KANSAS v. GARCIA
No. 17-834
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided March 3, 2020
589 U.S. ___ (2020)
ALITO, J.
OCTOBER TERM, 2019
Syllabus
NOTE: Whеre it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
KANSAS v. GARCIA
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS
No. 17-834. Argued October 16, 2019—Decided March 3, 2020*
Syllabus
upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.”
Kansas makes it a crime to commit “identity theft” or engage in fraud to obtain a benefit. Respondents, three unauthorized aliens, were tried for fraudulently using another person‘s Social Security number on the W-4‘s and K-4‘s that they submitted upon obtaining employment. They had used the same Social Security numbers on their I-9 forms. Respondents werе convicted, and the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed. A divided Kansas Supreme Court reversed, concluding that
Held:
1. The Kansas statutes under which respondents were convicted are not expressly preempted. IRCA‘s express preemption provision applies only to employers and those who recruit or refer prospective employees and is thus plainly inapplicable. The Kansas Supreme Court instead relied on
Syllabus
2. Respondents’ argument that Kansas‘s laws are preempted by implication is also rejected. Pp. 15-20.
(a) The laws do not fall into a field that is implicitly reserved exclusively for federal regulation, including respondents’ claimed field of “fraud on the federal verification system.” The submission of tax-withholding forms is neither part of, nor
(b) There is likewise no ground for holding that the Kansas statutes at issue conflict with federal law. It is certainly possible to comply with both IRCA and the Kansas statutes, and respondents do not suggest otherwise. They instead maintain that the Kansas statutes, as applied in their prosecutions, stand as “an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes” of IRCA—one of which is purportedly that the initiation of any legal action against an unauthorized alien for using a false identity in applying for employment should rest exclusively within the prosecutorial discretion of federal authorities. Respondents analogize their case to Arizona v. United States, 567 U. S. 387, 404-407, where the Court concluded that a state law making it a crime for an unauthorized alien to obtain employment conflicted with IRCA, which does not criminalize that conduct. But here, Congress made no decision that an unauthorized alien who uses a false identity on tax-withholding forms should not face criminal prosecution, and it has made using fraudulent information on a W-4 a federal crime. Moreover, in the present cases, there is certainly no suggestion that the Kansas prosecutions frustrated any federal interests. Federal authorities played a role in all three cases, and the Federal Government fully supports Kansas‘s position in this Court. In the end, however, the possibility that federal enforcement priorities might be upset is not enough to provide a basis for preemption. The Supremacy Clause gives priority to “the Laws of the United States,” not the criminal law enforcement priorities or preferences of federal officers. Art. VI, cl. 2. Pp. 18-20.
306 Kan. 1113, 401 P. 3d 588 (first judgment); 306 Kan. 1100, 401 P. 3d 155 (second judgment); and 306 Kan. 1107, 401 P. 3d 159 (third judgment), reversed and remanded.
Syllabus
ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined. BREYER, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made bеfore the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 17-834
KANSAS, PETITIONER v. RAMIRO GARCIA
KANSAS, PETITIONER v. DONALDO MORALES
KANSAS, PETITIONER v. GUADALUPE OCHOA-LARA
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS
[March 3, 2020]
JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
Kansas law makes it a crime to commit “identity theft” or engage in fraud to
Opinion of the Court
in question, as well as respondents’ alternative arguments based on implied preemption. We therefore reverse.
I
A
The foundation of our laws on immigration and naturalization is the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat. 163, as amended,
With the enactment of IRCA, Congress took a different approach. IRCA made it unlawful to hire an alien knowing that he or she is unauthorized to work in the United States.
Opinion of the Court
IRCA concomitantly imposes duties on all employees, regardless of citizenship. No later than their first day of employment, all еmployees must complete an I-9 and attest that they fall into a category of persons who are authorized to work in the United States.
While IRCA imposes these requirements on employers and employees, it also limits the use of I-9 forms. A provision entitled “Limitation on use of attestation form,”
Although IRCA expressly regulates the use of I-9‘s and documents appended to that form, no provision of IRCA directly addresses the use of other documents, such as federal
Opinion of the Court
and state tax-withholding forms, that an employee may complete upon beginning a new job. A federal regulation provides that all employees must furnish their employers with a signed withholding exemption certificate when they start a new job, but federal law apparently does not require the discharge of an employee who fails to do so. See
Kansas uses a tax-withholding form (K-4) that is similar to the federal form.
