The individual plaintiffs
The defendants appeal from the trial court's decision that they have violated article eighth, § 1, and the plaintiffs cross appeal from the trial court's rulings that they did not establish that the state has failed to provide minimally adequate educational opportunities to the children in any school district in the state and have not violated the plaintiffs' equal protection rights under the state constitution.
Thereafter, the Chief Justice granted the plaintiffs' application for certification to appeal to this court pursuant
Justices Norcott, Katz and Schaller concluded in a plurality opinion that the plaintiffs' claims were justiciable and, therefore, that this court had subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. See Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell , supra,
The plurality further concluded that "article eighth, § 1, entitles Connecticut public school students to an education suitable to give them the opportunity to be responsible citizens able to participate fully in democratic institutions, such as jury service and voting. A constitutionally adequate education also will leave Connecticut's students prepared to progress to institutions of higher education, or to attain productive employment and otherwise contribute to the state's economy. To satisfy this standard, the state, through the local school districts, must provide students with an objectively meaningful opportunity to receive the benefits of this constitutional right." (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
The plurality emphasized, however, that a public education system "need not operate perfectly" to be constitutionally adequate; (internal quotation marks omitted)
In his concurring opinion, Justice Palmer agreed with the plurality that the plaintiffs' claims were justiciable, although he did not entirely agree with the plurality's analysis of that issue.
Justice Palmer expressly rejected, however, the plurality's suggestion that it was appropriate "to craft the constitutional standard in broad terms." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
In addition, Justice Palmer disagreed with the plurality's decision to the extent that it could be interpreted to require the courts to examine educational outputs when determining the constitutional adequacy of the state's educational offerings.
Justice Palmer also repeatedly emphasized that "the legislature is entitled to considerable deference with respect to both its conception of the scope of the right and its implementation of the right";
Thus, a majority of this court-Justices Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Schaller-agreed that the trial court had improperly struck the plaintiffs' claims, although Justice Palmer did not agree with the qualitative component of the right to free public education under article eighth, § 1, as described in the plurality opinion. Accordingly, this court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings on the claim that the defendants had failed to provide the plaintiffs with a suitable public education.
Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint containing four counts, which is the operative pleading for purposes of this appeal.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the plaintiffs' claims were not ripe for adjudication in light of certain education reforms that the legislature enacted in 2012, that their claims were moot in light of these
Thereafter, the case was tried before the court, Moukawsher, J.
The court then observed that, since 2012, the state had funneled "over $400 million in new money" into the state's thirty lowest performing school districts. In addition, the state had provided $13 million in financial
The trial court then concluded, however, that, notwithstanding its conclusion that the state had satisfied
The defendants then filed this appeal, in which they renew their claims that the individual plaintiffs lack standing because they have failed to present evidence that any of them has been specifically injured by the defendants' acts or omissions and that the Coalition lacks associational standing to raise claims under article eighth, § 1, and article first, §§ 1 and 20. The defendants also claim that, after the trial court found that the state's schools met the Campaign I criteria adopted by Justice Palmer, that court improperly went on to apply a constitutional standard of its own devising. The defendants further contend that, even if the trial court properly adopted this new constitutional standard, it improperly applied it to conclude that the educational system is unconstitutional under article eighth, § 1. On cross appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the trial court improperly concluded that (1) the state's educational system meets the Campaign I criteria for determining the adequacy of the state's schools under article eighth, § 1, and (2) the state's educational system does not violate their equal protection rights under article first, §§ 1 and 20.
I
JURISDICTIONAL CLAIMS
We begin by addressing the defendants' jurisdictional claims that the individual plaintiffs lack standing because none of them has been specifically injured and that the Coalition lacks associational standing to raise its claims pursuant to article eighth, § 1, and article first, §§ 1 and 20. We disagree.
A
Standing of Individual Plaintiffs
It is well established that, "to have standing ... the plaintiffs necessarily
In the present case, the plaintiffs' complaint alleged that "[t]he state's failure to provide suitable education opportunities is evidenced by the fact that many plaintiffs attend schools that do not have the resources necessary to educate their high concentrations of poorly performing students" and that "[t]he state's failure to provide substantially equal educational opportunities is evidenced by the fact that, when compared to [other] students, a disparate number of the plaintiff students attend schools that do not have the resources necessary to educate their high concentrations of poorly performing students." If the plaintiffs had proved these allegations at trial, the trial court could have inferred a specific injury to the individual plaintiffs from the fact that they attended constitutionally inadequate schools. Although we conclude in parts III and IV of this opinion that the plaintiffs failed to prove any constitutional violation, the failure of a plaintiff to prove a colorable
B
Coalition's Associational Standing
We next address the defendants' claim that the Coalition lacked associational standing. This court has held that "[a]n association has standing to bring [an action] on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to [bring the action] in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the [action]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Assn. of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Worrell ,
First Prong of the Worrell Test
The defendants contend that the Coalition does not satisfy the first prong of the Worrell test for associational standing because the only individual members of the Coalition that would have personal standing to raise the claims set forth in the complaint are the members who are the parents of students attending public schools, and the parents "are not in fact 'members' in any real sense" because they lack voting rights in the Coalition.
