Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc.

HODEL, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING & RECLAMATION

ASSOCIATION, INC., et al. Argued February No. 79-1538. 1981 Decided June 1981* 79-1596, Virginia *Together with No. & Reclamation Surface al., Association, Inc., Hodel, Acting Secretary Interior, et al. v. et appeal also on from the same court. J., opinion Court, of delivered the in which Marshall, Burger, J.,C. Stevens, and and Blackmun, Brennan, Stewart, White, Powell, concurring post, p. JJ., joined. J., statement, filed 305. C. a Burger, J., concurring post, J., opinion, p. 305. filed filed Powell, Rehnquist, opinion concurring judgment, post, p. an in the 307.

Peter Buscemi argued appellant for in No. 79- cause him in No. on the briefs appellees 1538 and 79-1596. With Attorney McCree, Acting Assistant were Solicitor General Sagalkin, Michael A. McCord. General and Coleman, Marshall Attorney argued of Virginia, General the cause for appellees in No. 79-1538 in No. appellants and him Virginia 79-1596. With on the brief for Sur appellees face & et Association, Reclamation al. were Inc., Roger L. Gregory Luce, Attorneys and M. Assistant Chafe General, and John L. T. Copeland Kilcullen. Robert filed a brief for the appellees Town Charles et al., St. under this cases.† 10.4, Court’s both Rule Jr., Dean, L. †Norman filed a brief for National Federation Wildlife et urging al. as amici curiae reversal.

Briefs urging of amici curiae affirmance were filed State Wayne Alaska Condon, Attorney Alaska, et al. Wilson L. General Minami, Attorney Hawaii, Wong, Deputy General of Johnson H. At- and tornej'' General, Leroy, Attorney David Idaho, H. L. General of Steven Attorney Beshear, Guste, Attorney Kentucky, Jr., General of J. William Louisiana, Gary Keyser Blackmon, General of and L. Carmack and M. Attorneys General, Assistant Douglas, Attorney Paul J. General of Ne- braska, Judy and Hoffman, Attorney General, Bingaman, K. Assistant Jeff Attorney Mexico, Attorney Cartwright, General of New Jan Eric General Oklahoma, II, Attorney J. Island, Dennis Roberts General of Rhode Meierhenry, Attorney Mark V. Dakota, of South B. General Robert Hansen, Attorney Utah; General of for the State of Arizona et al. Attorney Wayne Robert Corbin, Minami, C. Arizona, General of Attor- ney Hawaii, Deputy Wong, Attorney General, General of and Johnson H. Attorney Larry Bryan, Nevada, Struve, Richard H. General of D. Chief Deputy Attorney Harry Attorney General, Swainston, Deputy W. General, Olson, Attorney Ray Dakota, Allen I. of North General Walton, Special Attorney Attorney General, Brown, Assistant James M. Oregon, Attorney Hansen, Utah, General of Robert B. Slade General Gorton, Attorney Washington, Troughton, and John D. At- General of torney Tyrone Wyoming; by for Fah- the State of Illinois C. General Sheldon; ner, Attorney General, Harvey M. for and the State of Texas by White, Attorney General, Fainter, Jr., Mark John W. First Assistant Gray III, Attorney General, Attorney Richard E. Executive Assistant Kever, Attorney General, General; Justin Andrew Assistant for Coal and by Operators Associates, Inc., Leathers, Joseph John Robert and Zalw- J. Eugene Mooney; ski, for Legal F. the Mountain States Foundation by Marzulla; Roger for J. the National Coal A. Association et al. John opinion delivered the of the Court. Justice Marshall These cases arise out of a pre-enforcement challenge to the constitutionality Mining of the Surface Control and Recla- mation Act of 1977 (Surface Act or Act), 91 Stat. Mining seq. (1976 S. C. et III). § ed., Supp. The United States Virginia District Court the Western District of de- provisions clared several central of the Act unconstitutional permanently enjoined their-'enforcement. Supp. 483 F. appeals, these we Congress, consider whether Act, adopting powers exceeded its under the Commerce Clause of Constitution,1 transgressed affirmative limi- tations exercise of that contained in the Fifth and Tenth Amendments. We conclude the context of a facial challenge, the Surface Act does not suffer any from alleged these constitutional defects, and up- we hold the Act as constitutional.

I

A The Surface Mining comprehensive Act is a statute de- signed to “establish a program protect nationwide society and the from environment the adverse effects of surface coal mining operations.” (a), § 30 U. S. (a) (1976 § C. 1202 ed., Supp. III). Title II of Act, 30 U. S. 1211 (1976 §C. Supp. ed., Ill), creates the Office of Surface Mining Reclama- tion and Enforcement (OSM), within the Department of the Interior, and the Secretary the Interior (Secretary) acting through OSM, is charged primary with responsibility for ad- MacLeod, McMillan, Jr.; and Richard and for Legal the Pacific Founda- Ronald Raymond A. Zumbrun tion M. Momboisse.

Eugene Mooney, George F. Seay, Jr., L. and John Robert Leathers filed a brief for Pike County, Kentucky, as amicus curiae. 1The Commerce empowers Clause regulate Commerce “[t]o foreign with among Nations and several and with the Indian

Tribes.” Const., I, U. S. Art. cl. 3.

269 ministering implementing promulgating reg- and Act provisions. its (c), § ulations and C. enforcing (1976 1211 (c) Supp. III). regulatory § The principal ed., and enforcement provisions are contained Title V of Act, (1976 ed., 91 Stat. C. §§ U. S. 467-514, Supp. III). ed., Section C. (1976 Supp. § 30 U. S. Ill), two-stage regulation establishes a program coal interim mining: regulatory phase, surface an or initial, and program a permanent phase. The interim subsequent, mandates immediate and enforcement promulgation federal performance of the protection some Act’s environmental complemented by standards, continuing regulation. state permanent Under regulatory is to be phase, program adopted for each State, mandating compliance with the full panoply federal performance standards, with enforce- ment responsibility lying or with either the State Federal Government.

Section' 501 (a) Secretary directs promulgate regu establishing regulatory lations interim program during an operators which mine will required comply with some performance standards, specified Act’s as (c), § 502 (1976 30 U. S. 1252 (c) ed., III). among §C. Supp. Included those selected are requirements (a) standards governing: res toration mining of land after prior condition; (b) its resto ration of land to approximate original contour; (c) its segre gation preservation of topsoil; (d) minimization of disturbance to hydrologic balance; (e) construction of coal piles mine waste as (f) used dams embankments; re- vegetation areas; spoil disposal. mined (g) (b), § (1976 C. (b) Supp. III).2 § The interim ed., provisions are, by terms, Other their own made effective during period. interim (e), One example is 30 U. S. C. §522 (e) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), prohibits, exceptions, which with some mining specified surface coal on certain parti lands or within distances of cular structures facilities.

regulations on 42 Fed. published 13, 1977, were December see currently in Reg. 62639,3 they are in effect most and including Virginia.4 Secretary responsible

The for interim enforcing reg- ulatory program. (e), (1976 ed., § 502 30 U. S. 1252 (e) §C. Supp. A III). inspection federal enforcement and program is to State, be established for each and to in remain effect a permanent until regulatory program is in the implemented may permits State. States issue mining opera- surface during tions the interim phase, operations but authorized permits such must comply with the interim perform- federal § ance standards. 502 (b), (b) (1976 ed., 30 U. S. C. 1252 § Ill). Supp. may pursue regulatory States also their own and inspection programs during they may the interim phase, 3 (b), (c) Act, (b), (c) (1976 Under 30 U. S. C. 1252 §§502 §§ ed., Ill), Supp. only applicable the interim standards are to min surface ing operations in regulating mining States that were themselves surface mining when the Act became law. All States in which surface was con private regulatory ducted on programs lands had of their own when the passed Accordingly, appli was in 1977. program the interim became throughout cable in including Virginia. all relevant areas country, 4 mining operations, New surface excluding those on “Federal lands” or lands,” February commencing 3, 1978, “Indian comply or after must performance with the regulatory pro standards established the interim gram operations. And, at the start of exceptions, with certain limited sur operations mining begun prior February face 3, 1978, required to were to compliance regulations May 3, with the interim as of 1978. 502 §§ (b), (c), (11), (b), (c), (11) (1976 30 U. S. 1252 C. and 1291 §§ III). ed., Supp. regulations Some of the interim challenged were in the United States (a) District Court for the District pursuant (1) of Columbia § Act, (a)(1) (1976 ed., III). U. S. C. 1276 Supp. In re § Surface Regulation Litigation, Supp. (1978); 452 F. In re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, Supp. (1978), part 456 F. aff’d in part, App. rev’d U. S. D. C. 627 F. 2d 1346 plaintiffs litigation in the District of challenged validity Columbia also statutory provisions of a number of the that are at issue in the instant validity The District Court cases. sustained the provisions, of those 1319-1321, Supp., at and the attack appeal. F. was not renewed on the Secretary assist the interim standards.5 The enforcing not, regu- States are however, required enforce interim latory and, pro- phase standards until the permanent gram, Secretary may not cede the Government’s Federal independent enforcement to conduct role States that wish programs. own their regulatory (b), (b)

Section 501 C. (1976 ed., Supp. 30 U. S. Ill), Secretary promulgate directs the estab- regulations permanent a lishing regulatory program all the incorporating performance Act’s published standards. The Secretary regulations permanent on March 13, 1979, see 44 Fed. Reg. regulations par- but these do become effective in permanent ticular until program, State either a sub- state approved mitted and Act, accordance with 503 the or § permanent program adopted federal the in ac- State, cordance implemented. §with 504, 503, any wishing §

Under State permanent regu- assume latory authority operations over the surface on mining coal 6 “non-Federal lands” within its pro- borders submit a must posed permanent program to the Secretary approval. for his proposed program The leg- must demonstrate that the state islature has enacted laws the environmental implementing protection by accompany- standards established the Act and ing regulations, and that State the has the administrative and ability technical to enforce these 30 standards. U. S. C. (1976 1253 ed., Supp. III). Secretary § The must approve disapprove each proposed such program in accordance with time schedules and procedures by (b), (c), §§ established 503

