JAMES WILLIS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF CARLSBAD, Defendant and Respondent.
D074988
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Filed 4/22/20; Certified for publication 5/12/20 (order attached)
(Super. Ct. No. 37-2016-00004240-CU-OE-NC)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Timothy M. Casserly, Judge. Affirmed.
Daley & Heft and Lee H. Roistacher, Mitchell D. Dean, Heather E. Paradis, Garrett A. Smee; Office of the City Attorney and Celia A. Brewer, Walter C. Chung for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff and appellant James Willis, a peace officer employed by the Carlsbad Police Department (Department), sued defendant and respondent City of Carlsbad (City) alleging in part that it engaged in whistleblower retaliation against him in violation of
Willis contends the trial court erred as a matter of law by striking those portions of his
Willis, a peace officer since 2000, was hired by City in 2008. In 2009 and 2010 his supervisors gave him overall exceptional performance ratings. In 2011, Willis applied for and was selected to be a detective in the Department‘s crimes of violence unit, where he worked with two other detectives. He received exceptional performance evaluations in that position as well.
In June 2012, Willis created a fictitious e-mail account under a pseudonym and wrote a critical e-mail about another detective who worked in his unit, sending it to various government entities, public information officers and news organizations.2
Several months later, during an investigation about the e-mail, Willis admitted he wrote it. In late 2012, Willis took family leave for the birth of his child. When he returned to work in January 2013, Willis‘s captain informed him he was being reassigned from the crimes of violence unit to patrol.3
In September 2013 and December 2013, Willis applied for open detective positions in the crimes of violence unit but was passed over in favor of other candidates. In March 2014, Willis was promoted to corporal. That month, Willis missed receiving an overall exceptional performance review by one criteria; his supervisors rated him as meeting standards. The following month, a Department captain found Willis‘s appeal of his written reprimand had merit. He advised Willis the document would be removed from his personnel file and destroyed. However, the sustained finding of misconduct remained in Willis‘s file. Willis received exceptional overall performance ratings on his next few evaluations.
In early 2015, Willis, who had since been elected president of the local police officer‘s association, learned that Department had implemented a monthly performance review for officers working patrol and traffic. Willis believed the review program was an illegal quota under the Vehicle Code because it collected statistical data, including about arrests and citations. At the next meeting between Department and the association, Willis complained about the review program and its implementation. The management disagreed that the program was illegal. Eventually the police officer‘s association demanded that Department stop the program.
In July 2015, Willis‘s supervisors passed him over for a promotion to sergeant. In December 2015, Willis brought a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing as well as a government tort claim against City, alleging he had suffered continued retaliation by City and Department, evidenced by his 2013 transfer to patrol; his October 2013 written reprimand; denials of requests for transfer he made in 2013, 2014 and 2015; and the July 2015 denial of his promotion to sergeant. City deemed all acts occurring before June 29, 2015—six months before the date it received Willis‘s claim—untimely as occurring beyond the six-month period in which to
In February 2016, Willis filed a complaint against City. He alleged various causes of action, including for retaliation in violation of
The trial court struck the allegations, ruling Willis could recover only for acts of retaliation occurring within six months of the day he filed his government tort claim; that neither tolling of that limitations period nor the continuing violation doctrine applied to excuse Willis‘s untimely claims.6
The jury returned a special verdict finding in Willis‘s favor that his reporting of City‘s violation of law was a contributing factor in City‘s decision to deny him the promotions. It also found City would have denied Willis his promotions in July 2015 or March 2016 anyway for legitimate independent reasons. Accordingly, the court entered judgment in City‘s favor on Willis‘s claims, ordering that Willis would take nothing on this complaint and awarding City its costs.
Willis timely filed this appeal from the judgment and the trial court‘s order granting City‘s motion to strike.
