KEIRA SPILLANE ET AL. v. NED LAMONT ET AL.
SC 20776
Supreme Court of Connecticut
July 30, 2024
Robinson, C. J., and D’Auria, Ecker, Alexander and Seeley, Js.
Argued October 26, 2023
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Action seeking a judgment declaring that a statute concerning mandatory school vaccinations is unconstitutional, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, where the action was withdrawn as against the defendant Whitby School; thereafter, the court, Hon. Robert L. Genuario, judge trial referee, denied the motions to dismiss filed by the named defendant et al., and the named defendant et al. appealed. Reversed in part; further proceedings.
Darren P. Cunningham, assistant attorney general, with whom were Timothy J. Holzman, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, William Tong, attorney general, for the appellants (named defendant et al.).
Lindy R. Urso, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
Opinion
ALEXANDER, J. The sole issue in this appeal is whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars this declaratory judgment action challenging the legality of No. 21-6 of the 2021 Public Acts (P.A. 21-6). P.A. 21-6 prospectively eliminated the long-standing religious exemption to vaccination requirements as a condition of public and private school enrollment in
elimination of the religious exemption to the school vaccination requirement. They commenced the present action against the defendants, state and municipal officials charged with oversight of public health and education,1 seeking injunctive relief and a declaration that P.A. 21-6 violates the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and their children to the free exercise of religion, equal protection of the laws, and a free public education; see
The plaintiffs allege the following facts, which are assumed to be true for purposes of this appeal. Each plaintiff has a minor
for the exemption before it was eliminated. The plaintiffs sincerely believe that mandatory inoculation violates their religious beliefs because, among other things, the vaccines are developed utilizing cell lines derived from aborted fetal tissue and the vaccines would “desecrate . . . their children’s bodies by forever altering their innate immune systems.”
A religious exemption to school vaccination requirements has existed since the enactment of
At the time of the passage of P.A. 21-6, students enrolled in Connecticut public and private schools fell into one of the following four categories: fully compliant with the statutorily mandated vaccine schedule, not compliant with the vaccine schedule due to a medical exemption, not compliant with the vaccine schedule due to a religious exemption, and not compliant with the vaccine schedule, despite having neither a medical nor a religious exemption (secular noncompliance). Despite those who were noncompliant, Connecticut’s statewide school vaccination rate was among the highest in the nation, well above the rate of 95 percent generally recommended by Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Prior to the enactment of P.A. 21-6, the defendants had made little or no effort to increase statewide compliance rates or rates at those schools or districts that had vaccination rates substantially below statewide rates due to secular noncompliance. The defendants also failed to make any meaningful effort to employ means of increasing vaccination rates that were less restrictive than the elimination of the religious exemption.
In light of these facts and the decision to maintain the medical exemption while eliminating the religious
exemption, the plaintiffs contend that P.A. 21-6 is part of a systematic effort to violate their religious rights. They commenced the present action against the defendants, seeking to enjoin the enforcement of P.A. 21-6 and a declaration that the act violates their rights under
The defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint on the basis of sovereign immunity. In support of their motions, the defendants submitted immunization data collected by the state Department of Public Health that indicated, inter alia, that the percentage of vaccinated kindergarten students for the 2019–2020 school year had decreased since the 2012–2013 school year, that the percentage of kindergarten students with religious exemptions to the vaccination requirements had increased over that same period, and that the percentage of those students with medical exemptions to the vaccination requirements had remained fairly constant since the 2012–2013 school year.3 They also submitted opening statements from the legislative
The trial court denied the motions to dismiss, agreeing with the plaintiffs that their claims satisfied an exception to sovereign immunity. The court determined that the plaintiffs’ statutory free exercise claim (count one) was not barred because
challenges to legislation and that
The trial court further determined that the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims (counts two through six) were not barred because the complaint sought only equitable relief and alleged “substantial” constitutional claims. It rejected the defendants’ argument that, in order for constitutional claims to be sufficiently substantial to overcome sovereign immunity, the complaint must allege facts that demonstrate that the plaintiffs are sufficiently likely to prevail on their constitutional claims under governing precedent. The court deemed this merits-type inquiry inappropriate for resolving the jurisdictional question raised by the defendants’ motions to dismiss. It instead focused on the constitutional nature of the alleged incursion on the plaintiffs’ rights, as well as the factual allegations in support of the claims, and deemed those allegations sufficiently substantial to overcome the defendants’ sovereign immunity defense.