5 Congress encouraged such by providing assistance for financial reim bursements States actively assist the federal enforcement effort during phase. the interim See 30 (e) (1976 U. S. (4) ed., Supp. C. 1252 § III). 6 separate regulatory A program governing “Federal lands” is established by Act, 523 of the (1976 30 U. ed., III). S. 1273 Supp. § C. The term § “Federal lands” is (4), defined in 30 (4) (1976 ed., U. S. 1291 C. §701 § III). Supp. Act, Section 710 of the (1976 30 ed., Supp. U. S. C. § Ill), regulates mining surface on “Indian lands.” Supp. III).7 In addi- (c) (1976 ed., (b), S. C. §§ 30 U. develop implement a federal Secretary must the tion, fails submit or en- for each State that program permanent satisfactory § C. program. § state force a ed., Secretary con- situations, Supp. III). such (1976 regulatory authority administering stitutes and until a continues as such unless within that State and eight months program” approved. No later than “state federally state-run or administered adoption either a after State, for a all surface coal regulatory program permanent lands” operations and reclamation “non-Federal mining permit State must obtain a new issued accord- within that applicable regulatory program. (a), §506 with ance (a) (1976 Supp. III). ed., S. C. § proposed programs state were to been Feb have submitted ruary 3, passed. Exercising 1979—18 months after the Act was his authority (a), Secretary under extended the deadline until §504 Reg. Secretary’s August 1979. See 44 Fed. Because publication permanent regulations March 1979 occurred seven months (b) (1976 Act, ed., Supp. the date after set see 30 U. C. 1251 Ill), District United States Court for the District of Columbia further programs including extended deadline for submission of state to and Mining Regulation Litigation, March In re Permanent 1980. Surface (DC July 1979). Aug. 21, Reg. Civ. No. 25 and See also Fed. (1979) (announcing conforming changes Secretary’s regula 60969 in the governing programs). tions submission of state exception Alaska, Georgia, Washington, the With of and all in States mining expected which surface is either conducted or is to be conducted proposed programs Secretary by submitted state March to the 1980. Secretary The has made his initial programs. decisions on these Three programs approved, approved were 8 were the condition States agree to modifications, approved part some 10 were in disapproved and part, disapproved in and legislatures 3 were because the state had failed to necessary implementing enact Virginia’s program among the statutes. was approved part disapproved part. those in and in Reg. See 45 Fed. 69977 (1980). Act, may plan Under 503 of the a State revise that has been disapproved part Secretary whole or in and resubmit it the within days of his initial decision.

B the 23, 1978, Virginia On October Surface and Association, an of Inc., pro- Reclamation association coal mining coal engaged operations ducers surface Virginia, member coal companies, 63 of its and individual landowners in Federal District declaratory filed suit Court seeking against relief injunctive provisions various of the Act. The Virginia of Wise, Commonwealth and the town in- Va., of plaintiffs.8 challenge tervened as primarily Plaintiffs’ was Title performance directed at V’s standards.9 the Because regulatory permanent program was scheduled to become not 1980, plaintiffs’ effective until June was challenge directed of at the sections the establishing regulatory interim alleged program. provisions Plaintiffs these violate the equal protection Commerce Clause, process guar- due antees of the Due Amendment,10 Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,11 Tenth Compensation and the Just Clause of the Fifth Amendment.12 District 13-day

The Court held a trial on plaintiffs’ re- quest permanent for a injunction. The subsequently court Virginia Inc., The Citizens Better Reclamation, the town of Charles, Va., Secretary. St. in support intervened as defendants also challenged Act, Plaintiffs Title IV of the U. S. C. §§ (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), program which establishes a reclamation for aban held, doned The Court, however, mines. District that it exercise its would grant [ing] declaratory “not judgments provisions discretion as title.” 483 Supp. appeal F. There is no from portion this judgment. District Court’s 10The Due Process Clause the Fifth Amendment states that no person deprived life, “be shall liberty, property, process without due of law.” powers delegated Tenth Amendment, Under the “[t]he Constitution, prohibited by United States nor it to are respectively, reserved the States people.” or to the Compensation prohibits taking private Clause property public just compensation.” “for use, without provi- central declaring several opinion and an order issued (1980). F. Supp. Act unconstitutional. sions of the Clause, pro- equal rejected Commerce plaintiffs’ The court Act. to the challenges process due tection, and substantive ‘displace Act "operates held, however, court The in areas operations integral States’ freedom structure contraven- in functions,’ and, therefore, . . of traditional . Id., quoting Na- of the Tenth Amendment.” tion Usery, S. League tional Cities v. U. of of the effect provisions The court also ruled that various of taking property violation uncompensated private an Fifth Amendment. Compensation Clause the Just chal- plaintiffs’ process with due Finally, agreed the court provisions. The lenges to some of the Act’s enforcement enforcing from enjoined Secretary permanently court of the Act.13 provisions various portion Secretary appeals

In No. from that 79-1538, judgment declaring various sections of the District Court’s enjoining their en permanently the Act unconstitutional and from the cross-appeal 79-1596, plaintiffs forcement. No. challenge rejection of their Commerce Clause District Court’s raised, importance Act.14 Because of the of the issues to the probable jurisdiction appeals,15 noted of both U. we stay Secretary’s pending The District Court denied the motion for a appeal time, this Court. At the same issued an order direct court clarifying App. modifying its earlier to Juris. opinion order. (J. Upon Secretary’s 79-1538, pp. App.). la-16a Statement No. staying judgment application, we issued an order the District Court’s timely “pending filing disposition appealfs] in this Court.” appeal portion do not from that the District Court’s Plaintiffs equal rejecting protection process judgment their and substantive due challenges to the Act. jurisdiction of this Court was invoked under 28 S. C. provides any appeal to this which direct Court from decision invalidating any the United an Act court of States suit agencies, officers, employees parties. the United its are which

275 two cases.16 For conven (1980), and consolidated the 817 usually plaintiffs “appellees.” to ience, shall refer as we

II that the District Court cross-appeal, appellees argue On beyond challenge to the Act as rejecting erred their scope under Clause. congressional power the Commerce the use They principal goal regulating insist that the Act’s not, borders of States as private lands within the commerce found, regulating the District Court the interstate appellees con- mining. Consequently, effects of surface coal as presented tend is “whether that the ultimate issue land such subject Clause, under regulation to Commerce ” Brief i. e. whether regarded ‘in commerce.’ land can be as Inc., Virginia Association, Surface & Reclamation Mining 12 In “no” (emphasis urging et al. us to answer original). question, appellees emphasize to this the Court has rec- police is within the inherent ognized regulation land-use powers political subdivisions,17 of the their States and

16 agreed 80-231, Indiana, appeal also to hear the Hodel v. We No. challenges provisions which involves similar constitutional to different today. Post, Mining Act, p. we 314. the Surface and which also decide At three have considered constitutional chal least other District Courts lenges provisions of the Surface Act. Concerned Citizens of Appalachia, (ED Andrus, Supp. 1980), appeal Inc. v. 494 F. 679 Tenn. upheld pending, (CA6), the District Court the Act in No. 80-1488 challenges plaintiffs raised in the instant case. face of similar those Andrus, (SD Iowa, 1980), In Star 79-171-2 Coal Co. v. No. Feb. rejected challenges appeal dism’d, (CA8), the District Court No. 80-1284 Amendments, enjoined the Fifth Tenth but some of the Act’s based on P-Burg Co., Supp. Andrus provisions. And in v. Coal 495 F. enforcement (CA7 1981), (SD aff’d, 2d 1980), Ind. 644 F. the District Court challenge rejected the Act. a Commerce Clause Village Boraas, as Belle Terre Appellees cite cases such v. Parker, (1954); Euclid Ambler (1974); U. S. U. S. Berman v. Realty Co., 272 U. S.

argue may regulate only land use insofar as the Property grants it control over Clause18 federal lands. accept appellees’

We do not either framing question or the they answer would have us supply. The task of a court that particular is asked determine whether a exer cise of congressional power is valid under Commerce relatively Clause is narrow. The must defer to a con court finding gressional regulated activity that a interstate affects commerce, any if there is such finding. rational basis for a Motel, States, Heart Atlanta Inc. v. United S. 241, 379 U. of 258 (1964); v. McClung, 294, Katzenbach 379 S.U. 303-304 (1964). only established, remaining This the question for judicial inquiry is by whether “the means [Congress] chosen must be reasonably adapted to permitted by the end the States, Constitution.” Heart Motel, Atlanta United Inc. v. of supra, at 262. See United Darby, 100, States v. U. S. 121 312 (1941); McClung, Katzenbach v. 379 U. at 304. S., The judicial task is at an end once the court determines that Con gress rationally acted in a adopting particular regulatory scheme. Ibid. in

Judicial review this area is influenced above all fact that grant Commerce is Clause author- plenary ity to Congress. League See National Cities v. Usery, supra, at 840; States, Cleveland v. United 329 S. 19 14, U. (1946); NLRB Laughlin v. & Jones Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 37 (1937). This power “complete is itself, may in be ex- ercised to its utmost extent, and no acknowledges limitations, other prescribed than are in the constitution.” Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 1, Wheat. (1824). this Moreover, Court has made clear that commerce not only extends to “the use of channels of interstate or foreign commerce” and Property provides: Clause Congress “The have shall Power dispose of and all make needful and Regulations Rules respecting the Territory Property belonging or other to the United Const., States.” U. S. IV, 3, Art. cl. 2. § com interstate of the instrumentalities “protection commerce,” but also persons things

merce ... or States, Perez United v. affecting “activities commerce.” Fry v. United explained S. we 146, U. As “[ejven States, 421 activity that (1975), S. U. regulated Congress, purely may intrastate character by others combined conduct activity, where with like States or with similarly among commerce situated, affects Usery, League Cities v. See National foreign nations.” Motel, Inc. v. United Heart Atlanta S., 840; 426 U. at Filburn, supra, Wickard v. 255; S. 317 U. Dairy Co., Wrightwood

