D.K., a minor, by and through his parents, Stephen K. and Lisa K.; Stephen K.; Lisa K., adults, individually and on their own behalf, Appellants v. ABINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT.
No. 10-2189
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Filed: Oct. 11, 2012.
696 F.3d 233
Before: FUENTES, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) July 9, 2012.
This straightforward conclusion accords with decisions from our sister circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Senter, 424 Fed. Appx. 443, 446-47 (6th Cir.2011) (rejecting defendant‘s argument that
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a statutory mandatory minimum provision constrains a district court‘s discretion under
Claudia L. Huot, Michael D. Kristofco, Wisler Pearlstinе, Blue Bell, PA, Attorneys for Appellee.
OPINION OF THE COURT
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
This case requires us to decide whether a public school district‘s failure to designate a struggling student as disabled violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),
I
A
In the fall of 2003, D.K. began attending kindergarten in a half-day program at Copper Beech Elementary in the Abington, Pennsylvania, School District (the School District). During that year, he struggled with reading and misbehaved regularly. According to the School District‘s psychologist, Dr. Suzanne Grim, and the Copper Beech principal, Dr. Jan Kline, D.K. failed to progress in several areas, including: following oral directions, listening to and acknowledging the contributions of others, exhibiting self-control, following rules, producing neat and legible work, completing class work in the time allotted, and using non-instructional time appropriately. At the same time, Dr. Grim stated that while some preschoоl and kindergarten students have difficulty following directions, it does not necessarily indicate a disorder. A conference form completed by D.K.‘s kindergarten teacher indicated that D.K. exhibited “much growth.” D.K. received “proficient,” “basic,” and “below basic” marks in various reading skills, and received one-on-one reading services from a specialist. At the conclusion of the year, the School District recommended that D.K. repeat kindergarten.
Although D.K.‘s second year of kindergarten was a more intensive full-day program, he showed little maturation. In conference forms, D.K.‘s teacher noted D.K.‘s proficiency in reading and advanced scores in math, but she expressed concern about his behavior, his tendency to rush through classwork and turn in incomplete assignments, and his difficulty controlling himself, especially when he became upset. Indeed, D.K. threw temper tantrums and was “defiant” and “extremely argumentative.” His teachers documented forty-three tantrums betwеen March 14 and May 24, 2005.
In response, D.K.‘s teachers implemented “behavior plans,” including a sticker chart and a system using popsicle sticks, but they did not conduct a functional behavioral assessment. D.K.‘s parents were optimistic about, and cooperative in, these behavioral improvement plans. In the
Within the first two months of D.K.‘s first-grade year, his teacher convened a parent-teacher conference to discuss D.K.‘s “listening/following directions and organizational weaknesses.” D.K. had been copying another student‘s work, was unable to recall instructions, exhibited poor organizational and planning skills, misplaced his work, stuttered, and often lost his train of thought. To rеsolve these problems, the teacher recommended, among other things, measures D.K.‘s parents could implement at home. The possibility of a formal evaluation was not discussed at that time.
At a second conference held the following month, D.K.‘s parents learned that he continued to struggle in the classroom and was making obscene gestures towards his classmates. At a third conference following the issuance of D.K.‘s first report card in December 2005, his teacher noted continuing behavioral challenges, explained that she was “providing as many supports as [she could] to aid” D.K., and opined that while “it was too soon to discuss testing (because he [was] not failing), that might be an option down the road.” The teacher‘s notes reflect that D.K.‘s parents saw “no significant problem” and attributed his behavior to “[D.K.] being [D.K.]“.
In January 2006, D.K.‘s poor social skills led the School District to place him in a special social skills group run by Dr. Grim. According to Dr. Grim, D.K. was “on par with” other students in the group.
