CITY OF SAN JOSE, as Successor Agency, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. VINOD K. SHARMA, as Director, etc., et al., Defendants and Appellants.
No. C074539
Third Dist.
Nov. 3, 2016.
123
Richard Doyle, City Attorney, Nora Frimann, Assistant City Attorney, Ardell Johnson and Margo Laskowska, Deputy City Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Douglas J. Woods, Assistant Attorney General, Constance L. LeLouis and Aaron Jones, Deputy Attorneys General, for Department of Finance as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
Remcho, Johansen & Purcell, Robin B. Johansen, Karen Getman, Harry Berezin; Orry P. Korb, County Counsel, and Steve Mitra, Assistant County Counsel, for Defendants and Appellants.
NICHOLSON, Acting P. J.—This dispute is over who is entitled to real property “tax increment” revenue after the statutory dissolution of the San Jose Redevelopment Agency. The trial court held that tax increment revenue from a real property tax imposed to raise funds for the pension obligations of Santa Clara County is properly distributed to the Redevelopment Property Tax Trust Fund to pay the debts of the former redevelopment agency. Santa Clara County, with its Director of Finance Vinod K. Sharma, contends on appeal that this holding was erroneous. The trial court also held that statutes dissolving the former redevelopment agency require that certain tax increment revenue be passed through from the Redevelopment Property Tax Trust Fund to Santa Clara County instead of being used to meet the enforceable obligations of the former redevelopment agency. The City of San Jose, as the successor of the redevelopment agency, contends on appeal that this holding was erroneous. Thus, both parties appeal.
We conclude that the trial court did not err.
BACKGROUND
Some history of real property taxation, public finances, and redevelopment in California and Santa Clara County will provide the framework for our discussion of the issues presented in this case.
In 1944, Santa Clara County voters approved Measure 13. The new law authorized Santa Clara County (the County) to participate in what eventually became the Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS). To finance this participation, the new law imposed “a special tax sufficient to raise the amount required to provide sufficient revenue,” which tax we refer to in this opinion as the retirement levy. This retirement levy is an ad valorem tax on real property in the County, or, in other words, a tax calculated as a percentage of the real property‘s assessed value. While that percentage has varied over the years, in recent years it has been 0.0338 percent, which means that, for every $1,000 in assessed value, the retirement levy imposes a tax of 33.8 cents on real property in the County.
In 1945, the California Legislature authorized local governments to create redevelopment agencies to revitalize blighted communities. These agencies had authority to acquire real property through purchase and eminent domain, dispose of property, build infrastructure, and improve public facilities in the agency‘s project area. But funding for the agencies was scarce because they had no power to levy taxes. (California Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos (2011) 53 Cal.4th 231, 245-246 [135 Cal.Rptr.3d 683, 267 P.3d 580] (Matosantos).)
“Under [the tax increment financing] method, those public entities entitled to receive property tax revenue in a redevelopment project area (the cities, counties, special districts, and school districts containing territory in the area) are allocated a portion based on the assessed value of the property prior to the effective date of the redevelopment plan. Any tax revenue in excess of that amount—the tax increment created by the increased value of project area property—goes to the redevelopment agency for repayment of debt incurred to finance the project. (
Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 16, subds. (a) , (b); [Health & Saf. Code,] § 33670, subds. (a) , (b); [citation].) In essence, property tax revenues for entities other than the redevelopment agency are frozen, while revenue from any increase in value is awarded to the redevelopment agency on the theory that the increase is the result of redevelopment. [Citation.]“The property tax increment revenue received by a redevelopment agency must be held in a special fund for repayment of indebtedness ([
Health & Saf. Code,] § 33670, subd. (b) ), but the law does not restrict the amount of tax increment received in a given year to that needed for loan repayments in that year. [Citation.] The only limit on the annual increment payment received is that it may not exceed the agency‘s total debt, less its revenue on hand. ([Health & Saf. Code,] § 33675, subd. (g) .) Once the entire debt incurred for a project has been repaid, all property tax revenue in the project area is allocated to local taxing agencies according to the ordinary formula. ([Health & Saf. Code,] § 33670, subd. (b) .)“A powerful and flexible tool for community economic development, tax increment financing nonetheless ‘has sometimes been misused to subsidize a city‘s economic development through the diversion of property tax revenues from other taxing entities . . . .’ [Citations.] This practice became more common in the era of constricted local tax revenue that followed the passage of Proposition 13. Some small cities with blighted areas available for industrial redevelopment ‘were able to shield virtually all of their property tax revenue from other government agencies,’ but ‘[e]ven in ordinary cities . . . the temptation to use redevelopment as a financial weapon was
considerable. Because it limited increases in property tax rates, Proposition 13 created a kind of shell game among local government agencies for property tax funds. The only way to obtain more funds was to take them from another agency. Redevelopment proved to be one of the most powerful mechanisms for gaining an advantage in the shell game.’ [Citation.] . . . [Citations.]