The 2013 version of the Coalition's bylaws authorized a membership class specifically for parents. Parent members still did not have the right to vote,
The defendants contend that the parents were not true members of the Coalition because the 2005 version of the Coalition's bylaws "gave the power to initiate and pursue litigation to a board over which the parent members had no voice whatsoever" because they lacked voting rights. The defendants also contend that, despite the provisions of the 2013 bylaws allowing parent members to belong to the Coalition's steering committee and to have the same powers as other members "to initiate and pursue litigation, to hire experts and other staff, and to make spending decisions," these powers were illusory because the parent members still had no right to vote. Thus, the defendants claim, the parent
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission ,
We conclude that, contrary to the defendants' claim in the present case, Hunt does not stand for the proposition that the right to vote is an essential characteristic of membership in an association for purposes of establishing the first prong of the Worrell test. Although the court in Hunt observed that the apple growers and dealers elected the commission's members and financed its activities, the court did not say that those facts were necessary to establish associational standing if there was other evidence of representation and control. Rather, the court determined that the facts that
In any event, Hunt involved a plaintiff that was not a true voluntary membership
Nevertheless, even if some evidence of representation and control were required to establish membership, even for a true voluntary membership association, we conclude that the fact that two parent members of the Coalition serve on its steering committee provides sufficient evidence of their control, and the fact that the parent members have voluntarily joined the Coalition knowing that it has publicly advocated in favor of specific public school funding policies provides sufficient evidence that the Coalition represents their views. See Citizens Coal Council v. Matt Canestrale Contracting, Inc. , supra,
The defendants also claim, however, that, even if the parent members are now actual members of the Coalition for purposes of the first prong of the Worrell test, because the Coalition had no parent members when this action was initiated in 2005 the Coalition lacked standing at that time, and a subject matter jurisdictional defect that existed when the complaint was filed cannot be cured by a subsequent amendment. The
Thereafter, the plaintiffs sought leave to file a second amended complaint in order to cure the standing deficiency by including an allegation that the Coalition's parent
The defendants claim that Judge Dubay improperly denied their motion to dismiss the Coalition's claims because, at the time that the original complaint was
In Fairchild Heights Residents Assn., Inc. , the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had violated various provisions of General Statutes § 21-82 (a) governing, inter alia, a landlord's responsibilities in operating a mobile home park. See Fairchild Heights Residents Assn., Inc. v. Fairchild Heights, Inc. , supra,
In Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors v. Hartford , supra,
Thus, Fairchild Heights Residents Assn., Inc. v. Fairchild Heights, Inc. , supra,
2
Second Prong of the Worrell Test
The defendants also claim that the Coalition fails the second prong of the Worrell associational standing test, i.e., that "the interests [that the Coalition] seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose"; Connecticut Assn. of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Worrell , supra,
As noted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, courts "have not been uniform in their approach to the presence of conflicts of interest in an association seeking standing." Retired Chicago Police Assn. v. Chicago ,
The courts that have held that conflicts of interest among members of an association generally do not deprive the association of standing have relied on the decision of the United States Supreme Court in International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. Brock ,
Other courts, however, have recognized that there may be circumstances under which conflicts among the members would deprive an association of standing. For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that an association lacks associational standing when "conflicts of interest among members of [an] association require that the members must join the [action] individually in order to protect their own interests" by taking a position adverse to that taken by the association, and the association initiated the litigation without first informing its membership. Maryland Highways Contractors Assn., Inc. v. Maryland ,
With these principles in mind, we address the defendants' claim in the present case that the conflicts of interest among the Coalition's members deprive it of associational standing. Although the defendants' claim highlights the immense complexity of the state's educational system and the wide variety of interests that the state must consider when formulating educational policies-circumstances that certainly support the notion that courts have very limited institutional competence to craft educational remedies for the types of claims raised in the present case and, therefore, must be extremely cautious when inserting themselves into this area-we conclude that the conflicts of interests among the Coalition's members are not so profound as to deprive the Coalition of associational standing. There is no evidence that a majority of the Coalition's members disagrees with the Coalition's claim that the defendants have deprived students in the state's poorer school districts with a suitable and substantially equal educational opportunity in violation of article eighth, § 1, and article first, §§ 1 and 20; the Coalition's primary litigation goal is not directly at odds with the interests of part of its membership; no members objected to the Coalition initiating this action; no member of the Coalition has expressed the belief that the relief sought by the plaintiffs in this action would not be generally beneficial to the state's educational system; there is no evidence that any member has challenged or intends to challenge the Coalition's claims in this litigation in
3
Third Prong of the Worrell Test
The defendants next contend that the plaintiffs cannot satisfy the third prong of the Worrell test, i.e., that "neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the
We disagree that the plaintiffs have not satisfied the third prong of the Worrell test. Nothing in Justice Palmer's concurring opinion in Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell , supra,
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED AN IMPROPER CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD TO THE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS PURSUANT TO ARTICLE EIGHTH, § 1
We next address the defendants' claim that the trial court, after determining that plaintiffs did not establish that the state has failed to provide children in any school district in this state with a minimally adequate educational system under the Campaign I criteria, improperly applied a constitutional standard of its own devising to conclude that the defendants have violated the plaintiffs' rights under article eighth, § 1. The plaintiffs disagree and argue that, if we agree with the defendants' claim, the trial court's interpretation of the Campaign I criteria nonetheless was unduly narrow. We agree with the defendants and
A
We begin with the standard of review. The scope of the right guaranteed by article eighth, § 1, is a question of law subject to plenary review. See Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell , supra,
As we have previously explained herein, the trial court concluded after a trial that the Campaign I criteria for a minimally adequate system of free public
The defendants claim on appeal that, once the trial court concluded that the Campaign I criteria were met, that court should have concluded that the state's educational system does not violate article eighth, § 1, and it should not have gone on to consider whether the state
As we have indicated, under the Campaign I standard, the state must provide (1) "minimally adequate physical facilities and classrooms which provide enough light, space, heat, and air to permit children to learn," (2) "minimally adequate instrumentalities of learning such as desks, chairs, pencils, and reasonably current textbooks," (3) "minimally adequate teaching of reasonably up-to-date basic curricula such as reading, writing, mathematics, science, and social studies," and (4) "sufficient personnel adequately trained to teach
Justice Palmer never suggested, however, that, after determining that the specific instrumentalities, facilities, curricula and personnel that the state is required to provide in its elementary and secondary schools reasonably address the minimal educational needs of their students, the courts must nevertheless examine all of
Indeed, Justice Palmer expressly recognized that "courts are ill equipped to deal with issues of educational policy" and
Relatedly, requiring courts to determine, as an issue entirely distinct from the question of whether the state is providing minimally adequate schools under the narrow and specific Campaign I criteria, whether the state's educational policies and programs "are rationally, substantially and verifiably connected to teaching children" would be entirely inconsistent with Justice Palmer's rejection of the plurality's suggestion that it would be appropriate "to craft the constitutional standard 'in broad terms' [because] the broader the standard, the more vague it is likely to be. In addition, the broader the standard, the more difficult it will be for the parties and the court to understand and apply it." Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell , supra, at 342-43 n.17,
The plaintiffs contend that this conclusion cannot be reconciled with Justice Palmer's suggestion that an "education funding system [that] is 'arbitrary and inadequate,' and not related to the actual costs of providing an education that meets constitutional standards" would be unconstitutional.
B
The plaintiffs claim on cross appeal that, if we agree with the defendants' claim that the trial court improperly
The plaintiffs contend that the subsequent history of the Campaign I case shows that the court in Campaign I contemplated a far broader standard than the trial court applied in this case. The plaintiffs point out that, after the court in Campaign I remanded the case for application of the standard that it had adopted, the trial court conducted a searching and detailed examination of New York City's educational system and concluded that the Campaign I standard was not met. See
We are not persuaded. Rather, a review of the subsequent history of Campaign I shows why Justice Palmer's concurring opinion did not contemplate that the trial court would apply the broader standard that the New York trial court applied in Campaign II. The trial court in Campaign II considered on remand a broad range of factors that were not specifically mentioned in Campaign I. See footnote 28 of this opinion. The trial court also applied a comparative standard, repeatedly considering whether the educational instrumentalities, facilities, curricula and personnel provided by New York City schools were equivalent to those provided elsewhere in the state,
Moreover, the trial court in Campaign II was not persuaded by the state's contention that it was "required only to provide the opportunity for a sound basic education" and that "students' failure to seize this opportunity is a product of various socioeconomic deficits experienced by the large number of [at risk] students in New York City public schools." (Emphasis in original.) Campaign II, supra,
We see no evidence in Justice Palmer's concurring opinion in Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. , that he contemplated that the narrow and specific criteria that he had identified for determining whether the state is providing minimally adequate educational resources would be subject to modification on remand. To the contrary, he repeatedly emphasized that a broader standard was inappropriate, that the trial court should give great deference to the
The plaintiffs also contend that the standard applied by the trial court was too narrow because Justice Palmer recognized that the Campaign I criteria "must be evaluated in light of current educational standards, which continue to evolve." See Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell , supra,
The plaintiffs further rely on Justice Palmer's suggestion that their allegations that "many [students] attend schools that do not have the resources necessary to educate their high concentration of poorly performing students" and that "the state has failed to provide the resources necessary to intervene effectively on behalf of [at risk] students, that is, students who, because of [a] wide range of financial, familial, and social circumstances, [are] at greater risk of failing or experiencing other unwanted outcomes unless intervention occurs" were sufficient to withstand a motion to strike because, if proven, they might establish "a violation of the standard articulated in this opinion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
This interpretation simply cannot be squared, however, with Justice Palmer's unequivocal statement elsewhere in his opinion that schools "cannot be constitutionally required to overcome every serious social and personal disadvantage that students bring with them to school, and that seriously hinder [s] the academic achievement of those students." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
We are compelled to conclude, therefore, that when Justice Palmer determined that the plaintiffs' allegations were sufficient to withstand the defendants' motion to strike, he did not intend to suggest that the Campaign I criteria were merely one part of a broader constitutional inquiry that should include an analysis of whether the state's educational offerings are sufficient to overcome disadvantaging conditions outside of the state's control that affect educational outcomes.