(1942); United States v. Darby, supra, at 120-121. United States (1942); activity af- when determined that an Thus, has inquire only fects interstate need courts commerce, finding Court the District Here, whether rational. out in properly express Congress’ findings, deferred set on inter- mining about the effects of surface coal itself, (c) (c), state commerce. Section 101 C. (1976 Supp. Ill), congressional finding ed., recites “many result disturbances mining operations surface adversely com- of surface areas that burden affect and by destroying or diminish- public merce and the welfare commercial, industrial, resi- ing utility the of land for and dential, recreational, agricultural, forestry purposes, by by contributing to causing landslides, erosion and floods, by destroying fish and by polluting water, the habitats, by beauty, by wildlife natural dam- impairing by creating of hazards dan- property citizens, aging gerous of property by quality to life degrading and by counteracting local and govern- life communities, and programs soil, water, mental and efforts to conserve other natural resources.” legislative ample support

The for these provides record statutory Mining findings. The became law Surface only years after six thorough most legislative consider- of Congress ation.19 Committees both Houses of held ex- hearings during tended which testimony vast amounts of and 19Hearings proposed legislation regulating on mining began coal surface Mining in 1968. Surface Hearings Reclamation: before the Senate Com Affairs, mittee on Interior (1968). and Insular 90th Cong., 2d Sess. Three years later, hearings by additional were held Committees both the House Regulation Strip Mining: and Senate. Hearings before Subcom Mining mittee on Mines and of the House Committee Interior and on Insular Affairs, Cong., (1971); Mining: Hearings 92d 1st Sess. Surface before the Minerals, Subcommittee on and Fuels Materials of the Senate Committee Affairs, Cong., (1972). on Interior and Insular 92d 1st Sess. The Com reported by mittees for respective bills consideration their Houses. passed adjourned Congress House H. R. but before Senate could on act the measure. Similar bills were Congress reintroduced in the 93d further and hear-

ings Regulation were held. Mining Operations: Hearings Surface before the Senate Committee on Affairs, Cong., Interior and Insular 93d 1st Sess. (1973); Regulation Mining: Hearings of Surface before Subcom- on mittee Mining Environment and and the Subcommittee on Mines the House Affairs, Committee on and Cong., Interior Insular 93d 1st (1973). request Committee, Sess. At the of the Chairman of the Senate Quality prepared the Council on report Environmental entitled a Coal Mining Surface and Reclamation: An and Environmental Economic (Comm. 1973), Assessment Alternatives Print and Senate Com- hearings held mittee additional report. to consider the Coal Surface Hearings and Minerals, Reclamation: before the on Subcommittee Materials and Fuels of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, (1973). Cong., 93d 1st Sess. The House and Senate Committees reported by passed Houses, Congress bills consideration both a bill was President vetoed Ford in 1974. legislation mining

The surface was reintroduced in 94th hearing objec- the Senate Committee held on administration Mining Briefing: Briefing to the tions bill. Surface before the Senate Affairs, 94th Cong., Committee Interior Insular 1st Sess. reported Senate, bills to the House and again Both Committees which reported a bill the Conference passed Committee. President Ford again vetoed the bill. congressional finally protracted

The endeavor bore fruit 1977. The held hearings and Senate Committees relevant House extensive shortly Congress to opening the 95th consider bills introduced after at the on documentary surface mining about effects of evidence economy brought Con- were Nation’s environment and our findings made detailed attention. Both Committees gress’ legislation need for federal urgent these effects and the about Report explained that The problem. Senate address "[sjurface mining imposed large have so- coal activities many country public cial on the ... areas costs ero- lands, water pollution, in the form of unreclaimed re- of fish and wildlife sion, floods, slope failures, loss No. beauty.” Rep. in natural sources, and a decline p. 50 95-128, (1977). id., at 50-54.

See adverse documented the Similarly, the House Committee as commerce mining coal on interstate effects surface including:

“ 11,000 drainage which has ruined an estimated 'Acid forest prime loss of hardwood streams; miles of min- strip destruction of wildlife habitat and the recurrent productive farmland; degrading ing; very legislative Mining Control and beginning of session. Surface new on Hearings 7 before the Subcommittee Reclamation Act of 1977: on S. Energy on Committee Lands and Resources of Senate Public (1977) (1977 Hearings); Resources, Cong., Senate 1st Sess. Natural 95th Hearings on H. R. Act of 1977: Control and Reclamation Surface the House Energy the Environment of on before the Subcommittee (1977) Affairs, Cong., 95th Sess. and Insular 1st Committee on Interior (1977 reported both Houses Hearings). legislation was House followed, lengthy floor debate. passage after in both Chambers (1977). Committee 12861-12886, 15691-15755 The Conference Cong. Rec. Rep. (1977), and July 1977, No. 95-493 was H. R. Conf. Report issued bill debate, agreed both to the recommended floor Houses after further (1977). 23967-23988, Presi- Cong. 24419-24429 the conferees. Rec. legislative August 3, 1977. The signed Act into law Carter dent (1977), 95-128, pp. Rep. No. 59-61 history Act is in S. summarized (1977). Note, pp. Rep. 95-218, See also H. No. and in R. L. Rev. Va.W.

landslides; sys- siltation sedimentation of and river H. No. Rep. 95-218, p. (1977), tems R. quot- ....’” ing p. (1976). H. R. No. Rep. 94-1445, in discussing mining And how surface coal affects water in resources and turn interstate Com- commerce, House mittee explained:

“The most widespread damages . are . . environmental in nature. Water users developers significant incur economic and financial losses as well.

“Reduced fishkills, recreational reductions in values, normal impaired waste assimilation sup- capacity, water plies, masonry metals and corrosion deterioration, frequencies flood increased and flood damages, reductions designed storage capacities in water impoundments, at higher operating for waterway- costs commercial users are some of the most obvious economic effects that mining-related from stem pollution and sedimentation.” H. Rep. 95-218, No. at 59. R. id.,

See at 96-122. The Committees explained also that inadequacies in exist- ing state laws and the need for uniform minimum nationwide made regulations standards federal imperative. Rep. See 95-128, 49; No. H. R. Rep. No. light at 58. 95-218, the evidence Congress available to and the detailed consider- ation legislation received, say we cannot that Con- not gress did have a rational basis for concluding surface mining coal has substantial effects interstate commerce. Appellees do dispute the not, validity of general, congressional findings.20 appellees’ contention Rather, is that 20Appellees do contend that mining surface enhances than rather utility diminishes the steep-slope of land Virginia. areas of Con gress, however, contrary made findings, and purposes it is sufficient for judicial review that had a rational basis concluding it as did. Kleppe Mexico, New See 10 (1976); United n. States Co., v. Carotene Products U. S. be- case apply not this test should basis”

the “rational affect- activity a local use, land regulates the Act cause appellees assuming even commerce. But ing interstate by as regulated use correctly characterize the land unpersuasive. argument their is “local” activity, or “intrastate” activity a “local” of an as The denomination Congress may whether activity question does not resolve previously Clause. As the Commerce regulate it under intra activities to those power “extends noted, commerce exertion commerce, or the so affect interstate state which themof regulation it, as to make power Congress over end, the legitimate of a to the appropriate means attainment interstate regulate to effective execution of the granted Co., Dairy Wrightwood United States v. commerce.” 547; Fry United S., S., U. U. at 119. See v. Laughlin Cory., Steel at 37. This NLRB v. Jones & S., 301 U. condi may Congress regulate long has Court held that are commerce shipped in interstate goods under which tions goods these activity producing produced the “local” where g., States v. e. United See, commerce. itself affects interstate Filburn, Wickard Darby, v. (1941); U. U. S. 100 Laughlin Corp., suyra; Steel NLRB & v. Jones (1942); Walling, Cf. Katz Co. v. Kirschbaum not do McClung, (1964). Appellees enbach v. S. 294 a moves interstate commodity is that dispute that coal rationally regu determined Here, commerce. necessary protect interstate mining is lation of surface coal may ac result from that from adverse effects that commerce sufficient to sustain tivity. congressional finding This under the Com Congress’ power a valid exercise Act as merce Clause. finding that congressional

Moreover, responds are and reclamation standards “surface mining nationwide in interstate competition order insure essential States of coal different produced sellers among commerce ability of several States to undermine the used will improve adequate and maintain standards on min- coal ing operations within their borders.” 30 U. S. 1201 (g) §C. III). (1976 ed., Supp. prevention of this sort of destruc- competition tive interstate is a traditional for congres- role United States sional action under the Commerce Clause. Darby, supra, the Court used a similar rationale to sustain imposition wage of federal minimum and maximum hour regulations on goods a manufacturer of shipped in interstate commerce. explained The Court the statute imple- mented Congress’ view that “interstate commerce should not competition be made the instrument of in the distribution of goods produced under substandard labor which conditions, competition injurious to the commerce and to the states Id., from and to which the flows.” commerce at 115. The same applies rationale here to support the conclusion that Surface Act is within the granted to authority Congress by the Commerce Clause.

Finally, agree we with the lower federal courts that have uniformly found conferred the Commerce enough Clause permit broad congressional regulation of activities air or water causing or other pollution, environ- mental that may hazards have effects in more than one State.21 Appellees do not dispute that environmental other problems the Act attempts to control can properly through addressed Commerce legislation. Clause In these circumstances, it is difficult to any find remaining foundation 21See, g., Byrd, e. United States v. 609 F. 2d 1204, (CA7 Corp. Train, Bethlehem Steel 1979); v. (CA3 1976) 657, ; 544 F. 2d 663 EPA, Club 335, Sierra v. 176 App. 360, D. 1114, S. C. 540 F. 2d 1139 (1976), denied, (1977); cert. 430 U. S. 959 Train, District Columbia v. App. 311, 172 328, U. S. D. C. 521 971, (1975), F. 2d 988 vacated and re sub grounds Brown, EPA manded on nom. other v. (1977); 431 U. S. 99 Transportation United Co., States v. Ashland Oil & 2d 504 F. 1325 Pennsylvania (CA6 EPA, 1974); (CA3 v. 500 1974); F. 2d 259 Corp. South EPA, Terminal (CA1 v. 2d 1974); F. United Bishop Processing Co., States Supp. (Md. 287 F. 1968), aff’d, 423 (CA4), 2d denied, F. cert. S. 904 for appellees’ argument that, it regulates particular because a use, Mining beyond congressional land Surface Act is authority. Commerce Clause we turn to the Accordingly, question whether the by Congress means selected were reason- able and appropriate.