DISCUSSION
I. City‘s Motion to Strike
Willis contends the trial court erred as a matter of law by striking the portions of his pleading alleging retaliation for his 2012 reports to Department management that another officer had committed timecard fraud and perjury. He first argues the statute of limitations for filing his
A. Standard of Review
Here, City‘s motion required the trial court to determine whether the doctrines of equitable tolling and continuing tort/continuing violation warranted striking certain of Willis‘s complaint‘s allegations as time-barred for his failure to file a claim within six months under the Government Claims Act. We agree with Willis that the motion presented pure questions of law. Thus, in assessing whether the court properly interpreted and applied the law governing such doctrines to the pleaded facts, we exercise independent review. (Brandwein v. Butler, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 1497; Cal-Western Business Services, Inc. v. Corning Capital Group, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 309.)
We first dispose of City‘s claim that Willis has waived his claim of trial court error and failed to meet his appellate burden of establishing a prejudicial abuse of discretion because he did not designate a reporter‘s transcript of the hearing on its motion to strike. City cites Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, in which our state‘s high court observed the absence of such a transcript “will frequently be fatal to a litigant‘s ability to have his or her claims resolved on the merits” (id. at p. 608), or that reviewing courts decline to reach the merits absent a transcript ” ‘[i]n numerous situations . . . .‘” (Id. at p. 609.) City does not explain how the absence of a reporter‘s transcript in this case makes it impossible to resolve the merits of Willis‘s challenge to the trial court‘s ruling on City‘s motion to strike. This leaves us unpersuaded that we cannot do so on the present record, which contains the operative pleading, the moving and opposing papers, as well as the court‘s minute order on the motion. (Accord, Bel Air Internet, LLC v. Morales (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 924, 933 [rejecting forfeiture argument where respondent did not claim the hearing included any live testimony or the introduction of any other evidence, nor did it identify any particular matter addressed at the hearing that had to be considered to decide the appeal].)
Further, City acknowledges that the rule is subject to an exception where the reviewing court exercises de novo review. As explained above, the issues presented here require independent review. For that reason, and on the state of this record, we reject City‘s waiver arguments. (Bel Air Internet, LLC v. Morales, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at pp. 933-934 [reporter‘s transcript was not necessary to consider appeal where review was de novo and the appellate record contained trial court‘s written orders and all evidentiary materials germane to the motion at issue].)
C. Claim That Willis Failed to Demonstrate Abuse of Discretion Based on Law Presented in the Trial Court
We likewise reject City‘s argument that we must assess the trial court‘s ruling by reviewing only the case law Willis cited below, not authorities he cites in his opening appellate brief. City‘s argument is akin to another claim of forfeiture; relying on Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, it argues that under the applicable abuse of discretion standard of review, Willis must show the trial court‘s decision “could not reasonably have [been] reached . . . under [the] applicable law.” City maintains “the ‘applicable law’ under which this Court must evaluate the trial court‘s decision is the ‘applicable law’ Willis gave to the trial court” and it is irrelevant that he cites new authorities in his
We cannot agree with this reasoning. First, City‘s citation to Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co., supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at page 957 does not support its propositions.8 Cahill summarizes the abuse of discretion standard of review; it says nothing about the scope of the “applicable law” or whether the reviewing court must restrict its consideration of the law to cases cited by the parties below for purposes of that standard. To the contrary, it is a settled appellate principle that we will uphold a trial court‘s rule or decision if it is “right upon any theory of the law applicable to the case” regardless of the court‘s reasoning. (See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Tab Transportation, Inc. (1995) 12 Cal.4th 389, 399, fn. 4, italics added; see Haro v. City of Solana Beach (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 542, 549 [demurrer context].) This principle applies even when the matter is governed by the abuse of discretion standard of review. (See Mendoza v. Ramos (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 680, 686, fn. 3.)
Even setting that aside, City‘s arguments are unavailing because as discussed ante the issues presented on City‘s motion to strike—application of equitable tolling and the continuing tort doctrines to the pleaded facts—are ultimately questions of law that we review de novo. Litigants “‘“may raise for the first time on appeal a pure question of law that is presented by undisputed facts.“‘” (Dudley v. Department of Transp. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 255, 259; see also Shields v. Hennessy Industries, Inc. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 782, 786.) In such circumstances an appellant may change his theory on appeal and the reviewing court can affirm or reverse on new grounds. (Dudley, at pp. 259-260.) Under these principles, we may consider the case law cited by Willis in his opening appellate brief even if he did not cite it to the trial court on City‘s motion to strike.