The defendants appealed from the denial of their motions to dismiss.4 Their appeal, broadly characterized, asserts that the trial court’s conclusions as to the exceptions to sovereign immunity were contrary
to settled principles of law and rules governing the construction of such exceptions.
We begin by setting forth certain fundamental principles that are not in dispute. “A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court. . . . A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction. . . . [O]ur review of the trial court’s ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [decision on] . . . the motion to dismiss will be de novo.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 293 Conn. 342, 346–47, 977 A.2d 636 (2009).
“When a trial court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss on the basis of the complaint alone, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light. . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily
jurisdiction is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to undermine this conclusion with counteraffidavits . . . or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action without further proceedings. . . . If, however, the defendant submits either no proof to rebut the plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations . . . or only evidence that fails to call those allegations into question . . . the plaintiff need not supply counteraffidavits or other evidence to support the complaint, but may rest on the jurisdictional allegations therein.” (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cuozzo v. Orange, 315 Conn. 606, 615–16, 109 A.3d 903 (2015).
“[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, supra, 293 Conn. 347. “The principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent . . . has deep roots in this state and our legal system in general, finding its origin in ancient common law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Law, 284 Conn. 701, 711, 937 A.2d 675 (2007). The doctrine “rests on the principle and on the hazard that the subjection of the state and federal governments to private litigation might constitute a serious interference with the performance of their functions and with their control over their respective instrumentalities, funds and property.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hicks v. State, 297 Conn. 798, 807, 1 A.3d 39 (2010).
“[I]n its pristine form the doctrine of sovereign immunity would exempt the state from suit entirely . . . because the sovereign could not be sued in its own courts and there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. . . . This absolute bar of actions against the state [however] has been greatly modified both by statutes effectively consenting to suit in some instances as
well as by judicial decisions in others. . . . For example, we have held that the doctrine . . . does not prevent a claimant from seeking declaratory or injunctive relief for allegations that a state official is acting either pursuant to an unconstitutional statute or in excess of his authority. . . . This is so because individuals have an important interest in being protected from improper governmental action and the state has no interest in allowing such activity to continue such that a court’s action to curb that activity would interfere with the state’s legitimate governmental functions.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Chief Information Officer v. Computers Plus Center, Inc., 310 Conn. 60, 80, 74 A.3d 1242 (2013); see id., 80–81 (explaining distinction drawn by this court between certain actions seeking equitable relief and those seeking damages); Doe v. Heintz, 204 Conn. 17, 31, 526 A.2d 1318 (1987) (acknowledging judicial decisions
Our caselaw has identified three recognized exceptions to sovereign immunity: “(1) when the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waives the state’s sovereign immunity . . . (2) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial claim that the state or one of its officers has violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights . . . and (3) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of the officer’s statutory authority.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, supra, 293 Conn. 349. The plaintiffs in the present case rely on the first and second of these exceptions.
I
We begin with the substantial claim exception, which determines whether the trial court has jurisdiction over
the constitutional violations alleged in counts two through six of the complaint.5 The defendants contend that the trial court incorrectly relied solely on the constitutional nature of the plaintiffs’ claims and the supporting factual allegations to determine that these claims are “substantial.” They assert that, in Markley v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 301 Conn. 56, 23 A.3d 668 (2011), this court made clear that the trial court was required to consider the merits of those claims in determining whether the allegations and the undisputed evidence were sufficient to establish the violation of a constitutional right as a matter of law. According to the defendants, without a threshold judicial determination of legal sufficiency, state officials would lose the benefit of their immunity from suit and be exposed to burdensome discovery for alleged constitutional claims that have no reasonable possibility of succeeding. They further contend that, if the trial court had applied the correct standard in the present case, it would have been compelled to grant their motions to dismiss because the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims are foreclosed as a matter of law and fact.
