Iowa Migrant Movement for Justice; Jane Doe; Elizabeth Roe v. Brenna Bird, in her official capacity as Attorney General of Iowa, Kimberly Graham; Zach Herrmann
No. 24-2263
United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit
October 23, 2025
Iowa Migrant Movement for Justice; Jane Doe; Elizabeth Roe
Plaintiffs - Appellees
v.
Brenna Bird, in her official capacity as Attorney General of Iowa
Defendant - Appellant
Kimberly Graham; Zach Herrmann
Defendants
Immigration Reform Law Institute; State of Oklahoma; State of Florida; State of Alabama; State of Alaska; State of Arkansas; State of Georgia; State of Idaho; State of Indiana; State of Kansas; State of Louisiana; State of Mississippi; State of Missouri; State of Montana; State of Nebraska; State of Ohio; State of South Carolina; State of South Dakota; State of Tennessee; State of Texas; State of Virginia; State of West Virginia; Arizona Legislature
Amici on Behalf of Appellant(s)
ASISTA Immigration Assistance; American Immigration Lawyers Association; Asian Pacific Institute on Gender-Based Violence; Esperanza United; Tahirih Justice Center
Amici on Behalf of Appellee(s)
Submitted: August 28, 2025
Filed: October 23, 2025
BENTON, Circuit Judge.
Iowa, in Senate File 2340, criminalized the presence within its boundaries of aliens who illegally reentered the United States. Aliens violating this Act are ordered to return to the country they reentered from. The Act forbids judges from abating a state prosecution due to a pending (or possible) federal determination of the alien‘s immigration status. Iowa Migrant Movement for Justice and two aliens residing in Iowa sued to enjoin enforcement of the Act. The district court1 granted a preliminary injunction. Iowa Attorney General Brenna Bird appeals. Having jurisdiction under
I.
In section 2 of the Act, Iowa forbids a “person who is an alien” to enter, attempt to enter, or at any time be found within the state “under any of the following circumstances“: having been “denied admission to or ... excluded, deported, or removed from the United States“; or having “departed from the United State while an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding.”
If an alien is convicted of violating section 2, then section 4 of the Act provides that a judge “shall enter in the judgment in the case an order requiring the person to return to the foreign nation from which the person entered or attempted to enter.”
Section 5 of the Act creates a separate offense for failure to comply with the return order.
II.
Jane Doe and Elizabeth Roe, two aliens residing in Iowa, claim to be harmed by the Act. Iowa Migrant Movement for Justice (Iowa MMJ), a membership-based organization, provides legal services and advocates about immigration issues. Its members include Doe and Roe, as well as about 350 dues-paying members and 2,000 non-dues-paying members who are clients
States Constitution. They moved for a preliminary injunction against enforcing the Act.
The district court ruled that Doe, Roe, David, and Iowa MMJ had standing to sue to enjoin the Act. Considering the Dataphase factors, the court found that they “established a likelihood of success on the merits of their position that federal immigration law preempts Senate File 2340 under both conflict and field preemption.” United States v. Iowa, 737 F.Supp.3d 725, 751 (S.D. Iowa 2024). The court also found irreparable harm if the Act went into effect, adding that the balance of the equities and the public interest favored an injunction. Id. at 749-50. See generally Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. C L Systems, Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc). The district court granted the preliminary injunction. Bird appeals.
This court reviews decisions on preliminary injunctions for abuse of discretion, reviewing factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. Sleep No. Corp. v. Young., 33 F.4th 1012, 1016 (8th Cir. 2022). A district court “by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.” Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996).
III.
A federal court must first decide whether plaintiffs have standing. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Reynolds, 89 F.4th 1071, 1076 (8th Cir. 2024). This court reviews de novo whether a party has standing. Dakotans for Health v. Noem, 52 F.4th 381, 385 (8th Cir. 2022). Plaintiffs have the burden to establish standing. Animal Legal Defense Fund, 89 F.4th at 1077. To have standing, a plaintiff must show it suffered an injury in fact, fairly traceable to the defendant, and likely redressable by a favorable decision of the court. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). Only one plaintiff needs standing for a case to proceed. Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477, 489 (2023). A plaintiff must support each element “with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of litigation.” Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 58 (2024). “At the preliminary injunction stage,
then, a plaintiff must make a ‘clear showing’ that she is ‘likely’ to establish each element of standing.” Id. At the preliminary injunction stage, this court assumes the plaintiff‘s allegations are true and views them most favorably to the plaintiff. GLBT Youth in Iowa Schools Task Force v. Reynolds, 114 F.4th 660, 667 (8th Cir. 2024).
A.