We turn to Willis‘s arguments that the doctrines of equitable tolling and continuing tort/continuing violation apply to postpone the running of the time by which he was required to present a claim to City under the Government Claims Act, making his December 2015 claim timely as to the allegations of City‘s actions stricken from the complaint. An overview of that Act is useful to resolve the questions.
1. Government Claims Act Requirements
“The Government Claims Act (
Accrual for purposes of the Act is the date of accrual that would pertain under the statute of limitations applicable to a dispute between private litigants. (Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1 (2017) 3 Cal.5th 903, 906; Shirk v. Vista Unified School District (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, 209 (Shirk), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Rubenstein, at p. 914.) ” ‘Only after the public entity‘s board has acted upon or is deemed to have rejected the claim may the injured person bring a lawsuit alleging a cause of action in tort against the public entity.‘” (California Restaurant, at p. 1591; J.J. v. County of San Diego, at p. 1219.) The deadline for bringing a lawsuit against the public entity after a
If a claim is not timely presented, a written application may be made to the public entity for leave to present such claim. (Le Mere v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 237, 246.) If the public entity denies the application,
With certain exceptions (
Public policy supports the “strict application” (DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 991, fn. 8) of the claims presentation requirements:
‘Requiring a [claimant] . . . to first present a claim to the entity, before seeking redress in court, affords the entity an opportunity to promptly remedy the condition giving rise to the injury, thus minimizing the risk of similar harm to others. [Citations.] [It] also permits the public entity to investigate while tangible evidence is still available, memories are fresh, and witnesses can be located. [Citations.] Fresh notice of a claim permits early assessment by the public entity, allows its governing board to settle meritorious disputes without incurring the added cost of litigation, and gives it time to engage in appropriate budgetary planning. [Citations.] The notice requirement . . . thus is based on a recognition of the special status of public entities, according them greater protections than nonpublic entity defendants, because ... public entities . . . will incur costs that must ultimately be borne by the taxpayers.’
(DiCampli-Mintz, at p. 991, quoting Shirk, at p. 213; see also Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 907.)
2. Equitable Tolling
“The equitable tolling of statutes of limitations is a judicially created, nonstatutory doctrine. [Citations.] It is ‘designed to prevent unjust and technical forfeitures of the right to a trial on the merits when the purpose of the statute of limitations—timely notice to the defendant of the plaintiff‘s claims—has been satisfied.’ [Citation.] Where applicable, the doctrine will ‘suspend or extend a statute of limitations as necessary to ensure fundamental practicality and fairness.‘” (McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 88, 99.) One circumstance in which the doctrine applies is when an injured person who possesses several legal remedies reasonably and in good faith pursues one designed to lessen the extent of his injuries or damage. (Id. at p. 100; Addison v. State of California (1978) 21 Cal.3d 313, 317-318.) “[T]he effect of equitable tolling is that the limitations period stops running during the tolling event, and begins to run again only when the tolling event has concluded. As a consequence, the tolled interval,
In his complaint, Willis alleges: “The City retaliated against Willis by forcing him to transfer from investigations to patrol on January 7, 2013. Willis filed a complaint of retaliation against the City with the Labor Commission, State of California, Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Labor Standards and Enforcement, Case No. 31927-STARCI. This complaint is pending.” In reviewing the court‘s ruling on City‘s motion to strike, we accept these allegations as true. (Clauson v. Superior Court, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 1255 [reviewing court will “read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth“].)
Charactering the six-month period by which he was required to file his government tort claim under
We conclude the doctrine of equitable tolling cannot be invoked to suspend
These policies and purposes underscore the unique status of public entity defendants. The purpose of the claims statutes is not to prevent surprise like judicial statutes of limitation. (See Elkins v. Derby (1974) 12 Cal.3d 410, 417 [primary purpose of statute of limitations is to ” [prevent] surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and
witnesses have disappeared’ “]; Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1124.)
