PATEL ET AL. v. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL
No. 20-979
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
May 16, 2022
OCTOBER TERM, 2021
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
PATEL ET AL. v. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-979. Argued December 6, 2021—Decided May 16, 2022
In 2007, Pankajkumar Patel, who had entered the United States illegally with his wife Jyotsnaben in the 1990s, applied to United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for discretionary adjustment of status under
Years later, the Government initiated removal proceedings against Patel and his wife due to their illegal entry. Patel sought relief from removal by renewing his adjustment of status request. Patel argued before an Immigration Judge that he had mistakenly checked the “citizen” box on the state application and thus lacked the subjective intent necessary to violate the federal statute. The Immigration Judge disagreed, denied Patel‘s application for adjustment of status, and ordered that Patel and his wife be removed from the country. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed Patel‘s appeal.
Patel petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for review, where a panel of that court held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider his claim. Federal law prohibits judicial review of “any judgment regarding the granting of relief” under
Held: Federal courts lack jurisdiction to review facts found as part of discretionary-relief proceedings under
(a) This case largely turns on the scope of the word “judgment” as used in
(1) Only amicus’ definition fits the text and context of
(2) The Government‘s and Patel‘s interpretations read like elaborate efforts to avoid the text‘s most natural meaning. The Government cites dictionary definitions such as “the mental or intellectual process of forming an opinion or evaluation by discerning and comparing” as indicating that “judgment” refers exclusively to a discretionary decision, which it describes as one that is “subjective or evaluative.” Brief for Respondent 12. The factual findings in this case, it says, do not fit that description. The Government is wrong about both text and context. A “judgment” does not necessarily involve discretion, nor does
(3) Neither does Patel‘s interpretation square with the text or context of
(b) Patel and the Government object that this Court‘s interpretation would arbitrarily prohibit review of some factual determinations made in the discretionary-relief context that would be reviewable if made elsewhere in removal proceedings. But the distinction simply reflects Congress’ choice to provide reduced procedural protection for discretionary relief. And while this Court does not decide what effect, if any, its decision has on review of discretionary-relief determinations made outside of removal proceedings, the Court rejects Patel‘s and the Government‘s contention that the risk of foreclosing such review should change its interpretation here. As the Court has emphasized many times before, policy concerns cannot trump the best interpretation of the statutory text. Pp. 15-17.
(c) As a last resort, Patel and the Government argue that the statute is ambiguous enough to trigger the presumption that Congress did not intend to foreclose judicial review. Here, however, the text and context
971 F. 3d 1258, affirmed.
BARRETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. GORSUCH, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 20-979
PANKAJKUMAR S. PATEL, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[May 16, 2022]
JUSTICE BARRETT delivered the opinion of the Court.
Congress has comprehensively detailed the rules by which noncitizens may enter and live in the United States. When noncitizens violate those rules, Congress has provided procedures for their removal. At the same time, there is room for mercy: Congress has given the Attorney General power to grant relief from removal in certain circumstances.
Federal courts have a very limited role to play in this process. With an exception for legal and constitutional questions, Congress has barred judicial review of the Attorney General‘s decisions denying discretionary relief from removal. We must decide how far this bar extends—specifically, whether it precludes judicial review of factual findings that underlie a denial of relief. It does.
I
A
A noncitizen who enters the United States illegally or who otherwise violates its laws may be removed from the country.
Being found removable is not always the end of the story, though, because Congress has authorized relief from removal in certain contexts. For example, the Attorney General has discretion to adjust the status of an eligible noncitizen who entered the United States illegally to that of lawful permanent resident, forgiving the illegal entry and protecting the noncitizen from removal on that ground. See
Congress has sharply circumscribed judicial review of the discretionary-relief process. Title
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including
section 2241 of title 28 , or any other habeas corpus provision, andsections 1361 and1651 of such title , and except as provided in sub-paragraph (D), and regardless of whether the judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings, no court shall have jurisdiction to review— “(i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under
section 1182(h) ,1182(i) ,1229b ,1229c , or1255 of this title .”