Appellees’ challenge essential the means selected they Act is that unnecessary. Appellees are redundant or variety contend that a of federal statutes such as the Clean Air Act, seq. (1976 Supp. U. S. C. 7401 et ed., Ill), § Flood Control Acts, seq. (1976 ed., Supp. U. C. 701 et § Ill), seq. and the Clean Water et Act, U. S. C. (1976 Supp. ed., Ill), adequately address the federal interest in controlling the environmental effects of coal min- surface without need to ing regulation resort to the land-use scheme of the Surface Act. The answer to argu- short this existing ment is in dealing effectiveness laws with problem by Congress identified com- ordinarily a matter legislative mitted to judgment. Congress considered ef- of existing legislation fectiveness and concluded that addi- necessary tional measures were to deal with the interstate commerce mining. effects of surface coal H. Rep. See It. 95-218, No. 58-60; Rep. 95-128, No. And at 59-63. agree with regulatory we the court below that the Act’s reasonably goals scheme is related to the Congress sought accomplish. The Act’s restrictions on practices mine control operators all serve to environmental and other ad- mining. verse effects of surface coal we conclude sum, the District Court properly re- jected appellees’ challenge Commerce Clause to the Act. We turn to the ruling therefore court’s that the Act contravenes constitutional limitations on congressional affirmative exer- power. cise of the commerce

Ill (d) 515 (e) §§ Court invalidated and District standards for prescribe performance which surface coal Act, 284 22 they “steep slopes,” ground on on the

mining violate on a constitutional limitation the commerce imposed by provisions “steep- the Tenth Amendment. These require slope” operators: (i) by reclaim the mined area completely covering highwall returning the the “approxi- site its 23 original contour”; (ii) mate to refrain from dumping spoil downslope material the below bench or mining cut; (iii) disturbing to refrain from land above the highwall permitted so regulatory authority. unless to do 515§ (d), (d) (1976 ed., C. Supp. III). § Under “steep-slope” operator may a (e), § obtain a variance approximate-original-contour from the requirement by show- it ing postreclamation will allow a use that is “deemed to constitute or equal an better economic or public use” than possible. would otherwise be 30 U. S. §C. 1265 (e)(3)(A) (1976 ed., III).24 Supp.

The District Court’s ruling relied heavily on our decision League National Cities Usery, 426 U. S. 833 The District Court viewed the central issue as whether the governs Act private activities of individuals, whether it instead regulates governmental decisions of the States. although And the court acknowledged that “ulti mately operator,” affects the coal mine Supp., 483 F. it concluded that the Act contravenes the Tenth Amendment (d)(4), Section (d)(4) (1976 30 U. S. C. ed., Supp. Ill), § “steep slope” “any defines a slope twenty as degrees above or such lesser may slope regulatory as authority be defined after consideration of soil, climate, and other region characteristics or State.” “approximate The term original contour” is defined as “that surface configuration by backfilling achieved and grading of the mined area so area, including any reclaimed terracing roads, closely or access general resembles the configuration surface prior of the land mining complements and blends into and drainage pattern surrounding terrain, highwalls with spoil piles all eliminated.” §701(2), (2) (1976 ed., III). Supp. S. C. § (e), (c) (1976 24Section 515 30 IT. S. C. ed., Supp. Ill), estab separate procedure lishes a variance mountaintop mining operations. governmen because it interferes with the States’ “traditional Id., tal function” of land use. at 435. The court regulating that, applied steep-slope provi held as Virginia, Act’s the impermissibly ability sions constrict the State’s to make “es accomplishes sential The court found decisions.” the “through this result control of relinquishment forced state planning; through land use control of its loss state econ omy; through harm, expenditure and economic from of state implement funds to the from of the tax act and destruction Id., ing power cities, certain towns.” at counties, and 435.26 The permanently enjoined court therefore enforce ment of 515 (d) (e).27 §§ although The court- reasoned that the Act allows a to elect to State regulatory

have its program, purportedly given own the “choice that federally no program comply choice at all” the state because must with prescribed Supp., standards. 483 F. at 432. presented On trial, the basis of the evidence the court found that postmining steep slopes “approximate original restoration of to their con “economically Id., physically impossible.” tour” is infeasible and at 434. steep-slope provisions particularly Virginia The court noted that the affect because of its coal reserves are And the located on such lands. 95% operators court indicated that coal mine had been forced to shut several they requirements, comply down because were unable the Act’s with consequences with adverse for the economies of various towns and counties dependent mining. that are on coal The court found that there is a also Virginia fields, need level land in the it counties coal con provisions prevent Act’s cluded reclamation would “forward- planning” by looking Finally, land use the State. Ibid. the court found original mined that restoration of land to its contour would diminish the $5,000-$300,000-an-aere value of the land from value of level land to steep-slope $5-$75-per-acre value of land. Secretary’s opinion accompanying In its order its denial of stay supra, request judgment pending appeal, for a of its see n. explained injunction against Court enforcement of District placed spoil not intended steep-slope standards was “allo[w] downslope in an uncontrolled manner.” The court stated that on the “[a]ny downslope spoil placement be in such shall a controlled manner protection meeting specified by regulatory standards environmental authority.” App. 2a. J. S. League Cities District reliance National Court’s of import actual basis of

requires a careful review the and we considered constitu- There, our decision that case. a to challenge to the amendments the Fair Labor tional wage Act which had federal minimum Standards extended regulations gov- hour to maximum most state and local and employees. Because it conceded the chal- ernment was that regulations lenged within of the “undoubtedly scope were the only Clause,” S., question pre- Commerce at 841, particular sented was whether exercise of commerce that power “encounter a . . constitutional because . barrier [ed] applied directly regulations] to States subdivi- [the employers.” began by sions of States as We drawing Ibid. distinction sharp congressional regulation private between persons subject “necessarily businesses to the dual sover- government eignty of Nation of the State id., they which reside,” regulation at and federal “di- rected, private not to citizens, but States,” to States as ibid. to the former, As we found Tenth no im- Amendment we, pediment congressional to action. Instead, reaffirmed our rule: consistent

“Congressional power over of private endeavor, areas even when its may exercise pre-empt express state-law determinations contrary to the result that has com- mended itself to the collective wisdom of Congress, has held been to be limited only requirement 'the means chosen [Congress] must be reasonably adapted permitted end by the Constitution.’ Motel, Heart Atlanta Inc. v. United 379 U. S. Id., (1964).” at 840. noted, The Court however, that “the States as States stand quite footing on a different from an corporation individual or challenging when the exercise of Congress’ power regulate Id., commerce.” at It 854. indicated that when Congress directly attempts to regulate the States as the Tenth States Amendment requires recognition that “there attributes are sovereignty government which attaching every state may may not be impaired by Congress, Congress not because authority lack an affirmative reach the legislative grant it from matter, prohibits but because the Constitution exer cising authority in that manner.” at 845. The Court Id., wages held that the to set the and work hours of state employees was “an sovereignty.” undoubted attribute of state Ibid. challenged And because it further found regulations “displace would the States’ freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional func governmental id., tions,” concluded could the Court consistently not, “abrogate with the Tenth Amendment, authority plenary States’ otherwise deci make [these Id., .” at 846.28 sions]

It should apparent from this discussion in order that succeed, a claim congressional power legis- commerce League lation is invalid under reasoning of National of satisfy Cities must requirements. each of First, three there must be a showing challenged regulates statute Id., “States as regula- States.” at 854. the federal Second, League National Cities question expressly open left “whether might different results Congress integral operations obtain if seeks to affect governments by authority state exercising granted it under other sections spending power, I, 8, 1, Constitution such as the cl. 5 of Art. § § Fitzpatrick S., the Fourteenth Amendment.” 426 U. at n. 17. v. Bitzer, (1976), upheld Congress’ power the Court under § of the Fourteenth Amendment private damages against to authorize actions governments state employment. discrimination in ex Court plained that because adopted specific the Amendment was with the purpose limiting autonomy, state principles constitutional of federalism congressional power autonomy do not restrict to invade state when legislates Id., under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. at City Similarly, Rome v. United 452-456. in U. S. (1980), places held that Tenth we Amendment no restrictions congressional “to ‘by enforce the Civil appro Amendments War legislation.’” priate indisputably “attribute matters that are [s]

tion must address ap- third, must be Id., at 845. And it sovereignty.” of state the federal law would compliance with parent that the States’ integral operations ability “to structure directly impair their Id., 852.29 governmental functions.” of traditional in areas light of these Act is in Mining the Surface examined When Amendment chal- appellees’ clear that Tenth principles, it is requirements first of the fail because the three lenge must contrary holding to the satisfied. The District Court’s not of the decision National on an unwarranted extension rests League Cities. steep-slope acknowledged, the the District Court itself

As govern only the activ- of the Surface provisions individuals and operators private coal mine who are ities of compelled not to en- Moreover, businesses. States are funds, expend any state steep-slope standards, force the any participate regulatory program or to the federal a to submit manner whatsoever. If State does wish Act and permanent program complies with the proposed regulatory burden will be implementing regulations, the full by the there can be no borne Federal Government. Thus, suggestion legislative processes that the Act commandeers by directly them en- compelling of the States to enact and EPA, Maryland regulatory program. force a federal Cf. (CA4 1975), 2d 530 F. vacated remanded Brown, nom. EPA v. 431 S. 99 District (1977); sub U. Train, 311, 172 App. 330-334, Columbia v. U. S. D. C. 521 sub nom. 971, (1975), F. 2d 990-994 vacated and remanded EPA, Brown, (1977); EPA 431 Brown v. S. 99 v. 521 F. U. 29Demonstrating requirements not, that these three are met does how ever, guarantee challenge congressional that a Tenth Amendment power action commerce will succeed. There are situations in which the may justifies of the federal interest advanced nature such that it Fry States, United (1975), 421 submission. See v. S. 542 state U. re League Usery, Cities affirmed in National S., 426 v. See 852-853. id., concurring). (Blackmun, J., also at 856