That same month, D.K.‘s parents requested an evaluation of D.K., and on April 24, 2006, the School District administered a cognitive ability test, which measures “innate ability,” and a visual-motor integration test. Dr. Grim also administered a Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Fourth Edition and a Wechsler Individual Achievement Test-Second Edition, and observed D.K. in the classroom setting. She prepared an Evaluation Report using the Behavior Assessment System for Children (BASC), specifically assessing whether D.K. suffered from Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). She concluded that D.K.‘s various scores placed him in average and low-average ranges, and that D.K. was not in need of special education services. Based on the BASC ratings, which are completed by a student‘s parents and teachers, D.K. was not in an “at risk” or “clinically significant” range. His math and reading tests showed he was proficient in both. D.K.‘s parents signed a Notice of Recommended Education Placement form approving the April 2006 evaluation results, and D.K. was promoted to second grade beginning in the fall of 2006.
Plaintiffs claim that despite extra help in math and reading—which consisted of 30 minutes and 180 minutes per week, respectively—D.K. continued to struggle academically during second grade. The School District, on the other hand, contends that D.K. made “considerable progress.” The record shows his grades improved compared with first grade, but he fought with other children on the playground and on the bus.
Around January 2007, D.K. began seeing private therapist Dr. Linn Cohen. At the end of March 2007, Dr. Cohen informed D.K.‘s teachers and the School District that she was “[e]xtremely convinced” D.K. needed special placement. D.K.‘s teachers discussed the results of the April 2006 testing with Dr. Cohen, who mentioned the possibility of re-testing D.K. At
Before D.K. began third grade, in July 2007, his parеnts formally requested a second, more comprehensive evaluation. Additionally, despite improvement in D.K.‘s behavior and academic performance at the beginning of his third-grade year, in September 2007 D.K.‘s parents obtained a private pediatric neurological evaluation from Dr. Peter R. Kollros. Dr. Kollros diagnosed D.K. with ADHD and opined that D.K.‘s “learning would be enhanced if he were to have the usual kinds of school accommodations for children with ADHD, including if needed preferential seating, taking tests in an environment without unnecessary distractions, organization support, and possibly extra time for tests.” Two months later, the School District‘s own second round of testing determined that D.K. was eligible for special education services as a student with “other health impairment,” and he was offered an Individualized Education Program (IEP) on November 30, 2007.
B
On January 8, 2008, in the midst of finalizing D.K.‘s IEP, his parents requested a due process hearing pursuant to the IDEA and requested an award оf compensatory education for September 2004 through March 12, 2008, after D.K.‘s IEP was finalized and implemented.1 After four hearings, the state agency hearing officer denied Plaintiffs’ claims. The appeals panel found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the hearing officer‘s findings. Having exhausted their administrative remedies, Plaintiffs sought review of those decisions in the District Court.2 See
The District Court affirmed the state agency in all respects. It concluded that the IDEA‘s statute of limitations, which was passed in 2004, barred Plaintiffs from seeking relief for any of the School District‘s conduct prior to January 8, 2006, (two years before Plaintiffs requested a due process hearing), D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., No. 08-4914, 2010 WL 1223596, at *6 (E.D.Pa. Mar. 25, 2010), and that Plaintiffs were ineligible for two statutory exceptions to the IDEA statute of limitations, id. at *4-6. In concluding that the School District did not violate its obligation to identify students in need of special education, the District Court opined:
[P]rior to receiving a diagnosis of ADHD and conducting its second evalu-
ation, thе [School] District had insufficient reason to believe that D.K. was a student with a mental impairment that substantially limited one or more of his major life activities. The Court agrees with the Hearing Officer‘s logic that one must take into account the fact that children develop cognitively and socially at different rates. In this instance, the problems experienced by D.K., which later triggered a second special education evaluation, were not so pronounced in his earlier development.
Id. at *7. The Court also rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the School District failed to provide D.K. a free appropriate public education (FAPE) before November 2007, when it designed an IEP for him. The Court found that D.K.‘s behavior did not require the school to conduct a functional behavioral assessment as part of the April 2006 evaluation and that the testing performed at that time was legally adequate.3 Id. at *8-9. Finally, the District Court denied Plaintiffs’ request to introduce additiоnal evidence, namely: (1) a report by Dr. Emily Perlis offering a post hoc analysis of the appropriateness of the School District‘s responses to D.K.‘s behavioral problems during each of his school years; and (2) the Pennsylvania Department of Education Guidelines, which set forth non-binding best practices. Id. at *10-11. Plaintiffs timely appealed, and we now consider the state agency and District Court decisions rejecting their claims.
