Dan LA BOTZ, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, Defendant.
Civil Action No.: 13-997 (RC)
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
Signed July 25, 2014
RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge
Re Document No.: 12
Robert William Bonham, III, Harry Jacobs Summers, Kevin Deeley, Federal Election Commission, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GRANTING THE FEC‘S MOTION TO DISMISS
RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
Dan La Botz was a member of Ohio‘s Socialist Party who unsuccessfully ran for the U.S. Senate in 2010. La Botz claims that the Ohio News Organization (“ONO“) unfairly excluded him from a series of sponsored televised debates held in the month preceding the election. He filed an administrative complaint with the Federal Election Commission (“FEC“), alleging that his exclusion from the debates violated the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA“). The FEC dismissed his complaint on prosecutorial discretion grounds, and La Botz brought suit, alleging that the FEC‘s action was contrary to law. Now before the Court is the FEC‘s motion to dismiss pursuant to
II. BACKGROUND
A. Legal Framework
The FECA prohibits corporations from making financial contributions in connection with any federal election.
Any person believing a violation of the FECA has occurred may file an administrative complaint with the FEC.
B. Factual Allegations and Procedural History
On September 1, 2010, the ONO, a consortium of eight Ohio newspapers, announced it was sponsoring a series of televised debates between the Democratic and Republican candidates for Ohio‘s U.S. Senate seat. AR005. La Botz was excluded from the debates. AR011. He alleges he received no prior notice when the debates were to take place, nor given the opportunity to achieve the criteria required for participation. Id. On September 21, 2010, La Botz filed an administrative complaint with the FEC alleging that the ONO violated federal regulations by not relying on “pre-established objective criteria” in selecting the debate participants. AR003, AR011.
1. MUR 6383
Upon receiving the Plaintiff‘s administrative complaint (MUR 6383), the FEC solicited responses from the ONO, the eight newspaper organizations, as well as the Republican and Democratic campaigns’ respective committees and treasurers. AR055-60. The FEC‘s general counsel reviewed the administrative complaint and issued a report concluding that the ONO employed pre-existing objective criteria in compliance with
2. La Botz I
On July 8, 2011, La Botz filed a court complaint alleging that the FEC‘s dismissal of his administrative complaint was contrary to law. See Compl., La Botz v. FEC, No. 11-1247 (D.D.C.2011), ECF No. 1. The FEC filed a motion to dismiss, and this Court denied that motion and remanded the matter to the agency. La Botz, 889 F.Supp.2d at 64. This Court found that it had jurisdiction to hear the Plaintiff‘s claim under the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine because La Botz would likely “run for federal office in Ohio again in the future.” Id. at 59 (internal quotation marks omitted). On the merits, this Court also held that the FEC‘s dismissal of La Botz‘s complaint was contrary to law, because its determination that the ONO used pre-existing criteria to select debate participants was not based on “substantial evidence.” Id. at 62. The Court noted that “its holding only applies to the FEC‘s determination that the ONO used pre-ex-
3. MUR 6383 On Remand
On remand, given the absence of substantial evidence in the record, the FEC decided that further investigation was necessary to conclusively determine whether the ONO had, in fact, employed pre-established objective criteria in choosing participants in advance of the 2010 debates. AR194-197. After concluding that pursuing an extensive investigation into the ONO‘s debate planning process would be an inefficient use of the Commission‘s limited resources, the Commission exercised its prosecutorial discretion and dismissed the matter. AR185, AR197-198. La Botz once again brought suit in this Court, alleging that the FEC‘s decision was contrary to law. Pending before the Court is the FEC‘s motion to dismiss, both for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. See Def.‘s Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 12. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the FEC‘s motion to dismiss on both grounds.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standards
1. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (12(b)(1))
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and the law presumes that “a cause lies outside this limited juris-
Here, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief asking the Court to compel the Defendants to refrain from “retaliating, blocking, or otherwise obstructing Plaintiff from filing his court documents.” Compl. at 19. As this Court lacks the authority to review another District Court‘s decisions, it cannot compel the Defendants to take the action Plaintiff requests. See Sibley, 786 F.Supp.2d at 345. Further, to the extent Plaintiff requests a declaratory judgment “declaring Defendants’ [actions] non-judicial in nature” and “unconstitutional,” this claim cannot survive. “The Declaratory Judgment Act neither expands a court‘s jurisdiction nor creates new substantive rights.” B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1428 (Fed.Cir.1997). The Act was not intended to “allow a declaratory judgment plaintiff to avoid the requirements imposed by the substantive law as a predicate to obtaining such relief.” Id. Accordingly, “a request for declaratory relief is barred to the same extent that the claim for substantive relief on which it is based would be barred.” Int‘l Ass‘n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 108 F.3d 658, 668 (6th Cir.1997). Given that this Court, as set forth above, has concluded that Plaintiff‘s substantive claims are barred by judicial immunity because Defendants’ actions were, in fact, judicial in nature, Plaintiff‘s claims for declaratory relief are likewise barred, and thus must also fail.
