G.L.; MR. G.L. and MRS. E.L., in their own right v. LIGONIER VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT AUTHORITY, Appellant
No. 14-1387
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
September 22, 2015
PRECEDENTIAL
Argued: December 16, 2014
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, GREENAWAY, JR., and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2-13-cv-00034) District Judge: Honorable Mark R. Hornak
Charles W. Jelley, Esq. [Argued]
Margaret A. Tremba, Esq.
Kristen C. Weidus, Esq.
Tremba, Jelley & Kinney
302 West Otterman Street
Greensburg, PA 15601
Christina Lane, Esq. [Argued]
Sanchez Legal Group
2403 Sidney Street, Suite 242
Pittsburgh, PA 15203
Counsel for Appellant
Mark L. Gross, Esq.
Holly A. Thomas, Esq.
United States Department of Justice
Civil Rights Division, Appellate Section
P.O. Box 14403
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
Jennifer N. Rosen Valverde, Esq. [Argued]
Rutgers University School of Law
Special Education Clinic
123 Washington Street
Newark, NJ 07102
Counsel for Amici Appellees1
OPINION
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA“) broadly authorizes the courts to provide appropriate relief, including compensatory education, to children who have been deprived by their state or local educational agencies of a free appropriate public education. When Congress reauthorized the IDEA in 2004, it enacted
In an appeal stemming from a due process complaint filed by the parents of G.L., a student with special needs, we consider, in a matter of first impression among the Courts of Appeals, how these two provisions should be interpreted together and what effect they have on the courts’ authority to remedy IDEA violations, in particular, through the award of compensatory education. We address today which, of a variety of interpretations, is correct: Does
We now conclude, after careful consideration of the parties’ plain language arguments, the statutory context and structure, the DOE‘s interpretive guidance, and the legislative history, that
I. Facts and Procedural History
A. G.L.‘s Schooling
After spending the previous year at a parochial school, G.L. entered high school in the Ligonier Valley School District (the “District“) in the fall of 2008.3 At a school open house shortly after he started, G.L.‘s teacher told his father that G.L. seemed distracted in class and lacked organizational skills. G.L.‘s father then orally requested that the District evaluate G.L. for any special education needs. The request was to no avail: No evaluation was conducted and, instead, in the wake of a tragic car accident in which G.L. lost his older sister, the District, purportedly on the basis of information in her obituary, opened an investigation into whether G.L. even lived within District boundaries. That investigation confirmed G.L.‘s residence and thus the District‘s obligation under the IDEA to provide him with a free appropriate public education (“FAPE“).
In the meantime, however, G.L. continued to struggle academically. For a time, he was able to keep those struggles partially hidden from his parents by intercepting and altering his report card. At the conclusion of the 2008-09 school year, however, District officials informed G.L.‘s parents that he would need to repeat the ninth grade. It was at this point that his parents learned that he was being bullied at school on the basis of his sexual orientation, with students regularly calling him a “faggot” and a “homo,” and that as a result he was having trouble eating, sleeping, and concentrating on his studies.
Faced with the District‘s contention that G.L. should repeat the ninth grade, G.L.‘s parents complained to the school principal about the bullying and again requested that G.L. be evaluated for special education needs. The conversation became heated, and the principal told G.L.‘s father to speak with the parents of the bullying students himself. The principal also informed G.L.‘s parents that a request for special education evaluation needed to be in writing. G.L.‘s father then immediately handwrote and submitted a request, which G.L.‘s mother followed up with an email to the principal. Apparently not caring for the tone of that email, the principal made an angry phone call to each of G.L.‘s parents. The same day, the principal requested that the District again investigate the residency of G.L. and his family.