II
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to
In cases arising under the IDEA, we apply a “modified de novo” standard of review, “giv[ing] ‘due weight’ and deference to the findings in the administrative proceedings.” P.P. ex rel. Michael P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 734 (3d Cir.2009) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982); S.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 269-70 (3d Cir.2003)). Like the District Court, we “must accept the state agency‘s credibility determinations unless the non-testimonial, extrinsic evidence in the record would justify a contrary conclusion.” Shore Reg‘l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S. ex rel. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir.2004) (citation, internal quotation marks, and emphasis omitted). “The statute of limitations claims аnd [Plaintiffs‘] claims for compensatory education ... are subject to plenary review as conclusions of law.” P.P., 585 F.3d at 735. But “whether [Plaintiffs] proved an exception to the [2004 IDEA] statute of limitations, and whether the [School] District fulfilled its FAPE obligations ... are subject to clear error review as questions of fact.” Id. (citing S.H., 336 F.3d at 271). Such “[f]actual findings from the administrative proceedings are to be considered prima facie correct,’ and if [we] do[] not adhere to those findings,” we must “explain why.” Id. at 734 (quoting S.H., 336 F.3d at 270). As the party seeking relief and the party challenging the administrative decisions, Plaintiffs bear the burden of persuasion on their IDEA and Rehabilitation Act claims. Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir.2012) (citing Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56, 126 S.Ct. 528, 163 L.Ed.2d 387 (2005)).
“The IDEA protects the rights of disabled children by mandating that public educational institutions identify and effectively educate those children, or pay for their education elsewhere if they require specialized services that the public institution cannot provide.” P.P., 585 F.3d at 735. Accordingly, schools must: (1) identify children in need of special еducation services (Child Find); and (2) provide a FAPE to disabled students. Plaintiffs contend that the School District neglected both duties by failing to identify D.K. as a disabled student based on his subpar behavioral and academic performances in kindergarten through third grade, by administering incomplete testing in April 2006 that was ill-suited to diagnose ADHD, and by offering inadequate support to D.K. before November 2007.
Because our analysis of the School District‘s obligations under the IDEA and
A
The IDEA statute of limitations requires a parent to request a due process hearing within two years of “the date the parent ... knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint.”4
Plaintiffs do not dispute that because they requested a due process hearing on January 8, 2008, the statute of limitations generally would limit their claims to the School District‘s conduct after January 8, 2006. Nevertheless, they seek refuge in two exceptions to the statute of limitations and, alternatively, equitable tolling doctrines.
The two exceptions upon which Plaintiffs rely state that the statute shall not apply ... if the parent was prevented from requesting the hearing due to—
(i) specific misrepresentations by the local educational agency that it had resolved the problem forming the basis of the complaint; or
(ii) the local educational agency‘s withholding of information from the parent thаt was required under this subchapter to be provided to the parent.
While district courts within the Third Circuit have interpreted the statute of limitations exceptions on several occasions over the last few years, the scope of these exceptions is an issue of first impression for United States Courts of Appeals.
1
a
The first exception to the statute of limitations is set forth in
Several district courts and administrative adjudicators have interpreted the meaning of “specific misrepresentation” in
We agree that the high threshold articulated by the district courts reflects a proper interpretation of subsection (i). In the absence of a showing of “misrepresentation” akin to intent, deceit, or egregious misstatement, any plaintiff whose teachers first recommended behavioral programs or instructional steps short of formal special education might invoke the exception. Mere optimism in reports of a student‘s progress would toll the statute of limitations. The allegations comprising a claim that a FAPE was denied or that Child Find obligations were not met would near-
Unlike subsection (i), the language of the second exception at
Having analyzed subsections (i) and (ii) of
b
Applying these standаrds to D.K.‘s case, we find no clear error in the administrative findings below that Plaintiffs failed to prove the applicability of the exceptions to the IDEA statute of limitations.