“Government regulations that require or forbid some action by the plaintiff almost invariably satisfy both the injury in fact and causation requirements. So in those cases, standing is usually easy to establish.” FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 382 (2024). Also, “allegation of future injury may suffice” to show an injury-in-fact “if the threatened injury is ‘certainly impending,’ or there is a ‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur.” L.H. v. Independence Sch. Dist., 111 F.4th 886, 893 (8th Cir. 2024). Both Jane Doe and Elizabeth Roe reside in Iowa. In 2005, Jane Doe was denied admission to the United States and issued a removal
Bird argues the Act does not apply to Doe and Roe, so they “do not face a credible threat of prosecution.” See Zanders v. Swanson, 573 F.3d 591, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing because their speech that plaintiffs claimed was chilled was not the target of the statute). According to Bird, an alien who reenters the United States with federal permission does not reenter “under . . . the . . . circumstances” of having “been denied admission to . . . or excluded, deported, or removed from the United States” or having “departed from the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding.”
Bird argues that her interpretation is the natural reading of section 2 of the Act and is required by Iowa‘s canons of construction. Under Iowa law: “In enacting a statute, it is presumed that,” “1. Compliance with the Constitutions of the state and of the United States is intended“; “2. The entire statute is intended to be effective“; and “3. A just and reasonable result is intended.”
Bird also reads section 6 of the Act to require abatement of any inadvertent prosecution of Doe and Roe. Applying the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon of statutory interpretation, Kucera v. Baldazo, 745 N.W.2d 481, 487 (Iowa 2008)
Bird asks this court to ignore the plain meaning of the Act. See State v. Doe, 903 N.W.2d 347, 351 (Iowa 2017) (providing that the Iowa Supreme Court first considers the “plain meaning of the relevant language of a statute, read in the context of the entire statute,” then applies other tools of statutory interpretation only if there is ambiguity). True, section 2‘s phrase “under . . . the . . . circumstances” includes “in this specific situation.” Under the circumstances, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/under%20the%20circumstances (last visited Aug. 13, 2025). But that does not mean that the Act contains the same exemptions as federal law. The plain text of section 2 has no exceptions. Likewise, the plain text of section 6 has no required abatement provision. It is “at least ‘arguable’ at this stage of the litigation” that the Act applies to Doe and Roe. See Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. Thompson, 992 F.3d 694, 700 (8th Cir. 2021).
Bird cites L.H. v. Independence School District, 111 F.4th 886 (2024). There, this court held that parents lacked standing to sue to enjoin a school district policy that automatically removed a book from the school library after someone challenged the book. L.H., 111 F.4th at 895. But there, the enforcement of the policy required the acts of third parties—someone challenging books—and the parents did not allege that “any challenge is currently pending or that any such challenge has been threatened” by a potential challenger. Id. at 894. Here, by contrast, Bird seeks to enforce the Act. Yes, Bird defends an interpretation of the Act that would not cover Doe and Roe. But just because Bird has “no ‘present plan‘” to enforce the Act against Doe or Roe does not mean that she would not enforce it against them in the
future. See United Food & Commercial Workers Intern. Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v. IBP, Inc., 857 F.2d 422, 429 (8th Cir. 1988) (“no ‘present plan‘“). One reason that Bird asks this court to allow the Act to go into effect is so Iowa courts can interpret it. Thus, Iowa courts could reject her reading of the Act. Cf. Id. at 429–30 (holding that plaintiffs had standing when “the state‘s position could well change” and the “provisions by their terms apply directly to plaintiffs‘... activity“). There is still likely a “substantial risk” that Doe and Roe will be prosecuted under the Act. See L.H., 111 F.4th at 893. Doe and Roe likely suffer an injury in fact.
The injury in fact here is likely fairly traceable to the defendants. Both Attorney General Bird and the county attorneys may enforce the Act. See
The injury is likely redressable by a favorable judicial decision, specifically, an injunction preventing the prosecutors from enforcing the Act against the Iowa MMJ members. FDA, 602 U.S. at 381 (“If a defendant‘s action causes an injury, enjoining the action . . . will typically redress that injury.“). Bird argues that the injury is not redressable because prosecutors who are not parties to this case (in less populous counties) could still enforce the Act. But a remedy need not completely redress an injury in order to satisfy the requirement for standing. Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 525–26 (2007). Enjoining some Iowa prosecutors reduces the threat of prosecution under the Act, likely redressing the injury.
Doe and Roe meet their burdens of clearly showing they are likely to establish an injury in fact, fairly traceable to defendants, and redressable by a favorable decision of the court. They have standing.
B.
Even accepting Bird‘s interpretation of the Act, this suit may still proceed because Iowa MMJ has “representational” standing on behalf of members who live in Iowa and are not in the United States lawfully. An organization has representational standing if it can demonstrate that “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization‘s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U.S. 181, 199 (2023). Here, Iowa MMJ satisfies all three requirements.
First, Iowa MMJ‘s membership includes Doe, Roe, Anna, and David. Anna received an order of removal, left the United States, reentered, received asylum status, now resides in Iowa, and recently graduated high school. David was deported and reentered unlawfully. The district court found that he resides in Iowa and is in the United States unlawfully. Iowa, 737 F.Supp.3d at 745-46. Under the Act‘s plain meaning, all four Iowa MMJ members could be prosecuted. But even if the Act included exceptions for aliens with lawful federal status, the Act still applies to David. Id.