Finally, IRCA contains a provision that expressly “preempt[s] any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.”
B
Like other States, Kansas has laws against fraud, forgeries, and identity theft. These statutes apply to citizens and
Opinion of the Court
aliens alike and are not limited to conduct that occurs in connection with employment. The Kansas identity-theft statute criminalizes the “using” of any “personal identifying information” belonging to another person with the intent to “[d]efraud that person,
Kansas‘s false-information statute criminalizes, among other things, “making, generating, distributing or drawing” a “written instrument” with knowledge that it “falsely states or represents some material matter” and “with intent to defraud, obstruct the detection of a theft or felony offense or induce official action.”
The respondents in the three cases now before us are aliens who are not authorized to work in this country but nevertheless secured employment by using the identity of other persons on the I-9 forms that they completed when they applied for work. They also used these same false identities when they completed their W-4‘s and K-4‘s. All three respondents were convicted under one or both of the Kansas laws just mentioned for fraudulently using another person‘s Social Security number on tax-withholding forms. We summarize the pertinent facts related to these three prosecutions.
C
Ramiro Garcia. In August 2012, a local patrol officer stopped Garcia for speeding and learned that Garcia had been previously contacted by a financial crimes detective about possible identity theft. App. 39-44, 89–91; 306 Kan. 1113, 1114, 401 P. 3d 588, 590 (2017). Local authorities ob-
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tained the documents that Garcia had completed when he began work at a restaurant, and a joint state-federal investigation discovered that Garcia had used another person‘s Social Security number on his I-9, W-4, and K-4 forms. The State then charged Garcia with identity theft. The complaint alleged that, when he began work at the restaurant, he used another person‘s Social Security number with the intent to defraud and in order to receive a benefit. App. 9-10.
Donaldo Morales. A joint state-federal investigation of Morales began after the Kansas Department of Labor notified a Social Security agent that an еmployee at a local restaurant was using a Social Security number that did not match the identifying information in the department‘s files. 306 Kan. 1100, 1101, 401 P. 3d 155, 156 (2017); App. to Pet. for Cert. 73; App. 124-125, 168–170. A federal agent contacted the restaurant and learned that Morales had used another person‘s Social Security number on his I-9, W-4, and K-4 forms. The federal agent arrested Morales, who then admitted that he had bought the Social Security number from someone he met in a park. App. 171-172; 306 Kan., at 1101-1102, 401 P. 3d, at 156; App. to Pet. for Cert.73. This information was turned over to state prosecutors, who charged Morales with identity theft and making false information. App. 124–125; 306 Kan., at 1101, 401 P. 3d, at 156.
Guadalupe Ochoa-Lara. Ochoa-Lara came to the attention of a joint state-federal task force after officers learned that he had used a Social Security number issued to someone else when he leased an apartment. 306 Kan. 1107, 1108-1109, 401 P. 3d 159, 160–161 (2017). The individual to whom this number was lawfully assigned advised the investigating officers that she had no knowledge that another person was using her number, and she later told authorities
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that income that she had not earned had been reported under her number. Id., at 1109, 401 P. 3d, at 160. After contacting the restaurant where Ochoa-Lara worked, investigators determined that he had also used the same Social Security number to complete his I-9 and W-4 forms. Ibid. The State charged Ochoa-Lara with identity theft and making false information for using another‘s Social Security number on those documents.
D
In all three cases, respondents argued before trial that IRCA preempted their prosecutions. They relied on
The trial courts allowed the State to proceed with the charges based on those forms. The State entered the K-4‘s and W-4‘s into evidence against Garcia and Morales, and Ochoa-Lara stipulated to using a stolen Social Security number оn a W-4. App. 109–110; 306 Kan., at 1108–1109, 401 P. 3d, at 160-161.1 Respondents were convicted, and
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three separate panels of the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed their convictions.
