MERCK & CO., INC., ET AL. v. REYNOLDS ET AL.
No. 08–905
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
April 27, 2010
559 U. S. ____ (2010)
Argued November 30, 2009
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
MERCK & CO., INC., ET AL. v. REYNOLDS ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 08–905. Argued November 30, 2009—Decided April 27, 2010
On November 6, 2003, respondent investors filed a securities fraud action under
Held:
1. The limitations period in
2. In determining the time at which “discovery” occurs, terms such as “inquiry notice” and “storm warnings” may be useful insofar as they identify a time when the facts would have prompted a reasonably diligent plaintiff to begin investigating. But the limitations period does not begin to run until the plaintiff thereafter discovers or a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered “the facts constituting the violation,” including scienter—irrespective of whether the actual plaintiff undertook a reasonably diligent investigation. Pp. 12–17.
(a) Contrary to Merck‘s argument, facts showing scienter are among those that “constitut[e] the violation.” Scienter is assuredly a “fact.” In a
(b) The Court also rejects Merck‘s argument that, even if “discovery” requires facts related to scienter, facts that tend to show a materially false or misleading statement (or material omission) are ordinarily sufficient to show scienter as well. Where
(c) And the Court cannot accept Merck‘s argument that the limitations period begins at “inquiry notice,” meaning the point where the facts would lead a reasonably diligent plaintiff to investigate further, because that point is not necessarily the point at which the plaintiff would already have “discover[ed]” facts showing scienter or other “facts constituting the violation.” The statute says that the plaintiff‘s claim accrues only after the “discovery” of those latter facts. It contains no indication that the limitations period can sometimes begin before “discovery” can take place. Merck also argues that determining when a hypothetical reasonably diligent plaintiff would have “discover[ed]” the necessary facts is too complicated for judges to undertake. But courts applying the traditional discovery rule have long had to ask what a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have known and done in myriad circumstances and already undertake this kind of inquiry in securities fraud cases. Pp. 14–17.
3. Prior to November 6, 2001, the plaintiffs did not discover, and Merck has not shown that a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered, “the facts constituting the violation.” The FDA‘s September 2001 warning letter shows little or nothing about the here-relevant scienter, i.e., whether Merck advanced the naproxen hypothesis with fraudulent intent. The FDA itself described the hypothesis as a “possible explanation” for the VIGOR results, faulting Merck only for failing sufficiently to publicize the less favorable alternative, that Vioxx might be harmful. The products-liability complaints’ general statements about Merck‘s state of mind show little
543 F. 3d 150, affirmed.
BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, GINSBURG, ALITO, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which THOMAS, J., joined.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 08–905
MERCK & CO., INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. RICHARD REYNOLDS ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[April 27, 2010]
JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the timeliness of a complaint filed in a private securities fraud action. The complaint was timely if filed no more than two years after the plaintiffs “discover[ed] the facts constituting the violation.”
I
The action before us involves a claim by a group of investors (the plaintiffs, respondents here) that Merck & Co. and others (the petitioners here, hereinafter Merck) knowingly misrepresented the risks of heart attacks accompany-
The applicable statute of limitations provides that a “private right of action” that, like the present action, “involves a claim of fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance in contravention of a regulatory requirement concerning the securities laws . . . may be brought not later than the earlier of—
“(1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation; or
“(2) 5 years after such violation.”
28 U. S. C. §1658(b) .
The complaint in this case was filed on November 6, 2003, and no one doubts that it was filed within five years of the alleged violation. Therefore, the critical date for timeliness purposes is November 6, 2001—two years before this complaint was filed. Merck claims that before this date the plaintiffs had (or should have) discovered the “facts constituting the violation.” If so, by the time the plaintiffs filed their complaint, the 2-year statutory period in
A
We first set out the relevant pre-November 2001 facts, as we have gleaned them from the briefs, the record, and the opinions below.
1. 1990‘s. In the mid-1990‘s Merck developed Vioxx. In 1999 the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved it for prescription use. Vioxx suppresses pain by inhibiting
2. March 2000. Merck announced the results of a study, called the “VIGOR” study. Id., at 291–294. The study compared Vioxx with another painkiller, naproxen. The study showed that persons taking Vioxx suffered fewer gastrointestinal side effects (as Merck had hoped). But the study also revealed that approximately 4 out of every 1,000 participants who took Vioxx suffered heart attacks, compared to only 1 per 1,000 participants who took naproxen. Id., at 296, 306; see Bombardier et al., Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofecoxib and Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis, 343 New England J. Medicine 1520, 1523, 1526–1527 (2000).