289 827, 2d remanded, 837-842 (CA9 1975), vacated and 431 U. (1977). The most that can be said is that the Surface Mining Act program cooperative establishes a federalism by that allows the within limits established federal minimum reg- to enact and administer their own standards, ulatory programs, structured to meet their own particular Mining Regulation needs. See In re Liti- Permanent Surface gation, App. 225, 199 U. S. C. 617 F. 2d 807, D. (1980). this Act respect, the resembles a number of other federal Tenth statutes have survived Amendment chal- lenges the lower federal courts.30 Appellees however, that the threat of federal usur- argue, pation of their regulatory roles coerces the States into en- forcing Appellees Surface Act. also contend that directly the Act States regulates the as States because it es- tablishes mandatory minimum In essence, federal standards. appellees urge join beyond us to looking District Court in actually regulated activities the Act to its conceivable effects on the States’ freedom make decisions in areas governmental “integral And appellees empha- functions.” size, as did court below, interferes with the ability States’ to exercise police powers regulating their use. land

Appellees’ accurately claims characterize the Act insofar as it prescribes federal minimum standards governing surface may coal mining, which a State either implement itself yield else a federally regulatory program. administered object To to this scheme, however, appellees assume must Tenth congressional power Amendment limits g., Helsley, United States See, (CA9 1979) e. (up v. 615 F. 2d 784 holding Hunting Friends Act, 742j 1); Airborne S. C. § — Earth, Carey, Inc. 552 F. (CA2) 2d (upholding v. the Clean Air seq. (1976 ed., Supp. III)), et Act, denied, 42 U. S. C. cert. §7401 EPA, Sierra Club (1977); App. U. S. 902 335, 359, U. S. D. C. (1976) 2d (upholding Act, F. the Clean Water 33 U. S. C. cert, seq.), 1251 et denied, U. S. ^290

pre-empt or displace private state regulation activities af- fecting interstate commerce. This assumption is incorrect.

A of precedent congressional wealth attests to authority to pre-empt displace state laws regulating private activity affecting interstate commerce when these conflict laws with See, g., federal law. Packing Co., e. Jones v. Rath 430 U. 519, (1977); Campbell, 525-526 Perez v. 402 U. S. 637, 649- 650 (1971); Growers, Paul, Florida Lime & Avocado Inc. v. S. 132, U. 141-143 Bethlehem (1963); Steel Co. v. New Bd., York Labor State Relations 330 U. S. 772-776 (1947); Davidowitz, Hines v. U. S. (1941). Moreover, it is clear that the Commerce Clause empowers prohibit just all—and inconsistent —state regulation of such activities. e. See, g., City Burbank v. Terminal, Lockheed Air Inc., 411 U. S. 624 (1973); Camp Hussey, bell (1961); S.U. Rice v. Santa Fe Eleva tor Corp., 331 U. S. 218 (1947); Transit Comm’n v. United States, 289 S. 121 (1933). U. Although such congressional obviously enactments curtail or prohibit the States’ preroga tives to legislative make respecting choices subjects the States may consider important, Supremacy Clause permits no other Chicago result. See & North Western Transp. v.Co. Co., Kalo Brick & Tile S. 311, U. 317-319 (1981); Sani tary District v. United 425-426 (1925) ; Cases, Minnesota Rate S. 352, U. 399 (1913); Gib Ogden, bons v. Wheat., at 211. As the Court long ago “It elementary stated: and well settled that there can be no divided authority over interstate commerce, and that acts of Congress subject on that supreme are and exclusive.” Missouri Stroud, R. Co. v. S. 404, Pacific

Thus, Congress could constitutionally have enacted a stat- ute prohibiting any regulation state of surface coal mining. why We fail to see Surface should become constitutionally suspect simply because Congress chose to allow States a regulatory role. Contrary to assump- tion both the District Court and appellees, nothing

291 League Cities National suggests that Tenth Amend- from pre-emptive ment shields the States federal regulation private commerce. To the activities interstate affecting League National Cities contrary, explicitly reaffirmed the pri- teaching Congress may, regulating of earlier cases that in “pre-empt pursuant power, vate activities the commerce contrary state-law determinations to the result which express commended itself to the collective wisdom of Con- has only . . . con- gress S., 426 U. at 840. The limitation on authority gressional regard requirement is the this that reasonably regulat- goal means related to selected already Ibid. We ing interstate commerce. have indicated that the Act satisfies this test.31 regardless applies

This conclusion federal whether-the. legislation displaces “police laws enacted under the States’ powers.” long rejected ago suggestion The Court by invades areas reserved to the States the Tenth simply authority its under Amendment because it exercises displaces the Commerce Clause a manner that the States’ States, See Hoke United police powers. exercise of their v. States, United Athanasaw v. (1913); 227 U. States, Cleveland v. United S., (1913); 227 S. 326 329 U. U. Darby, United States United S., 113-114; v. 312 at 19; U. Dairy Wrightwood Co., States v. United S., at 119. 315 U. Cf. Co., States v. Carolene Products (1938) 147 304 U. S. (“it objection power regulate is no exertion of the by its is attended same interstate commerce that exercise police which attend the exercise of the incidents Co., Pipeline FPC v. Natural Gas states”);32 accord, supra, significant at 283. It the Commonwealth of Vir See ginia presses challenge simply Tenth to the Act as an its Amendment regulatory regulator mining program coal whose has been other of surface displaced pre-empted text, law. are federal As indicated there no Tenth Amendment concerns in such situations. holding disposes appellees of the contention and various This pre- amici it the Surface unconstitutional because Kentucky Distilleries & Hamilton v. (1942); 575, 582 S.U. Seven Cases v. Co., (1919); 146, 156 U. S. Warehouse has This Court United U. S. en federal statutes any number of constitutional upheld as particular pre-empt power that the commerce under acted States g., United e. police power. See, of state exercises Drug, Food, Federal Walsh, (upholding (1947) S. 432 U. NLRB v. Jones 301-392); §§ S. C. Act, and Cosmetic Na (upholding 1 (1937) Corp., Steel Laughlin & 151-168); United Act, §§ 29 U. C. Labor Relations tional Act, Standards Darby, supra (upholding Fair Labor States v. de be a radical 201-219). It would therefore §§ 29 U. C. to for this Court long-established precedent from parture from prohibits Congress Amendment the Tenth hold that activity. regulating private power laws displacing police state hints League Cities compels or even in National Nothing of departure.33 at such a power. has stated: police As the Court the existence of a federal

sumes “ authority government interstate commerce does the federal over ‘The of by the states over or character from that retained differ in extent not ” S., 116, quot- Darby, States 312 U. United v. intrastate commerce.’ Royal Co-operative, 569-570 307 U. S. ing United States v. Rock by District Court for its remaining justification asserted the steep- here, ruling, appellees urge is that the one that Tenth Amendment economy destroy the requirements Virginia’s slope mining will harm In this and counties in the Commonwealth. taxing power of some towns National may the discussion in regard, the court have been influenced likely challenged regulations on League the Cities about the effects of League governments. National Cities v. finances of state and local clear, made the determi Usery, S., at 846-847. But as the Court 426 U. action, of the federal in that case was the nature native factor Moreover, Id., impact at 847. even on the States. ultimate economic requirements impact will have a measurable the Act’s if it is true alone, economy, effect, standing is insufficient Virginia’s this kind of to on Atkinson Amendment. In Oklahoma v. violation of the Tenth establish a (1941), rejected the Court the assertion that Co., 313 U. S. Congress’ and local economies is a barrier to impact on state an adverse Sur- challenge Tenth Amendment to the sum, appellees’ in contrast here, Act must because face fail Cities, at issue League the statute situation National subject only necessarily “individual businesses regulates government of the Nation and sovereignty the dual League Cities they State in reside.” National which turn to Usery, S., Accordingly, at 845.34 we other consti- ruling District Court’s that the Act contravenes congressional tutional limits action.

IV provisions The District Act’s Court held that two Clause of the Fifth Amend- Compensation violate Just steep-slope provisions ment. First, the found that court taking of uncompensated private discussed above effect an “economically perform property requiring operators sur- physically impossible” restoring steep-slope task of original contour. 483 F. approximate face mines their steep- if Supp., at The court further held even that, 437.35 approximate could restored to their slope surface mines original such res- the value of the mined land after contour, practically noth- toration would have “been diminished regulate private of its activ- exercise under the Commerce Clause affecting persuaded ities interstate not that there commerce. areWe presented reversing the compelling are reasons in the instant cases for position. Court’s correctly have held that land- We assumed that the District Court regulation “integral governmental is as term use an function” that was League National Cities. Our resolution of the Tenth Amend used of challenge unnecessary ment to the Act makes it for us to decide whether actually the this case. statutory proce acknowledged of a The District Court the existence requesting steep-slope provisions. for from the But the dure variances statutory requirement suggested highwalls re that the that of court completely procedure mining covered makes this variance claimed cuts steep-slope operators. Supp., at 437. This “meaningless” to mine 483 F. premature. was See n. conclusion infra.

ing.” Ibid. of Second, § the court found expressly effects an taking pro- unconstitutional because it prevent hibits in certain a mining “clearly locations and [s] Id., person from mining having land mined.” his own or it at 441.36 on Pennsylvania this Court’s decision in Relying Mahon, Coal Co. v. S. 393 District Court (1922), held that both of be- provisions these are unconstitutional they cause of “depriv[e] any of use operators] mine [coal land, only most . .” F. profitable . . [their] at 441. Supp.,