A divided Kansas Supreme Court reversed, concluding that “the plain and unambiguous language of
Justice Luckert concurred based on implied, not express, preemption. In her view, IRCA occupies “the field” within which the prosecutions at issue fell, namely, “the use of false documents, including those using the identity of others, when an unauthorized alien seeks employment.” Id. at 1136, 401 P. 3d, at 602. Justice Luckert also opined that the Kansas statutes, as applied in these cases, conflict with IRCA because they “usur[p] federal enforcement discretion” regarding the treatment of
Two members of the court, Justices Biles and Stegall, dissented, and we granted review. 586 U. S. ___ (2019).
Opinion of the Court
II
The Supremacy Clause provides that the Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties constitute “the supreme Law of the Land.”
In all cases, the federal restrictions or rights that are said to conflict with state law must stem from either the Constitution itself or a valid statute enacted by Congress. “There is no federal preemption in vacuo,” without a constitutional text, federal statute, or treaty made under the authority of the United States. Puerto Rico Dept. of Consumer Affairs v. ISLA Petroleum Corp., 485 U. S. 495, 503 (1988); see also Whiting, 563 U. S., at 599 (preemption cannot be based on “a ‘freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension with federal objectives.‘“) (citation omitted); Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 587 U. S. ___ (2019) (lead opinion of GORSUCH, J.) (slip op., at 3) (“Invoking some brooding federal interest or appealing to a judicial policy preference” does not show preemption).
In some cases, a federal statute may expressly preempt state law. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Comm‘n, 461 U. S. 190, 203 (1983) (“It is well established that within constitutional limits Congress may preempt state authority by so stating in express terms.“). But it has long been established thаt preemption may also occur by virtue of restrictions or rights that are inferred from statutory law. See, e.g., Os-
Opinion of the Court
born v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 865 (1824) (rejecting argument that a federal exemption from state regulation “not being expressed, ought not to be implied by the Court“). And recent cases have often held state laws to be impliedly preempted. See, e.g., Arizona 567 U. S., at 400–408; Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp., 565 U. S. 625, 630-631 (2012); PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U. S. 604, 617-618 (2011).
In these cases, respondents do not contend that the Kansas statutes under which they were convicted are preempted in their entirety. Instead, they argue that these laws must yield only insofar as they apply to an unauthorized alien‘s use of false documents on forms submitted for the purpose of securing employment. In making this argument, respondents invoke all three categories of preemption identified in our cases. They defend the Kansas Supreme Court‘s holding that provisions of IRCA expressly bar their prosecutions. And they also argue that the decision below is supported by “field” or “conflict” preemption or some combination of the two. We consider these arguments in turn.
We begin with the argument that the state criminal statutes under which respondents were convicted are expressly preempted.
As noted, IRCA contains a provision that expressly preempts state law, but it is plainly inapplicable here. That provision applies only to the imposition of criminal or civil liability on employers and those who receive a fee for recruiting or referring prospective employees.
The Kansas Supreme Court did not base its holding on this provision but instead turned to
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broadly restricts any use of an I-9, information contained in an I-9, and any documents appended to an I-9. Thus, unlike a typical preemption provision, it applies not just to the States but also to the Federal Government and all private actors.
The Kansas Supreme Court thought that the prosecutions in these cases ran afoul of this provision because the charges were based on respondents’ use in their W-4‘s and K-4‘s of the same fаlse Social Security numbers that they also inserted on their I-9‘s. Taken at face value, this theory would mean that no information placed on an I-9—including an employee‘s name, residence address, date of birth, telephone number, and e-mail address—could ever be used by any entity or person for any reason.
This interpretation is flatly contrary to standard English usage. A tangible object can be “contained in” only one place at any point in time, but an item of information is different. It may be “contained in” many different places, and it is not customary to say that a person uses information that is contained in a particular source unless the person makes use of that source.
Consider a person‘s e-mail address, one of the bits of information that is called for on an I-9. A person‘s e-mail address may be “contained in” a great many places. Individuals often provide their e-mail addresses to a wide circle of friends, acquaintances, online vendors, work-related contacts, and others. In addition, the records of every recipient of an e-mail from a particular person will contain that address.2 In ordinary speech, no one would say that a person who uses an e-mail address has used information that is contained in all these places.
