WEST CONTRA COSTA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, Respondent; A.M.M., Real Party in Interest.
A169314
In the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Five
Filed 7/31/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. C22-02774)
The District demurred, arguing that reviving a claim that was formerly barred for failure to satisfy the claim
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges she was repeatedly sexually assaulted by her counselor at Richmond High School, within the District, between 1979 and 1983. Plaintiff further alleges that District employees were aware of the counselor‘s conduct. In December
In August 2023, the District filed a demurrer on the ground that the gift clause prohibited the Legislature from retroactively reviving Plaintiff‘s claims, as well as on other grounds. In October, the trial court sustained the
In December 2023, the District filed a petition in this court seeking issuance of a writ of mandate directing respondent Superior Court of Contra Costa County to sustain the demurrer in its entirety. In February 2024, this court issued an order to show cause, Plaintiff filed a return, and the District filed a reply.2 This court also permitted Plaintiff to file a letter brief in response to a new state due process argument asserted by the District in its reply. Finally, this court granted requests by various entities to file 12 amicus curiae briefs, and Plaintiff and the District filed responses to the briefs.3
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Background
A. The Claim Presentation Requirement
Actions against a public entity “for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault” (
In particular, AB 218, which took effect January 1, 2020, revived claims for childhood sexual abuse, regardless of when the sexual abuse allegedly took place, for a three-year period that expired December 31, 2022. (Former
The District challenges this retroactive, statutory waiver of the claim presentation requirement. “For many decades before” the 1963 enactment of the GCA, “tort liability for public entity defendants was barred by a common law rule of governmental immunity.” (Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Prot. Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 798, 803 (Quigley).) The GCA “sets forth the general rule of immunity for public entities,” ” ‘abolish[ing] all common law or judicially declared forms of liability for public entities, except for such liability as may be required by the state or federal constitution,’ ” or ” ‘if a statute ... is found declaring them to be liable.’ ” (County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1034, 1045.) Thus, the GCA “is a comprehensive statutory scheme governing the liabilities and immunities of public entities and public employees for torts.” (Quigley, at p. 803.)
Pursuant to the claim presentation requirement, “[b]efore suing a public entity, the plaintiff must present a timely written claim for damages to the entity.” (Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, 208 (Shirk).) During the 1979-1983 timeframe at issue in the present case, “a claim relating to a cause of action for ‘injury to person’ had to be presented to a government entity ‘not later than the 100th day after the accrual of the cause of action.’ ” (Ibid., emphasis added.) “Accrual of the cause of action for purposes of the government claims statute is the date of accrual that would pertain under the statute of limitations applicable to a dispute between private litigants.” (Id. at pp. 208-209; accord, Willis v. City of Carlsbad (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1104, 1118.)
The California Supreme Court has explained the purposes of the claim presentation requirement as follows: ” ‘Requiring a person allegedly harmed by a public entity to first present a claim to the entity, before seeking redress in court, affords the entity an opportunity to promptly remedy the condition giving rise to the injury, thus minimizing the risk of similar harm to others. [Citations.] The requisite timely claim presentation before commencing a lawsuit also permits the public entity to investigate while tangible evidence is still available, memories are fresh, and witnesses can be located. [Citations.] Fresh notice of a claim permits early assessment by the public entity, allows its governing board to settle meritorious disputes without incurring the added cost of litigation, and gives it time to engage in appropriate budgetary planning. [Citations.] The notice requirement under the government claims statute thus is based on a recognition of the special status of public entities, according them greater protections than nonpublic entity defendants, because unlike nonpublic defendants, public entities whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused harm will incur costs that must ultimately be borne by the taxpayers.’ ” (Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1 (2017) 3 Cal.5th 903, 907-908 (Rubenstein).)
