JOHN DOE 1, et al., Plaintiffs, v. JOSEPH B. EDLOW, et al., Defendants.
Case No. 2:26-cv-494
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION
Judge Algenon L. Marbley; Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura
Case: 2:25-cv-01313-ALM-CMV Doc #: 24 Filed: 07/06/26 PAGEID #: 205
This matter comes before this Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 9). For the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion is GRANTED.
I. INTRODUCTION
This case concerns the legality of a series of policies developed and implemented by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). These policies indefinitely pause USCIS’s final adjudication of pending immigration benefit applications submitted by foreign nationals from certain countries, and treat nationality from those countries as a significant and negative factor in that adjudication process.
Plaintiffs are twenty-five foreign nationals who hold citizenship in a variety of countries: Burma, Canada, Iran, Nigeria, Syria, Tanzania, and Venezuela. In accordance with our nation’s laws and immigration scheme, they have all submitted applications for immigration benefits that are presently pending before USCIS. Their applications include applications for work authorization and green cards. These foreign nationals are not outside the country; they reside across the United States. Many of them have been in the United States for years, and already have received prior authorization to work here. Plaintiffs include a hospital pharmacist, a registered
USCIS issued the challenged policies following two proclamations issued by President Donald J. Trump that govern the entry of foreign nationals into the United States. These proclamations do not address USCIS’s task of adjudicating immigration benefit applications. Nor do they concern foreign nationals already present in the United States. Nevertheless, USCIS has, by policy, uniformly held the final adjudications of immigration benefit applications for foreign nationals from certain countries—including foreign nationals from Burma, Iran, Nigeria, Syria, Tanzania, and Venezuela. USCIS will also treat Burmese, Iranian, Nigerian, Syrian, Tanzanian, and Venezuelan nationality as a significant negative factor when considering such applications from those countries.
Plaintiffs sue to contest these policies, proceeding anonymously because they challenge Government policy. They allege that these policies were promulgated improperly, and thus violate the Administrative Procedure Act,
At a high level, this case follows an increasingly familiar procedural posture. Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction to challenge an agency’s implementation of executive action under circumstances where the President likely would “have had difficulty passing significant new legislation through Congress.” Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 878 (2025) (Kavanaugh, J.,
II. BACKGROUND
A. Executive Branch Rhetoric
In 2024, the American electorate chose Donald Trump to serve a second, nonconsecutive term as president with then-Senator J.D. Vance as his vice president. As candidates, both Trump and Vance promised to take a hard line on immigration and the border to secure the nation, prevent undesirable immigration, and protect American jobs. For instance, at a September 18, 2024 campaign rally in Uniondale, New York, then-candidate Trump stated:
[A] key part of restoring safety and saving our economy is stopping the invasion at the border of our country. . . . We have massive numbers of terrorists coming in to our country. You have everybody coming in—we have people who can’t speak the language. . . .
I want to be known as your border president—I’m going to be known as your border president. And Kamala will be known as your invasion president—just let them all come in, let them all come in. No. We’ve got to save our country. Our country’s going down. If you look at what is happening with the Venezuelans taking over, I mean they’re taking over large pieces of real estate in Colorado. And you have a Democrat governor who is petrified of them. He’s afraid, I’ve never seen anything like it, and he doesn’t want to talk about it. They’ve taken over your buildings and your land—you’ve got to do something about it. . . .
I’ve been talking about migrant crime for 5 years, I said, if you let them in, it’s going to be hell, they are vicious, violent criminals that are being let into our country. They are people that their countries, which are very smart, do not want them. That’s why all over the world, a lot of people are coming out of jails out of the Congo, in Africa. Where do you come from? The Congo. Where in the Congo? We come from jail. What did you do? We will not tell you. They’re coming from the Congo. They’re coming from Africa, they’re coming from the Middle East, they’re coming from all over the world. Asia, a lot of it coming from Asia. And what’s happening to our country is we’re just destroying the fabric of life in our country, and we’re not going to take it any longer, and you gotta get rid of these people.1
A few days later, at a campaign rally in Wilmington, North Carolina, Trump pledged:
I will get every migrant criminal out of our country and I’ll get them out fast, we have to, we have no choice. And they’re taking over our country, you see what they are doing, Kamala Harris’s border invasion is also crushing the jobs and wages of African-American workers and Hispanic American workers and also union members, unions are next, you watch. They are working and hurting what’s going on with African-American workers and with Hispanic in particular, just, they’re taking your jobs, they’re taking your jobs. Every job produced in this country over the last two years has gone to illegal aliens. Every job. Think of it. We are—what we’re doing to this country is so sad, you know. . . . Last month American-born workers lost, think of this, 1.3 million jobs. So, American voters, and they’re voters, American workers lost 1.3 million jobs. Meanwhile, the migrants picked up 635,000 jobs, plus another 700 or 800,000 jobs that we know of, but the Americans lost jobs. What a disgrace. . . . To save your jobs you must vote for Trump.2
President Trump won the 2024 presidential election and was inaugurated on January 20, 2025. True to his campaign promises, his second administration immediately focused on immigration, seeking to strengthen border security and minimize migration from certain countries. As President Trump promised during a stop in Mount Pocono, Pennsylvania on December 9, 2025, his administration would, through a series of policies, create “a permanent pause on third world migration, including from hellholes like Afghanistan, Haiti, Somalia, and many other countries.”9
After a member of the crowd apparently exclaimed “Shitholes!” in response, President Trump laughed and retorted that “I didn’t say shithole, you did,” before recounting a 2018 oval office meeting he had during his first term:
Remember I said that to the Senators, they came in, the Democrats. They wanted to be bipartisan, so they came in and they said this is totally off the record. Nothing mentioned here. We want to be honest because our country was going to hell. And we had a meeting and I said, why is it we only take people from shithole countries, right? Why can’t we have some people from Norway, Sweden, just a few, let’s have a few. From Denmark—do you mind sending us a few, send us some nice people, do you mind? But we always take people from Somalia; places that are a disaster, right? Filthy, dirty, disgusting, ridden with crime. The only thing they’re
good at is going after ships. But they don’t go after our ships, you know why? Because that same missile that knocks the crap out of them, that with the drug dealers from Venezuela and others.10
In sum, both the President and the Vice President have publicly and repeatedly expressed outright hostility toward immigrants, both before and after the 2024 presidential election. Their ire appears focused on immigrants from countries in the Caribbean, South America, Africa, and Asia. As the Supreme Court just observed, President Trump’s comments have “broadly denigrate[d] countries” and “malign[ed]” certain groups of immigrants. Mullin v. Doe, 609 U.S. __, 2026 WL 1825840, at *11 (June 25, 2026). These include the extraordinary statements that certain foreign nationals, including Haitians, are “poisoning the blood” of the United States. Id. at *20 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
This general hostility to immigration contrasts with an apparent interest in and preference for the migration of white people. Aside from a stated desire for more Scandinavian immigration, President Trump has sought to welcome white South Africans. On February 7, 2025, he signed Executive Order 14161, titled Addressing Egregious Actions of the Republic of South Africa. 90 Fed. Reg. 9497 (Feb. 7, 2025). In that Executive Order, the president determined that “the United States shall promote the resettlement of Afrikaner refugees escaping [the government of South Africa’s] race-based discrimination, including racially discriminatory property confiscation.
This Court takes judicial notice of these statements and facts, as they “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). Some statements and facts can be judicially noticed as statements contained in or incorporated by reference in official Government websites. See Yoder v. Bowen, 146 F.4th 516, 526 n.1 (6th Cir. 2025) (per curiam). Other statements and facts “are outside of reasonable controversy,” and thus the process of introducing them into evidence can be “dispensed with as unnecessary” since they have a “high degree of indisputability.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(a) advisory committee’s note; cf. Mullin, 2026 WL 1825840, at *11; id. at *20 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 522 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (taking judicial notice of President Trump’s February 5, 2017 interview with Bill O’Reilly); Texas v. United States, 2015 WL 1540022, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2015) (taking judicial notice of President Obama’s statements made during a town hall because “[t]he President’s statements have obvious significance to this case“), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134, 185 (5th Cir. 2015) (affirming district court’s entry of preliminary injunction while observing “the impact of the President’s statement“);
These facts and statements are important but not essential to this Court’s ultimate holding on this preliminary record. They inform this Court’s analysis of one factor of one of Plaintiffs’ claims, see Section IV(B)(1), infra, but this Court also finds that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of other claims. Still, these statements and facts are important because they provide significant background and frame the issues at stake.14
B. Factual Background
1. Executive Action
Eager to deliver on a central campaign promise, President Trump’s administration immediately took action to address immigration through executive action, beginning with an executive order and continuing via two presidential proclamations.