Bird argues that Iowa MMJ failed to plead that David lives in Iowa and that he is in the United States unlawfully. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (holding that a “pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do‘” and that a complaint will
not suffice “if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement‘“), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2009). But Iowa MMJ did plead specific facts: David graduated from high school in Iowa in 2007; he is an Iowa MMJ member; and that under the Act he “could be arrested, prosecuted, imprisoned, and removed.” The facts alleged by Iowa MMJ allowed the district court to “draw the reasonable inference” that David lives in Iowa and is in the United States unlawfully. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. Although this court reviews standing decisions at the preliminary injunction stage de novo, this court must “accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and ... construe the complaint in
Second, the interests Iowa MMJ seeks to protect are germane to its purposes as a membership organization. Bird argues that protecting aliens like David from prosecution under the Act is not germane to Iowa MMJ‘s purposes. But Iowa MMJ provides legal services to help “immigrants and refugees... avoid the separation from family and community . . . that results from removal from the United States.” It also advocates for policies that “protect their foundational rights and allow them to integrate into society in Iowa.” Enjoining the enforcement of the Act—which requires removal from the State of Iowa upon conviction—is germane to these purposes. Bird also highlights that “an organization that has not suffered a concrete injury caused by a defendant‘s action cannot spend its way into standing simply by expending money to gather information and advocate against the defendant‘s action.” FDA, 602 U.S. at 394. But that case was about an organization suing on behalf of harms to itself, not to its members. Here, Iowa MMJ members do suffer an injury in fact. Finally, Bird argues that Iowa MMJ may be acting unlawfully if it is helping David violate federal immigration law. See United States v. Hansen, 599 U.S. 762, 766 (2023) (upholding a federal law prohibiting encouraging or inducing
illegal immigration). But Iowa MMJ is not suing here to help its members violate federal immigration law. Rather, Iowa MMJ brings this suit to enjoin a state immigration law that it argues is unconstitutional. The injury suffered by Iowa MMJ‘s members is likely germane to Iowa MMJ‘s purposes. See ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772, 775 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (holding that the ACLU has standing, and “adopting the reasoning of the panel opinion on this point“), which was 358 F.3d 1020, 1031 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that the ACLU had organizational standing to sue on behalf of its member who was injured by a public Ten Commandments display, because the “interests at stake are germane to the ACLU‘s purpose of defending citizens’ constitutional rights“).
Third, this case does not require the participation of Iowa MMJ‘s individual members. Iowa MMJ facially challenges the Act. This is not a claim that requires “individualized proof.” See Kuehl v. Sellner, 887 F.3d 845, 851 (8th Cir. 2018), quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advertising Com‘n, 432 U.S. 333, 344 (1977). Iowa MMJ seeks a preliminary injunction, a remedy that does not require individual participation. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 515 (1975) (“If in a proper case the association seeks a declaration, injunction, or some other form of prospective relief, it can reasonably be supposed that the remedy, if granted, will inure to the benefit of those members of the association actually injured.“); see also Worth v. Jacobson, 108 F.4th 677, 686 (8th Cir. 2024). Iowa MMJ satisfies the requirements for representational standing on behalf of its members.
IV.
Evaluating a request for a preliminary injunction, a court must consider: 1. “the threat of irreparable harm to the movant“; 2. “the state of the balance between this harm and the injury that granting
moving party must clearly show that it is “likely” to prevail on the merits. Planned Parenthood, Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 732–33 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc). See also Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U.S. 339, 346 (2024).
A.
Bird argues that Doe, Roe, and Iowa MMJ cannot succeed on the merits because they lack a cause of action for a violation of the Supremacy Clause. True, the Supremacy Clause does not have an implied cause of action. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 325 (2015). But “in a proper case, relief may be given in a court of equity . . . to prevent an injurious act by a public officer.” Id. at 327. Bird emphasizes that equitable causes of action must be “grounded in traditional equity practice.” Whole Women‘s Health v. Jackson, 595 U.S. 30, 39 (2021). But there is an “equitable tradition of suits to enjoin unconstitutional actions by state actors.” Missouri, 114 F.4th at 986, citing Armstrong, 575 U.S. at 326–27. The Supreme Court has “long recognized” that “if an individual claims federal law immunizes him from state regulation, the court may issue an injunction upon finding the state regulatory actions preempted.” Id. at 326. Bird acknowledges this equitable tradition, but argues that Doe and Roe do not have an equitable action here because they are not “about to” be subject to prosecution under the Act. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 156–57 (1908). But, as discussed, the plain meaning of the Act criminalizes Doe and Roe‘s presence in Iowa. Doe and Roe likely have an equitable cause of action. See Florida Immigr. Coal. v. Attorney General, 2025 WL 1625385, at *3 (11th Cir. June 6, 2025) (allowing a preliminary injunction of a similar Florida law challenged by an Ex parte Young cause of action).