Merck‘s press release acknowledged VIGOR‘s adverse cardiovascular data. But Merck said that these data were “consistent with naproxen‘s ability to block platelet aggregation.” App. 291. Merck noted that, since “Vioxx, like all COX–2 selective medicines, does not block platelet aggregation[, it] would not be expected to have similar effects.” Ibid. And Merck added that “safety data from all other completed and ongoing clinical trials . . . showed no indication of a difference in the incidence of thromboembolic events between Vioxx” and either a placebo or comparable drugs. Id., at 293 (emphasis deleted).
This theory—that VIGOR‘s troubling cardiovascular findings might be due to the absence of a benefit conferred by naproxen rather than due to a harm caused by Vioxx—later became known as the “naproxen hypothesis.” In advancing that hypothesis, Merck acknowledged that the
3. February 2001 to August 2001. Public debate about the naproxen hypothesis continued. In February 2001, the FDA‘s Arthritis Advisory Committee convened to consider Merck‘s request that the Vioxx label be changed to reflect VIGOR‘s positive gastrointestinal findings. The VIGOR cardiovascular findings were also discussed. Id., at 392–395, 558–577. In May 2001, a group of plaintiffs filed a products-liability lawsuit against Merck, claiming that “Merck‘s own research” had demonstrated that “users of Vioxx were four times as likely to suffer heart attacks as compared to other less expensive, medications.” Id., at 869. In August 2001, the Journal of the American Medical Association wrote that the available data raised a “cautionary flag” and strongly urged that “a trial specifically assessing cardiovascular risk” be done. Id., at 331–332; Mukherjee, Nissen, & Topol, Risk of Cardiovascular Events Associated with Selective Cox-2 Inhibitors, 286 JAMA 954 (2001). At about the same time, Bloomberg News quoted a Merck scientist who claimed that Merck had “additional data” that were “very, very reassuring,” and Merck issued a press release stating that it stood “behind the overall and cardiovascular safety profile . . . of Vioxx.” App. 434, 120 (emphasis deleted; internal quotation marks omitted).
4. September and October 2001. The FDA sent Merck a warning letter released to the public on September 21, 2001. It said that, in respect to cardiovascular risks, Merck‘s Vioxx marketing was “false, lacking in fair balance, or otherwise misleading.” Id., at 339. At the same time, the FDA acknowledged that the naproxen hypothesis
After the FDA letter was released, more products-liability lawsuits were filed. See id., at 885–956. Merck‘s share price fell by 6.6% over several days. See id., at 832. By October 1, the price rebounded. See ibid. On October 9, 2001, the New York Times said that Merck had reexamined its own data and “found no evidence that Vioxx increased the risk of heart attacks.” App. 504. It quoted the president of Merck Research Laboratories as positing “two possible interpretations“: “Naproxen lowers the heart attack rate, or Vioxx raises it.” Ibid. Stock analysts, while reporting the warning letter, also noted that the FDA had not denied that the naproxen hypothesis remained an unproven but possible explanation. See id., at 614, 626, 628.
B
We next set forth three important events that occurred after the critical date.
1. October 2003. The Wall Street Journal published the results of a Merck-funded Vioxx study conducted at Boston‘s Brigham and Women‘s Hospital. After examining the medical records of more than 50,000 Medicare patients, researchers found that those given Vioxx for 30-to-90 days were 37% more likely to have suffered a heart attack than those given either a different painkiller or no painkiller at all. Id., at 164–165. (That is to say, if patients given a different painkiller or given no painkiller at all suffered 10 heart attacks, then the same number of patients given Vioxx would suffer 13 or 14 heart attacks.)
2. September 30, 2004. Merck withdrew Vioxx from the market. It said that a new study had found “an increased risk of confirmed cardiovascular events beginning after 18 months of continuous therapy.” Id., at 182 (internal quotation marks omitted). A Merck representative publicly described the results as “totally unexpected.” Id., at 186. Merck‘s shares fell by 27% the same day. Id., at 185, 856.