B. The Prohibition on Gifts of Public Funds
The District contends that AB 218‘s retroactive waiver of the claim presentation requirement constitutes an unconstitutional gift of public funds. The gift clause declares, in relevant part, that “The Legislature shall have no power ... to make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any public money or thing of value to any individual, municipal or other
The word “gift” as used in the gift clause is not limited to transfers of personal property, ” ‘but includes all appropriations of public money for which there is no authority or enforceable claim,’ ” or which are grounded on mere moral or equitable obligations. (Westly v. U.S. Bancorp (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 577, 582; see also Conlin, supra, 99 Cal. at pp. 21-22.)6 However, a “gift” of public funds is not unconstitutional if “it is to be used for a public rather than a private purpose. ... That is because ‘[t]he benefit to the state from an expenditure for a “public purpose” is in the nature of consideration and the funds expended are therefore not a gift even though private persons are benefited there from.’ ” (Westly, at p. 583; see also Los Angeles County v. La Fuente (1942) 20 Cal.2d 870, 876-877 (La Fuente) [“If the money is for a public purpose, the appropriation is not a gift even though private persons are benefited by the expenditure.“]; Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 630, 637 [“By its terms, article XVI, section 6 of the state Constitution prevents the Legislature from making or authorizing any gift of public funds for private purposes.“].)
“The determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a matter for the Legislature, and its discretion will not be disturbed by the courts so long as that determination has a reasonable basis.” (Cnty. of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 746 (Carleson).) Where the Legislature makes findings, they are “given great weight and will be upheld unless found to be unreasonable and arbitrary.” (California Hous. Fin. Agency v. Elliott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 575, 583 (Elliott).) But “[t]he failure to explicitly state a public purpose is not decisive. The courts may infer the public purpose from other legislation or the manner in which the legislation is enacted.” (Scott v. State Bd. of Equalization (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1597, 1604 (Scott).)
II. AB 218‘s Retroactive Waiver Is Not A Gift of Public Funds
The District contends AB 218‘s waiver of the claim presentation requirement is a gift of public funds, insofar as the statute retroactively removes the requirement for claims that accrued before 2009.7 In this Part, we reject this argument, without regard to the question of public purpose (see Part III, post). As we explain, waiver of the claim presentation requirement did not constitute an expenditure of public funds that may be considered a “gift” because AB 218 did not create new “substantive liability” (Quigley, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 813) for the underlying alleged wrongful conduct. Instead, AB 218 simply waived a condition the state had imposed on its consent to suit. (Quigley, at pp. 811-813; Chapman v. State (1894) 104 Cal. 690, 697 (Chapman).)
A. The Chapman Decision
Chapman, supra, 104 Cal. 690, is the appropriate lens through which to evaluate the District‘s gift clause claim. In that case, a state-operated wharf collapsed, allegedly due to the state‘s negligence, and coal stored on the wharf was lost. (Id. at p. 692.) At the time of the loss, such a claim could only be presented to the state board of examiners; the plaintiff did so and the
The Chapman court acknowledged that it would violate the gift clause for the Legislature to retroactively authorize an action based on negligence, because “the [L]egislature has no power to create a liability against the state for any such past act of negligence upon the part of its officers.” (Chapman, supra, 104 Cal. at p. 693.)8 However, the Court concluded the plaintiff‘s action was actually founded upon breach of contract, because the state, in consideration of wharfage paid to it, was contractually obligated to exercise ordinary care in preserving the property entrusted to it. (Id. at pp. 694-695.) And, critically, although the state was not liable for its negligence at the time of the loss, the state was at the time liable under contract, because “a state is bound by the same rules as an individual in measuring its liability on a contract.” (Id. at p. 694.)
The Court explained, “the liability of the state accrued at the time of its breach; that is, when the coal was lost through the negligence of the officers in charge of the state‘s wharf, although there was then no law giving to the plaintiff‘s assignors the right to sue the state therefor. At that time the only remedy given the citizen to enforce the contract liabilities of the state, was to
Thus, with respect to the gift clause, Chapman focused on whether the underlying conduct for which the Legislature provided a right to sue was conduct for which the state was liable at the time it occurred. (See also Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507, 517 [“The legislature has not attempted to create a liability against the state for any past acts of negligence on the part of its officers, agents or employees—something it could not do, and the doing of which would, in effect, be the making of a gift“].) Notably, the board of examiners presentation requirement in Chapman was perfectly analogous to the claim presentation requirement at issue in the present case: as explained by that Court, the challenged act providing the plaintiff a right to bring suit “contemplates that claims against the state shall first be presented to the state board of examiners for allowance, and . . . it is only on claims so presented, and ‘not allowed by the state board of examiners,’ that the state gives its consent to be sued.” (Chapman, supra, 104 Cal. at p. 697.) Unlike the present case, Chapman did not involve the waiver of that requirement, because the plaintiff had presented its claim to the board. Nevertheless, and critically, the Chapman decision not only concluded there is no gift clause violation if liability existed when the alleged misconduct occurred, but the decision also did not view satisfaction of the claim presentation requirement as an aspect of the relevant underlying liability. Instead, “the liability of the state accrued at the time of its [contractual] breach.” (Id. at p. 696.) As explained below, this liability has been referred to as the state‘s “substantive liability.” (Quigley, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 813.)