Bird also argues that Iowa MMJ lacks an equitable cause of action because it, as an organization, is not subject to prosecution under the Act. True, whether a cause of action exists is a different question from whether a plaintiff has standing. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 238 n.18 (1979) (“Whether a petitioner has asserted a cause of action ... depends not on the quality or extent of her injury, but on whether the class of litigants of which petitioner is a member may use the courts to enforce
the right at issue.“). But the Supreme Court has stated that “there is no warrant in our cases for making the validity of an Ex parte Young action turn on the identity of the plaintiff.” Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 256 (2011). An Ex parte Young action requires “a straightforward inquiry into whether the complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” Id. at 255. Iowa MMJ‘s complaint does so. A plaintiff with representation standing may bring an Ex parte Young action. See, e.g., Pharmaceutical Rsch. & Mfrs. of Am. v. Williams, 64 F.4th 932, 936, 948 (8th Cir. 2023). Iowa MMJ likely has a cause of action.
Doe, Roe, and Iowa MMJ make a facial challenge to the Act. Facial challenges are “hard to win.” Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707, 723 (2024); Reynolds, 114 F.4th at 669. To prevail, a plaintiff must establish either “no set of circumstances exists under which the law would be valid” or “the law lacks a plainly legitimate sweep.” NetChoice, 603 U.S. at 723 (cleaned up). To defeat the facial challenge, Bird must show only that the Act “is constitutional in some of its applications.” See United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 693 (2024). The question is whether all applications of the Act are preempted by federal law.
Conflict preemption is one way that Doe, Roe, and Iowa MMJ are likely to succeed on the merits. Even if Congress does not expressly preempt state laws in statutory text, conflict preemption occurs either when “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility” or when a state regulation “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012); Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 884 (2000). State laws in conflict with federal law are “without effect.” Mutual Pharm. Co., Inc. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 479–80 (2013). If every application of the Act conflicts with federal immigration law, then no application of the Act is constitutional.
True, “a court should not find pre-emption too readily in the absence of clear evidence of a conflict.” Geier, 529 U.S. at 885. Rather, “the proper approach is to reconcile the ‘operation of both statutory schemes with one another rather than holding one completely ousted.‘” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127 (1973). Further, “courts should assume that ‘the historic police powers of the States’ are not superseded ‘unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.‘” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 400. Bird emphasizes that the presumption against preemption “has greatest force when Congress legislates in an area traditionally governed by the States’ police powers.” CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 19 (2014).
But immigration is not a traditional subject of state regulation. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has “long recognized the preeminent role of the Federal Government with respect to the regulation of aliens within our borders.” Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982). The United States “has broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 394. Congress has the power to “establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization.”
On the other hand, in the early days of the nation, states did enact laws to exclude from their borders certain aliens, including alien convicts and alien paupers. Id. at 419 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Bird argues that the Act is not a regulation of removal, but rather is an exercise of the inherent and
traditional state power to “exclude” persons. The Supreme Court has declined to “decide for or against the right of a State, in the absence of legislation by Congress, to protect herself by necessary and proper laws against paupers and convicted criminals from abroad.” Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1876).
Even if Iowa possesses an inherent and traditional power to exclude, Iowa‘s Act still violates the Supremacy Clause if it clearly conflicts with federal law. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass‘n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (holding that “any state law, however clearly within a State‘s acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield“). See also Mayor, Aldermen and Commonality of the City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 143 (1837) (applying conflict preemption analysis even after concluding the state law in question was an exercise of the state‘s police powers). There is no absence of legislation from Congress here. “Federal governance of immigration and alien status is extensive and complex. Congress has specified categories of aliens who may not be admitted to the United States. . . . Unlawful entry and unlawful reentry into the country are federal offenses.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 395. “Congress has specified which aliens may be removed from the United States and the procedures for doing so.” Id. at 396.
Determining whether every application of Iowa‘s Act is likely conflict-preempted requires interpreting both the Act and federal law. See Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000) (“What is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects.“).
C.
Section 2 of the Act provides:
A person who is an alien commits an offense if the person enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in this state under any of the following circumstances:
- The person has been denied admission to or has been excluded, deported, or removed from the United States.
- The person has departed from the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding.
Similarly, federal law criminalizes illegal reentry, establishing fines and/or imprisonment not longer than two years for “any alien who has been denied admission, excluded, deported, or has departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding, and thereafter enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States.”