3. November 1, 2004. The Wall Street Journal published an article stating that “internal Merck e-mails and marketing materials as well as interviews with outside scientists show that the company fought forcefully for years to keep safety concerns from destroying the drug‘s commercial prospects.” Id., at 189–190. The article said that an early e-mail from Merck‘s head of research had said that the VIGOR “results showed that the cardiovascular events ‘are clearly there,‘” that it was “‘a shame but . . . a low incidence,‘” and that it “is mechanism based as we worried it was.” Id., at 192. It also said that Merck had given its salespeople instructions to “DODGE” questions about Vioxx‘s cardiovascular effects. Id., at 193.
C
The plaintiffs filed their complaint on November 6, 2003. As subsequently amended, the complaint alleged that Merck had defrauded investors by promoting the naproxen hypothesis, knowing the hypothesis was false. It said, for example, that Merck “knew, at least as early as 1996, of the serious safety issues with Vioxx,” and that a “1998 internal Merck clinical trial . . . revealed that . . . serious cardiovascular events . . . occurred six times more frequently in patients given Vioxx than in patients given a different arthritis drug or placebo.” Id., at 56, 58–59 (emphasis and capitalization deleted).
Merck, believing that the plaintiffs knew or should have
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. A majority held that the pre-November 2001 events, while constituting “storm warnings,” did not suggest much by way of scienter, and consequently did not put the plaintiffs on “inquiry notice,” requiring them to investigate further. In re Merck & Co. Securities, Derivative & “ERISA” Litigation, 543 F. 3d 150, 172 (2008). A dissenting judge considered the pre-November 2001 events sufficient to start the 2-year clock running. Id., at 173 (opinion of Roth, J.).
Merck sought review in this Court, pointing to disagreements among the Courts of Appeals. Compare Theoharous v. Fong, 256 F. 3d 1219, 1228 (CA11 2001) (limitations period begins to run when information puts plaintiffs on “inquiry notice” of the need for investigation), with Shah v. Meeker, 435 F. 3d 244, 249 (CA2 2006) (same; but if plaintiff does investigate, period runs “from the date such inquiry should have revealed the fraud” (internal quotation marks omitted)), and New England Health Care Employees Pension Fund v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 336 F. 3d 495, 501 (CA6 2003) (limitations period always begins to
II
Before turning to Merck‘s arguments, we consider a more basic matter. The parties and the Solicitor General agree that
We recognize that one might read the statutory words “after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation” as referring to the time a plaintiff actually discovered the relevant facts. But in the statute of limitations context, the word “discovery” is often used as a term of art in connection with the “discovery rule,” a doctrine that delays accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff has “discovered” it. The rule arose in fraud cases as an exception to the general limitations rule that a cause of action accrues once a plaintiff has a “complete and present cause of action,” Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U. S. 192, 201 (1997) (citing Clark v. Iowa City, 20 Wall. 583, 589 (1875); internal quotation marks omitted). This Court long ago recognized that something different was needed in the case of fraud, where a defendant‘s deceptive conduct may prevent a plaintiff from even knowing that he or she has been defrauded. Otherwise, “the law which was designed to prevent fraud” could become “the means by which it is
More recently, both state and federal courts have applied forms of the “discovery rule” to claims other than fraud. See, e.g., United States v. Kubrick, 444 U. S. 111 (1979). Legislatures have codified the discovery rule in various contexts. See, e.g.,
Like the parties, we believe that Congress intended courts to interpret the word “discovery” in
Subsequently, every Court of Appeals to decide the matter held that “discovery of the facts constituting the violation” occurs not only once a plaintiff actually discovers the facts, but also when a hypothetical reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered them. See, e.g., Law v. Medco Research, Inc., 113 F. 3d 781, 785–786 (CA7 1997); Dodds v. Cigna Securities, Inc., 12 F. 3d 346, 350, 353 (CA2 1993); see In re NAHC, Inc. Securities Litigation, 306 F. 3d 1314, 1325, n. 4 (CA3 2002). Some of those courts noted that other limitations provisions in the federal securities laws explicitly provide that the period begins to run “after the discovery of the untrue statement or after such discovery should have been made by [the] exercise of reasonable diligence,” whereas the formulation adopted by the Court in Lampf from
In 2002, when Congress enacted the present limitations statute, it repeated Lampf‘s critical language. The statute says that an action based on fraud “may be brought not later than the earlier of . . . 2 years after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation” (or “5 years after such violation“). §804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 116 Stat. 801, codified at
We normally assume that, when Congress enacts statutes, it is aware of relevant judicial precedent. See, e.g., Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 535 U. S. 106, 116–117, and n. 13 (2002); Commissioner v. Keystone Consol. Industries, Inc., 508 U. S. 152, 159 (1993). Given the history and precedent surrounding the use of the word “discovery” in the limitations context generally as well as in this provision in particular, the reasons for making this assumption are particularly strong here. We consequently hold that “discovery” as used in this statute encompasses not only those facts the plaintiff actually knew, but also those facts a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have known. And we evaluate Merck‘s claims accordingly.