B. The Claim Presentation Requirement is Not Part of the District‘s Substantive Liability
Under the GCA, the claims presentation requirement is not part of the District‘s substantive liability, so retroactive waiver of the requirement
The California Supreme Court‘s decision in Quigley, supra, 7 Cal.5th 798, is also instructive. In that case the Court addressed, in the context of the GCA, the distinction between “questions of substantive liability” and “the separate question whether public entities are amenable to suit in state courts.” (Id. at p. 813.) The case involved
The District‘s only response on this point is to assert that “[l]iability against a public entity cannot exist independent of the claim presentation requirement.” It is true, of course, that the GCA governs “the liabilities and immunities of public entities and public employees for torts.” (Quigley, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 803.) But, although the District appears to argue compliance with the claims presentation requirement is an aspect of its substantive liability, the District fails to explain how that aligns with the Law Review Commission‘s unambiguous statement that “the claims presentation provisions do not impose substantive liability.” (4 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1963) pp. 1001, 1028.)
Accordingly, the GCA itself makes clear that the District‘s substantive liability existed when the alleged wrongful conduct occurred; timely presentation of a claim was a condition to waiver of government immunity, but it was not necessary to render the underlying conduct tortious. Because a statute imposing liability on the District existed at the time of the sexual assaults, AB 218 imposes no new substantive liability under Chapman‘s gift clause analysis.
C. The Shirk and Bickerdike Cases Do Not Compel a Different Result
The District concedes that “statutes of limitations may be extended by the Legislature without violating the constitution—those statutes provide only new remedies.” (See Bickerdike v. State (1904) 144 Cal. 681, 692 (Bickerdike) [waiver of statute of limitations defense does not violate gift clause]; accord, Mitchell v. Cnty. Sanitation Dist. No. One of Los Angeles Cnty. (1957) 150 Cal.App.2d 366, 372.) But the District contends that “critical differences between statutes of limitations and the claim presentation requirement” mandate differing results under the gift clause. Although we agree that the
The District relies principally on the characterization of the claim presentation requirement in Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th 201. The Shirk Court undertook a straightforward analysis of the plain language of a 2002 statutory amendment to section 340.1 that revived claims barred “solely” by a statute of limitations (id. at p. 211) and determined it was not “intended to apply to the . . . claim presentation deadline.” (Id. at p. 212.) “[T]he government claim presentation deadline is not a statute of limitations. Had the Legislature intended to also revive in subdivision (c) the claim presentation deadline under the government claims statute, it could have easily said so. It did not.” (Id. at p. 213; accord, Rubenstein, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 907.)11
In declining to construe the statutory reference to “the applicable statute of limitations” to encompass the claim presentation requirement, Shirk went on to observe that “timely claim presentation is not merely a procedural requirement, but is . . . ’ ” ‘a condition precedent to plaintiff‘s maintaining an action against defendant’ ” ’ [citation], and thus an element of the plaintiff‘s cause of action. [Citation.] Complaints that do not allege facts demonstrating either that a claim was timely presented or that compliance with the claims statute is excused are subject to a general demurrer for not stating facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 209; accord, DiCampli-Mintz v. Cnty. of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983, 990; see also State of California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1240-1243.)