We conclude “tak- ruling Court’s District ing” issue from deficiency: appellees suffers a fatal neither nor the court any identified property appellees in which have an interest allegedly that has been operation taken By Act. proceeding in this below fashion, ignored court oft-repeated this Court’s admonition that the constitution- ality ought of statutes not be except decided an actual specified subject With certain exceptions, existing and “valid rights,” (e) prohibits mining operations surface parks in national forests, and they or adversely publicly where parks will affect owned places or that are Register included in the National Historic Sites. (e)(1), (3) (2), (1976 ed., III). S. C. Supp. and also §§ It prohibits mining cemetery right-of-way surface within 100 feet of a or the public road, occupied dwelling, public within 300 of an feet build ing, church, school, community public park. or institutional or building, (e)(4) §§522 (c), 522 (a), (d),

Sections applicable during which become permanent phase require regulatory program, the establishment of procedures designating particular lands as unsuitable for some or all mining. surface (1976 30 U. S. 1272 (a), (c), ed., Supp. C. and (d) §§ III). ruling The District Court’s provisions these latter an effect taking private property unconstitutional puzzling stand. and cannot provisions Since permanent these do not into until phase come effect regulatory they program, the Act’s applied appellees have not been any private Virginia. other landowner in circumstances, In these there controversy justiciable regard was no case or with to these sections Mitchell, (1947). Act. Public 75, See United Workers v. 330 U. S. factual setting necessary. makes such a decision See Socialist Labor Party Gilligan, v. 683, (1972); 406 U. S. Army Court, Rescue Municipal v. 549, 568-575, U. S. (1947); McAdory, Alabama State Federation Labor v. 325 U. S. 461 (1945). Adherence rule particu- to this larly important raising in cases allegations of an unconstitu- taking tional of private property. re- Term, Just last we affirmed that

“this generally any Court has develop ‘been unable to “set for determining “justice formula” when and fair- require ness” injuries economic by public caused action compensated by be the government, rather than remain disproportionately per- concentrated on a few sons.’ it has Rather, question by the ‘taking’ examined essentially hoc, inquiries ad factual have engaging identified several factors —such as impact the economic in- regulation, its interference with reasonable vestment backed expectations, and the character of the government particular significance.” action —that have Kaiser Aetna v. United (1979) U. S. (citations omitted).

These hoc, “ad factual inquiries” must be conducted with respect specific property, particular and the estimates economic impact and ultimate valuation relevant unique circumstances.

Because appellees’ taking claim arose in the context of a challenge, facial presented it no controversy concrete con cerning application either of the Act particular surface mining operations or its effect on specific parcels of land. only Thus, the issue properly before and, the District Court in turn, Court, this is whether the “mere enactment” of the Surface taking. Act constitutes a Ti Agins See buron, 447 The test to applied considering challenge fairly this facial straightforward. A 296 property

statute the that can be made of regulating uses economically viable taking effects a it “denies an owner if Agins Tiburon, supra, use of his land . at 260. See . . City, Penn Co. v. New York S. 104 Transp. Central (1978). Mining easily scrutiny The Surface Act survives this under test. Act

First, prevent the on its beneficial use not, face, does for coal-bearing Except proscription mining lands. by near certain locations Act § not cate- (e), does gorically prohibit merely surface coal it mining; regulates the conditions which operations may under such be conducted.37 purport regulate The Act does not to alternative uses to which coal-bearing may put.38 Thus, lands posture be 37Although (e) prohibits any mining surface coal in certain § areas, appellees’ “taking” challenge provision First, premature. this appellees showing they made no in the District Court own'tracts of by provision. Second, (e) not, that are affected land this does § face, deprive economically its owners of land within its reach of viable proscribe nonmining use of their land since it does not such uses of land. (e)’s Third, expressly subject restrictions are made “valid exist §522 ing rights.” Appellees exception “applies only contend that this specific mining operations required permits surface which all were prior August 3, 1977, issued the effective date of the Act.” Brief for Virginia Association, Mining Inc., Surface Reclamation al. 48. et This exception by interpretation compelled statutory either the history. language legislative or its Rep. 95-218, p. See EL R. No. apparently (a) (2) (i) It is (1980), reg based on CFR 761.5 promulgated Secretary. regulation, ulation That however, was re Secretary manded to for reconsideration the United States District Mining Court for District of Columbia. re Permanent Surface Litigation, Regulation appeals (1980), pending, ERC No. (CADC). Secretary Appeals 80-1810 et al. did not ask the Court of portion judgment. to review this of the District Court’s 38If, found, as Court steep-slope the District level land in the areas of Virginia $5,000-1300,000 per acre, is worth presumably some landowners option simply leveling retain the the land mining without first the coal. Moreover, truly if flat benchland is as found, valuable as the court below impediment there be no financial should to the re-establishment of flat sup- which these eases come before no us, there is reason to pose “mere enactment” of the Surface Act has de- prived appellees economically their property. viable use of

Moreover, appellees juncture legitimately cannot this complaints raise in this Court about manner which provisions challenged have been or will applied in specific or about their effect circumstances, particular mining operations. coal There is no in indication the record appellees op- have availed themselves of the portunities provided by the Act to obtain administrative re- by lief requesting approximate- either a variance from the original-contour of requirement (d) § 515 or a from waiver (e). surface restrictions in If mining appellees § to were seek administrative relief under procedures, these a mutually acceptable might solution well be reached with re- to gard properties, thereby obviating any individual need potential address the constitutional questions.39 The for such administrative solutions confirms the conclusion that by the taking simply issue decided the District Court is not ripe judicial resolution.40

areas on the mining operations, sites some old once those areas have been required restored and by stabilized in the manner the Act. 39 The District steep-slope proce Court’s conclusion that variance (e) dure meaningful opportunity does not offer a for adminis § premature. Appellees identify any trative relief was did not instance statutory obligation highwall which the prevented cover the had operator taking mine from advantage procedure. of the variance 40Although we conclude “mere enactment” did Act taking private property, holding preclude effect a ap- this does not pellees operators attempting or other coal mine from to show that as applied' particular parcels land, Secretary’s regu the Act and the taking. then, alleged taking lations effect a Even such an is not just compensation unconstitutional unless is unavailable. See Duke Study Group, Inc., Power v. Carolina Environmental Co. 438 U. S. Regional Reorganization (1978); Cases, Rail n. 419 U. S. Foreign (1974); Corp., Larson v. Domestic & Commerce 682, 697, n. 18 V

A Act contravenes ruled that the The District Court next pro- number of its enforcement Fifth Amendment because a One Amendment’s Due Process Clause. visions offend the (a) (2) (1976 (a) (2), § is 30 U. C. provision such immediately to Secretary ed., Supp. Ill), which instructs operation partial or cessation of a surface order total mining inspection, federal determines, he on the basis of a whenever con- permit or a operation violation the Act operation dition the Act and that required safety of danger immediate to the health or “creates an reasonably expected or can public, causing, or land, imminent harm to significant, cause environmental . . . .”41 air, water resources operator aggrieved A an immediate cessation order mine (a) by issued under 521 or a cessation order issued after (2) § of an expiration period a notice of violation and abatement may immediately (a) (3) request temporary under 521 re- § Secretary from respond lief the the must Secretary, and request days receipt. (c), the within five of its 525 30 § (1976 ed., Supp. III). (c) § C. Section (c) (1976 author- Act, ed., Supp. Ill), § 30 U. C. Secretary judicial denying izes review a decision temporary In addition, subject relief. cessation orders are informal administrative (a)(5), §521 review under and for- mal review, including adjudicatory administrative an hear- under ing, (b), (b) (1976 ed., Supp. § 525 30 U. S. §C. Secretary Where determines that a violation of the Act of a or permit threat, condition does not entail such a serious he must issue a fixing notice (a)(3), of violation a reasonable time for abatement. §521 (1976 (a)(3) ed., III). Supp. S.U. C. If the violation is not §1271 prescribed period, Secretary immediately abated within the must order partial offending mining operation. total cessation III).42 Secretary’s The decision in the pro- formal review ceeding subject judicial pursuant (a)(2), review to § (a)(2) (1976 30 U. S. C. 1276 Supp. III). ed., Court §521 District held that (a)(2)’s authorization of immediate cessation orders the Fifth violates Amendment because provide the statute does not sufficiently objective summary criteria for administrative action. regard, this the court on its finding inspectors relied that OSM is- had against particular sued company three cessa- immediate tion which orders were later overturned appeal, and that the company significant involved had suffered losses. The enjoined Secretary court any from issuing ces- immediate “until sation orders such time as provisions makes subjective correct use criteria inspectors.” OSM 483 F. at 448.43 In Supp., addition, the court ruled that even if the Act is amended to correct problem, 5-day this re- sponse period prescribed by the Act does not meet re- quirements of process. due Instead, the court held that Secretary respond must within 24 hours to a operator’s mine request temporary relief from an immediate cessation order. find both aspects We of the District Court’s reason- ing unpersuasive.

Our cases have indicated that process due ordinarily re- quires an opportunity for “some kind of hearing” prior to the deprivation significant of a property interest. See Parratt Taylor, v. 451 U. S. 527, 540 Boddie (1981); Connecticut, 401 U. S. (1971). The Court has often acknowl- 42Under (a)(5), 30 (a)(5) U. S. C. (1976 ed„ Supp. §521 Ill), §1271 automatically expire cessation orders days, after 30 public “unless a hear ing is held at the site within such proximity reasonable to the site that any viewings of the site can be during conducted public the course of the hearing.” 43 January 21, 1980, The District Court’s supplemental order and opinion, 13, supra, explained injunction see n. that its did apply to pursuant immediate cessation orders (a) (3) issued against 521 mine operators who failed had to abate violations within the period speci time App. fied in the notice violation. J. S. 2a-3a.