This bar has an important qualification: “Nothing in subparagraph (B) ... shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section.”
B
Pankajkumar Patel and his wife Jyotsnaben entered the United States illegally in the 1990s. In 2007, Patel applied to United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) (a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)) for adjustment of status under
USCIS denied Patel‘s application for adjustment of status because of that misrepresentation. One of the eligibility requirements for adjustment is that the noncitizen be statutorily admissible for permanent residence.
Several years later, DHS initiated removal proceedings against the Patels because they were present in the United States without having been admitted—the same illegal entry that Patel had sought to remedy in his initial application for adjustment of status. See
Now before an Immigration Judge, Patel‘s request for relief raised the same question that had been at issue in his application before USCIS: whether the misrepresentation of citizenship on his driver‘s license application rendered him ineligible for discretionary adjustment. He conceded that he had checked the “citizen” box on that application. But he argued that he had done so by accident—and therefore without the subjective intent that the BIA has interpreted
The Immigration Judge concluded otherwise. The judge explained that Patel was evasive when asked exactly how he had made a mistake. And though Patel testified that he had provided his alien registration number on his application, which would have identified him as a noncitizen, the actual application showed that he had not. The judge also
Patel petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for review, arguing that any reasonable judge would have been “compelled to conclude” that his testimony was credible and that he had made an honest mistake on the form. See
On rehearing en banc, both Patel and the Government argued that the panel had erred. Patel contended that the bar on judicial review applied only to the ultimate decision to grant or deny adjustment of status—not to any subsidiary decisions regarding an applicant‘s eligibility to be considered for relief. The Government argued that the bar applied not only to the ultimate decision to grant or deny relief but also to any discretionary determinations made at the
A majority of the full Eleventh Circuit agreed with the panel decision and held that all factual determinations made as part of considering a request for discretionary relief fall within
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 594 U. S. ___ (2021). Because the Government has continued to take the position that
II
Section
Amicus maintains that “judgment” means any authoritative decision. See Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary 1223 (1993) (“a formal utterance or pronouncing of an authoritative opinion after judging,” or “an opinion so pronounced“); 8 Oxford English Dictionary 294 (2d ed. 1989) (“[t]he pronouncing of a deliberate opinion upon a person or thing, or the opinion pronounced“). Under this broad definition,
The Government argues that, at least when used outside the context of a final judgment of a court, “judgment” does not refer to just any decision. According to the Government,
Patel agrees with the Government that “judgment” implies an exercise of discretion, but unlike the Government, he would not sift through eligibility determinations to classify them as discretionary or nondiscretionary. Instead, Patel reads the phrase “regarding the granting of relief” to focus the jurisdictional bar narrowly on a single discretionary judgment: the immigration judge‘s decision whether to grant relief to an applicant eligible to receive it. Everything else, Patel says, is reviewable. JUSTICE GORSUCH adopts Patel‘s approach, rejecting the Government‘s interpretation as well as amicus‘. See post, at 8 (dissenting opinion).
A
Amicus’ interpretation is the only one that fits
Section
No surprise, then, that we have already relied on subparagraph (D) to all but settle that judicial review of factfinding is unavailable. In Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. ___ (2020), we had to decide whether subparagraph (C)—which bars review of “any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed” certain criminal offenses—prohibits review of how a legal standard applies to undisputed facts. Our answer turned on whether such an application counts as a question of law
Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. ___ (2020), addresses Patel‘s situation even more directly. There, we held that a court has jurisdiction to review a factual challenge to an order denying relief under the Convention Against Torture, because that order falls outside of subparagraph (C)‘s prohibition on reviewing final orders of removal. In reaching that conclusion, we emphasized that our decision would have “no effect” on those orders that do fall within a jurisdiction-stripping provision—including “orders denying discretionary relief” under
B
In contrast to amicus’ straightforward interpretation, both the Government‘s and Patel‘s arguments read like elaborate efforts to avoid the most natural meaning of the text.