In comparison, ” ’ “[s]tatute of limitations” is the collective term applied to acts or parts of acts that prescribe the periods beyond which a plaintiff may not bring a cause of action.’ ” (Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 211-212.) “[T]he primary purpose of the statutes of limitation is to prevent plaintiffs
Shirk stands for the proposition that there are differences between a statute of limitations and the claim presentation requirement, and a statutory reference to one does not include the other. But the Court did not suggest the differences are material in the context of the gift clause (which was not at issue in that case). Nor, of course, did Shirk hold that a waiver of the claim presentation requirement is a gift but waiver of the statute of limitations is not. However, Bickerdike, supra, 144 Cal. 681, offers more support for the District‘s position. The Supreme Court reasoned, “The statute of limitations does not go to the substance of the right, but only to the remedy. When the statute has made the defense available to the debtor, his debt has not been extinguished. It still exists, and may be enforced against him unless he chooses to avail himself of the defense afforded by the statute and specially plead it. The payment of such a debt by the debtor is not a ‘gift,’ in any proper sense of the word, and there is nothing in the constitutional provision invoked that can be held to prohibit the Legislature from paying these claims.” (Id. at p. 692.) The District argues, “when no timely claim is presented, a plaintiff‘s claim is extinguished and a limitation on liability arises. . . . A statute creating liability that did not exist (because any prior liability was extinguished when no timely claim was presented) is a ‘gift’ or ‘thing of value to [Plaintiff].”
However, under Chapman the crucial consideration is whether the Legislature has created new substantive liability, or, instead, has simply removed an obstacle to recovery imposed by the state as a condition of its consent to suit that is not an aspect of the underlying substantive liability. Indeed, although Shirk characterized the timely presentation of a claim as an “element” of a cause of action in the sense that it must be pled in a complaint, both Shirk and Rubenstein make clear it is not an aspect of the underlying substantive liability. Thus, Shirk held that the cause of action for childhood sexual assault in that case “accrued” at the time of the last molestation. (Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 210 [“Generally, a cause of action for childhood sexual molestation accrues at the time of molestation.“].) Rubenstein, supra, 3 Cal.5th 903, which addressed the same enactment, made the point even more explicitly. The Court restated the general rule that ” ‘a cause of action accrues at “the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements,” ’ ” and re-affirmed Shirk‘s holding that a childhood sexual assault claim accrues (is ” ‘complete with all of
In conclusion, while the differences between the statutes of limitations and the claim presentation requirement are material in some circumstances, the District has not shown the distinction is material under the gift clause. When the Legislature waives either requirement, it exposes the public treasury to potential causes of action that were otherwise barred. As we understand Chapman, the gift clause is violated when conduct that was not tortious when it took place is subsequently made tortious with retroactive effect. But the GCA itself and the Quigley, Shirk, and Rubenstein decisions make clear that the District‘s substantive liability for the alleged sexual assaults exists independently of the claim presentation requirement.12 Thus, we conclude that no “gift” occurred when the Legislature waived the claim presentation requirement with respect to alleged conduct for which the District was indisputably substantively liable when it happened.
As noted previously, an expenditure of public funds that serves a public purpose does not violate the gift clause, and “[t]he determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a matter for the Legislature, and its discretion will not be disturbed by the courts so long as that determination has a reasonable basis.” (Carleson, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 746; accord, San Diego Cnty. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs. v. Superior Ct. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 761, 766; Scott, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1605.) Even if we had ruled that AB 218 authorizes expenditures within the scope of the gift clause, the expenditures are not “gifts” because they serve a public purpose.
