LATRICE RUBENSTEIN v. DOE NO. 1 et al.
S234269
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
Filed 8/28/17
Ct.App. 4/1 D066722; Imperial County Super. Ct. No. ECU08107
A similar issue was before us in Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201 (Shirk). In Shirk, the
We explained that, subject to exceptions listed in
“Accrual of the cause of action for purposes of the government claims statute is the date of accrual that would pertain under the statute of limitations applicable to a dispute between private litigants. (
The Shirk plaintiff‘s 2003 claim was clearly untimely if the cause of action accrued for purposes of the claims requirement in November 1979 and did not reaccrue later. In arguing the claim was timely, the plaintiff relied primarily on the legislation that had revived causes of action for childhood sexual molestation that were otherwise barred under the applicable statute of
The plaintiff in Shirk made two arguments why the claim was timely: First, “that under section 340.1, subdivision (c), . . . her cause of action against the School District reaccrued on September 12, 2003, when she discovered that her present psychological injury was caused by [the teacher‘s] sexual abuse of her some 25 years earlier“; and, second, “that her duty to present her claim to the School District, as required under the government claims statute, first arose on September 12, 2003, when she discovered that her psychological injury was caused by the teacher‘s sexual abuse and presented her claim to the School District.” (Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 210-211, italics added.) We rejected both the section 340.1 and the delayed discovery arguments.
Regarding the section 340.1 contention, we noted that the statute of limitations was not at issue. “Rather, it is the claim presentation deadline [citations] that is at issue . . . .” (Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 209.) We held that section 340.1 did not affect that deadline. We focused on the language of section 340.1, subdivision (c), which revived certain claims for damages “that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2003, solely because the applicable statute of limitations has or had expired.” (Shirk, at p. 211, quoting
We found support for this conclusion “in the public policies underlying the claim presentation requirement of the government claims statute. Requiring a person allegedly harmed by a public entity to first present a claim to the entity, before seeking redress in court, affords the entity an opportunity to promptly remedy the condition giving rise to the injury, thus minimizing the
We have reiterated these policies more recently. “‘The claims statutes also “enable the public entity to engage in fiscal planning for potential liabilities and to avoid similar liabilities in the future.“‘” (DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983, 991; see City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 738 [similar]; Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1234 [summarizing these policy considerations].)
In Shirk, we also rejected the plaintiff‘s delayed discovery argument that the plaintiff‘s “duty to present a claim to the School District did not arise until September 12, 2003, when at the age of 41 she first learned from a mental health practitioner that her adult-onset emotional problems resulted from [the teacher‘s] molestation of her as a teenager, some 25 years earlier.” (Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 214.) We explained “that the Legislature‘s amendment of section 340.1, subdivision (c), revived for the year 2003 certain lapsed causes of action against nonpublic entities, but that nothing in the express language of those amendments or in the history of their adoption indicates an intent by the Legislature to apply against public entity defendants the one-year revival provision for certain causes of action. (
Shirk agreed with County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1269, which, as we described it, similarly “held that the Legislature‘s 2002 amendment of section 340.1 did not reflect the Legislature‘s intent ‘to excuse victims of childhood sexual
Justice Werdegar dissented in Shirk. (Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 214-216 (dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.).) She recognized that the plaintiff‘s claim first accrued in 1979 but contended that the “claim accrued again in 2003.” (Id. at p. 214.) She argued that the “applicable statute of limitations, which in this case is the delayed discovery statute [i.e., section 340.1], defines accrual for purposes of the claim presentation statute. (See
Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th 201, is factually distinguishable. In Shirk, the cause of action had lapsed and was later revived. (Id. at pp. 207-208.) In this case, plaintiff‘s claim never actually lapsed. Instead, statutory changes extended the time period before it lapsed.1 Because of this, plaintiff‘s cause of
As noted, the claim must be presented “not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.” (
decide whether the changes to section 340.1 caused it to reaccrue at a later time. Shirk held the changes did not do so, at least for causes of action that had lapsed and been revived. But plaintiff argues, and the Court of Appeal found, that a claim that had never lapsed did reaccrue under section 340.1.
In support of this conclusion, plaintiff and the Court of Appeal rely largely on
The Court of Appeal‘s analysis presents the question of whether section 340.1 provides a new accrual date for purposes of
Shirk‘s reasoning suggests that, like a tolling statute, section 340.1 does not postpone the date of accrual. We thus agree with V.C. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 499, in which the court similarly held that the section did not provide a new accrual date.
