CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO v. WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General; ALAN R. HANSON, Acting Assistant Attorney General of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; LAURA L. ROGERS, Defendants-Appellants, and CURRENT AND FORMER PROSECUTORS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT LEADERS; MATT M. DUMMERMUTH, Defendants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Proposed Intervenor-Plaintiff, Movant. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, EX REL. XAVIER BECERRA, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of California v. WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General; ALAN R. HANSON; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; LAURA L. ROGERS; MATT M. DUMMERMUTH; PHIL E. KEITH, Defendants-Appellants, and TARA MICHELLE STEELEY, Real-Party-In-Interest.
No. 18-17308, 18-17311
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
July 13, 2020
Before: William A. Fletcher, Richard R. Clifton, and Eric D. Miller, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge Clifton
D.C. Nos. 3:17-cv-04642-WHO, 3:17-cv-04701-WHO. Argued and Submitted December 2, 2019 San Francisco, California.
OPINION
SUMMARY*
Nationwide Injunction
The panel affirmed in part, and vacated in part, the district court‘s summary judgment entering declaratory relief for plaintiffs and permanently enjoining the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ“) on a nationwide basis from imposing certain conditions for providing funding for state and local criminal justice programs through Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grants.
In Fiscal Year 2017, the Attorney General and DOJ announced three new conditions that state and local governments must satisfy to receive Byrne grants: the Access Condition, the Notice Condition, and the Certification Condition. Plaintiffs – the City and County of San Francisco and the State of California – are “sanctuary” jurisdictions, which have enacted laws that limit their employees’ authority to assist in the enforcement of federal immigration laws. Plaintiffs sued to prevent DOJ from denying funding of Byrne grants for their failure to comply with the Access, Notice, and Certification Conditions.
The panel affirmed the district court‘s order to the extent it held that DOJ did not have statutory authority to impose the Access and Notice Conditions and declared that plaintiffs’ respective sanctuary laws complied with
DOJ from withholding, terminating, or clawing back Byrne funding based on the Challenged Conditions and statutes at issue.
The panel held that the district court abused its discretion in granting nationwide injunctive relief, which was broader than warranted. The panel held that nothing in the record or in the nature of the claims suggested that the relief granted by the district court needed to be extended to state and local governments outside of California, not parties to this litigation, in order to fully shield plaintiffs. The panel vacated the nationwide reach of the permanent injunction and limited its reach to California‘s geographic boundaries.
COUNSEL
Mark B. Stern (argued), Daniel Tenny, Katherine Twomey Allen, Brad Hinshelwood, and Laura E. Myron, Appellate Staff; Hashim M. Mooppan, Deputy Assistant Attorney General; David L. Anderson, United States Attorney; Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General; United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, D.C.; for Defendants-Appellants.
Aileen M. McGrath (argued), Jesse C. Smith, Ronald P. Flynn, and Yvonne R. Mere, Deputy City Attorneys; Dennis J. Herrera, City Attorney; Office of the City Attorney, San Francisco, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee City and County of San Francisco.
Joshua A. Klein (argued), Deputy Solicitor General; Kristin A. Liska, Associate Deputy Attorney General; Lee Sherman, Deputy Attorney General; Sarah E. Belton, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; Michael L. Newman, Senior
Assistant Attorney General; Edward C. DuMont, Solicitor General; Xavier Becerra, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General, Oakland, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee State of California.
Matthew J. Piers, Chirag G. Badlani, and Caryn C. Lederer, Hughes Socol Peters
Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod, and David H. Gans, Constitutional Accountability Center, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae Members of Congress.
James R. Williams, County Counsel; Greta S. Hansen, Chief Assistant County Counsel; Kavita Narayan and Laura S. Trice, Lead Deputy County Counsel; H. Luke Edwards, Fellow; Office of the County Counsel, County of Santa Clara, San Jose, California; for Amici Curiae 43 Counties, Cities, and Municipal Agencies; National League of Cities; International Municipal Lawyers Association; and International City/County Management Association.
Robert W. Perrin, Sarah F. Mitchell, and Michael A. Hale, Latham & Watkins LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Amicus Curiae Anti-Defamation League.
Rachel S. Brass, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, San Francisco, California; Abiel Garcia and Ian F. Sprague, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Los Angeles, California; for Amicus Curiae Public Counsel.
Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General; Anisha S. Dasgupta, Deputy Solicitor General; Eric R. Haren, Special Counsel; Linda Fang, Assistant Solicitor General of Counsel; Letitia James, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General, New York, New York; Phil Weiser Attorney General, Denver, Colorado; William Tong, Attorney General, Hartford, Connecticut; Kathleen Jennings, Attorney General, Wilmington, Delaware; Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, Chicago, Illinois; Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland; Maura Healey, Attorney General, Boston, Massachusetts; Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Lansing, Michigan; Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, Trenton, New Jersey; Hector Balderas, Attorney General, Santa Fe, New Mexico; Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Salem, Oregon; Peter F. Neronha, Attorney General, Providence, Rhode Island; Thomas J. Donovan, Jr., Attorney General, Montpelier, Vermont; Robert W. Ferguson, Attorney General, Olympia, Washington; Karl A. Racine, Attorney General, Washington, D.C.; for Amici Curiae States of New York, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington, and the District of Columbia.
Omar C. Jadwat and Lee Gelernt, American Civil Liberties Union, New York, New York; Spencer E. Amdur and Cody H. Wofsy, American Civil Liberties Union, San Francisco, California; Mark Fleming and Katherine E. Melloy Goettel, National Immigrant Justice Center, Chicago, Illinois; for Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, National Immigrant Justice Center, National Immigration Law Center, Washington Defender Association, Southern
Poverty Law Center, Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, and New Orleans Workers’ Center for Racial Justice.
W. Hardy Callcott, Naomi A. Igra, and Mark Prior, Sidley Austin LLP, San Francisco, California, for Amici Curiae Immigrant Legal Resource Center and Asian Americans Advancing Justice-Asian Law Caucus.
OPINION
CLIFTON, Circuit Judge:
The federal government has provided funding for state and local criminal justice
Plaintiffs—the City and County of San Francisco and the State of California—are so-called “sanctuary” jurisdictions, which have enacted laws that limit their employees’
authority to assist in the enforcement of federal immigration laws. Plaintiffs sued DOJ, the Attorney General, and other DOJ officials (collectively, “DOJ“) to prevent DOJ from denying funding of Byrne grants for failure to comply with the Access, Notice, and Certification Conditions (collectively, the “Challenged Conditions“). Plaintiffs also sought a declaratory judgment that their respective “sanctuary” laws do not violate
Recent precedential decisions by this court have done the heavy lifting with regard to the merits of the relief granted by the district court. We held that DOJ lacked statutory authority to impose the Access and Notice Conditions on Byrne funds in reviewing a preliminary injunction obtained by the City of Los Angeles. See City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 941 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2019). Consistent with our discussion in City of Los Angeles, we affirm the injunction barring DOJ from using the Access and Notice Conditions as Byrne funding requirements for any California state entity or political subdivision.
We also uphold the injunction barring DOJ from denying or withholding Byrne funds on account of the Certification Condition based on Plaintiffs’ alleged non-compliance with
language of
With regard to the geographical reach of the relief granted by the district court,
I. Background
The Byrne program is the “primary provider” of federal grant dollars to support state and local criminal justice programs. DOJ‘s Office of Justice Programs, which administers the grant, disburses over $80 million in awards each year. California has used prior Byrne awards to support programs focused on criminal drug enforcement, violent crime, and anti-gang activities. San Francisco has used them to support programs focused on reducing the drug trade and
providing services to individuals with substance and mental health issues.
Each year, DOJ distributes Byrne funds pursuant to a statutory formula based on population and violent crime rate. See
To receive and draw upon a Byrne award, a state or local government must submit an application that complies with the statutory requirements outlined in
A. The Challenged Conditions
The FY 2017 Byrne solicitations included the Access and Notice Conditions, “two new express conditions” related to “the ‘program or activity’ that would be funded by the FY 2017 award.” Respectively, the Access and Notice Conditions require recipient jurisdictions to:
(1) permit personnel of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS“) to access any correctional or detention facility in order to meet with an alien (or an individual believed to be an alien) and inquire as to his or her right to be or remain in the United States; and
(2) provide at least 48 hours’ advance notice to DHS regarding the scheduled release date and time of an alien in the jurisdiction‘s custody when DHS requests such notice in order to take custody of the alien pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act.
The Byrne statute requires applicants to certify that “the applicant will comply with all provisions of this part and all other applicable Federal laws.”
B. Factual and Procedural History
The City and County of San Francisco and the State of California filed lawsuits in the Northern District of California in August 2017, seeking to enjoin DOJ from implementing the Challenged Conditions. Plaintiffs asserted that the Challenged Conditions are not authorized by the Byrne statute and violate constitutional separation of powers, the Spending Clause, and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA“). Plaintiffs also argued that
Plaintiffs understood the Access and Notice Conditions to be inconsistent with the sanctuary laws and policies they have enacted. Plaintiffs claimed, however, that they could comply with the Certification Condition if the statute on which it is based,
On appeal, DOJ argues that the Challenged Conditions were imposed pursuant to lawful authority and did not violate the Spending Clause or the APA, and that the district court erroneously construed
II. Standard of Review
Decisions regarding matters of law, including issues of statutory interpretation, are reviewed de novo. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). We review a decision to enter a nationwide injunction for abuse of discretion. Los Angeles Haven Hospice, Inc. v. Sebelius, 638 F.3d 644, 654 (9th Cir. 2011). “District courts abuse their discretion when they rely on an erroneous legal standard or clearly erroneous finding of fact.” E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 950 F.3d 1242, 1271 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). “[A]n overbroad injunction is an abuse of discretion.” California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 582 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1140 (9th Cir. 2009)).