But unlike the
As discussed, Bird argues that the Act should be interpreted not to conflict with federal law. She interprets section 2 of the Act to include all the federal law‘s exemptions, claiming this is the ordinary meaning of section 2 and required by Iowa‘s canons of construction. According to Bird, because section 2 criminalizes
only what is already a federal crime, the Act will not create any new implications for foreign relations. Further, Bird continues, federal immigration law defenses can be raised by aliens in state courts, and state courts will be able to rely on federal immigration decisions. Bird anticipates that state judges will not make decisions about an alien‘s admissibility or removability. Bird concludes that section 2 does not conflict with federal immigration law.
Again, Bird asks this court to ignore the plain meaning of the statute. See Doe, 903 N.W.2d at 351. The plain text of section 2 has no exceptions.
Even accepting Bird‘s interpretation, section 2 is still an obstacle to the exercise of the discretion that Congress gives federal officials charged with enforcing federal immigration law. See Geo Group, Inc. v. Newsom, 50 F.4th 745, 762 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (“Such interference with the discretion that federal law delegates to federal officials goes to the heart of obstacle preemption.“). Federal immigration law grants broad discretion to federal officials. See, e.g., Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, 604 U.S. 6, 8 (2024) (“A common feature of our Nation‘s complex system of lawful immigration is mandatory statutory rules paired with discretionary exceptions.“); Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 332 (2022) (describing the discretion granted to the Attorney General, subsequently delegated to immigration judges, to grant or not grant eligible noncitizens relief from removal); Newsom, 50 F.4th at 751 (describing the “broad discretion” given to the Secretary of Homeland Security to choose the place to detain deportable aliens); Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667, 683–84 (2018) (describing the “broad discretion” granted to the President to suspend the entry of aliens into the United States); Arizona, 567 U.S. at 396 (describing “broad discretion exercised by immigration officials” as a “principal feature of the removal system“); INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424–25 (1999) (describing the statutory grant of authority to the Attorney General to determine whether the statutory conditions for withholding removal of an alien are met). Discretion in the enforcement of federal immigration law is vital for accomplishing the purposes of federal immigration law. It “embraces immediate human concerns.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 396. Due to “resource constraints and regularly changing public-safety and
public-welfare needs, the Executive Branch must balance many factors when devising arrest and prosecution policies.” United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 680 (2023). Federal officials might choose to prioritize the arrest of an alien who commits a serious crime, rather than pursue enforcement against an alien who “has children born in the United States, long ties to the community, or a record of distinguished military
Even if section 2 were interpreted to have the same exceptions as federal law, the state law still conflicts with federal law because it creates a parallel scheme of enforcement for immigration law. Under section 2, Iowa could prosecute an illegal alien whom federal officials have exercised their discretion not to bring an enforcement action against. Cf. id. at 402 (expressing disapproval of a state having “the power to bring criminal charges against individuals for violating a federal law even in circumstances where federal officials in charge of the comprehensive scheme determine that prosecution would frustrate federal policies“). Also, creating a separate state offense eliminates the possibility of a presidential pardon. Id. at 403. Contrary to Bird‘s belief, section 2 does complicate U.S. foreign relations. “It is fundamental that foreign countries concerned about the status, safety, and security of their nationals in the United States must be able to confer and communicate on this subject with one national sovereign, not the 50 separate States.” Id. at 395. See also Crosby, 530 U.S. at 382 (describing how a state law that violated the Supremacy Clause undermined the President‘s “effective diplomacy“), citing Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 279. Section 2 of the Act would “allow the State to achieve its own immigration policy,” precisely the result the Supreme Court in Arizona found barred by conflict preemption. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 408.
Bird argues that the “mere ‘fact of identity‘” does “not mean the automatic invalidity of State measures.” Zyla Life Sciences, L.L.C. v. Wells Pharma of Houston, L.L.C., 134 F.4th 326, 332 (5th Cir. 2025), quoting California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 731 (1949). Bird urges: “Our federal system would be turned upside
down if we were to hold that federal criminal law preempts state law whenever they overlap,” quoting Kansas v. Garcia, 589 U.S. 191, 212 (2020). In the “vast majority of cases where federal and state laws overlap,” this is likely true. Id. But not here. Immigration is not a traditional subject of state regulation. Cf. Zyla, 134 F.4th at 330 (recognizing that the challenged state law was part of the state‘s “traditional prerogative to police drug safety“). Immigration policy, unlike many other subjects of law, implicates “trade, investment, tourism, and diplomatic relations for the entire Nation.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 395. By allowing state officers to prosecute aliens who federal officials have not decided to arrest, section 2 of the Act likely conflicts with federal immigration law. Even under Bird‘s narrow reading, section 2 of the Act permits state officials to arrest illegal aliens for violating the state crime of illegal reentry. This authority “could be exercised without any input from the Federal Government about whether an arrest is warranted in a particular case.” Id. at 408. The result of section 2 “could be unnecessary harassment of some aliens . . . who federal officials determine should not be removed.” Id.
