POWEREX CORP. v. RELIANT ENERGY SERVICES, INC., ET AL.
No. 05-85
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued April 16, 2007—Decided June 18, 2007
551 U.S. 224
David C. Frederick argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Scott H. Angstreich.
Douglas H. Hallward-Driemeier argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Keisler, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Mark B. Stern, and H. Thomas Byron III.
Leonard B. Simon argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Pamela M. Parker and William Bernstein.*
JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to decide whether, under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), petitioner is an “organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof.”
I
The procedural history of this case is long and complicated; we recount only what is necessary to resolve the writ before us. The State of California, along with some private and corporate citizens (hereinafter collectively referred to as plaintiffs-respondents), filed suits in California state courts against various companies in the California energy market,
The cross-defendants removed the entire case to federal court. BC Hydro and petitioner both relied on
The District Court initially concluded (we assume correctly) that
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that it was a foreign sovereign under the FSIA. BPA and WAPA (but not BC Hydro) also appealed, asserting that the District Court, before remanding the case, should have dismissed them from the action in light of their sovereign immunity. Plaintiffs-respondents, for their part, rejoined that both appeals were jurisdictionally barred by
Petitioner sought certiorari review of the Ninth Circuit‘s determination that it was not an “organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof” under
II
The authority of appellate courts to review district-court orders remanding removed cases to state court is substantially limited by statute. Title
“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the case was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction, the district court shall remand the case.” Id., at 342.
Consequently, Thermtron limited
“A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect in removal procedure must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under [28 U. S. C. §] 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”
§ 1016(c)(1), 102 Stat. 4670 .
When that version of
Although
A
The principal submission of the Solicitor General and petitioner is that the District Court‘s remand order was not based on a lack of “subject matter jurisdiction” within the meaning of
We reject this narrowing construction of
“A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect in removal procedure must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”
§ 1447(c) (1988 ed.) .
Finally, they conclude that since the purpose of the amendment was to alter the timing rules, there is no reason to think that Congress broadened the scope of
But the very statutory history upon which this creative argument relies conclusively refutes it. The same section of the public law that amended
“If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter
jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand the action to the State court.”
This unambiguously demonstrates that a case can be properly removed and yet suffer from a failing in subject-matter jurisdiction that requires remand. A standard principle of statutory construction provides that identical words and phrases within the same statute should normally be given the same meaning. See, e. g., IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U. S. 21, 34 (2005). That maxim is doubly appropriate here, since the phrase “subject matter jurisdiction” was inserted into
B
That holding requires us to determine whether the ground for the District Court‘s remand in the present case was lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. As an initial matter, it is quite clear that the District Court was purporting to remand on that ground. The heading of the discussion section of the remand order is entitled “Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over the Removed Actions.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 20a. And
For some Members of this Court, the foregoing conclusion that the District Court purported to remand for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is alone enough to bar review under
Petitioner puts forward another explanation for the remand, which we find implausible. Petitioner claims that, because the entire case was properly removed, the District Court had the discretion to invoke a form of supplemental jurisdiction to hear the claims against it, and that its remand rested upon the decision not to exercise that discretion. In short, petitioner contends that the District Court was actually relying on Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U. S. 343, 357 (1988), which authorized district courts to remand removed state claims when they decide not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Brief for Petitioner 45-48; Reply Brief for Petitioner 16-20. It is far from clear, to begin with, (1) that supplemental jurisdiction was even available
C
Part of the reason why the Ninth Circuit concluded it had appellate jurisdiction is a legal theory quite different from those discussed and rejected above. Petitioner, along with the other appellants, convinced the court to apply Circuit precedent holding that
The line of Ninth Circuit jurisprudence upon which petitioner relied appears to be invoking our decision in Waco v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 293 U. S. 140 (1934). There the District Court, in a single decree, had entered one order dismissing a cross-complaint against one party, and another order remanding because there was no diversity of citizenship in light of the dismissal. Id., at 142. We held that appellate jurisdiction existed to review the order of dismissal, although we repeatedly cautioned that the remand order itself could not be set aside. Id., at 143-144. The Ninth Circuit‘s application of Waco to petitioner‘s appeal was mistaken. As we reiterated in Kircher, see 547 U.S., at 645-646, n. 13, Waco does not permit an appeal when there is no order separate from the unreviewable remand order. Here petitioner can point to no District Court order, separate from the remand, to which it objects and to which the issue of its foreign sovereign status is material. Thus, petitioner‘s invocation of Waco amounts to a request for one of two impermissible outcomes: an advisory opinion as to its FSIA status that will not affect any order of the District Court, or a reversal of the remand order. Waco did not, and could not, authorize either form of judicial relief.
