact information, or otherwise facilitate for an immigration agent to apprehend or question an individual for immigration enforcement.
The Cook County Ordinance similarly provides:
Unless ICE agents have a criminal warrant, or County officials have a legitimаte law enforcement purpose that is not related to the enforcement of immigration laws . . . County personnel shall not expend their time responding to ICE inquiries or communicating with ICE regarding individuals’ incarceration status or release dates while on duty.
CCO § 46-37(b) (emphasis added).
Finally, Section 2-173-020(a)(3) of the WCO provides:
No agent or agency shall participate in civil immigration enforcement operations or assist the civil enforcement of federal immigration law, unless required to disclose information as addressed in Section 2-173-030(a). Specifically, no agency or agent shall: . . . (3) expend their time responding to ICE inquiries or communicating with ICE regarding a person‘s custody status, release date, or contact information. An agency or agent is authorized to communicate with ICE in order to determine whether any matter involves enforcement based solely on a violation of a civil immigration law.
WCO § 2-173-020(a)(3) (emphasis added).
The express preemption challenge turns on the scope of
The United States urges an expansive reading of
This issue has been treated extensively by other courts. Without exception, each has rejected the United States‘s capacious reading of
Begin with the text of
Even if “regarding” might extend
For starters, the court is not persuaded that the information the United States seeks-noncitizens’ contact information, custody status, and release dates-is linked to their status such that it is within the scope of even a slightly broader reading of
Second, release date information: The United States directs the court to
The structure and legislative history of
Section 1373(c) is structured differently than
Even if
Finally, the United States invokes
Furthermore, “presence, whereabouts” and “activities” do not necessarily bear on immigration status. Including a noncitizen‘s “presence, whereabouts” and “activities” in
In sum, the best reading of
Section 2-173-030(a)(1) of the WCO, however, runs headlong into
[N]o agent or agency shall request, maintain, or share the citizenship or immigration status of any person unless such disclosure has been authorized in writing by the individual to whom such information pertains, or if such individual is a minor or is otherwise not legally competent, by such individual‘s parent or guardian . . ..
WCO § 2-173-030(a)(1) (emphasis added). Unlike the рrovisions the court finds are not expressly preempted, § 2-173-030(a)(1) restricts sharing the precise kind of information that
The City of Chicago argues that
2. Preemptive Effect and Anticommandeering
Given that
The Supreme Court made clear in Murphy that for a federal statute to preempt state law it must “be best read as one that regulates private actors” rather than government entities or officials. 584 U.S. at 477; see also McHenry County, 44 F.4th at 588 (“[W]e are reluctant to endorse the[] argument that Murphy did not really mean what it said . . . The Court said at least three times . . . that a valid preemption provision is one that regulates private actors.“). This includes laws that regulate only private actors, and those that “evenhandedly regulate[] an activity in which both States and private actors engage.” Murphy, 584 U.S. at 475-76; see also Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U.S. 255, 284-85 (2023) (“When a federal statute applies on its face to both private and state actors, a commandeering argument is a heavy lift . . . . “). This pronouncement derives from the Constitution, which “confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States.” New York, 505 U.S. at 166. It also reinforces the anticommandeering doctrine, which preserves dual sovereignty by prohibiting federal command of States as sovereigns (rather than market participants).