Rather, the purpose is ” ‘to provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation. [Citations.] It is well-settled that claims statutes must be satisfied even in face of the public entity‘s actual knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the claim.’ ” (DiCampli-Mintz, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 991.) ” ’ “Such knowledge—standing alone—constitutes neither substantial compliance nor basis for estoppel.” ’ ” (J.J. v. County of San Diego, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1219.) ” ‘The claims statutes also “enable the public entity to engage in fiscal planning for potential liabilities and to avoid similar liabilities in the future.” [Citations.]’ [¶] . . . Moreover, the intent of the
Government Claims Act is ‘not to expand the rights of plaintiffs against government entities. Rather, the intent of the act is to confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances.’ ” (DiCampli-Mintz, at p. 991.)
Here, the important policy considerations behind the claims statutes—giving a public entity ” ‘prompt notice’ ” of a claim to permit ” ‘early investigation and evaluation’ ” (California Restaurant, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1591) as well as orderly fiscal planning for the protection of taxpayer funds (DiCampli-Mintz, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 992; Addison v. State of California, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 320) would not be served by tolling the government claim deadline while a plaintiff pursues other legal remedies
Nothing in this court‘s decision in California Restaurant contradicts our conclusion. In California Restaurant, this court declined to apply equitable tolling beyond the context of judicial statutes of limitations so as to suspend the government claims presentation time period for a party that had not timely filed its own government claim. (California Restaurant, 195 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1586, 1597.) That party—a commercial water user—sought to rely on an earlier class action lawsuit filed by residential water users to argue it was relieved from the deadline for filing its own government claim. (Id. at pp. 1589-1590.) This court observed that while authorities applied equitable tolling in the class action setting to toll a statute of limitations (id. at p. 1595), there was no such authority in the context of government claim requirements. (Id. at p. 1596.) Ultimately, we were “unpersuaded that the . . . tolling doctrine can be transferred from its limited context—tolling of statutes of limitations for class members if the class-wide pursuit of the claim falters—to also toll the distinct time limits for filing a governmental claim . . . . Because the governmental claim requirement serves purposes distinct from and in addition to purposes served by general statutes of limitations, we are not persuaded by [the parties‘] argument that tolling principles applicable to the latter should be superimposed on the former.” (Id. at p. 1600.)
Generally, a ” ‘cause of action accrues “when [it] is complete with all of its elements“—those elements being wrongdoing, harm, and causation.’ [Citation.] This is called the ‘last element’ accrual rule: ordinarily, the statute of limitations runs from ‘the occurrence of the last element essential to the cause of action.’ ” (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1191.) An exception to this rule is the continuing violation doctrine. (Id. at p. 1192.) “The continuing violation doctrine aggregates a series of wrongs or injuries for purposes of the statute of limitations, treating the limitations period as accruing for all of them upon commission or sufferance of the last of them.” (Ibid., citing Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798, 811-818 (Richards); see also Morgan v. Davidson (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 540, 560.) Consequently, the continuing violation doctrine “allows liability for unlawful . . . conduct occurring outside the statute of limitations if it is sufficiently connected to unlawful conduct within the limitations period.” (Richards, at p. 802; see also Yanowitz v. L‘Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1056 (Yanowitz).) For the continuing violation doctrine to apply, a plaintiff must show the defendant engaged in “a pattern of reasonably frequent and similar acts [that] may, in a given case, justify treating the acts as an indivisible course of conduct actionable in its entirety, notwithstanding that the conduct occurred partially outside and partially inside the limitations period.” (Aryeh, at p. 1198; Morgan v. Davidson, at p. 560.)