“In making this argument, [the plaintiff] confounds the principles of limitations periods and accrual dates. Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806-807, clarified the distinction between and purposes of the two concepts: ’ “Statute of limitations” is the collective term applied to acts or parts of acts that prescribe the periods beyond which a plaintiff may not bring a cause of action. [Citations.] There are several policies underlying such statutes. One purpose is to give defendants reasonable repose, thereby protecting parties from “defending stale claims, where factual obscurity through the loss of time, memory or supporting documentation may present unfair handicaps.” [Citations.] A statute of limitations also stimulates plaintiffs to pursue their claims diligently. [Citations.] A countervailing factor, of course, is the policy favoring disposition of cases on the merits rather than on procedural grounds. [Citations.] [[] A plaintiff must bring a claim within the limitations period after accrual of the cause of action. (
“Keeping these principles in mind, we conclude that while section 340.1 extends the time during which an individual may commence a cause of action alleging childhood sexual abuse, it does not extend the time for accrual of that cause of action.” (V.C. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at pp. 509-510, italics added.)
In Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127 (Hamilton), we concluded that this provision is not a typical accrual rule. The plaintiff in Hamilton was exposed to asbestos from the early 1940s to 1963. He was diagnosed with asbestosis in 1979, but was not disabled. His conditioned worsened, and he filed suit against various asbestos manufacturers in 1993. In 1996, he was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a form of cancer that is also caused by exposure to asbestos. He then filed a second suit against the asbestos manufacturers. At issue was whether
Section 340.1 is similar to
Our holding in Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th 201, supports this conclusion. If
Our opinion in Quarry also reflects this understanding of Shirk‘s implications: “[I]f adult psychological injury were a separate injury giving rise to a cause of action accruing upon discovery of the connection between the adult injury and childhood abuse, presumably Shirk should have been litigated and resolved differently. (Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th 201.) There we pointed out that causes of action accrue for childhood sexual abuse at the same time for the purpose of claims against public entities under the government claims statute (see
Moreover, the public policies behind the claim presentation requirement that we identified in Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th 201, apply equally here as in that case. Permitting a claim made in 2012 to suffice for molestation that allegedly occurred from 1993 to 1994 would contravene those policies. A public entity cannot plan for a fiscal year if it may be subject to an unknown and unknowable number of ancient claims like this one. It is probably too late today to meaningfully investigate the facts behind the claim and reach reliable conclusions; even if some investigation is still possible, a claim timely filed in 1993 or 1994 would certainly have been easier to investigate and would have allowed for more reliable conclusions. It is also too late to prevent the alleged abuser from abusing again.
Recent legislation in response to Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th 201, demonstrates that the Legislature, in amending the statutory scheme, has endeavored to take account of these policy concerns. “In direct response to Shirk, the Legislature enacted
The legislative history behind the new
In this way, during the calendar year 2008, the Legislature put governmental entities on notice that for conduct allegedly occurring on or after January 1, 2009, they would have to protect themselves as best they could against possible stale claims. But the Legislature also intended to protect those entities from such claims for conduct occurring before that date. This legislative intent supports our conclusion that plaintiff‘s 2012 claim for conduct allegedly occurring from 1993 to 1994 was untimely.
Our opinion in Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., supra, 35 Cal.4th at page 808, listed section 340.1 as among the statutes affecting the accrual date. But the instant issue was not before us in that case, and the listing contained no analysis. Our more recent opinion in Quarry v. Doe I, supra, 53 Cal.4th 945, which, as explained, considered Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th 201, and aptly explained its significance, correctly described section 340.1 as “tolling the limitations period for the underlying claim.” (Quarry, at p. 981, italics added.)
Plaintiff also argues that “the equitable doctrine of delayed discovery applies and warrants a finding that plaintiff‘s claim was timely.” However, once we conclude, as we do, that section 340.1 did not establish a new accrual date, our reasons for rejecting a similar argument in Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at page 214, apply here. We there explained that “it seems most unlikely” the Legislature intended to permit a late claim for someone who discovered only in 2012 “a new injury attributable to the same predicate facts underlying a cause of action previously barred by failure to comply with the government claims statute.” (Ibid.) As we concluded in Quarry v. Doe 1, supra, 53 Cal.4th at page 984, “we do not believe the Legislature intended that common law delayed discovery principles should apply to cases governed by section 340.1.”
Finally, plaintiff makes the closely related argument that her delayed adult awareness of her injury created its own cause of action with its own accrual date. We disagree for similar reasons. In Quarry v. Doe I, supra, 53
The dissent complains that today‘s holding, and presumably that of Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th 201, effectively give public entities immunity from liability for lawsuits like this one. (Dis. opn., post, at p. 2.) When the Legislature amended section 340.1 without modifying the claims requirement, and later overruled Shirk, but only prospectively, it took measured actions that protected public entities from potential liability for stale claims regarding conduct allegedly occurring before January 1, 2009, in which the public entity had no ability to do any fiscal planning, or opportunity to investigate the matter and take remedial action.