To determine whether a federal law regulates private actors, courts must “look beyond the phrasing employed” and interrogate whether the law in substance affects the rights of private actors. Murphy, 584 U.S. at 478 (“[L]anguage might appear to operate directly on the States, but it is a mistake to be confused by the way in which a preemption provision is phrased.“). Murphy illustrated this point using Morales v. TransWorld Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992). Morales considered the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, which lifted certain federal airline regulations. Id. at 378. The Act provided that “no State or political subdivision thereof . . . shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any [covered] air carrier.” Murphy, 584 U.S. at 478 (alteration in original) (quoting
Section 1373(a) is not a preemptive provision because it doesn‘t regulate private actors in language or effect. The plain text of
By contrast,
The United States asserts that
Second, the United States might mean that a court should consider a federal provision‘s downstream effects on private actors to determine whether it can be preemptive. For example, while intragovernmental sharing of information about an individual‘s immigration status doesn‘t directly affect private rights, it might generate more immediate immigration consequences. But such an effect is too attenuated from what
In short, there is no way to read
Murphy redrew the line. It noted that the “command-versus-proscription dichotomy,” City of Chicago I, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 869, turned on arbitrary phrasing and disregarded commandeering concerns, Murphy, 584 U.S. at 474-75 (“Th[e] distinction is empty. It was a matter of happenstance that the laws challenged in New York and Printz commanded ‘affirmative’ action as opposed to imposing a prohibition. The basic principle-that Congress cannot issue direct orders to state legislatures-applies in either event.“). Instead, Murphy held that a law‘s preemptive effect turns on the object of regulation-States or private actors. Id. at 471. As the Constitution only allows Congress to regulate private actors, this new rule brought preemption analysis into closer alignment with the anticommandeering doctrine. See id. (“[C]onspicuously absent from the list of powers given to Congress is the power to issue direct orders to the governments of the States.“); see also Hartnett at 351-56.
First,
Section 1373 also inverts the structure of state and local governance. Instead of legislatures prescribing regulations for government employees to implement,
Finally, if the State, County, and City cannot control whether and how their employees share information with the federal government, they cannot affirmatively opt-out of enforcing federal immigration laws. This conflicts with the guiding principle of anticommandeering: knowing and voluntary cooperation. Murphy, 584 U.S. at 472; cf. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (upholding a federal law as permissible cooperative federalism because it offered States a choice of either implementing a federal program or yielding to a federally administered regulatory program).
In defense, the United States asserts that
The United States also cites Reno for the proposition that federal laws that “regulate[] the States as the owners of data bases” rather than as sovereigns are valid. [Dkt. 50 at 46 (quoting Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000)).] But this misstates Reno, which held that a generally applicable fedеral law restricting the disclosure of personal information in driver‘s license applications did not violate the Tenth Amendment. 528 U.S. at 151. Contrary to the United States‘s assertion, Reno‘s holding was not motivated by the information-sharing nature of the statute at hand. Rather, as explained by Murphy and is apparent from Reno itself, the Court upheld the law because it regulated both States and private actors as mutual “suppliers to the market for motor vehicle information.” Id.; see Murphy, 584 U.S. at 475-76 (“The anticommandeering doctrine does not apply when Congress evenhandedly regulates an activity in which both States and private actors engage. That principle formed the basis for the Court‘s decision in [Reno].“); see also County of Ocean, 475 F. Supp. 3d at 378 n.21 (stating that neither Printz nor Reno recognizes an information-sharing exception to the Tenth Amendment); City of Philadelphia, 309 F. Supp. 3d at 330-31 (same); City of Chicago I, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 871-72 (same); City & County of San Francisco v. Sessions, 349 F. Supp. 3d 924, 953 (N.D. Cal. 2018), aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. City & County of San Francisco v. Barr, 965 F.3d 753 (9th 2020) (same); see also New York, 951 F.3d at 115 (“[T]he Supreme Court has not decided whether a federal law imposing ‘purely ministerial reporting requirements’ on the States violates the Tenth Amendment.“)
Whether information-sharing statutes should be an exception to anticommandeering is, at best, an open question. The United States has not pointed to any case recognizing such an exception. Nor has it proffered a reason to think that such an exception should be adopted.15 Consequently, the Tenth Amendment likely applies to
In sum, the United States‘s express preemption challenge in Count I fails as to each Defendant.
D. Conflict Preemption Challenge
The United States next argues that the Sanctuary Policies are “invalid as a matter of conflict preemption.” McHenry County, 44 F.4th at 591. “That doctrine includes ‘cases where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,‘” id. (quoting Arizona, 567 U.S. at 399), and where the state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). Like in McHenry County, “physical impossibility” is not at issue in this case; the question is whether the Sanctuary Policies “obstruct[] congressional purposes.” 44 F.4th at 591.
Courts must use their judgment, “informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects,” to determine whether a state statute is conflict preempted. Crosby v. Nat‘l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000). The text is the north star when interpreting statutes. “Extrinsic materials” like legislative history “have a role in statutory interpretation only to the extent that they shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature‘s understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms.” Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 568.