Unlike equitable tolling, the continuing tort/continuing violation theory affects a cause of action‘s accrual. (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1192; see Mitchell v. State Dept. of Public Health (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1011 [“tolled” in the context of statutes of limitation means “suspended” or “stopped“].) Thus, we must decide whether Willis has established the requirements for that doctrine, because the six-month government claim presentation period is triggered by “the accrual of the cause of action.” (
In Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th 1028, the California Supreme Court held in a summary adjudication context that the continuing violations doctrine applied to retaliation claims as long as “the requisite showing of a continuing course of conduct has been made.” (Id. at p. 1059.) It reiterated the relevant factors of the doctrine as described in Richards: a court must consider “whether ‘the employer‘s actions . . . (1) [were] sufficiently similar in kind—recognizing . . . that similar kinds of unlawful employer conduct, such
Here, in the context of City‘s motion to strike, we examine Willis‘s pleadings to decide whether they may be reasonably read to meet the Richards criteria for applying the continuing violation doctrine.
Willis alleges that:
- In 2012, he was assigned to a detective position in Department‘s crimes of violence unit. In that same year, he reported to Department‘s command staff that another sworn police officer had committed fraud on his timecard, had been dishonest and had violated the
Penal Code by committing perjury. He also testified in a City Equal Opportunity Employment (EEO) investigation concerning claims by a Mexican/American/Hispanic detective of race and national origin discrimination and that two officers, including the officerWillis had earlier accused of misconduct, had created a hostile work environment for him based on his race and national origin. On information and belief, the EEO complaint was sustained on some of the charges against the two officers. - City retaliated against him by forcing him in January 2013 to transfer from investigations to patrol, for which he filed a complaint of retaliation against the City with the Labor Commission.
- City further retaliated against him on October 1, 2013, by issuing a written reprimand to him for his alleged conduct in an internal affairs investigation, but in April 2014, after he appealed, the letter was removed and destroyed from his personnel file.
- In 2013, 2014 and 2015, Willis attempted to get the City to remedy the January 2013 transfer by applying for transfers back to either the crimes of violence unit or general investigations. Specifically, around October 2013, Willis and four other officers applied for two openings in the crimes of violence unit, but the City gave the position to lesser-qualified officers with no prior experience like Willis had.
- In January 2014, Willis again applied for another opening and a transfer back to the crimes of violence unit, but he was denied the transfer again in favor of a less-qualified officer.
- Around November 2014, Willis applied for a transfer to a general investigations position, but was once again denied a transfer to the position that was given to a far less-qualified officer, who unlike Willis had never been a detective.
- In March 2015, Willis again applied for a transfer to the general investigations unit, but he was denied in favor of a less qualified officer who was given the position in October or November 2015.
- Willis again applied for a sergeant promotion and was the only candidate rated highly qualified, but he learned in July 2015 that City denied him the promotion. In August 2015, Willis complained about the denial to higher-ups as well as an employee in City‘s human resources department who advised him she was passing it on to City‘s human resources manager. Thereafter Willis filed his December 2015 complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing and at the same time presented his government claim.
We need not decide whether these allegations, liberally construed (
Willis unambiguously alleges that after City denied him transfer and promotion in 2013, 2014 and early 2015, City hired a different, less-qualified officer. There can be no other conclusion in view of that allegation but that City‘s independent promotion decisions each became permanent when a different applicant was put in the position. (Accord, Jumaane v. City of Los Angeles (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1402-1404 [harassment and retaliation occurring in 1990‘s became permanent in 1999 once plaintiff served a 10-day suspension ordered by his chief after having endured reprimands, disciplines, transfers and denials of grievances in response to his discrimination complaints]; Cucuzza v. City of Santa Clara, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1043 [plaintiff‘s loss of job duties for allegedly discriminatory reasons became permanent when her job title changed; “[w]e can conceive of little that would be a more definitive denial of plaintiff‘s request to perform certain job duties than an offer to transfer her out of the job altogether“]; compare Brome v. California Highway Patrol, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 799 [jury could find the absence of permanence where
There are no other allegations that suggest Willis could have perceived City‘s actions on these discrete job openings as anything other than definitive and final. The fact Willis continued to apply for promotions in response to new openings does not establish a lack of permanence as to his past applications; we decline to hold his conduct in applying for future jobs revived his claims of retaliation for the City‘s prior decisions. (Accord Morgan v. Regents of University of California, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at pp. 66-67 [continuing violation doctrine not implicated for University‘s ” ‘isolated employment decisions’ ” not to rehire the plaintiff, and “each time [plaintiff] was informed he was not being hired for a position to which he had applied, he was, or should have been, aware this action might to contrary to his preferential rehire rights” such that he “should have been aware of his potential claim far earlier than it was asserted“].)