Suppose that John used his e-mail address five years ago to purchase a pair of shoes and that the vendor has that
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address in its files. Suppose that John now sends an e-mail to Mary and that Mary sends an e-mail reply. No one would say that Mary has used information contained in the files of the shoe vendor.
Or consider this bit of information: that the first man set foot on the moon on July 20, 1969.3 That fact was reported in newspapers around the world, from Neil Armstrong‘s hometown newspaper, the Wapakoneta (Ohio) Daily News4 to the Soviet
Accordingly, the mere fact that an I-9 contains an item of information, such as a name or address, does not mean that information “contained in” the I-9 is used whenever that name or address is later employed.
If this were not so, strange consequences would ensue. Recall that
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Government. Under
Suppose that an employee truthfully states on his I-9 that his name is Jim Smith. Under the interpretation of
The Kansas Supreme Court tried to fend off these consequences by suggesting that its interpretation applied only to the prоsecution of aliens for using a false identity to establish “employment eligibility.” 306 Kan., at 1126, 401 P. 3d, at 596. But there is no trace of these limitations in the text of
Apparently recognizing this, respondents turn to
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This argument fails because it rests on a misunderstanding of the meaning of the federal “employment verification system.” The sole function of that system is to establish that an employee is not barred from working in this country due to alienage. As described in
The federal employment verification system does not include things that an employee must or may do to satisfy requirements unrelatеd to work authorization. And completing tax-withholding documents plays no part in the process of determining whether a person is authorized to work.7 Instead, those documents are part of the apparatus used to enforce federal and state income tax laws.8
For all these reasons, there is no express preemption in these cases.
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IV
We therefore proceed to consider respondents’ alternative argument that the Kansas laws, as applied, are preempted by implication. This argument, like all preemption arguments, must be grounded “in the text and structure of the statute at issue.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U. S. 658, 664 (1993).
A
Respondents contend, first, that the Kansas statutes, as applied, fall into a field that is implicitly reserved exclusively for federal regulation. In rare cases, the Court has found that Congress “legislated so comprehensively” in a particular field that it “left no room for supplementary state legislation,” R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, 479 U. S. 130, 140 (1986), but that is certainly not the situation here.
In order to determine whether Congress has implicitly ousted the States from regulating in a particular field, we must first identify the field in which this is said to have occurred. In their merits brief in this Court, respondents’ primary submission is that IRCA preempts “the field of fraud on the federal employment verification system,” Brief for Respondents 41 (quotation altered), but this argument fails because, as already explained, the submission of tax-withholding forms is not part of that system.
At some points in their brief, respondents define the supposedly preempted field more broadly as the “field relating to the federal employment verification system,” id., at 42 (emphasis added); see also id., at 40, but this formulation does not rescue the argument. The submission
Opinion of the Court
to enforce income tax laws. And using another person‘s Social Security number on tax forms threatens harm that has no connection with immigration law.
For instance, using another person‘s Social Security number on tax-withholding forms affects the wages reported to federal and state tax authorities. In addition, many benefits—such as those for disability, unemployment, and retirement—are tied to an individual‘s work status and income. Inaccurate data also affect the accuracy of a State‘s tax information.9
It is true that employees generally complete their W-4‘s and K-4‘s at roughly the same time as their I-9‘s, but IRCA plainly does not foreclose all state regulation of information that must be supplied as a precondition of employment. New employees may be required by law to provide all sorts of information that has nothing to do with authorization to work in the United States, such as information about age (for jobs with a minimum age requirement), educational degrees, licensing, criminal records, drug use, and personal information needed for a background check. IRCA surely does not preclude States from requiring and regulating the submission of all such information.
Respondents suggest that federal law precludes their prosecutions because both the Kansas identity-theft statute and the Kansas false-information statute require proof that the accused engaged in the prohibited conduct for the purpose of getting a “benefit.” Their argument is as follows. Since the bеnefit alleged by the prosecution in these cases was getting a job, and since the employment verification system concerns authorization to work, the theory of respondents’ prosecutions is related to that system.