For the reasons set forth hereinafter, we agree with the defendants that, in ruling on a motion to dismiss based on a claim of sovereign immunity, our case law requires the trial court to assess the legal sufficiency of the allegations of a complaint to determine whether the plaintiff has asserted a substantial claim of a constitutional violation adequate to defeat the defense of sovereign immunity. Applying this standard to the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, we conclude that those claims are foreclosed as a matter of law and fact and, therefore, that they are barred by sovereign immunity.
A
In Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977), this court confirmed the three recognized exceptions to sovereign immunity and endorsed the “substantial claim” standard proposed by Professor J. Randolph Block to guide their application. Id., 624–25; see also J. Block, “Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine,” 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1060, 1081 (1946) (“[when] no substantial claim is made that the defendant officer is acting pursuant to an
We have stated that, “[f]or a claim made pursuant to the second exception, complaining of unconstitutional acts, we require that [t]he allegations of such a complaint and the factual underpinnings if placed in issue, must clearly demonstrate an incursion [on] constitu-
tionally protected interests. . . . In the absence of a proper factual basis in the complaint to support the applicability of [any of the three] exceptions, the granting of a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds is proper.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, supra, 293 Conn. 350.
Prior to today, fourteen appellate cases have considered a motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity in which the plaintiff claimed that the substantial claim exception had been met. In all of them, the court determined that the trial court should have granted the motion to dismiss because the complaint, as supplemented by the undisputed facts, demonstrated that the plaintiffs could not as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action. In each such case, the court reached its determination by assessing the facts alleged in the complaint (or established by uncontroverted evidence submitted in connection with the motion to dismiss) in light of case law establishing the elements required to prevail on the constitutional claim. See, e.g., Markley v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, supra, 301 Conn. 71–72 (allegations were insufficient to establish equal protection violation); Gold v. Rowland, 296 Conn. 186, 203–205, 994 A.2d 106 (2010) (allegations were insufficient to support claim of unconstitutional taking); Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, supra, 293 Conn. 358–63 (allegations were insufficient to establish deprivation of procedural due process and equal protection of law).6
sovereign immunity, [the complaint] must allege sufficient facts to support a finding of a taking of [property] in a constitutional sense . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gold v. Rowland, supra, 201. To the extent that Markley suggests that the court must also consider the merits of the constitutional claim in terms of its likelihood of success, we disavow any such implication.
Accordingly, in considering the defendants’ motions to dismiss in the present case, we must determine only whether the allegations set forth in the complaint, as supplemented by the undisputed facts, demonstrate that the plaintiffs cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that may be heard by the court.
B
Whether the plaintiffs’ complaint alleges constitutional claims sufficient to withstand the defendants’ motions to dismiss depends on the legal requirements for each claim and the facts necessary to meet those requirements. The plaintiffs’ complaint alleges violations of the right to the free exercise of religion and the right to equal protection of the law under both the state and the federal constitutions. The plaintiffs’ appellate brief treats those parallel provisions of the Connecticut constitution as being governed by the same legal principles and standards as those governing their federal constitutional claims. Their additional claim, pertaining to the right to a free public education, arises
1
Free Exercise Claim
In support of their claim that the plaintiffs’ free exercise claim is foreclosed as a matter of law, the defendants point to a recent federal decision that rejected a nearly identical constitutional challenge to P.A. 21-6.