D
Finally, petitioner contends, with no textual support, that
“Section 1447(d) applies ‘not only to remand orders made in suits removed under [the general removal statute], but to orders of remand made in cases removed under any other statutes, as well.’ . . . Absent a clear statutory command to the contrary, we assume that Congress is ‘aware of the universality of th[e] practice’ of denying appellate review of remand orders when Congress creates a new ground for removal.” Things Remembered, 516 U. S., at 128 (quoting United States v. Rice, 327 U. S. 742, 752 (1946); emphasis deleted and alterations in original).
Congress has repeatedly demonstrated its readiness to exempt particular classes of remand orders from
We are well aware that
*
*
*
Section 1447(d) reflects Congress‘s longstanding “policy of not permitting interruption of the litigation of the merits of a removed case by prolonged litigation of questions of jurisdiction of the district court to which the cause is removed.” Rice, supra, at 751. Appellate courts must take that jurisdictional prescription seriously, however pressing the merits
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom JUSTICE ALITO joins, concurring.
When Congress acted through the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,
As the Court explains, however, the structure and wording of
JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins, dissenting.
Unlike the Court, I believe the District Court‘s remand order is reviewable on appeal. And, reviewing the decision below, I would hold that Powerex is an organ of the Government of British Columbia.
I
The majority concludes that
Nonetheless this Court has found exceptions to
The subject matter of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976‘s (FSIA) removal provision, foreign sovereigns, is special. And the FSIA creates serious conflicts with
Osborn illustrates my starting point: a conflict with
A similarly strong conflict exists here, albeit not with a separate removal provision, but rather with a comprehensive statutory scheme. To understand how that is so, imagine a case not now before us. Imagine that a private plaintiff brings a lawsuit in state court against a noncommercial division of a foreign nation‘s government, say, a branch of that nation‘s defense ministry or, for that matter, against the foreign nation itself. The FSIA provides a specific guarantee that such a suit cannot continue (except in certain instances that, for purposes of my example, are not relevant).
What happens if the foreign sovereign removes the case to federal court only to have the federal judge mistakenly remand the case to state court? As in an ordinary case, the lawsuit may well continue in the state tribunal. But, if so, unlike the ordinary case (say, a wrongly remanded diversity or “arising under” case) but like Osborn, the removing party will have lost considerably more than a choice of forum. The removing party will have lost that which a different
That assurance forms a separate and central FSIA objective. The very purpose of sovereign immunity is to avoid subjecting a foreign sovereign to the rigors and “inconvenience of suit.” Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U. S. 468, 479 (2003). In such a case, a state court likely will feel bound by the federal court‘s prior judgment on the lack of immunity (under state law-of-the-case doctrine) and this Court‘s review (of an adverse state-court judgment) will come too late. In such a case, the FSIA‘s basic objective (unrelated to choice of forum) will have become “weightless.” Osborn, supra, at 242.
It is difficult to see how this conflict between the FSIA‘s basic objective and
Neither is a
Finally, as in Osborn, the FSIA is a specific, later enacted statute. Cf. 549 U. S., at 243; see generally Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, ante, at 170 (where statutory provisions are inconsistent, “normally the specific governs the general“); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S. 374, 384-385 (1992); Simpson v. United States, 435 U. S. 6, 15 (1978).
Taken together, these considerations lead me to believe that, were a foreign non-commercial government entity‘s immunity from suit at issue, the FSIA would conflict with
The removing defendant in this case, of course, is not a foreign sovereign immune from suit. It is a foreign governmental entity that acts in a commercial capacity and consequently is subject to suit.
The conflict is important, this case is special, and we should resolve it by reading the FSIA as implicitly preempting the general application of
It is true, as the majority states, that Congress has in other contexts carved out certain removal orders as being specifically reviewable on appeal. Ante, at 237. The majority reads these specific statutes to suggest that had Congress intended
II
I part company with the Ninth Circuit on the merits. The Circuit held that the District Court‘s remand was proper because, in its view, Powerex is not “an organ of a . . . political subdivision” of a “foreign state.”