A. The Purpose of AB 218
As noted at the outset of our discussion, prior California decisions have been clear that “‘the intent that illuminates section 340.1 as a whole‘” and AB 218 in particular is “an aim ‘to expand the ability of victims of childhood sexual abuse to hold to account individuals and entities responsible for their injuries.‘” (Los Angeles Unified, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 777; accord, Quarry v. Doe I (2012) 53 Cal.4th 945, 1003-1004; see also Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 536 [
The legislative history to AB 218 provides further details. A Senate Judiciary Committee report explains, “‘Childhood sexual abuse has been correlated with higher levels of depression, guilt, shame, self-blame, eating disorders, somatic concerns, anxiety, dissociative patterns, repression, denial, sexual problems, and relationship problems.’ Given the horrific damage and life-long trauma that can be caused by childhood sexual assault, these
B. Revival of An Unenforceable Claim Can Serve a Public Purpose
At the outset, we reject the District‘s blanket assertion that “California precedent firmly establishes that making previously unenforceable claims actionable cannot serve” a public purpose. In support of that proposition, the District cites Conlin, supra, 99 Cal. 17, Jordan v. Cal. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 431 (Jordan), and Orange Cty. Found. v. Irvine Co. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 195 (Orange County). The District misreads those authorities.13
In Conlin, the City of San Francisco had only a “moral or equitable obligation” to provide compensation to a contractor because there was no contractual liability at the time the work was performed. (Conlin, supra, 99 Cal. at p. 22.) Conlin is distinguishable because, as discussed in Part II, ante, AB 218 does not create new substantive liability. Furthermore, in Conlin “[t]here was no claim or suggestion that the moneys so directed to be paid were to be devoted to any public purpose.” (City of Oakland v. Garrison (1924) 194 Cal. 298, 302; accord, Patrick v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 350, 355-356.) In Garrison, the Court affirmed that, in cases involving the revival of previously unenforceable claims, it is still “the
Orange County and Jordan are analogous to Conlin. In Orange County, the court merely held that it would be a gift of public funds for the state to enter into a settlement agreement clearing title to property where the private party receiving the payment knew it had no claim to the property. (Orange County, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at pp. 200-201.) The payment was not “the settlement of a good faith dispute,” and no other public purpose was identified. (Id. at p. 200.) Similarly, in Jordan, the court of appeal concluded an arbitration award violated the gift clause because it awarded fees in excess of the maximum authorized by the Legislature in connection with the action. (Jordan, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at pp. 438-442, 450Id. at p. 450.) In contrast to Conlin, Orange County, and Jordan, which involved only discrete payments to private parties with no larger public goal, in the present case the Legislature sought to provide relief to a disadvantaged group of persons. As explained below, that is a sufficient public purpose under the gift clause.
C. Courts Have Regularly Concluded That Expenditures on Behalf of Disadvantaged Groups Serve a Public Purpose
“[A] public purpose embodies not only expenditures which are necessary for the continued existence of government, but also those ‘which may tend to make that government subserve the general well-being of society, and advance the present and prospective happiness and prosperity to the people.‘” (San Diego Cnty. v. Hammond (1936) 6 Cal.2d 709, 722; see also Carleson, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 746 [“the Legislature could reasonably have determined that such legislation was in the best interests of the general public welfare“]; Allied Architects’ Ass‘n of Los Angeles v. Payne (1923) 192 Cal. 431, 439 [“[A] gift as implying a gratuity, that is, something for nothing, . . . is the ‘gift’ meant by the constitution,” and the “return” may be “incorporeal and intangible“]; Standard, supra, 42 Cal.App.2d at p. 414 [“The legislature is vested with a large discretion in determining what is for the public good and what are public purposes for which public moneys can be rightfully expended and that discretion cannot be controlled by the courts except when its action is clearly evasive.“].)
Employing such a “general public welfare” rationale, a “wide variety of welfare and other social programs have been upheld against constitutional
We believe AB 218 may be sustained under the reasoning of the above cases. The District does not dispute “the horrific damage and life-long trauma that can be caused by childhood sexual assault” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of AB 218, supra, at p. 8); nor does the District deny that AB 218 was enacted to provide relief to such victims by providing an opportunity for them to obtain compensation from the private and public entities that employed their abusers. We believe the Legislature‘s purpose to aid the disadvantaged group of childhood sex assault victims in the present case is analogous to the intent to offer relief to other disadvantaged groups in the cases in the preceding paragraph and the other cases relied upon in those decisions.14
One additional decision, Scott, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th 1597, is instructive. There, the Legislature enacted a statute retroactively extending the time period during which taxpayers could claim an exclusion from reassessment for transfers of ownership of real property from parents to children. (Id. at p. 1600Ibid.) The court of appeal rejected a County Tax Assessor‘s claim that the statute violated the gift clause, concluding that the enactment served a public purpose. (Id. at pp. 1605-1606Id. at pp. 1604-1605.) By analogy, providing relief to a class of victims of childhood sexual assault who failed to file timely claims also serves a public purpose.
In sum, in seeking to aid victims of childhood sexual assault, the public purpose underlying AB 218 is not fundamentally different from the public purpose involved in any of a number of other enactments providing assistance to other disadvantaged classes of persons “in the best interests of the general public welfare.” (Carleson, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 746.) The main difference is the mechanism of expenditure of the public funds: many programs provide direct or indirect subsidies from the public treasury, while AB 218 ensures any public expenditures will be made by entities accountable for the victims’ injuries.
