MIKE GOVENDER HATCHET v. DANIEL W. ANDRADE, Dirеctor of Nashville Field Office of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, Secretary of U.S. Department of Homeland Security; UR MENDOZA JADDOU, Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
No. 23-5920
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
July 3, 2024
RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b). File Name: 24a0146p.06. Decided and Filed: July 3, 2024.
Before: MOORE, MURPHY, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Andrew P. Goldstein, Samuel S. Shirley, COLE LAW GROUP, P.C., Brentwood, Tennessee, for Appellant. Michael D. Ross, Katherine J. Shinners, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.
OPINION
KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Mike Govender Hatchet sought, on numerous occasions, an adjustment of his immigration status to that of lawful permanent resident. To do so, he applied for such discretionary relief, which was adjudicated by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS“). USCIS denied each of Hatсhet‘s applications, relying on facts that it found rendered Hatchet ineligible for discretionary relief. Eventually, Hatchet challenged the agency‘s actions in federal district court, claiming, in effect, that the agency relied on facts clearly at odds with the record. But because Congress has stripped us of our ability to review such claims concerned with the facts found during discretionary-relief proceedings, we AFFIRM the district court‘s dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Adjustment of Status
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA“) provides various mechanisms for noncitizens to gain lawful permanent residence. See, e.g., Lockhart v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 251, 254 (6th Cir. 2009). Relevant here,
The status of an alien who was inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States ... may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if (1) the alien makes an application for such adjustment, (2) the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence, and (3) an immigrant visa is immediately available to him at the time his application is filed.
At that point, an immigrant visa is immediately available to the noncitizen, and they are ready to apply for adjustment of status for lawful permanent residence. Id. To apply for an adjustment of status, the noncitizen must file a Form I-485.
A properly filed Form I-485 is then considered under “a two-step process.” Lockhart, 573 F.3d at 254. First, the adjudicator considers whether the applying noncitizen has proven that they are statutorily eligible for an adjustment of status. Id.;
Second, the adjudicator must exercise their discretion to adjust the noncitizen‘s status, even if the noncitizen is statutorily admissible. Lockhart, 573 F.3d at 254. That is, even if the noncitizen is statutorily eligible for adjustment of status, the adjudicator may still deny relief if the adjudicator finds that the noncitizen does not “merit[] a favorable exercise of agency discretion.” Matovski v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 722, 739 (6th Cir. 2007); see also I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 307-08 (2001) (explaining the difference between eligibility for discretionary relief and the actual exercise of discretion to grant relief), superseded by statutе on other grounds. Such exercise of discretion is “always ‘a matter of grace‘” regardless of statutory eligibility for relief. Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 332 (2022) (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 308).
B. Hatchet‘s Application
Hatchet claims to be a citizen of Sierra Leone who first arrived in the United States in 2002 and sought asylum at the Texas border. R. 15-1 (2020 USCIS Decision at 1-2) (Page ID #135-36). Although Hatchet was not granted asylum, he was paroled into the United States. Id. at 2 (Page ID #136). Hatchet has a lоng history with the immigration system and has applied for discretionary relief on several occasions, but only USCIS‘s most recent denials of an adjustment of status are relevant to this case.
On November 24, 2015, Hatchet married Lovelyne Emefesi, a United States citizen, who filed a Form I-130 on Hatchet‘s behalf.
Hatchet then filed a complaint in federal district court in August 2020. R.1 (Compl.) (Page ID #1-26). Hatchet brought various claims under the Administrative Procedure Act, including that USCIS acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Id. ¶¶ 52-89 (Page ID #16-25). In October 2020, however, USCIS sua sponte reopened Hatchet‘s application for adjustment of status. R. 15-1 (2020 USCIS Decision at 3) (Page ID #137). USCIS conducted an interview with Hatchet on November 6, 2020, but subsequent to that interview USCIS again denied Hatchet‘s application. Id. at 3-4 (Page ID #137-38). Specifically, USCIS first found that Hatchet was statutorily ineligible due to prior misrepresentations about (1) his children during an application Hatchet made while in a prior marriage, which would have led to the discovery of the fact that Hatchet was in an adulterous relationship; and (2) his citizenship status, which USCIS previously cited. Id. at 5 (Page ID #139). USCIS also found that it should not exercise discretion in Hatchet‘s favor for a variety of reasоns. Id. at 6-7 (Page ID #140-41).