300 may summary action administrative however,

edged, Calero-Toledo g., e. emergency See, situations. justified (1974); Co., 663, Leasing U. S. 677-680 Yacht v. Pearson Mytinger 378-379; Ewing Connecticut, v. supra, at v. Boddie v. Fahey (1950); Inc., 594, S. 599-600 Casselberry, & v. United (1947); Yakus Mallonee, 253-254 245, U. S. Willingham, v. (1944); 442-443 Bowles U. S. 414, Commissioner, v. Phillips (1944); U. S. 519-520 Storage Co. North American Cold (1931); S. 595-599 U. (1908). question The Chicago, 315-321 v. cessation orders immediate whether the issuance of then, excep situation emergency falls under this (a) 521§ under hearing process requires a the normal rule that due tion it right. We believe that property of a deprivation prior does. reflect provisions Congress’ cessation order

The immediate may from devastating damage result about concern They attempt to reach an represent an mining disasters.44 com legitimate desire mining between accommodation reg to administrative submitting to be heard before panies protecting the governmental pub interest ulation and safety from imminent and the environment lic health and safety public of the danger. of the health Protection justifies governmental which sum paramount ais interest Indeed, mary deprivation property action. administrative oldest public safety health and protect “[o]ne Ewing My v. examples” permissible action. summary Inc., Mackey 599. See tinger Casselberry, supra, & history (a) (2) legislative indicates that viewed The of § Secretary’s critical, immediate cessation orders as to issue primarily possible was intended to avert occurrence the measure Rep. 95-218, Creek flood. of such disasters as the Buffalo See H. R. No. 95-128, pp. (1977); (1977). pp. Rep. No. 90-91 The Buffalo collapse Creek flood caused the sudden coal mine waste im- was poundment Creek, dam in 1972 near Buffalo W. Va. flood left 4,000 persons persons Rep. dead and rendered homeless. No. See H. R. 94^-1445, p. 19

Montrym, id., (1979); n. U. J., Storage American Cold Co. dissenting); North (Stewart, Chicago, supra, Moreover, v. at 315-316. administrative provided through responds action orders immediate cessation necessary in which is protect situations swift action public This safety. precisely type health of emer gency summary situation in which found this Court has ad justified. action Ewing Mytinger ministrative See v. & Cas selberry, Inc., Storage North Co. supra; American Cold Chicago, supra.

Rather taking any than issue with principles, these District Court held sufficiently Act does not establish objective governing the criteria issuance of summary cessa- disagree. tion orders. We our judgment, the criteria established the Act and the Secretary’s reg- implementing specific ulations are enough governmental to control action and reduce the risk of deprivation. erroneous Section 701 (8) of Act, C. (8) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), defines the threat danger “imminent to the health and safety of public” the- as existence of a prac- condition or tice which could

“[Reasonably expected physical cause substantial persons harm to permit outside the area before such or practice, condition, violation can be abated. A rea- expectation sonable or injury death serious before abatement exists subjected if a rational person, to the same conditions or practices giving rise to the peril, would not expose himself or danger during to the herself the time necessary for abatement.” Secretary’s regulations define significant, “a imminent environ following mental harm” in the terms: “(a) An any harm impact air, environmental land, adverse or water resources, include, which resources to, plant but are not limited and animal life. “(b) An imminent, environmental harm is condition, practice, if a (1)

violation exists causing harm, Is or, (2) May reasonably such which — specific more than the cri these are If standards anything, authorizing summary administrative statutes other teria in challenges. against process due upheld been action that have Inc., Casselberry, supra, & at Ewing Mytinger v. g., e. See, or be in a material 'dangerous to health ... would ('' misleading injury damage purchaser or respect Mallonee, 250-251, n. 1 Fahey supra, v. or consumer’ ”); savings and manage or unfit to a Federal loan (''is unsafe " becoming s of im danger in imminent association” [i] Safety East, Transportation Air Inc. v. National paired”) ; Board, (CA3) ('' 'emergency requiring 2d 1227, 512 F. safety ”), ... to air in commerce’ respect action immediate denied, (1975). 423 U. cert. have immediate ces inspectors

The fact that OSM issued that were later overturned on administrative sation orders adequacy appeal does undermine the of the Act’s criteria not efficacy proce of the review but instead demonstrates is not inquiry dures. The relevant whether a cessation order been issued in a particular case, have but whether the should statutory affording procedure incapable proc due itself of ess. United S., Yakus v. at 434-435. The any possibility of regulatory administrative error inheres in statutory programs admin program; authorizing emergency prior hearing exception.46 action to a are no As istrative we any expected be to cause such harm at time before the end of rea- (a) (3) sonable abatement time that be set under would Section 521 Act.

"(c) significant appreciable if An environmental harm is harm is immediately reparable.” not CFR and 701.5 700.5 §§ might pattern presented different case if a A of abuse and arbi trary agency’s action were discernible from review of an administration summary procedure. Although sought a District Court to charac issuing record in terms, terize the OSM’s cessation in these orders a showing that three cessation orders were overturned on administrative pattern appeal from a arbitrary is far establish sufficient abuse action.

explained Ewing S., Mytinger Inc., & Casselberry, at 599: any

“Discretion may action official be abused. Yet it requirement a of due process there be judicial inquiry before discretion can be exercised. It is sufficient, where only property rights concerned, are there is stage at some an opportunity for hearing judicial and a determination.” mine operators Here, are afforded prompt adequate post- deprivation hearings administrative opportunity and an judicial review. We are satisfied that the Act’s immediate cessation provisions order comport requirements with the due process.

We also conclude reducing that the District Court erred in statutorily the prescribed time period Secretary’s for the re- sponse requests for temporary relief. In the place, first 5-day period the a statutory is maximum and there no in- is dication in the the Secretary record that not responded has or will not respond in less days. than five Second, appellees have not they demonstrated that adversely have been affected 5-day response the period particular in a case is or that it generally In unreasonable. addition, no evidence was intro- duced to a show that shorter reply period administratively is feasible. In circumstances, these there simply is no basis for the District Court’s decision judicial substitute a policy preference for the adopted by scheme Congress. Cf. Ver- mont Yankee Corp. Nuclear v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 S. 519 U. Accordingly, we turn to the holding District Court’s that other sections of the Act violate Fifth the Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

B The District Court ruled that the Act’s civil penalty pro- do visions not with comport the requirements of due process. Under these Secretary the provisions, is to notify the recip- ient of a notice of or violation a cessation order pro- of the any is to be assessed penalty that civil posed amount (1976 ed., Supp. 1268 (c) S. (c), § C. against § it. operator if (c) that, further states III). Section 518 or the penalty of the contest either the amount “wishes to amount proposed must “forward the violation,” fact of the it 47 Once account.” Secretary placement in an escrow to the operator receives a full met, requirement escrow judge, law hearing an administrative adjudicatory before judicial board and right appeal with to an a administrative (a) (2) § decision. See 30 U. C. review of final judicial or re- III). after (1976 ed., Supp. If, administrative that view, no occurred or it is determined that violation ap- penalty reduced, should be proposed amount of the operator to the promptly be refunded propriate amount must (1976 ed., Supp. III). (c) interest. C. 1268 with appellees civil penalty the Act’s challenging provisions had them, or one of have civil allege they, any did District against Moreover, penalties assessed them. ruling on the immediate ces- find, did not as it did in Court opera- coal mine any appellee order provisions, sation statutory been or any tors have affected harmed procedures Thus, for the assessment and collection fines. any there suggestion in these cases belies record controversy concerning operation case of these concrete provisions. circumstances, In these we must conclude that appellees’ and it challenge improper that was premature, for court to render this the below a decision on claim.

VI challenges Our to appellees’ examination constitutional the is not persuades Surface Act us that the Act finally However, penalties imposed alleged no are offender until provided opportunity public hearing. (b) has been an for a Section 518 only provides: penalty Secretary “A civil shall assessed after given person charged been opportunity with a violation . has . . an (b) (1976 III). public hearing.” for a ed., Supp. U. S. C. vulnerable pre-enforcement challenge. Accordingly, to their we the judgment affirm District Court upholding against appellees’ (No. Commerce Clause attack 79- 1596), judgment and we reverse the as below insofar it held various provisions (No. 79-1538). of the Act unconstitutional The cases to are remanded the District Court with instruc- injunction tions dissolve against the Secretary, issued for and further proceedings with this opinion. consistent

So ordered. The Justice, Chief concurring.* I agree largely with what Justice Rehnquist has said about the “fictions” concerning delegation, gradual case-by-case expansion of the reach the Commerce Clause. fully

I agree with his often to forget view we seem the doctrine laws enacted by Congress under Com- merce Clause must be based on a substantial effect inter- state commerce. I However, join the opinions Court’s these cases and in No. 80-231 because in them the Court acknowledges and reaffirms ante, g., doctrine. e. See, at 280.

Justice Powell, concurring.

The Surface Mining Act mandates an extraordinarily in- trusive program of regulation federal and control of land use land reclamation, activities normally left to state and governments. local But the decisions of this Court over many years make clear that, under the Commerce Clause, has the legislation. enact this

The Act seriously could affect the owners and lessees land coal in the seven westernmost counties of Virginia. Federal Government required the Fifth Amend- ment pay just compensation any “taking” of private opinion applies 80-231, Hodel, Acting also No. Secretary *[This Interior, al., p. et al. Indiana post, et 314.] Co. Diego Gas & Electric See San public use.1 for property (1981) (Brennan, Diego, 621, 450 U. S. City San v. of been a “tak has such dissenting).2 But whether there J., ques just compensation, are if amount ing” and, so, the Tiburon, 447 Agins v. specific in cases. tions to be decided States, 444 United Kaiser Aetna 255, (1980); U. I that agree therefore, the Court with S.U. under the questions consider in these cases it is premature Ante, have Appellees at 293-297. Compensation Clause. been property alleged no is to have specific that identified holding decision thus is confined to a The taken. Court’s facially is respect unconstitutional. that in this to, remains Ante, “taking” The issue available at n. 40. any property may litigated by, or lessee whose owner by of the Act.3 adversely is affected the enforcement interest Virginia I a that will be af add word about area of geology by Act, location, topography, this as its fected highly understanding “taking” ques to an are relevant coal, Virginia’s tion. Bituminous most valuable natural res region by steep slopes, in a mountain ource,4 found marked outcrops sharp ridges, rock, valleys— massive and narrow severely limit conditions alternative uses of land. that rugged terrain, Because of thin soil and the land in its nat agricultural growing ural state not suited use Its lies, instances, of merchantable timber. value most course, assume, Congress weighed probable against We this cost goals the desirable environmental of the Act. Justice Brennan “taking” question considered and the three joined majority Justices who him was not reached a the Court. 3 Agins, S., at we observed that “determination government taking is, essence, a a action constitutes determination single public large, owner, rather than a must bear the burden of an public exercise of state interest.” mining The District found that coal is per $2 Court billion industry year in the Commonwealth.