The District argues that AB 218 is different because it “‘does not benefit any recognizable “population” ’ . . . The beneficiaries of AB 218 are not united by any protected characteristic (like race or creed), nor by geography, property ownership, financial condition, or the like.” We disagree. The class of persons benefited by AB 218 is sufficiently defined, even if victims must prove their eligibility for compensation in individual lawsuits. The District cites no authority to the contrary.
The District has not shown AB 218 does not serve a valid public purpose.15
D. The Policy Arguments of the District and Amici Curiae are Misplaced
The District and the amici curiae who filed briefs in support of the District also argue at length that AB 218 is bad public policy. The District argues, “AB 218 affirmatively harms the public interest by precipitating an unprecedented wealth transfer from public schools to private individuals, imperiling the solvency of numerous school districts, and threatening the constitutional education rights of children now attending public schools.” The amici curiae who filed briefs in support of the District are, for example, various public entities facing liability under AB 218, policy groups representing public schools in California, and joint powers authorities (JPAs).16 The District summarizes the arguments in those briefs as
The concerns raised by the District and amici curiae are legitimate considerations that would have been appropriate considerations for the Legislature in deciding whether to enact AB 218.17 Indeed, those concerns were considered by the Legislature. A Senate Judiciary Committee report observed that the bill was “opposed by various associations that would likely be affected by these revived or extended claims periods.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of AB 218, supra, at p. 1.) In particular, “[a] coalition of groups, including the Schools Excess Liability Fund, the Schools Insurance Authority, the Association of California School Administrators, the California Association of Joint Powers Authorities, and the California Association of School Business Officials, [wrote] in opposition: ‘As drafted, AB 218 exposes local public schools and others, to claims of abuse going back 40 years ago and longer. It will be impossible for employers to effectively defend against these claims when evidence is likely gone, witnesses have moved or passed away, and there has been a turnover of staff.
Similarly, an Assembly Judiciary Committee Report stated that opponents of the bill—“public and private school officials, insurance associations, and joint powers associations“—argued, “it is very difficult to defend against old claims when records and witnesses may be unavailable, insurance may no longer be available, and the cost of defending these actions could be astronomical and could prevent the impacted entities from being able to support their main work.” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of AB 218, supra, p. 2, italics omitted; see also id. at pp. 9-10.) The opponents further argued, “‘AB 218 will create new liability that will be funded in large part by public dollars that would otherwise go directly to funding education.‘” (Id. at p. 10.) The report acknowledged opponents’ concerns and the request to retain the claims presentation bar, but observed, “Obviously, the flip side of the burden of the cost of these claims on schools, churches, and athletic programs that protected sexual abusers of children is the lifetime damage done to those children.” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of AB 218, supra, at pp. 10-11.)
Another committee analysis expressly acknowledged the potential fiscal impact on schools, referencing “Unknown, potentially-major . . . costs to local entities and school districts to the extent litigation is successfully brought outside the current statute of limitations and/or the entities are liable for damages. If payouts are large enough, this measure could lead to cost pressures to the state to stabilize a local jurisdiction or district.” (Sen. Rules Com., Analysis of AB 218 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended August 30, 2019, p. 6.)
Ironically, the District asserts it “is not asking this Court to make any policy decisions in this case or to weigh in on whether AB 218 is a good law.” Unfortunately, that is exactly what the District and amici curiae ask this court to do in arguing that the potential negative consequences of AB 218 outweigh its benefits. As the court recognized in Coats, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at page 429, “In [AB 218], the Legislature has again attempted to balance the competing concerns of protecting public entities from stale claims and allowing victims of childhood sexual abuse to seek compensation. This time, the Legislature came to a different conclusion, with an express revival provision for claims against public entities as well as those against private defendants.” (See also Los Angeles Unified, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 769-770 [the GCA “as a whole reflects an awareness that although tort claims can draw from public coffers and may impose additional burdens on taxpayers, to the extent these awards are necessary to compensate plaintiffs
IV. The District Lacks Standing to Assert Its Due Process Claims
The District also contends that “resurrecting extinguished claims that are barred by a lapsed claim presentation deadline” violates its right to due process under both the federal and California Constitutions.20 The District lacks standing to challenge AB 218 on those grounds.
In Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1 (Star-Kist), the Supreme Court noted “the well-established rule that subordinate political entities, as ‘creatures’ of the state, may not challenge state action as violating the entities’ rights under the due process or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment or under the contract clause of the federal Constitution. ‘A municipal corporation, created by a state for the better ordering of government, has no privileges or immunities under the federal constitution which it may invoke in opposition to the will of its creator.‘” (Id. at p. 6; accord, People v. Carter (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 960, 976 (Carter); City of Grass Valley v. Cohen (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 567, 592 (Cohen); San Diego Cnty. Water Auth. v. Metro. Water Dist. of S. California (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1162 (San Diego Cnty.); City of San Jose v. Sharma (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 123, 148; see also Santa Monica Cmty. Coll. Dist. v. Pub. Emp. Rels. Bd. (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 684, 690 [referring to “the long line of cases which hold that a public entity, being a creature of the state, is not a ‘person’ within the meaning of the due process clause, and is not entitled to due process from the state“])
“‘The same reasoning applies to the due process protections afforded under the California Constitution.‘” (City of Burbank v. Burbank Glendale Pasadena Airport Authority (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 366, 380, quoting Board of Supervisors v. McMahon (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 286, 296-297; see also Reclamation Dist. No. 1500 v. Superior Ct. in & for Sutter Cnty. (1916) 171 Cal. 672, 680 [rejecting takings claim under California Constitution and referring to “the proposition that the county (or reclamation or school district) is a mere political agency of the state, that it holds its property on behalf of the state for governmental purposes, and that it has no private proprietary interest in such property as against the state“]; Carter, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 976 [relying on Star-Kist to reject claims under the “United States and California Constitutions’ contracts clauses“]; McMahon, at p. 297 [citing cases].) The District provides no reason why it has standing to assert a due process claim under the California Constitution where it may not do so under the federal Constitution.
“‘A public school district is a political subdivision of the State of California.‘” (K.M. v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 717, 752; see also California Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos (2011) 53 Cal.4th 231, 243 [“the Legislature established school districts as political subdivisions and delegated to them [the] duty” of providing a public school system]; Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 680-681 [“‘Local districts are the State‘s agents for local operation of the common school system‘“].) The District does not dispute that point, and it has no substantial answer to the rule articulated in Star-Kist and applied repeatedly since then. The District points out that Star-Kist exempted certain constitutional claims from the “no standing” rule, but the exemption does not encompass the District‘s due process claims. In particular, the Court explained, “[p]rovisions like the Fourteenth Amendment and the contract clause ‘confer fundamental rights on individual citizens‘; the supremacy clause, in contrast, ‘establishes a structure of government which defines the relative powers of states and the federal government.’ [Citations.] Political subdivisions cannot assert ‘constitutional rights which are intended to limit governmental action vis-a-vis individual citizens’ but may invoke the supremacy clause to challenge preempted state law.” (Star-Kist, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 8.) At issue in Star-Kist was a claim based on the federal constitutional commerce clause, which “resembles the supremacy clause in that it, albeit indirectly, ‘defines the relative powers of states and the federal government.‘” (Id. at p. 9.) The District‘s due process claims are not analogous to the supremacy and commerce clause claims exempted by Star-Kist. (See Cohen, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 592 [emphasizing limited scope of the Star-Kist exception]; San Diego Cnty., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1162 [same].)
In support of its position, the District also cites to Rogers v. Brockette (5th Cir. 1979) 588 F.2d 1057, Zee Toys, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 763, and Board of Ed. of Central School Dist. No. 1 v. Allen (1968) 392 U.S. 236. None of those decisions are contrary to or undermine the rule articulated in the Star-Kist decision. Rogers was a supremacy clause case, and it stated that federal courts have “invariably” held municipalities may not assert due process claims against states. (Rogers, at pp. 1067-1068.) Zee Toys was a commerce clause case relating “to the national interest in observing the boundaries of state and federal power.” (Zee Toys, at p. 778.) Finally, Allen permitted school board members to assert a First Amendment challenge to a state law on the basis that they had “a ‘personal stake in the outcome’ of [the] litigation.” (Allen, at p. 241 & fn. 5.) Allen did not question the “well-established rule” described in Star-Kist or any of the United States Supreme Court cases cited therein. (Star-Kist, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 6.)
