CITY OF PHILADELPHIA v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Case No. 18-2648
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
February 15, 2019
PRECEDENTIAL
Argued on November 7, 2018
Before: AMBRO, SCIRICA and RENDELL, Circuit Judges
Jasmeet K. Ahuja
Alexander B. Bowerman
Virginia A. Gibson
Hogan Lovells US
1735 Market Street
23rd Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Kirti Datla
Matthew J. Higgins
Neal K. Katyal (Argued)
Hogan Lovells US
555 Thirteenth Street, N.W.
Columbia Square
Washington, DC 20004
Marcel S. Pratt
Lewis Rosman
Kelly S. Diffily
City of Philadelphia
Law Department
1515 Arch Street
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Counsel for Appellee
Katherine T. Allen (Argued)
United States Department of Justice
Civil Division, Appellate Staff
Room 7325
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20530
Bradley Hinshelwood
United States Department of Justice
Room 7256
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20530
Laura Myron
United States Department of Justice
Room 7222
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20530
Chad A. Readler
United States Department of Justice
Appellate Section, Criminal Division
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20530
Daniel Tenny
United States Department of Justice
Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch
20 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Room 7130
Washington, DC 20530
Counsel for Appellant
Lawrence J. Joseph
Suite 700-1A
1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
Counsel for Amicus Appellant Immigration Reform Law Institute
Adam S. Lurie
Linklaters
601 Thirteenth Street, N.W.
Suite 400 South
Washington, DC 20006
Counsel for Amicus American Jewish Committee
Benna R. Solomon
City of Chicago
Corporate Counsel‘s Office
30 North LaSalle Street
Room 800
Chicago, IL 60602
Counsel for Amicus Appellee City of Chicago
Spencer E. W. Amdur
American Civil Liberties Union
Immigrants’ Rights Project
125 Broad Street
18th Floor
New York, NY 10004
Counsel for Amicus Appellee American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
Ilana H. Eisenstein
DLA Piper
1650 Market Street
One Liberty Place, 49th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Counsel for Amicus Appellee Philadelphia Social and Legal Services Organizations
Nicolas Y. Riley
Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection
Georgetown University Law Center
600 New Jersey Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20001
Counsel for Amicus Appellee Current and Former Prosecutors and Law Enforcement Leaders
Office of Attorney General of New York
28 Liberty Street
23rd Floor
New York, NY 10005
Counsel for Amicus Appellee State of New York
Robert Perrin
Latham & Watkins
355 South Grand Avenue
Suite 100
Los Angeles, CA 90071
Counsel for Amicus Appellee Anti Defamation League
OPINION
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
The City of Philadelphia has received funds under the federal Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program (“Byrne JAG“) every year since the program‘s inception in 2006. Last year, however, the Justice Department notified the City that it was withholding its FY2017 award because the City was not in compliance with three newly implemented conditions (“the Challenged Conditions“). These conditions required greater coordination with federal officials on matters of immigration enforcement. The City filed suit to enjoin the Attorney General from withholding its award, and after discovery and extensive hearings, the District Court granted summary judgment in its favor.
The City attacked the government‘s ability to impose the Challenged Conditions on several statutory and constitutional fronts. But we need only reach the threshold statutory question. Where, as here, the Executive Branch claims authority not granted to it in the Constitution, it “literally has no power to act ... unless and until Congress confers power upon it.” La. Pub. Serv. Comm‘n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986). Therefore, our inquiry is straightforward: did Congress empower the Attorney General to impose the Challenged Conditions?
Underlying this question, and potentially complicating its resolution, is the stark contrast in the priorities of the City and those of the Executive Branch regarding immigration policy. In resolving the discrete legal question before us, however, we make no judgment as to the merits of this policy dispute. Rather, our role is more confined, and our focus is only on the legality of the particular action before us.