Arresting an alien for illegal reentry, Bird argues, does not implicate foreign affairs any more than arresting an alien for another state crime, like being a felon-in-possession of a firearm. To the contrary, enforcing a generally applicable state crime like murder does not necessarily allow a state to “achieve its own immigration policy.” See id. (finding that a generally applicable state law did conflict with federal immigration law because it empowered officers to arrest persons whom they
priorities’ but also ‘foreign policy objectives.‘” Texas, 599 U.S. at 679. Section 2 of the Act empowers Iowa to contradict the policy decisions of Congress, and the policy decisions made with the discretion that Congress grants to federal immigration officials, frustrating U.S. law enforcement and foreign policy interests. Thus, section 2 of the Act likely conflicts with federal law. See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 395 (“The federal power to determine immigration policy is well settled.“).
Federal immigration law authorizes the United States Attorney General to enter into agreements with a state to enable state officers to enforce federal law “in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in the United States.”
To the contrary, although some Iowa law enforcement officers may enforce federal law in certain circumstances, enforcing the state law still conflicts with
federal immigration law. A certified “officer or employee of a State or political subdivision of a State shall be subject to the direction and supervision of the [U.S.] Attorney General.”Bird also highlights that the United States has withdrawn its suit to enjoin enforcement of the Act. United States v. Iowa, 2025 WL 1140834, at *1 (8th Cir. Apr. 15, 2025). Also, Bird cites the amicus curiae brief of the United States in a suit about a Florida law like Iowa‘s, arguing that the Florida law is not preempted. Florida Immigr. Coal. v. Attorney General, No. 25-12441 (11th Cir. filed July 17, 2025). But the “Supremacy Clause gives priority to ‘the Laws of the United States,’ not the criminal law enforcement priorities or preferences of federal officers.” Kansas, 589 U.S. at 212, quoting
D.
Section 4 of the Act provides:
Upon a person‘s conviction of an offense under this chapter, the judge shall enter in the judgment in the case an order requiring the person to return to the foreign nation from which the person entered or attempted to enter. . . .
An order issued under this subsection must include all of the following:
- The manner of transportation of the person to a port of entry.
- The law enforcement officer or state agency responsible for monitoring compliance with the order.
By contrast, federal law provides federal officials discretion about the removal of aliens who reentered the United States. Federal law provides that if “the Attorney General finds an alien has reentered the United States illegally after having been removed or having departed voluntarily, under an order of removal,” then “the alien shall be removed under the prior order at any time after the reentry.”
Section 4 also likely conflicts with federal regulations over where to remove an alien to. Federal law restricts the removal of an illegal alien to a country “if the Attorney General decides that the alien‘s life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien‘s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”
Bird argues that the Act, properly interpreted, does not actually regulate the removal of illegal aliens from the United States. The Iowa Supreme Court presumes the state‘s statutes have no effect beyond the state‘s borders “unless the legislature clearly expresses otherwise.” Jahnke v. Deere & Co., 912 N.W.2d 136, 141 (Iowa 2018). Finding no clear expression in the text or legislative history of the Act, Bird argues section 4 does not regulate the removal of illegal aliens from the United States because it has no force beyond the borders of Iowa. Instead, Bird claims section 4 of the Act requires only the transportation of convicted aliens to a “port of entry” within Iowa, specifically the Des Moines International Airport.
Once again, Bird asks this court to ignore the plain meaning of the statute. See Doe, 903 N.W.2d at 351. Section 4 requires a judge to issue an order to an alien, not to exit the state, but to “return to the foreign nation from which the person entered or attempted to enter.”
Further, the Supreme Court looks also to the effects of a state law when deciding whether it conflicts with federal law. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637,651-52 (1971). The effect of section 4, even as Bird interprets it on appeal, is to deliver aliens to the Des Moines International Airport with an order to leave the United States for the country from which they entered or attempted to enter, or face further criminal penalties for refusing to obey. The effect of the Act is for illegal aliens not just to leave Iowa but to remove themselves from the United States entirely. Section 4 thus “violates the principle that the removal process is entrusted to the discretion of the Federal Government.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 409.
Even if section 4 of the Act were interpreted to leave the decision on removal to federal officials, Section 4 would still obstruct their discretion. Delivering an illegal alien to federal officials at a port of entry forces officials to decide what to do with that alien, a decision they may have postponed. Under the 1357(g) agreement between Iowa and ICE, certified officers who arrest an alien under the parameters of the agreement must “take the alien without unnecessary delay for examination before an immigration officer having authority to examine aliens as to their right to enter or remain in the United States.” But the agreement does not save section 4 of the Act from conflict preemption. Certified state officers act under the supervision of federal officers. A certified officer enforcing federal immigration law does not conflict with the discretion Congress gives to federal officials, because Congress permits federal officials to choose to allow state officers “to perform a function of an immigration officer.”
E.
Section 6 of the Act obstructs the discretion of federal officials: “A court may not abate the prosecution of an offense under this chapter on the basis that a federal determination regarding the immigration status of the person is pending or will be initiated.”