“Addressing these concerns, the Legislature has required redevelopment agencies to make certain transfers of their tax increment revenue for other local needs. First, 20 percent of the revenue generally must be deposited in a fund for provision of low- and moderate-income housing. ([
Health & Saf. Code,] §§ 33334.2 , 33334.3, 33334.6; [citation].) Second, redevelopment agencies must make a graduated series of pass-through payments to local government taxing agencies such as cities, counties, and school districts from tax increment on projects adopted or expanded after 1994. ([Health & Saf. Code,] § 33607.5, subd. (a)(2) ; [citation].) The payments are distributed according to the taxing agencies’ ordinary shares of property taxes. [Citation.]” (Matosantos, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 246-248, italics omitted.)
In 1956, the City of San Jose established the San Jose Redevelopment Agency, which began receiving tax increment revenue. The agency used its future entitlement to tax increment as security for debt incurred for redevelopment projects. Since 1956, all tax increment revenue associated with the retirement levy in the agency‘s project area has been distributed to the redevelopment agency.
The continued imposition of the retirement levy, which is an ad valorem real property tax over and above Proposition 13‘s 1 percent limitation, is legal because it was imposed to pay for “[i]ndebtedness” incurred before July 1, 1978, which is an exception to Proposition 13‘s 1 percent limitation. (
In 1986, California voters approved Proposition 62,3 which added
In the process of winding down the affairs of the San Jose Redevelopment Agency, the successor agency and County disagreed on two issues, framed by the trial court as follows: (1) ”Is the City, successor agency to the San Jose Redevelopment Agency, entitled to receive the tax increment portion of the property tax levied in 1944 to fund the County‘s retirement obligations [the retirement levy]?” And (2) ”Is revenue that would be allocated to the County pursuant to a ‘passthrough agreement’ between the County and former redevelopment agency subject to payment of any debt of the redevelopment agency, or only as needed to pay the agency‘s bond debt?” (Original boldface & italics.) The trial court responded that (1) the successor agency is entitled to the tax increment portion of the retirement levy to put toward the winding down of the former redevelopment agency, and (2) tax increment revenue not needed to pay bond debt of the former redevelopment agency is subject to the pass-through agreement, meaning that, instead of being used to pay nonbond debt of the former redevelopment agency, the tax increment revenue not needed to pay bond debt is to be passed through to the County.
Instead of distributing tax increment revenue associated with the retirement levy, the County retained those disputed funds and impounded them pending resolution of this litigation.
The County and the successor agency each filed a notice of appeal from the trial court‘s judgment on the successor agency‘s petition for writ of mandate and the County‘s cross-petition for writ of mandate. The County contends the trial court erred on the first issue, concerning the tax increment revenue on the retirement levy, and the successor agency contends the trial court erred on the second issue, concerning what tax increment revenues were to pass through to the County.5
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The parties agree that the facts are undisputed, and that we must independently apply statutory and constitutional law to determine whether the trial court was correct. (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1191 [151 Cal.Rptr.3d 827, 292 P.3d 871].)