On the same day he was inaugurated, Trump issued Executive Order 14161, titled Protecting the United States From Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats. 90 Fed. Reg. 8451, 8451 (Jan. 30, 2025). This Executive Order directed the Secretary of State, Attorney General, Secretary of Homeland Security, and Director of National Intelligence to: (1) identify resources for vetting and screening foreign nationals who were “seeking admission to the United States or who are already in the United States“; (2) “determine the information needed from any country to adjudicate any visa, admission, or other benefit” under the Immigration and Nationality Act for one of that country’s nationals “to ascertain whether the individual seeking the benefit is who the individual claims to be” and “is not a security or public safety threat“; (3) restore screening and vetting standards (as they existed at the end of President Trump’s first term on January 19, 2021) for foreign nationals seeking “a visa or immigration benefit of any kind“; and (4) “vet and screen to the maximum degree possible” foreign nationals seeking admission to or already present in the United States, “particularly” those “from regions or nations with identified security risks.”
b. Presidential Proclamation 10949
A few months later, on June 4, 2025, President Trump issued Presidential Proclamation 10949, titled Restricting the Entry of Foreign Nationals To Protect the United States From Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats. Proclamation No. 10949, 90 Fed. Reg. 24497 (June 10, 2025). Proclamation 10949 characterized certain countries as having inadequate screening, vetting, identity-management, information-sharing, visa-overstay,
Proclamation 10949 fully suspended the entry of foreign nationals from twelve countries: Afghanistan, Burma, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen into the United States.
By its terms, Proclamation 10949 only imposed entry restrictions, governing foreign nationals who were “outside the United States on the applicable effective date” and who lacked a “valid visa” on that date.
c. Presidential Proclamation 10998
On December 16, 2025, President Trump issued Presidential Proclamation 10998, expanding the scope of Proclamation 10949. Proclamation No. 10998, 90 Fed. Reg. 59717 (Dec. 19, 2025). Titled Restricting and Limiting the Entry of Foreign Nationals To Protect the Security of the United States, Proclamation 10998 expanded the foreign nationals subject to the administration’s entry restrictions, naming “additional countries that cannot meet basic criteria for identifying their nationals and residents who pose national security and public safety threats and for sharing information with the United States.”
Proclamation 10998 maintained the full entry restrictions on foreign nationals from the countries subject to full entry restrictions by Proclamation 10949, and added seven additional countries: Burkina Faso, Laos, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, and Syria to that list.
This proclamation’s scope was limited “to foreign nationals of the designated countries” who were “outside the United States on the applicable effective date of this proclamation” and “do not have a valid visa on the applicable effective date of this proclamation.”
2. Policy Implementation
Against this backdrop, DHS and USCIS implemented adjudicatory holds across pending immigration benefit applications filed by foreign nationals who were from countries referenced in President Trump’s proclamations but present inside the United States. They also indicated that they would treat the nationality of applicants from these referenced countries as a negative factor when adjudicating those applications.
DHS and USCIS implemented these policies even though the presidential proclamations did not address pending immigration benefit applications submitted by foreign nationals inside the United States.
a. Policy Alert PA-2025-26
First, on November 27, 2025, DHS and USCIS incorporated the country-specific concerns identified by President Trump’s first presidential proclamation, Proclamation 10949, to the adjudication of immigration benefit applications. They did so by updating the USCIS Policy Manual and issuing Policy Alert PA-2025-26, titled Impact of INA 212(f) on USCIS’ Adjudication of Discretionary Benefits. (ECF No. 1-1). Policy Alert PA-2025-26 stated that “[e]ffective immediately, USCIS will consider relevant country-specific facts and circumstances such as those
b. Policy Memo. PM-602-0192
Then, on December 2, 2025, DHS and USCIS issued Policy Memorandum PM-602-0192. Policy Memorandum PM-602-0192 was also based on Proclamation 10949, and was titled Hold and Review of all Pending Asylum Applications and all USCIS Benefit Applications Filed by Aliens from High-Risk Countries. (ECF No 1-2). It directed USCIS personnel to: (1) hold Form I-589 applications (Applications for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal) “regardless of the alien’s country of nationality, pending a comprehensive review“; (2) hold other pending benefit request applications15 submitted by foreign nationals from countries listed in Proclamation 10949 “pending a comprehensive review, regardless of entry date“; and (3) “[c]onduct a comprehensive re-review of approved benefit requests for aliens from countries listed in [Proclamation] 10949 who entered the United States on or after January 20, 2021.”16 (Id. at 1).
Thus, Policy Memorandum PM-602-0192 initiated an adjudicatory hold on many types of immigrant benefit applications submitted by foreign nationals from the countries identified in Proclamation 10949. Although Proclamation 10949 had, by its terms, only addressed the entry of
c. Policy Memo. PM-602-0194
Finally, DHS and USCIS issued Policy Memorandum PM-602-0194, entitled Hold and Review of USCIS Benefit Applications Filed by Aliens from Additional High-Risk Countries on January 1, 2026. (ECF No. 1-3). This was the same day that Proclamation 10998—which expanded entry restrictions to additional countries—came into effect. Policy Memorandum PM 602-0194 directed USCIS personnel to “hold . . . all pending benefit applications, for aliens listed in [Proclamation] 10998 . . . pending a comprehensive review, regardless of entry date.” (Id. at 1). Such a hold would permit “a case to proceed through processing, up to final adjudication.” (Id. at 1 n.2). It also mandated comprehensive reviews of “all policies, procedures, and screening and vetting processes for benefit requests” submitted by foreign nationals from the countries listed in Proclamation 10998, as well as “comprehensive re-review[s] of approved benefit requests implicated in [Proclamation] 10998 that were approved on or after January 20, 2021.” (Id. at 1).
Thus, Policy Memorandum PM-602-0194 expanded the immigration benefit application hold to the expanded list of countries identified in Proclamation 10998. Again, even though President Trump’s Proclamation 10998 only addressed the entry of foreign nationals from an expanded list of countries—by its terms, foreign nationals from Burma, Iran, and Syria would be subject to a full suspension of entry, while foreign nationals from Venezuela, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe would be subject to partial restrictions—USCIS transposed the president’s entry
C. Procedural History
Plaintiffs sued on April 23, 2026, challenging these USCIS policies and the resulting adjudicatory holds on their pending immigration benefit applications. (Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1–7).17 Plaintiffs are differently-situated in many ways. They are citizens of Burma, Canada, Iran, Nigeria, Syria, Tanzania, and Venezuela, and reside in thirteen different states across the country: from California to Massachusetts and Florida, and ten states in between. (¶¶ 14–33). Many Plaintiffs are graduates of American universities with jobs or job offers in the fields of science or engineering. One is a physics professor. Others work in healthcare, including at a hospital and in cancer research. Some are young parents raising their families in the United States. (¶ 2). But Plaintiffs also share key commonalities. They all claim to be present legally in the United States with pending immigration benefit applications. (See ¶¶ 6, 57). And they all challenge the same USCIS policies. (¶¶ 7, 57).