Courts find that state laws pose an obstacle only where “applying the state law would do major damage to clear and substantial federal interests.” C.Y. Wholesale, Inc. v. Holcomb, 965 F.3d 541, 547 (7th Cir. 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “It is not . . . a mere possibility of inconvenience in the exercise of powers, but an immediate constitutional repugnancy that can by implication alienate and extinguish a pre-existing right of (state) sovereignty.” Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 554-55 (1973) (alteration in original) (citing The Federalist No. 32, p. 243 (B. Wright ed. 1961)). “In preemption analysis, courts should assume that the historic police powers of the States are not superseded unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 400 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Where “the federal government may, without the cooperation of local law enforcement agencies, expend extra efforts and resources to apprehend” those subject to removal, the state law “does not create the kind of ‘direct’ obstacle necessary to trigger conflict preemption.” County of Ocean, 475 F. Supp. 3d at 382.
1. Relevant INA Provisions
To understand the purpose of the INA, the court considers “the entire scheme.” Hines, 312 U.S. at 67 n.20 (citation omitted). Since the INA provisions relevant to this dispute are unambiguous, the court has no need to venture beyond their text. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 568.
The INA provisions reflect Congress‘s intent that immigration officers be able to use administrative warrants and issue immigration detainers. Congress authorized the Attorney General to issue and use administrative warrants to detain noncitizens.
Immigration officers are also empowered to issue detainers: requests that a state or local law enforcement agency advise ICE before releasing noncitizens whom ICE wishes to detain so ICE can arrange to assume custody of them.
The INA also envisions some collaboration between federal immigration authorities and state or local police. The Attorney General is permitted to enter into agreements with States so that state officers can perform immigration enforcement tasks, including the “investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens.”
The United States argues the Sanctuary Policies pose an obstacle to three goals of the INA: (1) detention of individuals for commission of civil immigration violations, (2) access to individuals in state or local custody, and (3) obtaining information about those same individuals. The court reviews the corresponding provisions of the Sanctuary Policies in turn to determine if any pose an obstacle to the INA.
2. Detainers and Administrative Warrants
Each Sanctuary Policy prohibits its corresponding governmental unit from taking any action in response to an administrative warrant or immigration detainer. See
State laws pose an impermissiblе obstacle to a federal statutory scheme where they frustrate its purpose. When cases like Crosby and Arizona discuss frustration of purpose, they refer to state statutes that “upset[] the balance struck” by the federal statute, Arizona, 567 U.S. at 403, or undermine the authority granted by the federal statutory scheme. For example, in Arizona, the State believed federal immigration enforcement was too lax and, suffering from the effects, sought to impose its own penalties. Id. at 397-98, 416. Some of Arizona‘s laws added state penalties for conduct already proscribed by federal law, id. at 400, while others created entirely new prohibitions, id. at 403.
The Supreme Court struck down one of Arizona‘s laws making it a crime for “an unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for work, solicit work . . . or perform work” in the State, holding it was conflict preempted by the Immigration Reform and Control Act (“IRCA“). Id. at 403, 406-07. In passing IRCA, Congress determined it was “inappropriate” to penalize employees, instead imposing penalties only on employers. Id. at 406. While Arizona‘s law “attempt[ed] to achieve one of the same goals as federal law—the deterrence of unlawful employment—it involve[d] a conflict in the method of enforcement.” Id. It undercut Congress‘s decision that the goal was best advanced through criminal penalties on employers. Id. Because of that, the Court concluded that Arizona‘s law could not stand because it “would interfere with the careful balance struck by Congress with respect to unauthorized employment of aliens” and would “disrupt[] . . . the system Congress erected.” Id.
Similarly, in Crosby, the Supreme Court found that a Massachusetts law prohibiting its agencies from purchasing goods or services from companies doing business with Burma frustrated federal statutory objectives. 530 U.S. at 366. The state law was conflict preempted by a federal statute that “impos[ed] a set of mandatory and conditional sanctions on Burma” and gave the President the flexibility to impose additional sanctions and “develop а comprehensive, multilateral strategy to bring democracy to . . . Burma.” Id. at 368-69, 388. The Court reasoned that the Massachusetts law posed an obstacle to Congress‘s clear intent that “the federal Act . . . provide the President with flexible and effective authority over economic sanctions against Burma.” Id. at 374. In that way, the state law undermined the President‘s authority under the statute: “the President [would have] less to offer and less economic and diplomatic leverage.” Id. at 377.