This argument conflates the benefit that results from
complying with the federal employment verification system (verifying authorization to work in the United States) with the benefit of actually getting a job. Submitting W-4‘s and K-4‘s helped respondents get jobs, but this did not in any way assist them in showing that they were authorized to work in this country. Thus, respondents “relating to” argument must be rejected, as must the even broader definitions of the putatively preempted field advanced by respondents at earlier points in this litigation.
Contrary to respondents’ suggestion, IRCA certainly does not bar all state regulation regarding the “use of false documents when an unauthorized alien seeks employment.” Brief in Opposition 21. Nor does IRCA exclude a State from the entire “field of employment verification.” Id., at 22. For example, IRCA certainly does not prohibit a public school system from requiring applicants for teaching positions to furnish legitimate teaching certificates. And it does not prevent a police department from verifying that a prospective officer does not have a record of abusive behavior.
Respondents argue that field preemption in these cases “follows directly” from our decision in Arizona, 567 U. S. 387, Brief for Respondents 45-46, but that is not so. In Arizona, relying on our prior decision in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52 (1941), we held that federal immigration law occupied the field of alien registration. 567 U. S., at 400-402. “Federal law,” we observed, “makes a single sovereign responsible for maintaining a comprehensive and unified system to keep track of aliens within the Nation‘s borders.” Id., at 401-402. But federal law does not create a comprehensive and unified system regarding the information that a State may require employees to provide.
In sum, there is no basis for finding field preemption in these cases.
B
We likewise see no ground for holding that the Kansas statutes at issue conflict with federal law. It is certainly possible to comply with both IRCA and the Kansas statutes, and respondents do not suggest otherwise. They instead maintain that the Kansas statutes, as applied in their prosecutions, stand as “an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes” of IRCA—one of which is purportedly that the initiation of any legal action against an unauthorized alien for using a false identity in applying for employment should rest exclusively within the prosecutorial discretion of federal authorities. Brief for Respondents 49-55. Allowing Kansas to bring prosecutions like these, according to respondents, would risk upsetting federal enforcement priorities and frustrating federal objectives, such as obtaining the cooperation of unauthorized aliens in making bigger cases. Ibid.
Respondents analogize these cases to our holding in Arizona, 567 U. S., at 404-407—that a state law making it a crime for an unauthorized alien to obtain employment conflicted with IRCA, which does not criminalize that conduct—but respondents’ analogy is unsound. In Arizona, the Court inferred that Congress had made a considered decision that it was inadvisable to criminalize the conduct in question. In effect, the Court concluded that IRCA implicitly conferred a right to be free of criminal (as opposed to civil) penalties for working illegally, and thus a state law making it a crime to engage in that conduct conflicted with this federal right.
Nothing similar is involved here. In enacting IRCA, Congrеss did not decide that an unauthorized alien who uses a false identity on tax-withholding forms should not face criminal prosecution. On the contrary, federal law makes it a crime to use fraudulent information on a W-4.
The mere fact that state laws like the Kansas provisions at issue overlap to some degree with federal criminal provisions does not even begin to make a case for conflict preemption. From the beginning of our country, criminal law enforcement has been primarily a responsibility of the States, and that remains true today. In recent times, the reach of federal criminal law has expanded, and there are now many instances in which a prosecution for a particular course of conduct could be brought by either federal or state prosecutors. Our federal system would be turned upside down if we were to hold that federal criminal law preempts state law whenever they overlap, and there is no basis for inferring that federal criminal statutes preempt state laws whenever they overlap. Indeed, in the vast majority of cases where federal and state laws overlap, allowing the States to prosecute is entirely consistent with federal interests.
In the present cases, there is certainly no suggestion that the Kansas prosecutions frustrated any federal interests.
Finally, contrary to respondents’ suggestion, these cases are very different from Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U. S. 341 (2001), and Wisconsin Dept. of Industry v. Gould Inc., 475 U. S. 282 (1986). In Buckman Co., the preempted state tort claim for fraud on the Food and Drug Administration threatened serious disruption of the sensitive and highly technical process of approving medical devices. 531 U. S., at 347-353. In these cases, the state prosecutions posed no comparable risk.
In Gould, the decision rested on a special preemption rule governing state laws regulating matters that the National Labor Relations Act “protects, prohibits, or arguably protects.” 475 U. S., at 286-289; San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, 246 (1959). No similar rule is operative or appropriate here.