Most of the Plaintiffs have Form I-485 applications (for lawful permanent residence status) or Form I-765 applications (for employment authorization) pending. (¶¶ 14–29, 31–33). Several paid extra for expedited processing of their applications. (ECF Nos. 9-6 ¶ 5; 9-10 ¶ 7; 9-11 ¶ 3; 9-16 ¶ 5). Two Plaintiffs—Jane Doe 9 and Jane Doe 18—also have Form I-129 (petition for nonimmigrant employment under an H-1B visa) or Form I-131 (application for travel documents) applications pending alongside their pending Form I-485/Form I-765 applications. (¶¶ 22, 31). Jane Doe 9’s circumstances are notable because she already received USCIS approval of her Form
On May 1, 2026, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin USCIS from enforcing Policy Alert PA-2025-26, Policy Memorandum PM-602-0192, and Policy Memorandum PM-602-0194, arguing that the sweeping adjudicatory hold placed on their applications, as well as the mandate to treat their nationality as a significant negative factor in evaluating their applications, violate the Administrative Procedure Act and the Immigration and Nationality Act, and contend that they will suffer irreparable harm absent emergency relief. (ECF No. 9-1). In response, Defendants moved to sever and transfer venue for twenty-four of the Plaintiffs, arguing that most of the Plaintiffs’ claims should not be brought in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, and pointing out the variations in Plaintiffs’ respective statuses. (ECF No. 11). On May 26, 2026, this Court held a telephonic status conference to address these motions and schedule a preliminary injunction hearing. This Court subsequently denied the Defendants’ motion to sever and transfer venue, finding that Plaintiffs were properly joined, severance would be inappropriate, and venue was proper in this district given that John Doe 1 resides in Columbus, Ohio. Doe 1 v. Edlow, 2026 WL 1551970, at *3, *11 (S.D. Ohio June 2, 2026) (Marbley, J.) (ECF No. 20). Defendants then opposed the preliminary injunction, (ECF No. 21), and Plaintiffs replied in support. (ECF No. 21).
III. JURISDICTION
Defendants first argue that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs’ claims under
Plaintiffs raised Barrios Garcia again at the preliminary injunction hearing and this Court asked defense counsel for the Government’s position on the weight of authority and recent developments in the case law. Defendants thus had another opportunity to distinguish Barrios Garcia and engage with the substance of a myriad of other district courts finding they have jurisdiction over similar challenges to USCIS policies and ruling against the Government’s position. But defense counsel did not engage with the merits of those decisions; instead, defense counsel focused on the practical impact of Judge McConnell’s Dorcas decision and the possible remedies this Court could order.
Nevertheless, this Court must still assure itself of its jurisdiction. See Answers in Genesis of Ky., Inc. v. Creation Ministries Int’l, Ltd., 556 F.3d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[F]ederal courts have a duty to consider their subject matter jurisdiction in regard to every case.“). A review of the relevant statutes—the APA and INA—delineates this Court’s jurisdiction.
A. Judicial Review under the Administrative Procedure Act
The Administrative Procedure Act generally contemplates judicial review of agency actions. To understand why, begin with the judiciary’s jurisdictional north star. Federal courts have “judicial Power” to adjudicate cases and controversies.
The rise of federal agencies tasked with applying laws and promulgating regulations in the modern administrative state led to interpretive entanglements between the judiciary and federal agencies. In some instances, Congress might grant an executive branch agency discretion, and make that discretion unreviewable by federal courts. E.g., Mullin, 2026 WL 1825840, at *10 (INA provision makes executive branch’s Temporary Protected Status designation unreviewable)
But absent a clear bar on judicial review, the judiciary remains tasked with the interpretation of the law. And Congress, through the Administrative Procedure Act, codified forms of judicial review for agency actions. See Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 387–90.
Under the APA, “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”
In sum, there can be no question “that [t]he interpretation of the meaning of statutes, as applied to justiciable controversies,’ [is] ‘exclusively a judicial function.’” Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 387 (quoting United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 544 (1940)). Congress provided for judicial review of agency functions in the APA, and this review accords with the traditional understanding of the judiciary’s role in our nation’s government. “‘[I]n cases where [a court’s] own judgment . . . differ[ed] from that of other high functionaries,’ the court [is] ‘not at liberty to surrender, or to waive [its judgment].’” Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 386–87 (quoting United States v. Dickson, 40 U.S. 141, 162 (1841)). Under the APA, there is a “presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action” of statutes that are “reasonably susceptible to divergent interpretation,” and it “takes clear and convincing evidence to dislodge the presumption.” Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 251–52 (2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). That said, the APA’s presumption favoring judicial review may be rebutted in certain instances. See Barrios Garcia, 24 F.4th at 442. For instance, it may be rebutted if the relevant statute precludes review, or if the action is committed to agency discretion by law.
Second, in evaluating Plaintiffs’ challenge, it is important to distinguish the “direct review of individual denials” from “general collateral challenges” of agency “practices and policies” used in processing applications. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 492 (1991). McNary carefully distinguishes these types of challenges in the context of immigration proceedings, where the statute barred judicial review of determinations regarding individual applications. The Supreme Court held that a foreign national could bring a due process challenge to Immigration and Naturalization Service21 amnesty determination procedures despite an INA provision expressly limiting judicial review of individual amnesty determinations. It noted that if foreign nationals could “not . . . pursue their claims in the District Court,” they “would not as a practical matter be able to obtain meaningful judicial review . . . of their objections to INS procedures.” Id. at 496. The Supreme Court further reasoned that Congress was presumably aware of the “well-settled presumption favoring interpretations of statutes that allow judicial review of administrative action,” and therefore it was “most unlikely that Congress intended to foreclose all forms of meaningful judicial review.” Id.; see also Mullin, 2026 WL 1825840, at *8 (explaining that McNary “turned on the specific wording of the provision at issue,” which barred only “determination[s] respecting an application“).
In conclusion, the scope afforded to judicial review under the APA, our nation‘s separation of powers between Congress, the executive, and the judiciary, and the difference between a challenge to an individual‘s adjudication decision and a collateral challenge to agency policy inform this Court‘s analysis of each of the two INA provisions relevant to jurisdiction.
B. Jurisdiction under the Immigration and Nationality Act
Defendants argue that two neighboring subsections of the INA strip this Court of jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims. The text of these subsections reads, in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory) . . . and regardless of whether the judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings, no court shall have jurisdiction to review—
(i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section 1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b, 1229c, or 1255 of this title, or
(ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security . . .
1. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)
First,
The Supreme Court considered this subsection in the context of an individual challenge to removal proceedings. Evaluating the text of the provision, it concluded that through this provision, “Congress has sharply circumscribed judicial review of the discretionary-relief process.” Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 332–33 (2022) (citing
To be sure, Patel reads subsection (B)(i)‘s jurisdiction-stripping provision broadly, but it does so in the context of an individual‘s challenge to a judgment regarding discretionary relief under section 1255. Section 1255 presupposes that an adjustment of a foreign national‘s immigrant status would occur by the agency‘s adjustment of the “status of an alien,” i.e., an individual foreign national.
In context, this conclusion makes sense. The statutory subsection immediately preceding
In instances “where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act,” courts “generally presume[] that Congress act[ed] intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 430 (2009) (citation omitted); see, e.g., Mullin v. Al Otro Lado, 609 U.S. __, 2026 WL 1825741, at *7 (June 25, 2026) (considering variation in language across INA provisions and concluding that a provision‘s lack of language found elsewhere “signal[s] that Congress enacted the disparate language ‘intentionally and purposefully‘“) (quoting Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993)); Patel, 596 U.S. at 357 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (reviewing the “larger statutory
Here, “[b]ecause Congress explicitly stripped jurisdiction to review [USCIS] policies and procedures in § 1252(a)(2)(A)(iv) but not in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i),” this Court joins the Ninth Circuit and other courts who “presume that Congress did not intend for the latter provision to preclude review of agency policies and procedures.” Nakka v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 111 F.4th 995, 1005–06 (9th Cir. 2024); Dorcas, 2026 WL 1622708, at *12–13.