1
We begin with the Government‘s argument that “judgment” refers exclusively to a “discretionary” decision, which the Government describes as a decision that is “subjective or evaluative.” Brief for Respondent 12. According to the Government, this requirement is evident in definitions like this one: “‘the mental or intellectual process of forming an opinion or evaluation by discerning and comparing,‘” or
We do not see how the Government‘s cited definitions narrow the field in the way that the Government claims. Rather than delineating a special category of discretionary determinations, they simply describe the decisionmaking process. That process might involve a matter that the Government treats as “subjective” or one that it deems “objective.” Either counts as a judgment, even under the definitions that the Government offers.
Take the credibility determination at issue in this case. It is easily described as an “opinion or evaluation” formed “by discerning and comparing” the evidence presented. The Immigration Judge weighed Patel‘s testimony, reviewed documents, and considered Patel‘s history to conclude that he was an evasive and untrustworthy witness. Using the word “judgment” to describe that kind of credibility determination is perfectly natural—in fact, we have used it this way ourselves. See, e.g., Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U. S. 318, 327 (2015) (discussing “‘credibility judgments‘” about a witness). It is just as natural in other factfinding contexts, like the Immigration Judge‘s determination that Patel lied on his driver‘s license application. Finding that fact involved the same exercise of evaluating conflicting evidence to make a judgment about what happened.
So to succeed, the Government must do more than point to the word “judgment.” It must show that in context, the
The Government claims that Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 233 (2010), which interpreted neighboring provision
“any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security, other than the granting of relief under section 1158(a) of this title.”
We explained in Kucana that “[t]he proximity of clauses (i) and (ii), and the words linking them—‘any other decision‘—sugges[t] that Congress had in mind decisions of the same genre, i.e., those made discretionary by legislation.” Id., at 246–247. “Read harmoniously,” we said, “both clauses convey that Congress barred court review of discretionary decisions only when Congress itself set out the Attorney General‘s discretionary authority in the statute.” Id., at 247.
Kucana‘s discussion is inapposite. That opinion addressed whether the Attorney General could unilaterally proscribe review of decisions “declared discretionary by the Attorney General himself through regulation.” Id., at 237. In drawing the comparison between clauses (i) and (ii), we thus focused on the fact that each form of relief identified in clause (i) was entrusted to the Attorney General‘s discretion by statute. Id., at 246. We neither said nor implied anything about review of eligibility decisions made in the course of exercising that statutory discretion.
In short, the Government is wrong about both text and context. A “judgment” does not necessarily involve discretion, nor does context indicate that only discretionary judgments are covered by
2
Unlike the Government, Patel interprets
Like the Government, Patel cannot square his interpretation with the text of
Context further undermines Patel‘s position. He cannot explain why the bar in subparagraph (B) should be read differently from subparagraph (C)‘s prohibition on reviewing final orders of removal for certain criminal offenses. Patel acknowledges that this bar on review of a “final order” also precludes review of its factual support, including the very kind of factfinding at issue in this case. Reply Brief for Petitioners 7; Guerrero-Lasprilla, 589 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 12–13). But if Congress had wanted to achieve that effect in subparagraph (B), he argues, it could have used “final order” there too, rather than “judgment.” Reply Brief for Petitioners 7. Yet Patel ignores a simple explanation for the shift in terminology. Subparagraph (B) bars review of only one facet of the removal process (consideration of discretionary relief) whereas subparagraph (C) prohibits review of the entire proceeding (removal based on a criminal offense). Each statutory label describes its target, but otherwise, the provisions preclude judicial review in the same way and bear the same relationship to subparagraph (D). Given those similarities, we see no reason to think that subparagraph (B) would allow a court to review the factual underpinnings of a decision when subparagraph (C) prohibits just that.