The District then began another investigation, representing to the family that the new investigation was based on an anonymous phone call to the District. Meanwhile, the principal also conducted his own ad-hoc investigation, using school computers to search for voting records of G.L.‘s parents. Over the next month, it appears little was done to assist G.L. with the challenges he faced either academically or socially. The District did, however, demand that the family provide a number of additional documents to prove residency. Eventually, the District agreed to formally evaluate G.L. for the remedial support to which he might be entitled pursuant to the IDEA, and in August 2009, after the family
Thus, when G.L. returned to school in the fall, the District finally evaluated him for his special education needs for the 2009-10 school year and instituted a plan to prevent him from being bullied. That evaluation revealed that G.L. did indeed have learning disabilities in math, reading, and writing. In November 2009, the District offered to G.L.‘s parents an Individualized Education Program (“IEP“), which G.L.‘s parents found inadequate and sought to supplement with supports tied to each of G.L.‘s special needs. Despite multiple meetings between the parents and District officials during the months of December and January, they were unable to agree on the educational goals that would satisfy a FAPE for G.L.
While the parties were attempting to negotiate a satisfactory IEP over the fall and winter, the District also attempted to implement a plan to prevent G.L. from being bullied. However, by January 2010, the bullying not only had continued, but had grown to include the participation of the school‘s football coach, who allegedly made a disparaging remark to another student about that student‘s relationship with G.L., and did so in front of some of the very students who were bullying G.L. When he learned of this public remark by the coach, G.L. became distraught and refused to return to school. Instead, his parents picked up and returned his school work, which he completed at home. As this went on, G.L.‘s IEP team continued to meet, and his parents were in regular contact with District officials to attempt to address the bullying situation.
In March 2010, G.L. was evaluated by an intermediate unit psychologist, who conditionally diagnosed him with two additional disabilities, including post-traumatic stress disorder caused by the ongoing bullying. On March 8, 2010, frustrated with the bullying that had been allowed to escalate and apparently had caused additional disabilities in their child, upset by his academic struggles, and dissatisfied with the IEP offered by the District, G.L.‘s parents withdrew him from the school and enrolled him in a cyber charter school. The District has conceded that March 9, 2010 reflects the date G.L.‘s parents “knew or should have known” about the deprivation of a free appropriate public education to G.L., that is, the reasonable discovery date for purposes of this case.4
On January 9, 2012, within two years of the reasonable discovery date, and thus within the statute of limitations set forth in
B. Procedural History
As required by the IDEA, G.L.‘s parents initially requested their due process hearing by filing a complaint with the Pennsylvania Department of Education, which in turn assigned it to a Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer acknowledged that the language of
Applying this interpretation to G.L.‘s complaint, the Hearing Officer held that—even assuming that the District deprived G.L. of a FAPE from September 2008 until March 9, 2010, that the parents reasonably did not know about the injury before March 9, 2010, and that the January 9, 2012 complaint was timely filed within two years of that March 9, 2010 discovery—G.L.‘s remedy was limited to injuries that occurred in the three months between January 2010 and March 2010 because that was the only period G.L. attended the District school within the two-year window before the filing of the complaint. Because the Hearing Officer proceeded to hold that G.L. was not injured during this period, i.e., that the District had provided a FAPE to G.L. during the 2009-2010 school year, the Hearing Officer denied any award of compensatory education, even for those three months.5
The District Court, reviewing this decision, disagreed. In denying the District‘s motion to partially dismiss the complaint on the basis of the alleged remedy cap, the District Court construed
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to
The District Court‘s construction of
III. The Individuals With Disabilities Act
A. Statutory Overview
The IDEA is intended to ensure that every child with special needs is afforded a “free appropriate public education designed to meet [those] unique needs,”
Once a child is identified as having special needs, “[a] school district provides a FAPE by designing and implementing an individualized instructional program set forth in an [IEP], which ‘must be reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive meaningful educational benefits in light of the student‘s intellectual potential.‘” Id. at 729-30 (quoting Shore Reg‘l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 198 (3d Cir. 2004)). To the extent a school district fails to provide a student with a FAPE, a parent may file a due process complaint on behalf of his or her child, with a subsequent hearing held before an administrative hearing officer.