In conclusion, the “plain meaning” of the text of subsection (B)(i) shows that this provision strips jurisdiction such that “judicial review of fact determinations is precluded in the discretionary-relief context,” Patel, 596 U.S. at 347; Hatchet v. Andrade, 106 F.4th 574, 579 (6th Cir. 2024) (“[F]ederal courts are without jurisdiction to review both discretionary and nondiscretionary judgments related to the granting of relief.“), including review of an individual foreign national‘s application for permanent residence under section 1255. The relatively modest language stripping judicial review from judgments regarding discretionary and nondiscretionary relief on a particular foreign national‘s application under subsection (B)(i) cannot be distorted to strip federal court jurisdiction from broader legal challenges to agency policies under the APA. Nothing in the statute contemplates a wholesale removal from federal court jurisdiction of what the APA otherwise contemplates—judicial review of USCIS‘s adoption of broad policies or
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)
Next,
As the Supreme Court has explained, this subsection is “a catchall provision” that must be “[r]ead harmoniously” with the previous subsection. Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 246–47 (2010). Like subsection (B)(i), it “bar[s] court review of discretionary decisions.” Id. at 247. This Court must interpret subsection (B)(ii) in light of subsection (B)(i) and its limitations. Again, the statute addresses specific discretionary decisions regarding an individual foreign national‘s relief, and does not remove challenges to agency policy from this Court‘s jurisdiction. Cf. Bahaduri v. Noem, 2026 WL 878687, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2026) (the discretion relevant to subsection (B)(ii) “is not discretion regarding when to adjudicate“). Like subsection (B)(i), subsection (B)(ii) “focuses . . . on individualized forms of discretionary relief . . . not the type of generally applicable rulemaking governing . . . procedures.” Make the Road N.Y. v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 612, 630 (D.C. Cir. 2020). Indeed, nothing in the text of subsection (B)(ii) suggests that a catchall provision should be read to do more than similarly apply to individual judgments regarding the granting of relief. If Congress had wished for subsection (B)(ii) to read that way, it need only implement the “procedures and policies” language it included in the preceding subsection of the statute. See Section III(B)(1), supra (addressing
Defendants’ arguments fail. In the Sixth Circuit, where a statute “supplies only partly discretionary power to DHS [or another agency], the statute is ambiguous enough to sustain the APA‘s presumption of judicial review.” Barrios Garcia, 25 F.4th at 445. Here, none of the statutes cited by Defendants shows that USCIS‘s implementation of these policies is something that has been made wholly “discretionary by legislation.” Kucana, 558 U.S. at 247.
First, Defendants’ statutory authorities for general discretion fail. These statutes mandate that Edlow is responsible for establishing “national immigration services policies and priorities,”
Second, Defendants’ reliance on
Defendants have not offered sufficient statutory authority25 under the INA for the sweeping agency discretion that they claim allows them to make policy insulated from judicial review.26 As
3. The INA does not strip this Court of jurisdiction.
In sum, neither subsection of
The Supreme Court‘s conclusion in Mullin rested on the particular text of the TPS statute, which differs in language and structure from
The Supreme Court also determined that the “sole” constitutional claim for equal protection would “likely fail,” because while some foreign nationals challenging TPS terminations
The APA requires this Court determine whether USCIS “has acted within its statutory authority” in adopting the challenged policies. Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 412. And even where the INA “delegates discretionary authority” to USCIS, “the role of the reviewing court under the APA is, as always, to independently interpret the statute and effectuate the will of Congress subject to constitutional limitations. The Court fulfills that role by recognizing constitutional delegations, ‘fix[ing] the boundaries of [the] delegated authority,’ and ensuring the agency has engaged in reasoned decisionmaking within those boundaries.” Id. at 395 (quoting H. P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 27 (1983); other internal quotation marks omitted). Other courts to consider this issue have determined that they have jurisdiction to hear challenges to these immigration policies. E.g., Varniab, 2026 WL 485490, at *11; Bowser, 2026 WL 555624, at *6; Behdin, 2026 WL 1031079, at *11; Karimi, 2026 WL 1103448, at *3–6; Saghafi, 2026 WL 1127468 at *7; Doe, 2026 WL 1170971, at *10; Meschi, 2026 WL 1157151, at *1; Pouri, 2026 WL 1508425, at *2; Sepehri, 2026 WL 1678050, at *2; Bahaduri, 2026 WL 878687, at *9; Dorcas, 2026 WL 1622708, at * 10–22. This Court joins that chorus. But before
C. Justiciability
Separate from their jurisdictional arguments, Defendants assert that the Government must be afforded latitude to make decisions regarding matters of national security and public safety. They argue that managing the nation‘s immigration system “is committed to the political branches and is unsuited to judicial second guessing.” (ECF No. 21 at 16–17). Although Defendants raise this point in challenging whether Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims, this point bears on justiciability.
For a case or controversy to be justiciable, the “subject matter for judicial consideration” must be appropriate. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962). A nonjusticiable issue necessitates some inquiry beyond jurisdiction to ask “if consideration of the cause is not wholly and immediately foreclosed,” or “whether the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially determined, and whether protection for the right asserted can be judicially molded.” Id. An issue may be nonjusticiable where there exists: (1) “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department“; (2) “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it“; (3) “the impossibility deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion“; (4) “the impossibility of a court‘s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government“; (5) “an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made“; or (6) “the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.” Id. at 217. A court should not dismiss a cause for non-jusiticiability “[u]nless one of these formulations is inextricable” from it. Id.
Here, no justiciability concerns preclude judicial review. It is difficult to see how any asserted Government interest in public safety or national security—which Defendants advert to in a perfunctory manner—would have any bearing on foreign nationals who are lawfully present in the United States and are following the Government‘s requirements to apply for immigration benefits. Indeed, the “distinction between an alien who has effected an entry into the United States and one who has never entered” is one that “runs throughout immigration law.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001); accord Refugee & Immigr. Ctr. for Educ. & Legal Servs. v. Mullin, 174 F.4th 81, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2026) (“[This] distinction is etched into the INA‘s comprehensive and carefully calibrated statutory scheme.“); see also Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958) (“[O]ur immigration laws have long made a distinction between those aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission . . . and those who are within the United States after an entry, irrespective of its legality.“). Particularly in light of this distinction, Defendants’ position is inherently self-contradictory. It makes no sense for Defendants to suggest or imply that foreign nationals like Plaintiffs (who are following our country‘s immigration laws) may be national security or public safety threats, and because they may be threats, the Government will indefinitely pause final adjudication on their applications. If there were actual national security or public safety concerns about wholesale categories of foreign nationals, surely the executive branch would take swift action to reach a final adjudication to determine and resolve any public safety or national
True, the executive branch‘s “evaluation of the underlying facts is entitled to appropriate weight, particularly in the context of litigation involving ‘sensitive and weighty interests of national security and foreign affairs.‘” Hawaii, 585 U.S. at 708 (citation omitted); see generally Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33 (2010) (The “evaluation of the facts by the Executive, like Congress‘s assessment, is entitled to deference.“). And “federal courts do not exercise general oversight of the Executive Branch.” CASA, 606 U.S. at 861.
But this case only calls for resolution of a dispute “consistent with the authority Congress has given” the federal courts through the APA. Id. Any national security concerns that the Executive Branch might have cannot relieve the Judicial Branch from its obligation to decide cases and controversies. National security cannot be “a talisman used to ward off inconvenient claims.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 143 (2017); see Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1161 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (rejecting the argument that “the President‘s decisions about immigration policy, particularly when motivated by national security concerns, are unreviewable“). Defendants’ argument to the contrary would allow the Executive Branch to trample on the structure of our constitutional democracy and run contrary to the separation of powers, particularly where the Legislative Branch has assigned to the Judicial Branch, via the APA, an obligation to review agency action.
[T]he question here is not whether the Court thinks it is wise for USCIS to place a hold on all applications for immigration benefits filed by individuals from Travel Ban Countries. Such an inquiry is best left to the political branches. The question instead is whether USCIS has the legal authority to enact its Challenged Policies in the first place, which is a purely legal question that this Court is well-equipped to address.
Dorcas Int‘l Inst., 2026 WL 1622708, at *11 (citations omitted; emphasis added). This Court agrees. When presented with legal questions like the ones here, federal courts “must exercise their independent judgment” and decide whether USCIS “has acted within its statutory authority, as the APA requires.” Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 412 (emphasis added). This matter is justiciable, and this Court turns to the requested preliminary injunction.