Patel and the Government object that our interpretation of
That distinction is not arbitrary. It reflects Congress’ choice to provide reduced procedural protection for discretionary relief, the granting of which is “‘not a matter of right under any circumstances, but rather is in all cases a matter of grace.‘” St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 308. That reduced protection is reflected in the burden of proof too: The Government bears the burden of proving removability by clear and convincing evidence, while an applicant bears the burden of establishing eligibility for discretionary relief. Compare
Patel and the Government also briefly suggest that interpreting
The reviewability of such decisions is not before us, and we do not decide it. But it is possible that Congress did, in fact, intend to close that door.3 The post-St. Cyr amendments expressly extended the jurisdictional bar to judgments made outside of removal proceedings at the same time that they preserved review of legal and constitutional questions made within removal proceedings. See
As a last resort, Patel and the Government insist that the statute is ambiguous enough to trigger the presumption that Congress did not intend to foreclose judicial review. We disagree.
Because ““executive determinations generally are subject to judicial review,” Guerrero-Lasprilla, 589 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6), we presume that review is available when a statute is silent. See Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U. S. 43, 56 (1993). But that presumption “may be overcome by specific language” in a provision or evidence “drawn from the statutory scheme as a whole.” Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S. 340, 349 (1984). And as we have explained in detail, the text and context of
* * *
Federal courts lack jurisdiction to review facts found as part of discretionary-relief proceedings under
It is so ordered.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 20-979
PANKAJKUMAR S. PATEL, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[May 16, 2022]
JUSTICE GORSUCH, with whom JUSTICE BREYER, JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, and JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting.
It is no secret that when processing applications, licenses, and permits the government sometimes makes mistakes. Often, they are small ones—a misspelled name, a misplaced application. But sometimes a bureaucratic mistake can have life-changing consequences. Our case is such a case. An immigrant to this country applied for legal residency. The government rejected his application. Allegedly, the government did so based on a glaring factual error. In circumstances like that, our law has long permitted individuals to petition a court to consider the question and correct any mistake.
Not anymore. Today, the Court holds that a federal bureaucracy can make an obvious factual error, one that will result in an individual‘s removal from this country, and nothing can be done about it. No court may even hear the case. It is a bold claim promising dire consequences for countless lawful immigrants. And it is such an unlikely assertion of raw administrative power that not even the agency that allegedly erred, nor any other arm of the Executive Branch, endorses it. Today‘s majority acts on its own to shield the government from the embarrassment of having to correct even its most obvious errors. Respectfully, I dissent.
A
Pankajkumar Patel has lived in the United States for nearly 30 years. He and his wife Jyotsnaben Patel currently reside in Georgia. They have three sons—one who is already a U. S. citizen, and two who are lawful permanent residents and spouses of U. S. citizens. As a young man, Mr. Patel entered the country illegally. But in 2007, he tried to make things right by applying for an adjustment of his immigration status to a lawful permanent resident (also known as a green card).
Mr. Patel had at least some reason to hope. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) expressly authorizes the Attorney General to grant relief in cases like his. The statute sets forth a two-step process. At the first step, the government must determine if an individual is statutorily eligible for an adjustment of status. Various circumstances specified by law, including prior criminal convictions, may render an applicant ineligible for relief. See
Seeking relief under this scheme, Mr. Patel filed an application with the necessary paperwork. Soon, the government responded by returning a document allowing Mr. Patel to continue to work and remain in the country while it processed his application. So far, so good.
Apparently, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) saw things differently. Operating through United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the agency denied Mr. Patel‘s application for adjustment of status, citing his faulty driver‘s license application. According to USCIS, Mr. Patel‘s conduct rendered him statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status under a provision that excludes any alien who “falsely represents . . . himself . . . to be a citizen of the United States” to obtain a “benefit under . . . State law.”
B
Some months later, the government elected to bring removal proceedings against Mr. Patel. As a defense to removal, Mr. Patel renewed his application for adjustment of status consistent with regulations permitting him to do so.
None of this moved the immigration judge. Relevant here, the immigration judge rested his decision on a factual finding. He said he did not believe Mr. Patel‘s testimony that he checked the wrong box mistakenly. Instead, the immigration judge found, Mr. Patel intentionally represented himself falsely to obtain a benefit under state law. According to the immigration judge, Mr. Patel had a strong incentive to deceive state officials because he could not have obtained a Georgia driver‘s license if he had disclosed he was “neither a citizen [n]or a lawful permanent resident.” And because intentionally deceiving state officials to obtain a benefit is enough to render an applicant statutorily ineligible for relief at step one, the immigration judge concluded, there was no need to reach the second-step question whether Mr. Patel warranted a favorable exercise of discretion.