As discussed, Bird applies the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon of statutory interpretation. Kucera, 745 N.W.2d at 487 (describing that “the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of others not so mentioned“). Bird interprets section 6 to require abatement after federal officials make a final determination of an alien‘s status. But, again, this reading contradicts the plain meaning of the statute. See Doe, 903 N.W.2d at 351. The Act‘s text contains no mandatory abatement provision.
Distinguishing “abatement” from a voluntary stay of proceedings, Bird also argues that a state court might voluntarily stay a state prosecution on the basis that a federal determination is pending or yet-to-be initiated. But the potential for discretionary stays by state judges does not prevent conflict preemption. The decision to stay proceedings remains within the discretion of state courts, so Iowa still could make its own immigration policy. Under the current scheme of federal immigration law, the United States need not depend on the noblesse oblige of the states. Cf. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480 (2010). Federal immigration law bars states from making their own immigration policies. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 408. Despite the potential for discretionary stays by judges (or discretionary non-enforcement by state prosecutors), the Act likely conflicts with federal immigration law.
F.
Bird asks this court not to conclude here that the Act is likely facially unconstitutional, asserting “a basic uncertainty about what the law means and how it will be enforced.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 415. Bird argues that reversing the preliminary injunction would give “state courts . . . an opportunity to construe” theAct. Id. at 416. But this court has evaluated the Act according to Bird‘s interpretation. This court does not “go beyond the statute‘s facial requirements and speculate about ‘hypothetical’ or ‘imaginary’ cases.” Keller v. City of Fremont, 719 F.3d 931, 945 (8th Cir. 2013), quoting Washington State Grange v. Washington State Rep. Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449-50 (2008). This court does not “anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it“; nor does this court “formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.” Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 501 (1985). Any enforcement of the Act would likely conflict with federal law by interfering with the enforcement discretion that federal law gives to federal officers. Doe, Roe, and Iowa MMJ have clearly shown that their facial challenge is likely to succeed on the merits because every application of the Act stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. See Florida Immigr. Coal. v. Attorney General, 2025 WL 1625385, at *3 (11th Cir. June 6, 2025) (declining to stay a preliminary injunction issued by a district court against the enforcement of a similar Florida law that the district court concluded is field-preempted), app. for stay denied, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2025 WL 1890573 (July 9, 2025) (Mem.).
V.
This court next examines the other Dataphase factors. One factor is “the threat of irreparable harm to the movant.” Dataphase, 640 F.2d at 113. An irreparable harm occurs when “a party has no adequate remedy at law.” Sleep No. Corp., 33 F.4th at 1018. A party “must show harm that is certain and great and of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief.” Cigna Corp. v. Bricker, 103 F.4th 1336, 1346 (8th Cir. 2024). A party “is not required to prove with certainty the threat of irreparable harm, but it must prove that ‘irreparable harm is likely in the absence of an injunction.‘” Sleep No. Corp., 33 F.4th at 1018, quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). The district court found several potential harms from the enforcement of the Act:
- “permanent legal residents facing a risk of prosecution and criminal punishment under state law despite having permission under federal law to be present in the United States“;
- “state court prosecutions for illegal reentry moving forward even when defendants are in the process of applying for legal status under federal law“;
- “state court judges entering orders requiring noncitizens to leave the United States following an adjudicatory process with fewer safeguards and far less sophistication than the federal system“;
- “state court judges requiring noncitizens to return to countries where they might not be accepted or might face prosecution or torture“; and
- “noncitizens being delivered to a port of entry with no clear mechanism for what happens next.”
Iowa, 737 F.Supp.3d at 750.
This court reviews for clear error the district court‘s determination that “there is a threat of irreparable harm that justifies a preliminary injunction.” Sleep No. Corp., 33 F.4th at 1018. This court‘s scope of review is “very limited.” Id. The district court did not clearly err in concluding that Doe, Roe, and other Iowa MMJ members showed harms that are certain, great, and imminent. Bird once again claims that the Act does not apply to Doe and Roe. But, as discussed, the most likely reading of the Act is that it applies to Doe and Roe, as well as other Iowa MMJ members. Also, Bird again argues that Iowa MMJ‘s mission does not cover aliens here illegally. But, as discussed, Bird defines Iowa MMJ‘s purpose too narrowly. See also Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 645 F.3d 978, 995-96 (8th Cir. 2011) (affirming a preliminary injunction when organizations with associational standing showed that individual members would suffer irreparable harms from the government‘s action). Bird seeks to enforce the Act, so the harms to Doe, Roe, and other Iowa MMJ members are “more than mere speculation.” H&R Block, Inc. v. Block, Inc., 58 F.4th 939, 951 (8th Cir. 2023).