III. The Access and Notice Conditions
The district court invalidated the Access and Notice Conditions on multiple grounds, holding that they exceed DOJ‘s statutory authority, violate constitutional separation of powers, violate the Spending Clause, and are arbitrary and capricious under the APA. See City & Cty. of San Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 944–48, 955–66. While this appeal was pending, we upheld a preliminary injunction obtained by the City of Los Angeles against DOJ‘s enforcement of the Access and Notice Conditions, holding that DOJ lacked statutory authority to implement them. See City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 941 F.3d 931, 945 (9th Cir. 2019).
DOJ contends that Congress granted it independent authority to establish the Access and Notice Conditions under
DOJ alternatively argues that the Access and Notice Conditions are authorized by provisions in the Byrne statute requiring applicants to certify that “there has been
appropriate coordination” between the applicant and “affected agencies,”
Other circuits have reached differing conclusions regarding DOJ‘s authority under
IV. The Certification Condition and 8 U.S.C. § 1373
The district court enjoined DOJ from enforcing the Certification Condition on multiple alternative grounds. See City & Cty. of San Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 948–55, 957–61. Among other things, the district court declared that Plaintiffs’ sanctuary laws do not violate
As described above, at page 11, applicants for Byrne grants are required to certify that they “will comply with all provisions of this part and all other applicable Federal laws.”
This court recently interpreted
DOJ argued that
immigration status (i.e. what one‘s immigration status is).‘” Id. (quoting United States v. California, 314 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 1102 (E.D. Cal. 2018)).
In November 2017, using the same broad construction of
DOJ identified as likely violative of
As noted above, while this appeal was pending, we adopted the same narrow construction of
information but did not prohibit the sharing of information regarding “immigration status.”7 See id. at 891–93. Consistent with these holdings in California, we affirm the district court‘s decision below, applying the same narrow construction of
DOJ “effectively conceded” that the TRUST Act, TRUTH Act, and confidentiality statutes do not conflict with
DOJ similarly argues that San Francisco‘s laws conflict with
federal law. See id. ch. 12H, § 12H.2. Because
DOJ claims that San Francisco, in accordance with these provisions, “provides no information in response to ICE requests regarding individuals in local custody.” The declaration cited in the record, however, only states that “[l]ocal law enforcement officials in San Francisco, California, do not respond to any non-criminal requests from ICE, including requests for notification regarding the release of detainees . . . .” Again, such information is not within the scope of
In sum, we affirm the ruling below holding that Plaintiffs’ respective sanctuary laws comply with
V. The Nationwide Injunction
We uphold the district court‘s entry of permanent injunctive relief barring DOJ from withholding or denying Plaintiffs’ Byrne awards based on the Challenged Conditions. However, we vacate the district court‘s imposition of a nationwide injunction. The district court abused its discretion by issuing a nationwide injunction without determining whether Plaintiffs needed relief of this scope to fully recover. We do not remand to the district court for further consideration because Plaintiffs have established no nexus between their claimed injuries and the nationwide operation of the Challenged Conditions, and they advance no reason why limiting the injunction along state boundaries would not grant them full relief. Therefore, the geographical reach of the relief should be limited to California.
“Although ‘there is no bar against . . . nationwide relief in federal district court or circuit court,’ such broad relief must be ‘necessary to give prevailing parties the relief to which they are entitled.‘” California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 582 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bresgal v. Brock, 843 F.2d 1163, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 1987)). On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to nationwide relief by emphasizing evidence in the record, including declarations from “all types [of] grant recipients across the geographical spectrum” about how they are affected by the Challenged Conditions. Plaintiffs argue that the “far-reaching impact” of the Challenged Conditions makes this “one of the ‘exceptional cases’ in which program-wide relief is necessary.”