Mr. Patel appealed the immigration judge‘s ruling to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). In his appeal, Mr. Patel argued that the immigration judge‘s finding that he had an incentive to deceive state officials was simply wrong—under Georgia law he was entitled to a driver‘s license without being a citizen or a lawful permanent resident given his pending application for adjustment of status and permission to work. Mr. Patel submitted, too, that all the record evidence pointed to the conclusion he simply checked the wrong box by mistake; even state officials agreed they had no case to bring against him for deception. In the end, however, a divided panel of the BIA rejected the appeal by a vote of 2 to 1.
II
As it comes to us, this case poses the question: Does a federal court have statutory authority to review and correct a BIA decision holding an individual ineligible for relief when that decision rests on a glaring factual error? Today, the majority insists the answer is no. It does not matter if the BIA and immigration judge in Mr. Patel‘s case erred badly when they found he harbored an intent to deceive state officials. It does not matter if the BIA declares other individuals ineligible for relief based on even more obvious factual errors. On the majority‘s telling, courts are powerless to correct bureaucratic mistakes like these no matter how grave they may be.
It is an eye-catching conclusion. Normally in this country, federal courts shoulder the responsibility of reviewing agency decisions to ensure they are at least supported by “substantial evidence.”
That is exactly the sort of argument Mr. Patel seeks to pursue. He hopes to persuade a court of law that the BIA‘s factual errors in his case are so obvious no reasonable factfinder could adopt them. It is a claim expressly permitted by statute. Tellingly, in the proceedings before us the government has continued to maintain that, however his case is finally resolved, Mr. Patel is entitled to his day in court. Nor is this some new position. For at least 20 years the government has taken the view that the law permits judicial review in cases like these. Yet even in the face of all this, the majority balks. It holds that no court may entertain Mr. Patel‘s challenge. And its reasoning promises that countless future immigrants will be left with no avenue to correct even more egregious agency errors.
A
How does the majority manage to reach such an unlikely conclusion? It depends on a Court-appointed amicus who offers arguments for the government that even the government refuses to advance on its own behalf. It turns out, too, that all of those arguments hinge on a narrow exception to the usual rule of judicial review—one found in
“Denials of discretionary relief
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . and regardless of whether the judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings, no court shall have jurisdiction to review— (i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section . . . 1255 of this title.”
This language does not begin to do the work the majority demands of it. Recall that requests for adjustment of status involve a two-step process. First, the Attorney General, acting through the BIA, must determine whether an individual is statutorily eligible for adjustment of status. See
This much follows directly from the statute‘s terms. Subparagraph (B)(i) renders unreviewable only those judgments “regarding the granting of relief.” That phrase has a well-understood meaning. To “grant relief” is to supply “redress or benefit.” United States v. Denedo, 556 U. S. 904, 909 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). And where, as here, the BIA issues a judgment only at step one, it never reaches the question whether to grant relief or supply some redress or benefit. Instead, the agency resolves only the antecedent question whether an individual is statutorily eligible to petition for relief, redress, or a benefit. As the BIA has explained, a judgment at step one can never “result in a grant of the application.” Arai, 13 I. & N., at 495. Any “judgment regarding the granting of relief” comes only at step two where the INA expressly vests the Attorney General with substantial discretion. See St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 307 (noting the traditional and longstanding “distinction between eligibility for discretionary relief, on the one hand, and the favorable exercise of discretion, on the other hand” (emphasis added)).
All of which leads us back to Mr. Patel‘s case. Before the Eleventh Circuit, Mr. Patel sought to challenge the BIA‘s step-one determination that he was statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status, arguing that no reasonable adjudicator could have found the facts as the agency did. The INA expressly authorizes courts to hear claims like his.