Finally, to the extent that the plaintiffs contend that, even if the Campaign II standard does not apply, the trial court failed to apply the Campaign I criteria properly because it did not consider whether the state's educational offerings reasonably address the minimal educational needs of the state's children, we disagree. As we have explained, it is implicit in the Campaign I standard that the educational
These claims, however, simply cannot be reconciled with Justice Palmer's concurring opinion in Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell , supra,
With respect to the dissent's claim that the trial court failed to consider whether the state's educational offerings are "designed to address the basic educational needs of at risk learners in underprivileged communities," the dissent has failed to explain why the courts must make this determination when it agrees that they are barred from requiring the state either "to overcome
In any event, even if this were the proper standard, the trial court expressly found that there are numerous state and federal programs that are designed to provide needy students with "breakfast, lunch, and many times food to take home," even during the summer months when school is not in session, to provide parental education, to address the needs of homeless
The dissent also claims that the trial court stripped "rationality review" from its analysis pursuant to Campaign I. For the reasons that we have already explained, we disagree. We further disagree with the dissent's claim that "there is no indication that the court considered any of [the specific factual findings that the plaintiffs rely on] ...." We decline to presume that the trial court made 1060 specific factual findings, filling 157 single-spaced pages, only to then conclude that the findings were completely irrelevant to its legal analysis.
We also disagree with the dissent's contention that the trial court improperly applied the Campaign I criteria on a statewide basis instead of determining on a school by school or school district by school district basis whether the state's educational offerings are constitutionally adequate. As we have already explained at length, the trial court made copious factual findings regarding conditions in specific schools and school districts and expressly found that the state is meeting its
Finally, the dissent contends that, in applying the constitutional standard, the trial court was required "first [to determine] whether students have in fact been unable to obtain a minimally adequate education" and then to consider whether any poor educational outcomes that the court discovered were " 'the result of specific deficient educational inputs, or [have been] caused by factors not attributable to, or capable of remediation by, state action or omission ....' "
In short, the dissent has adopted a new constitutional standard that is far broader and vaguer than the Campaign I criteria that Justice Palmer adopted in his concurring opinion in Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. , which is controlling. This new constitutional standard is entirely inconsistent with Justice Palmer's conclusions that the criteria for determining whether the state's schools are minimally adequate must be narrow and specific, that the courts must defer to the educational policy choices of the political branches, that the state is not constitutionally
III
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT THEIR CLAIM THAT THE CAMPAIGN I CRITERIA WERE NOT SATISFIED
The plaintiffs next claim that the trial court improperly concluded that the state has not violated article eighth, § 1, by failing to provide educational resources that comply with the Campaign I criteria adopted by Justice Palmer in his concurring opinion in
The plaintiffs' claim involves a question of law subject to plenary review. See Right v. Breen ,
In support of the plaintiffs' claim that the trial court's factual findings cannot be reconciled with its conclusion that the state is providing the neediest schools with
With respect to the other factual findings relied on by the plaintiffs, such as the findings that there are low test scores in schools with large numbers of poor and needy students and the findings that the state has provided inadequate socioemotional and related support services, specialist teachers, interventionists and preschool opportunities to its poorer students, we conclude that, in contrast to the court's findings regarding the adequacy of teachers, class size, library books and textbooks, these findings do not relate to the narrow Campaign I criteria.
IV
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THEIR EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTION HAVE NOT BEEN VIOLATED
Finally, we address the plaintiffs' claim that, contrary to the trial court's determination, the evidence that they presented at trial compels the conclusion that the defendants have violated their rights under the state constitution's equal protection provisions, article first, §§ 1 and 20, by failing to provide a substantially equal educational opportunity to all of the state's schoolchildren.
The court concluded that this "tilt" in spending was "fatal to the plaintiffs' equal protection claim .... In [ Horton v. Meskill ,
The plaintiffs now claim that, in reaching this determination, the trial court failed to properly apply the three part standard that this court adopted in Horton II , supra,
Before addressing this claim, we address the defendants' claim that the trial court properly declined to apply the three part Horton II standard because the plaintiffs failed to establish that they are not receiving a minimally adequate educational opportunity under the Campaign I standard. See id., at 38,
We conclude, however, that we need not determine whether the plaintiffs have established a prima facie showing of more
The plaintiffs contend, however, that this court rejected the maintenance of local control of schools as a legitimate public policy that would justify disparities in education spending in Horton I , supra,
Under the third part of Horton II , the state must prove that the effect of the state's education funding system is "to narrow significantly disparities in the ability of local communities to finance local education and to increase significantly the state's share of overall educational costs for public schools." (Footnote omitted.) Id., at 40,
Although the plaintiffs have convincingly demonstrated that in this state there is a gap in educational achievement between the poorest and neediest students and their more fortunate peers, disparities in educational
The judgment is reversed with respect to the trial court's determination that the defendants are violating article eighth, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution and the case is remanded to that court with direction to render judgment for the defendants on that claim; the judgment is affirmed with respect to the trial court's determination that the defendants are providing a substantially equal educational opportunity under article first, §§ 1 and 20, of the Connecticut constitution.
In this opinion EVELEIGH, VERTEFEUILLE and ALVORD, Js., concurred.
PALMER, J., with whom ROBINSON and SHELDON, Js., Concurring and Dissenting.
"[A] sound education is the 'very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed
I
A
Before I explain the nature of my disagreements with the majority, I begin by noting the substantial overlap between my views and those of the majority. As an initial matter, I agree, for the reasons articulated in the majority opinion, that both the individual plaintiffs
Second, I agree with the majority that, when we consider whether the various Campaign I factors have been satisfied, we do not do so in a vacuum, divorced from the goals and purposes of a minimally adequate education. Instead, the state's compliance with its constitutional mandates must be evaluated in light of
Third, the majority properly emphasizes that judicial review of the state's education policies and spending priorities under article eighth, § 1, should be highly deferential, as such considerations are quintessentially legislative in nature. As I explained in Rell , "the plaintiffs will not be able to prevail on their claims unless they are able to establish that what the state has done to discharge its obligations under article eighth, § 1, is so lacking as to be unreasonable by any fair or objective standard." Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell , supra,
Fourth, the majority recognizes that the scope of my disagreement with the plurality in Rell was quite
Finally, as I discuss more fully in part II B of this opinion, I agree with the majority that the trial court exceeded its mandate and failed to apply the proper standard of review in the second half (parts 5 through 8) of its memorandum of decision, in which it scrutinized the rationality of the state's various educational policies, procedures, and spending priorities. In the remainder of this opinion, I explain in what respects I do not agree with the majority opinion.