In my view, however, Powerex is “an organ” of the Province of British Columbia, a “political subdivision” of Canada. The record makes clear that Powerex is a government-owned and government-operated electric power distribution company, not meaningfully different from ordinary municipal electricity distributors, the Tennessee Valley Authority, or any foreign “nationalized” power producers and distributors, such as Britain‘s former Central Electricity Generating Board or Electricité de France. See generally C. Harris, Electricity Markets: Pricing, Structures, and Economics 15-20 (2006) (summarizing features of electricity companies in United States and Europe, among others); J. Nelson, Marginal Cost Pricing in Practice 3-6, 32, 37 (1964) (summarizing features of France hydropower industry). See also http://tva.com/abouttva/index.htm (summarizing general features of Tennessee Valley Authority) (all Internet materials as visited June 8, 2007, and available in Clerk of Court‘s case file);
Powerex is itself owned and operated by BC Hydro, an entity that all apparently concede is governmental in nature. Brief for Plaintiffs-Respondents 38-40, 42. British Columbia‘s statutes create BC Hydro as a kind of government agency to produce water-generated electric power. Power Measures Act, S. B. C., ch. 40 (1964); App. to Pet. for Cert. 52a, 118a, 163a-169a. BC Hydro has a board of directors, all of whom are appointed by British Columbia‘s government. Id., at 58a-59a. It is an “agent of the [provincial] government and its powers may be exercised only as an agent of the government.” Hydro Power Authority Act, R. S. B. C., ch. 212, § 3(1) (1996). The District Court concluded that BC Hydro is, in fact, a foreign sovereign entity entitled to immunity. 391 F. 3d, at 1024.
British Columbia‘s Minister of Energy issued a written directive ordering that BC Hydro create a subsidiary, Powerex, to carry out the specialized tasks of exporting hydro-generated electric power and of importing power, which it is then to distribute to British Columbia residents. App. 235-239, 250-251, 267. Powerex specifically carries out these obligations in accordance with various treaties between Canada and the United States. Id., at 133-155; App. to Pet. for Cert. 55a; see Treaty Between the United States of America and Canada Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Resources of the Columbia River Basin, Jan. 17, 1961, [1964] 15 U. S. T. 1555, T. I. A. S. No. 5638, App. to Pet. for Cert. 61a-82a; Treaty Between Canada and the United States of America Relating to the Skagit River and Ross Lake, and the Seven Mile Reservoir on the Pend d‘Oreille River, Apr. 2, 1984, 1469 U. N. T. S. 309, T. I. A. S. No. 11088, App. to
Powerex‘s board members consist of some of BC Hydro‘s board members and other members whom those members appoint. App. 233-235. The government‘s comptroller general reviews Powerex‘s financial operations and regulates the terms under which it conducts business. Financial Administration Act, R. S. B. C., ch. 138, §§ 4.1, 8(2)(c)(i), 75, 79.3 (1996) (FAA), Addendum to Brief for Petitioner 34-36, 40-42 (hereinafter Addendum). British Columbia‘s fiscal control statute refers to Powerex as a “‘government body.‘” FAA § 1, Addendum 31, 33. And other British Columbia laws refer to its employees as “‘public office holders.‘” Lobbyists Registration Act, S. B. C., ch. 42, § 1 (2001), Addendum 50. Powerex pays no income taxes. See Income Tax Amendments Act, 1997, S. C. 1998, ch. 19, § 178 (to be codified at R. S. C., ch. 1, §§ 149(1)(d), (d.2), Addendum 45; App. to Pet. for Cert. 58a; Brief for Petitioner 31. The British Columbian government, through BC Hydro, has sole beneficial ownership and control of Powerex. App. 267. If Powerex earns a profit, that profit must be rebated directly or indirectly to British Columbia‘s residents. Id., at 215, 238. I can find no significant difference between Powerex and the classical government entities to which I previously referred. Supra, at 245.
The Ninth Circuit noted that Powerex may earn a profit and that the government of British Columbia does not provide financial support. And the Ninth Circuit thought these facts made a critical difference. But a well-run nationalized firm should make a reasonable profit; nor should it have to borrow from the government itself. See, e. g., Nelson, supra, at 8-12; Harris, supra, at 125, 130-132; Rothwell & Gómez, supra, at 3-4. The relevant question is not whether Powerex earns a profit but where does that profit go? Here it does not go to private shareholders; it goes to the benefit
The Ninth Circuit also pointed out that certain provincial regulations that apply to other governmental departments do not apply to Powerex. That fact proves little. The Tennessee Valley Authority, which is “perhaps the best known of the American public corporations,” First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U. S. 611, 625, n. 15 (1983), is not subject to certain federal regulations regarding hiring that apply to other governmental departments. See, e. g.,
In sum, Powerex is the kind of government entity that Congress had in mind when it wrote the FSIA‘s “commercial activit[y]” provisions. See generally
For these reasons, I believe we should consider, and reverse, the Ninth Circuit‘s determination. With respect, I dissent.