Concluding that Congress did not grant the Attorney General this authority, we hold that the Challenged Conditions were unlawfully imposed. Therefore, we will affirm the District Court‘s order to the extent that it enjoins enforcement of the Challenged Conditions against the City of Philadelphia. We will vacate part of the order, however, to the extent that it exceeds the bounds of this controversy. See infra III. B.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Byrne JAG and the Challenged Conditions
Federal grants to state and local governments play a large role in facilitating national, state, and local policy. In FY2018 alone, the federal government was expected to give approximately $728 billion to state and local governments through 1,319 federal grant programs. Robert Jay Dilger, Cong. Research Serv., R40638, Federal Grants to State and Local Governments: A Historical Perspective on Contemporary Issues 1 (2018). These programs encompass a wide range of policy areas, from health care to special education to infrastructure projects. Our immediate concern, however, is one particular grant program for state and local law enforcement: the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program.
Byrne JAG, named for a fallen New York City police officer, was established in
Any “State or unit of local government” may submit an application to the Attorney General for this grant.
In the FY2017 applications that are the subject of this case, the Department included three new conditions. These Challenged Conditions are:
- The Certification Condition. Grantees must “certify compliance with [8 U.S.C. § 1373 (“Section 1373“)].” Backgrounder on Grant Requirements, Dep‘t of Justice (July 25, 2017); App. 246. Section 1373 prohibits state and local governments from restricting the sharing of information relating to an individual‘s immigration status—lawful or unlawful—with federal immigration officials.
- The Access Condition. Grantees must “permit personnel of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS“) to access any detention facility in order to meet with an alien and inquire as to his or her right to be or remain in the United States.” Id.
- The Notice Condition. Grantees must “provide at least 48 hours advance notice to DHS regarding the scheduled release date and time of an alien in the jurisdiction‘s custody when DHS requests such notice in order to take custody of the alien.” Id.
The Attorney General maintains that these conditions are “designed to ensure that the activities of federal law-enforcement grant recipients do not impair the federal government‘s ability to ensure public safety
Although the Certification Condition did not apply to FY2016 applications, DOJ asked ten jurisdictions, including Philadelphia, to submit legal opinions certifying their compliance with Section 1373. Philadelphia submitted its letter in April 2017. Upon receiving letters from all ten jurisdictions, DOJ issued a press release on July 6, 2017. It stated that the Department was “in the process of reviewing” the letters, but also stated that “[i]t is not enough to assert compliance, the jurisdictions must actually be in compliance.” Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice (July 6, 2017); App. 248.
B. Immigration Enforcement and Local Law Enforcement
Under our federal system, “both the National and State Governments have elements of sovereignty the other is bound to respect.” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 398 (2012). While the federal government has “broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens,”2 id. at 394, the “States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law,” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) (internal quotation omitted). These powers intersect when a state or city arrests an individual whom ICE would also like to apprehend for removal proceedings.3 This occurs frequently: 142,356 times in FY2017.
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enft, Fiscal Year 2017 ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Report 8 (2017).
An important tool used by ICE in these situations is the immigration detainer. Once ICE identifies a removable alien who is in state or local custody, it cannot simply wrest that individual from custody. Instead, it may issue a detainer, which serves to “advise another law enforcement agency that [it] seeks custody of an alien presently in the custody of that agency, for the purpose of arresting and removing the alien.”
Like the immigration detainer, Section 1373 seeks to facilitate cooperation between the State and National Governments. Specifically, it prohibits any restrictions on the sharing of immigration information. Section 1373 provides in relevant part:
[A] Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.
C. Factual and Procedural History
1. Factual History
Philadelphia filed its FY2017 Byrne JAG application on September 5, 2017.4 The Department issued a “preliminary determination” of the application on October 11, stating that the City “appears to have laws, policies, or practices that violate
City believes that these policies help foster trust between the immigrant community and law enforcement. It argues that such policies are “critical to reassure law-abiding residents that contact with the City government will not lead to deportation by ICE.” Philadelphia Br. 7.
2. Procedural History
This case has unfolded in four main acts: Philadelphia filed a complaint seeking to enjoin the Department from implementing the Challenged Conditions; the District Court granted a preliminary injunction; the District Court granted summary judgement and a permanent injunction for the City; and, finally, the Attorney General filed this appeal.