A. Standard of Review
Courts may issue preliminary injunctive relief upon notice to the adverse party when the moving party believes it will suffer immediate and irreparable harm. See
Courts consider four factors “to be balanced” in evaluating whether to issue a preliminary injunction: (1) “whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits“; (2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable injury absent the injunction“; (3) whether the injunction would cause substantial harm to others“; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by the issuance of an injunction.” S. Glazer‘s Distribs., 860 F.3d at 849 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Although these factors are not prerequisites, if there is no chance of success on the merits, an injunction cannot issue. See id. The two factors addressing harm to others and the
B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The first preliminary injunction factor, which analyzes the movant‘s likelihood of success on the merits, is “typically the most important” factor in the analysis. Higuchi Int‘l Corp. v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 103 F.4th 400, 409 (6th Cir. 2024). It alone is not dispositive, however, because courts may also grant a preliminary injunction “if the [movant] has raised questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult, and doubtful as to make them a fair ground for litigation and thus for more deliberate investigation.” Sony/ATV Pub., LLC v. Marcos, 651 F. App‘x 482, 485 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Six Clinics Holding Corp., II v. Cafcomp Sys., Inc., 199 F.3d 393, 402 (6th Cir. 1997)).
Where multiple claims are at issue, the movant need only show a likelihood of success on the merits of one claim. See Six Clinics Holding Corp., 119 F.3d at 402 (finding it “not necessary” to evaluate likelihood of success on the merits for each claim, so long as likelihood of success is demonstrated on a “central issue“); see also, e.g., Union Home Mortgage Corp. v. Ballew, 814 F. Supp. 3d 884, 905 (N.D. Ohio 2025) (Movant “need not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of every claim.“); Oruganti v. Noem, 2025 WL 1144560, at *6 n.5 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 18, 2025) (Marbley, J.) (collecting cases).
Plaintiffs have advanced four causes of action under the Administrative Procedure Act. (¶¶ 186–216). They argue that: (1) the challenged policies unlawfully withheld and unreasonably delayed USCIS action in violation of
1. Agency Failure to Act
Under the APA, a reviewing court must “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”
a. Unlawful Withholding
First, the APA requires that federal courts compel agency action that is “unlawfully withheld.”
As the Sixth Circuit explained in Barrios Garcia, USCIS has created “a non-discretionary duty by binding itself through [its] regulation[s] carrying the force of law.” Barrios Garcia, 25 F.4th at 450 (quoting Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. Internal Revenue Serv., 910 F.3d 1232, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2018)). USCIS‘s governing regulations provide that it must adjudicate pending immigration benefit applications. For example, USCIS must render a decision on applications for permanent residence status.
In light of the APA‘s statutory command that USCIS must “proceed to conclude” each benefit application submitted to it, as well as USCIS‘s own regulations that require decisionmaking for a variety of applications, this Court finds that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of
b. Unreasonable Delay
The APA also requires that federal courts compel agency action “unreasonably delayed.”
Defendants’ arguments are unconvincing because as Defendants recognize, (see id. at 13), Plaintiffs take issue with the adjudicatory hold arising from the challenged policies. They do not seek any particular relief in the individual adjudication of their pending applications. (See ECF No. 9-1 at 19) (“The relief Plaintiffs seek is narrow and individualized—adjudication of their own pending applications and petitions, without application of the Challenged Policies. Plaintiffs do not ask the Court to direct any particular outcome for their applications.“). Moreover, Defendants fail to engage with the six TRAC factors that aid in determining whether non-adjudication is unreasonably delayed.
First, the “rule of reason” factor suggests unreasonable delay. Plaintiffs allege that their pending applications are subject to an indefinite adjudicatory hold created by the challenged policies. (¶¶ 1–2, 51–52). This indefinite adjudicative hold undermines the prior logic of USCIS adjudications where USCIS had adjudicated immigration benefit applications in a first-in, first-out order of operation. See Behdin, 2026 WL 1031079 at *14. That USCIS‘s prior process has been removed for some foreign nationals, subjecting all Plaintiffs to the same undifferentiated hold, undermines a claim to a rule of reason. See Barrios Garcia, 25 F.4th at 452–53 (finding that plaintiffs adequately alleged the first factor where USCIS system would prioritize later-filed applications over plaintiffs’ applications). This factor favors Plaintiffs.
Second, timetables informing the rule of reason also suggest unreasonable delay. True, there is no firm congressional timetable here, although Congress has indicated an expectation that immigration benefit applications should be processed “not later than 180 days after the initial filing of the application.”
Third and fifth (these factors are often considered in tandem), the TRAC factors concerning health, welfare, and prejudice strongly suggest unreasonable delay. Plaintiffs exist in a state of limbo, with their reliance on a previous USCIS process fundamentally undercut. Many of them face loss of lawful employment, loss of immigration status, inability to travel and prolonged separation from family abroad. (See generally ECF Nos. 9-2–9-19). Others face discrete harms. For instance, John Doe 19 faces potential foreclosure on his home. (ECF No. 9-18 ¶¶ 5–6). John Doe 17 faces a possible return to Iran, where he could be persecuted for converting to Christianity. (ECF No. 9-16 ¶¶ 9–10). These factors weigh heavily in favor of Plaintiffs. Barrios Garcia, 25 F.4th at 452.
Sixth, there is manifest evidence of impropriety imbuing USCIS‘s decision, which strongly suggests unreasonable delay. Plaintiffs argue that “USCIS‘s rationale has shifted from national security to a labor-market ‘protect American jobs’ theory not grounded in any of the Policies themselves.” (ECF No. 9-1 at 11–12). In support, Plaintiffs cite a March 31, 2026 statement by USCIS spokesman Matthew J. Tragesser. In that statement, Tragesser announced that optional practical training applications for Iranian nationals would be banned “in accordance with Presidential Proclamation 10998.” (ECF No. 1-5). He stated that the Trump administration was “reviewing every immigration benefit to protect American jobs by ensuring foreign nationals do not displace American STEM graduates,” explaining that Iran was also a high-risk country. Id. (emphasis added).
Generally, impropriety need not be found for a showing of unreasonable delay. See TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80. But here, the evidence of the impropriety lurking behind USCIS‘s inaction is on
This Court is not and cannot be blind to the “backdrop against which the Challenged Policies were implemented.” Dorcas, 2026 WL 1622708, at *52. President Trump, Vice President Vance, former Secretary Noem, and the Executive Branch as a whole have issued statement after statement that “fairly shout, in their racial undertones and overtones alike,” Mullin, 2026 WL 1825840, at *20 (Kagan, J., dissenting), the Government‘s hostility toward many immigrants from particular countries. As one district court recently concluded, the “outright disdain for individuals from Travel Ban Countries” reflected by the public statements of President Trump and then-Secretary Kristi Noem “seem[ed] to suggest that, in enacting the Challenged Policies, USCIS personnel seemed less concerned with matters of ‘national security’ and more so focused on
Or, as the Supreme Court observed in Mullin, President Trump has made statements that “broadly denigrate countries” or “malign” certain groups of immigrants, such as “Haitians who have come to the United States.” Mullin, 2026 WL 1825840, at *11. That puts it mildly. As the Mullin dissent explains, “the evidence [of racial animus] is there, plain to see, in the President‘s statements, which the majority [and the Government‘s lawyers] cannot even bear to repeat.” Id. at *17 (Kagan, J., dissenting). These statements include President Trump‘s “repellent and racially inflected” statements about certain “shithole” countries, whose nationals are “poisoning the blood” of the United States. Id. at *20; accord id. at *12 (majority opinion) (voicing disapproval of statements “denigrating the character of Haitians“). Meanwhile, then-Secretary Noem made statements that “expressed antipathy toward travelers from countries covered by a renewed travel ban,” or made “derogatory comments about immigration and its effects.” Id. at *11 (majority opinion). While Mullin ultimately concluded those statements were unlikely to show that race was a motivating factor in the termination of TPS given the Trump administration‘s apparently uniform desire to end TPS, and thus found that Haitian foreign nationals under TPS would not be entitled to interim relief on an equal protection claim, these statements have a different valence in this case, where the issue is one of possible impropriety in agency inaction.