“The rules governing statutory construction are well settled. We begin with the fundamental premise that the objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. [Citations.] ‘In determining intent, we look first to the language of the statute, giving effect to its “plain meaning.” [Citations.] Although we may properly rely on extrinsic aids, we should first turn to the words of the statute to determine the intent of the Legislature. [Citation.] Where the words of the statute are clear, we may not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history. [Citation.]‘” (Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556, 562 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 531, 828 P.2d 672].)
The same rules apply generally to our interpretation of the California Constitution. We endeavor to ascertain and effectuate the voters’ intent. (Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil (2006) 39 Cal.4th 205, 212 [46 Cal.Rptr.3d 73, 138 P.3d 220].)
DISCUSSION
I
Retirement Levy
The County contends the trial court erred by finding that the tax increment revenue associated with the retirement levy in the redevelopment project area must be allocated to the successor agency. The County argues that, because the retirement levy is a special tax, it can be used only for the purpose for which it was enacted—that is, to meet the County‘s retirement obligations with CalPERS. We disagree. The tax increment revenue associated with the retirement levy is properly distributed to the successor agency under
A. Application of Section 16
The retirement levy is an ad valorem tax because it is based on the assessed value of the real property. Therefore,
B. County‘s Arguments
Despite this straightforward application, the County‘s arguments on appeal consist of urging us to construe this unambiguous constitutional provision differently. Mainly, the County argues that (1) the retirement levy is a special tax that can be used only to help satisfy the County‘s retirement obligations, (2) payment of the tax increment portion of the retirement levy to the redevelopment agency or its successor constitutes a prohibited gift of public funds, and (3) diverting retirement levy funds violates the vested rights of county employees. None of these arguments has merit.
1. Special Tax
Under Proposition 218, approved in 1996, “‘[s]pecial tax’ means any tax imposed for specific purposes . . . .” (
As chronicled above, California voters approved Proposition 62 in 1986, which added
This provision of the
Also as chronicled above, Proposition 218 placed in the Constitution Proposition 62 with respect to votes necessary to impose taxes, but it did not include the provision limiting the purpose for which revenues from a special tax may be used. In other words,
To the extent
The County also asks us to look to the ballot arguments in favor of Proposition 18, which is the 1952 initiative that eventually became
Finally, the County claims that the dissolution law somehow recognized that special taxes such as the retirement levy are not included in the tax increment revenue used to pay the debts of the former redevelopment agencies. The County focuses on two provisions of the dissolution law that require that tax increment revenues necessary to pay the debts of the former redevelopment agency be directed to pay those debts but that tax increment revenues not needed to meet the enforceable obligations of the former redevelopment agency be redirected to the usual recipients of property tax
We disagree with the County that the Legislature‘s reference to tax increment revenue associated with the 1 percent limitation of Proposition 13 provides any evidence that the Legislature recognized a difference between general and special taxes in allocating money to pay the debts of the former redevelopment agencies. As discussed above,
In summary, nothing in the law concerning special taxes prohibits distribution of the tax increment portion of the retirement levy to the successor agency to pay the former redevelopment agency‘s debts.
2. Gift of Public Funds
The County‘s argument that use of tax increment revenue associated with the retirement levy constitutes an unconstitutional gift of public funds fails
“The Legislature shall have no power to . . . make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any public money or thing of value to any individual, municipal or other corporation whatever . . . .” (
Interpreting this constitutional provision, the California Supreme Court has held: “[A] contribution from one public agency to another for a purely local purpose of the donee agency is in violation of the constitutional prohibition, but . . . such a contribution is legal if it serves the public purpose of the donor agency even though it is beneficial to local purposes of the donee agency.” (Santa Barbara etc. Agency v. All Persons (1957) 47 Cal.2d 699, 707 [306 P.2d 875], revd. on other grounds sub. nom. Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken (1958) 357 U.S. 275 [2 L.Ed.2d 1313, 78 S.Ct. 1174], mod. Santa Barbara County Water Agency v. All Persons & Parties (1960) 53 Cal.2d 743 [3 Cal.Rptr. 348, 350 P.2d 100].)