In both Crosby and Arizona, the state statutes undercut Congress‘s exercise of authority by “affirmatively disrupt[ing] federal operations.” California II, 921 F.3d at 888 (discussing Crosby and Arizona among other cases). Rather than affirmative disruption, the issue in this case is inaction on the part of Illinois, Cook County, and Chicago; crucially, inaction permitted by the INA. Cf. id. at 888-89 (explaining that a state statute instituting a regulatory scheme by omission may run afoul of the preemption doctrine where it “demand[s] inaction that directly conflict[s] with federal requirements“).
The Seventh Circuit addressed the question of conflict preemption under similar circumstances in McHenry County. In that case, two counties that “had agreements
The Seventh Circuit rejected the argument that the INA reflected a “congressional purpose[]” of “using local detеntion facilities” that was contravened by the TRUST Act. Id. at 591. Rather, it held that
In arguing that the INA reflects Congress‘s intent that States extend reciprocal comity to the United States, [Dkt. 1, ¶ 36], the United States runs into the same roadblock as in McHenry County. The INA provisions in question impose requirements on federal immigration officials and give them the ability to use certain tools, such as detainers. They also reflect Congress‘s desire that States have the option to assist in civil immigration enforcement. But “neither an administrative warrant issued by federal authorities nor any other provision of law identified by the United States compels any action by a state or local official.” California II, 921 F.3d at 887. Detainers are requests, not requirements.
While the INA requires agents to issue detainers in some situations, see
There‘s no doubt—particularly at the motion to dismiss stage where well-pleaded allegations are presumed true—that, absent the Policies, it might be easier for immigration agents to discharge their obligations under the INA. Some line agents might choose to assist the United States in its civil immigration enforcement efforts. But because the INA merely offers States the opportunity to assist in civil immigration enforcement, the Polices don‘t make ICE‘s job more difficult; they just don‘t make it easier. See, e.g., United States v. New Jersey, 2021 WL 252270, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 26, 2021) (“While it may very well be easier for federal law enforcement to effect removals if it has states’ assistance, that does not change the clear command of sections 1226 and 1231(a)(1), which place the burden of complying with the INA on the federal government, not state and local authorities.” (citing County of Ocean, 475 F. Supp. 3d at 382)); [Dkt. 50 at 32-33.]
Courts must “distinguish between expectations and requirements” manifested in federal statutes. McHenry County, 44 F.4th at 592. All the United States has alleged is Congress‘s anticipation of States participating in civil immigration enforcement. Following McHenry County‘s guidance, the court concludes that the Policies’ provisions concerning administrative warrants and immigration detainers do not pose an obstacle to the INA.
3. Access and Information
While phrased in different ways, the Sanctuary Policies prohibit their corresponding governmental units from sharing with ICE any person‘s custody status, release date, or contact information.
Dovetailing with its argument concerning detainers, the United States argues that these prohibitions make it “nearly impossible” for it to detain removable individuals with the expediency required by the INA. [Dkt. 50 at 33.] “[E]ven if federal agents could stake out Illinois jail facilities to try to independently stage arrests,” the Sanctuary Policies bar federal agents from learning “their target[‘s] . . . release date.” [Id.]17 As a result, the United States argues that the Policies “obstruct[] and impair[] the efficiency of the federal process in a way that is inconsistent with the Congressional design.” [Id. at 32.]
The text of the INA does not support that argument. The INA directs immigration officers to wait to take a person into custody until after their criminal custody concludes. See, e.g.,
To be sure, the INA reflects Congress‘s intent to allow States to enter into agreements with the federal government so that state officers can perform the
functions of immigration officers.