B
Before I explain in what respects I think that both the trial court and the majority have gone astray, it will be helpful briefly to review the Campaign I test and to set forth with greater precision certain aspects of that test that could perhaps have been stated more directly in my concurrence in Rell. At the most basic level, Campaign I stands for the proposition that, to afford students the opportunity to obtain a minimally adequate education, the state must ensure the presence of certain core or essential components: "Children are entitled to minimally adequate physical facilities and
1
Although these four components are individually necessary to the provision of a minimally adequate education, neither my concurrence in Rell nor Campaign I itself suggested that they are jointly sufficient. As I observed in Rell , for example, "[i]t goes without saying that a safe and secure environment also is an essential element of a constitutionally adequate education." Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell , supra,
2
It also bears emphasizing that the provision of books, teachers, buildings, and the like is not an end in itself, but all to the purpose of giving students the opportunity to obtain a minimally adequate modern education. What constitutes a minimally adequate education is, within reasonable limits, to be left to the discretion of the legislature. See, e.g.,
3
It follows from these principles that the state, in designing an educational system and delivering educational services, must make at least some reasonable effort to account for the distinct learning challenges that confront many of our state's least fortunate children. Although it may be assumed that many if not most of the students in Connecticut's more affluent towns have had their basic needs satisfied and arrive at school ready to learn, the same cannot be said for children who have spent their entire lives in poverty. Residents of our poorest communities, even those hungry to learn, may have to overcome a host of obstacles before they are able to attend to fractions and Fitzgerald. These run the gamut from homelessness, malnutrition, and illness, to violence in the home and in the community, to the pervasive and pernicious effects of racism. Some students struggle to learn in a non-native tongue; others wrestle with undiagnosed disabilities, whether physical, academic, or emotional/psychological.
As I acknowledged in Rell , article eighth, § 1, is not a panacea for all of society's ills, and the state cannot be expected
The majority correctly notes that elementary and secondary schools are not the only source of support services, and that the state may choose to address the social, economic, and mental and physical health needs of underprivileged students through other state agencies, preschools, and other programs. See footnote 41 of the majority opinion. It is important to bear in mind, however, that article eighth, § 1, requires that the state , not the schools, provide students with the opportunity to obtain a minimally adequate education. If the plaintiffs
In order to understand how this constitutional standard applies in practice, it will be helpful to briefly review where and how the trial court went astray. Although it is not entirely clear, I understand the trial court to have taken the following path.
A
The court appears to have concluded that the Campaign I test that this court articulated in Rell involves two components, each of which is subject to a different standard of review. The first component is adequate funding. In the first half (parts 3 and 4) of its memorandum of decision, the trial court evaluated aggregate state funding of facilities, equipment, teachers, and curricula, and assessed whether those expenditures were constitutionally sufficient. The trial court reviewed the state's educational expenditures according to a highly deferential standard, as prescribed in my concurrence in Rell , proceeding according to the principle that "any constitutional standard the courts set for overall spending levels must be modest." The court evaluated whether overall state educational spending levels exceed the bare constitutional minimum, bearing in mind that, to find a violation, it had to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the resources that the state dedicates to education are "unreasonable by any fair or objective standard ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Assessing the trial evidence according to this standard, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that the state's aggregate educational expenditures are constitutionally insufficient.
The second portion of the trial court's analysis involved a more wide ranging review of the state's specific
B
In analyzing the plaintiffs' claims under article eighth, § 1, in this manner, the trial court failed to properly apply the Campaign I test in several respects. First, and most fundamentally, the court should not have treated educational funding and educational policy as distinct legal issues, subject to different legal standards. Rather, the proper approach was to evaluate whether the state's comprehensive system for delivering educational services-including financial and other resources, policies, and procedures-is rationally designed to ensure that each student will have the opportunity to obtain a minimally adequate education.
In this respect, I agree with the majority insofar as it holds that the trial court, having once concluded that the Campaign I test was satisfied, should not have
What the majority fails to recognize, however, is that the trial court improperly stripped out this rationality review from its Campaign I analysis and thus fundamentally
And yet there is no indication that the court considered any of these findings in parts 3 and 4 of its decision before it concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that the state does not provide minimally adequate facilities, instrumentalities, curricula, and personnel.
The court's analysis of the other Campaign I factors likewise suggests that the court was concerned only with whether the plaintiffs could establish systemic, statewide failures to provide minimally adequate educational opportunities. With regard to instrumentalities, the court reasoned: "[T]here is no proof of a statewide problem caused by the state sending school districts too little money.... There are certainly some hardships with computers and significant disparities in computer access, but against a minimal standard the plaintiffs have not proved ... that there is a systemic problem that should spark a constitutional crisis and an order to spend more on school supplies." (Emphasis added.) The court's analysis of the state's educational personnel was in the same vein: "No one suggests that teaching in Connecticut is broadly incompetent. The claim is that opportunities for good teaching are not being rationally marshaled in favor of needy kids. Judged against a low minimum and judged as a system , the plaintiffs have plainly not met their burden ...." (Emphasis added.) True, the court proceeded to consider whether the state dedicates enough resources to "needy schools," concluding that it does. Even
The trial court made other, different missteps in the second half of its decision. In that section of the analysis, the court properly considered the specific quality of education afforded to students in individual school districts such as Bridgeport, specifically, whether schools receive adequate financial support to hire and retain essential support staff, whether students are provided with adequate transportation, whether they are able to master basic literacy skills, and how they perform on standardized assessment tests and based on other measures of high school achievement.
But, here, the court applied a standard of review-requiring that the state's educational policies and priorities be reasonably, substantially, and verifiably related to teaching-that finds no support in Rell and that had the practical effect of shifting to the state the burden of proving that every aspect of its educational system complies with article eighth, § 1, by requiring that all of the state's "efforts" be "verifiable enough to be measured ...." Having adopted this novel standard of review, the trial court proceeded to identify various, purported irrationalities in the system that required the court to choose sides on philosophical questions that are hotly contested by educators and academics, some
So what should the trial court have done? It should have performed a single legal analysis, applying the Campaign I test, as articulated in my concurrence in Rell , to the specific educational failings that the plaintiffs allege exist in specific schools and school districts. It should have determined whether, in light of its factual
III
My disagreement with the majority over the controlling legal standard compels me to part ways with respect to the appropriate resolution of this appeal. The majority concludes that the trial court (1) applied the correct legal standard in parts 3 and 4 of its decision, and (2) properly determined that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that Connecticut's schools have delivered less than a minimally adequate education. For this reason, the majority would simply reverse the judgment of the trial court-because it exceeded its mandate in parts 5 through 8 of its decision-with direction to render judgment for the defendants.
The plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to an opportunity to prevail at a new trial under the Campaign I standard, as properly applied. They emphasize, and the majority acknowledges, that the trial court found, among other things, that (1) the Bridgeport public schools have been forced to cut key support personnel and even school bus service at the same time as some wealthier districts have received an influx of new state funds; see footnote 1 of the majority opinion; (2) other high needs schools have inadequate classroom facilities and shortages of experienced teachers, specialists, interventionists, and counselors, (3) large numbers of high needs students are not even approaching appropriate
I disagree. As I explained in part II B of this opinion, I believe that the trial court misapplied Campaign I in several respects. "We have often stated that a party is generally entitled to a new trial when, on appeal, a different legal standard is determined to be required, unless we conclude that, based on the evidence, a new trial would be pointless." McDermott v. State ,
A
I agree with the majority that the trial court's primary focus in evaluating whether the state has complied with its constitutional obligations should be on the adequacy of educational inputs, rather than on students' level of academic achievement. As I explained in Rell , "student achievement may be affected by [too] many factors outside the state's control" for the state to be able to guarantee academic outcomes. Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell , supra,
I have never suggested, however, that educational outcomes are uninformative or irrelevant to the constitutional analysis. See
More fundamentally, evaluation of educational outputs will, in many instances, be a fundamental and necessary starting point in evaluating claims brought under article eighth, § 1. This is because outcomes provide the clearest evidence of
In the present case, the trial court found that a number of the state's schools are "utterly failing" and that one third of high school students in poorer communities such as Bridgeport, Windham, and New Britain fail to reach even the most basic levels in math and reading. In the trial court's words, "[n]ot reaching the most basic level means they [do not] have even limited ability to read and respond to grade level material. There can be
With respect to economically disadvantaged students, the court found, among other things, that Connecticut's fourth and eighth grade students who qualify for free and reduced lunch services rank among the lowest in the nation on National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) math assessments. Between 80 and 90 percent of the state's poor students failed to reach the minimum standards for high school reading as assessed by Smarter Balanced Assessment Consortium (SBAC) tests. More than 70 percent of the impoverished students entering the state's higher education system lack basic literacy and numeracy skills.
The court also found that success rates for economically disadvantaged students vary dramatically between school districts, which suggests that differing academic outcomes may arise from differing inputs and educational strategies rather than any intractable barriers to learning created by poverty. On the 2015 SBAC mathematics test, for example, only 9.1 percent of Bridgeport students and 11 percent of New Britain students who qualified for free or reduced lunch performed at level 3 or above, whereas over 40 percent of students who qualified for free and reduced lunch reached that level in towns such as Darien, Ridgefield, and Weston. At the other end of the spectrum, approximately two thirds of students eligible for free and reduced lunch in Bridgeport and New Britain performed only at level 1, more than twice the rate as in Darien.
More generally, the trial court's findings highlight the dramatic differences in educational outcomes between
With respect to the secondary level, out of 1177 students attending Bridgeport's Bassick High School in 2013, only 6 percent even attempted to take an advanced placement (AP) exam, and, of those who did, only 3 students earned a qualifying score, which indicates an ability to complete college level work. By contrast, approximately one fourth of all students at Darien High School took AP exams and almost all earned qualifying scores. No more than 15 percent of high school graduates in Bridgeport, Hartford, New Haven, and Waterbury were deemed to be college and career ready. As judged by Preliminary Scholastic Aptitude Test (PSAT) scores, less than 2 percent of students in Bridgeport were on track to be college and career ready.
The court also made specific findings with respect to the academic success of students who are not native English speakers or are racial minorities. As of 2012-2013, for example, the school districts of Bridgeport, Danbury, East Hartford, Hartford, Meriden, New Britain, New Haven, New London, Norwalk, Norwich, Stamford and Waterbury all had failed to meet Annual Measurable Achievement Objectives (AMAO) performance
B
There is little dispute that educational inputs represent the most important consideration in assessing whether the state has satisfied its constitutional obligation to ensure that Connecticut residents have a reasonable opportunity to obtain a minimally adequate education. If students in each school have access to adequate facilities, equipment, teachers, and curricula, as well as other essentials such as transportation and security, then a presumption arises that they have been afforded this opportunity. By contrast, the failure to provide these basic essentials supports a conclusion that the state has failed to meet its obligations under article eighth, § 1.
In the present case, notwithstanding its conclusion that the four Campaign I factors have been satisfied and that the state
Schools in low income, high poverty districts already had significantly fewer counselors and academic support staff per student, despite demonstrably greater needs. Among the court's many specific findings in this regard: Bridgeport's Bassick High School has only 4 full-time guidance counselors for nearly 1200 students and New London has only 3 to serve over 900 students. Windham has only 4 full-time school psychologists serving a population of almost 3200 students; the student to psychologist ratio is far lower in more affluent towns such as Greenwich and Westport, even though those towns have a lower percentage of students with disabilities. Waltersville School in Bridgeport, which has a student population of approximately 600 ranging from prekindergarten to eighth grade, has only one literacy coach, one guidance counselor, and no social workers
Turning to East Hartford, the trial court found that economically disadvantaged school district has only one translator, who speaks Spanish, even though the district's students collectively speak 50 different languages; has 4 or 5 elementary schools that do not have a social worker; has only 1 social worker for 400 ninth grade students, which is insufficient to meet their varied socioemotional needs; has only 1 high school reading intervention teacher, which leaves many students who are far below grade level unable to access reading support services; and employs only 1 high school psychologist who, despite working 70 to 90 hours per week, is unable to meet the needs of the district's 1700 high school students.
Some of the court's findings in this respect were so dramatic that it is questionable whether the Campaign I factors are being satisfied even under the narrowest reading of that case. For example, there are no reading teachers or reading interventionists to provide necessary literacy interventions in Bridgeport's comprehensive high schools. During the 2015-2016 school year, New London High School
The court also found that, while there is widespread agreement that high quality preschool is perhaps the
Finally, with respect to transportation and facilities, the trial court found that Bridgeport no longer provides school bus service to the comprehensive high schools, forcing students to transfer between multiple public transit buses to get to school in the morning. Some Bridgeport schools also have unreliable boilers, and ceilings fell in one building. In light of these findings, the trial court's ultimate conclusion appears to be that our "constitution's promise of a free elementary school education" could be realized if additional resources were marshaled in support of "drastic interventions" for the most troubled school districts.
C
Finally, the trial court identified various policies and procedures that, in its view, the state could modify in order to improve educational outcomes for underprivileged students. Indeed, the court went so far as to conclude that "many of our most important [educational] policies are so befuddled or misdirected as to be irrational."
As I explained in part II B of this opinion, I agree with the majority that the trial court generally overstepped its authority in parts 5 through 8 of its decision.
That is not to say, however, that policy questions fall completely beyond the legitimate ambit of the court's authority to review alleged violations of article eighth, § 1, or that a violation of that provision might not result from policy choices rather than from inadequate resourcing. This idea is implicit in Campaign I , which requires that schools adopt modern, age appropriate educational curricula. The majority concedes as much when it recognizes that "if the plaintiffs had shown that the state was providing elementary school students with books and curricula only intended for advanced college students, a court could conclude that the state was not reasonably meeting the minimal educational needs of these students ...."