The County asserts that distributing the tax increment portion of the retirement levy to the successor agency to pay debts of the former redevelopment agency is a gift of public funds from the County to the successor agency. To the contrary, the tax increment portion of the retirement levy has, since 1956, been a tax on real property within the former redevelopment agency‘s project area to finance redevelopment in that area. The tax increment portion of the retirement levy never belonged to the County.
The cases cited by the County do not support the County‘s position.
For example, in City of Oakland v. Garrison (1924) 194 Cal. 298 [228 P. 433], the California Supreme Court held that use of Alameda County funds to improve a road in the City of Oakland did not constitute a prohibited gift of public funds because the funds were to be devoted to a public purpose and improvement of the street within the city is of general interest to the county. (Id. at pp. 303-305.) Here, the situation is similar in that redevelopment in the City is a public purpose and is of general interest to the County. Thus, there is no prohibited gift of funds, even if we assume that the tax increment portion of the retirement levy ever belonged to the County.
In Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. v. Luehring (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 204 [84 Cal.Rptr. 291], the Golden Gate Bridge and Highway District had surplus funds that the district‘s directors desired to transfer to the counties in the district, but the district‘s general manager and auditor opposed the transfer.
Finally, the County argues that our interpretation “assume[s] that [
3. County Employees’ Vested Rights
The County argues that “diversion of retirement levy funds violates the vested rights of County employees.” (Some capitalization omitted.) This argument suffers from the same flaw as the other arguments—the tax increment portion of the retirement levy was never designated to meet the County‘s retirement obligations. By law, the tax increment portion has always been designated to meet the obligations of the former redevelopment agency. Since it has always been designated to meet the obligations of the former redevelopment agency, County employees are not entitled to those funds.
In any event, use of the tax increment portion of the retirement levy to pay the obligations of the former redevelopment agency does not impair any vested rights of County employees because the County has failed to show any actual impairment of any vested right. “A public employee‘s pension constitutes an element of compensation, and a vested contractual right to pension benefits accrues upon acceptance of employment. Such a pension right may not be destroyed, once vested, without impairing a contractual obligation of the employing public entity. [Citation.]” (Betts v. Board of Administration of Public Employees’ Retirement System (1978) 21 Cal.3d 859, 863 [148 Cal.Rptr. 158, 582 P.2d 614].) To support a claim that a public employee‘s pension rights have been impaired, the proponent of that claim must present “a factual record disclosing present, specific and substantial impairment of [the] contract . . . .” (Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 241 [149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281] (Amador Valley).)
The County argues, however, that its ability to fund the pension benefits without the entirety of the retirement levy does not mean that the County employees’ vested rights to their pension benefit have not been violated. In support of this proposition, the County cites Patton v. City of Alameda (1985) 40 Cal.3d 41, 43 [219 Cal.Rptr. 1, 706 P.2d 1135] (Patton). But that case is unhelpful to the County on this issue. In Patton, the California Supreme Court was asked to construe part of an exemption to the 1 percent ad valorem tax found in Proposition 13, which exemption allowed the county to impose an ad valorem tax in addition to the 1 percent tax. That exemption applied, by the terms of the initiative, if the tax was imposed to pay “[i]ndebtedness” incurred before Proposition 13 was approved. (
In this context, relating to whether the library services tax was exempt from the 1 percent limitation of Proposition 13, the Patton court held:
“[T]he issue is not whether the city can comply with [the provision mandating support of library services] without imposing the override tax [in addition to the 1 percent tax], but whether it must do so. In [Patton], the money for funding the pensions might also have come from the 1 percent ad valorem tax levied under subdivision (a) [of Proposition 13]. Yet the fact that
the voters had obligated themselves to establish a pension system and to tax themselves to fund it before article XIII A [of the California Constitution] became effective was held to allow imposition of a tax in addition to the 1 percent allowed by subdivision (a).” (Patton, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 47.)
