A.M., a Minor, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. VENTURA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Respondents.
2d Civil No. B266650
(Super. Ct. No. 56-2013-00445601-CU-PO-VTA) (Ventura County)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SIX
Filed 10/12/16
D.G., as guardian ad litem for her minor daughter, A.M. (appellant), sued the Ventura Unified School District (District), Michael Tapia, and Gwen Fields (collectively respondents) for negligence. Appellant alleged, among other things, that respondents negligently allowed male students to sexually abuse her while at school. The trial court granted summary judgment for respondents, concluding that appellant failed to file the required government tort claim with the District.
Appellant concedes she did not file a tort claim, but asserts she was excused from doing so pursuant to
Because
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant was a second grade student at an elementary school in Ventura. Between September 2012 and April 2013, appellant allegedly was bullied, battered and sexually abused by some of her fellow students. A.R., a male student, hit and kicked her, touched her private parts, pinched her buttocks, hugged her and pressed himself against her. Another student exposed himself to appellant and rubbed his private parts on her. On one occasion, appellant was knocked unconscious.
D.G. reported the abuse to various District employees, including appellant‘s teacher (Fields) and the school‘s principal (Tapia). When D.G. attempted to see the superintendant, she was referred to another District employee, who referred her back to Tapia. According to D.G., the District did nothing to stop the attacks on appellant. Fields told D.G. that “[she needs] to fix things on [her] own,” and Tapia suggested that she move appellant to another school.
As a result of the bullying and attacks, appellant was afraid to go to school or to play outside with her friends. In April 2013, D.G. began homeschooling appellant.
In June 2013, appellant presented a tort claim to the County of Ventura, which is a separate entity from the District. The County of Ventura sent a notice of rejection. No claim was presented to the District.
Appellant and D.G. filed a complaint for damages against respondents for (1) negligent supervision of students; (2) negligent supervision of school premises; (3) violation of
Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground that the remaining three causes of action are barred due to appellant‘s failure to comply with the claims presentation requirement set forth in
The trial court rejected appellant‘s contention “that a claim was not required in the first place pursuant to an exception granted by
A. Standard of Review
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. (Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 1142.) In addition, “‘the interpretation and application of a statutory scheme to an undisputed set of facts is a question of law [citation] which is subject to de novo review on appeal. [Citation.]‘” (Bodell Construction Co. v. Trustees of Cal. State University (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1508, 1515.)
“We begin with the fundamental rule that our primary task is to determine the lawmakers’ intent” in enacting the relevant statute. (Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 798.) “In determining such intent, a court must look first to the words of the statute themselves, giving to the language its usual, ordinary import and according significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and sentence in pursuance of the legislative purpose. A construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided. The words of the statute must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible. [Citations.] Where uncertainty exists consideration should be given to the consequences that will flow from a particular interpretation. [Citation.] Both the legislative history of the statute and the wider historical circumstances of its enactment may be considered in ascertaining the legislative intent. [Citations.]” (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386-1387.)
B. Enactment of Government Code Section 905, Subdivision (m)
The Government Tort Claims Act (
As discussed more fully below,
In direct response to Shirk, the Legislature enacted
Appellant‘s complaint alleges that, while she was a second grade student at a Ventura elementary school in 2012 and 2013, respondents negligently failed to supervise “the conduct of children on school grounds and to enforce the rules and regulations
C. Interpretation and Application of Section 340.1
Notwithstanding this language, an action against third parties brought under
1. Relevant History of Amendments to Section 340.1
As a general rule, a cause of action for childhood sexual abuse accrues at the time of molestation. (John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438, 443.) Prior to the enactment of
In 1986 the Legislature enacted
Amendments in 1998 and 1999 applied an extended limitations period to third party defendants “who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, where a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse which resulted in the injury to the plaintiff,” with an absolute cutoff at age 26 regardless of when discovery occurred. (
2. Application of Section 340.1 to Appellant‘s Claims
The trial court determined that by creating a subcategory of third party defendants to which the expanded statute of limitations applies, the Legislature meant to also limit third-party claims arising out of
There is nothing to suggest that the Legislature intended to modify
Here, appellant is still a minor and therefore has no need to invoke the three-year revival provision in
Aaronoff v. Martinez-Senftner (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 910 does not aid respondents’ position. The plaintiff in that case was 40 years old when she sued her parents for damage inflicted by her father‘s sexual abuse. She claimed that because her parents were in business together, her father was her mother‘s agent. (Id. at p. 923.) On that basis she argued that her case fell within
Nor are we persuaded by S.M. v. Los Angeles Unified School District, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th 712, in which the court determined that the plaintiff‘s cause of action accrued for purposes of the tort claim presentation requirement when she learned of the
Respondents argue that even if the trial court did misconstrue the application of
Second, respondents contend appellant‘s defense fails because appellant is not in the class of persons for whom
Third, respondents maintain that acts alleged to have been committed by seven-year-old children do not fall within the definition of “childhood sexual abuse” in
Appellant‘s complaint alleges that between September 2012 and April 2013, appellant was sexually abused by two of her fellow students. A.R., a male student, touched her private parts, pinched her buttocks, hugged her and pressed himself against her, while another student exposed himself to her and also rubbed his private parts on her. These actions qualify as lewd and lascivious acts committed upon a child under the age of 14. (See
Respondents argue that these students are not legally responsible for these acts because
Finally, the legislative history of
In sum, we conclude that appellant‘s claim for liability against respondents is subject to the limitations period in
DISPOSITION
We reverse the judgment and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings on appellant‘s claims for childhood sexual abuse. Appellant shall recover her costs on appeal.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
PERREN, J.
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
TANGEMAN, J.
Superior Court County of Ventura
Law Offices of Robert S. Gerstein and Robert S. Gerstein; Law Offices of Robert H. Tourtelot, PLC and Robert H. Tourtelot for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Woo Houska LLP, Carol A. Woo and Maureen M. Houska for Defendants and Respondents.