See We the Patriots USA, Inc. v. Connecticut Office of Early Childhood Development, 579 F. Supp. 3d 290, 302–306, 311–13 (D. Conn. 2022) (despite having previously accommodated religious objections to vaccination by providing mechanism for objectors to obtain exemptions, state may repeal religious exemptions without offending free exercise or equal protection clauses), vacated in part on other grounds, 76 F.4th 130 (2d Cir. 2023), cert. denied, U.S. , S. Ct. , L. Ed. 2d (2024). While the present appeal was pending, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s resolution of the free exercise claim in We the Patriots USA, Inc., citing, among other reasons, the “nearly unanimous consensus” of other courts rejecting claims of a constitutional defect in a state’s school vaccination mandate on account of the absence or repeal of a religious exemption. We the Patriots USA, Inc. v. Connecticut Office of Early Childhood Development, supra, 76 F.4th 136. The United States Supreme Court subsequently denied the plaintiffs’ petition for a writ of certiorari in that case. See We the Patriots USA, Inc. v. Connecticut Office of Early Childhood Development, supra, U.S. . We agree with the Second Circuit’s analysis of the free exercise claim and adopt it as our own as it pertains to the plaintiffs’ arguments in the present case.7
In Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 108 L. Ed. 2d
876 (1990), the United States Supreme Court held that “the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 879. Under Smith, “generally applicable, [religion neutral] laws that have the effect of burdening a particular religious practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest . . . .” Id., 886 n.3. “When a religiously neutral and generally applicable law incidentally burdens free exercise rights, [courts] will sustain the law against constitutional challenge if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.” Does 1-6 v. Mills, 16 F.4th 20, 29 (1st Cir. 2021), cert. denied sub nom. Does 1-3 v. Mills, U.S. , 142 S. Ct. 1112, 212 L. Ed. 2d 9 (2022); see id., 29–30, 37 (upholding denial of preliminary injunction because petitioners were unlikely to succeed on merits of their claim that Maine’s mandatory vaccination law for health-care workers, which did not
A law is not neutral if the government “proceeds in a manner intolerant of religious beliefs or restricts practices because of their religious nature.” Fulton v. Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522, 533, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 210 L. Ed. 2d 137 (2021). This occurs when a law either “refers to a religious practice” or is facially neutral but “targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment . . . .” Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533, 534, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1993). “To fail the neutrality prong, it is not enough for a law to simply affect religious practice; the law or the process of its enactment must demonstrate ‘hostility’ to religion. See, e.g., [Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 584 U.S. 617, 638, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 201 L. Ed. 2d 35 (2018)]. The [United
States] Supreme Court has stressed, however, that even ‘subtle departures from neutrality’ violate the [f]ree [e]xercise [c]lause, and thus ‘upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state intervention stem from animosity to religion or distrust of its practices, all officials must pause to remember their own high duty to the [c]onstitution and to the rights it secures.’ [Id., 638–39] . . . . To determine whether the government has acted neutrally, courts look to factors such as the background of the challenged decision, the sequence of events leading to its enactment, and the legislative or administrative history.” (Emphasis in original.) We the Patriots USA, Inc. v. Connecticut Office of Early Childhood Development, supra, 76 F.4th 145.
“A law is not generally applicable if it invite[s] the government to consider the particular reasons for a person’s conduct by providing a mechanism for individualized exemptions.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fulton v. Philadelphia, supra, 593 U.S. 533; see id., 534–35 (ordinance not generally applicable because exemptions to nondiscrimination provision made at “ ‘sole discretion’ ” of city official). A law is also not generally applicable if it “prohibits religious conduct while permitting secular conduct that undermines the government’s asserted interests in a similar way.” Id., 534. This principle, that a government may not be substantially underinclusive in pursuit of its legitimate interests, prohibits the state from “impos[ing] burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief . . . .” Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, supra, 508 U.S. 543; see id. (“The ordinances . . . fail to prohibit nonreligious conduct that endangers these interests in a similar or greater degree than [religious conduct] does. The underinclusion is substantial, not inconsequential. Despite the city’s proffered interest in preventing cruelty to animals, the ordinances are
drafted with care to forbid few killings but those occasioned by religious sacrifice.”).
The United States Supreme Court, in applying these principles to state limitations on private religious gatherings during the COVID-19 pandemic, clarified the proper general applicability analysis. Relevant here, the court explained that government regulations “are not neutral and generally applicable, and therefore trigger strict scrutiny under the [f]ree [e]xercise [c]lause, whenever they treat any comparable secular activity more favorably than religious exercise.” (Emphasis in original.) Tandon v. Newsom, 593 U.S. 61, 62, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 209 L. Ed. 2d 355 (2021). Further, “whether two activities are comparable for purposes of the [f]ree [e]xercise [c]lause must be judged against the asserted government interest that justifies the
We first consider whether P.A. 21-6 is neutral toward religion.8 In undertaking the identical inquiry, the Second Circuit, in We the Patriots USA, Inc., concluded that P.A. 21-6 satisfies Smith’s neutrality prong because (1) it is facially neutral, and (2) the legislative history surrounding it is devoid of evidence that the act was motivated by “hostility to religious believers, even when read with an eye toward ‘subtle departures from neutrality’ or ‘slight suspicion’ of ‘animosity to religion or distrust of its practices.’ ” We the Patriots USA, Inc. v. Connecticut Office of Early Childhood Development, supra, 76 F.4th 148, quoting Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, supra, 584 U.S.