On August 30, 2017, Philadelphia filed the complaint in this action against the Department of Justice in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The City sought5
to enjoin the Department from implementing the Challenged Conditions and a writ of mandamus compelling the Department to disburse its FY2017 Byrne JAG funds. The City argued that this relief was warranted for five reasons: the Department acted ultra vires in enacting the Challenged Conditions in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA“) and the Constitution‘s separation
The District Court held extensive hearings and issued a preliminary injunction on November 15, 2017. In a thoughtful and well-reasoned opinion, the Court found that the City was likely to succeed on all of its claims, and enjoined the Department from denying its FY2017 application. See City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 579 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (Philadelphia I). The Department appealed the preliminary injunction to this Court on January 16, 2018. After filing its appeal, the case continued in the District Court, where the Department also filed a motion to dismiss the City‘s complaint. The District Court denied this motion on March 13, 2018. See City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 271 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
In two orders, the Court granted summary judgment for the City on all of its claims. See App. 93; City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 289 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (Philadelphia II). It permanently enjoined the Department from enforcing the Challenged Conditions, ordered the Department to disburse the City‘s FY2017 funds, and issued declaratory relief on all of the City‘s legal claims. Furthermore, the Court issued additional relief, namely, ordering that “[t]o the extent an agency of the United States Government has probable cause to assert that an individual in the custody of the City of Philadelphia is a criminal alien and seeks transfer to federal custody of such individual within a city facility, it shall secure an order from a judicial officer of the United States for further detention, as allowed by law.” App. 191.
After the District Court issued this order, we dismissed the Attorney General‘s appeal of the preliminary injunction. The Attorney General filed this timely appeal of the Court‘s grant of summary judgment and permanent injunction.
D. Related Litigation
Philadelphia is not alone in being advised that its Byrne JAG award depends upon compliance with the Challenged Conditions. Indeed, several other jurisdictions have sued to enjoin enforcement of the Challenged Conditions, including the City of Chicago, the City and County of San Francisco, and the City of New York (which was joined by seven states—New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Washington, Massachusetts, and Virginia). In all of these cases, the courts that have ruled have enjoined enforcement of the Challenged Conditions. See City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (Chicago I) (issuing a preliminary injunction as to the Notice and Access Conditions); City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018) (Chicago II) (affirming the district court‘s preliminary injunction); City of Chicago v. Sessions, 321 F. Supp. 3d 855 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (Chicago III) (issuing a permanent injunction); City & County of San Francisco v. Sessions, 2018 WL 4859528 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2018) (San Francisco) (issuing a permanent injunction after declining to issue a preliminary injunction); States of New York, et al. v. Dep‘t of Justice, 2018 WL 6257693 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2018) (New York, et al.) (issuing a permanent injunction).
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to
III. DISCUSSION
The District Court addressed each of the City‘s contentions and ruled that: the Attorney General did not have statutory authority to promulgate the Challenged Conditions; he did so arbitrarily and capriciously; the Challenged Conditions violate the Spending Clause; the Certification Condition violates the Tenth Amendment; and the City was in substantial compliance with the Challenged Conditions. The Attorney General challenges these rulings and also argues that the District Court abused its discretion in granting injunctive relief.
We begin with the threshold issue: whether the Attorney General possessed the statutory authority to enact the Challenged Conditions. If the Attorney General did not have that authority, then we needn‘t reach the other claims.
A. Statutory Authorization for the Challenged Conditions
Where, as here, the Executive Branch is not acting pursuant to a constitutional power, it “literally has no power to act unless and until Congress confers power upon it.” La. Pub. Serv. Comm‘n, 476 U.S. at 374. An executive agency that acts without statutory authority violates the Administrative Procedure Act, see
In interpreting the meaning of these statutory provisions, we rely on the rules of statutory interpretation articulated by the Supreme Court and this Court. Our point of departure is the text of the statute. See Gov‘t of Virgin Islands v. Knight, 989 F.2d 619, 633 (3d Cir. 1993). But we are mindful not to read provisions in isolation. Rather, we look to the text and structure of the statute as a whole. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988). We are also guided by any relevant, well-established canons of statutory interpretation. See Schaar v. Lehigh Valley Health Servs., Inc., 598 F.3d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 2010).