The Ninth Circuit heard a similar dispute over California‘s sanctuary policy, the California Values Act, and found it was not preempted by the INA. California II, 921 F.3d at 887-88. Like the Sanctuary Policies in this case, the Act limited cooperation with immigration authorities by, among other things, prohibiting sharing information about a person‘s release date. Id. at 876. The United States made many of the same arguments as it does in this case, including that California‘s policy, which resulted in ICE needing to “stake out a jail . . . to make a public arrest,” ran contrary to Congress‘s intention in permitting “state detention [to] proceed first” before immigration detention. Id. at 888. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that “refusing to help is not the same as impeding.” Id. As the Seventh Circuit explained in McHenry County, agreeing with the Ninth Circuit‘s reasoning in California II, it “make[s] no sense to hold that a federal statute premised on State cooperation preempts a Stаte law withholding that cooperation.” McHenry County, 44 F.4th at 592.
44 F.4th at 592. “[T]he choice of a state,” reflected here in the Sanctuary Policies, “to refrain from participation cannot be invalid under the doctrine of obstacle preemption where, as here, it retains the right of refusal.” Id. (quoting California II, 921 F.3d at 890).
Because any collaboration under the INA is permissive, not mandatory, there is no hook for the United States‘s preemption argument with respect to maintaining or sharing information about people in custody (including maintaining detainer requests in individuals’ criminal case files) and providing access to individuals in detention for state and local offenses to facilitate ICE interviews. It does not matter whether some or all of the information the United States seeks is made available to the public. [Dkt. 28 at 22; Dkt. 50 at 33-34.] Because the INA gives States the option to share information, but does not require it, the Sanctuary Policies do not pose an obstacle.
4. Anticommandeering
Even if the Sanctuary Policies “obstruct[] federal immigration enforcement, the United States‘[s] position that such obstruction is unlawful runs directly afoul of the Tenth Amendment and the anticommandeering rule.” California II, 921 F.3d at 888. “Extending conflict or obstacle preemption to [the Sanctuary Policies] would, in effect, ‘dictate what a state legislature may and may not do.‘” Id. at 890 (citation modified) (quoting Murphy, 584 U.S. at 474). It would transform a statutory provision giving States “the right of refusal” into a provision requiring state action. Id. As explained, “the Federal Government may not compel the States to implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs.” Printz, 521 U.S. at 925.
“It is no more compatible with [the State‘s] independence and autonomy that their officers be ‘dragooned’ . . . into administering federal law, than it would be compatible with the independence and autonomy of the United States that its officers be impressed into service for execution of state laws.” Id. at 928.
True, the INA supports extremely importаnt federal goals that are “most efficiently administered” with state support. Printz, 521 U.S. at 931-32. That was also the case in Printz where the United States argued the Brady Act served very important purposes most efficiently administered by local law enforcement. Id. But a “‘balancing’ analysis is inappropriate” where the provisions at issue,
For their part, Defendants believe their Sanctuary Policies further their own important goals. [See, e.g., Dkt. 35 at 7.] As amici explain, that includes increasing the safety of all residents and focusing officers’ limited time and resources on preventing and responding to crime. [Dkt. 49 at 10-12, 14.] Those goals are inextricably bound up in the Defendants’ core police powers. California II, 921 F.3d at 887 n.11 (“A state‘s ability to regulate its internal law enforcement activities is a quintessential police power.” (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000))). This connects with a key harm the anticommandeering doctrine is intended to prevent—that the federal government could shift the “credit or blame” associated with its civil immigration enforcement agenda onto Illinois, Cook County, or Chicago. Murphy, 584 U.S. at 473-74. As the Supreme Court recognized in Murphy, if the Constitution permitted the federal government to saddle States with the obligation to impose regulations, “responsibility [would be] blurred.” Id.
Beyond ensuring that residents and voters know which sovereign to associate with which policies, anticommandeering “prevents Congress from shifting the costs of regulation to the States.” Id. at 474. If the federal government could avoid the cost of implementing its desired programs by demanding States administer them, it would be less likely to weigh costs and benefits to ensure efficient use of resources. Id. In addition to eliminating front-end costs by withdrawing local government support from civil immigration enforcement, amici explain that the Policies also limit Defendants’ exposure to liability emanating from participation in the United States‘s removal efforts. [Dkt. 49 at 19 (explaining that, as of March 31, 2025, there were 31 lawsuits pending against ICE and DHS for alleged constitutional violations arising from removal efforts).] It is not the court‘s role to evaluate the relative merits of any of these policies. City of Chicago, 888 F.3d at 277. But in this case, it falls to the court to determine whether the Defendants’ Sanctuary Policies are protected by the Tenth Amendment. That is true, even if those policies frustrate the federal government‘s civil immigration enforcement efforts.20
E. Intergovernmental Immunity
Defendants’ final claims concern intergovernmental immunity. Rooted in the Constitution‘s Supremacy Clause,
United States v. Washington, 596 U.S. 832, 838 (2022) (emphasis added) (citing North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 435 (1990)).