Contrary to the County‘s suggestion, this quote has nothing to do with the vested rights of County employees. Instead, it relates only to whether the county could impose the library services tax over and above Proposition 13‘s 1 percent limitation.
The County has failed to establish that the distribution of the tax increment portion of the retirement levy to pay the obligations of the former redevelopment agency since 1956 has violated the vested rights of County employees.
II
Priority of Distribution
The second issue is similarly a question of determining what the text of the law (in this instance, a statute) provides on its face and interpreting the law consistently with that text because the language is unambiguous. This issue relates to how much of the tax increment revenue must be passed through to the County rather than used to meet the enforceable obligations of the former redevelopment agency. We conclude that the trial court properly interpreted the relevant statute,
A. Interpretation of Health and Safety Code Provisions
Under the dissolution law, which includes
Subdivision (a) of
Subdivision (a) of
(1) Administrative costs incurred by the auditor-controller in administering the dissolution law. - (2) Statutory and contractual pass-throughs. The pass-through at issue in this case is the result of an agreement between the former redevelopment agency and the County.
- (3) Payments listed in the recognized obligation payment schedule (ROPS) prepared by the successor agency. The ROPS, generally speaking, is a list of the former redevelopment agency‘s enforceable obligations. (City of Emeryville v. Cohen (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 293, 299 [182 Cal.Rptr.3d 578].)
- (4) Administrative costs of the successor agency.
- (5) Distributions to local agencies and school entities (other than distributions made under pass-through agreements) that ordinarily receive property tax revenues. This distribution applies simply to the remainder after the first four priorities are satisfied. Therefore, if there is no remainder, there is nothing to distribute. (
Health & Saf. Code, § 34183, subd. (a) .)
Thus, the waterfall provides that the payment to the County under the contractual pass-through agreement has priority over the payments to meet the former redevelopment agency‘s enforceable obligations listed in the ROPS. But the waterfall assumes that there are sufficient funds to cover the allocations. Here, the parties agree that the tax increment revenue in the trust fund is not sufficient to make all the payments listed in the waterfall. That condition—the trust fund‘s inability to make all the waterfall payments—brings into play the reverse waterfall, provided for in
Subdivision (b) of
(1) The part of the tax increment revenue to be distributed to local agencies and school entities after all other priorities have been satisfied. - (2) Administrative costs of the successor agency.
- (3) Statutory and contractual pass-through agreements, but with a condition and a limitation. To the extent that funds can be deducted from the statutory and contractual pass-through agreements, they can be applied to the enforceable obligations of the former redevelopment agency listed in the ROPS. (
Health & Saf. Code, § 34183, subd. (b) .)
The condition for deducting a contractual pass-through agreement (the only type of pass-through relevant here) from the deficiency in the waterfall is that the pass-through agreement must be, by its own terms, subordinate to the former agency‘s payments on enforceable obligations. “If [a redevelopment] agency, . . . as expressly provided in a passthrough agreement . . . made passthrough payment obligations subordinate to debt service payments required for enforceable obligations, [this provision applies].” (
That leaves a determination of what limitation is to be placed on the amount deducted from payment of pass-through funds to pay the former redevelopment agency‘s enforceable obligations. This is the main dispute between the parties on the pass-through issue. The successor agency asserts there is no limitation to what can be deducted to service the former redevelopment agency‘s debt, while the County argues that only funds sufficient to service the former redevelopment agency‘s bond debt may be deducted. The plain language of the statute supports the County‘s argument.
B. Successor Agency‘s Arguments
Despite the clarity of the reverse-waterfall provision of
1. Legislative Intent
The successor agency‘s first argument, that the plain language of
2. Rights of Unsecured Third Party Creditors
The successor agency argues that the plain language of
In another redevelopment case, the California Supreme Court considered a similar argument. It wrote that it would not consider the impairment of contracts issue because the successor agency had no standing to assert the impairment of contracts claims. (Amador Valley, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 239-240.) We also decline to consider the issue without a proper party involved. In any event, we see no way to interpret the language in the way that would satisfy the successor agency without doing violence to the statutory language.