638–39. The court observed that, “[f]ar from expressing hostility, legislators accommodated religious objectors to an extent the legislators believed would not seriously undermine the [a]ct’s goals.” We the Patriots USA, Inc. v. Connecticut Office of Early Childhood Development, supra, 76 F.4th 148. They did this in a number of ways that included, but was not limited to, a legacy provision allowing students in kindergarten through twelfth grade to keep their religious exemptions, even if they moved to another school district. Id.
In reaching its determination, the Second Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that “[P.A. 21-6] is not neutral under Smith [because] . . . repealing any existing religious exemption is hostile to religion per se.” Id., 149. The plaintiffs in the present case make the same argument, asserting that “there is little doubt that P.A. 21-6 is not neutral on its face, as the entire purpose of the law was to eliminate the school vaccine religious exemption, which has existed for as long as the vaccine requirement itself.”9 (Emphasis omitted.) In rejecting this argument, the Second Circuit reasoned: “[The United States] Supreme Court has used a consistent cluster of terms to describe the kind of official attitude
that violates the neutrality prong of Smith—‘hostility,’ ‘animosity,’ ‘distrust,’ ‘a negative normative evaluation.’ . . . These terms denote a subjective state of mind on a government actor’s part, not the mere fact that government action has affected religious practice. . . .
The Second Circuit further reasoned: “[The United States] Supreme Court has long described religious exemptions as part of a mutually beneficial ‘play in the joints’ between the [e]stablishment [c]lause and [the] [f]ree [e]xercise [c]lause. [Walz v. Tax Commission], 397 U.S. 664, 669, 90 S. Ct. 1409, 25 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1970). As with many of the other exemptions that benefit individuals and communities of faith—not requiring religious organizations to pay income and property tax, for instance—the government may constitutionally elect to accommodate religious believers but is not constitutionally required to do so. See, e.g., Carson v. Makin, [596 U.S. 767, 785, 142 S. Ct. 1987], 213 L. Ed. 2d 286 (2022) (holding [that] [s]tates need not subsidize private education, including private religious schools, but must make any subsidies equally available to religious and nonreligious schools). [The plaintiffs’] argument, which would make every exemption permanent once granted, threatens to distort the relationship between the [c]lauses.” (Emphasis in original). We the Patriots USA, Inc. v. Connecticut Office of Early Childhood Development, supra, 76 F.4th 150.
In coming to this conclusion, the Second Circuit relied on Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48 (10th Cir. 2014), in which the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit explained that “the granting of a religious accommodation to some in the past doesn‘t bind the government to provide that accommodation to all in the future, especially if experience teaches [that] the accommodation brings with it genuine safety problems that can‘t be addressed at a reasonable price.” Id., 58. Following the Tenth Circuit‘s reasoning, the Second Circuit observed that “adopting [the] plaintiffs’ rule would disincentivize [s]tates from accommodating religious practice in the first place. . . . Few reasonable legislators or other government actors would be willing to tie the hands of generations of their successors by enacting accommodations that could not be repealed or changed if they no longer served the public good.” (Citation omitted.) We the Patriots USA, Inc. v. Connecticut Office of Early Childhood Development, supra, 76 F.4th 150. We agree with the Second Circuit‘s analysis of this issue and similarly conclude that
Having determined that
In reaching its determination, the Second Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that
the physical condition of such child . . . shall be exempt from the appropriate provisions of this section.” (Emphasis added; footnote added.)
As for whether
In determining that
tion omitted.) We the Patriots USA, Inc. v. Connecticut Office of Early Childhood Development, supra, 76 F.4th 153.