C. Procedural History
After USCIS‘s most recent denial, Hatchet filed an amended complaint in district court. R. 28 (Am. Compl.) (Page ID #218-46). Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on July 14, 2022, R. 38 (Mot. to Dismiss) (Page ID #264-65), arguing, among other things, that the Supreme Court‘s recent decision in Patel demonstrated that Hatchet‘s claims were not subject to judicial review due to a jurisdiction-stripping statute, R. 39 (Defs.’ Mem. at 7-12) (Page ID #272-77). The district court ultimately agreed with defendants’ position and dismissed Hatchet‘s amended complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. R. 43 (Op. at 4-7) (Page ID #327-30). Hatchet timely filed his notice of appeal on October 17, 2023. R. 46 (Not. of Appeal) (Page ID #334-35).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review de novo a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Lovely v. United States, 570 F.3d 778, 781 (6th Cir. 2009).
B. Patel and 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)
As a general matter, federal courts are courts of limited subject-mаtter jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. Field, 756 F.3d 911, 914 (6th Cir. 2014). Because our subject-matter jurisdiction derives principally from statute, in certain circumstances Congress may strip us of jurisdiction to review claims that would otherwise fall within our purview. See, e.g., Cooper Butt ex rel. Q.T.R. v. Barr, 954 F.3d 901, 910 (6th Cir. 2020). In the federal immigration system,
Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory) ... except as provided in subparagraph (D), and regardless of whether the judgment, decisiоn, or action is made in removal proceedings, no court shall have jurisdiction to review—(i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section 1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b, 1229c, or 1255 of this title, or (ii) any other decision of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in [their] discretion ...
The Supreme Court recently addressed the effect of
In reaching this result, thе Court expressly rejected arguments that sought to preserve review of nondiscretionary judgments made as part of the ultimate decision to grant relief like an adjustment of status. Id. at 340-41. Because such nondiscretionary findings, like credibility determinations, are still “judgment[s],” and given that
Finally, the Court in Patel acknowledged that its holding would have broad implications for review of discretionary-relief decisions. See id. at 344-46. But those implications did not weigh in favor of a different result. For one, courts would be unable to “review ... some factual determinations made in the discretionary-relief context that would be reviewable if made elsewhere in removal proceedings.” Id. at 344. The Court reasoned, however, that this likely stemmed from “Congress’ choice to provide reduced procedural protection for discretionary relief.” Id. at 345. Second, the Court recognized that its decision could potentially insulate USCIS denials of discretionary relief from review, given that such decisions are made “outside of the removal context.” Id. Although that question was not squarely before the Court, in dicta the Court noted that “foreclosing judiciаl review unless and until removal proceedings are initiated would be consistent with Congress’ choice to reduce procedural protections in the context of
C. Title 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) Strips Jurisdiction Over Hatchet‘s Claims
Hatchet‘s appeal raises precisely the issue that was not squarely addressed in Patel but that the Court nevertheless discussed in dicta: whether, outside of the removal context,
First, we deal with the same text that the Supreme Court held prevents judicial review of fact findings in the removаl context save for those issues preserved by subparagraph (D). Although
Once
Hatchet‘s arguments to the contrary are easily dismissed, as every argument asks us simply to disagree with the reasoning of the Supreme Court with respect to the same statutоry language. To do so, however, Hatchet must provide us with some reason why Patel does not effectively control the outcome here. Hatchet has not done so. Hatchet first mounts textual arguments for why
At bottom, Hatchet in his briefing asks us to disagree with the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Appellant Br. at 37 (“[T]he Court ignored its own precedent [in Patel] that long recognized a distinct difference between decisions to grant discretionary relief and the associated underlying eligibility determinations.“); id. at 42 (“Plaintiff respectfully submits that the Patel [C]ourt‘s declination to employ the strong presumption of judicial review of agency action mischaracterized said presumption as an interpretive tool of last resort.“). But we are not at liberty to ignore the Supreme Court. And to the extent that Hatchet relies on pre-Patel caselaw that is either inconsistent with Patel or at odds with its logic, Patel governs. Accordingly, we hоld that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review the factual findings of USCIS, and because Hatchet‘s arguments are entirely fact-bound, we agree that the district court properly dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
Notes
Hatchet‘s case fundamentally concerns fact issues, not legal or constitutional claims. See, e.g., R. 28 (Am. Compl. ¶ 74 (Page ID #239) (“[USCIS‘s] [d]ecision gets the facts wrong, misconstrues what actually occurred and arrived at conclusions that are clearly contrary to the evidence in the record.“). By its own terms, Patel applies only to review of fact issues, because