For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the matter to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CHIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
KRUGER, J.
DISSENTING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J.
I disagree with the court‘s conclusion that plaintiff Rubenstein‘s suit is barred. The court holds her cause of action accrued when she was molested by a high school track coach, at the age of 14, and then lapsed six months later when she failed to present a claim to the school district. This reasoning, in my view, reflects a misunderstanding of
Section 340.1 permits a victim of childhood sexual abuse to bring suit “within eight years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, whichever period expires later . . . .” (
The Legislature‘s landmark effort to expand victims’ access to the courts does not help Latrice Rubenstein, the majority reasons, because section 340.1 tolls, or suspends the running of, the statute of limitations for childhood sexual abuse claims rather than delaying those claims’ accrual. The arcane difference between tolling and delayed accrual makes little or no difference to plaintiffs who are suing private parties. But someone suing a public entity must present a claim within six months after his or her cause of action accrues or the claim is lost. (
Section 340.1 is most naturally read as delaying the accrual of claims for sexual abuse rather than tolling the statute of limitations. The section sets “the time for commencement of the action” by reference to “the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse . . . .” (
The legislative history of
“provid[ing] for delayed discovery accrual . . . .” (Cal. Off. of Crim. Justice Planning, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 108 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) prepared for Governor Deukmejian (Aug. 28, 1990) p. 1; see id., at p. 2 [same].) One may infer the Legislature appreciated the distinction between delayed accrual and tolling because the proposed legislation was described as “expressly provid[ing] for delayed discovery accrual,” while then-existing law (
Various public policies affecting the government claims process play a strong role in the majority‘s analysis. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 13-15; cf. id., at pp. 4-5.) Those policies logically inform our interpretation of the statutes that regulate the claims process. (See
The majority makes the same mistake by invoking Government Code section 905, subdivision (m), as support for its interpretation of section 340.1. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 13-15.) Section 905 categorically exempts plaintiffs who sue public entities for childhood sexual abuse from the need to submit claims. Because this law applies “only to claims arising out of conduct occurring on or after January 1, 2009” (
No controlling precedent supports the court‘s interpretation of section 340.1. The case law that does exist offers more opposition to, than support for, that interpretation. In Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th 797, 808, albeit in dictum, we described section 340.1 as “making accrual of a cause of action contingent on when a party discovered or should have discovered that his or her injury had a wrongful cause.” (Italics omitted.) Not in dictum, the Court of Appeal in K.J. v. Arcadia Unified School Dist. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1241-1243, held that section 340.1 delays the accrual of claims for childhood sexual abuse until the plaintiff discovers that adult psychological injury was caused by childhood sexual abuse. The majority summarily disapproves that adverse precedent in a footnote (maj. opn., ante, at p. 16, fn. 2) and relies instead on V.C. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 499. But V.C., like the majority, commits the error of interpreting section 340.1 through the lens of the government claims process. V.C. ultimately depends on the premise that to read section 340.1 as delaying accrual would in effect “override” (V.C., at p. 511) or “carve out an exception to the claims requirements.” (V.C., at p. 512.) This method of analysis is illegitimate, as I have explained (ante, at pp. 2-3), given the Legislature‘s decision to apply generally applicable law to determine when a cause of action accrues for the purpose of a claim against the government. (See
The remaining decisions on which the majority relies provide no meaningful support for their conclusion. Neither Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201 (Shirk), nor Quarry, supra, 53 Cal.4th 945, decided whether section 340.1 is properly interpreted as tolling, or as delaying the accrual of, claims for childhood sexual abuse. And Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127 (Hamilton), interpreted a statute of limitations (
In Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th 201, the plaintiff conceded her cause of action for sexual abuse committed by a high school teacher between 1977 and 1979 had been extinguished by her failure to present a claim in 1980. (Id. at p. 210.) In view of this concession, the question before the court was whether a 2002 amendment to section 340.1 (see Stats. 2002, ch. 149, § 1, p. 753 [adding § 340.1, subd. (c)]) had revived her claim. The amended statute revived only those causes of action that were barred “solely because the applicable statute of limitations has or had expired” (§ 340.1, subd. (c), italics added) as of January 1, 2003. We held the statute did not revive the plaintiff‘s claim because it was “not barred ‘solely’ by lapse of the applicable statute of limitations” (Shirk, at p. 213), but also because she had not presented a timely claim to the school district (ibid.). The plaintiff made the alternative argument that her claim first accrued when she learned the abuse had caused adult psychological harm. (Id. at p. 214.) The court did not dispose of that argument by interpreting 340.1 as tolling, rather than delaying the accrual, of claims. Instead, the court simply reiterated its earlier conclusion that the 2002 amendment had not revived plaintiff‘s already extinguished claim. (Ibid.)