As to subsection (i), neither the School District nor its individual teachers intentionally or knowingly misled Plaintiffs regarding the extent of D.K.‘s academic and behavioral issues or the efficacy of the solutions and programs they attempted. Throughout the relevant school years, D.K.‘s teachers held numerous conferences with his parents at which they described, often in detail, his misconduct, frustration, challenges, and development. The majority of these conferences were specifically aimed to notify his parents of his poor performance. The School District proposed solutions, but it did not imply, let alone state with any confidence, that these measures would succeed or eliminate the eventual need for an evaluation. Individualized behavioral plans did yield some imprоvement, and the School District accurately reported those results to D.K.‘s parents. Notably, neither the conference forms nor the remainder of the record in this case suggest that the School District represented that these minor improvements resolved D.K.‘s behavioral challenges or obviated the need for monitoring and parent-teacher cooperation, i.e. “resolved the problem forming the basis of the complaint,”
With respect to subsection (ii), Plaintiffs claim the School District provided them with neither a permission to evaluаte form nor a procedural safeguards notification until after they requested an evaluation of D.K. in January 2006. But the School District was not obligated to do so in these circumstances. Procedural safeguard notices must be provided only when: (1) the student is referred for, or the parents request, an evaluation; (2) the parents file a complaint; or (3) the parents specifically request the forms. See
As for the permission to evaluate form, Plaintiffs’ argument that the School District should have notified them of the availability of an evaluation pursuant to
2
Plaintiffs argue in the alternative that two common law equitable tolling doctrines should apply: (1) “minority tolling,” which applies to plaintiffs who were minors when their claims accrued; and (2) tolling because the School District prevented Plaintiffs from learning of the basis for their claims. We disagree. Although the statute is silent on the matter, legislative intent and the doctrine of exclusio unius preclude application of common law equitable tolling principles tо save claims otherwise foreclosed by the IDEA statute of limitations. First, the legislative and regulatory history of the 2004 amendments to the IDEA makes clear that only the enumerated statutory exceptions may exempt a plaintiff from having his claims time-barred by the statute of limitations. See S.Rep. No. 108-185, at 40 (2003) (“The committee does not intend that common law determinations of statutes of limitations override this specific directive....“);
Accordingly, IDEA plaintiffs cannot escape its statute of limitations by invoking equitable tolling doctrines recognized under state law. They can argue only for the application of one of the statutory exceptions, as the district courts have correctly held. See Evan H., 2008 WL 4791634, at *5 (concluding that the IDEA statute of limitations “is not subject to the continuing violation or equitable tolling doctrines, but ... instead, ... can be extended only for one of the enumerated statutory exceptions“); J.L. ex rel. J.L. v. Ambridge Area Sch. Dist., 622 F.Supp.2d 257, 269 (W.D.Pa.2008) (“The Court agrees ... that the Regulations firmly establish that the two exceptions specifically set forth in the statute are the exclusive exceptions to the statute of limitations....“).
In sum, because D.K.‘s parents are ineligible for the statutory exceptions and because common law equitable tolling doctrines do not apply, their claims are limited to violations after January 8, 2006.
B
We next consider the merits of Plaintiffs’ claim that they are entitled to the equitable remedy of compensatory education because the School District failed to identify D.K. as disabled and to provide him a FAPE. “A disabled student‘s right to compensatory education accrues when the school knows or should know that the student is receiving an inappropriate education.” P.P., 585 F.3d at 739 (quoting Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 272 (3d Cir.2007)). When a school fails to correct a situation in which a disabled student “is not receiving more than a de minimis educational benefit,” the “child is entitled to compensatory edu-
The remedy of compensatory education is available only where a student‘s substantive rights are affected by a school district‘s non-compliance with the IDEA. “Accordingly, ‘[a] procedural violation is actionable under the IDEA only if it results in a loss of educational opportunity for the student, seriously deprives parents of their participation rights, or causes a deprivation of educational benefits.‘” M.R., 680 F.3d at 274 (quoting D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 565 (3d Cir.2010)).
“School districts have a continuing obligation under the IDEA and
Child Find extends to children “who are suspected of [having] ... a disability ... and in need of speciаl education, even though they are advancing from grade to grade.”