The United States argues that the Sanctuary Policies both discriminate against (Count II) and directly regulate the federal government (Count III). [Dkt. 1 at 21-22.] Neither argument is persuasive.
1. Discriminatory Treatment
State law may not discriminate against the federal government by setting it apart for less favorable treatment based on its federal governmental status. Washington, 596 U.S. at 839. “A state law or regulation discriminates against the federal government if it treats comparable classes of federal and state employees differently, advantaging the state employees,” Nwauzor v. GEO Grp., Inc., 127 F.4th 750, 763 (9th Cir. 2025) (citing Dawson v. Steager, 586 U.S. 171, 175-76 (2019)), and “no significant differences between the two classes justify the differential treatment,” Dawson, 586 U.S. at 175 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also McHenry County, 44 F.4th at 594 (“Differential treatment is critical . . . .“). However, a comparator is necessary; “the mere fact that the [state law] touches on an exclusively federal sphere is not enough to establish discrimination.” McHenry County, 44 F.4th at 594.
That is where the United States‘s claim fails. The challenged policies certainly affect the federal government as the primary enforcer of civil immigration law; some call out ICE specifically or refer to “immigration agents.” See
The first two assertions gesture generally at all non-federal law enforcement, but
The United States argues that the third allegation shows the WFA is discriminatory because it “treat[s] federal immigration agents worse than even other federal law enforcement agents.” [Dkt. 50 at 41.] This misapprehends the standard for discrimination. For a state law to unconstitutionally discriminate against the federal government, it must treat comparable classes of federal and non-federal employees differently, not different classes of federal employees. Washington, 596 U.S. at 839; Nwauzor, 127 F.4th at 763. In other words, the discrimination must be based on governmental status. The WFA‘s criminal investigation exception discriminates based on the enforcement context (civil immigration versus criminal law), not governmental status.
The complaint also fails to allege that the Policies impose a burden on the federal government in the way the intergovernmental immunity doctrine considers problematic. Unlike most discrimination cases in which a State affirmatively levies a tax or cost on the federal government, see, e.g., Washington, 596 U.S. at 838-39, the Policies here simply decline to ease the burden of civil immigration enforcement by permitting state and local government agents to assist. “The State‘s refusal to cooperate in the immigration context—a possibility contemplated by the relevant federal statutes—does not constitute discrimination against the federal government.” McHenry County, 44 F.4th at 594 n.7; California I, 314 F. Supp. 3d at 1111 (“[T]he purported ‘burden’ here is California‘s decision not to help the Federal government implement its immigration enforcement regime. The State retains the power to make this choice and the concerns that led California to adopt this policy justify any differential treatment that results.“).
As a result, the court grants Defendants’ motions to dismiss Count II.
2. Direct Regulation
In addition to prohibiting discriminatory treatment, the intergovernmental immunity doctrine bars States from directly regulating the federal government. McHenry County, 44 F.4th at 592. Direct regulation can take many forms, including taxing the federal government or prohibiting the federal government from taking a particular action. Id. The crux of the inquiry, however, is whether the state law directly regulates the federal government. Id.; see also New Jersey, 2021 WL 252270, at *13 (finding no intergovernmental immunity violation where “the Directive regulates only state and local law enforcement agencies“); Texas v. U.S. Dep‘t of Homeland Sec., 123 F.4th 186, 206 (5th Cir. 2024) (“[T]he key question is whether state law seeks to improperly ‘control’ the employee‘s federal duties, or whether the law only ‘might affect incidentally the mode of carrying out the employment—as, for instance, a statute or ordinance regulating the mode of turning at the corners of streets.‘” (quoting Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1920))).