Our decision in Quarry, supra, 53 Cal.4th 945, also concerned the 2002 revival statute. (§ 340.1, subd. (c).) The court held the plaintiff‘s claims against a church for sexual molestation committed by a priest were not revived because the plaintiffs had failed to bring their action within the one-year period prescribed by the revival statute. Arguing against this conclusion, the plaintiffs’ asserted “their adult psychological injuries were so
The majority tries to find some guidance in Quarry‘s treatment of Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th 201. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 12-13.) But in the passage on which the majority relies, the Quarry court went no farther than to hold, once again, that a claim for adult psychological injuries caused by childhood sexual abuse is not separate from a claim based on the assault itself.1 Quarry did not hold that section 340.1 tolls the statute of limitations, rather than delaying accrual, until adult harm is discovered. That question was not before the court.
The majority makes much of a single sentence in Quarry, supra, 53 Cal.4th 945, noting the 1990 amendment to section 340.1 was intended “to recognize that a delayed awareness that adult psychological injury was caused by childhood abuse would justify tolling the limitations period for the underlying claim against the perpetrator.” (Quarry, at p. 981, italics added, quoted in maj. opn., ante, at p. 15.) But this sentence cannot fairly be understood to reject, even in dictum, the argument that section 340.1 provides for delayed discovery accrual, as the Legislature intended. Instead, the sentence provides context for the sentences that immediately follow, wherein the court again reiterates its holding that “the amendment did not treat adult psychological injury as an entirely separate and new injury. Rather, the new language [of section 340.1] was intended to afford victims a longer period in which to become aware of their injuries.” (Quarry, at p. 982.) The Quarry court also
Finally the majority relies on Hamilton, supra, 22 Cal.4th 1127. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 10-12.) But Hamilton had nothing to do with section 340.1. Hamilton construed
The majority asserts that section 340.2 is similar to section 340.1. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 11.) Not so. The Legislature expressly limited the application of section 340.2 “to those causes of action which accrued prior to the change in the law” brought about by the enactment of section 340.2. (Stats. 1979, ch. 513, § 2, p. 1690, italics added.) This uncodified statute made the holding in Hamilton, supra, 22 Cal.4th 1127, unavoidable: The court could effectuate the purpose of section 340.2 only by extending the limitations period for claims that had, by definition already accrued. To interpret the statute as delaying the accrual of those claims was not an option. In this critical respect, section 340.1 differs from section 340.2. In 1990, when the Legislature amended section 340.1 to set “the time for commencement of the action” by reference to “the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse” (id., subd. (a)), the Legislature did not limit the amended statute‘s application to claims that had already accrued, as it did with section 340.2. More importantly, as already discussed (ante, at
In conclusion, I urge the Legislature to read today‘s decision and determine for itself whether the majority‘s holding accurately reflects the intended meaning and purpose of section 340.1. ” ‘Statutes of limitation are products of legislative authority and control’ ” (Valley Circle Estates v. VTN Consolidated, Inc. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 604, 615) and should reflect the Legislature‘s policy goals rather than those of the judicial branch. Prior judicial decisions unduly restricting sexual abuse victims’ access to the courts have repeatedly led the Legislature to amend both section 340.1 and the claims statutes.2 This case suggests section 340.1 may require further clarification.
For all of these reasons I respectfully dissent.
WERDEGAR, J.
WE CONCUR:
LIU, J.
CUÉLLAR, J.
Notes
The most recent change to section 340.1 came in 2002, when defendant was still under the age of 26 years. This time, the Legislature amended section 340.1, subdivision (b), to provide that a plaintiff may bring a claim against a third party even after the plaintiff‘s 26th birthday “if the person or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, and failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future by that person, including, but not limited to, preventing or avoiding placement of that person in a function or environment in which contact with children is an inherent part of that function or environment.” (
In sum, whenever plaintiff‘s claim came close to expiring, the Legislature expanded the statute of limitations. (See Quarry v. Doe I (2012) 53 Cal.4th 945, 974 [“an enlarged limitations period is considered to apply prospectively and appropriately to actions that are not already barred even if the conduct occurred prior to the enactment“].) See Quarry, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pages 982-983, footnote 11: “We also observe that if adult psychological injury were a separate injury giving rise to a cause of action accruing upon discovery of the connection between the adult injury and childhood abuse, presumably Shirk should have been litigated and resolved differently. . . . [I]f the plaintiff‘s adult psychological injury were a separate injury giving rise to a new cause of action with its own accrual date, the plaintiff in Shirk would not have needed to rely upon the one-year revival period of subdivision (c)—her claim would not have accrued at all, whether as a civil action or under the government claims statute, until she became aware of her adult injury.” (Italics added.)