B
The majority, of course, offers a different view. Following the Eleventh Circuit‘s lead, the majority contends that subparagraph (B)(i)‘s phrase “any judgment regarding the granting of relief under
It is easy to see why. We do not normally suppose that Congress blithely includes words in its laws that perform no work. See, e.g., Liu v. SEC, 591 U. S. ___ (2020) (slip op., at 16) (noting the “cardinal principle of interpretation that courts must give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute“). Yet that is exactly what the majority‘s interpretation requires of us. If subparagraph (B)(i) operated as the majority imagines, Congress would have had no need to deny courts jurisdiction over “any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section
The majority‘s attempt to resolve its surplusage problem only underscores the gravity of its error. First, the majority tells us that, as used in subparagraph (B)(i), the words “any judgment” mean “any authoritative decision.” Ante, at 7, 8. Then the majority tells us that the phrase “regarding the granting of relief” expands the universe of covered judgments further, because the word “regarding” ““generally has a broadening effect.” Ante, at 8–9. But how could that be? Under the majority‘s reading of the word “judgment,” the statute already precludes judicial review of any authoritative decision “under section
What is more, the majority‘s argument rests on a faulty premise. The majority insists that the word “regarding” has “a broadening effect.” Ibid. It even suggests that failing to give the term that effect would be to read it “out of the statute entirely.” Ante, at 14. But in truth, the word can have either a broadening or narrowing effect depending on context. Cf. Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 537 (2015) (plurality opinion) (“In law as in life . . . the same words, placed in different contexts, sometimes mean different things“). And in subparagraph (B)(i), “regarding” is much more likely to serve a narrowing function, focusing our attention on a specific subset of judgments—namely, those step-two discretionary judgments “regarding the granting of relief.”
To appreciate the point, consider a hypothetical. Imagine I said: “Please bring me any book regarding the history of the American West from that shelf of history books.” In this sentence, the phrase “regarding the history of the American West” does not broaden the referenced set. Instead, it directs you to a narrow subset of books: those regarding the history of the American West. Any other interpretation misses the point and leaves me with a pile of unwanted volumes.
A
To the extent doubt remains about the proper construction of subparagraph (B)(i), it dissipates quickly with a look to the larger statutory context. Here the clues are many—yet the majority pauses to consider almost none of them.
Take first a neighboring statutory provision. After denying courts the power to review “any judgment regarding the granting of relief” in subparagraph (B)(i), Congress proceeded in the very next clause to deny courts jurisdiction to entertain another category of cases: “any other decision . . . the authority for which is specified . . . to be in the discretion of the Attorney General.”
Next, consider the other statutes subparagraph (B)(i) addresses. It doesn‘t just bar review of “judgments regarding the granting of relief” under
Still other clues confirm that subparagraph (B)(i) targets second-step discretionary decisions. Take the title Congress chose in
Consider as well the statute‘s history. When Congress borrows words from an established legal context, it “presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached” to them. Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 263 (1952).
B
Not only does the majority ignore most of these contextual clues. Its own arguments from statutory context do more to hurt than help its cause. The majority first directs us to
This argument falters almost immediately. Everyone agrees that, at the very least, subparagraph (B)(i) precludes judicial review of the Attorney General‘s second-step discretionary judgments “regarding the granting of relief.” And everyone agrees that subparagraph (D) restores judicial review of these discretionary judgments only to the extent a legal question or constitutional claim is in play. So, for example, if the Attorney General sought to exercise his discretion to discriminate against an applicant on the basis of race, subparagraph (D) would allow judicial review despite the terms of subparagraph (B)(i). But if no legal or constitutional defect is alleged, judicial review would be impermissible. It is hardly necessary to adopt the majority‘s interpretation to fit these two provisions together and give each real work to do.
Even more fundamentally, the majority‘s argument proceeds on a mistaken assumption. On its view, subparagraph (D) must leave something unreviewable under subparagraph (B)(i) for the former to make any sense as an exception. But that takes far too blinkered a view of the statutory scheme; it is not as if these are the only two provisions in our Nation‘s immigration laws. By its terms, subparagraph (D) operates across a whole chapter of the U. S. Code. And in fact, subparagraph (D) undoubtedly performs real work as an exception with respect to other provisions besides subparagraph (B)(i).