1. The Byrne JAG Statute
The Attorney General argues that authorization for the Notice Condition and the Access Condition is found in the Byrne JAG statute itself.6 See Att‘y Gen. Br. 23. He pursues this
argument in the least depth, however, and for good reason. Such authorization is nowhere to be found in the text of the statute. As other courts have noted, the statute delegates some authority to the Attorney General, but it is exceptionally
First, the Attorney General has limited authority to monitor and review grantees’ program and financial information. For example, the statute directs him to require grantees to certify that program funds “will not be used to supplant State or local funds.”
“there has been appropriate coordination with affected agencies,”
The Attorney General argues that these latter two provisions—regarding data reporting and coordination with affected agencies—authorize the Notice and Access Conditions. See Att‘y Gen. Br. 26. His theory is that notice of an alien‘s release from custody constitutes “information” that the Attorney General may “reasonably require” and access to prison facilities constitutes “appropriate coordination” with an affected agency. But this interpretation stretches those provisions too far. The data-reporting requirement is expressly limited to “programmatic and financial” information—i.e., information regarding the handling of federal funds and the programs to which those funds are directed. It does not cover Department priorities unrelated to the grant program. Furthermore, the coordination requirement asks for a certification that there “has been” appropriate coordination. Given that “Congress’ use of a verb tense is significant in construing statutes,” United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992), and this provision is housed in a subsection containing several other certification requirements regarding a grantee‘s application, we interpret it to require certification that there was appropriate coordination in connection with the grantee‘s application. This does not serve as a basis to impose an ongoing requirement to coordinate on matters unrelated to the use of grant funds.
Second, certain provisions of the statute, and other provisions in the U.S. Code that expressly mention the Byrne JAG statute, give the Attorney General narrow authority to withhold or re-allocate funds under very limited circumstances.8 For example,
There are also circumstances in which the Attorney General may, or must, withhold Byrne JAG funds for a grantee‘s failure to comply with certain federal laws. For example, he may withhold up to four percent of a jurisdiction‘s Byrne JAG funds if it fails to meet certain requirements of the National Instant Criminal Background Check System. See
sort are similarly circumscribed. See
We discuss these provisions primarily to highlight what they do not authorize: the power to withhold all of a grantee‘s funds for any reason the Attorney General chooses. See Chicago II, 888 F.3d at 284 (“None of those provisions grant the Attorney General the authority to impose conditions that require states or local governments to assist in immigration enforcement, nor to deny funds to states or local governments for the failure to comply with those conditions.“). Moreover, as the District Court and the Seventh Circuit have observed,9 Congress knows how to grant this sort of broad discretionary authority when it wants. See
Such a grant of authority, if it existed, would also render the aforementioned limited grants of authority superfluous. If Congress had already given the Attorney General this sweeping authority to withhold all funds for any reason, it would have no need to delineate numerous, specific circumstances under which the Attorney General may withhold limited amounts of funds. Even if the statute were ambiguous—which it is not—we generally would not interpret such a provision to render superfluous more specific delegations of power. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 262 (2006) (“It would be anomalous for Congress to have so painstakingly described
Finding no authority for the Challenged Conditions in the Byrne JAG statute or other provisions that specifically mention it, we turn to the Attorney General‘s next suggested source of authority.
2. The Duties and Functions of Assistant Attorney General
The Attorney General also argues that all three conditions are authorized by
exercise such other powers and functions as may be vested in the Assistant Attorney General pursuant to this chapter or by delegation of the Attorney General, including placing special conditions on all grants, and determining priority purposes for formula grants.
But the Attorney General‘s argument runs headlong into an obstacle: the word “including.”10 In the Attorney General‘s view, the Special Conditions Clause confers upon the AAG new authority, not found elsewhere in the Code, to establish conditions on grants. This clause, however, is preceded by the word “including,” which is used to denote something that is within a larger whole. See Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, 1143 (3d ed. 1993) (defining “include” as “to place, list, or rate as a part or component of a whole or of a larger group class or aggregate“).
In the case of this provision, “including” signifies that the Special Conditions Clause is part of “such other powers and functions as may be vested in the Assistant Attorney General pursuant to this chapter or by delegation of the Attorney General.”