Also, the
3. State Controller‘s Interpretation of the Statute
The successor agency argues that the State Controller agrees with its interpretation of
On June 22, 2012, the State Controller sent a letter to the County disagreeing with some of the County‘s analysis concerning the distribution of tax increment revenue. In the sentence most applicable to this issue, the State Controller wrote: “Specifically, we do not concur that the planned county pass-through payment cannot be subordinated for the purposes of servicing the bonded debt appearing on the successor‘s Recognized Obligation Payment Schedule.” The successor agency fails to quote this sentence and, instead, overgeneralizes, as follows: “The State Controller‘s analysis was consistent with the Legislature‘s intent to restrict auditor-controllers from withholding or deducting any amount from [Health and Safety Code section] 34183[, subdivision] (a)(2) disbursements for payment of enforceable obligations.” This general statement does not take into account the State Controller‘s limitation of its opinion to “servicing the bonded debt.” Because (1) the State Controller‘s letter does not appear to support the successor agency‘s argument that the County‘s pass-through payment must be subordinated to all enforceable obligations and (2) the successor agency does not quote this part of the letter and explain how it supports the successor agency‘s position, we cannot conclude that the State Controller agrees with the successor agency‘s interpretation of the effect of the reverse-waterfall provisions.
The successor agency rattles off several reasons why the County must comply with the State Controller‘s directions. Notably, no authority is proffered for any of these reasons. Therefore, the argument is forfeited, even if we were to assume for the purpose of argument that the State Controller‘s interpretation of the reverse-waterfall provisions is consistent with the successor agency‘s argument on appeal.
The successor agency argues: “The County had a mandatory duty to follow the State Controller‘s June 22, 2012 directions. If the County disagreed with the Controller‘s decision, it should have challenged it by bringing a mandamus action, not by refusing to comply with the Controller‘s order. Unilaterally withholding money, as the County did in this case, is not part of any procedure authorized by the dissolution law. The trial court should not have countermanded the State Controller‘s order by allowing the County to retain funds after the Controller directed the County to make them available to [the successor agency] for payment of enforceable obligations.” (Fn. omitted.)
This court is not obligated to act as counsel for the successor agency and search for authority to support its legal contentions. We therefore reject
4. Language of Pass-through Agreement
Finally, the successor agency contends that the contractual pass-through agreement does not support our interpretation of the reverse-waterfall provision. This contention is without merit because the pass-through agreement provides that the County would be entitled to pass-through funds provided by future legislation, such as the provisions of the dissolution law.
Even though the pass-through agreement between the County and the former redevelopment agency stated that the pass-through was to be subordinated to all of the former redevelopment agency‘s enforceable obligations, the agreement also provided: “It is hereby understood by and between the parties that under no circumstances shall the amount of money paid to the County by virtue of any provisions of this Agreement be less than the statutory pass through amount presently provided in
The dissolution law, as discussed above, with its waterfall and reverse-waterfall provisions, resulted in the County‘s entitlement to more pass-through funds because the pass-through is now subordinated only to the former redevelopment agency‘s bond debt. This change in the law redounds to the benefit of the County under the pass-through agreement‘s clause that the revenue distributed to the County would not be less than provided for by future legislation. Therefore, the pass-through agreement is consistent with our conclusion that
Because we conclude that the pass-through agreement between the County and the former redevelopment agency anticipated and incorporated future changes in the law, we need not discuss at length the Legislature‘s right to modify agreements made between the state‘s subordinate political entities. We note only that those subordinate political entities are ” ‘creatures’ ” of the state and have no standing to challenge state action on due process or impairment of contracts grounds. (Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1, 6 [227 Cal.Rptr. 391, 719 P.2d 987].)
III
Senate Bill No. 107
After the parties filed their briefs on appeal, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 107 (2015–2016 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 107), amending the dissolution law. The County asserts that Senate Bill 107 applies to this case and requires allocation of the funds held in the impound account (pending resolution of this litigation) to the County for payment of its retirement obligations rather than to the trust fund.