Under the IDEA, a “district court is authorized to grant ‘such relief as the court determines is appropriate,’ including attorneys’ fees, reimbursement for a private educational placement, and compensatory education.” A.W., 486 F.3d at 802 (quoting
B. The 2004 Reenactment and Its Aftermath
Prior to 2004, the IDEA did not include a statute of limitations. See Steven I. v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 618 F.3d 411, 413 (3d Cir. 2010). Congress found this problematic because parents could knowingly wait for many years to file complaints, resulting in school districts that were “often surprised by claims . . . involving issues
In the 2004 reauthorization of the IDEA, Congress sought to remedy this problem by adding a statute of limitations to
A parent or agency shall request an impartial due process hearing within 2 years of the date the parent or agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint, or, if the State has an explicit time limitation for requesting such a hearing under this subchapter, in such time as the State law allows.
Section 1415 overall is a lengthy and detailed section, the “entire purpose” of which “is to provide parents ‘procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of a free appropriate public education.‘” D.M. v. N.J. Dep‘t of Educ., --- F.3d ----, No. 14-4044, 2015 WL 5255088, at *5 (3d Cir. Sept. 10, 2015) (quoting
(b) Types of procedures
The procedures required by this section shall include the following: . . .
(6) An opportunity for any party to present a complaint—
(A) with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child; and
(B) which sets forth an alleged violation that occurred not more than 2 years before the date the parent or public agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint, or, if the State has an explicit time limitation for presenting such a complaint under this subchapter, in such time as the State law allows, except that the exceptions to the timeline described in subsection (f)(3)(D) shall apply to the timeline described in this subparagraph.
The differences in the language of these provisions and the fact that they appear to move in opposite directions from the reasonable discovery date, has given rise to confusion in the wake of the 2004 reenactment, with district courts within this Circuit interpreting them in a range of ways. Some have construed them to limit redress to the two years preceding a complaint. See, e.g., D.C. v. Mount Olive Twp. Bd. of Educ., No. 12-5592, 2014 WL 1293534, *21-22 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2014). Some have interpreted them to impose a filing deadline but not to limit the remedy for timely-filed claims. See, e.g., Cent. Sch. Dist. v. K.C. ex rel. S.C., No. 11-6869, 2013 WL 3367484, at *12 n.6 (E.D. Pa. July 3, 2013) (collecting cases) (“We also agree with the conclusion reached by several courts within this district, that the IDEA‘s statute of limitations does not apply to limit the permissible period of compensatory educational awards.“). And at least four, including the District Court here, have adopted the 2+2 analysis. See, e.g., G.L., 2013 WL 6858963, at *3-6.
The District contends there can be no confusion because we have already addressed and resolved the question of how these provisions interact with each other and how they apply to claims dating back a number of years in Steven I., 618 F.3d 411,
In Steven I., we considered a case brought by parents who had knowingly sat on a claim for years, see Mark v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., No. 08-571, 2009 WL 415767, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 2009), rev‘d and remanded sub nom. Steven I., 618 F.3d at 417, and held that
Although we observed in passing in D.K. that this two-year statute of limitations in
IV. Analysis
The starting point of all statutory construction is the text of the statute, but where that text is ambiguous, “we ‘must do our best, bearing in mind the fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.‘” King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 (2015) (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A., 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2441 (2014)). Thus, we consider below (1) the plain language arguments of the parties and amici; (2) the broader context of the
omitted). Instead, our analysis confirms that, as we presaged in D.K.,
A. The Plain Language of § 1415(b)(6)(B) Is Ambiguous
In interpreting
i. The School District‘s Proposed Remedy Cap
We begin with the District, which contends, first, that
The District does not attempt to reconcile the language of these provisions; it simply asks us ipse dixit to declare them identical and further asks that we read this single statute of limitations to permit relief only for those injuries that occurred no more than two years before the filing of the complaint. The problem is that this is not what the statute says and the District‘s logic proves an unworkable syllogism:
The District‘s reading not only lacks textual support but affirmatively contravenes the language and purpose of Congress in using a reasonable discovery date. When fashioning a statute of limitations, a legislature may choose as the date from which the limitations period begins to run either the date the injury actually occurred, an approach known as the “occurrence rule,” or the date the aggrieved party knew or should have known of the injury, that is, the “discovery rule.” See Knopick v. Connelly, 639 F.3d 600, 607 (3d Cir. 2011) (discussing these rules in the context of Pennsylvania tort law); see also Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1385 (3d Cir. 1994) (explaining that the discovery rule provides that the date the statute of limitations begins to run “is not the date on which the wrong that injures the plaintiff occurs, but the date on which the plaintiff discovers that he or she has been injured“). Under the discovery rule, a plaintiff‘s time to bring suit is not in any way shortened by his or her reasonable ignorance: “the statutory limitations period begins to run and the plaintiff is afforded the full limitations period, starting from the point of [discovery], in which to file his or her claim.” Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1386.10