According to Bird, any harm is not irreparable. She elaborates that persons can raise as-applied challenges to the Act in response to prosecution. Thus, Bird concludes, a preliminary injunction of enforcement is improper. See Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 732 n.5 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“The basis of injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies.“), quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1959). True, the “mere prospect of facing criminal prosecution is not per se irreparable injury.” Munson v. Gilliam, 543 F.2d 48, 54 (8th Cir. 1976); see also Lindell v. United States, 82 F.4th 614, 620 (8th Cir. 2023). But, here, there are additional harms which are irreparable. Cf. United States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 518, 533 (4th Cir. 2013) (concluding that “for individual, unlawfully present immigrants and others, the likelihood of chaos resulting from” a state “enforcing its
For the final two Dataphase factors, the district court concluded that the balance of the harms and the public interest favored granting the preliminary injunction. When a state official acting in her official capacity is the nonmoving party, the public interest and the balance of the harms merge into one factor. Eggers v. Evnen, 48 F.4th 561, 564-65 (8th Cir. 2022). Bird emphasizes the harm to the state from preventing enforcement of an enacted law. Abbot v. Perez, 585 U.S. 579, 602 n.17 (2018); Org. for Black Struggle v. Ashcroft, 978 F.3d 603, 609 (8th Cir. 2020). Bird also stresses that if Iowa cannot enforce the law, it will suffer harms from the presence of tens of thousands of illegal aliens within its borders. Birdargues that the harm is even worse because, according to her, the Act involves Iowa‘s core sovereign right to use its police power to control who may enter and remain in its territory. Nevertheless, the district court concluded that the Dataphase factors favored granting the preliminary injunction. Iowa, 737 F.Supp.3d at 750. This court reviews for abuse of discretion the district court‘s balancing of the harms and weighing of the public interest. See, e.g., Cigna Corp., 103 F.4th at 1348-49.
Under the 1357(g) agreement, certified state officers can enforce federal immigration law. This ameliorates Bird‘s concern about an illegal immigration crisis. See Florida Immigr. Coal., 2025 WL 1625385, at *6. Bird even argues that the preliminary injunction might impede Iowa‘s ability to fulfill its obligations under the agreement. But the preliminary injunction enjoins the enforcement of Iowa‘s Act, not federal immigration law. On the other hand, Doe, Roe, and the other Iowa MMJ members face many harms from the enforcement of the Act, as found by the district court. Also, the Act could harm the public interest by causing friction with foreign countries and weakening the effective diplomacy of the Executive Branch. See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 395; Hines, 312 U.S. at 63 (explaining that “the interest of the cities, counties and states, no less than the interest of the people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference.” See also Florida Immigr. Coal., 2025 WL 1625385, at *5 (holding that because the state attorney general‘s success on the merits is “quite uncertain,” the harm of not being able to enforce the state law “is less relevant“). The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the balance of the equities favored enjoining the enforcement of the Act.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction.
VI.
Two questions remain. First, who does the preliminary injunction enjoin from enforcing the Act? The district court issued
Second, to whom does the preliminary injunction provide relief? “Traditionally, courts issued injunctions prohibiting executive officials from enforcing a challenged law or policy only against the plaintiffs in the lawsuit.” Trump v. CASA, Inc., 145 S. Ct. 2540, 2548 (2025). Thus “universal injunctions“—that is, injunctions that “prohibit enforcement of a law or policy against anyone“—“likely exceed the equitable authority that Congress has granted to the federal courts.” Id. Doe, Roe, and Iowa MMJ argue that narrowing the relief to enjoin enforcement of the Act only against them is not workable. Bird responds that the Supreme Court held that “the policy pros and cons are beside the point.” Id. at 2560. Doe, Roe, and Iowa MMJ also argue that a statewide injunction is especially important in a preemption case, because a narrower injunction allows a state law that “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 399. Bird counters that there is no preemption exception to the rule against universal injunctions. Bird concludes thatextending the injunction to persons beyond the Iowa MMJ members would make the injunction “broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue.” Trump, 145 S. Ct. at 2562-63.
The district court did not address the scope of the injunction. Nor did the district court explain whether its injunction was a “universal injunction” or only relief to the plaintiffs. The district court also did not decide whether Iowa MMJ has standing to sue as an organization for injuries to itself. This court is “a court of review, ‘not of first view.‘” MPAY Inc. v. Erie Custom Comput. Apps., Inc., 970 F.3d 1010, 1021 (8th Cir. 2020). Doe, Roe, and Iowa MMJ invite this court to remand this case to the district court to evaluate these legal questions and perhaps receive additional factual submissions. Bird asks this court to apply Trump v. CASA here. In Trump v. CASA, the Supreme Court declined to decide “whether a narrower injunction is appropriate.” Trump, 145 S. Ct. at 2558. The Court left to the lower courts “to consider these and any related arguments.” Id. The Court expects the lower courts to “move expeditiously to ensure that, with respect to each plaintiff,” the injunctions are not “broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue” and that the
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The order granting a preliminary injunction is affirmed, except as modified consistent with this opinion.