solely in. coal. major its the coal is industrial ac tivity in impoverished Virginia.5 an otherwise of area

A number of to been provisions appear the Act’s have written comprehension potential with little of its on effect rugged this area. For in example, requirement (d) § the that steep-slope orig- areas be their approximately restored to particularly inal contours seems unrealistic. As the District found, Court Virginia in strippable coal lands 95% are located in slopes degrees. excess of 20 483 F. Supp. 425, 434 (1980). The of cost restoration in some situations could substantially exceed any value the coal. In restoring diminish event steep slopes mountain often would rather than increase land’s worth. if sum, the Act is implemented in broadly accordance

with its terms, consequences individual lessees and owners, and to the area as a whole, far-reaching. could be adjudication But arising implementa- of claims from such tion is for the future. I agree with the Court that we cannot say the Act facially invalid, that I join therefore its opinion. Rehnquist,

Justice concurring judgment.* It is illuminating for purposes argu- reflection, if ment, to greatest note that one of the “fictions” of our federal system is that only powers exercises those dele- gated to while the remainder are it, reserved the States or to people. The manner which con- this Court has strued the Commerce amply Clause illustrates the extent of Although this fiction. it is clear through that the people, delegated the States, authority to Congress “regulate Com- among merce . . . the several States,” U. S. Art. Const., I, said, perhaps frivolously now, It bootlegging was the second activity part remunerative most of the State. opinion applies 80-231, Hodel, Acting Secretary also No. *[This al., Interior, p. post, et al. Indiana et 314.] from this Court’s easily get the sense 3, one could 8, cl. system only at the sufferance exists the federal opinions Congress. under the Congress’ power Court, interpreted As evolved power has is broad indeed. Clause Commerce regulation in simply the years to include not through the Ogden, 9 Wheat. as in Gibbons v. itself, terstate commerce the commerce “to exclude from (1824), but also they destined it use in the states for which are articles whose health, the morals may injurious conceive to be to public though sought regulate not to their welfare, even the state has In Darby, (1941). 114 use.” States v. 312 U. S. United Case, the Shreveport (1914), the Rate 234 U. regulating in the rates of upheld Congress action of Court in railroads, reasoning power the commerce intrastate “control such a power having cluded the all matters ... In .” close and substantial relation interstate traffic . . . Laughlin Corp., (1937), NLRB v. Jones & Steel S.U. rejected activity the Court the notion that certain kinds of “commerce,” not in as cf. manufacturing, were such United Knight Co., C. (1895), States v. E. and concluded Congress may regulate any in labor relations manufac turing plant stoppage any plant because a work such upon “would have a most serious effect interstate commerce.” Filburn, S., at 41. And in Wickard U. S. of (1942), expanded scope the Court the Commerce regulation Clause to include the of acts which taken alone might not have a effect on substantial economic interstate such commerce, production, as a wheat farmer’s own but reasonably might nationally significant which be deemed effect, their cumulative such altering supply-and- as relationships commodity in the demand interstate market. Perez (1971) See also v. United 402 U. S. the class (“Where regulated activities is and that class is of reach of power, power within the federal courts have no trivial, ffo excise, class”). as individual instances’ As “In years, Congress summarized recent one commentator: upon has its consti- principle relied the 'cumulative effect’ as crim- justification rights legislation, tutional for civil certain regulatory inal of foods statutes, affecting measures the sale and additives, registration producers. and a law drug congressional fact-findings regula- each case, stressed that necessary tion activity of local of an was abate incidents affecting Tribe, cumulative L. evil national commerce.” American Constitutional Law.237 Despite holdings cases, these the broad dicta often therein, contained there are constitutional limits on power to regulate to the pursuant Commerce explained: Clause. As Chief Hughes Justice “Undoubtedly scope of must be this considered system light may our dual of government and be extended so toas embrace effects on interstate com- merce so indirect remote that them, embrace view our complex society, effectually would obliterate the distinction between what national and what completely local create a government.” centralized NLRB Laughlin v. Jones Corp., supra, & Steel at 37. And Cardozo, Justice cogent writing his on the subject, often expressed his concern reading about too broad power. commerce In his concurring opinion in Schechter Poultry Corp. States, v. United (1935), he observed: is

“There a view causation that would obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local in the activities of Motion commerce. at the outer rim is though communicated perceptibly, minutely, to record- ing A instruments at the center. as society ours 'is such an elastic medium which transmits all tremors through- out its territory; question is of . . . only size.’ law is not indifferent to degree. considerations of Activ- immediacy ities local their do not become interstate To repercussions. ... national because of distant immediacy to find it almost or directness here is find to If forces are be isolated everywhere. centripetal and counteract oppose the exclusion of the forces that system.” them, there will be an end to our federal separate point elaborated on this in his Justice Cardozo Co., opinion in Carter v. Carter Coal not agriculture manufacture are inter- “Mining by yet themselves, state commerce considered their rela- tionship may pro- that commerce such that regulate tection of one is the other. there need Poultry Schechter States .... Some- Corp. v. United bring it is times said that the relation must be ‘direct’ to power play. many into circumstances such a description sufficiently will be precise to meet the needs of the great principle occasion. But a of constitutional is not susceptible comprehensive law in an statement adjective. The underlying thought merely this, that ‘the law indifferent to considerations of degree.’ Poultry Schechter Corp. supra, v. United concur- ring opinion, p. It 554. cannot be indifferent to them expansion without an clause that would commerce absorb or imperil the powers reserved of the states. At times, as the case cited, the waves of causation will have radiated so far undulatory that their if dis- motion, cernible at all, will be too obscure, faint or too broken cross-currents, to be heeded the law.” Thus it would be a mistake to Congress’ conclude that regulate pursuant to the Commerce Clause is un limited. Some may be so private activities or local in nature they simply may not inbe commerce. Nor is it suffi cient that the person activity reached have some nexus with interstate commerce. Our cases have consistently held the regulated that activity must have a substantial effect on NLRB g., Laughlin commerce. E. v. Jones & Steel interstate if (local may at 37 activities be Corp., regulated U. S., they com have a “close and relation to substantial interstate merce”). Congress simply may because conclude Moreover, activity particular substantially that a affects com interstate necessarily findings merce does not make it so. Congress’ supported must be a “rational basis” and are reviewable States, the courts. Perez United S., Cf. v. at 157 In J., dissenting).* short, reserved unlike the (Stewart, police powers of the which plenary are unless chal lenged violating as specific provision Constitution, some the connection jurisdic with is interstate commerce itself a any for prerequisite legislation tional by Congress substantive under Commerce Clause.

In many ways, opinions in con- Court’s these cases are approach. with sistent that Virginia both the and Indiana cases, the Court exhaustively analyzes Congress’ articulated justifications for the power of its exercise under the Commerce Clause and concludes Congress’ that findings detailed factual as to the effect mining of surface on interstate commerce are to justify sufficient power. Though exercise there can no Congress be doubt that in regulating mining surface has stretched its authority to the “nth our prior degree,” precedents me compel agree with the I Court’s conclusion. therefore concur in judgments of the Court. is, however,

There a troublesome difference between what says. the Court does and what it In both cases, the Court regulation upheld asserts will be Congress if had a ra- basis finding tional the regulated activity affects course, power *Of Congress once the regulate established, rarely question Court will power the manner in which that is exercised. g., U. S. E. Railroad Fritz, Retirement Bd. U. S. sphere authority, its Within Congress broad should only rarely subject judicial question invalidation. here, in con- trast, authority is whether even has to act. ante, Mining, 276; at Virginia

interstate commerce. Surface Indiana, statement of The Court takes this post, at 323-325. Motel, Atlanta Inc. v. United proper “test” from Heart my view, In mis the Court 379 U. above, long noted it has been established the test. As states merely power activity that the commerce does not reach which “affects” interstate commerce. There must instead be a show ing regulated activity on that has a substantial effect Laughlin Corp., supra; commerce. See NLRB & Steel v. Jones Shreveport Cases, 234 Fil (1914); Rate U. S. 342 Wickard v. burn, (local activity may by 317 U. at be reached Con S., if “it gress exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate SEC, commerce”); North American Co. v. S. 686, U. (1946) (Congress may attack an evil which bears a “substan tial relationship commerce”). recently to interstate As as Wirtz, Maryland v. S. 183, 197, n. 27 (1968), Justice Harlan stressed that either nor here in Wickard has the “[n] Congress may Court declared that use a im relatively trivial on pact commerce as an excuse for general regulation broad private of state or activities.” Even in Heart Atlanta Motel, Inc., just in the paragraph prior to the relied passage by here, the Court emphasized the Court that Congress regulate had the to local “which might activities have a substantial harmful upon effect that commerce.” 379 S., Though 258. I believe the Court errs in its state may ment “test,” I it be that read too much into the Court’s choice of In language. case, Virginia for exam ple, it point does mention at one Congress did have a “rational concluding basis for that surface coal has mining substantial effects on interstate Ante, commerce.” at 280. my sum, difficulty with some of the recent Commerce jurisprudence Clause is that the Court often forget seems to legislation by enacted Congress subject to two differ- ent challenge, kinds of while that enacted the States is subject only kind challenge. one Neither Congress nor prohibited by any provision in manner may

the States act activity must show that the Constitution. com- has a substantial effect on interstate regulate it seeks my uncertainty to whether the intends merce. It is as Court language, some of its this test that leads me broaden, only judgments. concur

Case Details

Case Name: Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc.

Court Name: Supreme Court of the United States

Date Published: Jun 15, 1981

Citation: 452 U.S. 264

Docket Number: 79-1538

Court Abbreviation: SCOTUS