Plaintiffs claim that the School District violated its Child Find duties in three ways: (1) by failing to evaluate D.K. within a reasonable time after it should reason-
We have “infer[red] a requirement that [schools identify disabled children] within a reasonable time after school officials are on notice of behavior that is likely to indicate a disability.” M.R., 680 F.3d at 271 (quoting W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 501 (3d Cir.1995), abrogated on other grounds by A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791 (3d Cir.2007)). This requirement “is implicit in the ‘child find’ duty.” W.B., 67 F.3d at 501 (holding that a jury could reasonably find a violation of Child Find where a school failed to conduct an evaluation within six months after the personal observations of teachers and the receipt of information from parents provided notice of the student‘s likely disability). Accordingly, such a delay can constitute a procedural Child Find violation.
Moreover, a poorly designed and ineffective round of testing does not satisfy a school‘s Child Find obligations. See, e.g., G.D. ex rel. G.D. v. Wissahickon Sch. Dist., 832 F.Supp.2d 455, 465-67 (E.D.Pa.2011) (finding that the school‘s re-evaluation of an elementary school student with significant behavioral problems was inadequate because it overemphasized the student‘s academic profiсiency and assessed behavioral issues only cursorily). The IDEA requires that initial evaluations upon suspicion of a disability
(A) use a variety of assessment tools and strategies to gather relevant functional, developmental, and academic information, including information provided by the parent ... [;]
(B) not use any single measure or assessment as the sole criterion for determining whether a child is a child with a disability or determining an appropriate educational program for the child; and
(C) use technically sound instruments that may assess the relative contribution of cognitive and behavioral factors, in addition to physical or developmental factors.
We agree with the decisions below that Plaintiffs have failed to establish an unwarranted delay,6 a deficient
April 2006 evaluation, or evidence showing the School District should reasonably have suspected D.K. was disabled and in need of special education services after April 2006.
The School District was not required to jump to the conclusion that D.K.‘s misbehavior denoted a disability or disorder because hyperactivity, difficulty following instructions, and tantrums are not atypical during early primary school years. See L.M., 478 F.3d at 314 (finding no violation where witnesses testified that the student‘s “diffiсulties would not necessarily indicate a disability or a need for special education, and that it would be inappropriate to rush to identify a child that young as disabled“); id. (noting that “[s]chool personnel ... testified that [the student‘s] behavioral and learning problems were not atypical of immature young boys“); see also Scarsdale Union, 826 F.Supp.2d at 662-63 (finding no Child Find violation where a high school junior‘s absences and difficulty keeping up with assignments were “not unusual among first-semester juniors ... [and] five or six other kids were having similar problems at the time“). Moreover, D.K.‘s report cards and conference forms indicated intermittent progress and even academic success in several areas. Cf. L.M., 478 F.3d at 311 (finding no violation where a student was “meeting expectations” in academic areas despite struggling with social and behavioral problems throughout elementary school).
Nor do we find error in the conclusions that the April 2006 battery of tests was adequate under Child Find. Plaintiffs contend, among other things, that the School District‘s failure to use a functional behavioral assessment rendered the testing legally inadequate. But the IDEA and its implementing regulations do not require that a school use a functional behavioral assessment when initially testing students for suspected disabilities.7 The four tests the School District did employ covered discrepant skill sets and probed for indicia of varying disabilities. The mere fact that a subsequent evaluation of D.K. yielded a different result—i.e. he was found disabled with an “other health impairment” in November 2007 but did not qualify in April 2006—does not necessarily render the earlier testing inadequate. Cf. M.R., 680 F.3d at 264-66 (finding no Child Find violation where a school‘s February 2007 evaluation concluded that a student did not have a learning disability but its February 2008 testing found reading, math, reasoning, and writing disabilities). Therefore, we will not second-guess the findings of the state agency or the District Court on this question. D.K., 2010 WL 1223596, at *7-9.