The Second Circuit continued: “[Public Act 21-6] promotes the health and safety of vaccinated students by decreasing, to the greatest extent medically possible, the number of unvaccinated students (and, thus, the risk of acquiring [vaccine preventable] diseases) in school . . . [while simultaneously] promot[ing] the health and safety of unvaccinated students. Not only does the absence of a religious exemption decrease the risk that unvaccinated students will acquire a [vaccine preventable] disease by lowering the number of unvaccinated peers they will encounter at school, but the medical exemption also allows the small proportion of students who cannot be vaccinated for medical reasons to avoid the harms that taking a particular vaccine would inflict on them. It is for these reasons that the acting commissioner [of public health] testified that ‘[h]igh vaccination rates protect not only vaccinated children, but also those who cannot be or have not been vaccinated.’ . . . In contrast, exempting religious objectors from vaccination would only detract from the
[s]tate‘s interest in promoting public health by increasing the risk of transmission of [vaccine preventable] diseases among vaccinated and unvaccinated students alike.
“This analysis is bolstered by the public health data and expert testimony the General Assembly considered before adopting the [a]ct, some of which are summarized in a document [the] plaintiffs appended to the complaint. . . . The material attached to the complaint is sparse, but, as we noted . . . we may take judicial notice of the facts and analysis in the legislative record, including the testimony of the acting commissioner [of public health] and comments from numerous medical authorities. These materials show there is no question that there is a difference in magnitude between the number of religious and medical exemptions that Connecticut families claimed prior to the [a]ct‘s adoption. In school years 2018–2019 and 2019–2020, more than ten times as many kindergartners claimed religious exemptions compared to medical exemptions. The legislative history, moreover, contains numerous indications that significant numbers of religiously exempt students attend the same schools. Against this backdrop, the [l]egislature reasonably judged that the risk of an outbreak of disease was acute, even if not necessarily imminent, and that continuing to permit religious exemptions, the [s]tate‘s only kind of nonmedical exemption, to multiply would increase that risk.” (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted.) Id., 153–54.
Having concluded that
Finally, we note that, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 S. Ct. 358, 49 L. Ed. 643 (1905), the United States Supreme Court rejected equal protection and due process challenges to a Massachusetts compulsory vaccination law. Id., 38–39. The court later observed that ”Jacobson . . . settled that it is within the police power of a [s]tate to provide for compulsory vaccination.” Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43 S. Ct. 24, 67 L. Ed. 194 (1922). Although Jacobson was decided before the free exercise clause was held to apply to the states; see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940); the United States Supreme Court has since stated, albeit in dictum, that a parent “cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself on religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or
death.” (Footnote omitted.) Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67, 64 S. Ct. 438, 88 L. Ed. 645 (1944). “That dictum is consonant with [the United States Supreme Court‘s] and [the Second Circuit‘s] precedents holding that a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Phillips v. New York, 775 F.3d 538, 543 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 822, 136 S. Ct. 104, 193 L. Ed. 2d 37 (2015); see id. (following reasoning of Jacobson and Prince, and concluding that “New York could constitutionally require that all children be vaccinated in order to attend public school” and that New York vaccination law “goes beyond what the [c]onstitution requires by allowing an exemption for parents with genuine and sincere religious beliefs“).
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the plaintiffs’ free exercise challenge fails as a matter of law on this record, and, therefore, it is barred by sovereign immunity.