The discovery rule controls here. Generally, “absen[t] . . . a contrary directive from Congress, we apply the federal discovery rule” as a default. Disabled in Action of Pa. v. SEPTA, 539 F.3d 199, 209 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, of course, Congress left nothing to doubt, unambiguously providing in the
Take a practical example. Assume a school district unreasonably fails to identify a child‘s disability from the beginning of first grade through the end of third grade. Assume also that at the end of third grade, the parents first reasonably discover the injury, and the school district immediately begins providing the student with the educational supports he or she needs going forward but declines to provide that child with compensatory education to make up for the three years the child was deprived a FAPE. Under the theory espoused by the District, even if the parents filed a due process complaint the very same day they reasonably discovered the injury, the
Putting aside the oddity of a statute of limitations functioning in this manner and its inconsistency with the broad remedial purposes of the
Accordingly,
ii. G.L.‘s 2+2 and Pleading Requirement Theories
In a diametrically different but no less problematic reading, G.L. argues that the
Both of these interpretations, however, would render the text illogical. For like
In sum, the supposedly straightforward textual arguments of the parties more resemble the twists and bends of a contortion artist, presenting us with the option, on the one hand, of ignoring swaths of the statutory text or, on the other, accepting a reading that is absurd on its face. The parties’ positions are illustrative, however, of the difficulty of applying a plain language reading to this text. We conclude, as we observed in addressing the pre-2004 version of the
B. Statutory Interpretation of § 1415(b)(6)(B)
The Supreme Court has instructed that “[t]he meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.” F.D.A. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000). That is, “[a] provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme . . . because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.” United Sav. Ass‘n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988); accord Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 59-60 (1987) (analyzing statutory language in a way that is in accord with the “language and structure” of the section of law at issue). Such is the case here, where examining
i. The Structure, Language, and Context of the Act
We begin with the overarching structure of
Given that
Moreover, it is “[a] standard principle of statutory construction . . . that identical words and phrases within the same statute should normally be given the same meaning.” Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 232 (2007). Here, the words and phrases describing the
“Textual cross-reference confirms this conclusion,” Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994), for
Indeed, while it would make no sense for a state filing deadline to displace a federal remedy cap or elements of a prima facie case, it makes perfect sense that Congress, according due weight to principles of federalism, would allow a state filing deadline to displace a federal one. Likewise, it would be odd indeed for
ii. Forest Grove and the Canon against Sub Silentio Repeal
Even if the structure, language, and context of the
Given the broad remedial scheme of the
Against the backdrop of these cases and the broad interpretation the Supreme Court has given to a court‘s remedial power under
On this point, we find clear guidance in the Supreme Court‘s decision in Forest Grove, which examined the 1997 amendments to the
The Supreme Court disagreed. It observed that the 1997 amendments preserved the
So too here, for the 2004 reauthorization reaffirmed the
Consistent with that purpose and the traditional way in which a discovery-based statute of limitations functions, courts since the passage of the 2004 reenactment have routinely affirmed awards of compensatory education that remedy deprivations of greater than two years, or at minimum, remanded for an administrative agency to consider those claims. See Ferren C. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 612 F.3d 712, 715 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming award of three years of compensatory education); M.S. ex rel. Simchick v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 553 F.3d 315, 324 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that the broad discretion afforded under the
Of course, the
iii. The Department of Education‘s Regulation and Interpretation
The
In its regulations following the 2004 reenactment, the
In this appeal, at our request, the
subsections are, in fact, referencing a single statute of limitations.17
We afford the DOE‘s interpretation of its regulation and its position before us here “‘respect’ . . . to the extent it has the ‘power to persuade,‘” Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256 (2006) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)); see id. at 256-57 (holding that an agency‘s interpretation of regulations that merely parrot the statute are accorded Skidmore deference, rather than the higher deference generally accorded to interpretive guidance under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997)). Here, we find the DOE‘s position persuasive because it accords with the language, structure and purpose of the statute, and it is yet one more voice in a harmonious chorus that
To the extent there remains any doubt about this conclusion, it is put to rest by the legislative history, to which we next turn.