The district court agreed, basing its analysis on “recent guidance” from the Ninth Circuit “on the breadth of evidence and inquiry needed to justify nationwide injunctive relief in the context of [Executive action] attempting to place similar conditions on grant funding.” See City & Cty. of San
Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 971 (citing City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1245 (9th Cir. 2018)). In those cases, we held that nationwide injunctions against unlawful Executive action, obtained by state and municipal plaintiffs, were overbroad where,
While it was correct to state this rule, the district court erred by considering only this rule. This rule addresses one form of tailoring: “Once a constitutional violation is found, a federal court is required to tailor the scope of the remedy to fit the nature and extent of the constitutional violation.” Trump, 897 F.3d at 1244 (quoting Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 293–94 (1976)). However, this is not the only form of tailoring a court must do when issuing a remedy. See, e.g., Azar, 911 F.3d at 584.
We have long held that an injunction “should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs before the court.” Los Angeles Haven Hospice, Inc. v. Sebelius, 638 F.3d 644, 664 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682,
702 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under this rule, the appropriate inquiry would be whether Plaintiffs themselves will continue to suffer their alleged injuries if DOJ were enjoined from enforcing the Challenged Conditions only in California. The district court did not make such a finding, and it is not apparent how the record would support one.
We look first to the injuries Plaintiffs claimed. By imposing the Challenged Conditions, San Francisco argued, DOJ offered “an unacceptable choice: either comply with [the Challenged Conditions] and abandon local policies that San Francisco has found to promote public safety and foster trust and cooperation between law enforcement and the public, or maintain these policies but forfeit critical funds that it relies on to provide essential services to San Francisco residents.” San Francisco claimed that it faced “the immediate prospect of losing over $1.4 million” in program funds. California claimed it was at risk of “losing $31.1 million,” which would have devastating impacts on state and local law enforcement agencies, requiring many of their programs to be cut.
An injunction barring DOJ from enforcing the Challenged Conditions within California‘s geographical limits would resolve Plaintiffs’ injuries by returning Plaintiffs to the status quo. While extending this same relief to non-party jurisdictions beyond California‘s geographical bounds would likely be of consequence to those other jurisdictions, it does nothing to remedy the specific harms alleged by the Plaintiffs in this case. A nationwide injunction was therefore unnecessary to provide complete relief. It was overbroad and an abuse of discretion.
We acknowledge the “increasingly controversial” nature of nationwide injunctions, Innovation Law Lab v. Wolf, 951
F.3d 1073, 1094 (9th Cir. 2020), and distinguish this case from recent decisions in which we upheld this form of relief. See id. (affirming an injunction operating in four
Plaintiffs here, a state and a municipality, “‘operate in a fashion that permits neat geographic boundaries.‘” E. Bay Port-of-Entry, 950 F.3d at 1282–83 (quoting E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump (E. Bay III), 354 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1120–21 (N.D. Cal. 2018)). Because Plaintiffs do not operate or suffer harm outside of their own borders, the geographical scope of an injunction can be neatly drawn to provide no more or less relief than what is necessary to redress Plaintiffs’ injuries. This is distinguishable from a case involving plaintiffs that operate and suffer harm in a number of jurisdictions, where the process of tailoring an injunction may be more complex.
We recognized this distinction when we affirmed the nationwide injunction entered in East Bay Port-of-Entry:
The Organizations . . . represent “asylum seekers” broadly. Unlike the plaintiffs in California v. Azar—individual states seeking affirmance of an injunction that applied past their borders—the Organizations here “do not operate in a fashion that permits neat geographic boundaries.” [E. Bay] III, 354 F. Supp. 3d at 1120–21. . . An injunction that, for example, limits the application of the Rule to California, would not address the harm that one of the Organizations suffers from losing clients entering through the
Texas-Mexico border. One fewer asylum client, regardless of where the client entered the United States, results in a frustration of purpose (by preventing the organization from continuing to aid asylum applicants who seek relief), and a loss of funding (by decreasing the money it receives for completed cases).
950 F.3d at 1282–83 (citation omitted).
Accordingly, we vacate the nationwide reach of the permanent injunction and limit its reach to California‘s geographical boundaries.
VI. Conclusion
We affirm the district court‘s order to the extent it held that DOJ did not have statutory authority to impose the Access and Notice Conditions and declared that Plaintiffs’ respective sanctuary laws comply with
Each party to bear its own costs.
AFFIRMED in part; VACATED in part.
Notes
(a) In general
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.
(b) Additional authority of government entities
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, no person or agency may prohibit, or in any way restrict, a Federal, State, or local government entity from doing any of the following with respect to information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual:
(1) Sending such information to, or requesting or receiving such information from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
(2) Maintaining such information.
(3) Exchanging such information with any other Federal, State, or local government entity.
(c) Obligation to respond to inquiries
The Immigration and Naturalization Service shall respond to an inquiry by a Federal, State, or local government agency, seeking to verify or ascertain the citizenship or immigration status of any individual within the jurisdiction of the agency for any purpose authorized by law, by providing the requested verification or status information.