Because subject matter jurisdiction focuses on the Court‘s power to hear a claim, the Court must give the plaintiff‘s factual allegations closer scrutiny than would be required for a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim. See Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F.Supp.2d 9, 13 (D.D.C.2001). Thus, the court is not limited to the allegations contained in the complaint. See Wilderness Soc‘y v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 16 n. 10 (D.C.Cir.1987). Instead, “where necessary, the court may consider the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court‘s resolution of disputed facts.” Herbert v. Nat‘l Acad, of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C.Cir.1992) (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir.1981)).
The D.C. Circuit has explained that a motion to dismiss for lack of standing constitutes a motion under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because “the defect of standing is a defect in subject matter jurisdiction.” Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C.Cir.1987). Likewise, “[m]otions to dismiss on grounds of mootness are properly brought under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Flores ex rel. J.F. v. District of Columbia, 437 F.Supp.2d 22, 27 (D.D.C.2006); Toxco, Inc. v. Chu, 801 F.Supp.2d 1, 5 (D.D.C.2011) (“Under Rule 12(b)(1), a party may move to dismiss a case on grounds of mootness.“) (citing Comm. in Solidarity with People of El Salvador v. Sessions, 929 F.2d 742, 744-45 (D.C.Cir.1991)); see also Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. U.S., 570 F.3d 316, 321 (D.C.Cir.2009) (reviewing de novo district court‘s dismissal of case on mootness grounds under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)).
2. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (12(b)(6))
The defendant has moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
***
The FEC first argues that the Court should dismiss this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the Plaintiff no longer has standing and this case is now moot. See Def.‘s Mot. 11-13. In the alternative, the FEC contends that La Botz‘s case should be dismissed for failure to state a claim because the FEC‘s use of prosecutorial discretion was reasonable1 and subject to deference. Id. at 15-20. The Court analyzes both issues in turn.
The FEC first argues that given La Botz‘s recent relocation to New York, the Court lacks Article III jurisdiction to hear La Botz‘s claim. Id. at 11. In response, La Botz argues that he has continuing Article III standing, and further, that he falls under the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine. See Pl.‘s Opp‘n Mot. 16-21, ECF No. 13. Because the parties make arguments regarding both standing and mootness, the Court addresses both of these jurisdictional doctrines, ultimately agreeing with the FEC as to each.
1. Standing
To meet the constitutional requirements of standing, a plaintiff must show: (1) he has suffered an “injury in fact,” which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) there is a causal connection between the alleged injury and conduct at issue that is fairly traceable to the defendant; and (3) it is likely, not merely speculative, the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. Whether a plaintiff has standing is determined at the time the suit commences. Del Monte Fresh Produce Co., 570 F.3d at 324. Thus, standing in the present action is ascertained from the facts as they existed when La Botz first filed his complaint in this Court in 2013. See Natural Law Party of the U.S. v. FEC, 111 F.Supp.2d 33, 40 (D.D.C.2000); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 570 n.4 (“The existence of federal jurisdiction ordinarily depends on the facts as they exist when the complaint is filed.“) (citation omitted).