iv. The Legislative History of the 2004 IDEA Amendments
“Supreme Court cases declaring that clear language cannot be overcome by contrary legislative history are legion.” First Merchs. Acceptance Corp. v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 198 F.3d 394, 402 (3d Cir. 1999) (collecting cases). That said, legislative history can play a confirmatory role in resolving ambiguity when statutory language and structure support a given
A legislature designing a statute of limitations confronts certain choices. As we have discussed, it can set the date from which the limitations period begins to run by using the occurrence rule or the discovery rule. See supra at 23-26. It also can set the expiration date either by counting forward from that occurrence or discovery date to the filing of a complaint or by counting backward from the date a complaint is filed to the occurrence or discovery date.
When the House of Representatives proposed the amendment that was eventually incorporated into
(6) an opportunity to present complaints–
(A) with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child; and
(B) which set forth a violation that occurred not more than one year before the complaint is filed;
H.R. Rep. 108-77, at 254 (2003). The House committee‘s report unambiguously described this language as a one-year statute of limitations. Id. at 115-16 (“Statute of limitations[:] The Act currently has no statute of limitations and leaves local educational agencies open to litigation for the entire length of time a child is in school, whether or not the child has been identified as a child with a disability. . . . The bill includes a statute of limitations of one year from the date of the violation . . . .). And as written, it would have unambiguously functioned like one, barring claims based on injuries that occurred more than twelve months before the complaint was filed.
The Senate, meanwhile, chose to use the discovery rule and to count forward, providing in what became
Timeline for requesting hearing.–A parent or public agency shall request an impartial due process hearing within 2 years of the date the parent or public agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint, or, if the State has an explicit time limitation for requesting such a hearing under this part, in such time as the State law allows.
S. Rep. 108-185, at 222 (2003). Unlike the House‘s proposal, the Senate‘s also added the provision giving primacy to a state‘s limitations period, along with the two statutory tolling exceptions.
Those two bills—both statutes of limitations but pointing in different directions and using different starting dates for the limitations period—then went to conference where the conference committee sought to reconcile them. That committee reaffirmed that each body‘s amendment functioned as a traditional statute of limitations on the filing of a complaint:
The House bill and Senate amendment have similar language regarding the opportunity to present complaints, but the House bill, not the Senate amendment, includes language establishing a 1 year statute of limitations on the right to present complaints. Senate has a 2 year timeline for filing complaints at note 221.
H.R. Rep. 108-779, at 213 n.193 (2004) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2480, 2527; see also id. at 218 n.221, 2532 (“The Senate amendment establishes a 2-year statute of limitations unless State law already has a statute of limitations. The House bill includes a 1-year statute of limitations (see note 193).“).
Section 1415(b)(6), in other words, started in the House as a functioning, one-year statute of limitations for the filing of complaints:
(A) with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child; and
(B) which set forth a violation that occurred not more than one year before the complaint is filed[.]