It is impossible to “ignore the backdrop of extraordinary statements by direct decision-makers when assessing whether the agency‘s proffered rationale was genuine or merely a pretext” for an ulterior motive. Nat‘l TPS Alliance v. Noem, 166 F.4th 739, 775 (9th Cir. 2026) (Mendoza, J., concurring). Federal courts need “not . . . exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are
This sixth factor favors Plaintiffs—though Plaintiffs would prevail on their preliminary injunction even on just the first five TRAC factors.
c. Conclusion
In sum, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their alternative argument that Defendants, through the challenged policies, have unreasonably delayed adjudication on Plaintiffs’ pending immigration benefit applications in violation of the APA.
The APA also requires that courts “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”
An arbitrary and capricious agency action “is itself unlawful.” Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. 211, 222 (2016). Agency action is arbitrary and capricious if the agency “relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,” “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,” explained its decision in a way that “runs counter to the evidence before the agency,” or is “so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass‘n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
Although the scope of review of agency action under the APA‘s arbitrary and capricious standard “is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency, the agency nevertheless must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action.” Id. at 30; see SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943) (“The orderly function of the process of review requires that the grounds upon which the administrative agency acted are clearly disclosed and adequately sustained.”). Indeed, “deferential judicial review under the APA does not relieve the agency of its obligation to develop an evidentiary basis for its findings. To the
The agency‘s explanation for its decisions must have “adequate reasons,” Encino Motorcars, 579 U.S. at 221, “including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made,” Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass‘n, 463 U.S. at 43. Where the agency‘s explanation is “clear enough that its ‘path may reasonably be discerned,’” it has satisfied this requirement. Encino Motorcars, 579 U.S. at 221 (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974)). But if the agency has “failed to provide even that minimal level of analysis, its action is arbitrary and capricious and so cannot carry the force of law.” Id.
An agency‘s action may also change the agency‘s existing policies. But changes to existing policies also require “a reasoned explanation for the change.” Id. That does not necessarily mean that the agency must provide a more detailed explanation than it would if it were creating a new policy, but it “must at least ‘display awareness that it is changing position’ and ‘show that there are good reasons for the new policy.’” Id. (quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009)). When an agency changes policies, it must recognize that “longstanding policies may have ‘engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account.’” Id. at 221–22 (quoting FCC, 556 U.S. at 515). In these instances, “a reasoned explanation is needed for disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or were engendered by the prior policy.” FCC, 556 U.S. at 515–16.
a. Judicial review extends to the challenged policies.
Defendants focus their attention on whether the challenged policies are final, and thus may be subject to judicial review. Judicial review of agency action extends to agency actions that are “made reviewable by statute,” as well as “final agency action for which there is no other adequate
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to challenge a final agency action, because the challenged policies “neither conclude[] [USCIS‘s] decision-making process nor determine[] any rights and obligations or legal consequences.” Rather, Defendants take the position that the challenged policies “merely advise[] the public as to the adjudication guidance being provided to USCIS personnel,” and assert that USCIS “‘weighed’ any potential resultant ‘delay to the adjudication of some pending applications’ against the ‘urgent need for the agency to ensure that applications are vetted and screened to the maximum degree possible.’” (ECF No. 21 at 14–15). They also argue that the issuance of additional operational guidance and the creation of a USCIS vetting center show that the challenged policies are not final agency action. (Id. at 15–16).
For their part, Plaintiffs argue that the challenged policies are indeed reviewable, final agency actions. They point to a multitude of district courts that have reached this conclusion. (ECF No. 9-1 at 12).
On this preliminary record, this Court finds that the challenged policies constitute judicially-reviewable final agency action. Under the first Bennett prong, the policies appear to consummate USCIS‘s decisionmaking process following President Trump’ proclamations, contrary to Defendants arguments that the policies merely advise the public regarding guidance provided to USCIS personnel. Policy Alert PA-2025-26 notes that USCIS would “consider relevant country-specific facts and circumstances . . . as part of its adjudication of discretionary
Under the second Bennett prong, the adjudicatory holds may well determine Plaintiffs’ rights, but there can be no question that legal consequences will flow from the policies to Plaintiffs. Courts “regularly determine[] that the second prong of Bennett is satisfied ‘when an indefinite pause is imposed by an agency.’” Dorcas Int‘l Inst., 2026 WL 1622708, at *25–26 (quoting New York v. Trump, 811 F. Supp. 3d 215, 234 (D. Mass. 2025)). The significant negative factor treatment also may have legal consequences for Plaintiffs, whose applications may be impacted by its application.
Defendants also argue that these policies are not final agency action because USCIS has “implemented a series of robust actions after issuing those policy memoranda” and has established the USCIS Vetting Center in Atlanta “to centralize enhanced vetting using advanced technologies including artificial intelligence.” (ECF No. 21 at 15–16). These arguments appear irrelevant—Defendants do not explain how a new vetting center or the use of AI bear on the finality of the policies at issue as they are applied to Plaintiffs.
Other courts have concluded that these policies constitute final agency action susceptible to judicial review. E.g., Behdin, 2026 WL 1031079, at *18–20 (finding plaintiffs likely to succeed
b. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits in showing that the challenged policies are arbitrary and capricious.
The inquiry turns to the merits of these policies. Plaintiffs argue that the policies are arbitrary and capricious for five independent reasons. First, they argue that USCIS failed to articulate a rational connection between its objectives and its policies. Second, they argue that USCIS failed to consider their reliance interests. Third, they argue that USCIS abandoned its first-in, first-out adjudicatory methodology without recognizing or justifying that change. Fourth, they argue that USCIS failed to consider whether a hold of fixed duration would accomplish its objectives. Fifth, they argue that USCIS‘s public statements confirm that its rationale has shifted. (ECF No. 9-1 at 12–14). Plaintiffs’ arguments focus on the Policy Memoranda, though they also challenge the Policy Alert and the significant negative factor treatment.
Defendants’ merits argument is perfunctory and conclusory. They simply assert that USCIS weighed possible delay to adjudication of pending immigration benefit applications, and apparently determined that the need for USCIS to vet and screen applicants “to the maximum degree possible” outweighed any issues stemming from delay. (ECF No. 21 at 14–15).
Defendants’ conclusory assertion is insufficient. See Saghafi, 2026 WL 1127468, at *9 (finding conclusory statements that USCIS “considered” consequences and “weighed” competing interests insufficient to show a rational connection); Varniab, 2026 WL 485490, at *19. First,
Second assertions of national security interests clash with the reliance interests of foreign nationals like Plaintiffs, who are lawfully present in the United States. Defendants do not address how USCIS accounted for this important reliance interest in formulating policies that would impact foreign nationals like many of the Plaintiffs, “who have been in this country for years.” Karimi, 2026 WL 1103448, at *10. And it is hard to see how any national security interest “can . . . be served by making beggars out of legal immigrants who are likely to remain lawfully present in the United States indefinitely.” Id. Defendants’ position seems to be that because some foreign nationals already admitted into the United States may be threats to national security or public safety, USCIS will delay adjudication of their pending benefit applications. See id. If that is Defendants’ position, it is frankly preposterous. Should the Government‘s national security concern be legitimate, it is unclear why adjudications that might address that threat ought to be
The problems with the challenged policies are magnified in light of the compelling reliance interests that Plaintiffs assert. See Encino Motorcars, 579 U.S. at 221–22. Many Plaintiffs have explained, through declarations, how they have generally relied on USCIS‘s adjudicatory regime prior to the challenged policies to plan their lives. (E.g., ECF Nos. 9-2 ¶¶ 3–4, 6–10; 9-3 ¶¶ 3, 6–13, 9-4 ¶¶ 4–8; 9-6 ¶¶ 3–9; 9-7 ¶¶ 4–8; 9-8 ¶¶ 3–14; 9-15 ¶¶ 3–8; 9-17 ¶¶ 3–9; 9-19 ¶¶ 2–9). Several have paid additional fees for premium processing but have not received the speedy processing that USCIS promises. (E.g., ECF Nos. 9-6 ¶ 5; 9-10 ¶ 7; 9-11 ¶ 3; 9-16 ¶ 5). John Doe 17, a professor teaching physics and astronomy in the United States, is an Iranian convert to Christianity and could face persecution if returned to Iran. (ECF No. 9-16 ¶¶ 3–10). John Doe 19‘s Form I-485 has been pending for seven years. (ECF No. 9-18 ¶¶ 3–7).