*
*
*
For these reasons, the judgments of the Supreme Court of Kansas are reversed, and these cases are remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 17-834
KANSAS, PETITIONER
v.
RAMIRO GARCIA
KANSAS, PETITIONER
v.
DONALDO MORALES
KANSAS, PETITIONER
v.
GUADALUPE OCHOA-LARA
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS
[March 3, 2020]
JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins, concurring.
I agree that Kansas’ prosecutions and convictions of respondents for identity theft and making false information are not pre-empted by §101(a)(1) of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,
The founding generation treated conflicts between federal and state laws as implied repeals. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U. S. 604, 622 (2011) (plurality opinion). Then, as now, courts disfavored repeals by implication. See, e.g., Warder v. Arell, 2 Va. 282, 299 (1796) (opinion of President Judge); 2 T. Cunningham, A New and Complete Law-Dictionary (2d ed. 1771) (defining “Statute“); 4 M. Bacon, A New Abridgment of the Law 638 (3d ed. 1768). To overcome this disfavor, legislatures included non obstante clauses in statutes. See Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va. L. Rev. 225, 237-240, and nn. 42-44 (2000) (cоllecting examples). Courts understood non obstante provisions to mean that, “[r]ather than straining the new statute in order to harmonize it with prior law, [they] were supposed to give the new statute its natural meaning and to let the chips fall where they may.” Id., at 242.
The Founders included a non obstante provision in the Supremacy Clause. It directs that “the Judges in every State shall be bound” by the “Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.”
The doctrine of “purposes and objectives” pre-emption impermissibly rests on judicial guesswork about “broad federal policy objectives, legislative history, or generalized notions of congressionаl purposes that are not contained within the text of federal law.” Wyeth, supra, at 587 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); see also Arizona v. United States, 567 U. S. 387, 440 (2012) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). I therefore cannot apply “purposes and objectives” pre-emption doctrine, as it is contrary to the Supremacy Clause.*
In these cases, the Court correctly distinguishes our “purposes and objectives” precedents and does not engage in a “freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension with federal objectives.” Wyeth, supra, at 588 (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U. S. 431, 459 (2005) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)). It also acknowledges that “[t]he Supremacy Clause gives priority to ‘the Laws of the United States,’ not the criminal law enforcement priorities or preferences of federal officers.” Ante, at 19. Because the Court rejects respondents’ “purposes and objectives” argument without atextual speculation about legislative intentions, I join its opinion in full.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 17-834
KANSAS, PETITIONER
v.
RAMIRO GARCIA
KANSAS, PETITIONER
v.
DONALDO MORALES
KANSAS, PETITIONER
v.
GUADALUPE OCHOA-LARA
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS
[March 3, 2020]
JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG, JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, and JUSTICE KAGAN join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority that nothing in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), 100 Stat. 3359, expressly preempts Kansas’ criminal laws as they were applied in the prosecutions at issue herе. But I do not agree with the majority‘s conclusion about implied preemption.
When we confront a question of implied preemption, the words of the statute are especially unlikely to determine the answer by themselves. Nonetheless, in my view, IRCA‘S text, together with its structure, context, and purpose, make it “clear and manifest” that Congress has occupied at least the narrow field of policing fraud committed to demonstrate federal work authorization. Arizona v. United States, 567 U. S. 387, 400 (2012) (quoting Rice v. Santa FeElevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947)); see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Puente Arizona v. Arpaio, No. 15-15211 etc. (CA9), p. 15 (contending that the Act preempts state criminal laws “to the extent
The Act creates what we have called “a comprehensive scheme” to “comba[t] the employment of illegal aliens.” Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U. S. 137, 147 (2002). To that end, the statute‘s text sets forth highly detailed requirements. The Act specifies, for example: that employers and employees must affirm in writing that the employee is authorized to work in the United States,
IRCA also contains two carefully calibrated sets of sanctions for noncompliance. On the employer side, the Act makes it unlawful for employers to hire someone without complying with the I-9 process,
On the employee side, IRCA is somewhat more lenient. Employees, unlike employers, are not subject to punishment for mere failure to complete the paperwork that the Act requires. See
Our precedent demonstrates that IRCA impliedly preempts state laws that trench on Congress’ detailed and delicate design. In Arizona, we invalidated a state law that made it a crime for an unauthorized alien to work. 567 U. S., at 403. In reaching that conclusion, we acknowledged that the Act‘s employer-related sections contain an express preemption provision, while the employee-related provisions do not. Id., at 406. Even so, the Act‘s employee-related provisions retained, through implication, preemptive force. Id., at 406-407.