The majority fails, however, to follow this hypothetical to its logical conclusion. If the constitution is violated when schools do not provide students with
IV
The state's duty to act rationally in developing and implementing a system for affording all students the opportunity to receive a minimally adequate education is not a duty disconnected from reality but a duty that must be exercised with a clear-eyed view of its essential purpose and a commitment to dealing with those circumstances of modern life that tend to frustrate that purpose. It is not enough to seek success in some places, for some children. Our schools must carry on in the faith that all students can learn, and our state must aspire to no less. Although the ultimate measure of an adequate educational opportunity for purposes of article eighth, § 1, cannot be educational outputs, the educational system must be reasonably designed to achieve results in every district and neighborhood. Our state constitution simply will not allow us to leave our neediest children behind.
Because the plaintiffs were not afforded the opportunity to prove their case according to the correct legal standard, and because there is reason to believe that the trial court may have found one or more violations of Campaign I if that test had been applied properly, I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion that directs judgment for the defendants. Instead, I would remand the case for a new trial.
Notes
For example, the trial court found that, in Bridgeport, school "[a]dministrators, clerks, guidance counselors and technicians are being shed. Kindergarten and special education paraprofessionals are being let go. Some schools have no extras like music and athletics left to cut. The school year is to be shortened. Class sizes are increasing in many places to twenty-nine children per room-rooms where teachers might have a class with one third requiring special education, many of them speaking limited English, and almost all of them working considerably below grade level. Many of these children get their only meals at school. They don't have two parents at home. Sometimes, they have no homes at all. They bounce from place to place and from school to school as the system struggles to find some way to teach them.
"For almost all students, there will be no high school buses in Bridgeport. Children will get tokens for the public transit system and some youngsters will have to figure out how to switch multiple transit buses just to make it to school in the morning.... It's the same in other poor towns. Too little money is chasing too many needs."
Article eighth, § 1, of the constitution of Connecticut provides: "There shall always be free public elementary and secondary schools in the state. The general assembly shall implement this principle by appropriate legislation." Hereinafter, we refer to this provision as article eighth, § 1.
The individual plaintiffs who are participating in this appeal are Sherry Major and her daughter Nichole Major, who reside in Willimantic, Brenda Miller-Black and her daughters, Alison Black and Carolyn Black, who reside in Norwich, Walter and Janet Rivera and their daughter, Melody Rivera, who reside in New Britain, Lisette Velasquez, her son Ashariel Velasquez and her daughter Lyonece Velasquez, who reside in New Britain, Mary Gallucci and her sons, Pascal Phillips-Gallucci and Ellis Phillips-Gallucci, who reside in Willimantic, and Andrew Sklover and his daughters, Ryan Sklover and Marley Sklover, who reside in Stamford.
The defendants, who were named in their official capacities, are Governor M. Jodi Rell or her successor; State Board of Education members Betty J. Sternberg, Allan B. Taylor, Beverly R. Bobroske, Donald J. Coolican, Lynne S. Farrell, Janet M. Finneran, Theresa Hopkins-Staten, Patricia B. Luke and Timothy J. McDonald, or their successors; State Treasurer Denise L. Nappier or her successor; and State Comptroller Nancy S. Wyman or her successor.
Article first, § 1, of the constitution of Connecticut provides: "All men when they form a social compact, are equal in rights; and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." Hereinafter, we refer to this provision as article first, § 1.
Article first, § 20, of the constitution of Connecticut, as amended by articles five and twenty-one of the amendments, provides: "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his or her civil or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry, national origin, sex or physical or mental disability." Hereinafter, we refer to this provision as article first, § 20, of the Connecticut constitution, as amended by articles five and twenty-one of the amendments, as article first, § 20, and to article first, §§ 1 and 20, collectively, as the equal protection provisions.
The defendants filed an application for certification to appeal to this court from the judgment of the trial court pursuant to General Statutes § 52-265a, which the Chief Justice granted. The Chief Justice also granted the plaintiffs' request under § 52-265a that this court review issues decided adversely to them.
The court in Campaign I indicated that, in New York, the state legislature "has made prescriptions ... with reference to the minimum number of days of school attendance, required courses, textbooks, qualifications of teachers and of certain nonteaching personnel, pupil transportation, and other matters. If what is made available by this system (which is what is to be maintained and supported) may properly be said to constitute an education, the constitutional mandate is satisfied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Campaign I, supra,
In this regard, it is important to distinguish educational outputs, i.e., the actual level of student achievement, from the qualitative component of article eighth, § 1, i.e., the level of achievement that a student may attain if the student takes advantage of the educational opportunity that the state is offering.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Zarella, joined by Justice McLachlan, contended that the stricken claims presented a nonjusticiable political question, and, therefore, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell , supra,
Hereinafter, we refer to the plaintiffs' third amended complaint as the complaint.
The trial court's memorandum of decision did not contain an express ruling on the fourth count of the complaint, and the plaintiffs are not pursuing any claims on appeal to this court pursuant to
Hereinafter, all references to the trial court are to Judge Moukawsher, unless otherwise indicated.
The criteria articulated by the New York Court of Appeals in Campaign I, supra,
The trial court apparently merged the third and fourth Campaign I criteria. See footnote 13 of this opinion.
We recognize that, if the plaintiffs had established that a particular school district did not meet the Campaign I criteria, the trial court could have found a violation of article eighth, § 1, with respect to that school district, and the plaintiffs were not required to prove that the educational system, considered as a whole, was constitutionally inadequate in order to obtain relief. As we discuss more fully later in this opinion, however, the plaintiffs have pointed to no factual findings or evidence that, under the Campaign I criteria, would compel the conclusion that the state's educational offerings in any particular school district are not constitutionally adequate. See part III of this opinion.
This court granted the defendants' request to stay further proceedings pending this appeal.
After this appeal was filed, this court granted permission to the following amici curiae to file briefs: Advocates for Educational Choice; twelve individuals with severe disabilities who have filed in fictitious names; Education Law Center; Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities; National Disability Rights Network, Association of University Centers on Disabilities, Autistic Self Advocacy Network, Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, National Association of Councils on Developmental Disabilities, National Down Syndrome Congress, and the Connecticut Office of Protection and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities; and The Arc of the United States and The Arc of Connecticut.
The other members of the Coalition are various education advocacy organizations, community groups, municipalities, local boards of education and teachers' unions.
Voting members of the Coalition had the right to participate in the election or removal of members of the steering committee, proposed amendments to the Coalition's certification of incorporation or bylaws that would deprive the members of their right to vote in an election or would result in the removal of any member of the Coalition, and any proposed amendment to the Coalition's certificate of incorporation or bylaws pertaining to dues, assessments, fines or penalties to be levied or imposed upon members. In addition, each voting member had one vote on each matter submitted to a vote at a general membership meeting, except for the election or removal of members of the steering committee.
Practice Book § 9-3 provides in relevant part: "All persons having an interest in the subject of the action, and in obtaining the judgment demanded, may be joined as plaintiffs, except as otherwise expressly provided ...."
The defendants rely on the statement of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Disability Advocates, Inc. v. New York Coalition for Quality Assisted Living, Inc. , supra,
In addition, some courts have held that the existence of potential conflicts of interest implicates the second prong of the Worrell test; see Retired Chicago Police Assn. v. Chicago , supra,
As we have explained herein, the United States Supreme Court appears to have suggested that even if a member of an association would likely challenge the position taken by the association in court that would not necessarily defeat associational standing if other members agree with the association's position. See Brock , supra,
The Coalition's 2005 bylaws provide that the purposes of the Coalition are, inter alia, to "(a) engage in activities that promote the adequate funding of education in the [s]tate of Connecticut [and] (b) engage in activities that relieve the burdens of Connecticut municipalities in funding education ...."