H.R. Rep. 108-77, at 254 (emphasis added).
It ended, however, as something different altogether:
(A) with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child; and
(B) which set forth an alleged violation that occurred not more than two years before the date the parent or public agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint, or, if the State has an explicit time limitation for presenting such a complaint under this subchapter, in such time as the State law allows, except that the exceptions to the timeline described in subsection (f)(3)(D) shall apply to the timeline described in this subparagraph.
The Congressional Research Service described the amendments this way:
The 2004 reauthorization includes statutes of limitations in various sections. As previously discussed [Section 1415(b)] provides for a two-year statute of limitations regarding the filing of a complaint. There is also a two-year statute of limitations regarding requests for a hearing. The two years is from the date the parent or agency knew or should have known about the alleged action.
Richard N. Appling and Nancy Lee Jones, Cong. Research Serv., RL32716, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA): Analysis of Changes Made by P.L. 108-446, CRS-27 (2005) (emphasis added). While this post-enactment observation on its own carries little weight, nothing in the IDEA‘s legislative history points to a contrary interpretation.
In fact, quite the opposite. Far from Congress intending that the two limitations periods diverge or limit a court‘s remedial power under
This new provision is not intended to alter the principle under
IDEA that children may receive compensatory education services, as affirmed in School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Education of Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 359 (1985) and Florence County School District Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993) and otherwise limited under section [1412(a)(10)(C)] . . . . In essence, where the issue giving rise to the claim is more than two years old and not ongoing, the claim is barred; where the conduct or services at issue are ongoing to the previous two years, the claim for compensatory education services may be made on the basis of the most recent conduct or services and the conduct or services that were more than two years old at the time of due process or the private placement . . . .
S. Rep. 108-185, 40 (emphasis added).
After conference, but before final passage, Senator Harkin, a co-sponsor of the amendments, addressed the addition of a statute of limitations this way:
In this reauthorization, we also include a 2-year statute of limitations on claims. However, it should be noted that this limitation is not designed to have any impact on the ability of a child to receive compensatory damages for the entire period in which he or she has been deprived of services. The statute of limitations goes only to the filing of the complaint, not the crafting of remedy. This is important because it is only fair that if a school district repeatedly failed to provide services to a child, they should be required to provide compensatory services to rectify this problem and help the child achieve despite the school‘s failings.
Therefore, compensatory education must cover the entire period and must belatedly provide all education and related services previously denied and needed to make the child whole.
150 Cong. Rec. S11851 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 2004) (statement of Sen. Tom Harkin) (emphasis added); see also Robert R. v. Marple Newtown Sch. Dist., No. 05-1282, 2005 WL 3003033, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2005) (examining the IDEA‘s legislative history and concluding that “the limitations period placed on claims for compensatory education by the [2004] amendment to the
V. Conclusion
As a general rule, “[t]he plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive.” United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989). However, in the “rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters,” the plain meaning need not control. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)). In those exceptional instances where “it is uncontested that legislative intent is at odds with the literal terms of the statute, . . . [our] primary role is to effectuate the intent of Congress even if a word in the
Here, the language, context, and structure of
The upshot of all this is two-fold. On the one hand, although a child‘s right to special education under the
On the other hand, where parents neither knew nor reasonably should have known of the special needs of their child or of the educational system‘s failure to respond appropriately to those needs, the other partner in this endeavor—the school district itself—still has its independent duty to identify those needs within a reasonable time period and to work with the parents and the IEP team to expeditiously design and implement an appropriate program of remedial support.
For these reasons, we hold today that, absent one of the two statutory exceptions found in
* * *
G.L.‘s claim was filed within two years of the date his parents knew or reasonably should have known of his injury, and thus his right to compensatory education upon proof of a violation was not curtailed by the IDEA‘s statute of limitations. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court‘s decision that his claims for remedy prior to March 2010 were not time-barred and will remand to the District Court for proceedings consistent with this Opinion.