Congress, we explained, “made a deliberate choice not to impose criminal penalties on aliens who” merely “seek, or engage in, unauthorized employment.” Id., at 405. The Act puts combating the employment of unauthorized aliens at the forefront of federal immigration policy. Id., at 404. But it also reflects “a considered judgment” not to pursue that goal at all costs. Id., at 405. “Unauthorized workers trying to support their families” usually “pose less danger than alien smugglers or aliens who commit a serious crime.” Id., at 396. And they may have “children born in the United States, long ties to the community,” or other attributes that could counsel in favor of prosecutorial restraint. Ibid.
We ultimately held in Arizona that the States thus may not make criminal what Congress did not, for any such state law “would interfere with the careful balance struck by Congress with respect to unauthorized employment of аliens.” Id., at 406. Given that “obstacle to the regulatory system Congress chose,” we concluded that the state law at issue conflicted with the federal Act and was therefore preempted. Id., at 406-407.
State laws that police fraud committed to demonstrate federal work authorization are similarly preempted. Even though IRCA criminalizes that conduct, the Act makes clear that only the Federal Government may prosecute people for misrepresenting their federal work-authorization status. This is so for two reasons.
First, the Act takes from the States the most direct means of policing work-authorization fraud. It prohibits States from using for that purpose both the I-9 and the federal employment verification system more generally. See
Second, consider another part of our decision in Arizona. We also addressed in that case a different federal statute, one establishing a federal alien-registration system. See 567 U. S., at 400-403. Pointing to that statute‘s “full set of standards governing alien registration, including the punishment for noncompliance,” we concluded that Congress had enacted “a comprehensive and unified system to keep track of aliens within the Nation‘s borders.” Id., at 401-402. The statute therefore left no room for a state law designed to police violations of the federal alien-registration system. Similarly, IRCA‘s intricate procedures and penalties create a comprehensive and unified system to keep track of who is authorized to work within the Nation‘s borders. See supra, at 2-3. This too shows that criminal enforcement falls to the Federal Government alone.
Nor does it matter that the state statutes invalidated in Arizona had expressly targeted aliens. In preemption cases, we must consider not just what a state law says, but also what it does. Wos v. E. M. A., 568 U. S. 627, 637 (2013). For this reason, even generally applicable and facially neutral state laws may be preempted when applied in a particular factual context in a particular way. See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U. S. 341, 347-350 (2001) (rejecting claims grounded in generally applicable state-law principles because they
Take Donaldo Morales, for example. Kansas charged him under two state antifraud statutes. Both required the State to prove, as an element, an intent to defraud. See
On different facts, there would have been no preemption. Had Kansas proved instead that Morales used a false Social Security number on his tax-withholding forms to induce another sort of reliance (e.g., to hide a criminal history), or perhaps to obtain another kind of benefit (e.g., to pay less in taxes), IRCA would permit the prosecution. But that is not what Kansas did. What Kansas did was prosecute Morales for misrepresenting his federal work-authorization status for the purpose of obtaining employment. Kansas’ prosecution of Morales thus fell squarely within the field that, in my view, the federal Act preempts.
By permitting these prosecutions, the majority opens a colossal loophole. Starting a new job almost always involves filling out tax-withholding forms alongside an I-9. So unless they want to give themselves away, people hoping to hide their federal work-authorization status from their employer will put the same false information on their tax-withholding forms as they do on their I-9. To let the States prosecute such people for the former is, in practical effect, to let the States police the latter. And policing the latter is what the Act expressly forbids.
For these reasons, I would hold that federal law impliedly preempted Kansas’ criminal laws as they were applied in these cases. Because the majority takes a different view, with respect, I dissent.