The plaintiffs contend that the trial court improperly determined that, under the "narrowest grounds" of agreement approach set forth in State v. Ross , supra,
Justice Palmer did not expressly discuss in his concurring opinion in Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell , supra,
See various portions of Justice Palmer's concurring opinion in Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell , supra,
We address the merits of this equal protection claim in part IV of this opinion.
Specifically, the trial court considered measures of teacher quality, including the percentage of teachers who are certified, passage rates on certification examinations, years of experience, the ranking of the colleges that teachers attended, school spending on professional development and the adequacy of internal rating systems for teacher quality; see Campaign II,
"Title VI [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. (2012) ] provides [in relevant part]: 'No person in the United States Shall on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.' " Campaign I, supra,
See Campaign II, supra,
Of course, the state did not claim in Campaign II that it was "excused" from providing a sound, basic education to students with "socioeconomic deficits." Campaign II, supra,
Although disparities in achievement that are the result of disadvantaging conditions are generally uninformative on the question of whether the state is providing a minimally adequate educational opportunity, there are situations in which disparities in outcome might be informative. For example, if two school districts with similar demographic characteristics have wide disparities in educational outputs, that fact might inform a court's constitutional analysis because it reasonably might be inferred that the gap is the result of disparities in educational inputs, which are the proper subject of the court's constitutional analysis.
In his concurring and dissenting opinion in this case, Justice Palmer contends that it is clear, from his conclusion in Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. , that the plaintiffs' claims were legally cognizable, that he contemplated that Campaign I "requires not only that the state provide the essential components of a minimally adequate education, including facilities, instrumentalities, curricula, and personnel, but also that some reasonable effort be made to ensure that those modalities are designed to address the basic educational needs of at risk learners in underprivileged communities." As we explain more fully later in this opinion, it is clear to us that this is an expansion of the Campaign I criteria. We note, however, that Justice Palmer makes no claim that the trial court should have considered all of the factors that the court considered in Campaign II.
We note that the opinion by Justice Palmer in this case concurs with the majority in part and dissents in part. For purposes of simplicity, we refer to it as the dissenting opinion.
Thus, the dissent's contention that we have failed to recognize that "the rationality test is part and parcel of Campaign I " is incorrect. To the contrary, that is the very basis for our conclusion that the trial court properly considered the reasonableness of the state's educational offerings.
The dissent contends that this reasoning is "circular," and that we have improperly presumed that the trial court properly applied the Campaign I criteria. It is well established, however, that, "[a]bsent a record that demonstrates that the trial court's reasoning was in error, we presume that the trial court correctly analyzed the law and the facts in rendering its judgment." DiBella v. Widlitz ,
We conclude in part III of this opinion that the trial court's factual findings do not compel the conclusion that the state's educational offerings are constitutionally inadequate.
We do not disagree that the trial court found that many poor and needy schools are "utterly failing." Taken in context, however, it is clear that the trial court was not suggesting that the state is failing to meet its constitutional obligation. Specifically, immediately before making this observation, the court noted that the state's new academic standards governing what high school students must learn in order to graduate "can't do much good where they're needed most because they don't stop students from graduating when they fall miles below the standard." Thus, this finding related to educational outcomes , which are not the proper subject of a Campaign I analysis. The dissent also contends that the trial court improperly focused on the state's expenditures rather than the adequacy of its educational offerings. As we have explained, however, the court expressly found that the state is making these expenditures in order to provide specific resources for needy students.
We note that the dissent relies on a quote from the plurality opinion in Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. , not from Justice Palmer's concurring opinion, in which he expressly rejected the plurality's suggestion that the trial court could consider educational outcomes as part of its constitutional analysis. See Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell , supra,
The trial court did not specify the periods for which the East Hartford and Danbury budgets for, respectively, library books and textbooks were zero.
The plaintiffs also contend that the state is not providing minimally adequate access to modern technology in some schools. Even if we were to assume, however, that the adequacy of computer access must be considered under the Campaign I criteria; cf. Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell , supra,
The dissenting opinion contends that there "is no indication that the trial court even considered whether school security, transportation, and other essentials are minimally adequate before concluding that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a violation under Campaign I. " The plaintiffs make no claim on appeal, however, and point to no evidence that would support a finding that school security or transportation is so lacking in any particular school district that the district does not satisfy the constitutional standard. The only evidence in the record on this issue is the trial court's finding that some high school students in Bridgeport are required to take municipal buses to school at the government's expense. We conclude that, as a matter of law, this does not render the Bridgeport schools constitutionally inadequate.
We recognize, of course, that the lack of such support services makes it extremely difficult for many students in the state's neediest school districts to take advantage of the state's educational offerings. Schools, however, are not the exclusive source of these services. Rather, the Department of Social Services, the Department of Children and Families, the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services and other state agencies all play a role in providing such services to those in need. It simply is not the role of the courts to determine the extent to which such services must be provided by the schools rather than these other state agencies, as this would be a clear violation of the separation of powers.
We apply the same standard of review to this claim that we applied to the plaintiffs' claim pursuant to article eighth, § 1. See part III of this opinion.
The thirty Alliance District program school districts are Ansonia, Bloomfield, Bridgeport, Bristol, Danbury, Derby, East Hartford, East Haven, East Windsor, Hamden, Hartford, Killingly, Manchester, Meriden, Middletown, Naugatuck, New Britain, New Haven, New London, Norwalk, Norwich, Putnam, Stamford, Vernon, Waterbury, West Haven, Winchester, Windham, Windsor and Windsor Locks.
Although the trial court did not apply the three part Horton II standard when it concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to establish an equal protection violation under the state constitution, because the issue involves a question of law, we may apply that standard in the first instance, as the court did in Horton II. See Horton II , supra,
The specific claim that the plaintiffs raised in the Horton case was that "the present system of financing public education in Connecticut, principally embodied in [General Statutes §§] 10-240 and 10-241... insofar as the system purports to delegate to the town of Canton the duty of raising taxes to operate free public elementary and secondary schools and insofar as it purports to delegate to Canton the duty of operating and maintaining free public elementary and secondary schools violates the constitution of Connecticut, article first, §§ 1 and 20, and article eighth, § 1 ...." Horton I , supra,
We recognize that the statistical evidence that the court cited in Horton II did not expressly correlate these spending disparities among the towns to disparities in the wealth of the towns as reflected in their property tax bases. See
To the extent that the plaintiffs contend that the disparities in spending between schools with large numbers of poor and needy students and other schools is more than de minimis because the state's neediest students require significantly more funds than other students to achieve a substantially equal level of educational achievement , we are not persuaded. In support of this claim, the plaintiffs rely on the 2011 report of their expert witnesses, Bruce Baker and Robert Bifulco. Baker and Bifulco concluded that "the highest need districts require 50 [percent] to 100 [percent] more funding than the lowest need districts to provide equal educational opportunities." Baker and Bifulco incorrectly assumed, however, that the plurality opinion in Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell , supra,
We note, for example, that the evidence shows that, in 2013, the town that was ranked last out of 169 towns in per student expenditures, namely, Ellington, was ranked 114th in wealth as measured by "equalized net grand list per capita." Similarly, a number of towns that ranked very low in wealth ranked relatively high in student expenditures. For example, Hartford, Bridgeport, and New Haven, which ranked, respectively, 165th, 164th and 163rd out of 169 towns in wealth, ranked 19th, 114th and 31st, respectively, in per student spending. Although we draw no definitive conclusions from this evidence, it certainly does not seem to support the inference that per student expenditures are directly correlated to the number of poor and needy students in a town.