For other Plaintiffs, it is unclear why they would be subject to the challenged policies at all. Jane Doe 13 is a Canadian citizen who “is not a national of any country listed” in the presidential proclamations yet apparently is subjected to the challenged policies because she was born in Zimbabwe. (ECF No. 9-13 ¶¶ 2–10). And Jane Doe 9‘s Form I-765 was already approved by USCIS, but USCIS has since withheld issuance of the physical employment authorization document. (ECF No. 9-9 ¶¶ 3–10). Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of this argument, too.
Third, Plaintiffs are likely to show that Defendants have not recognized their change in policy and shown a good reason for that change in deviating from a first-in, first-out adjudication of pending benefits. See Encino Motorcars, 579 U.S. at 221; Behdin, 2026 WL 1031079, at *14 (Defendant Edlow representing that USCIS generally adjudicated Form I-765 applications under
Similarly, Plaintiffs’ fourth argument challenges the logic of an indefinite hold without consideration of whether a hold of a specific, fixed duration could have sufficed to accomplish the same goals. Defendants have not shown or explained why “[a] hold with a fixed end point” could not have “given USCIS time to review and bolster its security review processes while giving applicants some indication of how long they would need to wait.” Meschi, 2026 WL 1157151, at *1. Plaintiffs are likely to show that USCIS failed to provide a “reasoned explanation” for the indefinite hold. Encino Motorcars, 579 U.S. at 221; see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass‘n, 463 U.S. at 48 (“At the very least this alternative way of achieving the objectives . . . should have been addressed.”).
Fifth and finally, Plaintiffs argue that USCIS‘s “shifting or post hoc rationales,” as offered by USCIS spokesman Tragesser‘s statements regarding labor market protectionism, is itself a hallmark of arbitrary agency action. (ECF No. 9-1 at 14). That may well be the case, but Plaintiffs have not shown why those post-hoc statements informed the earlier policies, or how they independently demonstrate that the policies are arbitrary and capricious. Certainly, if Defendants had tried to bolster the challenged policies by offering this labor market rationale, that defense could be an “impermissible post hoc rationalization.” Dep‘t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1, 22 (2020). But post hoc rationalizations made through public statements given by a spokesperson do not necessarily show that the earlier agency action was in and of itself arbitrary and capricious. Plaintiffs’ overall argument on this point is perfunctory, and they have not shown that they are likely to succeed on the merits of this fifth, separate arbitrary and capricious
3. Notice and Comment
The APA also requires that courts set aside agency action that is performed “without observance of procedure required by law.”
Under the APA, when an agency seeks to “promulgate a rule that intends to create new law, rights or duties . . . they must engage in a process known as notice-and-comment rulemaking.” Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Comm‘r of Internal Revenue, 28 F.4th 700, 710 (6th Cir. 2022). Under this process, the agency must first publish a “notice of proposed rule making” in the Federal Register.
Plaintiffs are likely to show that the challenged policies are substantive rules subject to notice and comment. The challenged policies are, by their own terms, mandatory adjustments to how USCIS adjudicates pending immigration benefit applications. (ECF No. 1-1 at 1) (“Effective
Given that the challenged policies impose obligations on USCIS personnel, Plaintiffs are likely to show that they are substantive in nature. Other courts have reached similar conclusions in evaluating motions for preliminary injunctions. E.g., Behdin, 2026 WL 1031079, at *22–23. This Court concludes that Plaintiffs have shown that they are likely to succeed on the merits of this notice-and-comment claim.
4. Ultra Vires
Finally, the APA prohibits agency action taken “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.”
Defendants counter that
Defendants are correct that section 1182(f) confers broad authority to the President to “suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate” by proclamation, should the President “find[] that the entry of aliens or any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.”
Moreover, Defendants’ reliance on section 1182(f) is inapposite for the simple reason that the applicable Presidential Proclamations here do not actually require or even anticipate the adjudicative hold policy. The Presidential Proclamations also do not discuss USCIS‘s
Defendants’ reliance on sections 1103(a)(1) and 1103(a)(3) presents more of a mixed picture of statutory authority. First, section 1103(a)(1) simply “charge[s]” Secretary Mullin “with the administration and enforcement of . . . all . . . laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens.”
Similarly, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their argument that Policy Memorandum PM-602-0192 and Policy Memorandum PM-602-0194 exceed USCIS authority because they violate USCIS‘s duty to adjudicate properly-filed benefit applications. Recall that Congress expects that immigration benefit applications will be processed within a finite time, see
Because this Court has determined that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits on all their APA claims for unlawful withholding and unreasonable delay, for lack of notice-and-comment procedures, and for exceeding authority, as well as for four of their five theories of liability under their arbitrary and capricious APA claim, this factor weighs in favor of entering the requested preliminary injunction.
C. Immediate, Irreparable Harm
The second preliminary injunction factor evaluates the immediacy and irreparability of the claimed harm that will occur absent injunction. Immediacy requires a showing of “actual and imminent” harm, “rather than harm that is speculative or unsubstantiated.” Abney v. Amgen, Inc., 443 F.3d 540, 551–52 (6th Cir. 2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Irreparability indicates a type of harm that cannot be fully compensable by money damages, though an injury is not fully compensable by money damages if the “nature” of the loss makes damages “difficult to calculate.” Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, LLC v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 550 (6th Cir. 2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiffs argue that without a preliminary injunction, they will suffer irreparable harm through a variety of injuries, including the loss of the legal ability to work, rescission of job offers, and an inability to travel, with a concomitant prolonged separation from family abroad. (ECF Nos. 9-1 at 17–18; 22 at 7–8; see ECF Nos. 9-2–9-19). Certain Plaintiffs face particular harms—for instance, John Doe 19 faces “imminent risk of losing [his] employment,” with the resultant threat of foreclosure and bankruptcy. (ECF No. 9-18 ¶¶ 5–6). John Doe 1, a licensed pharmacist, feels as though he cannot “move forward” with his life, career, home, and community in Columbus, Ohio. He fears that despite being granted asylum in the United States, he may be forced back to
Defendants counter that Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate an immediate, irreparable injury that is likely to occur. (ECF No. 21 at 18–20). Although “sympathiz[ing] with Plaintiffs’ concerns,” Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have not established an injury that would be prevented by a preliminary injunction, because even if the policies were made inapplicable to them, their pending benefit applications “are highly unlikely to be immediately granted.” Relying on two out of circuit district court cases, Defendants argue that their national security concerns eclipse Plaintiffs’ interest in the adjudication of their pending applications. They suggest that any alleged harm arising from the inability to plan for the future is not irreparable. (Id. at 19).