2
Equal Protection Claim
The defendants next claim that the trial court incorrectly denied their motions to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim that
3
Right to Education Claim
Finally, the defendants argue that the trial court incorrectly denied their motions to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim that
In Horton v. Meskill, supra, 172 Conn. 615, this court held, in the context of statewide disparities in the financing of public school education, that “elementary and secondary education is a fundamental right, [and] that pupils in the public schools are entitled to the equal enjoyment of that right . . . .” Id., 648–49. Although we stated in Horton that the constitutional right to education is “so basic and fundamental that any infringement of that right must be strictly scrutinized“; id., 646; we subsequently rejected the conclusion that “strict scrutiny must be the test for any and all governmental regulations affecting public school education.” Campbell v. Board of Education, 193 Conn. 93, 105, 475 A.2d 289 (1984). Indeed, we have held repeatedly that decisions relating to educational policy and its implementation are “quintessentially legislative in nature” and are not to be second-guessed by the courts. Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 327 Conn. 650, 658, 176 A.3d 28 (2018); see also Bissell v. Davison, 65 Conn. 183, 190–92, 32 A. 348 (1894) (upholding vaccine mandate under state and federal constitutions and observing that “the question [of] what terms, conditions, and restrictions will best [serve] the end sought in the establishment and maintenance of public schools . . . is a question solely for the legislature and not for the courts“).
We conclude that
Although the right to education was not yet enshrined in our state constitution when Bissell was decided, we recognized therein that the duty to provide a free public school education had been “assumed by the [s]tate; not only because the education of [children] is a matter of great public utility, but also and chiefly because it is one of great public necessity for the protection and welfare of the [s]tate itself. In the performance of this duty, the [s]tate maintains and supports, at great expense, and with an ever watchful solicitude, public schools throughout its territory, and secures to its [children] the privilege of attendance therein. . . . This privilege is granted, and is to be enjoyed [on] such terms and under such reasonable conditions and restrictions as the [lawmaking] power, within constitutional limits, may see fit to impose; and, within those limits, the question [of] what terms, conditions, and restrictions will best [serve] the end sought in the establishment and maintenance of public schools . . . is a question solely for the legislature and not for the courts. The statute in question authorizes the [school] committee to impose [a] vaccination [requirement] as one of those conditions. It does not authorize or compel compulsory vaccination; it simply requires vaccination[s] as one of the conditions of . . . attending the public school. Its object is to promote the usefulness and efficiency of the schools by caring for the health of the scholars. . . . The statute is essentially a police regulation . . . .” Id., 191.
“In the case at bar the [vaccination requirement] is made to operate impartially [on] all children alike; it affects all in the same way; and reasonable provision is made for providing free vaccination[s] [when] necessary. It is a reasonable exercise of the power to require vaccination[s] . . . . [W]e think that in a case like [this] . . . touching the terms and conditions of attendance at the public schools, the question of the reasonableness . . . of such a requirement, is one exclusively for the legislature.
“The question before us is not whether the legislature ought to have passed such a law; it is simply whether it had the power to pass it.
“In no proper sense can this statute be said to contravene the provisions of . . . our [s]tate [c]onstitution, as claimed by the plaintiff. It may operate to exclude his son from school, but if so, it will be because of his failure to comply with what the legislature regards, wisely or unwisely, as a reasonable requirement enacted in good faith to promote the public welfare.
“Nor in any proper sense can the statute be said to deprive the plaintiff of any right without due process of law, or to deny to him the equal protection of the law.” Id., 192.
Although our state constitution now imposes an affirmative obligation on the state to provide adequate educational opportunities to its school-age children, we remain of the view that school vaccine requirements are a rational exercise of legislative judgment reasonably related to the state‘s interest in caring for the health and safety of its students, and that, “within the limits of rationality, the legislature‘s efforts to tackle the problems [of education] should be entitled to respect.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, supra, 327 Conn. 667–68.
We find no merit in the plaintiffs’ argument that
II
We next turn to the question of whether the plaintiffs’ free exercise of religion claim under
The defendants raise two challenges to the trial court‘s determination that this exception was satisfied. First, they contend that the text of
Our analysis begins with the statutory text. Section 52-571b provides in relevant part: “(a) The state or any political subdivision of the state shall not burden a person‘s exercise of religion under section 3 of article first of the Constitution of the state even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
“(b) The state or any political subdivision of the state may burden a person‘s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the per-son (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
“(c) A person whose exercise of religion has been burdened in violation of the provisions of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against the state or any political subdivision of the state.
* * *
“(f) For the purposes of this section, ‘state or any political subdivision of the state’ includes any agency, board, commission, department, officer or employee of the state or any political subdivision of the state . . . .”