III
We turn now to Merck‘s arguments in favor of holding that petitioners’ claims accrued before November 6, 2001. First, Merck argues that the statute does not require “discovery” of scienter-related “facts.” See Brief for Petitioners 19–28. We cannot agree, however, that facts about scienter are unnecessary.
The statute says that the limitations period does not begin to run until “discovery of the facts constituting the
And this “fact” of scienter “constitut[es]” an important and necessary element of a
We consequently hold that facts showing scienter are among those that “constitut[e] the violation.” In so hold-
Second, Merck argues that, even if “discovery” requires facts related to scienter, facts that tend to show a materially false or misleading statement (or material omission) are ordinarily sufficient to show scienter as well. See Brief for Petitioners 22, 28–29. But we do not see how that is so. We recognize that certain statements are such that, to show them false is normally to show scienter as well. It is unlikely, for example, that someone would falsely say “I am not married” without being aware of the fact that his statement is false. Where
Third, Merck says that the limitations period began to run prior to November 2001 because by that point the plaintiffs were on “inquiry notice.” Merck uses the term “inquiry notice” to refer to the point “at which a plaintiff possesses a quantum of information sufficiently suggestive of wrongdoing that he should conduct a further inquiry.”
If the term “inquiry notice” refers to the point where the facts would lead a reasonably diligent plaintiff to investigate further, that point is not necessarily the point at which the plaintiff would already have discovered facts showing scienter or other “facts constituting the violation.” But the statute says that the plaintiff‘s claim accrues only after the “discovery” of those latter facts. Nothing in the text suggests that the limitations period can sometimes begin before “discovery” can take place. Merck points out that, as we have discussed, see supra, at 8–9, the court-created “discovery rule” exception to ordinary statutes of limitations is not generally available to plaintiffs who fail to pursue their claims with reasonable diligence. But we are dealing here with a statute, not a court-created exception to a statute. Because the statute contains no indication that the limita-
As a fallback, Merck argues that even if the limitations period does generally begin at “discovery,” it should nonetheless run from the point of “inquiry notice” in one particular situation, namely, where the actual plaintiff fails to undertake an investigation once placed on “inquiry notice.” In such circumstances, Merck contends, the actual plaintiff is not diligent, and the law should not “effectively excuse a plaintiff‘s failure to conduct a further investigation” by placing that nondiligent plaintiff and a reasonably diligent plaintiff “in the same position.” Brief for Petitioners 48.
We cannot accept this argument for essentially the same reason we reject “inquiry notice” as the standard generally: We cannot reconcile it with the statute, which simply provides that “discovery” is the event that triggers the 2-year limitations period—for all plaintiffs. Cf. United States v. Mack, 295 U. S. 480, 489 (1935) (“Laches within the term of the statute of limitations is no defense at law“). Furthermore, the statute does not place all plaintiffs “in the same position” no matter whether they investigate when investigation is warranted. The limitations period puts plaintiffs who fail to investigate once on “inquiry notice” at a disadvantage because it lapses two years after a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered the necessary facts. A plaintiff who fails entirely to investigate or delays investigating may well not have discovered those facts by that time or, at least, may not have found sufficient facts by that time to be able to file a
Merck further contends that its proposed “inquiry no-
We conclude that the limitations period in
IV
Finally, Merck argues that, even if all its other legal arguments fail, the record still shows that, before Novem
The FDA‘s warning letter, however, shows little or nothing about the here-relevant scienter, i.e., whether Merck advanced the naproxen hypothesis with fraudulent intent. See Part I-A(4), supra. The FDA itself described the pro-Vioxx naproxen hypothesis as a “possible explanation” for the VIGOR results, faulting Merck only for failing sufficiently to publicize the alternative less favorable to Merck, that Vioxx might be harmful. App. 340.