We are also unpersuaded that the School District violated its Child Find obligations by failing to suspect D.K. of a disability after the April 2006 еvaluation based on further misconduct and additional opinions by his parents and private therapist. See M.R., 680 F.3d at 273 (“When a school district has conducted a comprehen-
Finally, the measures the School District did take to assist D.K. in the classroom militate against finding a Child Find violation. His teachers did not neglect his difficulties. Far from it, they and other Copper Beech faculty took proactive steps to afford him extra assistance and worked closely with his parents to maximize his potential for improvement. It would be wrong to conclude that the School District failed to identify D.K. as a challenged student when it offered him substantial accommodations, special instructions, additional time to complete assignments, and one-on-one and specialist attention en route to eventually finding a disability. Cf. M.R., 680 F.3d at 272 (agreeing with a hearing officer‘s decision that no Child Find violation occurred where the school district‘s investment in “addressing [a student‘s] needs and providing appropriate instruction and interventions before rushing to special education identification” was apparent).
In sum, schools need not rush to judgment or immediately evaluate every student exhibiting below-average capabilities, especially at a time when young children are developing at different speeds and acclimating to the school environment. Moreover, neither the failure to employ a functional behavioral assessment nor a subsequent disability finding is per se indicative of an inappropriate evaluation. The School District did not breach its Child Find duty by failing to test D.K. until April 2006, during his first-grade year, or by declining to label him disabled under the IDEA until his second-grade year.
Plaintiffs’ claim for compensatory education is further foreclosed because the hearing officer, appeals panel, and District Court correctly determined that D.K. was not denied a FAPE. D.K. demonstrated academic progress in math and reading as he progressed from grade to grade. During the 2004-2005 school year, his teachers noted that he possessed advanced math skills, and between 2003 and 2006, he received numerous “рroficient” and “advanced” marks in reading, social studies, health and safety, math, music, art, and physical education. When D.K. became frustrated with reading and communication skills, the School District provided him with one-on-one tutoring and gave him additional time to complete tests. To address his below-average social development, D.K.‘s teachers designed individualized systems, which yielded some progress. See L.M., 478 F.3d at 314 (finding that the school provided a FAPE where, although it had not identified the student as IDEA-eligible, its individualized “interventions ... were moderately successful” and supplied extra assistance necessary for a meaningful education); see also M.C., 81 F.3d at 395-96 (denying compensatory education where the school believed in
C
Plaintiffs lastly argue that the District Court erred by excluding the expert report of Dr. Emily Perlis and the Pennsylvania Department of Education Guidelines, both of which Plaintiffs offered for the first time in the District Court. A district court reviewing administrative IDEA decisions “shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party,”
First, as the District Court found, the Perlis report is largely duplicative of the evidence given at the administrative hearings. Six of the report‘s nine pages—a summary of D.K.‘s early education—were already introduced as exhibits and discussed by witnesses before the hearing officer. Moreover, her report offers only a commentary, prepared with the benefit of hindsight, regarding the evidence and testimony already presented to the state agency.
Second, contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions that the Pennsylvania Department of Education Guidelines should have been admitted because they set forth “necessary components” of behavioral support strategies that the School District failed to incorporate, the Guidelines offer only non-binding best practices. Holmes v. Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 583, 591 (3d Cir.2000). The School District‘s failure to adhere tо those Guidelines does not amount to the denial of a FAPE, so they are of only minor relevance at best. Therefore, we will uphold the District Court‘s discretion-
IV
In sum, we conclude that Plaintiffs’ claims are limited to the two-year time period between January 8, 2006, and January 8, 2008. Having interpreted the IDEA statute of limitations exceptions as requiring either intentional or knowing misrepresentation of D.K.‘s problems and progress or the withholding of information expressly required by the IDEA statutes and regulations to be disclosed to parents, we hold that neither the District Court nor the state agency clearly erred when it found Plaintiffs ineligible for the exceptions. Nor may Plaintiffs invoke common law equitable tolling doctrines in the face of specifically enumerated exceptions in the governing federal statute.
We further hold that during the relevant portion of D.K.‘s education at Copper Beech Elementary, the School District consistently monitored, documented, and responded to his individual educational needs. The School District developed behavioral improvement systems with his parents’ cooperation and offered him special attention and testing accommodations. Under these circumstances, we find no Child Find or FAPE violation justifying an award of compensatory education. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
HARDIMAN
CIRCUIT JUDGE