McHenry County again controls. Evaluating the TRUST Act, the Seventh
The United States alleges that “[b]y refusing to honor civil detainers and warrants expressly authorized by Congress, Defendants have unlawfully eliminated these means for federal immigrations officials to carry out their statutory functions.” [Dkt. 1, ¶ 87.] It argues that the Sanctuary Policies “improperly regulate [it] by requiring ICE agents to procure criminal warrants to access detainees.” [Dkt. 50 at 38.] But each Policy controls the actions of its own agents and agencies. For example, the Policies prohibit employees from responding to immigration detainers, providing release date information, or giving immigration agents access to persons in custody unless presented with a criminal warrant.
Each case the United States cites is factually distinct and involves local governments acting as review boards overseeing federal decisions. GEO Group, Inc. v. Newsom concerned a California law barring private detention facilities in the State, which “requir[ed] ICE to entirely transform its approach to detention in the state or else abandon its California facilities” and gave “California a virtual power of review over ICE‘s detention decisions.” 50 F.4th 745, 750-51 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, the County executive order at issue in United States v. King County barred contractors from working with ICE to transport and remove noncitizen detainees, which the court found “effectively grants King County the ‘power to control’ ICE‘s deportation operations.” 122 F.4th 740, 756 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting GEO Grp. Inc., 50 F.4th at 757). Contrary to the United States‘s arguments, the Sanctuary Policies here do not comparably regulate ICE operations or meddle with the contractual rights of private individuals working with ICE. Importantly, they leave open ICE‘s ability to obtain and present a criminal warrant, thereby receiving the assistance and information it seeks. Following McHenry County, the court grants Defendants’ motions to dismiss as to Count III.
Once again, the anticommandeering doctrine is at play. As explained, the Sanctuary Policies reflect Defendants’ decision to not participate in enforcing civil immigration law—a decision protected by the Tenth Amendment and not preempted by the INA. Finding that these same Policy provisions constitute discrimination or impermissible regulation would provide an end-run around the Tenth Amendment. It wоuld allow the federal government to commandeer States under the guise of intergovernmental immunity—the exact type of direct regulation of states barred by the Tenth Amendment. See California II, 921 F.3d at 891; McHenry County v. Raoul, 574 F. Supp. 3d 571, 582 (N.D. Ill. 2021), aff‘d sub nom. McHenry County, 44 F.4th 581; New Jersey, 2021 WL 252270, at *13. The intergovernmental immunity doctrine cannot be used to circumvent the Constitution
VI. Conclusion
Defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted. The individual defendants are dismissed because the United States lacks standing to sue them with respect to the Sanctuary Policies; Cook County Board of Commissioners is dismissed because it is not a suable entity separate from Cook County. Cook County‘s Rule 12(b)(1) motion is denied, but the remaining motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) are granted. The United States‘s complaint [Dkt. 1] is dismissed in its entirety without prejudice. If it wishes to do so, the United States may amend its complaint. Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chi. & Nw. Ind., 786 F.3d 510, 519 (7th Cir. 2015). If no amended pleading is filed by the date the court separately provides, the dismissal will convert to one with prejudice.
Enter: 25-cv-1285
Date: July 25, 2025
Lindsay C. Jenkins
United States District Court Judge
Notes
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, no State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way restricted, from sending to or receiving from [DHS] information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States.
As City of Philadelphia aptly described it, “[t]he phrase ‘citizenship or immigration status,’ plainly means an individual‘s category of presence in the United States-e.g., undocumented, refugee, lawful permanent resident, U.S. citizen, etc.-and whether or not an individual is a U.S. citizen, and if not, of what country.” 309 F. Supp. 3d at 333; accord California II, 921 F.3d at 891.
The United States didn‘t present any argument to link custody status to citizenship or immigration status, nor is it obviously related, so the court does not find that
As Illinois points out, the WFA also contains a broad savings clause that would negate preemption if it applied:
This Act shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict any entity from sending to, or receiving from, the United States Department of Homeland Security or other federal, State, or local government entity information regarding the citizenship or immigration status of any individual under Sections 1373 and 1644 of Title 8 of the United States Code.
The complaint also cites
Some courts have concluded that even if there were an information-sharing exception to the Tenth Amendment,