The products-liability complaints’ statements about Merck‘s knowledge show little more. See Part I-A(3), supra. Merck does not claim that these complaints contained any specific information suggesting the fraud alleged here, i.e., that Merck knew the naproxen hypothesis was false even as it promoted it. And, without providing any reason to believe that the plaintiffs had special access to information about Merck‘s state of mind, the complaints alleged only in general terms that Merck had concealed information about Vioxx and “purposefully downplayed and/or understated” the risks associated with Vioxx—the same charge made in the FDA warning letter. App. 893.
In our view, neither these two circumstances nor any of the other pre-November 2001 circumstances that we have set forth in Part I-A, supra, whether viewed separately or
Affirmed.
In my opinion the Court‘s explanation of why the complaint was timely filed is convincing and correct. Ante, at 12-19. In this case there is no difference between the time when the plaintiffs actually discovered the factual basis for their claim and the time when reasonably diligent plaintiffs should have discovered those facts. For that reason, much of the discussion in Part II of the Court‘s opinion, see ante, at 8-12, is not necessary to support the Court‘s judgment. Until a case arises in which the difference between an actual discovery rule and a constructive discovery rule would affect the outcome, I would reserve decision on the merits of JUSTICE SCALIA‘s argument, post, at 1-7 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment). With this reservation, I join the Court‘s excellent opinion.
Private suits under
In ordinary usage, “discovery” occurs when one actually learns something new. See Webster‘s New International Dictionary of the English Language 745 (2d ed. 1957) (defining “discovery” as “[f]inding out or ascertaining something previously unknown or unrecognized“). As the Court notes, however, ante, at 8-10, in the context of statutes of limitations “discovery” has long carried an additional meaning: It also occurs when a plaintiff, exercising reasonable diligence, should have discovered the facts giving rise to his claim. See, e.g., Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 135, 140-142 (1879); 2 H. Wood, Limitations of
In context, however, I do not believe it can. Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84, explicitly established a constructive-discovery rule for claims under §§11 and 12 of that Act:
“No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under section 77k or 77l(a)(2) of this title unless brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or after such discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence . . . .”
15 U. S. C. §77m .
“[D]iscovery” in
Unable to identify anything in the statutory context that warrants giving “discovery” two meanings, the Court relies on the historical treatment of “discovery” in limitations periods (particularly for fraud claims) as incorporating a constructive-discovery rule. Ante, at 8-10, 12. But that history proves only that “discovery” can carry that technical meaning, and that without
The Court‘s other reason for rejecting the more natural reading of
Even assuming that Congress intended to incorporate the Circuits’ views—which requires the further unrealistic assumption that a majority of each House knew of and agreed with the Courts of Appeals’ opinions—that would be entirely irrelevant. Congress‘s collective intent (if such a thing even exists) cannot trump the text it enacts, and in any event we have no reliable way to ascertain that intent apart from reading the text. See Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U. S. ____ (2010) (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 1).
The only way in which the Circuits’ pre-2002 decisions might bear on
But as amici note, that is not so. See Brief for Faculty at Law and Business Schools as Amici Curiae 23-29 (hereinafter Faculty Brief). Some circuit cases cited by the Court and amici can conceivably be read as interpreting the language Lampf adopted from
The rest of the Circuits apparently had not decided the issue before
This motley assortment of approaches comes nowhere near establishing that the word “discovery” in
Respondents suggested at oral argument, Tr. of Oral Arg. 29, and their amici imply, see Faculty Brief 33-34, that in fraud-on-the-market cases there is little if any difference between actual and constructive discovery because of the presumption of reliance applicable in such cases, see Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U. S. 224, 247 (1988). It seems to me Basic has no bearing on the question discussed here. A presumption of reliance upon market-price signals is not a presumption of knowledge of all public information, much less knowledge of nonpublic information that a reasonably diligent investor would have independently uncovered. In any event, whether or not a constructive-discovery standard will in many cases yield the same result, actual discovery is what