The structure of Section 10102 also casts serious doubt on the Attorney General‘s interpretation. The Special Conditions Clause is housed in the sixth of six subsections delineating the AAG‘s power. The preceding five subsections all deal with the AAG‘s power to disseminate criminal justice information and coordinate with various agencies and officials. See
Given its text and structure,
3. All Other Applicable Federal Laws
The Attorney General next argues that the Certification Condition is authorized by
Starting with the text, we observe that
But several other considerations all suggest that Section 1373 is not an “applicable” law. First, the canon against surplusage counsels us to read the term “applicable” in a way that gives it some independent heft. See Paek v. Att‘y Gen., 793 F.3d 330, 337 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The canon against surplusage counsels us to give effect to every word of a statute.“). Here, the term “applicable” avoids being redundant only by doing some limiting work beyond delineating the set of all federal laws that would “appl[y]” to an entity like Philadelphia. Otherwise, Congress could have simply written that a grant applicant must certify compliance with “all other Federal laws.” See San Fransisco, 2018 WL 4859528 at *17 (“[I]t is superfluous to interpret ‘all other applicable Federal laws’ as ‘all Federal laws.‘“). Thus, the word “applicable” must have a narrower meaning than one that sweeps in all possible laws that independently apply to a grant applicant.
Second, the noscitur a sociis canon—discussed supra, III. A. 2.—provides further guidance. The Applicable Laws Clause is located in the fourth of four subsections, all of which require certifications that must be included in a Byrne JAG application. These four requirements provide that an “application shall include ... [a] certification ... that“:
(A) the programs to be funded by the grant meet all the requirements of this part;
(B) all the information contained in the application is correct;
(C) there has been appropriate coordination with affected agencies; and
(D) the applicant will comply with all provisions of this part and all other applicable Federal laws.
Third, the historical practice of the Justice Department is also an important interpretive tool. See N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014) (“[T]he longstanding ‘practice of the government’ can inform our determination of ‘what the law is.‘“) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 401 (1819), and Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803)). Here, the Justice Department‘s historical practice does not comport with the broad interpretation that it urges in this case. Every condition that is authorized by the Applicable Laws Clause applies specifically to programs funded under the grant, not more generally to the grantee.12
The Attorney General points to several conditions—such as compliance with laws regarding human research, body armor purchases, and military equipment purchases—as establishing a practice of conditioning Byrne JAG funds on certification of compliance with broader categories of federal law. But these conditions are not blanket requirements with which the grantee must comply under all circumstances; rather, their applicability is conditioned on whether federal funds are used in a particular area. See, e.g., App. 379 (requiring compliance with
Fourth, as we have noted, Congress structured the Byrne JAG program as a “formula grant,” under which a jurisdiction‘s award is calculated through a formula that considers only population and violent crime statistics. The Attorney General asserts that the Applicable Laws Clause authorizes him to condition Byrne JAG funds on compliance with any law in the U.S. Code. But that reading of the Clause would destabilize the formula nature of the grant. Allowing the Attorney General to withhold all funds because a jurisdiction does not certify compliance with any federal law of the Attorney General‘s choosing undermines the predictability and consistency embedded in the program‘s design, thus turning the formula grant into a discretionary one. Moreover, if Byrne JAG were intended to be a discretionary grant, one would think that Congress would house it in the section of the U.S. Code containing discretionary Justice Department grants, see
Finally, there is reason to doubt that even under a broad reading of the Applicable Laws Clause, Section 1373 would apply. In the “Administrative Provisions”
Nothing in this chapter or any other Act shall be construed to authorize any department, agency, officer, or employee of the United States to exercise any direction, supervision, or control over any police force or any other criminal justice agency of any State or any political subdivision thereof.
Accordingly, we find that Section 1373 is not an applicable law for the purposes of Byrne JAG.
* * *
After reviewing the three sources of authority offered by the Attorney General, we hold that Congress has not empowered the Attorney General to enact the Challenged Conditions. Because the Attorney General exceeded his statutory authority in promulgating the Challenged Conditions, we needn‘t reach Philadelphia‘s other arguments. Therefore, all that remains for the purposes of our review is the District Court‘s injunctive order.
