Leslie Miller, Inc. v. ArkansasLeslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas
Appellant submitted a bid in May 1954 for construction of facilities at an Air Force Base in Arkansas over
Congress provided in § 3 of the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, 62 Stat. 21, 23,
“(a) Is a manufacturer, construction contractor, or regular dealer ....
“ (b) Has adequate financial resources, or ability to secure such resources;
“(c) Has the necessary experience, organization, and technical qualifications, and has or can acquire the necessary facilities (including probable subcontractor arrangements) to perform the proposed contract;
“(d) Is able to comply with the required delivery or performance schedule (taking into consideration all existing business commitments);
“(e) Has a satisfactory record of performance, integrity, judgment, and skills; and
“(f) Is otherwise qualified and eligible to receive an award under applicable laws and regulations.”32 CFR § 1.307 ; see also32 CFR § 2.406-3 .
Under the Arkansas licensing law similar factors are set forth to guide the Contractors Licensing Board:
“The Board, in determining the qualifications of any applicant for original license . . . shall, among other things, consider the following: (a) experience, (b) ability, (c) character, (d) the manner of performance of previous contracts, (e) financial condition, (f) equipment, (g) any other fact tending to show ability and willingness to conserve the public health and safety, and (h) default in complying with the provisions of this act ... or any other law of the State. . . .” Ark. Stat., 1947, §71-709.'
Mere enumeration of the similar grounds for licensing under the state statute and for finding “responsibility” under the federal statute and regulations is sufficient to
“It seems to us that the immunity of the instruments of the United States from state control in the performance of their duties extends to a requirement that they desist from performance until they satisfy a state officer upon examination that they are competent for a necessary part of them and pay a fee for permission to go on. Such a requirement does not merely touch the Government servants remotely by a general rule of conduct; it lays hold of them in their specific attempt to obey orders and requires qualifications in addition to those that the Government has pronounced sufficient. It is the duty of the Department to employ persons competent for their work and that duty it must be presumed has been performed. . . .”
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Arkansas is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.