Defendants’ arguments are unavailing. Any persuasive weight their out-of-circuit authorities might have is tempered greatly by the fact that they predate the challenged policies at issue in this case.29 Plaintiffs have sufficiently shown the risk of immediate, irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction. First, this Court has previously determined that jeopardy to a foreign national‘s immigration status can generate irreparable harm, even if that harm is economic, because money damages likely will not be available when such litigation concludes. Oruganti,
Second, and relatedly, Plaintiffs have presented evidence of other irreparable harms they may suffer if their applications remain frozen. (ECF Nos. 9-2–9-19). “These harms include inability to travel to visit family, inability to make basic life decisions, and significant emotional strain.” Varniab, 2026 WL 485490, at *23; cf. Oruganti, 2025 WL 1144560, at *5 (threats to immigrant status may place a foreign national‘s “education, research, financial stability, and career trajectories at imminent risk of irreparable harm,” not to mention the “risk of detention or deportation”). The career risk appears acute for many Plaintiffs in this case, where individual work authorizations hang in the balance. See Iowa Migrant Movement for Justice v. Bird, 157 F.4th 904, 929 (8th Cir. 2025) (the foreign national who “might be prevented from pursuing her chosen career” may face irreparable harm); see generally Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 215 (1923) (Foreign nationals have a “right to earn a livelihood by following the ordinary occupations of life.”). Moreover, the instability created by the adjudicative holds may generate similar irreparable harms by subjecting Plaintiffs to the looming specter of deportation. For immigrants, “deportation may result in the loss ‘of all that makes life worth living.’” Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945) (quoting Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922)).
D. Balance of Harms and Public Interest
The final two preliminary injunction factors are the balance of harms and the public interest. These factors merge when the Government is a party,30 Oruganti, 2025 WL 1144560, at *7 (citing Nken, 556 U.S. at 435), though the Government‘s role as respondent does not render the public interest “negligible.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434–35 (addressing stay issuances and recognizing the “substantial overlap” with the preliminary injunction factors).
Defendants raise perfunctory arguments about national security concerns. (ECF No. 21 at 19). To be sure, there is a strong public interest in national security, and facilitating considerations of safety in evaluating pending immigration benefit applications. See Bowser, 2026 WL 555624, at *7–8. But any national security justification offered by Defendants for challenged policies makes no sense in this case. See Section IV(B)(2)(b), supra. Plaintiffs “are already in the country.” Bowser, 2026 WL 555624, at *8. Defendants fail to explain how a delay of a decision on pending immigration benefit applications for foreign nationals already within the United States could ameliorate any public safety or national security concern. Their arguments amount to nothing more than a talismanic invocation of national security. To be sure, under some
By contrast, there is an overriding public interest in ensuring that Government agencies adhere to the letter of the law. Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1103 (6th Cir. 1994) (recognizing the “greater public interest in having governmental agencies abide by the federal laws that govern their existence and operations”); Oruganti, 2025 WL 1144560, at *7 (the “public interest is served when administrative agencies comply with their obligations under the APA”). Similarly, there is a strong public interest in ensuring that foreign nationals receive fair treatment and due consideration once they have applied for immigration benefits. Cf. Nken, 556 U.S. at 436 (recognizing the public interest, in the context of removal of foreign nationals, that weighs in favor of “preventing aliens from being wrongfully removed”). Plaintiffs have shown that the balance of harms and the public interest favor a preliminary injunction.
E. Remedy
All preliminary injunction factors favor Plaintiffs, and this Court must tailor appropriate relief, bearing in mind “the rule that injunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the
Plaintiffs request this Court issue an order: (1) enjoining Defendants and their subordinates from applying the challenged policies to any pending immigration benefit application filed by Plaintiffs; (2) directing Defendants to resume processing Form I-485 and Form I-131 applications in the ordinary course, without application of the challenged policies; (3) compelling Defendants to adjudicate each Plaintiff‘s pending Form I-765 application within thirty days, and, where applicable, issuing employment authorization documents for Plaintiffs whose Form I-765 applications are based on optional practical training with validity periods adjusted to restore time lost due to the unlawful hold; (4) directing Defendants to either adjudicate applications for Plaintiffs who paid the premium-processing fee, or to refund the premium-processing fee; (5) directing Defendants to issue and deliver Jane Doe 9‘s employment authorization document immediately, given that her Form I-765 was approved on December 3, 2025; and (6) waiving the bond requirement. (ECF No. 9-1 at 20).
Should this Court rule in Plaintiffs’ favor, Defendants request that they be ordered to adjudicate the pending applications as if the challenged policies did not exist, arguing that this Court should not place Plaintiffs in a more favorable position than foreign nationals who did not file a lawsuit or were not subject to the challenged policies. In essence, Defendants ask this Court to not permit Plaintiffs to “jump the line” or skip ahead of others who might have had applications pending before them.
1. Relief
First, this Court finds that a preliminary injunction is warranted. Defendants Joseph B. Edlow and Markwayne Mullin and their officers, agents, and employees at the U.S. Citizenship
Second, Defendants shall resume processing each Plaintiff‘s pending Form I-485 and Form I-131 applications in the ordinary course, without application of the challenged policies.31
Third, Defendants shall adjudicate each Plaintiff‘s pending Form I-765 within thirty days of this Court‘s order. For Plaintiffs with Form I-765 applications based on optional practical training, should Defendants grant the pending applications, Defendants shall issue employment authorization documents with validity periods adjusted to restore all time lost due to the adjudicatory hold implemented by the challenged policies.32
Fourth, Defendants shall, for each Plaintiff who paid a premium-processing fee for an application that is pending, either (a) take adjudicative action within the expedited timeframe from the date of this order, should that expedited timeframe still be live; or (b) refund the paid premium-processing fee(s) to the payor, in accordance with law and regulation. See
2. Bond
Finally, this Court considers an appropriate bond. Under
Plaintiffs request that this Court waive the bond requirement, observing that other courts have done so. (ECF No. 9-1 at 20). The amount of required bond ordinarily depends on the gravity of the potential harm to the enjoined party, and this Court has previously found that only a nominal bond is required in an immigration benefit case where the public interest considerations are “strong.” Oruganti, 2025 WL 1144560, at *7. The record does not reflect any reason why bond in this case should differ from the $1.00 bond ordered in Oruganti. Accordingly, each Plaintiff is ordered to post a nominal bond with the Clerk of Court in the amount of $1.00, for a total bond of $25.00.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 9) is GRANTED. Defendants U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Director Joseph B. Edlow and Department of Homeland Security Director Markwayne Mullin are hereby PRELIMINARILY ENJOINED from applying Policy Alert PA-2025-26, Policy Memorandum
Defendants are ORDERED to resume processing all pending Form I-485 and Form I-131 applications filed by Plaintiffs in this action in the ordinary course, and to adjudicate all pending Form I-765 applications within thirty days of the date of this order. For any granted Form I-765 applications that are based on optional practical training, Defendants SHALL issue employment authorization documents with validity periods adjusted to restore any and all time lost due to the adjudicatory hold implemented by Policy Alert PA-2025-26, Policy Memorandum PM-602-0192, or Policy Memorandum PM-602-0194. Defendants SHALL inform each Plaintiff of all final adjudicatory decisions. If Defendants deny any application, they SHALL inform this Court of that decision and the reasons for denial.
Defendants are FURTHER ORDERED to either (a) take adjudicative action within the expedited timeframe or (b) issue a refund for Plaintiffs who paid premium-processing fees for a pending immigration benefit application.
Defendants are FURTHER ORDERED to issue Plaintiff Jane Doe 9‘s employment authorization document within seven days of the date of this Order.
Plaintiffs’ request for a waiver of the bond requirement is DENIED. Each individual Plaintiff is ORDERED to post a nominal bond of $1.00 with the Clerk of Court.
Within thirty days of this Order, Defendants are ORDERED to file with this Court and serve on the Plaintiffs a report in writing under oath setting forth in detail the manner and form in which USCIS and DHS have complied with the terms of this injunction. Defendants are FURTHER ORDERED to notify this Court and Plaintiff within three days should further USCIS
Counsel for Defendants SHALL provide written notice of this Order to all Defendants within two days of this Order, and SHALL certify to this Court once notice has been provided.
Counsel for all parties in this matter and this matter‘s related cases (Nazari v. Edlow, Case No. 2:25-cv-1313, and Charles v. Edlow, Case No. 2:26-cv-149) are ORDERED to meet and confer in good faith to discuss the extent to which this Order might resolve outstanding issues across these cases. Within sixty days of the date of this Order, the parties in the related cases SHALL notify this Court of their respective positions regarding outstanding issues.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to docket this Order in this matter‘s related cases.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ALGENON L. MARBLEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATED: July 6, 2026