The majority‘s argument fails for still another reason. It overlooks the “basic principle of statutory construction that a statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more generalized spectrum.” Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U. S. 148, 153 (1976). Congress enacted subparagraph (B)(i) in 1996 to address the narrow question of judicial review over administrative “denials of discretionary relief.” Meanwhile, as the majority acknowledges, Congress adopted subparagraph (D) nearly a decade later and did so to address a much larger problem—the potential that many statutes in the INA foreclosing judicial review might be unconstitutional in certain applications. Ante, at 9. Congress responded to this potential problem by allowing legal and constitutional challenges under “any other provision of [an entire] chapter” of the U. S. Code.
Tellingly too, the majority‘s contextual arguments yield an inexplicable anomaly. On its view, subparagraph (B)(i) precludes judicial review of all adjustment-of-status applications, whether an individual seeks to challenge the agency‘s step-one eligibility determination or its step-two discretionary judgment. Subparagraph (D) then sweeps in to restore judicial review for legal and constitutional questions. But by its terms, subparagraph (D) applies only to “petition[s] for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals.”
This feature of the law has profound consequences under the majority‘s reading of the INA.
Nor is this some new position. As the government, Mr. Patel, and amici stress, thousands of individuals seek to obtain a green card every year outside the removal context—the student hoping to remain in the country, the foreigner who marries a U. S. citizen, the skilled worker sponsored by her employer. In the last three months of 2021 alone, USCIS denied more than 13,000 green-card applications, with nearly 790,000 still pending.4 The agency issues decisions on those applications in unpublished and terse letters, which appear to receive little or no administrative review within DHS. See Brief for National Immigration Litigation Alliance et al. as Amici Curiae 25.
The majority‘s response is hardly satisfying. The majority does not try to explain how its interpretation fits with the usual presumption of judicial reviewability of administrative actions—a presumption it claims to endorse and no party before us questions. Ante, at 17. Instead, the majority muses that denying green-card applicants any ability to seek judicial review might be “consistent with Congress’ choice to reduce procedural protections in the context of discretionary relief.” Ante, at 16. But a hunch about unexpressed legislative intentions is no response to our usual presumption of judicial review. Nor is it any answer to the mountain of textual and contextual evidence suggesting that Congress limited judicial review only with respect to second-step discretionary decisions, not decisions about statutory eligibility.
Just look, too, at all the guesswork lurking behind the majority‘s hunch. The majority‘s argument first depends on a hypothesis that Congress intentionally designed a scheme that encourages individuals who receive erroneous rulings on their green-card applications to overstay their visas and remain in this country unlawfully. Next, it depends on a second-level hypothesis that Congress replaced a presumptive promise of judicial review with a scheme in which judicial review depends on the happenstance of a governmental decision to seek removal. Finally, the majority‘s position relies on a third supposition—that Congress might have withdrawn judicial review for thousands upon thousands of lawfully present persons annually, and done so without expressly discussing the question.
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The majority concludes that courts are powerless to correct an agency decision holding an individual ineligible for relief from removal based on a factual error, no matter how egregious the error might be. The majority‘s interpretation has the further consequence of denying any chance to correct agency errors in processing green-card applications outside the removal context. Even the government cannot bring itself to endorse the majority‘s arresting conclusions. For good reason. Those conclusions are at war with all the evidence before us. They read language out of the statute and collapse the law‘s clear two-step framework. They disregard the lessons of neighboring provisions and even ignore the statute‘s very title. They make no sense of the statute‘s history. Altogether, the majority‘s novel expansion of a narrow statutory exception winds up swallowing the law‘s general rule guaranteeing individuals the chance to seek judicial review to correct obvious bureaucratic missteps. It is a conclusion that turns an agency once accountable to the rule of law into an authority unto itself. Perhaps some would welcome a world like that. But it is hardly the world Congress ordained.