We note that the two components of the state‘s burden under subsection (b) of the statute—compelling governmental interest
A
The defendants’ textual argument implicitly concedes what is plainly apparent from the text of
The issue of whether the legislature has waived the state‘s sovereign immunity under the statute is a matter of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Envirotest Systems Corp. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 293 Conn. 382, 386, 978 A.2d 49 (2009). This inquiry implicates certain general rules of construction, as well as specific rules applicable to the particular inquiry. One such specific rule is that “statutes in derogation of sovereign immunity should be strictly construed. . . . [When] there is any doubt about their meaning or intent they are given the effect [that] makes the least rather than the most change in sovereign immunity.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Feliciano v. State, 336 Conn. 669, 675, 249 A.3d 340 (2020). This rule, under which our inquiry begins and ends with the statute‘s text, applies when the question is whether a statute provides a waiver of immunity, either expressly or by necessary implication. See Envirotest Systems Corp. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, supra, 389–91 and n.6. When, however, the question is the scope of a waiver of immu-
nity, our inquiry is not similarly constrained. See id., 391 n.6. In such cases, we are guided by
The issue in the present case involves the scope of the waiver provided in
We therefore consider extratextual sources. As this court previously has explained after examining the statute‘s legislative history, “§ 52-571b was enacted in response to the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, supra, 494 U.S. 885, in which the court held that a generally applicable prohibition against socially harmful conduct does not violate the free exercise clause, regardless of whether the law burdens religious exercise. . . . [T]he purpose of § 52-571b was to restore the balancing standard, articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner, [374 U.S. 398, 403, 83 S. Ct. 1790, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1963)], under which a law that burdens religious exercise must be justified by a compelling governmental interest.” (Citations omitted.) Cambodian Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 285 Conn. 381, 423–24, 941 A.2d 868 (2008). Smith and Sherbert, notably, both involved constitutional challenges to statutes. See id., 402–404 (discussing facts in both cases). Proponents of the bill ultimately enacted as
B
We next consider the defendants’ arguments as to why, regardless of
The text of
The question thus becomes whether
2d 407 (2003) (opinion announcing judgment); accord Lockhart v. United States, supra, 149 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Public Act 21-6 does not expressly conflict with
Although the law permits us to presume that the legislature was aware of the compelling interest standard in
Accordingly, nothing in the legislative history indicates that the legislature considered
The judgment is reversed in part and the case is remanded with direction to dismiss counts two through six of the complaint and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
Notes
The medical exemption also does not render
“[Representative Dale W. Radcliffe]: In introducing the bill Representative Tulisano referred to the [s]tate [c]onstitution, the [s]tate constitutional provisions. This is a statute. We‘re in effect adopting [the] compelling interest test as a statutory standard. . . . [G]iven the decision in Smith and the fact that no similar case has been decided under the [s]tate [c]onstitution, if this [l]egislature or a subsequent [l]egislature does desire, might we establish a rational basis test to replace this compelling interest test in [the] statute?
. . .
“[Representative Richard D. Tulisano]: . . . I believe we could. However . . . the [s]tate Supreme Court may very well say, could very well say, that despite what we did, that it is the compelling state interest test under [the Connecticut constitution] because our [c]onstitution in some people‘s [belief] . . . has greater protections than that given under the federal, and so [the court] could very well interpret our [c]onstitution to have always had that despite what we say, and we cannot minimize what has already been granted by the people of the [s]tate of Connecticut.” 36 H.R. Proc., Pt. 14, 1993 Sess., pp. 4940–41.
“And that is what we are asserting here. There is a compelling state interest here that demands regulation that we would be irresponsible not to undertake. Attorney General Tong‘s opinion was mentioned earlier, he just two years ago . . . asserted that repealing or suspending the religious exemption does not create any necessary conflict with [§ 52-571b] in the first instance and says that combatting the spread of dangerous infectious diseases, particularly among children who congregate in schools where the danger of the spread of such diseases is particularly high ground. That it is the state‘s paramount duty to seek to ensure [the] public safety has repeatedly been found to constitute a compelling state interest . . . .” 64 S. Proc., Pt. 1, 2021 Sess., p. 794.
Finally, contrary to the plaintiffs’ assertions,