Finally, the District cites to Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 (1982) 458 U.S. 457, with the bold but erroneous assertion that the decision “signaled that school districts are different and not subject to the political-subdivision rule.” That case did not suggest that school districts are “different” and did not consider the issue in Star-Kist: whether a political subdivision possesses ” ‘privileges or immunities under the federal constitution which it may invoke in opposition to the will of ’ ” the state. (Star-Kist, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 6.) Instead, in Seattle School District the Supreme Court allowed a local school board seeking to defend a busing integration program to challenge a state initiative on equal protection grounds because the initiative “use[d] the racial nature of an issue to define the governmental decisionmaking structure, and thus impose[d] substantial and unique burdens on racial minorities.” (Seattle School District, at p. 470.) Therefore, the decision in that case was grounded on the equal protection rights of the racial minorities adversely affected by the initiative, not on any equal protection right held by the school district vis-à-vis the state. The same is true of other cases cited by the District. (See Romer v. Evans (1996) 517 U.S. 620, 625 [municipalities challenging state constitutional amendment based on equal protection rights of gays and lesbians]; Coral Construction, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco (2010) 50 Cal.4th 315, 329 (Coral Construction) [considering claim by city that statute violated citizens’ equal protection rights]; Cent. Delta Water Agency v. State Water Res. Control Bd. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 621, 629 [water agencies had standing to bring action contending statute “violate[d] the [equal
The District lacks standing to assert a due process challenge to AB 218 under either the federal or California Constitutions.
DISPOSITION
The District‘s petition for writ of mandate is denied. Costs are awarded to Plaintiff.
SIMONS, J.
We concur.
JACKSON, P. J.
BURNS, J.
(A169314)
West Contra Costa USD v. Superior Court (A169314)
Trial Judge: Hon. John P. Devine
Trial Court: Contra Costa County Superior Court
Attorneys:
Horvitz & Levy LLP, David M. Axelrad and Peder K. Batalden; Fagen Friedman & Fulfrost LLP, Roy A. Combs, David R. Mishook, and Rami B. Noeil for Petitioner.
Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland LLP, Edward L. Xanders and Alana Rotter for Schools Association for Excess Risk, Northern California Regional Liability Excess Fund, Southern California Regional Liability Excess Fund, and Statewide Association of Community Colleges as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud & Romo, Mark Bresee, Alyssa Ruiz de Esparza, and Juliana Duran; California School Boards Association, Kristin Lindgren, Bode Owoyele, and Dana Scott for California School Boards Association and its Education Legal Alliance as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
Griffith & Thornburgh, LLP, Craig Price, Felicita A. Torres, and Austin S. Payne for Montecito Union School District and Carpinteria Unified School District as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
Cole Huber LLP, Derek P. Cole for Schools Excess Liability Fund, California Association of Joint Powers Authorities, and Public Risk Innovations, Solutions, and Management as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
Fozi Dwork & Modafferi, LLP, Daniel S. Modafferi for Alliance of Schools for Cooperative Insurance Programs as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
Lozano Smith, Sloan R. Simmons and Adam M. Vasquez for California Association of School Business Officials as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
Matheny Sears Linkert & Jaime, LLP, Richard S. Linkert and Madison M. Simmons for Schools Insurance Authority as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
Miller Barondess, LLP, Mira Hashmall, Nadia A. Sarkis, and Eleanor S. Ruth for County of Los Angeles as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
Orbach Huff & Henderson LLP, David M. Huff, Enrique M. Vassallo, JiEun Choi, and Julia A. Wolpert for Compton Unified School District as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
Davis, Bengtson & Young, Eric J. Bengtson and Bruce D. MacLeod for East Side Union High School District, San Mateo Union High School District, Santa Clara Unified School District, Oakland Unified School District, Los Gatos-Saratoga Union High School District, Oak Grove School District, and Berryessa Union School District as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Boucher LLP, Raymond Boucher, Shehnaz M. Bhujwala, and Amanda Walbrun; Esner, Chang, Boyer & Murphy, Holly N. Boyer for Real Party in Interest.
Alan Charles Dell‘Ario; DeMarco Law Firm, Anthony M. DeMarco for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.
Public Justice, Sean Ouellette and Adele P. Kimmel for Public Justice, Child USA, Equal Rights Advocates, and National Center for Victims of Crime as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.