The defendants' expert witness, Michael Wolkoff, explained in his expert report that he limited his analysis to school districts with enrollments greater than 1000 because "[s]maller school districts have the potential to influence the results as they are most likely to have their per pupil expenditure totals elevated due to diseconomies of scale." He also indicated, however, that his "analyses for districts with enrollments greater than 1000 are very similar to those that [he] found using all districts ...."
Other evidence shows a similar discrepancy between per pupil spending in the neediest and the least needy decile of school districts as measured by the number of students receiving a free lunch.
Other evidence shows a similar discrepancy in the aid provided to the school districts with the largest percentage of needy students and school districts with the smallest percentage of such students, as measured by the percentage of students receiving a free lunch.
The trial court noted that in 2016, in the face of "a bone crushing fiscal crisis," the state cut education funds to fourteen of the neediest school districts by approximately $5.3 million at the same time that it increased funds to twenty-two comparatively wealthy school districts by approximately $5.2 million. Such anecdotal evidence, however, does not compel the conclusion that, contrary to the trial court's finding, there are systematic and ongoing disparities in the education funds that the state provides to needy districts as compared to wealthier districts, especially in light of the trial court's finding that, since 2012, the state had funneled "over $400 million in new money" into the state's thirty lowest performing schools. Indeed, we take judicial notice that, in 2017, the legislature adopted a budget that cut primary state grants to public schools by $30 million overall, but shielded the thirty Alliance Districts from any cuts. See J. Thomas, "Education Aid: Here's What is in the Bipartisan [Connecticut] Budget Plan," The Connecticut Mirror, October 25, 2017, available at https://ctmirror.org/2017/10/25/education-aid-heres-what-is-in-the-bipartisan-ct-budget-plan, last visited January 17, 2018.
See footnote 3 of the majority opinion.
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State ,
See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State , supra,
Because the question is not before us, I express no opinion as to whether and under what circumstances article eighth, § 1, might be offended solely on the basis of evidence that an individual student has been denied minimally adequate educational opportunities.
See, e.g., Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell , supra,
I wrote separately in Rell primarily (1) to emphasize the special and considerable deference that is owed to the legislature in these matters; see, e.g., Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell , supra,
The majority contends that the standard that I articulate in this opinion goes beyond and is broader than the one that I articulated in Rell. For the reasons set forth herein, that is incorrect. In any event, as I explain in part II of this opinion, the trial court failed to properly apply the Campaign I test under even the narrowest fair reading of that standard.
I wish to recognize, and to emphasize, that the trial court had before it a Herculean task. It was charged with divining a governing legal standard from the area of overlap between two less than crystal clear opinions in Rell and then applying that standard, with virtually no guiding precedent, to an enormous and complex factual record covering a field-education-that accounts for a significant share of all public expenditures.
There also is no indication that the trial court even considered whether school security, transportation, and other essentials are minimally adequate before concluding that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a violation under Campaign I.
The trial court appears to have read my concurrence in Rell to mean that Campaign I was concerned principally with questions of financial resources. The court stated, for example, that "Justice Palmer appeared to view [Campaign I ] as enough to consider about resources ...." (Emphasis added.) The court also referenced my concurrence in support of its conclusion that, "[b]eyond a bare minimum, the judiciary is constitutionally unfit to set the total amount of money the state has to spend on schools." I do not believe, and I do not understand the majority to believe, that my concurrence in Rell supports such an interpretation.
The majority contends that we must assume that the trial court considered all of its 1060 specific factual findings in conducting the Campaign I analysis in parts 3 and 4 of its decision, and that it is implicit in the trial court's factual findings that this reasonableness standard was met. This reading of the trial court's decision, however, is demonstrably wrong. It defies logic to think that the trial court, which waited to expressly evaluate these findings and described the state's educational failings at great length in the second half of its decision, already had considered all of them sub silentio in the context of its Campaign I analysis but concluded that not even one of its hundreds of troubling findings regarding deficiencies in the schools warranted mention or discussion therein. That would be a truly bizarre way to craft a judicial decision, and there is simply no indication that the court did so. Rather, it is readily apparent that the court misread Rell and felt constrained not to consider in the context of Campaign I either its conclusion that many of Connecticut's schools are "utterly failing" or the myriad factual findings that supported that conclusion. If there were any doubt as to whether the court factored its findings into its Campaign I analysis, then this court should order an articulation. See Practice Book § 60-5.
For the same reason, the majority's reliance on the assumption that the court found that "the state's educational offerings, even in the poorest school districts, are sufficient to enable students who take advantage of them to become functional members of society" is misplaced. There is no indication whatsoever in the trial court's memorandum of decision that the trial court ever made such a finding, and the majority is unable to point to any language to support its reading of the court's decision.
The court also noted that facility issues in the town of Windham and the city of New London were "already on the state's list to be fixed and fixed mostly with state money." It is unclear how this observation factored into the court's Campaign I analysis.
That the court considered educational adequacy only from an aggregate standpoint in the first half of its decision becomes clear in the second half, when the court turns its attention to the problems facing individual school districts, explains the "flaw of averages," and concludes that the state is not allocating sufficient funds to its poorer cities. The court states, for example, that "[t]he children in most Connecticut towns do well on tests and some do extremely well, pulling up the average to impressive heights. But viewed individually, the state of education in some towns is alarming." The court ultimately concluded: "But if the egregious gaps between rich and poor school districts in this state don't require more overall state spending, they at least cry out for coherently calibrated state spending."
The court concluded, for example, that a different method of evaluating and compensating teachers would be preferable, social promotion should be curtailed, and fewer resources should be spent educating severely disabled children. These are matters over which administrators reasonably may disagree with teachers, parents with students, and legislators with taxpayers. The irrationality of one position or the other would have to be far more conspicuous for a court to be justified in resolving the debate by judicial fiat.
The majority relies in this respect on the circular argument that, because the Campaign I test encompasses certain considerations, and because the trial court purported to apply Campaign I , the court must have taken those considerations into account and found them to be satisfied. The obvious flaw in this reasoning is that, if the court misunderstood and misapplied Campaign I , as I have demonstrated in part II B of this opinion, then there is no reason to assume consequences that would flow from the court's proper application of the test.
What follows should not be taken either as a determination that the plaintiffs have established a constitutional violation or as a comprehensive canvass of the constitutionally relevant evidence that was presented at trial. My purpose is merely to identify examples of some of the types of evidence the plaintiffs have presented that the trial court, serving as the finder of fact, would need to consider under the proper legal standard.
For example, "[a] town may not [merely] herd children in an open field to hear lectures by illiterates." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell , supra,
The term "white students," as used in this opinion, refers to non-Hispanic, white students.