Senate Bill 107 provides that revenues raised pursuant to a local pension levy cannot be paid to the trust fund unless the revenue is pledged as security for the payment of an indebtedness obligation and is needed to pay that obligation.9 (
We conclude (1) Senate Bill 107 does not apply to taxes collected under the retirement levy before Senate Bill 107 (eff. Sept. 22, 2015), and (2) whether tax increment from the retirement levy was pledged as security for indebtedness of the former redevelopment agency and needed to pay that indebtedness is beyond the scope of appellate review.10
A. Property Taxes Collected Before Enactment of Senate Bill 107
Senate Bill 107 took effect immediately because it provided for appropriations related to the budget bill. (Stats. 2015, ch. 325, § 31; see
This argument refers to additional language included in the provision of Senate Bill 107 just discussed concerning revenues raised pursuant to a local pension levy. The additional language provides that all “allocations” of property tax revenue before June 15, 2015, “to make payments in support of pension programs . . . are valid and shall not be affected by this section.” (
The County‘s attempt to use this additional language in the statute to validate its allocation of the tax increment revenue associated with the retirement levy to pay the retirement obligations of the County rather than to the trust fund to put toward the winding down of the former redevelopment
When this litigation began, the county auditor-controller, in the County‘s words, “impounded the funds so that they would not be spent pending resolution of the dispute with the City.” Impounding the funds so that they are not spent is different from allocating the funds “to make payments in support of pension programs.” (
The County claims that retaining the funds from the retirement levy tax increment and impounding them rather than paying them to the trust fund constituted allocating those funds, especially since the County did not turn the funds over to the trust fund. This stretches too thin the definition of “allocation” and is entirely inconsistent with the specific use of that word in the new statute. That statute validates “allocations of revenues . . . to make payments in support of pension programs.” (
Because Senate Bill 107 was not made retroactive and the validation provision of
B. Property Taxes Collected After Enactment of Senate Bill 107
Under Senate Bill 107, revenues raised pursuant to a local pension levy cannot be paid to the trust fund “unless the amounts in question are pledged as security for the payment of any indebtedness obligation, as defined in subdivision (e) of Section 34171, and needed for payment thereof.” (
On the other hand, the successor agency wants us to take judicial notice of official letters supporting a position that the trust fund has not had sufficient funds to meet all of its obligations over the past several years.
We are not well positioned to resolve these issues, which should be resolved in the first instance, if necessary, in a trial court proceeding. (See In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 414 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 683, 73 P.3d 541]; Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 184, fn. 1 [151 Cal.Rptr. 837, 588 P.2d 1261] [evidence not presented in the trial proceeding is beyond the scope of appellate review].) Therefore, we decline to consider what effect, if any, Senate Bill 107 has on tax increment associated with the retirement levy after September 22, 2015, the date of enactment of Senate Bill 107.12
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed as to tax increment funds before September 22, 2015, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings as to tax increment
Robie, J., and Murray, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied November 30, 2016, and the petition of defendants and appellants for review by the Supreme Court was denied February 1, 2017, S238918.
Notes
On October 26, 2015, the County filed a request for judicial notice of (1) a bill analysis of Senate Bill 107 by the Senate Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review and (2) an undated document entitled “Five-Year Economic Forecast and Revenue Projections—2016-2020.” The request is granted as to the bill analysis and denied as to the economic forecast and revenue projections document.
The County also filed, on July 28, 2014, a request for judicial notice of (1) a letter from the City of San Jose‘s director of finance regarding the City‘s ability to pay debt service, (2) ballot pamphlet materials for Proposition 87 (Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1988)), (3) excerpts from Assembly Bill No. 26 X1 (2011-2012 1st Ex. Sess.), and (4) the Assembly Floor Analysis for Assembly Bill No. 26 X1. The request is denied as to the first document and granted as to the remaining documents.
On November 25, 2015, the successor agency filed a request for judicial notice of five letters from the county auditor-controller to the State Controller concerning the sufficiency of funds to meet the trust fund‘s obligations. The request is denied.