B. The Judicial Warrant Injunction
In its final judgment and decree, the District Court issued injunctive relief establishing that a judicial warrant shall be necessary to transfer a criminal alien to federal custody. The order provides, in relevant part:
To the extent an agency of the United States Government has probable cause to assert that an individual in the custody of the City of Philadelphia is a criminal alien (as previously defined by this Court in City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 2018 WL 2725503, *19 n. 3 (E.D. Pa. June 6, 2018), and seeks transfer to federal custody of such individual within a city facility, it shall secure an order from a judicial officer of the United States for further detention, as allowed by law.
App. 191. The Attorney General asks that, even if we find for the City on the merits—which we have done—we vacate this section of the order. In a memorandum accompanying the Order, the District Court explained that the order was necessary to shield the City from legal liability that might arise if it detained an individual pursuant to an immigration detainer who should have otherwise been released. App. 194. The Court stated that, with this order, “[t]his risk can be easily eliminated.” App. 194.
We do not doubt, as the District Court rightly decided, that equitable relief was warranted in this case. See Philadelphia II, 309 F. Supp. 3d at 338-43. The question before us, however, is whether the Court‘s order swept too broadly.13 While there are tried and true standards for determining when equitable relief is warranted, see, e.g., Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 482 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussing the four-part test for determine when a permanent injunction is warranted), there is less authority regarding the scope of
Our review of the scope of the District Court‘s injunction, then, has two aspects: first, we must determine “the extent of the violation established,” id.; and second, we must determine whether the injunction is “more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to plaintiffs.” Novartis, 290 F.3d at 598. On the first point, we have already addressed the legal violation at length: the Attorney General acted ultra vires in imposing the three Challenged Conditions on Byrne JAG grants. Several aspects of the District Court‘s order are narrowly tailored to remedying this legal wrong, including enjoining the Attorney General from enforcing the Challenged Conditions on Philadelphia‘s application and ordering the Attorney General to issue Philadelphia‘s FY2017 award. Both of these orders speak directly to the dispute over the Challenged Conditions.
The judicial warrant requirement, however, goes beyond the bounds of the complaint. While the District Court‘s concerns regarding the legality of holding an alien pursuant to a detainer may well be legitimate, they are not part of this case and controversy. Nor, as we noted above, is the broader policy dispute between the City and the Attorney General regarding immigration enforcement. The order extends outside of this particular case and controversy and into those disputes.
Moreover, the other aspects of the order entered by the District Court afford the City full and complete relief. The City filed its complaint to enjoin the Attorney General from denying its Byrne JAG award based on unlawfully imposed conditions. The other aspects of the District Court‘s order require that the Attorney General distribute the City‘s FY2017 award and re-frain from ever enforcing the Challenged Conditions. A district court has discretion to fashion equitable remedies, but these aspects of the order left the City wanting nothing by way of further remedies. The judicial warrant requirement was not requested in the District Court and was not defended with any vigor at oral argument. See Oral Argument Transcript, 52 (stating that the District Court‘s order is “the hardest thing to defend“).
Accordingly, we hold that the District Court abused its discretion as to the scope of the equitable relief and will vacate its order to the extent it imposed a requirement that the federal government obtain a
IV. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, we hold that the Attorney General did not have statutory authority to impose the Challenged Conditions. We also determine that the District Court abused its discretion in granting broader injunctive relief than was warranted. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court‘s order to the extent it is supported by this opinion, and we will vacate its order as it pertains to the judicial warrant requirement.
Notes
The Confidentiality Memo. Police Memorandum 01-06, adopted in May 2001, directs law enforcement officers to share immigration information with the federal government under limited circumstances: when required by law, when the immigrant consents, or when the “immigrant is suspected of engaging in criminal activity.” App. 250-51. The Confidentiality Order. Executive Order 8-09, enacted in November 2009, bars law enforcement officers from inquiring about a person‘s immigration status, “unless the status itself is a necessary predicate of a crime the officer is investigating or unless the status is relevant to identification of a person who is suspected of committing a crime.” App. 254.
The Detainer Order. Executive Order 5-16, enacted in January 2016, bars City officials from detaining an immigrant pursuant to an ICE detainer or from providing notice of the immigrant‘s release, unless the request is accompanied by a judicial warrant. App. 258-59.
The Inmate Consent Form. These consent forms are distributed to incarcerated individuals whom ICE requests to interrogate. The forms require the inmate‘s consent before ICE is permitted access to the facility to conduct an interview. App. 263.