Given these allegations, we conclude City‘s actions acquired a degree of permanence so as to preclude application of the continuing violation doctrine. (Richards, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 823.) Under the circumstances, the trial court correctly rejected its application to Willis‘s
A. Background
Before trial, City moved in limine to preclude Willis from presenting evidence or argument that City had violated
At the same time, Willis moved in limine to exclude evidence of the June 2012 e-mail. He argued the e-mail and evidence City used it as justification for denying him promotions to sergeant in July 2015 and March 2016 was irrelevant in part because City had not completed any investigation into the e-mail within one year of its discovery, and thus using it to deny him promotion violated
After hearing lengthy arguments on the matter, the trial court denied Willis‘s motion, permitting City to admit evidence of the June 2012 e-mail. It granted City‘s motions to exclude any evidence of
B. Contentions
Willis contends the court prejudicially abused its discretion when it excluded evidence that City‘s promotion decisions violated
Department management never charged him with misconduct for the 2012 e-mail and he was not disciplined for it, thus Department missed the one-year limitations period for charging and investigating him such that its management was prohibited from using the e-mail to deny him his promotion. Willis asserts “[a]s a matter of law, the evidence the City may have violated [POBRA] when it denied Willis the promotions to sergeant was relevant and should not have been excluded from evidence.”
C. POBRA
“POBRA ‘codif[ies] “a list of basic rights and protections which must be afforded all peace officers . . . by the public entities [that] employ
Accordingly,
In Conger v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th 262, the Court of Appeal addressed whether an officer‘s denial of promotion was “on grounds other than merit” within the meaning of
D. Analysis
” ‘No evidence is admissible except relevant evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘Relevant evidence is evidence “having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” ’ [Citation.] ‘The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.’ [Citation.] ‘In general, the trial court is vested with wide discretion in determining relevance and in weighing the prejudicial effect of proffered evidence against its probative value. Its rulings will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.’ ” (People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 87.) Under this appellate standard, the court‘s ruling ” ’ “will not be disturbed except on a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (People v. Case (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1, 46.)
The trial court in ruling on City‘s and Willis‘s motions did not articulate a substantive reason for its decision: “[Willis‘s motion in limine] is denied. This evidence [the June 2012 e-mail] is going to come in and we‘re not going to hear anything—we‘re not even going to hear anything about POBR[A]. We‘re not going to hear it. It‘s not relevant. They are going to hear the evidence.” Reviewing the ruling itself and not the court‘s rationale (Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Tab Transportation, Inc., supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 399, fn. 4), we cannot say the trial court abused its broad discretion in excluding evidence of
But the premise fails under the plain statutory language of
In short, the trial court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
O‘ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
IRION, J.
Filed 5/12/20
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
JAMES WILLIS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF CARLSBAD, Defendant and Respondent.
D074988
(Super. Ct. No. 37-2016-00004240-CU-OE-NC)
ORDER GRANTING REQUEST AND CERTIFYING OPINION FOR PUBLICATION
THE COURT:
The opinion in this case filed April 22, 2020, was not certified for publication. It appearing the opinion meets the standards specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c), the respondent‘s request pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1120(a) for publication is GRANTED.
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the opinion meets the standards for publication specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c); and ORDERED that the words “Not to be Published in the Official Reports” appearing on page one of said opinion be deleted and the opinion herein to be published in the Official Reports.
McCONNELL, P. J.
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