La Botz‘s standing problem, however, is with redressability. The FEC argues that under Nader v. FEC, 725 F.3d 226 (D.C.Cir.2013), La Botz lacks standing because, given recent developments, there is now virtually no possibility that any decision by this Court could redress his injury. Def.‘s Mot. 14. In Nader, the court found that a presidential candidate could not establish redressability because it was too speculative at the time he filed suit that he would run again for President, thus making the chances of him being subjected to the same alleged violations in a subsequent campaign too hypothetical. Id. at 229. Like Nader, La Botz‘s 2013 statements that “[i]t is likely” that he will run for office, do not suffice to establish a redressable injury for purposes of standing, because La Botz will no longer be running for office in Ohio, as he has relocated to New York. Compare La Botz Decl. 2013 ¶¶ 6, 8-9, ECF No. 13-1 (explaining that he is “relocating to New York in January of 2014 where I will be domiciled for the immediate future,” and that “[i]t is likely that I will run for federal office in the future“) with La Botz Decl. 2011 ¶ 7, La Botz v. FEC, No. 11-1247, ECF No. 13-1 (“I am considering running for office again, either for United States Senate in Ohio or for some other federal office as a candidate of the Socialist Party of Ohio.“) (emphasis added). Given that he will not be running for office again in Ohio, a favorable decision by this Court will not redress his injuries, as the ONO‘s selection criteria will no longer affect his campaigning. See Nader, 725 F.3d at 228 (explaining that “a favorable decision here will not redress the injuries he claims” because Nader did not allege or show that he would be participating in an upcoming Presidential election); Natural Law Party, 111 F.Supp.2d at 50 (“[P]laintiffs’ inju-
2. Mootness
Even if La Botz could satisfy the requirements for standing, the judicial doctrine of mootness would nevertheless prevent this Court from having Article III jurisdiction over his claims. Courts must ensure that jurisdiction continues to exist throughout all stages of the litigation. La Botz, 889 F.Supp.2d at 57; Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 732-33 (2008) (“To qualify as a case fit for federal-court adjudication, an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.“) (citation omitted); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 461-62 (2007) (“Article III‘s ‘case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings ... [I]t is not enough that a dispute was very much alive when suit was filed.‘“) (citations omitted). As noted previously by this Court, the mootness doctrine is a logical corollary to the case-or-controversy requirement: if subsequent events have made it impossible for the court to grant effectual relief to the complaining party, “any opinion as to the legality of the challenged action would be advisory.” La Botz, 889 F.Supp.2d at 58 (quoting City of Erie v. Pap‘s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000)).
Given the unique circumstances surrounding most electoral controversies, it is very rare for these claims to be fully litigated prior to election day. Herron for Congress, 903 F.Supp.2d at 14; see also Johnson v. FCC, 829 F.2d 157, 166 n. 7 (D.C.Cir.1987) (explaining that issues presented in a debate rules challenge would persist in future elections but could not be resolved within the time frame prior to elections). Thus, many potentially meritorious claims in election cases would routinely become moot as a matter of course. However, courts have consistently applied an exception to the mootness doctrine in cases where challenged practices are “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 462 (noting that election law challenges against the FEC “fit comfortably within the established exception to mootness for disputes capable of repetition, yet evading review“); Davis, 554 U.S. at 735 (same); Shays v. FEC, 424 F.Supp.2d 100, 111 (D.D.C.2006) (concluding challenge to presidential debate rules after election was over is appropriately analyzed under “capable of repetition, yet evading review” doctrine). This Court previously held that the Plaintiff‘s claim fit within this exception, see La Botz, 889 F.Supp.2d at 58, but given subsequent developments, La Botz‘s claim no longer warrants this treatment and is now moot.
To invoke this exception, a party must show that “(1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again.” E.g., Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 462 (citation omitted). Regarding the first prong, as discussed above, electoral disputes can rarely be resolved through litigation prior to the challenged action‘s expiration. See Herron for Congress, 903 F.Supp.2d at 14; Johnson, 829 F.2d at 166 n. 7. Thus, “[e]lectoral disputes are ‘paradigmatic’ examples of cases that cannot be fully litigated before
The second prong requires that there be a reasonable expectation that the “same complaining party will be subject to the same action again.” E.g., Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 462. Determining the scope of the term “same complaining party” has proved problematic for courts and has led to inconsistent application of the exception in federal courts. See Van Wie v. Pataki, 267 F.3d 109, 114 (2d Cir.2001) (noting discrepancy in whether courts require same complaining party or only similarly situated party for second prong of “capable of repetition, yet evading review” test) (emphasis added), La Botz, 889 F.Supp.2d at 59 (same). In the electoral context, the Supreme Court has suggested that the capable of repetition, yet evading review doctrine is appropriately applied where the state statute or policy in question will be applied in future elections and thus cause a comparable harm to candidates in the future. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 737 n. 8 (1974).
The Court did not have occasion to adopt a particular approach in La Botz I, because it found that La Botz himself could be subjected to the same challenged action again. La Botz, 889 F.Supp.2d at 59 (“[T]his [C]ourt need not reconcile any putative discrepancy in the case law to resolve this case.“). The Court simply noted that some courts only require the plaintiff to show “others similarly situated” might suffer comparable harm in the future. See id. (emphasis in original) (citing Storer, 415 U.S. at 737 n. 8).
Again, this Court need not decide which approach is best—requiring the same party or others similarly situated—because either way, La Botz‘s injury is not capable of repetition yet evading review. Even if this Court were to adopt the laxer, similarly situated standard, because the ONO has implemented new written debate participant criteria, the chance of even a similarly situated party being subjected to the same precise FECA violation in the future—the lack of pre-existing, objective criteria—is slight. First, the ONO‘s criteria are now pre-existing and in written form, so there is no chance that a candidate—including Scott Rupert, the Plaintiff‘s example—will be subjected to purportedly post-hoc rationales by the ONO. See AR154-56 (outlining the ONO‘s newly proffered “evidence of electoral support” criteria (in addition to showing at least 10% success in Ohio state polls from March thru September 2012): (1) raising at least $500,000 in financial support; (2) being the nominee of a major party; or (3) receiving in excess of 10% of the general election vote preceding the Senatorial vote) (emphasis in original). Second, although this Court need not decide the substantive issue, it notes that other courts, including this one, have already concluded that, generally, the criteria relied upon by the ONO, such as polling data and financial support, are objective for purposes of
And as for La Botz himself, he has not shown that he will ever be the same complaining party again alleging the same FECA violation. In La Botz I, this Court found that the Plaintiff fell within the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception because it was “likely that he [would] run for federal office in Ohio again in the future.” Id. at 59. However, that is no longer the case. La Botz has now relocated to New York “for the immediate future,” see La Botz Decl. ¶ 6, and although he remains committed to running for federal office again in the future, see La Botz Decl. ¶¶ 6, 8, it is no longer likely that he will run for Senate again in Ohio.2 Thus, La Botz has failed to carry his burden of showing that there is a “reasonable expectation” that he will be subjected to the ONO‘s alleged unfair debate practices again in the future.3 Herron for Congress, 903 F.Supp.2d at 14 (holding that the plaintiff must “demonstrate a ‘reasonable expectation’ or a ‘demonstrated probabili-
The FEC next argues that its dismissal of La Botz‘s administrative complaint was a reasonable exercise of its prosecutorial discretion. See Def.‘s Mot. 16-22. In response, La Botz does not contest or dispute the FEC‘s prosecutorial discretion rationale. See Pl.‘s Opp‘n Mot. 14 (“Plaintiff, for its part, does not challenge the FEC‘s prosecutorial discretion.“). Instead, La Botz challenges three broad policy statements in the Commission‘s Factual and Legal Analysis in MUR 6383R that he contends the FEC adopted as national policies. See id. at 22-30.4 The Court again agrees with the FEC.
The prosecutorial discretion afforded to the FEC is “considerable.” Nader, 823 F.Supp.2d at 65 (“The FEC has broad discretionary power in determining whether to investigate a claim, and its decisions to dismiss complaints are entitled to great deference as well, as long as it supplies reasonable grounds.“) (citations omitted). An agency decision not to pursue a potential violation involves a complicated balancing of factors which are appropriately within its expertise, including whether agency resources are better spent elsewhere, whether its action would result in success, and whether there are sufficient resources to undertake the action at
Here, La Botz fails to meet the substantial burden of showing that the Commission‘s dismissal of his complaint under its prosecutorial discretion was “contrary to law” or an abuse of discretion. On remand, the Commission determined that there was insufficient evidence in the record to conclusively establish whether the ONO had in fact employed pre-existing objective criteria in selecting debate participants. AR195. The Commission then noted that ascertaining precisely the “nature and timing of the criteria employed by the ONO would require an extensive examination of the ONO‘s debate planning process.” AR197. Additionally, it determined that further investigation would require a labor intensive review of the ONO‘s internal communications, including those of all eight constituent media entities. Id. Finally, given that only a single item in the record supported La Botz‘s allegation,6 the Commission concluded his claim did not “warrant undertaking such a resource-intensive review and would be an inefficient use of the Commission‘s limited resources.”7 Id.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant the FEC‘s motion to dismiss both for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.
RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
United States District Judge